Aristotle · 亚里士多德
De Anima · 论灵魂
Undated 未注日期
De Anima — Reading notes
Reflections · Apple Notes
Revised 8 January 2024
1
402a 1
Precision and the things studied are two criteria for the study itself: the study of the soul is then primary. Soul is crucial for understanding nature.
403a 1
Without the properties the what something is is empty.
403a 10
Imagination is tied to the body.
403a 30
Soul has materiality: but it can be separate in account with logicians and people who study nature.
403b 10
Some people concern with the attributes of materials; craftsmen with work done by and done to material; mathematicians with inseparable things about the body that are abstracted from any particular body; first philosophers with things separated.
412a 10
Entelechy in the sense of knowledge and in the sense of the act of contemplating.
412a 20
It is necessary that the soul has its thinghood as the form of a natural body having life as a potency.
412b 1
Because the soul can sleep the soul is entelechy in the sense of knowledge.
412b 20
Analogy.
413a 10
Another kind of being-at-work: like the sailor to the boat.
413a 10
What is clear and knowable by reason arises out of what is unclear but more obvious.
413a 30
Some capacities can be separate from each other, but if parts of the soul can be is a question.
414a 10
Why is the soul said to be the means not as knowledge is a means but as what is receptive, yet again says the soul is a form acting upon body: so can the form and the material be layered?
414a 30
Potencies of the soul: the soul has potencies since the soul can be and not be doing its work; while potency of the body is the body can and can not conform to the soul.
414b 1
Why is perception always accompanied by pleasure and pain, couldn’t there be disinterested perceptions? Or, wouldn’t nutritive capacity be more appropriate for desire? Perhaps the nutritive part is transformed into appetite as food becomes qualified.
414b 20
The account of the soul is like that of geometrical figures: what gives this account an unusual precision than his other writings?
414b 30
Some common thing or general thing is present in the particular thing in its potency, so that this kind of common thing can be applicable to other kinds. But some common thing is not particular and cannot be applied to the particular.
415a 20
In account actions come before potencies.
415b 1
All things yearn for eternity and divine: how is it different from desire?
416a 10
Soul then is the cause both for growing and not growing: it’s a limit that the growing part should be kept as growing.
416a 20
Some contraries feed on other contraries if 1.the former comes from the latter and 2.the amount of growth is not incidental.
416b 10
Food is contrary if it’s undigested but like if it’s digested. Food is that which not just produces growth but also preserves: so the amount of growth produced by food is not incidental. So nutrition and begetting are twofold for the begetting of one like oneself.
417a 1
Sensory organs do not sense themselves, but only perceive things outside.
417a 10
Perception requires something outside because it’s a potency that needs be triggered.
417a 20
Being acted upon is treated as being at work, for it’s an incomplete kind of being at work. There is always potency involved.
417b 1
Two senses of potency: 1.not have knowledge but is able to acquire; 2.have knowledge and is able to contemplate it. The crucial difference then is if the state of being-at-work is ready at hand.
417b 10
Alteration can be in this sense: what is in potency is altered to be at-work-staying-itself, so that the being is preserved. Then the term “being acted upon” is ambiguous, for it’s uncertain if it means something changed into its nature, or it means something starts to acquire or develop the potency.
418a 20
The incidental is not at work and is not acting upon the senses.
418a 30
What is visible is the color of the chair and not the chair itself: it’s because there might be something like a transparent chair. In other words, though color is only accidental to the thing, if the thing is visible at all it has to be the thing itself that is colored, and color is present in the thing, and not some outside cause independent from the thing. So in this sense color applies to things not merely due to their definitions but because the causes are present in them. But color depends upon what is actively transparent, namely light.
418b 10
Light is the work of the transparent as the transparent, acted upon by fire.
418b 30
The colorless: the blind? the invisible? the transparent?
419a 20
Color is the first cause of sight: but (transparent) things in between are required in order to be acted upon and transmit visibility.
423a 1
If there were a membrane wrapping around the flesh the sense of touch still seems immediate, and if the membrane were to grow into flesh the perception would travel even faster, even when there’s no sense organ, so it makes no indication of where the sensory organ is. But people imagine there’s this one medium, this one membrane for touch, and it is possible because even though flesh has a multiplicity of feelings, it does have some homogeneity as a mixture of elements. Whereas for other senses it can be denied that they share one medium for they have different motions.
423b 20
Touch is perceived to have the medium being acted upon simultaneously with the thing acted upon.
424a 10
Every sense is kind of a mean that partakes of both potencies; and it has the potency for both the perceptible and the imperceptible. Imperceptible things are things either too minute or too destructive.
424a 20
Sense perception is receptive of the forms. And what it receives is the attributes the thing has, not what the thing is.
424a 30
The ratio, which is the sense, of the sense organ is done away with because the sense organ has a size, and its potency, though does not have a size, is however related to it(thus a magnitude).
424b 1
Plants have no perceptions because their material absorbs and their soul has no mean ratio.
424b 10
If perceptibles do not act on bodies, how are bodies altered by those attributes? Are those things acted upon indeterminate? And how does the thing acted upon itself transformed into a perceptible by perception?
2
425a 10
With regard to the things, there are only so many kinds; they either come through air alone or through water alone or through both air and water, so that the sense organs can only be made of air, water or a mixture of both. So as the material for organs are this many, the things coming through are this many, the senses can only be this many, and every animal has them.
425a 20
The common attributes do not themselves have a corresponding sense organ, for otherwise they would be perceived incidentally; yet they are perceived necessarily as the common thing for any perception, not incidentally.
425b 1
The common attributes are differentiated because they accompany every particular sense, yet do not belong to any. If the common were a particular, the underlying thing itself would become incidental (for senses perceive the incidental), which is not possible.
425b 20
How to perceive that one is perceiving? It cannot be another sense or it will go to infinity, it cannot be itself or the perception itself will be a color or have a color. It can only be that seeing is of different sorts; so it can discriminate dark and light, it can also in a way make the seeing thing colored (as the color is without material). But in what way? Only in the sense that color becomes the same thing as that which sees the color.
425b 30
The being at work of the sensing and the sensed are the same, though their beings differ.
426a 10
The being acted upon and the action are both in the thing being acted upon.
426b 10
Yet it’s said how only excesses can be perceived. But it’s resolved by the unlike and like argument.
426b 20
There needs to be one perception that differentiates all senses and perceptible things. This is a potency to perceive perceptions differentially. To see that one is seeing is a potency that only intensively relates to seeing as a pre-reflexive activity.
426b 30
Time is not incidental: it’s now that they’re different, not they’re different by now. So that it’s an indivisible act in an indivisible time; two things are differentiated simultaneously, thus discrete. Yet it is divided into two parts; so is the act indivisible in number but divisible in being?
427a 10
A thing is divided when being put to work, even if it’s undivided in being; so in being it’s one with potency, but when being put to work it’s divided into which is opposite potency. So even to say a thing is one in number but not one in being seems not right, for the work and the potency are one in being.
427a 20
Thinking and understanding seem to be sort of perceiving for they too discriminate. Yet this leaves out the fact that mistakes happen.
427b 10
The same mistake has to concern both recognition by like and unlike. To think things through falsely is only present in animals with speech.
427b 20
Perception-imagination-conception. Only conception has capacity for both truth and falsity, whereas perception is always true.
427b 30
It seems that thinking consists of imagination and conception.
428b 1
Imagination cannot be composed of opinion and perception, for it’s neither opinion nor perception. If it were composed of both, the component opinion would have to be of what is not incidentally related to the perceived. But even in this case there will be opinion disagreeing with appearance. When the opinion that relates essentially to the perceived is true but the appearance is false, the imagination is true and false at the same time, which is impossible. So opinion and perception have to be true in their own sense, and cannot be combined.
428b 20
Perception is always true with its proper object, but the things incidental to it are prone to be mistaken.
429a 10
The thinking has to be receptive and formless in potency.
429a 20
Intellect has no nature other than this: it is a potency.
429a 30
Perception receives that which is without material; intellect receives that which are the forms. The thinking soul is a place that preserves the forms.
429b 20
It seems then forms have a formal potency.
429b 30
The intellect is in a certain way the intelligible things in potency. Things having material are potentially intelligible. Intelligible things in potency are different from things potentially intelligible.
430a 20
The intellect self splits into the material and the forming source. The forming source is the unprethinkable thinking.
430a 30
Thinking of things indivisible allow no falsehood.
430b 10
Things actively undivided can be thought for a duration, which is also actively undivided. But even if things are thought in separate durations, there’s still one unified time underlying.
430b 20
This passage corresponds to 426b 30 and 427a 10. There’s always something that makes one undivided: like one thing and its opposite are connected into one by deprivation. So the thinking of the whole has no falsehood, but intellect might mistake the way two things are put together. So that the whole itself is not incidental, but it is incidental in relation to parts. So the whole (time) in which one part is differentiated from the other part is not incidental, yet the way the indivisible kind is thought by the indivisible soul is incidental for divided parts that are put together into something indivisible. In other words, the whole is not incidental if A and B mutually determine each other in this whole, but with only A in relation to the whole, the whole is incidental.
431a 1
Knowledge in its being-at-work is the same as the thing it knows.
431a 10
The soul’s mean condition is at work in the sense of being activated, when it is pained and pleased by imaginings and perceptions. So when the soul thinks things through, whether they are good or bad, the soul is accompanied by an image marked out for good and bad as if it denies or affirms.
431b 10
True and false are present simply, but good and bad in relation to someone. To think in abstraction is to think mathematical things as if they were separate from material, despite the fact they are not.
432a 1
The intellect is the form of forms and the perception is the form of perceptible things.
432a 10
Thinking is not separate from experience, yet experience has to be accompanied by an image.
433a 10
The source of motion is practical intellect and/or desire.
433a 20
The source seems to be both, for the thing desired starts the practical thinking, and the practical thinking carries out the action. Desire is more primary in causing motion for the good or the apparent good in action that can be otherwise. So what causes motion is the potency of desire.
433b 10
Intellect looks to the future while instinct looks to the immediate.
434a 10
Imagination in animals without reason is of a non-specific kind.
434b 20
Plants now seem puzzling; how do plants tell what’s good and bad for them?
435a 20
Other sense organs (can?) perceive also by touch, though through something else. Touch is a mixture of elements, so are other senses.
3
403b 30
In motion and in sensing us the soul most distinguished. Earlier thinkers think that for something to move other things itself needs to be moving, so the soul is moving.
404b 30
Some claim the soul to be a self-moving number.
405b 10
Another feature of the soul is spoken of: bodilessness. Some say the soul has one source and is one element; others say there are many elements and to this effect the soul has to be made of many elements. The same applies if contraries instead of elements are concerned.
406a 10
A thing can be moved in virtue of other things or in virtue of itself. A part of a whole, when moved together with the moving whole, like the feet of a human being, are moved in virtue of themselves. Sailors however are moved by something else moved, namely the boat.
406a 20
If the soul is naturally moved, it has to be in its place; a place belongs to it. And if a thing can be moved by nature, it can be moved by force. So can it be at rest.
406b 1
In whatever way the body is moved, the soul should then be moved in the same way; then the soul could move in and out of body.
406b 10
If the soul is by nature self-moving, it cannot be moved by anything else except incidentally. Yet self-moving in virtue of itself is contradictory: to be moved is to be stepping outside of the actual thinghood, yet motion still remains its very thinghood, so that its actual thinghood would never be done with and its motion has no telos to realize.
406b 20
Then the soul would never be at rest, which is impossible. Plus, it seems the soul moves by thinking instead of dragging.
407a 10
The soul in Timaeus is no magnitude, but a number that thinks and is thought either as one or as one series, which is continuous in a different way.
407a 30
Yet why does the intellect whose revolution is the act of thinking move in a circle? If it has parts how does it think of things without parts and if it has to think as one whole how does it think of things with parts? How does it think of magnitudes if it thinks in numbers? And why does thinking have to return to the beginning instead of going in a straight line?
407b 1
Thinking seems to be more like a coming to rest instead of a motion. And if motion does not belong to the soul but is imposed on it, and if thinking were motion, thinking would not be happy.
407b 10
The motion of the soul in a circle is incidental. Timaeus fails to mention how it should be better for the soul to move in a circle, though not necessarily.
407b 20
It’s then absurd that nothing is brought up about body by earlier thinkers.
407b 30
Can the soul be a harmony or attuning? No, for a harmony does not cause motion.
408a 20
It’s problematic to determine if the soul is the ratio or that which causes a ratio to be present in body. And what about a fresh corpse? And what is destroyed when soul departs if not the ratio of the body?
408b 10
Feelings are physiological processes, and are moved by the soul without the soul necessarily moving. Motions can come to the soul (incidentally) but essentially go out from the soul, as sense perception is coming to and memory is going out.
408b 20
Intellect seems to be the most divine and seems to be separate.
409a 1
The soul could not be self-moving number, for a number will not be divided and cannot be moved, much less self-moved. And, the number when moving will produce lines, for the soul is already somewhere having a number of units that have positions, but lines are not produced when the soul is moved, but one line at best (for thinking proceeds uniformly?). And also if a unit is deducted a different number remains but not so with plants or animals with one part of the soul deducted.
409a 10
If the soul is a number, the units seem no different from small bodies. For as long as there’s motion, and there’s a number of things, it doesn’t matter what magnitude each is said to have, one will cause motion in the other while the other is only moved.
409a 20
Yet if one unit is the moving while the other is the moved, these are not units anymore. Even if the soul is number, the units being equivalent to points would be infinite, that no body is not ensouled, and no soul can be separate.
409b 1
If the soul is some sort of body, then there will be two bodies in the same place, for the soul is also distinguished from body. This is an impasse unless there’s some other sort of number, yet the animal is moved by number in exactly the same way.
409b 30
The soul recognizes not just elements but also wholes; so the soul has to be made out of not only elements. But this is impossible. For things are not said to be in the soul, and a soul cannot be both an amount and an independent thing. In addition, it’s impossible for the soul to be unaffected by what is like in recognizing what is like (yet affections are not mentioned by those earlier thinkers), so mere perception is not enough.
411a 20
To say one element can be ensouled is based on the premise that the whole and its parts are of the same kind, so the soul and its component parts of one same element are of the same kind. Yet this is not true, for there are many kinds of soul; when one part can be made out of the element, other parts cannot.
411b 20
It seems that each part of the soul does not correspond to each part of the body.
4
419b 10
Sound at work is always something struck by something.
419b 20
The striking has to be against air too. A sound is produced when the striking thing moves faster than the air struck.
419b 30
Echo is produced as the air sounded is trapped in one mass of air by some enclosure and bounces back.
420a 1
Smooth bodies make sounds because it is one and effects on one mass of air.
420a 10
If air is dispersed there’s no sound; that’s why there’s air inside one’s ears.
420a 30
The sharp and blunt tones are results of fast and slow motions of air, they are fast and slow incidentally.
420b 10
Voice are sounds coming from beings having souls.
420b 30
The part that makes a voice has to be ensouled in striking the windpipe of air breathed in. So instead of the air breathed in striking the windpipe like in coughing, a voice occurs when the air is struck by some parts to strike the windpipe again.
421a 20
Touch is the most precise sense for a human.
422a 10
Moist is the material for flavor to be present in. Yet it’s no medium. It doesn’t transfer taste, it only makes it present in itself. Color, on the other hand, transmits itself through air without making all mass of air the same as the colorful thing. So it moves air in a certain way, but itself remains itself.
422a 20
Multiple meanings of negation of sense: impossible to be sensed, incapable to be sensed but only sensed as a privation, too slight to be sensed, too strong and bad and destructive.
422b 1
Taste has to be capable of becoming moist but not itself moist, for it is to be affected by moisture.
422b 10
What’s capable of tasting is what’s of the flavors in potency, and what can be tasted is what makes it be actively one of them.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
1
402a 1
精确性与所研究的事物,是衡量研究本身的两个标准:因此,对灵魂的研究居于首位。灵魂对于理解自然至关重要。
403a 1
没有属性,某物之所是就是空洞的。
403a 10
想象力与身体相连。
403a 30
灵魂具有质料性;但在逻辑学家与自然研究者的论述中,它可以被分离。
403b 10
有些人关心质料的属性;工匠关心质料所做和所受的工作;数学家关心身体中不可分离、却从任何特定身体中抽象出来的事物;第一哲学家关心分离之物。
412a 10
知识意义上的圆成(entelechy),与沉思活动意义上的圆成。
412a 20
灵魂必然以具有生命潜能的自然身体的形式,作为其物性。
412b 1
因为灵魂可以睡眠,所以灵魂是在知识的意义上的圆成。
412b 20
类比。
413a 10
另一种现实活动(being-at-work):如水手之于船。
413a 10
理性中清楚且可知之物,源自不清楚却更显明之物。
413a 30
有些能力可以彼此分离,但灵魂的各部分是否也可以分离,是个问题。
414a 10
为什么说灵魂是凭借,并非如知识那样是凭借,而是如接受者那样;却又说灵魂是作用于身体的形式?那么,形式与质料能否分层?
414a 30
灵魂的潜能:灵魂有潜能,因为它可以进行、也可以不进行其工作;而身体的潜能则是身体可以符合、也可以不符合灵魂。
414b 1
为什么知觉总伴随着快乐和痛苦,难道不能有无利害的知觉吗?或者,营养能力不是更适合作为欲望的基础吗?也许,当食物获得性质时,营养部分就转化成了食欲。
414b 20
关于灵魂的论述如同关于几何图形的论述:是什么使这套论述比他的其它著作具有不同寻常的精确性?
414b 30
某种共同之物或一般之物,以潜能的方式存在于特殊事物中,使这种共同之物能够适用于其它种类。但有些共同之物并非特殊者,也无法应用于特殊者。
415a 20
在论述中,活动先于潜能。
415b 1
万物渴求永恒与神圣:这与欲望有什么不同?
416a 10
灵魂因此既是生长的原因,也是不生长的原因:它是一种限度,使生长的部分得以保持为生长着的。
416a 20
有些相反者以另一些相反者为食,条件是:1. 前者来自后者;2. 生长的量并非偶然。
416b 10
食物尚未消化时是相反者,消化后则是相似者。食物不仅使其生长,也使其保存,因此食物造成的生长之量并非偶然。所以营养与生殖,是生出一个与自身相似者的两个方面。
417a 1
感觉器官不感觉自身,而只感知外在事物。
417a 10
知觉需要外在事物,因为它是一种需要被触发的潜能。
417a 20
受作用被当作现实活动,因为它是一种不完整的现实活动。其中总包含潜能。
417b 1
潜能的两种意义:1. 尚未拥有知识,却能够获得;2. 已拥有知识,并能沉思它。关键区别因此在于,现实活动的状态是否已触手可及。
417b 10
变化可以有这样的意义:潜能中的事物改变为保持自身的现实活动(being-at-work-staying-itself),使其存在得到保存。那么,“受作用”一词就有歧义,因为不确定它是指某物改变而进入其自然,还是指某物开始获得或发展这种潜能。
418a 20
偶然者并不在现实活动,也不作用于诸感觉。
418a 30
可见的是椅子的颜色,而非椅子本身,因为可能有透明椅子这样的东西。换句话说,虽然颜色对事物而言只是偶然的,但只要事物是可见的,就必须是事物本身有颜色,颜色存在于事物中,而不是某个独立于事物的外部原因。因此,在这个意义上,颜色适用于事物,不仅因为其定义,也因为原因存在于事物之中。但颜色依赖于现实地透明之物,即光。
418b 10
光是透明者作为透明者在受火作用时的工作。
418b 30
无色者:盲的?不可见的?透明的?
419a 20
颜色是视觉的第一原因;但需要中间的透明之物来受作用,并传递可见性。
423a 1
假如肉体外包着一层膜,触觉仍然显得是直接的;假如这层膜长进肉体,即便没有感觉器官,知觉也会传得更快,所以这并不能说明感觉器官位于何处。但人们设想触觉有这样一个媒介、一层膜;这也是可能的,因为虽然肉体具有多样的感受,它作为元素的混合仍具有某种同质性。至于其它感觉,则可以否认它们共享同一媒介,因为它们有不同的运动。
423b 20
在触觉中,媒介被感知为与受作用之物同时受作用。
424a 10
每种感觉都是某种中道,分有两端的潜能;它既具有感知可感者的潜能,也具有感知不可感者的潜能。不可感者是过于微小或过于具有毁灭性的东西。
424a 20
感觉接受形式。它接受的是事物具有的属性,而非事物之所是。
424a 30
感觉器官的比例,即感觉,会被取消,因为感觉器官有大小,而其潜能虽然没有大小,却与大小相关,因而具有量。
424b 1
植物没有知觉,因为其质料进行吸收,而其灵魂没有中道比例。
424b 10
如果可感者不作用于身体,身体又如何被这些属性改变?那些受作用的事物是不定的吗?受作用之物本身又如何通过知觉转化为可感者?
2
425a 10
就事物而言,种类只有这么多:它们或仅通过空气,或仅通过水,或同时通过空气与水,因此感觉器官只能由空气、水或二者的混合构成。既然器官的质料只有这些,传过来的事物也只有这些,那么感觉也只能有这些,每个动物都拥有它们。
425a 20
共同属性本身没有对应的感觉器官,否则它们就会被偶然地感知;然而,它们是作为任何知觉的共同之物而被必然地、而非偶然地感知的。
425b 1
共同属性之所以能被区分,是因为它们伴随每一种特殊感觉,却不属于任何一种。假如共同者是某个特殊者,那么底层事物本身就会变成偶然者,因为感觉所感知的是偶然者;但这是不可能的。
425b 20
如何感知自己正在感知?不能是另一种感觉,否则会趋于无限;也不能是它自己,否则知觉本身就会是一种颜色,或具有颜色。只能是观看有不同种类,因此它能分辨黑暗与光明,也能在某种意义上使观看之物有颜色,因为颜色是不带质料的。但是什么意义?只能是说,颜色与看见颜色者成为同一个东西。
425b 30
感觉者与被感觉者的现实活动是同一的,尽管它们的存在不同。
426a 10
受作用与作用都在受作用之物中。
426b 10
但这里又说,只有超出者才能被感知。不过,这由不相似者与相似者的论证得到了解决。
426b 20
需要有一种知觉来区分所有感觉与可感之物。这是一种差异性地感知诸知觉的潜能。看见自己正在看见,是一种仅在强度上关联于观看这一前反思活动的潜能。
426b 30
时间并非偶然:它们是现在不同,而非到现在为止变得不同。因此,这是不可分的时间内的不可分活动;两个事物被同时区分,因而是分立的。但它又被分成两部分,那么,这个活动是否在数目上不可分,在存在上却可分?
427a 10
某物一旦投入工作就被分开,即使它在存在上未被分开;因此,它在存在上与潜能为一,但投入工作时就被分成与潜能相反者。所以,即便说某物在数目上是一,在存在上不是一,似乎也不对,因为工作与潜能在存在上是一。
427a 20
思考与理解似乎是某种知觉,因为它们也进行区分。但这遗漏了错误会发生这一事实。
427b 10
同一种错误必须同时涉及通过相似者和不相似者进行的认识。错误地思考事物,只存在于具有言语的动物中。
427b 20
知觉—想象—构想。唯有构想具有真与假的能力,而知觉总是真的。
427b 30
思考似乎由想象与构想组成。
428b 1
想象不能由意见与知觉组成,因为它既不是意见,也不是知觉。如果由二者组成,其中的意见就必须是关于与被感知者具有非偶然关系之物的意见。但即使如此,意见仍可能与显象不一致。当与被感知者具有本质关系的意见是真的,而显象是假的,想象就会同时真且假,这是不可能的。因此,意见与知觉必须各自在自身的意义上为真,不能被组合起来。
428b 20
知觉对于其专属对象总是真的,但与之偶然关联的事物容易被误认。
429a 10
思考在潜能上必须是接受性的、无形式的。
429a 20
理智没有其它自然,只有这一点:它是一种潜能。
429a 30
知觉接受不带质料者;理智接受形式。思考的灵魂是保存形式的场所。
429b 20
那么,形式似乎具有一种形式上的潜能。
429b 30
理智在某种意义上是潜能中的可理解之物。具有质料的事物是潜在可理解的。潜能中的可理解之物,不同于潜在可理解的事物。
430a 20
理智自行分裂为质料与赋形的源头。赋形的源头就是不可预思的思。
430a 30
对不可分之物的思考不容许虚假。
430b 10
现实中未被分开的事物,可以在一段持续中被思考,而这一持续也在现实中未被分开。但即使事物在分开的持续中被思考,底下仍有一个统一的时间。
430b 20
这一段对应426b 30和427a 10。总有某物使一保持未分:例如某物及其反面通过缺失被联系为一。因此,对整体的思考没有虚假,但理智可能误认两个事物结合的方式。所以,整体本身并非偶然,但相对于部分却是偶然的。一个部分在其中与另一部分相区分的整体,即时间,并非偶然;然而,不可分的种类被不可分的灵魂思考的方式,对于那些被组合为不可分者的分立部分而言,是偶然的。换句话说,如果A与B在整体中互相规定,那么整体不是偶然的;但如果只有A与整体相关,那么整体就是偶然的。
431a 1
知识在其现实活动中,与它所知的事物相同。
431a 10
当灵魂因想象与知觉而感到痛苦和快乐时,它的中道状态以被激活的意义在现实活动。因此,当灵魂思考事物是好是坏时,它伴随着一个被标定为好或坏的图像,仿佛它在否定或肯定。
431b 10
真与假是单纯地存在的,但好与坏则相对于某人。抽象思考,就是把数学事物当作与质料分离来思考,尽管它们事实上并不分离。
432a 1
理智是形式的形式,知觉是可感之物的形式。
432a 10
思考不与经验分离,但经验必须伴随图像。
433a 10
运动的源头是实践理智和/或欲望。
433a 20
源头似乎是两者,因为被欲求之物引发实践思考,而实践思考实行行动。欲望在引起运动方面更为首要,指向行动中可以另样的善或表面上的善。因此,引起运动的是欲望的潜能。
433b 10
理智面向未来,本能面向直接当前。
434a 10
没有理性的动物,其想象是非特定种类的。
434b 20
植物现在显得令人困惑:植物如何分辨对自身而言的好与坏?
435a 20
其它感觉器官也能够(?)通过触觉来感知,只不过经过别的东西。触觉是元素的混合,其它感觉也是。
3
403b 30
灵魂在运动与感觉中最为显著。早期思想家认为,某物要推动其它事物,自身就必须在运动,所以灵魂在运动。
404b 30
有人说灵魂是自行运动的数。
405b 10
灵魂的另一特征被提出来:无身体性。有人说灵魂只有一个源头,是一种元素;另一些人说有多种元素,因此灵魂必定由多种元素构成。如果讨论的是相反者而非元素,同样适用。
406a 10
某物可以因其它事物而被推动,也可以因自身而被推动。整体的一部分,在随运动的整体一同被推动时,如人的双脚,是因自身而被推动的。但水手则是被另一个运动之物,即船,所推动。
406a 20
如果灵魂自然地被推动,它就必须处于自己的处所,有一个属于它的处所。而如果某物可以依自然而被推动,它也可以被强力推动。静止也是如此。
406b 1
无论身体以何种方式被推动,灵魂也应以同样方式被推动;那么,灵魂就可以进出身体。
406b 10
如果灵魂自然地自行运动,它就不能被任何别的东西推动,除非是偶然地。但凭自身而自行运动是矛盾的:被推动就是离开现实的物性,而运动却仍然是它的物性本身;如此,它的现实物性就永远无法完成,其运动也没有可以实现的目的。
406b 20
那么灵魂就永远不会静止,这是不可能的。此外,灵魂似乎是通过思考来推动,而非通过拖曳。
407a 10
《蒂迈欧篇》中的灵魂不是量,而是数;它作为一或一个序列来思考,也被如此思考,这是一种不同的连续性。
407a 30
然而,为什么理智要作圆周运动,其旋转就是思考的活动?假如它有部分,如何思考没有部分的事物?假如它必须作为一个整体思考,又如何思考有部分的事物?如果以数来思考,如何思考量?而思考又为什么必须回到开端,而不是沿直线前进?
407b 1
思考似乎更像趋于静止,而非运动。如果运动不属于灵魂,而是被强加于它;如果思考是运动,那么思考就不会是幸福的。
407b 10
灵魂的圆周运动是偶然的。蒂迈欧没有说明,为什么灵魂作圆周运动会更好,尽管它并非必然如此。
407b 20
那么,早期思想家完全没有提出有关身体的事情,就是荒谬的。
407b 30
灵魂可以是和谐或调和吗?不可以,因为和谐不能引起运动。
408a 20
难以判定灵魂是比例本身,还是使比例出现在身体中的东西。那么,一具刚死的尸体又如何呢?灵魂离开时,被毁灭的如果不是身体的比例,又是什么?
408b 10
感受是生理过程,被灵魂推动,而灵魂本身不必运动。运动可以偶然地来到灵魂,但在本质上从灵魂出发;如感觉是来到,记忆是出去。
408b 20
理智似乎是最神圣的,并且似乎是分离的。
409a 1
灵魂不能是自行运动的数,因为数不会被分割,也无法被推动,更不用说自行运动。而且,数在运动时会产生线,因为灵魂已经在某处,具有一定数量、有位置的单位;但灵魂运动时并不产生线,最多产生一条线,因为思考均匀地前进(?)。此外,如果减去一个单位,就剩下另一个数;但植物或动物失去灵魂的某一部分时,并非如此。
409a 10
如果灵魂是数,其单位似乎与小物体没有区别。因为只要有运动、有一定数量的事物,无论据称每个事物具有何种量,都不重要:一个会推动另一个,而另一个只是被推动。
409a 20
但如果一个单位是推动者,另一个是被推动者,它们就不再是单位。即使灵魂是数,等同于点的单位也会是无限的,因此没有任何身体不具有灵魂,也没有任何灵魂可以分离。
409b 1
如果灵魂是某种身体,同一处所就会有两个身体,因为灵魂也区别于身体。这是一个死结,除非还有另一种数;但动物仍以完全相同的方式被数推动。
409b 30
灵魂认识的不只是元素,还有整体;因此,灵魂必定不只由元素构成。但这是不可能的。因为事物并不是被说成在灵魂之中,而灵魂也不能既是一个数量,又是一个独立的事物。此外,灵魂在通过相似者认识相似者时,不可能不受相似者的作用;但那些早期思想家没有提到受作用。所以,单纯的知觉还不够。
411a 20
说某一种元素可以具有灵魂,是基于整体与部分属于同一种类的前提,所以灵魂与由同一元素构成的组成部分属于同类。但这不是真的,因为灵魂有多种:即使一部分可以由这种元素构成,其它部分却不可以。
411b 20
灵魂的各部分似乎并不与身体的各部分一一对应。
4
419b 10
现实活动中的声音,总是某物被某物撞击。
419b 20
撞击也必须针对空气。当撞击之物运动得比被撞击的空气更快时,就产生声音。
419b 30
发声的空气被某种围障困在一团空气中,并弹回来,就产生回声。
420a 1
光滑物体发声,因为它是一个整体,并作用于一团空气。
420a 10
如果空气散开,就没有声音;这就是耳朵内部有空气的原因。
420a 30
尖锐与低钝的音调,是空气快慢运动的结果;它们只是偶然地快或慢。
420b 10
嗓音是来自具有灵魂之物的声音。
420b 30
发出嗓音的部分,在撞击充满吸入空气的气管时,必须具有灵魂。因此,嗓音不是像咳嗽那样由吸入的空气撞击气管,而是在空气受到某些部分撞击、继而再撞击气管时产生的。
421a 20
对人而言,触觉是最精确的感觉。
422a 10
湿润是味道得以存在的质料。但它不是媒介。它不传递味道,只使味道存在于自身。颜色则通过空气传递自身,却不使整团空气变得与有颜色的事物相同。因此,它以某种方式推动空气,而自身仍保持自身。
422a 20
对感觉之否定的多种意义:不可能被感觉;不能被感觉,却只能作为缺失被感觉;太微弱而无法被感觉;过于强烈、恶劣而具有毁灭性。
422b 1
味觉必须能够变得湿润,却不能自身已经湿润,因为它要受湿润的作用。
422b 10
能品尝者,是在潜能上具有诸味道者;可被品尝者,则使它在现实活动中成为其中一种味道。