Gui Ruiyan

Aristotle · 亚里士多德
De Anima · 论灵魂

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De Anima — Reading notes

Reflections · Apple Notes

Revised 8 January 2024

In this note / 篇目

1

402a 1
Precision and the things studied are two criteria for the study itself: the study of the soul is then primary. Soul is crucial for understanding nature.

403a 1
Without the properties the what something is is empty.

403a 10
Imagination is tied to the body.

403a 30
Soul has materiality: but it can be separate in account with logicians and people who study nature.

403b 10
Some people concern with the attributes of materials; craftsmen with work done by and done to material; mathematicians with inseparable things about the body that are abstracted from any particular body; first philosophers with things separated.

412a 10
Entelechy in the sense of knowledge and in the sense of the act of contemplating.

412a 20
It is necessary that the soul has its thinghood as the form of a natural body having life as a potency.

412b 1
Because the soul can sleep the soul is entelechy in the sense of knowledge.

412b 20
Analogy.

413a 10
Another kind of being-at-work: like the sailor to the boat.

413a 10
What is clear and knowable by reason arises out of what is unclear but more obvious.

413a 30
Some capacities can be separate from each other, but if parts of the soul can be is a question.

414a 10
Why is the soul said to be the means not as knowledge is a means but as what is receptive, yet again says the soul is a form acting upon body: so can the form and the material be layered?

414a 30
Potencies of the soul: the soul has potencies since the soul can be and not be doing its work; while potency of the body is the body can and can not conform to the soul.

414b 1
Why is perception always accompanied by pleasure and pain, couldn’t there be disinterested perceptions? Or, wouldn’t nutritive capacity be more appropriate for desire? Perhaps the nutritive part is transformed into appetite as food becomes qualified.

414b 20
The account of the soul is like that of geometrical figures: what gives this account an unusual precision than his other writings?

414b 30
Some common thing or general thing is present in the particular thing in its potency, so that this kind of common thing can be applicable to other kinds. But some common thing is not particular and cannot be applied to the particular.

415a 20
In account actions come before potencies.

415b 1
All things yearn for eternity and divine: how is it different from desire?

416a 10
Soul then is the cause both for growing and not growing: it’s a limit that the growing part should be kept as growing.

416a 20
Some contraries feed on other contraries if 1.the former comes from the latter and 2.the amount of growth is not incidental.

416b 10
Food is contrary if it’s undigested but like if it’s digested. Food is that which not just produces growth but also preserves: so the amount of growth produced by food is not incidental. So nutrition and begetting are twofold for the begetting of one like oneself.

417a 1
Sensory organs do not sense themselves, but only perceive things outside.

417a 10
Perception requires something outside because it’s a potency that needs be triggered.

417a 20
Being acted upon is treated as being at work, for it’s an incomplete kind of being at work. There is always potency involved.

417b 1
Two senses of potency: 1.not have knowledge but is able to acquire; 2.have knowledge and is able to contemplate it. The crucial difference then is if the state of being-at-work is ready at hand.

417b 10
Alteration can be in this sense: what is in potency is altered to be at-work-staying-itself, so that the being is preserved. Then the term “being acted upon” is ambiguous, for it’s uncertain if it means something changed into its nature, or it means something starts to acquire or develop the potency.

418a 20
The incidental is not at work and is not acting upon the senses.

418a 30
What is visible is the color of the chair and not the chair itself: it’s because there might be something like a transparent chair. In other words, though color is only accidental to the thing, if the thing is visible at all it has to be the thing itself that is colored, and color is present in the thing, and not some outside cause independent from the thing. So in this sense color applies to things not merely due to their definitions but because the causes are present in them. But color depends upon what is actively transparent, namely light.

418b 10
Light is the work of the transparent as the transparent, acted upon by fire.

418b 30
The colorless: the blind? the invisible? the transparent?

419a 20
Color is the first cause of sight: but (transparent) things in between are required in order to be acted upon and transmit visibility.

423a 1
If there were a membrane wrapping around the flesh the sense of touch still seems immediate, and if the membrane were to grow into flesh the perception would travel even faster, even when there’s no sense organ, so it makes no indication of where the sensory organ is. But people imagine there’s this one medium, this one membrane for touch, and it is possible because even though flesh has a multiplicity of feelings, it does have some homogeneity as a mixture of elements. Whereas for other senses it can be denied that they share one medium for they have different motions.

423b 20
Touch is perceived to have the medium being acted upon simultaneously with the thing acted upon.

424a 10
Every sense is kind of a mean that partakes of both potencies; and it has the potency for both the perceptible and the imperceptible. Imperceptible things are things either too minute or too destructive.

424a 20
Sense perception is receptive of the forms. And what it receives is the attributes the thing has, not what the thing is.

424a 30
The ratio, which is the sense, of the sense organ is done away with because the sense organ has a size, and its potency, though does not have a size, is however related to it(thus a magnitude).

424b 1
Plants have no perceptions because their material absorbs and their soul has no mean ratio.

424b 10
If perceptibles do not act on bodies, how are bodies altered by those attributes? Are those things acted upon indeterminate? And how does the thing acted upon itself transformed into a perceptible by perception?

2

425a 10
With regard to the things, there are only so many kinds; they either come through air alone or through water alone or through both air and water, so that the sense organs can only be made of air, water or a mixture of both. So as the material for organs are this many, the things coming through are this many, the senses can only be this many, and every animal has them.

425a 20
The common attributes do not themselves have a corresponding sense organ, for otherwise they would be perceived incidentally; yet they are perceived necessarily as the common thing for any perception, not incidentally.

425b 1
The common attributes are differentiated because they accompany every particular sense, yet do not belong to any. If the common were a particular, the underlying thing itself would become incidental (for senses perceive the incidental), which is not possible.

425b 20
How to perceive that one is perceiving? It cannot be another sense or it will go to infinity, it cannot be itself or the perception itself will be a color or have a color. It can only be that seeing is of different sorts; so it can discriminate dark and light, it can also in a way make the seeing thing colored (as the color is without material). But in what way? Only in the sense that color becomes the same thing as that which sees the color.

425b 30
The being at work of the sensing and the sensed are the same, though their beings differ.

426a 10
The being acted upon and the action are both in the thing being acted upon.

426b 10
Yet it’s said how only excesses can be perceived. But it’s resolved by the unlike and like argument.

426b 20
There needs to be one perception that differentiates all senses and perceptible things. This is a potency to perceive perceptions differentially. To see that one is seeing is a potency that only intensively relates to seeing as a pre-reflexive activity.

426b 30
Time is not incidental: it’s now that they’re different, not they’re different by now. So that it’s an indivisible act in an indivisible time; two things are differentiated simultaneously, thus discrete. Yet it is divided into two parts; so is the act indivisible in number but divisible in being?

427a 10
A thing is divided when being put to work, even if it’s undivided in being; so in being it’s one with potency, but when being put to work it’s divided into which is opposite potency. So even to say a thing is one in number but not one in being seems not right, for the work and the potency are one in being.

427a 20
Thinking and understanding seem to be sort of perceiving for they too discriminate. Yet this leaves out the fact that mistakes happen.

427b 10
The same mistake has to concern both recognition by like and unlike. To think things through falsely is only present in animals with speech.

427b 20
Perception-imagination-conception. Only conception has capacity for both truth and falsity, whereas perception is always true.

427b 30
It seems that thinking consists of imagination and conception.

428b 1
Imagination cannot be composed of opinion and perception, for it’s neither opinion nor perception. If it were composed of both, the component opinion would have to be of what is not incidentally related to the perceived. But even in this case there will be opinion disagreeing with appearance. When the opinion that relates essentially to the perceived is true but the appearance is false, the imagination is true and false at the same time, which is impossible. So opinion and perception have to be true in their own sense, and cannot be combined.

428b 20
Perception is always true with its proper object, but the things incidental to it are prone to be mistaken.

429a 10
The thinking has to be receptive and formless in potency.

429a 20
Intellect has no nature other than this: it is a potency.

429a 30
Perception receives that which is without material; intellect receives that which are the forms. The thinking soul is a place that preserves the forms.

429b 20
It seems then forms have a formal potency.

429b 30
The intellect is in a certain way the intelligible things in potency. Things having material are potentially intelligible. Intelligible things in potency are different from things potentially intelligible.

430a 20
The intellect self splits into the material and the forming source. The forming source is the unprethinkable thinking.

430a 30
Thinking of things indivisible allow no falsehood.

430b 10
Things actively undivided can be thought for a duration, which is also actively undivided. But even if things are thought in separate durations, there’s still one unified time underlying.

430b 20
This passage corresponds to 426b 30 and 427a 10. There’s always something that makes one undivided: like one thing and its opposite are connected into one by deprivation. So the thinking of the whole has no falsehood, but intellect might mistake the way two things are put together. So that the whole itself is not incidental, but it is incidental in relation to parts. So the whole (time) in which one part is differentiated from the other part is not incidental, yet the way the indivisible kind is thought by the indivisible soul is incidental for divided parts that are put together into something indivisible. In other words, the whole is not incidental if A and B mutually determine each other in this whole, but with only A in relation to the whole, the whole is incidental.

431a 1
Knowledge in its being-at-work is the same as the thing it knows.

431a 10
The soul’s mean condition is at work in the sense of being activated, when it is pained and pleased by imaginings and perceptions. So when the soul thinks things through, whether they are good or bad, the soul is accompanied by an image marked out for good and bad as if it denies or affirms.

431b 10
True and false are present simply, but good and bad in relation to someone. To think in abstraction is to think mathematical things as if they were separate from material, despite the fact they are not.

432a 1
The intellect is the form of forms and the perception is the form of perceptible things.

432a 10
Thinking is not separate from experience, yet experience has to be accompanied by an image.

433a 10
The source of motion is practical intellect and/or desire.

433a 20
The source seems to be both, for the thing desired starts the practical thinking, and the practical thinking carries out the action. Desire is more primary in causing motion for the good or the apparent good in action that can be otherwise. So what causes motion is the potency of desire.

433b 10
Intellect looks to the future while instinct looks to the immediate.

434a 10
Imagination in animals without reason is of a non-specific kind.

434b 20
Plants now seem puzzling; how do plants tell what’s good and bad for them?

435a 20
Other sense organs (can?) perceive also by touch, though through something else. Touch is a mixture of elements, so are other senses.

3

403b 30
In motion and in sensing us the soul most distinguished. Earlier thinkers think that for something to move other things itself needs to be moving, so the soul is moving.

404b 30
Some claim the soul to be a self-moving number.

405b 10
Another feature of the soul is spoken of: bodilessness. Some say the soul has one source and is one element; others say there are many elements and to this effect the soul has to be made of many elements. The same applies if contraries instead of elements are concerned.

406a 10
A thing can be moved in virtue of other things or in virtue of itself. A part of a whole, when moved together with the moving whole, like the feet of a human being, are moved in virtue of themselves. Sailors however are moved by something else moved, namely the boat.

406a 20
If the soul is naturally moved, it has to be in its place; a place belongs to it. And if a thing can be moved by nature, it can be moved by force. So can it be at rest.

406b 1
In whatever way the body is moved, the soul should then be moved in the same way; then the soul could move in and out of body.

406b 10
If the soul is by nature self-moving, it cannot be moved by anything else except incidentally. Yet self-moving in virtue of itself is contradictory: to be moved is to be stepping outside of the actual thinghood, yet motion still remains its very thinghood, so that its actual thinghood would never be done with and its motion has no telos to realize.

406b 20
Then the soul would never be at rest, which is impossible. Plus, it seems the soul moves by thinking instead of dragging.

407a 10
The soul in Timaeus is no magnitude, but a number that thinks and is thought either as one or as one series, which is continuous in a different way.

407a 30
Yet why does the intellect whose revolution is the act of thinking move in a circle? If it has parts how does it think of things without parts and if it has to think as one whole how does it think of things with parts? How does it think of magnitudes if it thinks in numbers? And why does thinking have to return to the beginning instead of going in a straight line?

407b 1
Thinking seems to be more like a coming to rest instead of a motion. And if motion does not belong to the soul but is imposed on it, and if thinking were motion, thinking would not be happy.

407b 10
The motion of the soul in a circle is incidental. Timaeus fails to mention how it should be better for the soul to move in a circle, though not necessarily.

407b 20
It’s then absurd that nothing is brought up about body by earlier thinkers.

407b 30
Can the soul be a harmony or attuning? No, for a harmony does not cause motion.

408a 20
It’s problematic to determine if the soul is the ratio or that which causes a ratio to be present in body. And what about a fresh corpse? And what is destroyed when soul departs if not the ratio of the body?

408b 10
Feelings are physiological processes, and are moved by the soul without the soul necessarily moving. Motions can come to the soul (incidentally) but essentially go out from the soul, as sense perception is coming to and memory is going out.

408b 20
Intellect seems to be the most divine and seems to be separate.

409a 1
The soul could not be self-moving number, for a number will not be divided and cannot be moved, much less self-moved. And, the number when moving will produce lines, for the soul is already somewhere having a number of units that have positions, but lines are not produced when the soul is moved, but one line at best (for thinking proceeds uniformly?). And also if a unit is deducted a different number remains but not so with plants or animals with one part of the soul deducted.

409a 10
If the soul is a number, the units seem no different from small bodies. For as long as there’s motion, and there’s a number of things, it doesn’t matter what magnitude each is said to have, one will cause motion in the other while the other is only moved.

409a 20
Yet if one unit is the moving while the other is the moved, these are not units anymore. Even if the soul is number, the units being equivalent to points would be infinite, that no body is not ensouled, and no soul can be separate.

409b 1
If the soul is some sort of body, then there will be two bodies in the same place, for the soul is also distinguished from body. This is an impasse unless there’s some other sort of number, yet the animal is moved by number in exactly the same way.

409b 30
The soul recognizes not just elements but also wholes; so the soul has to be made out of not only elements. But this is impossible. For things are not said to be in the soul, and a soul cannot be both an amount and an independent thing. In addition, it’s impossible for the soul to be unaffected by what is like in recognizing what is like (yet affections are not mentioned by those earlier thinkers), so mere perception is not enough.

411a 20
To say one element can be ensouled is based on the premise that the whole and its parts are of the same kind, so the soul and its component parts of one same element are of the same kind. Yet this is not true, for there are many kinds of soul; when one part can be made out of the element, other parts cannot.

411b 20
It seems that each part of the soul does not correspond to each part of the body.

4

419b 10
Sound at work is always something struck by something.

419b 20
The striking has to be against air too. A sound is produced when the striking thing moves faster than the air struck.

419b 30
Echo is produced as the air sounded is trapped in one mass of air by some enclosure and bounces back.

420a 1
Smooth bodies make sounds because it is one and effects on one mass of air.

420a 10
If air is dispersed there’s no sound; that’s why there’s air inside one’s ears.

420a 30
The sharp and blunt tones are results of fast and slow motions of air, they are fast and slow incidentally.

420b 10
Voice are sounds coming from beings having souls.

420b 30
The part that makes a voice has to be ensouled in striking the windpipe of air breathed in. So instead of the air breathed in striking the windpipe like in coughing, a voice occurs when the air is struck by some parts to strike the windpipe again.

421a 20
Touch is the most precise sense for a human.

422a 10
Moist is the material for flavor to be present in. Yet it’s no medium. It doesn’t transfer taste, it only makes it present in itself. Color, on the other hand, transmits itself through air without making all mass of air the same as the colorful thing. So it moves air in a certain way, but itself remains itself.

422a 20
Multiple meanings of negation of sense: impossible to be sensed, incapable to be sensed but only sensed as a privation, too slight to be sensed, too strong and bad and destructive.

422b 1
Taste has to be capable of becoming moist but not itself moist, for it is to be affected by moisture.

422b 10
What’s capable of tasting is what’s of the flavors in potency, and what can be tasted is what makes it be actively one of them.