Gui Ruiyan

Sophocles · 索福克勒斯
Antigone · 安提戈涅

Human Nature in Antigone’s Second Choral Ode

Paper / 论文 · Date from document metadata / 日期据原稿文件信息 · Editorial title / 本版编拟标题

What this paper aims at is to lay out an interpretation of the second choral ode in Antigone in light of a general thesis. The thesis runs as follows: the second choral ode can be interpreted as a commentary on human nature. This thesis is posited in contrast to other possible interpretations that construe the form of this ode as either a lament or a praise, or construe the content of this ode as a depiction of a historic progression, though in no way do I reject such possibilities. I will first address the question of content.

The start of this ode seems to me to pose explicitly the question of human nature. “Uncanny things are many, but none moves (or is) more uncanny than man”(332). As a general claim, the beginning seems to pin down the “uncanny” as the most prominent feature of men. In other words, what ensue in this ode as depictions of human behaviors or actions suggest themselves to be merely expressions of a “fixed” nature, and can only be construed through it. What I mean is, instead of a sequence of historical events or actions that follow upon one another, or a set collection of sporadic human pursuits, the actions that later are ascribed to humans are gathered under one heading, that of the “uncanny”. This would undermine the tendency which attempts to interpret the end of this ode with the emergence of the city as exclusively speaking to the pinnacle of the ongoing historical progression of humanity, for city-building and city-dwelling seem to be no more than the newest expression of the uncanny human nature, which itself is or moves the same way for all time.

Indeed, I am against the teleological viewpoint that sees in the city a completion of the human task. For first, how do we understand the political life? Being the politician in this tragedy, arguably the statesman par excellence, Kreon understands the city through metaphors that stem exactly from those “primitive human endeavors” the ode describes, i.e. sailing in seas and yoking cattle. This interpenetration in his mind of activities that seem to belong to different categories might be his virtue or his weakness, yet either way it implies a fundamental continuity, as he understands it, between the early exertions and latest inventions that belong to humanity.

Certainly, the city brings to blossom some latest developments that are unprecedented. For instance, with the emergence of a city, a reversal seems to be effected: the “daring” which seems to be at work in all earlier pursuits are now rejected as “citiless”(370). Yet one has to be careful to remark here that the “daring” has a qualification, namely, the daring is that which “makes him keep company with what is not fine”(372). Do we see here a general statement or a particular one? Are all kinds of daring not fine or only some specific species? Either way, we do witness here a variation: before, human beings can carry out their endeavors whilst the “partner” or “antagonist” in those actions remain indifferent, e.g. the yoked or caught animals, the untiring earth, the inescapable death. But now such indifference is fazed, so that “may such a person never share my hearth”(373), as the chorus claims.

Yet, is this variation a significant one? That is, is this variation so poignant that it breaks from the genus those earlier pursuits describe? It seems that this variation on the note of enmity is heavily restricted in its strength. For the “hearth” only marks out the private sphere, and the expression (an optative wish) used by the chorus stresses, if anything, a weakness more than a fortitude. It looks as if, hence, the possibility of a citiless person inside a city is not inconceivable by imagination, but its prevention is inconceivable by political reckoning. In other words, the public sphere of the city, the stage on which the political is most properly performed, seems to lack the mechanism to deal effectively with the citiless. This seems to be the inherent paradox that is laid at the very foundation of a city, that now men are no longer dealing with tribes and clans and broods of animals, but with themselves, the most uncanny creatures, and in carrying this out they are thus struck resourceless.

How does this not echo the former futilities in their dealings with nature? Human endeavors are futile, in the sense that none can be essentially and eternally good. As human beings lead away animals through traps and contraptions, so are they themselves led away by other humans. As they wear away the indestructible earth, so are they themselves buried and worn away in earth. As they eat birds, so are their corpses eaten by birds. As they yoke oxen, so are they yoked as oxen. The city is not built as the completion of a long stretch of triumphant advance, but a base where all prior tensions and contradictions are sedimented. With every ever newest invention, man still “comes to evil sometimes, sometimes to good”(366).

Are we supposed to understand the city as one among many invented products of the human spirit? It seems suspect to me that the chorus here is talking about invention, as we might understand it, at all. What I mean is, it is familiar to us to describe those human creations and various endeavors as part of “technological advancement”, yet this seems not the way they are pictured by the chorus.

It is true that many things described here by the chorus are invented by the human genius, yet the presentation of these invented products seems to be more situated in their environing nature than detached from man’s practical dealings with the world. The poetic language used here fundamentally connects man’s inventions to their interactions with nature, so that medicine deals with diseases, yokes and nets deal with animals, and plows deal with earth. In other words, even if what is sketched here as man’s practical life within nature is coextensive to what we would call “technological advancement”, this ode only reveals the very naturalness behind the facade of any artificiality the technological advancement might entail. What is considered exceptionally human, hence exceptionally artificial, still remains attached to nature, belongs essentially to nature, and is precisely the nature of man. In a way, one can say that behind the apparent opposition posited between the conquering man and the to be conquered nature, the tragic poet discerns the true nature of this opposition: instead of an opposition between man and nature as two separate entities, what is at work here is rather an opposition between two natures, an opposition between nature and herself.

Man is a microcosm that mirrors this higher abyss that is located inside nature, as he takes on the uncanny of all things and intensifies it. The ultimate expression of this abyss is man’s futility. Yet this futility cuts deeper into human existence than is normally expected: it is not so much that “technological advancement” is futile, but that even to reject or despise it is also futile. This ode, it appears to me, is neither a praise nor a condemnation on human endeavors. Rather, it analyzes and describes human nature as it inevitably is. Quite contrary to that of an interested party, the chorus seems more like a bystander whose curiosity is intrigued by an awe-inspiring phenomenon, i.e. the uncanny human being.

Wherein lies this intrigue? The word “uncanny” appears right before the ode, when the guard says, in response to Kreon’s accusation, that “how uncanny to believe when your beliefs are false!”(323) and an earlier appearance is marked when the guard reports to Kreon that “great hesitation is induced by uncanny things”(243). Hence, it seems that the uncanny has already been noticed before the ode starts. Is the chorus condemning the uncanny? Yet they claim that “uncanny” deed to possibly be “prompted by the gods”. Then are they praising it? Yet they seem to have great reservations to Kreon’s “uncanny” accusation when they suggest that the deed might not stem from someone’s greed. Thus it seems to me more likely that this ode is neither a praise nor a condemnation, and the word choice of “uncanny”, which can have a variety of connotations, positive or negative, strongly suggests an ambiguity to be preserved.

In a way, one can say that the uncanny is the tragic itself. For the tragic consciousness, life is composed of irremediable sufferings. Kreon sees the fundamental root of evil to come from “money”(295), as if the physical object of metal bears the bane and stirs up the city from the outside. Yet he fails to see how the failing of a city lies not so much in a thing, nor even in its policy, but in its very foundation in familial units, right by its own hearth. And against this fundamental tragedy, the city is essentially resourceless and powerless: for how can it go against itself without destroying itself by its very own hands? The city, on a larger scale, only reflects the same happenings that befall the family of Oedipus and its individual members: an inevitable self-destruction.

So far, we have established how the uncanny is this inevitable self-driven destruction, or what is the other side of the same coin, the futile striving and perpetual unrest. Yet this in itself is neither an optimistic nor a bleak image, for the implication is, what destroys destroys itself, so that by a self-driving destiny, one might be led down into her cave of death and sees there her bride chamber, where life abounds.