Aristotle · 亚里士多德
De Caelo · 论天
Undated 未注日期
De Caelo — Reading notes
Reflections · Apple Notes
Revised 29 December 2023
I
1.
268a 1
bodies and magnitudes; affections and movements; starting points. that which is body and magnitude; that which has body and magnitude (animals? composites?); that which are starting points of body and magnitude.
268a 5
continuity is that which is always divisible; body is that which is divisible in all ways (three ways).
268a 10
weird Pythagorean theory, given his critique on Pythagoreanism.
268a 15
“all things” and “the All” and “complete” have the same form, that is, they have the same meaning, though might be used on different subjects; but their shared meaning entails the things should be bodies, since bodies fit the form of the All.
268a 25
definition of continuity retracted; that which is continuous does not necessarily entail that which is divisible, at least not yet proved.
268b 5
the All includes complete bodies as parts of itself being in a way all things.
2.
268b 10
parts of the All, motion by nature; rectilinear or circular as simple movements; up, down and around, no such thing as natural horizontal linear movement; the number three.
268b 25
simple or composite body, simple or composite movement that is mostly that of the predominant element.
269a 5
movement by force and movement by nature; there has to be a simple body that moves simply in a circle according to nature.
269a 10
if circular motion is contrary to something’s nature, we have to appoint one such simple body which moves “strictly” contrary to a circle (for rectilinear motion is in general contrary to circular motion, yet since circular motion is simple, we need to find something else that is its simple contrary, that is what I call “strictly contrary), which we couldn’t in the four elements; so circular motion is of some other body; is this argument not unnecessarily complex? But this might be supplementary to the first argument.
269a 20
circle is more complete and hence more primary; both unlimited or limited lines are incomplete; hence circular motion is more primary and must find its corresponding natural body.
269a 30
circular motion is not strictly contrary to the movement of fire or earth, but is in general contrary to rectilinear motion; so there must be one nature that moves in a circle.
269b 5
if circular motion is applied only by force, that body will pass away the fastest and not be eternal; hence the four elements don’t move simply in a circle.
269b 15
such body is more estimable (knowable) than the four elements because it’s farther away
3.
269b 20
how do bodies move to or away from the center relatively? It might be the place they finally rest; or it’s just the intensity of movement.
269b 30
circularly moving bodies are neither light nor heavy and cannot move according or contrary to nature up or down, since if it moves down contrary to nature, it means its upward movement is natural, which is false; therefore the stars cannot be forced up or down. Though I do wonder if rectilinear movement can be considered to be its contrary.
270a 15
actually, circular motion has no contrary and hence does not change. It seems that it cannot move linearly contrary to nature because rectilinear motion is itself not a simple entity, nor a simple contrary motion; if it’s rectilinear, it’s either up or down, and if it’s up it means down is its contrary, not circular.
270a 20
there’s no increase or decrease of heavenly bodies since they don’t come to be; they don’t alter since they don’t increase or decrease.
270b 1
attestation to appearances (custom). Gods dwell among stars.
270b 10
attestation to perceptions. No one sees change in stars.
4.
Bruh.
arbitrary standard for contrarieties. Even if contraries do exist, they are made “pointless”.
5.
271b 10
starting-points are often small in magnitude but large in capacity.
271b 20
limited things (in number and magnitude) make up limited things.
271b 30
if the primary body is unlimited, the circle is unlimited, the interval through which it passes is unlimited, which is impossible.
272b 1
unlimited thing cannot move as a whole, for an unlimited thing cannot pass the smallest distance, since passing means from the beginning of the unlimited to move to its end, which can’t be done. Yet we see the Heaven as a whole move and pass around.
6.
273a 10
up and down are both definite directions to definite places, as center is definite; this actually makes sense since in an actual infinity no place can be determinate.
7.
274b 1
forms are limited since simple motions are limited.
274b 5
number in each form is limited, since unlimited heaviness is impossible, for the thing will be simultaneously moving and unmoving.
274b 10
movement and place of a body cannot be unlimited either, for there’s no such thing as infinite coming to be without a destination.
274b 20
nor can there be multiple unlimited bodies, hence unlimited body cannot be un-homoeumorous.
274b 25
an unlimited body is not homoeomerous, that is its whole is not of the same kind as its parts.
275a 10
this seems to me to be the ultimate argument: unlimited has no ratio to the limited.
275b 5
unlimited bodies can only be imperceptible. Anything outside heaven, however, is in a place, and is therefore perceptible. So what is outside heaven, either absolutely or partially, cannot be unlimited body.
275b 15
any unlimited movement requires two unlimited places.
276a 1
it’s impossible to have simple particles because they all have the same nature and hence should move the same way. But this is false. Yet if this were true, these should all move either up or down together, and hence posit a center, which is impossible if body were unlimited.
8.
276b 1
there’s only one heaven for all elements move to the same places they belong to.
276b 15
a decentralized universe where orientation is broken.
276b 20
distance doesn’t affect the nature of moving body.
276b 25
it’s evident things move; things can only move if they can move by nature; the same nature or form points to one place; if the same nature points to many similar places, the prior argument should hold.
277b 15
again the only-one-contrary principle.
277b 20
circular motion has endpoints that’s two ends of the diameter, but no endpoint as a whole.
277b 25
gravitational acceleration; the lower the heavier; the infinitely low, the infinitely heavy, the infinitely fast.
277b 1
things have to move by nature since if things only move by force more earth should move more difficultly toward the center, but reality has it the other way.
277b 5
the farther one gets from the forcer the slower it moves; so if a thing should move to its end by force it will not accelerate, as a thing resists being moved while the force declines more and more; this seems to give one case of exception, since here the forcer can only be the pusher.
277b 20
the center, the extremity and the intermediate; earth, aether and fire; fire cannot be outside aether since there’s nothing lighter than that which has no heaviness and always moves in its own way, for lightness is defined through in between the extremity and center, and light is the only contrary to heavy; plus, if fire gets outside it should be to another such place, which is proved impossible.
9.
278a 1
form and form in matter; universal and particular.
278a 10
a thing is unlimited in number if its form and matter are distinct.
278a 15
even if ideas are not actually separate from matter, they can be set apart in account and the generative principle is the same, since forms are simply universals.
278b 25
but heaven is the totality of matter and exhausts all matter.
278b 10
the outermost revolution is said to be heaven.
278b 15
the region of planets is also called heaven.
278b 20
the whole universe is also called heaven.
278b 30
there can be no place outside the outermost revolution, yet it’s not certain how big an expanse the revolution actually takes; but at least it cannot be unlimited and the stars don’t move about a different center.
279a 20
the timeless, placeless outside of heaven; heaven, the end of the “unlimited”.
279a 30
mysterious. Heaven is moved unceasingly by the primary things that are most divine and unmoved. So the first part refers to unmoved movers, the second part heaven?
10.
279b 10
either heaven comes to be and is eternal, or heaven comes to be and passes away, or it changes its state, sometimes passing away and other times not.
The first case is impossible. First we don’t see this happen. Second what has a starting point is capable of being in another state, since it’s caused to change. Third, a geometrical figure comes to be for us but always is in itself, this can be so because these figures are not self-contradictory; but heaven is said to come to be in itself, since it comes into order from disorder, hence comes to be from its contrary, while contraries don’t coexist at the same time. Fourth, if the cosmos alternates between order and disorder, it means that only its disposition changes, not itself, and disorder is just another form of composition. Since heaven is one and continuous, it doesn’t come to be unless there’s a composition before it, nor does it change before it comes to be, so it always persists and returns to itself; otherwise, there will be infinitely many cosmoses simultaneously, and what passes away in one comes to be in the other, so that only in this case can one cosmos completely pass away, which will be shown to be impossible.
11.
280b 10
Reeve is wrong in assigning counterparts. First kind is the coming to be of a state of being of a thing that contradicts the process of coming to be, not the coming to be of the thing itself. Being in contact and being in motion don’t come to be strictly since being in contact is a state indivisible and cannot “be coming to be”, whereas being in motion if it comes to be would entail infinite regress. Second kind is the actual coming to be of things within the given period. Third kind is the potential, possible coming to be of a thing, or how possible it is.
281a 10
capacity is defined through its maximum: sight has its maximum in relation to the smallest thing whereas speed the greatest distance.
12.
281a 30
if a thing is capable of being and not being, the thing must be and not be for determinate times. But if it’s capable of being for unlimited time, it has to be for unlimited time; for otherwise it would have a starting point, and would therefore not be capable of being for unlimited time.
281b 5
there’s impossibility versus falsity; and these again conditionally (based on hypotheses) or unconditionally.
281b 15
a thing can do contrary things at distinct times; if a thing can do things at unlimited time, these things are done simultaneously.
281b 20
things that always are cannot be capable of passing away, for they then must pass away at some time, and would therefore not always be. Hence there cannot be things that always are capable of passing away, for then they should not be and not always be capable.
282a 10
what is capable of both being and non-being is intermediary between what always is and what always is not, as that which is capable of both coming to be and passing away.
282b 1
(mistranslation by Reeve, something is incapable of coming to be or incapable of passing away).
283a 5
unlimited is definite, being the nothing is greater than. (Mistranslation by Reeve, from being incapable of passing away).
283a 15
things cannot be both always capable of being and non-being, nor alternate between the two, for then it amounts to saying that things are capable of coming to be and passing away for unlimited time. Yet this means that as a thing is capable of coming to be for unlimited time, it also is capable of non-being for an unlimited time, since only that which is not can come to be. But this is absurd, for if both capacities are realized by their maxima the two contraries both cover the full span of time.
283a 25
a thing also is not always capable of passing away for if one thing is capable of passing away, it should pass away at some time, yet always passing away will make things both always exist (since they are passing away) and not always exist.
283a 30
by chance or by nature. What is by chance cannot be incapable of change. Hence what is incapable of change has to be by nature. But if what is incapable of passing away were to come to be, its nature must dictate so. Its nature is therefore of two contradictories, but its matter, in order to actualize one term (non-being to being; coming to be), has to actively contradict the other (being for always; incapacity for passing away); which is impossible.
283b 15
the cause for coming to be entails a cause for passing away; if one thing was capable of coming to be, it will be capable of passing away, and vice versa; the capacity can therefore be transported into different times to contradict any active state; if a thing has come to be eternal, it still is capable of non-being absolutely, though it might not be capable of non-being at some definite time; hence it is capable of passing away, and that capacity once realized shall contradict the active state dictated.
II
1.
284a 5
such eternal motion has a limit but no cessation and is the complete motion that “starts” and “receives” every incomplete motion.
284a 15
such motion is also unlabored because it’s not kept moving by force.
284a 25
Empedocles sounds like Newton.
284a 30
the soul at leisure in activity when body is put to sleep. Dream and thinking coalesced.
2.
284b 20
up-down, left-right, front-back; starting point for dimension: length, breadth, depth; starting point for movement: growth, locomotion, perception.
284b 30
these pairs therefore don’t pertain to every body since not every body has such starting point of (universal) movement. Plant’s down for us is up, for instance. All these are therefore functional categories. But fire doesn’t have such starting point of motion, since it doesn’t move animatedly and its motive center is not localizable. To move animatedly means to be able to choose differently, or to have a capacity for a different actuality. It means to have a starting point literally, to be able to start and stop, so as to preserve capacity. Fire cannot withhold and preserve its own capacity, but its natural capacity is always either actualized or coerced and subdued. Hence for inanimate beings you only see activity and resistance, but not self-change and preservation.
285a 1
all these categories are only in relation to us. Like Timaeus, Aristotle proposes a disoriented world.
285a 20
up seems to be prior to right, since length is prior to breadth. A further development of this category: up like growth is the ultimate source of movement, right the direct cause of movement, and front like perception is the target of movement.
285a 25
heaven is animate. Yet this seems strange; how come fire is inanimate? Heaven can as well only move one way. But it might be heaven has a starting point (soul) for universal motion but chooses to move in one singular way.
285b 1
to have a starting point of motion seems to mean to have a universal capacity for motion, even though only one particular potency is actualized throughout. That is, even though heaven doesn’t grow, it has a starting point for growth as if it could grow; even though heaven doesn’t move differently,
285a 15
the only logic that seems to work for me is that: poles are unmoving, hence prior, sources, hence of length, hence up and down; right is relative to the human right(?) and so heading one hemisphere and the other changes the direction of movement, one is right to right the other is left to left; that in view of which movement is from right to right is thereby up. But is this not relative to human beings? Here it is somewhat more nuanced; it is not that we simply treat right as that which is opposite to our right, but rather in order to determine up, it needs be toward where the right of cosmos agrees with the right of man; the directions are determined by that which is the most intelligible.
3.
286a 10
god is for the function of eternal circular motion.
286a 15
center of cosmos does not move; center would then be the telos of circular movement since center is where heaven should come to rest; yet it then means that heaven cannot reach its telos and always moves contrary to nature; but what is contrary to nature cannot be eternal, hence that which circularly moves doesn’t aim at center, hence center is not the natural place of rest for heaven. Yet this seems to not account for the poles which are also at rest and the specific nature of circular movement. Also the assumption that which moves contrary to nature cannot move eternally seems dubious. It seems that he’s arguing, if a thing moves contrary to nature, it’s got capacity for its nature to be fully realized, then in infinite time it should be realized, otherwise it’s not its actual nature.
286a 25
since there’s one place there’s its contrary, hence its opposite element. And if there’s contrariety, there’s coming to be.
286b 1
since there’s coming to be, these other elements change and move towards their places; but also moved by the heaven, there would therefore be multiple circular motions, i.e. planetary motions, so as to be the cause of such coming to be and passing away of the composition of elements, as instruments for bringing on the local change of contraries.
4.
286b 10
sphere is the primary solid because it encompasses with one surface and nothing can be added to a circular line indefinitely, that it always closes off. Sphere is also indivisible into plane figures, since its surface is curved.
287a 1
primary body takes up the primary shape. Everything continuous with heaven will be spherical.
287a 15
this seems to be a good argument that solves the problem of necessity of rotating sphere, for a sphere if it doesn’t move circularly will move to a place outside, while there cannot be a place outside; the same if it’s not a sphere that rotates. Since if there’s only void outside, where is the place that the body actually goes to? And if there’s no medium nor resistance, how fast should the body move? And if it’s just the angular points moving through void circularly, what is the place it aims at? For it doesn’t move from a place to a place, as it moves only toward undifferentiated void, but not the unmoving limit of a body that is also a natural habitat for bodies; if it rotates it moves never to a place nor in a place. But suppose it does move into a void. That void, presumably, should have a nature that directs the motion. There’s then no reason why one other elements should not move there into that given void. The motion will then be always disturbed and no longer simple. And eventually it will settle into circle again. Though it’s better to think of it as simply eternal.
287a 25
circular path is the fastest path for a thing to return to itself. Is this true? According to Reeve, Archimedes proved that given an area the circle has the shortest path.
287b 10
sphere of everything starting from sphere of water.
5.
287b 25
what is by chance is what is capable of being otherwise, hence what is not eternal.
288a 1
nature always produces the best possible. Hence one direction more estimable than the other.
288a 20
since there’s no starting point of motion in circular movement, there’s no natural nor contrary place, hence no different speeds.
288a 30
it’s impossible for the mover of heaven, which is more divine than heaven, to change, hence these will always move heaven regularly.
288b 5
parts of heaven don’t change there respective distances, hence they don’t change speed; but the whole also doesn’t change speed for change of speed means change of capacity (or change of the actualization of this capacity) for motion, which entails change in the composition, that some parts in the composition become contrary to nature and resist such activity. This is impossible for heaven.
288b 20
since heaven moves eternally, if it moves irregularly it has to accelerate for infinite time and/or decelerate for infinite time, which is impossible, for if it does, we’ve already proved earlier incapacity or capacity cannot last for unlimited time and remain unactualized, and in this case, an animal slows down because it is incapable of such motion and will decelerate till it’s capable again, but if incapacity is eternal, it will be continuously actualized and hence always decelerate, and there would not be a definite magnitude, plus what’s contrary to nature cannot be for unlimited time; if it does both, it should accelerate and decelerate for equal times (unlimited), but what is contrary to nature is less than what is natural, hence also not possible.
7.
289a 20
stars look fiery because their movement are like missiles whose movements ignite and affect air into fire.
8.
289b 1
star movements. earth being at rest, star and heaven have to either both move or only one moves.
289b 5
The argument here seems to be: if circles and stars both move, since stars are all of the same nature, it seems unbelievable that they should all move proportionate in speed while also carried by the circles proportionately, so as to be choreographed with constant distance; the same holds for if the circles stay at rest and only they move. Hence stars don’t move but are only carried by the spheres.
290a 1
since all spheres are continuous and are hence one body, they naturally move with the sane angular speed so that they don’t encumber and go contrary to each other, thus dispersing the whole heaven; or the stars don’t cut through the spheres and shatter them, as if moving contrary to the flow of a river.
290a 15
the movement we see of stars are neither roll nor rotate, which most properly belong to stars if stars only move by themselves; if they only rotate, they should stay stationary, yet they do move; if they only roll, this would hold too. But not only this, they don’t rotate or roll at all, for if they rotate, they all rotate, yet we don’t see any star doing this except the sun, while this observation only happens at sunrise or sunset when the sun seems to wobble, but only due to our failing senses; if they roll, they all roll, then the moon should change its face toward us, since it’s carried around always facing us without rolling, and if it rolls it should change its face.
9.
290b 15
interesting idea; people believe heavenly bodies produce heavenly music. And we can’t hear them only because we are accustomed to them as background music.
290b 30
refutation: not only is it absurd that music might not be heard, it’s also impossible that no body is affected by such sound, as stones by thunder.
291a 10
because heavenly bodies are present in the spatially moving thing and don’t move by themselves, they don’t produce sounds. Sound is only produced by blows, hence only by that which moves by itself encountering other bodies unmoving or moving contrarily.
291a 20
nature does not foresee future so as to move in a way that preserves the sublunar bodies. A teleology non-anthropocentric. Or it might simply be that there’s no such way of movement that preserves sublunar bodies, so “not as if”. Yet how does this not apply to the spheres?
10.
291a 30
the farther from earth the slower is the planet completing its own ecliptic circle, since its own sphere’s motion runs contrary to the sphere of the stars.
11.
291b 10
this is bastard reasoning now. Sphere is least capable of motion so stars must be shaped like this. Also we see moon shows itself to be always parts of a circle. Also we see in eclipse the sun is crescent shaped, so the moon has to be a sphere. If one star is sphere, all are.
12.
291b 25
audacity of philosophy to solve puzzles. Two greatest puzzles.
291b 30
first puzzle is that why the intermediate planets have most movements rather than those farthest to earth. Since stars have only one movement and are simple, those closer should have fewer and be simper in motion.
292a 10
second puzzle is why the outermost sphere has apparently infinitely many bodies but we only have a finite number of planets.
292a 15
we think of stars as inanimate bodies, but we should conceive of them as participating in life and action.
292a 20
activity of perfection (perfect state) without action, such state with action by different degrees.
292a 25
while it’s difficult to excel on many things to reach perfection, it’s easier to excel on one thing to get closer to perfection. The farther away from perfection, the more aspects of lacking, and the weaker the power. Hence the closest only fills one lack, whereas the middle can fill many lacks, and the farthest can only fill one lack. It is better to fill a lack than to not fill any. In this sense, perfection cannot be quantitative, and power should not be equally distributed to feed every lack. It’s better to excel on one thing than to be average on everything.
292b 10
men are capable of excelling on many things to become perfect, but animals and plants are capable of only one to get closer to perfection, while gods excel on one simple thing that is being perfect.
292b 20
in the same vein stars are doing one thing to be perfect, outer planets many things to be perfect, inner planets one thing to get close to perfection. But do planets partake of coming to be? It seems necessary that planets have to strive against the possibility of passing away? But this needs not be. For planets are eternally moving multiple ways to stay in their own good state; their multiple circles cause coming to be and passing away of earthly things, forcing elements leave their natural places and making them return.
292b 25
the primary sphere moves infinitely many bodies because it is more powerful, whereas many inferior spheres move only one body.
293a 5
the inferior spheres only move one planet because the final sphere of the planet also moves other added-on spheres (eccentrics), hence one of the inferior spheres in the same stellar system can actually be said to move multiple bodies of spheres; and since its power is much more limited, moving more than one planet would be laborious.
13.
293a 20
Pythagoreans believe in a heliocentric model and the existence of an anti-earth; they don’t seek their accounts and causes toward appearances but drag appearances to their beliefs.
293a 30
they believe fire is more estimable than earth and hence should be at the center, which is more estimable than the middle.
293b 1
Pythagoreans also believe the positional center to be the center unconditionally, hence the most important location to be guarded by the strongest element, as if the center of a body is the same as the center of its being and soul.
293b 10
the starting point is estimable, but the center of the place is more of an ending than a starting point, since the center is what’s determined, the limit what determines. Limit is the substance, center the matter.
293b 20
earth is said to either move around the center, move at the center, or stay at rest at the center.
294a 5
those who believe earth to be flat think the horizon looks straight; but they don’t see that the circumference of earth is too big compared to how sun appears to is that it only looks flat. But they also claim that earth has to be flat since it stays at rest.
294a 10
the puzzle is how the whole earth, being heavy, doesn’t fall. People assume something must support earth.
294a 30
but the supporter must itself be supported; unless the support is unlimited, yet this must not be, and such opinion is due to mental laziness.
294b 1
water is lighter than earth and hence cannot support earth.
294b 5
inquiry should be directed to the matter itself and not to the person who objects, even if the person is oneself; for only with respect to the matter itself will the inquiry be theoretical, i.e. proper to the genus and includes all differentia. If we only focus on the person we would either not probe deep enough into the puzzle and would not be able to really grasp the matter and construct a theory. That argument is destroyed: but what is the new theory? And how do you know if your conviction is justified by things themselves?
294b 15
people believe the earth is flat so that it doesn’t cut the air below it so it can remain at rest. The air remains at rest because it has nowhere to go as if trapped in a jar.
295a 1
a different beginning: with the nature of things, not simply with the bodies.
295a 5
if there’s no motion by nature, there’s no motion by force, but it’s not necessary that if there’s motion by nature, there’s motion by force, since there’s the fifth element. Also if there’s no motion there’s no rest since things only are at rest when they move to the natural place or if they are forcibly stopped from moving, but it’s not the case that everything that moves has to come to rest, because of the fifth element.
295a 10
the earth stays at rest either naturally or forcibly. “Naturally” in the theory of flatness, forcibly in the theory of vortex, that the heavenly revolution forces earth to stay together.
295a 25
yet if the earth is forcibly at rest, where is its natural place? If it’s neither upward nor downward, and air above (and therefore below; for if air is trapped by earth below, why can’t air be trapped above? why can’t earth move upwards but only hampered by air atop? but this we see doesn’t happen, earth can be moved through air easily, and if earth can be forced through air easily, it’s easier to move through by nature) doesn’t prevent it from moving, it means we can’t find such natural place, which seems absurd.
295a 30
the vortex made parts of earth come together, but what forces other things now fall to earth? It can’t be vortex again since the vortex proper is too far off from us and the rotation of heaven is insensible to us. Also when things fall apart and stay in their own region is it also due to vortex that earth stays at rest?
295b 1
fire moves upward not due to vortex; also the vortex doesn’t cause heavy and light but move heavy and light things accordingly to their places, yet what then does this nature of heaviness entail if not to a natural place?
295b 10
the more subtle theory is a theory of similarity: because the center is similarly distant to both up and down, it cannot move to either, since one thing does not make movement in contrary directions at the same time.
295b 15
the problem however is that this argument of similarity dismisses the uniqueness of earth; anything at the center shall do the same and not earth alone. But earth moves towards center, so it shows that it has a nature for center.
295b 30
fire is immobile at the extremes; hence it’s not due to similarity of distance that things remain at rest.
296a 15
also earth as a whole could move in a radiating manner so that as a whole it reaches every extremity and does not move to any particular point, so that the principle of similarity is not breached, that the earth does not move to one particular point over the other.
14.
296a 30
earth has to be at rest because if it moves it has to move by force, for its natural movement always points to the center in a straight line; but what is by force is not eternal, while the cosmos is eternal.
296b 1
also if earth moves circularly it should move as circularly moving things near earth (other planets) move, that is, by two composite motions; but that should make earth move irregularly (suppose the earth is swept along the daily motion while always facing one direction, even though this already violates the principle of non-rotation/rolling) relative to the stars and make stars rise and set irregularly (retrograde), yet this is not observed.
296b 10
since the center of earth coincides with the center of universe, which we know by seeing heavy things fall by angles converging to the center of earth and not fall by parallel, we might wonder if things move to the center of earth or of universe; it has to be to the center of universe because fire moves straight upward, hence fire has to move all the way to the extremity of universe; that leaves earth, its direct contrary, the center of universe (other possible places are totally similar in form). If fire does not move out to the extremities it must stay at some circumference and not move further, yet this is impossible, for what other body could take up the remaining place, since there are only four bodies?
297a 1
mathematical reasoning supports that earth should be at the center, otherwise we might not see six of twelve constellations all the time anywhere; and the shadows cast at equinoxes might not be in a straight line; there might not be four equal seasons; the angular velocity of stars might change; and eclipses might not happen at the predicted time (from Ptolemy). But what if the whole observable world is moved out of the center, like all planets and constellations and the like are moved southward; but I guess then we should be able to observe, as our observer moves along the circumference to east or west until they are totally opposite, that stars don’t have the same angular velocities in reverse toward north and south; and thus it could be ruled out by calculation.
297a 10
earth has to be a sphere because like how Archimedes treats water under gravity earth also pushes to the center; if every part of earth comes together to the center from the extremes in a similar way, they should all add up equally from the center and be equally distant, hence a sphere; if every part is dissimilar, for a heavier and greater part shall push a lighter and lesser part away till itself equalizes at the center. For instance, if a stone falls to the center, as it first contacts the center, there’s no balance-weight on the other side, so it pushes past the center; then a smaller part of itself is pushed to the other side, and this smaller part tries to get to the center, hence pushes back against the larger part; now the motion continues until the stone’s center has coincided with the center of universe. Now one half of it pushes to the center, but the other half pushes back with equal force, and they equalize and remain at rest.
297b 15
if earth has come to be it has come to be the same way described; if it has been there forever it should be the same way as it would have come to be were it to come to be.
297b 20
moving at similar angles is also according to the nature of the sphere, hence earth should be sphere.
297b 25
also we perceive earth’s shape in lunar eclipses to be spherical.
298a 1
earth is also not great in magnitude because as one moves a little bit to the north a lot of stars shall vanish; so it means that one small change in angle shall cover great expanse; this is only possible when earth is very small compared to the whole heaven.
III
1.
298b 5
there’s the fifth element that’s eternal; are there elements that have or compose of coming to be? Is coming to be a real thing?
298b 15
Parmenides, there’s no actual coming to be of the things themselves; but they assume these unchanging things are only substance of perceptibles.
298b 25
Hesiod, all things come to be but stay always.
298b 30
Heraclitus, all things come to be and pass away except one thing that persists.
299a 15
the mathematical things are on the basis of abstraction, the natural ones are on the basis of an additional posit, perceptible matter.
299a 20
two ways of divisible affection: by species, so that different species within one genus are continuous to each other, and a thing is divided into its mixing contraries, like color into black and white; by coincidentals, so that one thing belonging to a divisible thing is itself also divisible, the thing hence divided into its substantial parts, like color into smaller parts of color, and the current inquiry related to bodies belongs to this category, since it’s not the contraries making these affections that we’re interested in teasing out, but the modified substance and its relation to the affection. In other words, the first way would be simply divide the state one thing suffers into heavy and light; but the second way divides the thing itself and its corresponding state.
299b 1
there’s always more or less of a relative, hence body is always able to be heavier or lighter, hence divisible. But if units are absolutely light they don’t make up heavy things.
300a 10
time also cannot be indivisible.
2.
300a 20
elements move, if they don’t move by nature they move by force, by force is contrary to nature, so they can move by nature.
300b 1
if a prime mover, supposedly elements according to others, doesn’t move by nature it has to move by force from a more primary mover, and ad infinitum.
300b 20
elements must not move disorderly as claimed by Timaeus, since either they are by force, hence they point to natural places, or they are by nature, and will eventually settle down.
300b 25
also, is it possible that disordered movements should compose bodies that are in accord with nature? The implied answer is no. And if such bodies were composed, it means that these motions already are organized by a natural purpose and destination, like the motion by friendship is not a completely disordered motion.
300b 30
unlimitedly many things moving in unlimitedly many movements: first, if there’s only one mover, it cannot be that there are unlimitedly many movements; second, if there’re unlimitedly many movers, it cannot be true, since there are only limitedly many movements; third, if there’re limitedly many movements, (mistranslation on Reeve again, missing μὴ from the original), this is still order, since disorder doesn’t mean not all things move to the same place.
301a 5
what’s disorderly is what’s contrary to nature. Hence what’s unlimited cannot be what’s disordered, since the nature of things is that which most of them have for most of the time, and therefore disorder will be natural and order will be contrary to nature, which is self-contradictory. Order doesn’t come by luck because it’s according to nature, yet under this view it’s simultaneously contrary to nature, which is absurd. Aristotle here is taking order to be synonymous or coeval with nature. He denies the palintropic possibility of “the only self-sameness is difference”.
301a 15
to aggregate heaven from elements is to disaggregate the original natural order of elements; that is what Aristotle previously argues, that what changes is just the disposition of the universe, not the substance.
301a 20
any element that naturally moves between contraries must have heaviness or lightness, otherwise it does not move to its end.
301b 1
any element forced to move between contraries also must have heaviness or lightness, otherwise it doesn’t move to its opposite in a limited way, which is impossible.
301b 15
nature is a starting point of movement within the thing itself; the intrinsic starting point is hence not exclusive to animals, only animals can withstand and preserve the potency to move. A capacity is a starting point of movement within another thing or within the thing itself insofar as it’s another.
301b 20
force either modifies the natural motion or causes its own motion.
301b 25
air is both heavy and light so air goes upward when there’s a little force pointing upward, and continues to push part by part the thrown object, until it settles down back to the heavy side.
302a 1
all bodies can change into other bodies, even elements (though it’s probably not so for the fifth element), yet there must be some bodies that don’t come to be, otherwise there should be void, since if everything comes to be, there must be a moment where nothing still exists, and there must therefore be void, since the place is not occupied by body.
3.
302a 15
an element of bodies is what other bodies are divided into, present in them either potentially or actively, and is not itself divisible into things distinct in species.
302a 25
a composite body cannot be present in an element even potentially, for if potentially we should at least be able to see and explain its coming to be from the element within the element.
302b 5
we see composite movements, composite movements come from simple movements, and simple movements are of simple bodies, hence there must be elements.
4.
302b 10
there is only limited number of kinds for elements; for first whatever is composite, even if homogenous, can be further divided. Composite bodies are therefore ruled out from the picture as candidates for elements.
302b 20
second, it’s not necessary to take unlimited elements, for from a limited number of species we could combine unlimitedly many things; and it’s always better to posit a limited number of starting points.
302b 30
even the contrarieties of bodies are always limited in number (regarding tangible qualities, which are the most appropriate and primary differentiae for bodies), it’s unreasonable to have unlimitedly many elements.
303a 1
a short rebuttal of atomism; but this refutation is already fully carried out earlier about the planes; anything divisible in thought is absolutely divisible, since there’s no metaphysical necessity, but only physical obstacle.
303a 10
shapes are not unlimited in number either, since there are starting points and differentiae for shapes, and these are finite in number.
303a 20
to say there’s unlimited number of indivisible atoms is in contradiction to mathematics and respectable opinions.
303b 1
just like there’s only so many primary shapes, so is for motion.
5.
303b 15
only the finest-grained elements are primary elements.
304a 1
since elements are divisible in magnitude, if they are defined in terms of magnitude, they will all be defined relative to each other, that earth will be fire to another.
304a 15
it’s subtler to claim that primary element has primary shape, which is pyramid.
304a 25
the argument seems to be: if air were indivisible, then air being comparable to water means air, which is more, should each element be bigger than water, when each water element turns into air element; yet air really is smaller, hence air must be divisible.
304b 1
but if the primary element is divisible, it cannot be defined by shape, otherwise the element contains in itself non-element; it also cannot be defined by magnitude for the same reason.
304b 15
those who compose everything by one element cannot explain the complexity of movement, especially that the more fire one has the faster it moves up whilst the more earth one has the faster it moves down, hence it’s not just relative nature but absolute nature that creates such difference. If it’s only a relative matter, then up or down depends on the quantity of element one has, yet it is independent of that, it must be the nature of the element itself.
6.
304b 25
for elements to be eternal is impossible, since they do dissolve; yet they can’t dissolve infinitely either in space or time, since in space implies also in time, and the time of dissolution has to be limited, so dissolution and composition both will stop at some point.
305a 5
division will not stop at indivisible since there’s no indivisible body; it also will not stop at that which is not actively divided, since a smaller body is more easily divided than a larger one, and hence what is divisible will nearly always be actively divided.
305a 10
two ways of destruction: by contraries or by dying out, which is either dissolution into smaller and smaller parts until all parts vanish away into indiscernible or elements move away into somewhere else while that from which the element is replenished is exhausted.
305a 15
elements come to be either from incorporeal things or from bodies; they cannot come from an incorporeal thing for that necessitates void, because if there once were no bodies but then suddenly there are, it must be thought that there’s void before the body exists and occupies it, for all bodies that come to be come to be in a place. But if elements come from bodies, they come from not another body but from among themselves, for if from another body that body will itself be an element capable of moving in a place, or that body shall be totally immobile and hence has no place at all. For a place is not a stipulation or abstraction, for that could be arbitrary; if body A is immobile at the center, one cannot give an account as to why A has to stay at the center, since if you ideally move A to another place (there’s no metaphysical impossibility here), A should stay immobile at a different place. Place, therefore, is that which a body naturally stays at and naturally moves to.
7.
306a 5 —— 306a 15
“result is that people speaking about these things……”
8.
306b 5
element shapes don’t fill up the whole space.
306b 10
elements change shape according to its encompassing place, that is, other bodies surrounding it.
306b 15
it’s reasonable that the elements must be thought of in the same way as all-receptive matter. For they are capable of transforming into each other despite their qualitative differences, though pure matter is never actively separated from these differences.
306b 25
also composite bodies wouldn’t be continuous were elements shaped, and bodies themselves can’t be made up of planes since they were first made up of elements, for there must be elements and simple bodies to make up composite ones, as we observe in appearance.
307a 5
and even the shapes assigned to elements aren’t correct ones; for neither spheres nor pyramids conform to the natural movement of fire, for instance. Also when in the natural place all elements shall be cubes, which allegedly are least capable of motion.
307a 15
all elements have angles so all angles are like fire, which is obviously false, since all elements are different by kind.
307a 20
fire cuts things into fire; this is funny, as if it’s saws cutting things into saws.
307b 1
fire unites and aggregates things of the same kind, and cutting or dividing is only coincidental to fire.
307b 5
cold has no shape as opposed to hot; shape has no direct or positive contrary. Hence if hot has a shape, what might be the shape of cold?
307b 10
Timaeus’ definitions of elements contradict each other, since at one point it is through shape, at another it’s through size.
IV
1.
308a 30
definition of “up” and “down”, “heavy” and “light”: up is the extremity, down the center; unconditional heaviness that which actively moves downward (naturally), lightness that which actively moves upward. What is relative heaviness is that which of equal mass(volume) moves downward faster.
2.
308b 15
a larger mass of fire moves upward faster; hence heaviness is not related to mass.
308b 25
also if what is heavier has more numerous parts, air will at one point be heavier than water, yet this never happens.
309a 1
another cause for such incongruity: void enclosed makes more volume less heavy.
309a 30
what is unconditionally light, like fire, if it moves upwards merely due to the void it encloses, will at one point be heavier than a small part of earth, yet this never happens, since fire is determined to be naturally and unconditionally light. The same is with water and earth; yet since water has the nature of both heavy and light, it will move downward, and the larger the magnitude, the faster it moves, so initially it would seem that water of a larger mass is weightier than earth of a smaller mass. Yet there will be one point where earth sinks down in water. So the same argument still holds, that at the place really close to the center, if water only had a higher ratio of void, eventually a larger mass of water will have more weight than earth and should push earth away from the center, but this never happens.
309b 10
it also cannot be the ratio between plenum and void that causes such phenomena; for if fire has the same ratio always, it will not move faster with larger mass.
309b 15
and if the void enclosed doesn’t move but causes the thing to move, this is absurd; if the void moves, this is also impossible, since the void might simply leave the thing, and there’s no reason why simple bodies should move the way they do.
309b 25
the impossibility of void(space), which has no nature, moving to places. Even if void does have a nature to move, the solid shouldn’t move along, since the solid doesn’t share this nature. And simple magnitudes, like space, are not differentiae for a body under the genus of cosmos, for these differences do not differentiate equal parts from each other, since magnitude is relative, but forms are absolute and distinct. And therefore a body could move indefinitely, which is absurd. Magnitude is therefore a secondary differentia that is applicable to already formed things.
309b 30
if there’s one matter, there’s only relative heaviness and lightness; if there’s only a pair of contraries, there’s no intermediation. What’s the alternative? Is it to have multiple natures? It seems rather that one should say there’s only one matter but two contraries; that the two contraries are principles of this one matter, which are themselves not separate entities, like void and plenum, but are generators of natures or differentiae.
3.
310a 25
change comes about from contraries to contraries or to intermediates, and not the change from what is random to what is random. Mover and moved are distinct.
310b 1
this is such crucial passage! One important aspect of Aristotelian natural philosophy is finally clarified: earth as a whole moves to the center because center is the limit encompassed by other bodies so as to be properly formed; the potency of heaviness is thereby actualized by the mover into the formation of earth. So with other elements. The nature of these elements is therefore to move to a place where their form is properly actualized by being encompassed properly. Water to air to fire, air to water to earth, a chain of material and formation, though two extremities of the chain do not resemble each other and are in themselves not mediated. This can also be understood in a different direction: since there is the center, the thing formed at the center should receive such form in its own nature; hence its nature is to move to the center to be formed thus; such element is earth.
310b 25
a sophisticated account. Aristotle seems to suggest that: unlike a substance indifferent to contraries, e.g. a thing equally capable of being healthy or ill, a substance like fire has a natural tendency to go upward (since that’s its telos when it first comes to be). Hence there are two potencies of a thing, one is a natural potency which is nature yet to be actualized, the other is a capacity to be hindered in this actualization. It’s therefore important to see that activity-potency is a predetermined polarity structure: not what is real or current is what is active, for what is active is that which has a mastering hand in the thing’s nature. This is the same in the case of nourishment, for nourishment is the cause when present makes body tend toward health, if not impeded from attaining it. Therefore a thing can have a starting point of motion in itself, though the cause for its motion might be only that which removes the obstacle or that which sets it off (overcoming the initial resistance), etc.
4.
311b 15
it’s apparent that fire always moves upward and never sinks below and nothing rises above it, hence fire is unconditionally light and has no heaviness whatsoever. Yet does this not incur a difficulty of calculation? Hopefully, what is unconditionally light doesn’t mean what is infinitely light (it also seems that isn’t the case), for how can what is infinitely light be forced down, and how can what is infinitely light not move infinitely fast? Therefore what Aristotle means by unconditional cannot be unlimited. Rather it seems like what is unconditionally light means that its speed of moving upward is due to its mass and proximity to extremity, and is not bounded or constrained by anything but the resistance of other heavy bodies. Unconditional lightness or heaviness therefore means that wherever one element is present in another, it naturally moves up or down, but has nothing to do with the speed it has moving up or down, since that has to do with a lot of factors.
312a 15
heavy and light have the same matter but different beings; earth and fire, health and disease. So the matter is capable of both and indifferent to both, but the being, once formed into fire or earth or nourishment or harm, has a natural capacity and a capacity contrary to nature.
5.
312a 25
(another mistranslation, air rises above everything…)
312a 30
it makes sense that there should be three kinds; yet why is it necessary to have four elements? Why not even more numerous, as Aristotle admits?
312b 1
bodies that are both heavy and light move downward in its own space until it encounters something it cannot sink lower than. But why not the reverse? It’s because these two are used as matter and are therefore encompassed and formed by higher things, yet they cannot move upward and be transformed: forms can be used as matter, but matter cannot be used as form.
312b 20
there must be natures that correspond to the number of kinds; if there is only one kind, there’s no unconditional contrary; if there are only two kinds, there’s either no intermediate, or the intermediates aren’t unconditional to each other; therefore the contraries are not entities, but principles to rule what and how many entities that are themselves homogenous and of their own singular nature. And the mass of this body is simply the magnitude of this singular nature; the larger the magnitude, the stronger its capacity, the faster its natural movement.
6.
313b 15
the reason why sometimes specially shaped heavy bodies float on light bodies is that, since bodies are continuous, and continuity has a strength of not being divided; therefore, if the surface covered is large enough, the weight does not succeed in cutting through the continuous body, since the larger and the less divisible (air is more divisible than water, water than earth) a body is, the strength required to divide it is more.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
I
1.
268a 1
物体与大小;受作用与运动;本原。作为物体与大小者;具有物体与大小者(动物?复合物?);作为物体与大小之本原者。
268a 5
连续者是总可分割者;物体是在所有方向(三个方向)都可分割者。
268a 10
考虑到他对毕达哥拉斯主义的批评,这个毕达哥拉斯式理论真奇怪。
268a 15
“一切事物”“大全”与“完整”有同样的形式,也就是说,它们含义相同,虽可能用于不同主体;但它们共有的含义要求事物应当是物体,因为物体符合大全的形式。
268a 25
连续性的定义被收回;连续者不必然意味着可分者,至少尚未得到证明。
268b 5
大全把完整的物体包含为自身的部分,自身在某种意义上是一切事物。
2.
268b 10
大全的部分、依自然的运动;直线或圆周作为简单运动;上、下、环绕,没有自然的水平直线运动这种东西;数目三。
268b 25
简单或复合的物体,简单或复合的运动,后者大多是占主导元素的运动。
269a 5
强迫的运动与依自然的运动;必然有一个简单物体,依自然作简单的圆周运动。
269a 10
如果圆周运动违反某物的自然,我们就必须指定一个这样的简单物体,它的运动与圆周“严格相反”(因为直线运动一般而言与圆周运动相反,但圆周运动既然简单,我们需要找到另一个作为其简单相反者的东西,这就是我所说的“严格相反”);然而在四元素中找不到它,所以圆周运动属于某种其他物体;这个论证岂不复杂得没有必要?但它可能是对第一个论证的补充。
269a 20
圆更完整,因而更首要;无限与有限的线都不完整;所以圆周运动更首要,必须找到其对应的自然物体。
269a 30
圆周运动并不与火或土的运动严格相反,只是一般而言与直线运动相反;所以必须有一种自然作圆周运动。
269b 5
如果圆周运动只是由强迫施加,那么那个物体就会最快消逝,而非永恒;所以四元素并不简单地作圆周运动。
269b 15
这种物体比四元素更值得尊重(更可知),因为它更遥远。
3.
269b 20
物体如何相对地朝向或远离中心运动?这可能是它们最终静止的位置,也可能只是运动的强度。
269b 30
作圆周运动的物体既不轻也不重,不能依自然或违反自然地向上或向下运动,因为如果它违反自然地向下运动,就意味着向上运动是自然的,而这是错误的;所以星辰不能被强迫向上或向下。不过,我确实怀疑,直线运动是否可以被视为它的相反者。
270a 15
其实,圆周运动没有相反者,所以不变化。它似乎不能违反自然地作直线运动,因为直线运动本身不是简单实体,也不是简单的相反运动;如果是直线的,就或者向上或者向下,而若向上,就意味着向下是它的相反者,而非圆周运动。
270a 20
天体不增加也不减少,因为它们不生成;它们不发生性质变化,因为它们不增加也不减少。
270b 1
以显象(习俗)为证。诸神住在星辰之间。
270b 10
以知觉为证。没有人看见星辰变化。
4.
哥们儿……
相反性的标准任意而定。即便相反者确实存在,也被弄得“没有意义”。
5.
271b 10
本原往往大小很小,能力却很大。
271b 20
有限事物(在数目与大小上)组成有限事物。
271b 30
如果首要物体无限,圆就无限,它穿过的间隔就无限,这是不可能的。
272b 1
无限之物不能作为整体运动,因为无限之物连最小距离也不能通过;通过意味着从无限者的起点移动到它的终点,而这做不到。然而,我们看到天作为整体运动、环绕。
6.
273a 10
上与下都是朝向确定位置的确定方向,因为中心是确定的;这其实有道理,因为在现实无限中,没有位置可以被确定。
7.
274b 1
形式有限,因为简单运动有限。
274b 5
每种形式中的数目有限,因为无限重量不可能,否则事物将同时运动且不动。
274b 10
物体的运动与位置也不能无限,因为没有无目的地的无限生成这种东西。
274b 20
也不能有多个无限物体,所以无限物体不能由异质部分组成。
274b 25
无限物体并非同质的,即它的整体与其部分不属于同一类。
275a 10
这在我看来是最终的论证:无限者与有限者没有比例。
275b 5
无限物体只能不可感。然而,天外的任何东西都在一个位置中,因而可感。所以,天外之物无论完全在外还是部分在外,都不能是无限物体。
275b 15
任何无限运动都需要两个无限位置。
276a 1
不可能有简单粒子,因为它们都有同样的自然,因而应以同样方式运动。但这不符合事实。然而,若果真如此,它们就都应一起向上或向下运动,从而设定一个中心,而如果物体无限,这就不可能。
8.
276b 1
只有一个天,因为所有元素都运动到它们所属的相同位置。
276b 15
一个去中心化、方位破碎的宇宙。
276b 20
距离不影响运动物体的自然。
276b 25
事物运动是显然的;事物只有能依自然而动,才可能运动;同样的自然或形式指向同一个位置;如果同样的自然指向多个相似位置,先前的论证就应成立。
277b 15
又是唯一相反者原则。
277b 20
圆周运动有作为直径两端的端点,但作为整体没有端点。
277b 25
重力加速度;越低越重;无限低、无限重、无限快。
277b 1
事物必须依自然而动,因为若事物只被强迫推动,更多的土就应更难朝中心运动,但现实恰好相反。
277b 5
离施力者越远,运动越慢;所以,如果事物被强迫朝其终点运动,它就不会加速,因为事物抗拒被推动,而力量越来越衰减;这似乎给出了一个例外,因为这里的施力者只能是推者。
277b 20
中心、最外端与中间;土、以太与火;火不能在以太之外,因为没有什么能比既无重量、又总依自身方式运动者更轻;轻性通过最外端与中心之间的关系来定义,而轻是重唯一的相反者;此外,如果火到了外面,它就应去另一个这样的位置,而这已被证明不可能。
9.
278a 1
形式与质料中的形式;普遍者与特殊者。
278a 10
如果事物的形式与质料不同,它在数目上就无限。
278a 15
即便理念实际上不与质料分离,它们也可在说明中被分开,生成原则相同,因为形式只是普遍者。
278b 25
但天是质料的总体,穷尽全部质料。
278b 10
最外层旋转被称为天。
278b 15
行星区域也被称为天。
278b 20
整个宇宙也被称为天。
278b 30
最外层旋转之外不能有位置,但旋转实际占据多大范围尚不确定;至少它不可能无限,星辰也不绕着不同的中心运动。
279a 20
天外无时间、无位置;天,是“无限者”的终点。
279a 30
神秘。天被那些最神圣且不动的首要事物不停推动。所以,前一部分指不动的推动者,后一部分指天?
10.
279b 10
或者天生成而永恒,或者天生成并消逝,或者它改变状态,有时消逝,有时不消逝。
第一种情况不可能。首先,我们没见过这类事情发生。其次,有起点者能够处在另一状态,因为它由原因使其改变。第三,几何图形对我们而言生成,在自身中却一直存在;之所以可以这样,是因为这些图形并不自相矛盾;但天被说成在自身中生成,因为它从无序进入秩序,因而从相反者生成,而相反者不同时共存。第四,如果宇宙在有序与无序之间交替,就意味着改变的只是其配置,而非自身,无序只是另一种组成形式。天既然是一且连续,除非在它之前已有某种组成,否则它就不生成;它也不在生成之前改变,所以它始终持续并回归自身。否则,就会有无限多个宇宙同时存在,在一个宇宙中消逝者在另一个中生成;只有在这种情况下,一个宇宙才会完全消逝,而这将被证明不可能。
11.
280b 10
里夫在配对对应项时错了。第一种是与生成过程相矛盾的、事物某种存在状态的生成,而非事物自身的生成。接触与运动严格来说不生成,因为接触是一种不可分的状态,不能“正在生成”;而运动如果生成,就会导致无限倒退。第二种是在给定期间内事物的现实生成。第三种是事物潜在、可能的生成,或者它有多大可能。
281a 10
能力通过其最大限度被界定:视觉的最大限度相对于最小之物,速度则相对于最大距离。
12.
281a 30
如果事物能够存在与不存在,它就必须分别在确定时间内存在与不存在。但若它能够存在无限时间,就必须存在无限时间;否则,它就会有起点,因而不能存在无限时间。
281b 5
有不可能性与假性之别;而这些又或者是有条件的(基于假设),或者是无条件的。
281b 15
事物能在不同时间做相反的事;如果事物能在无限时间中做诸事,这些事就是同时做的。
281b 20
一直存在的事物不可能能够消逝,否则它们就必须在某时消逝,因而不是一直存在。所以,不可能有一直能够消逝的事物,因为那样它们就应不存在,也就并非一直具有该能力。
282a 10
能够既存在又不存在者,是一直存在者与一直不存在者之间的中间者,也就是既能生成又能消逝者。
282b 1
(里夫误译:某物不能生成或不能消逝。)
283a 5
无限者是确定的,即没有什么比它更大。(里夫误译:从不能消逝而来。)
283a 15
事物不能一直同时能够存在与不存在,也不能在两者之间交替,因为那就等于说,事物能够在无限时间内生成与消逝。但这意味着:一个事物既然能在无限时间内生成,也就能在无限时间内不存在,因为只有不存在者才能生成。但这是荒谬的,因为如果两种能力都按其最大限度实现,这两个相反者就都覆盖整个时间跨度。
283a 25
事物也不一直能够消逝,因为若某物能消逝,它就应在某时消逝;然而,一直消逝将使事物既一直存在(因为它们正在消逝),又并非一直存在。
283a 30
出于偶然或依自然。出于偶然者不可能不能变化。所以不能变化者必须依自然而是。但如果不能消逝者竟会生成,其自然就必然如此规定。它的自然因此包含两个矛盾者,而其质料为了现实化一端(从不存在到存在,即生成),必须现实地违背另一端(一直存在,即不能消逝);这是不可能的。
283b 15
生成的原因包含消逝的原因;如果某物曾能够生成,它就将能够消逝,反之亦然;因此,能力可以被移到不同时间,与任何现实状态矛盾;如果某物已经生成为永恒者,它绝对地仍能够不存在,虽然它可能不能在某个确定时间不存在;所以它能够消逝,而这一能力一旦实现,就将与所规定的现实状态相矛盾。
II
1.
284a 5
这种永恒运动有界限却不停息,是“启动”并“接纳”每个不完整运动的完整运动。
284a 15
这种运动也不劳苦,因为它不是被强力维持的运动。
284a 25
恩培多克勒听起来像牛顿。
284a 30
身体入睡时,灵魂在活动中闲适。梦与思考融合。
2.
284b 20
上—下、左—右、前—后;维度的起点:长、宽、深;运动的起点:生长、位移、知觉。
284b 30
所以这些对子不属于每个物体,因为并非每个物体都有这样的(普遍)运动起点。例如,植物的下,对我们来说是上。所以这些都是功能范畴。但火没有这样的运动起点,因为它并非有灵地运动,其运动中心也无法定位。有灵地运动,意味着能够作不同选择,或具有另一种现实性的能力。它意味着字面上具有起点,能够开始与停止,从而保存能力。火不能抑制并保存自身能力,其自然能力总是或者现实化,或者被强制、压服。因此,对于无灵存在者,只看到活动与抵抗,而非自我改变与保存。
285a 1
所有这些范畴都只是相对于我们。像蒂迈欧一样,亚里士多德提出一个无固定方位的世界。
285a 20
上似乎先于右,因为长先于宽。进一步发展这个范畴:上如生长,是运动的终极来源;右是运动的直接原因;前如知觉,是运动的目标。
285a 25
天是有灵的。但这似乎奇怪:火怎么会无灵?天同样只能以一种方式运动。不过,也许天有普遍运动的起点(灵魂),却选择以单一方式运动。
285b 1
具有运动起点,似乎意味着具有普遍运动能力,即使始终只有一种特殊潜能被现实化。也就是说,虽然天不生长,它却有生长的起点,仿佛它能够生长;虽然天不以不同方式运动,
285a 15
对我而言似乎唯一说得通的逻辑是:两极不动,因而在先,是源头,所以属于长,所以是上与下;右相对于人的右(?),所以朝向一个半球与另一个半球会改变运动方向,一种是从右到右,另一种是从左到左;从其视角看运动是从右到右者,因此就是上。但这岂不相对于人?这里略微细致一些:并非单纯把右当作与我们的右相对者,而是为了确定上,需要朝向宇宙的右与人的右一致的方向;方向由最可理解者来规定。
3.
286a 10
神以永恒圆周运动为其功能。
286a 15
宇宙中心不动;中心于是会是圆周运动的目的,因为中心应是天趋于静止的所在;但这就意味着天无法抵达目的,总在违反自然而动;可违反自然者不能永恒,所以作圆周运动者不以中心为目标,中心因而不是天自然静止的位置。不过,这似乎没有说明同样静止的两极,以及圆周运动的特殊自然。另外,“违反自然的运动不能永恒”这一假定似乎可疑。他似乎在论证:如果某物违反自然而动,它就有能力使其自然充分实现,那么在无限时间内,这自然就应实现,否则它就不是其实际自然。
286a 25
既然有一个位置,就有它的相反者,因而有相反的元素。而若有相反性,就有生成。
286b 1
既然有生成,这些其他元素就变化,朝它们的位置运动;但它们也被天推动,所以会有多个圆周运动,即行星运动,作为元素组合如此生成与消逝的原因,作为引起相反者局部变化的工具。
4.
286b 10
球是首要立体,因为它以一个表面包围,而且不能向圆线无定限地添加什么,它总会闭合。球也不可分割为平面图形,因为它的表面是弯曲的。
287a 1
首要物体采取首要形状。与天连续的一切都会是球形。
287a 15
这似乎是一个解决旋转球体之必然性问题的好论证:球若不作圆周运动,就会运动到外部的位置,但外部不能有位置;若旋转者不是球,也一样。因为如果外部只有虚空,物体实际去的位置在哪里?如果既没有媒介也没有阻力,物体该运动多快?如果只是角点沿圆周穿过虚空,它以什么位置为目标?因为它并非从一个位置到一个位置,而是只朝向无差别的虚空,并非朝向同时作为物体自然居所的物体之不动界限;如果它旋转,就既不趋向任何位置,也不在任何位置中运动。但假设它确实进入虚空。那虚空想必应有某种指导运动的自然。于是,就没有理由说其他某个元素不会也运动到那给定的虚空中。运动就会总被扰乱,不再简单。而最终,它又会稳定为圆。虽然最好还是把它看成单纯永恒的。
287a 25
圆形路径是事物返回自身的最快路径。这是真的吗?据里夫,阿基米德证明:给定面积,圆的路径最短。
287b 10
从水球开始,一切都是球。
5.
287b 25
出于偶然者是能够有别样者,因而是非永恒者。
288a 1
自然总产生可能的最好者。所以一个方向比另一个更值得尊重。
288a 20
圆周运动既然没有运动起点,就没有自然或相反的位置,因而没有不同速度。
288a 30
天的推动者比天更神圣,不可能变化,所以它们总会规则地推动天。
288b 5
天的各部分不改变各自距离,所以不改变速度;整体也不改变速度,因为速度变化意味着运动能力(或该能力的现实化)变化,而这包含组成的变化,即组成中的某些部分变得违反自然,抵抗这种活动。这对于天不可能。
288b 20
天既永恒运动,若运动不规则,就必须加速无限时间,和/或减速无限时间,这是不可能的;因为此前已证明,无能力或能力不能持续无限时间而不现实化。在这里,动物减速是因为它不能作这种运动,并会减速到再次能够运动;但如果无能力是永恒的,它就会不断现实化,因而总是减速,于是不会有确定大小,加之违反自然者不能存在无限时间。如果两者兼有,它就应加速与减速同样长的时间(无限),但违反自然者少于自然者,所以也不可能。
7.
289a 20
星辰看起来像火,因为其运动如投射物,运动把空气点燃、作用成火。
8.
289b 1
星辰的运动。地静止时,星辰与天必须或者都运动,或者只有一个运动。
289b 5
这里的论证似乎是:如果圆与星辰都运动,既然星辰有同样的自然,就很难相信它们自身速度全都成比例,同时又被圆按比例携带,从而像编排好一样保持恒定距离;如果圆静止,只有星辰运动,也一样。所以星辰不动,只被天球携带。
290a 1
所有天球连续,因而是一个物体,所以自然以同样角速度运动,从而不妨碍彼此、不逆向冲突,以免整个天散开;或者使星辰不切穿并击碎天球,仿佛逆河流而行。
290a 15
我们看到的星辰运动既非滚动,也非自转,而如果星辰只凭自身运动,这两者本应最恰当地属于星辰;若只自转,它们应留在原处,但它们确实移动;若只滚动,也同样如此。不仅如此,它们根本不自转也不滚动,因为若自转,它们就全自转,但除太阳外我们没见其他星辰这样,而这一观察只出现在日出或日落、太阳似乎摇晃时,且只是感官失灵所致;若滚动,它们就全滚动,那么月亮就应改变朝向我们的面,因为它总在面向我们、不滚动地被携带环行,而若滚动,就应改变面向。
9.
290b 15
有趣的想法:人们相信天体奏出天乐。我们听不到,只是因为习惯了它,把它当作背景音乐。
290b 30
反驳:音乐可能听不到已属荒谬,而且也不可能没有物体受这种声音影响,正如石头会受雷声影响。
291a 10
因为天体在作空间运动者之中,并非自行运动,所以不发声。声音只由撞击产生,因而只由自行运动者遇到其他不动或反向运动的物体产生。
291a 20
自然不预见未来,以某种保存月下物体的方式运动。一种非人类中心的目的论。或者,也可能只是没有能保存月下物体的这种运动方式,所以说“并非仿佛”。但这怎么不适用于天球呢?
10.
291a 30
越远离地球,行星完成自身黄道圈越慢,因为其自身天球的运动与恒星天球相反。
11.
291b 10
这下简直是混账推理。球最不能运动,所以星辰必然长这样。另外,我们看到月亮总呈现为圆的部分。又看到日食时太阳呈新月形,所以月亮必定是球。如果一颗星是球,就全是。
12.
291b 25
哲学解决难题的大胆。两个最大的难题。
291b 30
第一个难题是,为什么中间的行星运动最多,而非离地最远者。恒星只有一个运动且简单,所以更近者应运动更少、更简单。
292a 10
第二个难题是,为什么最外层天球显然有无限多个物体,而我们只有有限数目的行星。
292a 15
我们把星辰想成无灵物体,但应把它们理解为参与生命与行动者。
292a 20
没有行动的完满活动(完满状态),以及通过不同程度行动获得的这种状态。
292a 25
虽然擅长许多事以达到完满很难,但擅长一件事以接近完满更容易。离完满越远,匮乏方面越多,力量越弱。因此,最近者只补足一个缺失,中间者能补足多个缺失,而最远者只能补足一个缺失。补足一个缺失胜于一个也不补足。在这个意义上,完满不能是数量性的,也不应平均分配力量以满足每个缺失。擅长一件事胜于在一切方面都平庸。
292b 10
人能擅长许多事而成为完满,动物与植物却只能擅长一件事来接近完满,而诸神擅长的单纯一事,就是完满本身。
292b 20
同样,恒星做一件事以完满,外行星做许多事以完满,内行星做一件事以接近完满。但行星参与生成吗?似乎行星必须与消逝的可能性抗争?但未必如此。行星永恒地以多种方式运动,以保持自身善好状态;它们的多个圆引起地上事物的生成与消逝,迫使元素离开自然位置,又让它们返回。
292b 25
首要天球推动无限多个物体,因为更有力,而许多较低天球只推动一个物体。
293a 5
较低天球只推动一颗行星,因为该行星最后一个天球也推动其他附加天球(偏心球),所以同一恒星系统中的一个较低天球,实际上可以说推动了多个天球物体;而其力量有限得多,所以推动不止一颗行星就会很劳苦。
13.
293a 20
毕达哥拉斯派相信日心模型以及对地的存在;他们不是朝着显象寻求说明与原因,而是把显象拖向自己的信念。
293a 30
他们认为火比土更值得尊重,因而应在中心,而中心比中间更值得尊重。
293b 1
毕达哥拉斯派还认为,位置中心就是无条件的中心,因而是应由最强元素守护的最重要位置,仿佛身体的中心等同于其存在与灵魂的中心。
293b 10
本原值得尊重,但位置的中心更像终点而非起点,因为中心是被规定者,界限是规定者。界限是本体,中心是质料。
293b 20
地被说成或者绕中心运动,或者在中心运动,或者在中心静止。
294a 5
相信地平的人认为地平线看起来是直的;但他们没看到,相比太阳对我们呈现的大小,地的圆周太大,所以只是看起来平。不过他们也声称,地必须平,因为它静止。
294a 10
难题是:整个地既然重,为什么不落下?人们假定一定有什么支撑地。
294a 30
但支撑者自身也必须被支撑;除非支撑无限,然而这不可以,这种意见出于精神懒惰。
294b 1
水比土轻,所以不能支撑地。
294b 5
探究应朝向事情本身,而非提出异议的人,即便那人是自己;因为只有相对于事情本身,探究才会是理论的,即切合其属、包含所有种差。如果只关注人,就或者不能深入难题,也就不能真正把握事情、构造理论。那个论证被摧毁了:但新理论是什么?你怎么知道自己的确信有事物本身的支持?
294b 15
人们认为地平,所以不会切开其下空气,从而能够静止。空气静止,是因为无处可去,仿佛被困在罐中。
295a 1
另一种开端:从事物的自然,而非仅从物体开始。
295a 5
如果没有自然运动,就没有强迫运动;但有自然运动,不必然就有强迫运动,因为有第五元素。同样,若无运动便无静止,因为事物只有运动到自然位置,或被强迫停止运动时才静止;但并非一切运动者都必须趋于静止,因为有第五元素。
295a 10
地或者自然地、或者被强迫地静止。在平地理论中“自然地”,在旋涡理论中被强迫地,即天的旋转迫使地聚在一起。
295a 25
但如果地被强迫静止,它的自然位置在哪里?如果既非向上也非向下,而上方的空气(因而下方也是;如果下方空气被地困住,为什么不能困在上方?为什么不能说地能向上运动,只是被顶上的空气阻碍?但我们看到事实并非如此,土可以容易地穿过空气运动,而如果土能容易地被强迫穿过空气,依自然穿过就更容易)并未阻止它运动,那么这就意味着我们找不到这样的自然位置,这似乎荒谬。
295a 30
旋涡使地的各部分聚合,但现在什么迫使其他东西落向地?不能又是旋涡,因为真正的旋涡离我们太远,天的旋转对我们不可感。而且,当事物分离,各处其区域时,地静止也是由于旋涡吗?
295b 1
火向上运动并非由于旋涡;而且,旋涡不造成重与轻,只是把重物与轻物相应地移向其位置,但若非趋向自然位置,这一重性又包含什么?
295b 10
更细致的理论是相似性理论:因为中心与上、下的距离相似,所以不能朝任何一方运动,因为一个事物不能同时朝相反方向运动。
295b 15
但问题是,相似性论证忽略地的独特性;位于中心的任何东西都会如此,而非只有地。但地朝中心运动,所以这表明它具有朝向中心的自然。
295b 30
火在最外端不动;所以事物静止并非由于距离相似。
296a 15
另外,地作为整体可以放射式运动,从而作为整体抵达每个最外端,而不朝任何特殊点运动,这样相似性原则并未被违反:地没有偏向某个特殊点而非另一点。
14.
296a 30
地必须静止,因为如果运动,就必须被强迫运动,其自然运动总沿直线朝向中心;但强迫者非永恒,而宇宙永恒。
296b 1
另外,地若作圆周运动,就应像近地作圆周运动的事物(其他行星)那样运动,即通过两个复合运动;但这会使地相对于恒星不规则地运动(假设地被日周运动带着走,却总面向一个方向,虽然这已违反不自转/不滚动的原则),使星辰不规则地升落(逆行),而这未被观察到。
296b 10
地的中心与宇宙中心重合,我们从重物以汇聚于地心的角度下落而非平行下落知道这一点;但仍可问,事物是朝地心还是宇宙中心运动?必然是宇宙中心,因为火沿直线向上,因而必须一直运动到宇宙最外端;这就给火的直接相反者土留下宇宙中心(其他可能位置在形式上完全相似)。如果火不向外运动到最外端,就必须停在某个圆周、不再前进,但这不可能,因为既然只有四种物体,还有什么物体能占据剩下的位置?
297a 1
数学推理支持地应在中心,否则我们也许不能在任何地方一直看到十二星座中的六个;二分日的投影也许不在一条直线上;也许没有四个等长季节;星辰的角速度也许变化;食也许不在预测时间发生(来自托勒密)。但如果整个可观察世界都移出中心,比如所有行星、星座等都向南移动呢?我想,随着观察者沿圆周向东或向西移动,直到两者完全相对,我们应能观察到星辰朝北、朝南的反向角速度不相同;所以可通过计算排除它。
297a 10
地必须是球,因为正如阿基米德处理重力作用下的水,土也向中心挤压;如果地的每一部分以相似方式从最外端汇聚到中心,它们就应从中心均等堆积、等距分布,因而成为球;如果各部分不同,则更重、更大的部分会推开更轻、更小的部分,直到自身在中心平衡。例如,如果石头落向中心,在初次接触中心时,另一边没有平衡重量,所以它推过中心;于是自身较小的一部分被推到另一边,这较小部分也试图到达中心,因而向较大部分反推;运动继续,直到石头的中心与宇宙中心重合。现在它的一半向中心推,另一半以相同力量反推,两者平衡并静止。
297b 15
如果地生成过,就是以上述方式生成;如果它永远在那里,它也应与假如生成时会有的样子相同。
297b 20
以相似角度运动也符合球的自然,所以地应是球。
297b 25
此外,在月食中,我们知觉到地的形状为球形。
298a 1
地的大小也不大,因为稍向北移就有许多星辰消失;这意味着一个很小的角度变化能覆盖很大范围;只有地相对于整个天很小时,这才可能。
III
1.
298b 5
有永恒的第五元素;是否有具有生成、或组成生成的元素?生成是真实的东西吗?
298b 15
巴门尼德:事物自身没有现实生成;但他们假定这些不变事物只是可感者的本体。
298b 25
赫西俄德:一切事物生成,却永远留存。
298b 30
赫拉克利特:除一个持续者之外,一切事物都生成与消逝。
299a 15
数学事物以抽象为基础,自然事物则以额外设定——可感质料——为基础。
299a 20
受作用可分的两种方式:依种,使同一属内的不同种彼此连续,事物被分为混合于其中的相反者,比如颜色分为黑与白;依偶属性,使属于可分事物的某物自身也可分,事物于是被分为其本体部分,比如颜色分为更小的颜色部分。当前涉及物体的探究属于后一类,因为我们要析出的不是造成这些受作用的相反者,而是变样了的本体及其与受作用的关系。换言之,第一种方式只是把事物承受的状态分为重与轻,第二种方式则分割事物本身及其对应状态。
299b 1
相对者总有更多或更少,所以物体总能更重或更轻,因而可分。但若单位绝对轻,它们就不能组成重物。
300a 10
时间也不能不可分。
2.
300a 20
元素运动;如果不依自然而动,就被强迫而动;强迫违反自然,所以它们能依自然而动。
300b 1
如果第一推动者——按其他人说法应是元素——不依自然而动,就必须被更首要推动者强迫而动,如此无穷。
300b 20
元素不能如蒂迈欧所说无序运动,因为或者它们受强迫,因而指向自然位置,或者依自然而动,最终会稳定下来。
300b 25
另外,无序运动可能组成符合自然的物体吗?隐含的回答是否定的。而若真组成了这样的物体,就意味着这些运动已经由自然目的与归宿组织起来,比如友爱引起的运动就不是完全无序的运动。
300b 30
无限多个事物以无限多种运动而动:首先,若只有一个推动者,就不能有无限多种运动;其次,若有无限多个推动者,也不可能,因为只有有限多种运动;第三,若只有有限多种运动(里夫又误译,漏了原文的μὴ),这仍是秩序,因为无序不意味着并非所有事物都运动到同一个位置。
301a 5
无序者是违反自然者。所以无限者不能是无序者,因为事物的自然是多数事物在多数时间所具有者,于是无序将成为自然,有序反而违反自然,这自相矛盾。秩序不由机运而来,因为它依自然;但在这种观点下,它同时违反自然,这是荒谬的。亚里士多德在这里把秩序与自然视为同义或同时。他否定“唯一的自身同一就是差异”这种反向回转的可能性。
301a 15
从元素聚合成天,就是打散元素原初的自然秩序;这就是亚里士多德此前论证的:变化的只是宇宙的配置,而非本体。
301a 20
任何自然地在相反者之间运动的元素,都必须有重性或轻性,否则就不会运动到其终点。
301b 1
任何被强迫在相反者之间运动的元素,也必须有重性或轻性,否则它不会以有限方式运动到其相反者,这是不可能的。
301b 15
自然是事物自身内部的运动本原;所以内在本原并非动物独有,只是动物能够抵住并保存运动潜能。能力则是在另一物中的运动本原,或在事物自身中、就其为另一者而言的运动本原。
301b 20
强力或者改变自然运动,或者引起自身的运动。
301b 25
空气既重又轻,所以稍有向上的力便向上,逐部分继续推动被投掷之物,直到它重新稳定到重的一边。
302a 1
所有物体都可变成其他物体,甚至元素也如此(虽然第五元素可能不然),但必须有某些不生成的物体,否则就应有虚空;因为若一切都生成,必有一个什么都尚未存在的时刻,因而必有虚空,因为位置未被物体占据。
3.
302a 15
物体的元素是其他物体分解所至者,潜在或现实地存在于其中,而自身不可再分为种上不同的东西。
302a 25
复合物体甚至不能潜在地存在于元素中,因为若潜在地存在,我们至少应能在元素内部看到并解释它从该元素生成。
302b 5
我们看到复合运动;复合运动来自简单运动,而简单运动属于简单物体,所以必有元素。
4.
302b 10
元素只有有限种类;因为首先,任何复合者,哪怕同质,都能进一步分解。因此,复合物体被排除出元素候选之列。
302b 20
其次,不必设无限多元素,因为从有限数目的种可以组合无限多个事物;设定有限数目的本原总是更好。
302b 30
连物体的相反性在数目上也总有限(就可触性质而言,它们是物体最恰当、最首要的种差),所以有无限多个元素并不合理。
303a 1
对原子论的简短反驳;但此前关于平面的讨论已充分完成这一反驳;凡在思想中可分者,都绝对可分,因为并无形而上学的必然性,只有物理障碍。
303a 10
形状的数目也不无限,因为形状有本原与种差,而这些数目有限。
303a 20
说有无限多个不可分原子,与数学及可敬的意见相矛盾。
303b 1
正如首要形状只有那么多,运动也一样。
5.
303b 15
只有颗粒最细的元素才是首要元素。
304a 1
既然元素在大小上可分,若用大小来定义它们,它们就全会被彼此相对地定义,土相对于另一个就会是火。
304a 15
更细致的说法是:首要元素具有首要形状,即金字塔形。
304a 25
论证似乎是:如果空气不可分,那么空气与水可比较就意味着,当每个水元素变成空气元素时,更多的空气中每个元素应比水更大;但空气实际上更小,所以空气必定可分。
304b 1
但如果首要元素可分,就不能用形状来定义,否则元素自身中就包含非元素;基于同样理由,也不能用大小来定义。
304b 15
用一种元素组成一切的人无法解释运动的复杂性,尤其是火越多上升越快,土越多下降越快;所以造成这种差异的不只是相对的自然,而是绝对的自然。如果只是相对问题,那么向上或向下就取决于元素数量,但它独立于数量,所以必定是元素自身的自然。
6.
304b 25
元素不可能永恒,因为它们确实溶解;但它们也不能在空间或时间上无限溶解,因为空间上无限也意味着时间上无限,而溶解时间必须有限,所以溶解与组成都会在某处停止。
305a 5
分割不会停在不可分者,因为没有不可分物体;也不会停在未被现实分割者,因为较小物体比较大物体更易分割,所以可分者几乎总会被现实地分割。
305a 10
毁灭有两种方式:由相反者毁灭,或自行消散;后者或者是分解成越来越小的部分,直到所有部分消失为不可辨认,或者是元素移向别处,同时补充该元素的来源耗尽。
305a 15
元素或者从无形体之物生成,或者从物体生成;不能从无形体之物生成,因为那必然要求虚空:如果曾经没有物体,后来突然有了,就必须认为,在物体存在并占据它之前有虚空,因为一切生成的物体都在某个位置中生成。但若元素从物体生成,它们就不是从另一种物体,而是彼此生成;因为若从另一物体生成,那物体自身就会是能在位置中运动的元素,或者那物体完全不动,因而根本没有位置。位置不是约定或抽象,因为那可以任意:如果物体A在中心不动,就无法说明为何A必须留在中心,因为若在理念上把A移到另一位置(这里没有形而上学的不可能性),A也应在另一位置保持不动。因此,位置是物体自然停留且自然趋向之处。
7.
306a 5 —— 306a 15
“结果是,谈论这些事情的人……”
8.
306b 5
元素的形状不能填满整个空间。
306b 10
元素依包围它的位置,即周围其他物体,而改变形状。
306b 15
有理由认为,必须以与全接纳的质料相同的方式思考元素。因为尽管性质不同,它们仍能相互转化,虽然纯粹质料从未现实地与这些差异分离。
306b 25
而且,如果元素有固定形状,复合物体就不会连续;物体自身也不能由平面组成,因为它们首先由元素组成,因为必须有元素与简单物体来组成复合者,正如我们在显象中所见。
307a 5
甚至分配给元素的形状也不正确;例如,球与金字塔形都不符合火的自然运动。而且,在自然位置中,所有元素都应是据说最不能运动的立方体。
307a 15
所有元素都有角,所以所有角都像火,这显然错误,因为所有元素都依种而不同。
307a 20
火把事物切成火;真好笑,就像锯子把事物锯成锯子。
307b 1
火把同类事物统一、聚合,而切割或分离只是偶属性地属于火。
307b 5
与热相对,冷没有形状;形状没有直接或肯定的相反者。所以,如果热有形状,冷可能是什么形状?
307b 10
蒂迈欧对元素的定义相互矛盾,因为一处通过形状,另一处却通过大小来定义。
IV
1.
308a 30
“上”与“下”、“重”与“轻”的定义:上是最外端,下是中心;无条件的重性是现实地(自然地)向下运动者,轻性是现实地向上运动者。相对的重性则是等量(等体积)时向下运动更快者。
2.
308b 15
更多的火向上运动更快;所以重性不与物量相关。
308b 25
另外,如果更重者有更多部分,空气就会在某一点比水更重,但这从未发生。
309a 1
解释这种不协调的另一个原因:包围的虚空使更大体积更轻。
309a 30
无条件轻者,例如火,如果只是由于所包围的虚空而上升,就会在某一点比小部分土更重,但这从未发生,因为火被规定为自然且无条件地轻。水与土也一样;但水既有重又有轻的自然,它会向下运动,大小越大,运动越快,所以起初似乎更多的水比更少的土更重。然而会有某一点,土沉入水中。所以同样的论证仍成立:在很靠近中心的位置,如果水只是虚空比例更高,最终更多的水就会比土更重,应把土推离中心,但这从未发生。
309b 10
也不能是充实与虚空的比例造成这类现象;因为若火总有相同比例,它就不会随着物量增大而运动更快。
309b 15
如果包围的虚空不动却使事物运动,这荒谬;如果虚空运动,也不可能,因为虚空可能直接离开事物,而简单物体为何以其现有方式运动,就没有理由了。
309b 25
无自然的虚空(空间)向诸位置运动之不可能性。即使虚空确实有运动的自然,实物也不应随它运动,因为实物不分享这一自然。而简单的大小,比如空间,不是在宇宙这个属下物体的种差,因为这些差异不能区分相等部分,大小是相对的,形式却绝对而不同。于是,物体将可能无定限地运动,这是荒谬的。所以,大小是适用于已成形事物的次级种差。
309b 30
如果只有一种质料,就只有相对的重性与轻性;如果只有一对相反者,就没有中介。替代方案是什么?具有多种自然?似乎毋宁应说,只有一种质料,却有两个相反者;两个相反者是这一种质料的原则,自身并非像虚空与充实那样的分离实体,而是自然或种差的生成者。
3.
310a 25
变化从相反者到相反者,或到中间者,而不是从任意者到任意者。推动者与被动者不同。
310b 1
这段极其关键!亚里士多德自然哲学的一个重要方面终于被澄清:土作为整体朝中心运动,因为中心是被其他物体包围、使其恰当成形的界限;重性的潜能由此被推动者现实化为土的成形。其他元素亦然。因此,这些元素的自然,就是运动到一个能因被恰当包围而使其形式恰当现实化的位置。水到气到火,气到水到土,一条质料与成形的链,虽然链的两个极端并不相似,也并非在自身中得到中介。也可从另一方向理解:既然有中心,在中心成形的事物就应在自身自然中接受这种形式;所以其自然就是向中心运动,以如此成形;这种元素就是土。
310b 25
精细的说明。亚里士多德似乎在说:不同于对相反者中立的本体,例如同样能够健康或生病的事物,像火这样的本体有向上的自然倾向(因为这是它最初生成时的目的)。因此,事物有两种潜能,一种是自然潜能,即尚待现实化的自然,另一种是在此现实化中受阻的能力。所以,必须看清活动—潜能是预先规定的极性结构:并非真实或当前者就是活动者,因为活动者是在事物自然中占据主导者。营养也是如此,因为营养是一种在场时使身体趋向健康的原因,只要未被阻止达到健康。因此,事物能够在自身中有运动本原,虽然其运动的原因可能只是移除障碍者,或启动它(克服初始阻力)者,等等。
4.
311b 15
显然,火总向上运动,从不沉到下方,也没有什么升到它上方,所以火无条件地轻,完全没有重性。但这岂不引起计算上的困难?但愿无条件轻不意味着无限轻(似乎确实并非如此),因为无限轻者如何能被强迫向下,又如何不运动得无限快?所以亚里士多德所谓无条件,不能是无限。毋宁说,无条件轻意味着:其上升速度取决于物量与接近最外端的程度,除了其他重物的阻力,不受任何东西限制或约束。因此,无条件轻性或重性意味着:一个元素无论处在另一个元素的哪里,都自然地向上或向下运动,但这与其上升或下降的速度无关,因为速度涉及许多因素。
312a 15
重与轻有同样的质料,却有不同的存在;土与火,健康与疾病。所以质料能够成为两者,对两者中立;但存在一旦成形为火或土、营养或伤害,就有自然的能力与违反自然的能力。
5.
312a 25
(又一处误译:空气上升到一切之上……)
312a 30
应有三类,这说得通;但为何必须有四元素?为何不能如亚里士多德承认的那样更多?
312b 1
既重又轻的物体在自身空间中向下运动,直到遇到不能再沉到其下的东西。但为何不是反向?因为这两者被用作质料,因此被更高事物包围并成形,然而它们不能向上运动并转化:形式可以用作质料,质料却不能用作形式。
312b 20
必须有与种类数目相应的自然;如果只有一类,就没有无条件相反者;如果只有两类,就或者没有中间者,或者中间者彼此不是无条件的;所以相反者并非实体,而是支配有哪些、有多少实体的原则,这些实体自身同质,各有其单一自然。而这个物体的物量,只是这一单一自然的大小;大小越大,能力越强,自然运动越快。
6.
313b 15
有时特殊形状的重物浮在轻物上,原因是:物体连续,而连续性具有不被分开的力量;所以,如果覆盖表面足够大,重量就无法切穿连续物体,因为物体越大、越不易分(空气比水易分,水比土易分),分开它所需的力量就越大。