Anselm · 安瑟伦
On the Fall of the Devil · 论魔鬼的堕落
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论魔鬼的堕落——散记
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对安瑟尔谟「论魔鬼的堕落」一文论证的梳理
1.上帝是至善,也是至在。
2.世界在上帝的创造中被“无中生有”。
3.没有上帝的保持,存在者回归于无。
4.上帝给予造物与自身之善相似的自由,即不进入无、恶与罪的自由。但存在者并非上帝,其善与自由因此不是绝对的。
5.相对的自由就是选择作恶与不作恶的自由。
6.因此,魔鬼的堕落并不是由上帝的意志导致的,而是在上帝的允许下,由自己的意志导致的。
7.上帝给予了自由,但魔鬼没有接受上帝的给予;而非因为上帝没有给予自由,所以魔鬼没有接受自由。
8.我们不知道为什么上帝允许魔鬼的堕落,但这个堕落是对意志的使用,意志的存在本身是善的,因此在上帝的角度,恶是被祂所允许去存在的无和不存在,也就是恶在根源上也是善的。
9.但这不意味着恶就是善。相反的,恶只在上帝的秩序的管制中(也就是在根源处)成为善。这意味着恶的善来自于其本体确实为恶并因此受到正义的惩戒。
10.因此尽管上帝允许了魔鬼的堕落,这不意味着魔鬼是无辜的,也不意味着上帝是恶的,或上帝导致了恶。
11.如果魔鬼只是能够意志,它将永远无法意志,因为要将潜能转化为现实,这一转化本身就是意志的结果。意志因此永远是先在的。
12.这充分证明了魔鬼的意志来自于上帝的给予,因此在根源上是善的。
13.这个意志因此不能有恶的内容。恶是这个意志的后果,而非这个意志的根源。
14.魔鬼被给予的因此是求善的意志。求善的意志可以划分成两类,一类是求幸福的意志,一类是求正义的意志。
15.如果只有任意一者,魔鬼的意志将不能说是恶的,因为它只意志着必然的事物。
16.因此,魔鬼的意志之恶果,来自于求幸福的意志与求正义的意志的冲突。
17.魔鬼求至善,其求幸福的意志超出了其求正义的意志。魔鬼的罪在于它意愿获得与上帝同样的幸福,这是傲慢;无力获得与上帝同样的幸福时,便转向更唾手可得的目标,这是懒惰。
18.与魔鬼对比,天使的求正义的意志大过了求幸福的意志。因此,它首先不求比它现在拥有的更多的幸福,其次它不曾转向其它超出正义允许范围的快乐和幸福。
19.但是,如果魔鬼事先知道自己这样做是会带来惩罚的,那它就不会这样做。因为这与求幸福的意志矛盾。尽管魔鬼必然知道自己的意志是不正义的,因为它同时有着正义的意志。但它存有侥幸心理,认为上帝不会用人取代天使,或上帝不会舍得让祂最完美的造物堕落。
20.相对的,天使也并不事先知道自己这样做是有回报的,因为它必须只因为正义本身而选择正义。
21.尽管魔鬼堕落了,但它依然保有正义的痕迹。因为它已经被给予了正义,而它堕落后的不正义是依赖于正义的对之前正义的否定。
22.而“不正义会受惩罚”的道德知识就是对天使的回报,因为现在天使凭借这一条知识将再不可能犯罪。罪的不可能性就是绝对自由。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
Sorting Out the Argument of Anselm’s On the Fall of the Devil
1. God is the highest good and the highest being.
2. The world is “created from nothing” through God’s creation.
3. Without God’s preservation, beings return to nothing.
4. God gives creatures a freedom resembling his own goodness: freedom not to enter nothingness, evil, and sin. But beings are not God, so their goodness and freedom are not absolute.
5. Relative freedom is freedom to choose to do evil or not to do evil.
6. The devil’s fall is therefore caused not by God’s will, but by its own will under God’s permission.
7. God gives freedom, but the devil does not accept God’s gift. It is not that the devil fails to receive freedom because God has not given it.
8. We do not know why God permits the devil’s fall. But this fall is an exercise of will, and the existence of will is itself good. From God’s perspective, therefore, evil is the nothingness and nonexistence he permits to exist. Evil is thus also good at its root.
9. This does not mean that evil is good. On the contrary, evil becomes good only under the governance of God’s order, at its root. This means that evil’s goodness comes from its substance genuinely being evil and consequently receiving just punishment.
10. Although God permits the devil’s fall, this does not mean the devil is innocent, God is evil, or God causes evil.
11. If the devil were merely capable of willing, it could never will. To transform potentiality into actuality, the transformation itself must already be a result of will. Will therefore always precedes.
12. This sufficiently proves that the devil’s will comes from God’s gift and is therefore good at its root.
13. This will therefore cannot have evil content. Evil is a consequence of this will, not its origin.
14. What the devil receives is therefore a will for the good. This will can be divided into two kinds: the will for happiness and the will for justice.
15. If it had either one alone, the devil’s will could not be called evil, because it would will only what is necessary.
16. The evil result of the devil’s will therefore arises from conflict between the will for happiness and the will for justice.
17. The devil seeks the highest good; its will for happiness exceeds its will for justice. Its sin lies in willing to obtain the same happiness as God: this is pride. Unable to obtain God’s happiness, it turns toward more readily attainable goals: this is sloth.
18. In contrast to the devil, the angel’s will for justice exceeds its will for happiness. It therefore, first, does not seek more happiness than it currently possesses, and second, never turns toward other pleasures and forms of happiness beyond what justice permits.
19. Yet if the devil knew in advance that acting this way would bring punishment, it would not do so, because this would contradict its will for happiness. The devil must know its willing is unjust, since it also possesses a will for justice. But it hopes to get lucky, thinking that God will not replace angels with human beings, or will not bear to let his most perfect creation fall.
20. Correspondingly, the angel does not know in advance that its action will be rewarded, because it must choose justice solely for justice itself.
21. Although the devil has fallen, it retains traces of justice. It has already been given justice, and its injustice after the fall is a negation of its former justice that depends on justice.
22. The moral knowledge that “injustice will be punished” is the angel’s reward, because with this knowledge the angel can no longer sin. The impossibility of sin is absolute freedom.