Gui Ruiyan

Aristotle · 亚里士多德
De Caelo · 论天

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De Caelo — Reading notes

Reflections · Apple Notes

Revised 29 December 2023

In this note / 篇目

I

1.
268a 1
bodies and magnitudes; affections and movements; starting points. that which is body and magnitude; that which has body and magnitude (animals? composites?); that which are starting points of body and magnitude.

268a 5
continuity is that which is always divisible; body is that which is divisible in all ways (three ways).

268a 10
weird Pythagorean theory, given his critique on Pythagoreanism.

268a 15
“all things” and “the All” and “complete” have the same form, that is, they have the same meaning, though might be used on different subjects; but their shared meaning entails the things should be bodies, since bodies fit the form of the All.

268a 25
definition of continuity retracted; that which is continuous does not necessarily entail that which is divisible, at least not yet proved.

268b 5
the All includes complete bodies as parts of itself being in a way all things.

2.
268b 10
parts of the All, motion by nature; rectilinear or circular as simple movements; up, down and around, no such thing as natural horizontal linear movement; the number three.

268b 25
simple or composite body, simple or composite movement that is mostly that of the predominant element.

269a 5
movement by force and movement by nature; there has to be a simple body that moves simply in a circle according to nature.

269a 10
if circular motion is contrary to something’s nature, we have to appoint one such simple body which moves “strictly” contrary to a circle (for rectilinear motion is in general contrary to circular motion, yet since circular motion is simple, we need to find something else that is its simple contrary, that is what I call “strictly contrary), which we couldn’t in the four elements; so circular motion is of some other body; is this argument not unnecessarily complex? But this might be supplementary to the first argument.

269a 20
circle is more complete and hence more primary; both unlimited or limited lines are incomplete; hence circular motion is more primary and must find its corresponding natural body.

269a 30
circular motion is not strictly contrary to the movement of fire or earth, but is in general contrary to rectilinear motion; so there must be one nature that moves in a circle.

269b 5
if circular motion is applied only by force, that body will pass away the fastest and not be eternal; hence the four elements don’t move simply in a circle.

269b 15
such body is more estimable (knowable) than the four elements because it’s farther away

3.
269b 20
how do bodies move to or away from the center relatively? It might be the place they finally rest; or it’s just the intensity of movement.

269b 30
circularly moving bodies are neither light nor heavy and cannot move according or contrary to nature up or down, since if it moves down contrary to nature, it means its upward movement is natural, which is false; therefore the stars cannot be forced up or down. Though I do wonder if rectilinear movement can be considered to be its contrary.

270a 15
actually, circular motion has no contrary and hence does not change. It seems that it cannot move linearly contrary to nature because rectilinear motion is itself not a simple entity, nor a simple contrary motion; if it’s rectilinear, it’s either up or down, and if it’s up it means down is its contrary, not circular.

270a 20
there’s no increase or decrease of heavenly bodies since they don’t come to be; they don’t alter since they don’t increase or decrease.

270b 1
attestation to appearances (custom). Gods dwell among stars.

270b 10
attestation to perceptions. No one sees change in stars.

4.
Bruh.

arbitrary standard for contrarieties. Even if contraries do exist, they are made “pointless”.

5.
271b 10
starting-points are often small in magnitude but large in capacity.

271b 20
limited things (in number and magnitude) make up limited things.

271b 30
if the primary body is unlimited, the circle is unlimited, the interval through which it passes is unlimited, which is impossible.

272b 1
unlimited thing cannot move as a whole, for an unlimited thing cannot pass the smallest distance, since passing means from the beginning of the unlimited to move to its end, which can’t be done. Yet we see the Heaven as a whole move and pass around.

6.
273a 10
up and down are both definite directions to definite places, as center is definite; this actually makes sense since in an actual infinity no place can be determinate.

7.
274b 1
forms are limited since simple motions are limited.

274b 5
number in each form is limited, since unlimited heaviness is impossible, for the thing will be simultaneously moving and unmoving.

274b 10
movement and place of a body cannot be unlimited either, for there’s no such thing as infinite coming to be without a destination.

274b 20
nor can there be multiple unlimited bodies, hence unlimited body cannot be un-homoeumorous.

274b 25
an unlimited body is not homoeomerous, that is its whole is not of the same kind as its parts.

275a 10
this seems to me to be the ultimate argument: unlimited has no ratio to the limited.

275b 5
unlimited bodies can only be imperceptible. Anything outside heaven, however, is in a place, and is therefore perceptible. So what is outside heaven, either absolutely or partially, cannot be unlimited body.

275b 15
any unlimited movement requires two unlimited places.

276a 1
it’s impossible to have simple particles because they all have the same nature and hence should move the same way. But this is false. Yet if this were true, these should all move either up or down together, and hence posit a center, which is impossible if body were unlimited.

8.
276b 1
there’s only one heaven for all elements move to the same places they belong to.

276b 15
a decentralized universe where orientation is broken.

276b 20
distance doesn’t affect the nature of moving body.

276b 25
it’s evident things move; things can only move if they can move by nature; the same nature or form points to one place; if the same nature points to many similar places, the prior argument should hold.

277b 15
again the only-one-contrary principle.

277b 20
circular motion has endpoints that’s two ends of the diameter, but no endpoint as a whole.

277b 25
gravitational acceleration; the lower the heavier; the infinitely low, the infinitely heavy, the infinitely fast.

277b 1
things have to move by nature since if things only move by force more earth should move more difficultly toward the center, but reality has it the other way.

277b 5
the farther one gets from the forcer the slower it moves; so if a thing should move to its end by force it will not accelerate, as a thing resists being moved while the force declines more and more; this seems to give one case of exception, since here the forcer can only be the pusher.

277b 20
the center, the extremity and the intermediate; earth, aether and fire; fire cannot be outside aether since there’s nothing lighter than that which has no heaviness and always moves in its own way, for lightness is defined through in between the extremity and center, and light is the only contrary to heavy; plus, if fire gets outside it should be to another such place, which is proved impossible.

9.
278a 1
form and form in matter; universal and particular.

278a 10
a thing is unlimited in number if its form and matter are distinct.

278a 15
even if ideas are not actually separate from matter, they can be set apart in account and the generative principle is the same, since forms are simply universals.

278b 25
but heaven is the totality of matter and exhausts all matter.

278b 10
the outermost revolution is said to be heaven.

278b 15
the region of planets is also called heaven.

278b 20
the whole universe is also called heaven.

278b 30
there can be no place outside the outermost revolution, yet it’s not certain how big an expanse the revolution actually takes; but at least it cannot be unlimited and the stars don’t move about a different center.

279a 20
the timeless, placeless outside of heaven; heaven, the end of the “unlimited”.

279a 30
mysterious. Heaven is moved unceasingly by the primary things that are most divine and unmoved. So the first part refers to unmoved movers, the second part heaven?

10.
279b 10
either heaven comes to be and is eternal, or heaven comes to be and passes away, or it changes its state, sometimes passing away and other times not.

The first case is impossible. First we don’t see this happen. Second what has a starting point is capable of being in another state, since it’s caused to change. Third, a geometrical figure comes to be for us but always is in itself, this can be so because these figures are not self-contradictory; but heaven is said to come to be in itself, since it comes into order from disorder, hence comes to be from its contrary, while contraries don’t coexist at the same time. Fourth, if the cosmos alternates between order and disorder, it means that only its disposition changes, not itself, and disorder is just another form of composition. Since heaven is one and continuous, it doesn’t come to be unless there’s a composition before it, nor does it change before it comes to be, so it always persists and returns to itself; otherwise, there will be infinitely many cosmoses simultaneously, and what passes away in one comes to be in the other, so that only in this case can one cosmos completely pass away, which will be shown to be impossible.

11.
280b 10
Reeve is wrong in assigning counterparts. First kind is the coming to be of a state of being of a thing that contradicts the process of coming to be, not the coming to be of the thing itself. Being in contact and being in motion don’t come to be strictly since being in contact is a state indivisible and cannot “be coming to be”, whereas being in motion if it comes to be would entail infinite regress. Second kind is the actual coming to be of things within the given period. Third kind is the potential, possible coming to be of a thing, or how possible it is.

281a 10
capacity is defined through its maximum: sight has its maximum in relation to the smallest thing whereas speed the greatest distance.

12.
281a 30
if a thing is capable of being and not being, the thing must be and not be for determinate times. But if it’s capable of being for unlimited time, it has to be for unlimited time; for otherwise it would have a starting point, and would therefore not be capable of being for unlimited time.

281b 5
there’s impossibility versus falsity; and these again conditionally (based on hypotheses) or unconditionally.

281b 15
a thing can do contrary things at distinct times; if a thing can do things at unlimited time, these things are done simultaneously.

281b 20
things that always are cannot be capable of passing away, for they then must pass away at some time, and would therefore not always be. Hence there cannot be things that always are capable of passing away, for then they should not be and not always be capable.

282a 10
what is capable of both being and non-being is intermediary between what always is and what always is not, as that which is capable of both coming to be and passing away.

282b 1
(mistranslation by Reeve, something is incapable of coming to be or incapable of passing away).

283a 5
unlimited is definite, being the nothing is greater than. (Mistranslation by Reeve, from being incapable of passing away).

283a 15
things cannot be both always capable of being and non-being, nor alternate between the two, for then it amounts to saying that things are capable of coming to be and passing away for unlimited time. Yet this means that as a thing is capable of coming to be for unlimited time, it also is capable of non-being for an unlimited time, since only that which is not can come to be. But this is absurd, for if both capacities are realized by their maxima the two contraries both cover the full span of time.

283a 25
a thing also is not always capable of passing away for if one thing is capable of passing away, it should pass away at some time, yet always passing away will make things both always exist (since they are passing away) and not always exist.

283a 30
by chance or by nature. What is by chance cannot be incapable of change. Hence what is incapable of change has to be by nature. But if what is incapable of passing away were to come to be, its nature must dictate so. Its nature is therefore of two contradictories, but its matter, in order to actualize one term (non-being to being; coming to be), has to actively contradict the other (being for always; incapacity for passing away); which is impossible.

283b 15
the cause for coming to be entails a cause for passing away; if one thing was capable of coming to be, it will be capable of passing away, and vice versa; the capacity can therefore be transported into different times to contradict any active state; if a thing has come to be eternal, it still is capable of non-being absolutely, though it might not be capable of non-being at some definite time; hence it is capable of passing away, and that capacity once realized shall contradict the active state dictated.

II

1.
284a 5
such eternal motion has a limit but no cessation and is the complete motion that “starts” and “receives” every incomplete motion.

284a 15
such motion is also unlabored because it’s not kept moving by force.

284a 25
Empedocles sounds like Newton.

284a 30
the soul at leisure in activity when body is put to sleep. Dream and thinking coalesced.

2.
284b 20
up-down, left-right, front-back; starting point for dimension: length, breadth, depth; starting point for movement: growth, locomotion, perception.

284b 30
these pairs therefore don’t pertain to every body since not every body has such starting point of (universal) movement. Plant’s down for us is up, for instance. All these are therefore functional categories. But fire doesn’t have such starting point of motion, since it doesn’t move animatedly and its motive center is not localizable. To move animatedly means to be able to choose differently, or to have a capacity for a different actuality. It means to have a starting point literally, to be able to start and stop, so as to preserve capacity. Fire cannot withhold and preserve its own capacity, but its natural capacity is always either actualized or coerced and subdued. Hence for inanimate beings you only see activity and resistance, but not self-change and preservation.

285a 1
all these categories are only in relation to us. Like Timaeus, Aristotle proposes a disoriented world.

285a 20
up seems to be prior to right, since length is prior to breadth. A further development of this category: up like growth is the ultimate source of movement, right the direct cause of movement, and front like perception is the target of movement.

285a 25
heaven is animate. Yet this seems strange; how come fire is inanimate? Heaven can as well only move one way. But it might be heaven has a starting point (soul) for universal motion but chooses to move in one singular way.

285b 1
to have a starting point of motion seems to mean to have a universal capacity for motion, even though only one particular potency is actualized throughout. That is, even though heaven doesn’t grow, it has a starting point for growth as if it could grow; even though heaven doesn’t move differently,

285a 15
the only logic that seems to work for me is that: poles are unmoving, hence prior, sources, hence of length, hence up and down; right is relative to the human right(?) and so heading one hemisphere and the other changes the direction of movement, one is right to right the other is left to left; that in view of which movement is from right to right is thereby up. But is this not relative to human beings? Here it is somewhat more nuanced; it is not that we simply treat right as that which is opposite to our right, but rather in order to determine up, it needs be toward where the right of cosmos agrees with the right of man; the directions are determined by that which is the most intelligible.

3.
286a 10
god is for the function of eternal circular motion.

286a 15
center of cosmos does not move; center would then be the telos of circular movement since center is where heaven should come to rest; yet it then means that heaven cannot reach its telos and always moves contrary to nature; but what is contrary to nature cannot be eternal, hence that which circularly moves doesn’t aim at center, hence center is not the natural place of rest for heaven. Yet this seems to not account for the poles which are also at rest and the specific nature of circular movement. Also the assumption that which moves contrary to nature cannot move eternally seems dubious. It seems that he’s arguing, if a thing moves contrary to nature, it’s got capacity for its nature to be fully realized, then in infinite time it should be realized, otherwise it’s not its actual nature.

286a 25
since there’s one place there’s its contrary, hence its opposite element. And if there’s contrariety, there’s coming to be.

286b 1
since there’s coming to be, these other elements change and move towards their places; but also moved by the heaven, there would therefore be multiple circular motions, i.e. planetary motions, so as to be the cause of such coming to be and passing away of the composition of elements, as instruments for bringing on the local change of contraries.

4.
286b 10
sphere is the primary solid because it encompasses with one surface and nothing can be added to a circular line indefinitely, that it always closes off. Sphere is also indivisible into plane figures, since its surface is curved.

287a 1
primary body takes up the primary shape. Everything continuous with heaven will be spherical.

287a 15
this seems to be a good argument that solves the problem of necessity of rotating sphere, for a sphere if it doesn’t move circularly will move to a place outside, while there cannot be a place outside; the same if it’s not a sphere that rotates. Since if there’s only void outside, where is the place that the body actually goes to? And if there’s no medium nor resistance, how fast should the body move? And if it’s just the angular points moving through void circularly, what is the place it aims at? For it doesn’t move from a place to a place, as it moves only toward undifferentiated void, but not the unmoving limit of a body that is also a natural habitat for bodies; if it rotates it moves never to a place nor in a place. But suppose it does move into a void. That void, presumably, should have a nature that directs the motion. There’s then no reason why one other elements should not move there into that given void. The motion will then be always disturbed and no longer simple. And eventually it will settle into circle again. Though it’s better to think of it as simply eternal.

287a 25
circular path is the fastest path for a thing to return to itself. Is this true? According to Reeve, Archimedes proved that given an area the circle has the shortest path.

287b 10
sphere of everything starting from sphere of water.

5.
287b 25
what is by chance is what is capable of being otherwise, hence what is not eternal.

288a 1
nature always produces the best possible. Hence one direction more estimable than the other.

288a 20
since there’s no starting point of motion in circular movement, there’s no natural nor contrary place, hence no different speeds.

288a 30
it’s impossible for the mover of heaven, which is more divine than heaven, to change, hence these will always move heaven regularly.

288b 5
parts of heaven don’t change there respective distances, hence they don’t change speed; but the whole also doesn’t change speed for change of speed means change of capacity (or change of the actualization of this capacity) for motion, which entails change in the composition, that some parts in the composition become contrary to nature and resist such activity. This is impossible for heaven.

288b 20
since heaven moves eternally, if it moves irregularly it has to accelerate for infinite time and/or decelerate for infinite time, which is impossible, for if it does, we’ve already proved earlier incapacity or capacity cannot last for unlimited time and remain unactualized, and in this case, an animal slows down because it is incapable of such motion and will decelerate till it’s capable again, but if incapacity is eternal, it will be continuously actualized and hence always decelerate, and there would not be a definite magnitude, plus what’s contrary to nature cannot be for unlimited time; if it does both, it should accelerate and decelerate for equal times (unlimited), but what is contrary to nature is less than what is natural, hence also not possible.

7.
289a 20
stars look fiery because their movement are like missiles whose movements ignite and affect air into fire.

8.
289b 1
star movements. earth being at rest, star and heaven have to either both move or only one moves.

289b 5
The argument here seems to be: if circles and stars both move, since stars are all of the same nature, it seems unbelievable that they should all move proportionate in speed while also carried by the circles proportionately, so as to be choreographed with constant distance; the same holds for if the circles stay at rest and only they move. Hence stars don’t move but are only carried by the spheres.

290a 1
since all spheres are continuous and are hence one body, they naturally move with the sane angular speed so that they don’t encumber and go contrary to each other, thus dispersing the whole heaven; or the stars don’t cut through the spheres and shatter them, as if moving contrary to the flow of a river.

290a 15
the movement we see of stars are neither roll nor rotate, which most properly belong to stars if stars only move by themselves; if they only rotate, they should stay stationary, yet they do move; if they only roll, this would hold too. But not only this, they don’t rotate or roll at all, for if they rotate, they all rotate, yet we don’t see any star doing this except the sun, while this observation only happens at sunrise or sunset when the sun seems to wobble, but only due to our failing senses; if they roll, they all roll, then the moon should change its face toward us, since it’s carried around always facing us without rolling, and if it rolls it should change its face.

9.
290b 15
interesting idea; people believe heavenly bodies produce heavenly music. And we can’t hear them only because we are accustomed to them as background music.

290b 30
refutation: not only is it absurd that music might not be heard, it’s also impossible that no body is affected by such sound, as stones by thunder.

291a 10
because heavenly bodies are present in the spatially moving thing and don’t move by themselves, they don’t produce sounds. Sound is only produced by blows, hence only by that which moves by itself encountering other bodies unmoving or moving contrarily.

291a 20
nature does not foresee future so as to move in a way that preserves the sublunar bodies. A teleology non-anthropocentric. Or it might simply be that there’s no such way of movement that preserves sublunar bodies, so “not as if”. Yet how does this not apply to the spheres?

10.
291a 30
the farther from earth the slower is the planet completing its own ecliptic circle, since its own sphere’s motion runs contrary to the sphere of the stars.

11.
291b 10
this is bastard reasoning now. Sphere is least capable of motion so stars must be shaped like this. Also we see moon shows itself to be always parts of a circle. Also we see in eclipse the sun is crescent shaped, so the moon has to be a sphere. If one star is sphere, all are.

12.
291b 25
audacity of philosophy to solve puzzles. Two greatest puzzles.

291b 30
first puzzle is that why the intermediate planets have most movements rather than those farthest to earth. Since stars have only one movement and are simple, those closer should have fewer and be simper in motion.

292a 10
second puzzle is why the outermost sphere has apparently infinitely many bodies but we only have a finite number of planets.

292a 15
we think of stars as inanimate bodies, but we should conceive of them as participating in life and action.

292a 20
activity of perfection (perfect state) without action, such state with action by different degrees.

292a 25
while it’s difficult to excel on many things to reach perfection, it’s easier to excel on one thing to get closer to perfection. The farther away from perfection, the more aspects of lacking, and the weaker the power. Hence the closest only fills one lack, whereas the middle can fill many lacks, and the farthest can only fill one lack. It is better to fill a lack than to not fill any. In this sense, perfection cannot be quantitative, and power should not be equally distributed to feed every lack. It’s better to excel on one thing than to be average on everything.

292b 10
men are capable of excelling on many things to become perfect, but animals and plants are capable of only one to get closer to perfection, while gods excel on one simple thing that is being perfect.

292b 20
in the same vein stars are doing one thing to be perfect, outer planets many things to be perfect, inner planets one thing to get close to perfection. But do planets partake of coming to be? It seems necessary that planets have to strive against the possibility of passing away? But this needs not be. For planets are eternally moving multiple ways to stay in their own good state; their multiple circles cause coming to be and passing away of earthly things, forcing elements leave their natural places and making them return.

292b 25
the primary sphere moves infinitely many bodies because it is more powerful, whereas many inferior spheres move only one body.

293a 5
the inferior spheres only move one planet because the final sphere of the planet also moves other added-on spheres (eccentrics), hence one of the inferior spheres in the same stellar system can actually be said to move multiple bodies of spheres; and since its power is much more limited, moving more than one planet would be laborious.

13.
293a 20
Pythagoreans believe in a heliocentric model and the existence of an anti-earth; they don’t seek their accounts and causes toward appearances but drag appearances to their beliefs.

293a 30
they believe fire is more estimable than earth and hence should be at the center, which is more estimable than the middle.

293b 1
Pythagoreans also believe the positional center to be the center unconditionally, hence the most important location to be guarded by the strongest element, as if the center of a body is the same as the center of its being and soul.

293b 10
the starting point is estimable, but the center of the place is more of an ending than a starting point, since the center is what’s determined, the limit what determines. Limit is the substance, center the matter.

293b 20
earth is said to either move around the center, move at the center, or stay at rest at the center.

294a 5
those who believe earth to be flat think the horizon looks straight; but they don’t see that the circumference of earth is too big compared to how sun appears to is that it only looks flat. But they also claim that earth has to be flat since it stays at rest.

294a 10
the puzzle is how the whole earth, being heavy, doesn’t fall. People assume something must support earth.

294a 30
but the supporter must itself be supported; unless the support is unlimited, yet this must not be, and such opinion is due to mental laziness.

294b 1
water is lighter than earth and hence cannot support earth.

294b 5
inquiry should be directed to the matter itself and not to the person who objects, even if the person is oneself; for only with respect to the matter itself will the inquiry be theoretical, i.e. proper to the genus and includes all differentia. If we only focus on the person we would either not probe deep enough into the puzzle and would not be able to really grasp the matter and construct a theory. That argument is destroyed: but what is the new theory? And how do you know if your conviction is justified by things themselves?

294b 15
people believe the earth is flat so that it doesn’t cut the air below it so it can remain at rest. The air remains at rest because it has nowhere to go as if trapped in a jar.

295a 1
a different beginning: with the nature of things, not simply with the bodies.

295a 5
if there’s no motion by nature, there’s no motion by force, but it’s not necessary that if there’s motion by nature, there’s motion by force, since there’s the fifth element. Also if there’s no motion there’s no rest since things only are at rest when they move to the natural place or if they are forcibly stopped from moving, but it’s not the case that everything that moves has to come to rest, because of the fifth element.

295a 10
the earth stays at rest either naturally or forcibly. “Naturally” in the theory of flatness, forcibly in the theory of vortex, that the heavenly revolution forces earth to stay together.

295a 25
yet if the earth is forcibly at rest, where is its natural place? If it’s neither upward nor downward, and air above (and therefore below; for if air is trapped by earth below, why can’t air be trapped above? why can’t earth move upwards but only hampered by air atop? but this we see doesn’t happen, earth can be moved through air easily, and if earth can be forced through air easily, it’s easier to move through by nature) doesn’t prevent it from moving, it means we can’t find such natural place, which seems absurd.

295a 30
the vortex made parts of earth come together, but what forces other things now fall to earth? It can’t be vortex again since the vortex proper is too far off from us and the rotation of heaven is insensible to us. Also when things fall apart and stay in their own region is it also due to vortex that earth stays at rest?

295b 1
fire moves upward not due to vortex; also the vortex doesn’t cause heavy and light but move heavy and light things accordingly to their places, yet what then does this nature of heaviness entail if not to a natural place?

295b 10
the more subtle theory is a theory of similarity: because the center is similarly distant to both up and down, it cannot move to either, since one thing does not make movement in contrary directions at the same time.

295b 15
the problem however is that this argument of similarity dismisses the uniqueness of earth; anything at the center shall do the same and not earth alone. But earth moves towards center, so it shows that it has a nature for center.

295b 30
fire is immobile at the extremes; hence it’s not due to similarity of distance that things remain at rest.

296a 15
also earth as a whole could move in a radiating manner so that as a whole it reaches every extremity and does not move to any particular point, so that the principle of similarity is not breached, that the earth does not move to one particular point over the other.

14.
296a 30
earth has to be at rest because if it moves it has to move by force, for its natural movement always points to the center in a straight line; but what is by force is not eternal, while the cosmos is eternal.

296b 1
also if earth moves circularly it should move as circularly moving things near earth (other planets) move, that is, by two composite motions; but that should make earth move irregularly (suppose the earth is swept along the daily motion while always facing one direction, even though this already violates the principle of non-rotation/rolling) relative to the stars and make stars rise and set irregularly (retrograde), yet this is not observed.

296b 10
since the center of earth coincides with the center of universe, which we know by seeing heavy things fall by angles converging to the center of earth and not fall by parallel, we might wonder if things move to the center of earth or of universe; it has to be to the center of universe because fire moves straight upward, hence fire has to move all the way to the extremity of universe; that leaves earth, its direct contrary, the center of universe (other possible places are totally similar in form). If fire does not move out to the extremities it must stay at some circumference and not move further, yet this is impossible, for what other body could take up the remaining place, since there are only four bodies?

297a 1
mathematical reasoning supports that earth should be at the center, otherwise we might not see six of twelve constellations all the time anywhere; and the shadows cast at equinoxes might not be in a straight line; there might not be four equal seasons; the angular velocity of stars might change; and eclipses might not happen at the predicted time (from Ptolemy). But what if the whole observable world is moved out of the center, like all planets and constellations and the like are moved southward; but I guess then we should be able to observe, as our observer moves along the circumference to east or west until they are totally opposite, that stars don’t have the same angular velocities in reverse toward north and south; and thus it could be ruled out by calculation.

297a 10
earth has to be a sphere because like how Archimedes treats water under gravity earth also pushes to the center; if every part of earth comes together to the center from the extremes in a similar way, they should all add up equally from the center and be equally distant, hence a sphere; if every part is dissimilar, for a heavier and greater part shall push a lighter and lesser part away till itself equalizes at the center. For instance, if a stone falls to the center, as it first contacts the center, there’s no balance-weight on the other side, so it pushes past the center; then a smaller part of itself is pushed to the other side, and this smaller part tries to get to the center, hence pushes back against the larger part; now the motion continues until the stone’s center has coincided with the center of universe. Now one half of it pushes to the center, but the other half pushes back with equal force, and they equalize and remain at rest.

297b 15
if earth has come to be it has come to be the same way described; if it has been there forever it should be the same way as it would have come to be were it to come to be.

297b 20
moving at similar angles is also according to the nature of the sphere, hence earth should be sphere.

297b 25
also we perceive earth’s shape in lunar eclipses to be spherical.

298a 1
earth is also not great in magnitude because as one moves a little bit to the north a lot of stars shall vanish; so it means that one small change in angle shall cover great expanse; this is only possible when earth is very small compared to the whole heaven.

III

1.
298b 5
there’s the fifth element that’s eternal; are there elements that have or compose of coming to be? Is coming to be a real thing?

298b 15
Parmenides, there’s no actual coming to be of the things themselves; but they assume these unchanging things are only substance of perceptibles.

298b 25
Hesiod, all things come to be but stay always.

298b 30
Heraclitus, all things come to be and pass away except one thing that persists.

299a 15
the mathematical things are on the basis of abstraction, the natural ones are on the basis of an additional posit, perceptible matter.

299a 20
two ways of divisible affection: by species, so that different species within one genus are continuous to each other, and a thing is divided into its mixing contraries, like color into black and white; by coincidentals, so that one thing belonging to a divisible thing is itself also divisible, the thing hence divided into its substantial parts, like color into smaller parts of color, and the current inquiry related to bodies belongs to this category, since it’s not the contraries making these affections that we’re interested in teasing out, but the modified substance and its relation to the affection. In other words, the first way would be simply divide the state one thing suffers into heavy and light; but the second way divides the thing itself and its corresponding state.

299b 1
there’s always more or less of a relative, hence body is always able to be heavier or lighter, hence divisible. But if units are absolutely light they don’t make up heavy things.

300a 10
time also cannot be indivisible.

2.
300a 20
elements move, if they don’t move by nature they move by force, by force is contrary to nature, so they can move by nature.

300b 1
if a prime mover, supposedly elements according to others, doesn’t move by nature it has to move by force from a more primary mover, and ad infinitum.

300b 20
elements must not move disorderly as claimed by Timaeus, since either they are by force, hence they point to natural places, or they are by nature, and will eventually settle down.

300b 25
also, is it possible that disordered movements should compose bodies that are in accord with nature? The implied answer is no. And if such bodies were composed, it means that these motions already are organized by a natural purpose and destination, like the motion by friendship is not a completely disordered motion.

300b 30
unlimitedly many things moving in unlimitedly many movements: first, if there’s only one mover, it cannot be that there are unlimitedly many movements; second, if there’re unlimitedly many movers, it cannot be true, since there are only limitedly many movements; third, if there’re limitedly many movements, (mistranslation on Reeve again, missing μὴ from the original), this is still order, since disorder doesn’t mean not all things move to the same place.

301a 5
what’s disorderly is what’s contrary to nature. Hence what’s unlimited cannot be what’s disordered, since the nature of things is that which most of them have for most of the time, and therefore disorder will be natural and order will be contrary to nature, which is self-contradictory. Order doesn’t come by luck because it’s according to nature, yet under this view it’s simultaneously contrary to nature, which is absurd. Aristotle here is taking order to be synonymous or coeval with nature. He denies the palintropic possibility of “the only self-sameness is difference”.

301a 15
to aggregate heaven from elements is to disaggregate the original natural order of elements; that is what Aristotle previously argues, that what changes is just the disposition of the universe, not the substance.

301a 20
any element that naturally moves between contraries must have heaviness or lightness, otherwise it does not move to its end.

301b 1
any element forced to move between contraries also must have heaviness or lightness, otherwise it doesn’t move to its opposite in a limited way, which is impossible.

301b 15
nature is a starting point of movement within the thing itself; the intrinsic starting point is hence not exclusive to animals, only animals can withstand and preserve the potency to move. A capacity is a starting point of movement within another thing or within the thing itself insofar as it’s another.

301b 20
force either modifies the natural motion or causes its own motion.

301b 25
air is both heavy and light so air goes upward when there’s a little force pointing upward, and continues to push part by part the thrown object, until it settles down back to the heavy side.

302a 1
all bodies can change into other bodies, even elements (though it’s probably not so for the fifth element), yet there must be some bodies that don’t come to be, otherwise there should be void, since if everything comes to be, there must be a moment where nothing still exists, and there must therefore be void, since the place is not occupied by body.

3.
302a 15
an element of bodies is what other bodies are divided into, present in them either potentially or actively, and is not itself divisible into things distinct in species.

302a 25
a composite body cannot be present in an element even potentially, for if potentially we should at least be able to see and explain its coming to be from the element within the element.

302b 5
we see composite movements, composite movements come from simple movements, and simple movements are of simple bodies, hence there must be elements.

4.
302b 10
there is only limited number of kinds for elements; for first whatever is composite, even if homogenous, can be further divided. Composite bodies are therefore ruled out from the picture as candidates for elements.

302b 20
second, it’s not necessary to take unlimited elements, for from a limited number of species we could combine unlimitedly many things; and it’s always better to posit a limited number of starting points.

302b 30
even the contrarieties of bodies are always limited in number (regarding tangible qualities, which are the most appropriate and primary differentiae for bodies), it’s unreasonable to have unlimitedly many elements.

303a 1
a short rebuttal of atomism; but this refutation is already fully carried out earlier about the planes; anything divisible in thought is absolutely divisible, since there’s no metaphysical necessity, but only physical obstacle.

303a 10
shapes are not unlimited in number either, since there are starting points and differentiae for shapes, and these are finite in number.

303a 20
to say there’s unlimited number of indivisible atoms is in contradiction to mathematics and respectable opinions.

303b 1
just like there’s only so many primary shapes, so is for motion.

5.
303b 15
only the finest-grained elements are primary elements.

304a 1
since elements are divisible in magnitude, if they are defined in terms of magnitude, they will all be defined relative to each other, that earth will be fire to another.

304a 15
it’s subtler to claim that primary element has primary shape, which is pyramid.

304a 25
the argument seems to be: if air were indivisible, then air being comparable to water means air, which is more, should each element be bigger than water, when each water element turns into air element; yet air really is smaller, hence air must be divisible.

304b 1
but if the primary element is divisible, it cannot be defined by shape, otherwise the element contains in itself non-element; it also cannot be defined by magnitude for the same reason.

304b 15
those who compose everything by one element cannot explain the complexity of movement, especially that the more fire one has the faster it moves up whilst the more earth one has the faster it moves down, hence it’s not just relative nature but absolute nature that creates such difference. If it’s only a relative matter, then up or down depends on the quantity of element one has, yet it is independent of that, it must be the nature of the element itself.

6.
304b 25
for elements to be eternal is impossible, since they do dissolve; yet they can’t dissolve infinitely either in space or time, since in space implies also in time, and the time of dissolution has to be limited, so dissolution and composition both will stop at some point.

305a 5
division will not stop at indivisible since there’s no indivisible body; it also will not stop at that which is not actively divided, since a smaller body is more easily divided than a larger one, and hence what is divisible will nearly always be actively divided.

305a 10
two ways of destruction: by contraries or by dying out, which is either dissolution into smaller and smaller parts until all parts vanish away into indiscernible or elements move away into somewhere else while that from which the element is replenished is exhausted.

305a 15
elements come to be either from incorporeal things or from bodies; they cannot come from an incorporeal thing for that necessitates void, because if there once were no bodies but then suddenly there are, it must be thought that there’s void before the body exists and occupies it, for all bodies that come to be come to be in a place. But if elements come from bodies, they come from not another body but from among themselves, for if from another body that body will itself be an element capable of moving in a place, or that body shall be totally immobile and hence has no place at all. For a place is not a stipulation or abstraction, for that could be arbitrary; if body A is immobile at the center, one cannot give an account as to why A has to stay at the center, since if you ideally move A to another place (there’s no metaphysical impossibility here), A should stay immobile at a different place. Place, therefore, is that which a body naturally stays at and naturally moves to.

7.
306a 5 —— 306a 15
“result is that people speaking about these things……”

8.
306b 5
element shapes don’t fill up the whole space.

306b 10
elements change shape according to its encompassing place, that is, other bodies surrounding it.

306b 15
it’s reasonable that the elements must be thought of in the same way as all-receptive matter. For they are capable of transforming into each other despite their qualitative differences, though pure matter is never actively separated from these differences.

306b 25
also composite bodies wouldn’t be continuous were elements shaped, and bodies themselves can’t be made up of planes since they were first made up of elements, for there must be elements and simple bodies to make up composite ones, as we observe in appearance.

307a 5
and even the shapes assigned to elements aren’t correct ones; for neither spheres nor pyramids conform to the natural movement of fire, for instance. Also when in the natural place all elements shall be cubes, which allegedly are least capable of motion.

307a 15
all elements have angles so all angles are like fire, which is obviously false, since all elements are different by kind.

307a 20
fire cuts things into fire; this is funny, as if it’s saws cutting things into saws.

307b 1
fire unites and aggregates things of the same kind, and cutting or dividing is only coincidental to fire.

307b 5
cold has no shape as opposed to hot; shape has no direct or positive contrary. Hence if hot has a shape, what might be the shape of cold?

307b 10
Timaeus’ definitions of elements contradict each other, since at one point it is through shape, at another it’s through size.

IV

1.
308a 30
definition of “up” and “down”, “heavy” and “light”: up is the extremity, down the center; unconditional heaviness that which actively moves downward (naturally), lightness that which actively moves upward. What is relative heaviness is that which of equal mass(volume) moves downward faster.

2.
308b 15
a larger mass of fire moves upward faster; hence heaviness is not related to mass.

308b 25
also if what is heavier has more numerous parts, air will at one point be heavier than water, yet this never happens.

309a 1
another cause for such incongruity: void enclosed makes more volume less heavy.

309a 30
what is unconditionally light, like fire, if it moves upwards merely due to the void it encloses, will at one point be heavier than a small part of earth, yet this never happens, since fire is determined to be naturally and unconditionally light. The same is with water and earth; yet since water has the nature of both heavy and light, it will move downward, and the larger the magnitude, the faster it moves, so initially it would seem that water of a larger mass is weightier than earth of a smaller mass. Yet there will be one point where earth sinks down in water. So the same argument still holds, that at the place really close to the center, if water only had a higher ratio of void, eventually a larger mass of water will have more weight than earth and should push earth away from the center, but this never happens.

309b 10
it also cannot be the ratio between plenum and void that causes such phenomena; for if fire has the same ratio always, it will not move faster with larger mass.

309b 15
and if the void enclosed doesn’t move but causes the thing to move, this is absurd; if the void moves, this is also impossible, since the void might simply leave the thing, and there’s no reason why simple bodies should move the way they do.

309b 25
the impossibility of void(space), which has no nature, moving to places. Even if void does have a nature to move, the solid shouldn’t move along, since the solid doesn’t share this nature. And simple magnitudes, like space, are not differentiae for a body under the genus of cosmos, for these differences do not differentiate equal parts from each other, since magnitude is relative, but forms are absolute and distinct. And therefore a body could move indefinitely, which is absurd. Magnitude is therefore a secondary differentia that is applicable to already formed things.

309b 30
if there’s one matter, there’s only relative heaviness and lightness; if there’s only a pair of contraries, there’s no intermediation. What’s the alternative? Is it to have multiple natures? It seems rather that one should say there’s only one matter but two contraries; that the two contraries are principles of this one matter, which are themselves not separate entities, like void and plenum, but are generators of natures or differentiae.

3.
310a 25
change comes about from contraries to contraries or to intermediates, and not the change from what is random to what is random. Mover and moved are distinct.

310b 1
this is such crucial passage! One important aspect of Aristotelian natural philosophy is finally clarified: earth as a whole moves to the center because center is the limit encompassed by other bodies so as to be properly formed; the potency of heaviness is thereby actualized by the mover into the formation of earth. So with other elements. The nature of these elements is therefore to move to a place where their form is properly actualized by being encompassed properly. Water to air to fire, air to water to earth, a chain of material and formation, though two extremities of the chain do not resemble each other and are in themselves not mediated. This can also be understood in a different direction: since there is the center, the thing formed at the center should receive such form in its own nature; hence its nature is to move to the center to be formed thus; such element is earth.

310b 25
a sophisticated account. Aristotle seems to suggest that: unlike a substance indifferent to contraries, e.g. a thing equally capable of being healthy or ill, a substance like fire has a natural tendency to go upward (since that’s its telos when it first comes to be). Hence there are two potencies of a thing, one is a natural potency which is nature yet to be actualized, the other is a capacity to be hindered in this actualization. It’s therefore important to see that activity-potency is a predetermined polarity structure: not what is real or current is what is active, for what is active is that which has a mastering hand in the thing’s nature. This is the same in the case of nourishment, for nourishment is the cause when present makes body tend toward health, if not impeded from attaining it. Therefore a thing can have a starting point of motion in itself, though the cause for its motion might be only that which removes the obstacle or that which sets it off (overcoming the initial resistance), etc.

4.
311b 15
it’s apparent that fire always moves upward and never sinks below and nothing rises above it, hence fire is unconditionally light and has no heaviness whatsoever. Yet does this not incur a difficulty of calculation? Hopefully, what is unconditionally light doesn’t mean what is infinitely light (it also seems that isn’t the case), for how can what is infinitely light be forced down, and how can what is infinitely light not move infinitely fast? Therefore what Aristotle means by unconditional cannot be unlimited. Rather it seems like what is unconditionally light means that its speed of moving upward is due to its mass and proximity to extremity, and is not bounded or constrained by anything but the resistance of other heavy bodies. Unconditional lightness or heaviness therefore means that wherever one element is present in another, it naturally moves up or down, but has nothing to do with the speed it has moving up or down, since that has to do with a lot of factors.

312a 15
heavy and light have the same matter but different beings; earth and fire, health and disease. So the matter is capable of both and indifferent to both, but the being, once formed into fire or earth or nourishment or harm, has a natural capacity and a capacity contrary to nature.

5.
312a 25
(another mistranslation, air rises above everything…)

312a 30
it makes sense that there should be three kinds; yet why is it necessary to have four elements? Why not even more numerous, as Aristotle admits?

312b 1
bodies that are both heavy and light move downward in its own space until it encounters something it cannot sink lower than. But why not the reverse? It’s because these two are used as matter and are therefore encompassed and formed by higher things, yet they cannot move upward and be transformed: forms can be used as matter, but matter cannot be used as form.

312b 20
there must be natures that correspond to the number of kinds; if there is only one kind, there’s no unconditional contrary; if there are only two kinds, there’s either no intermediate, or the intermediates aren’t unconditional to each other; therefore the contraries are not entities, but principles to rule what and how many entities that are themselves homogenous and of their own singular nature. And the mass of this body is simply the magnitude of this singular nature; the larger the magnitude, the stronger its capacity, the faster its natural movement.

6.
313b 15
the reason why sometimes specially shaped heavy bodies float on light bodies is that, since bodies are continuous, and continuity has a strength of not being divided; therefore, if the surface covered is large enough, the weight does not succeed in cutting through the continuous body, since the larger and the less divisible (air is more divisible than water, water than earth) a body is, the strength required to divide it is more.