Aristotle · 亚里士多德
Metaphysics · 形而上学
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形而上学——散记
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亚里士多德的努斯是自足的思维运动,对物之显现进行锚定,也就是,对物之最高原则(理念)进行认识。然而,努斯这种自足性是建立在其被规定性之上的,也就是它自足且自由,当且仅当它没有跨越自己的界限的时候。也就是,努斯在这里已经被限制了。根据亚的三段论式形而上学,限制或差异永远来自外部导入的生成性原则;也就是,努斯受更高于它的理念规定。然而,一切理念又都被努斯包含,它没有一个可被思考的外部。换一种模式说,努斯要认识一切理性必须自身是无规定的;然而它却可以被自己思考而又获得规定,作为最高规定不被规定,但又还是要成为一个规定;这同样的矛盾也呈现在亚体系的任意存在者中。
又思考了Thinghood的问题,觉得还需要尝试进行进一步的澄清……亚里士多德对Thinghood的两个定义(underlying subject和essential articulation)其实是被综合在一块儿了;essential articulation已经预设了underlying subject;因为如果没有一个underlying subject,那我们无法决定一个定义是本质性被开显的;同样,如果没有essential articulation,那underlying subject将无法进入知识。但是这同时又会陷入矛盾的。假如言说是概念的组合,那我们得疑问概念与对象各自的优先性。如果对象优先,而我们必须通过概念思考,那我们似乎无法追问对象知识的合法性,对象已经是所予;如果概念优先,那事物的本质就被概念的组合规定了,那我们就无法追问这概念的组合是否反映了对象的真实,因为概念的来源是对对象的抽象,却又反过来规定对象,这就明显是荒谬的。
举例来说,“人是理性的动物”。如果我们认为,人的本质是理性和动物的概念(共相)组合,那我们就得追问这种特殊的组合自身是如何可能、甚至是必然的;更遑论理性和动物的概念本身也来自对其关涉领域对象的抽象;那人作为存在的本质是“such and such”,但这个“such and such”各自又要从另一个对象中被抽象出来;那那个对象本身又是“such and such”,因此又来自更根本的对象;这样就有了无穷的对象和概念,这就与亚的有限系统抵触了。但假如是人的存在本身作为规定开显出了特定的概念组合,我们尽管得到了一个确定的参照点,但我们却无法得知这个独立于概念组合的特定的存在是否被概念呼应;“人”是否可能不是理性的,甚至是否可以不是动物?对于亚来说,要解决这个悖论只能依赖于一个外部的功能:对对象的直观将直接地揭示其对应的概念关系。
然而对对象的直观仍然带有双重性;未从对象分离开来的概念组合是形式,而未从概念组合分离开来的对象性是质料。形式与质料一齐构成了Thinghood的要素;形式提供质料被组合起来的原则,而质料提供被原则组合起来的被动质素。而更进一步的检视将会从这对象组成内部得到双重性的重复:被组合起来的质料实际上是可把握的诸共相,如人的心脑、手足、口鼻等,因此具有形式性;而进行组合的形式、超越了诸形式的最高形式,如理性原则,无法被诸形式把握,而必须作为超出诸形式规定的对象,因此具有质料性。对这个情境做进一步刻画,主动对质料进行约束的理性原则必须被现实化,因此我们可以得到各非理性者、弱理性者、时理性时不理性者,因为质料可以接受各形式的塑造;现实中可以有、并且确实有不完美的理性者作为人;而对现实的理性进行规定的是理性原则本身;理性因此要么可以被其它形式影响,就不会是人的最高规定,要么自己就包含了与其自身相反的形式,就是矛盾的。无论是何种情况,都可以说明形式与质料区分的暧昧性。形式如果超出诸形式作为最高的形式,那它就成为了一个最根本的无法追问无法追思的所予,因此具有质料性;如果形式被放置在诸规定之内,那它同样是被动地受到其它形式的规定,而同样具有质料性。
亚将对对象的直观下,形式与质料的统一形容为目的论的自我实现。最高的形式,如理性原则,对动物属下的诸实在(同样是形式与质料的统一),进行永恒自我实现的循环。然而,面对的问题便是,这样的最高形式为什么会进入一个现实的循环;为什么它会要求自我的毁坏来自我保存?似乎从一开始,最高的形式就已经被给予了物质性,而物质也从一开始就被围绕一个与其区分的概念组织起来;这双重原则因此在根本上就已经被给予在了直观中。亚将这直观的能力归功于努斯(nous)。这与海德格尔的世界-大地的双重性的综合相呼应。
然而,当我们讨论双重原则的综合,哪怕这个综合在根本上被给予了,我们也不得不承认,这里我们还是得到了两个分离的原则。我们无法从大地推得世界或反之,无法从质料推得形式或反之,无法从知性推出感性或反之,因为它们两者都永远已经被综合并给予了。而无论是亚里士多德,普罗提诺,还是康德,如果要坚持原则的双重性,就必须预先设立一个外部的预先所予,如nous,类比,统觉……而无法做到无前提、无条件之思,因此永远与绝对真理相区隔。
亚里士多德的体系是一个有限体系,规定了最高的属们,也要规定最低的种们,那问题就是最低的种们是什么。最高属是不能再被添加谓词而只能自己作为谓词,而最低种则是可以被添加任何谓词,但自己不能再作为谓词。换句话说,最低种就是所谓的Thinghood,事物本身。但是亚对Thinghood的理解却是双重的,一方面他认为Thinghood等于underlying subject,也就是不能再被添加谓述的主语,一方面他又认为Thinghood等于本质,即被去除后物便不再为物的谓述,也就是本质谓述,只能作为自己的谓词而不能作为谓词规定其它事物。那这里就会诞生一种矛盾,一方面Thinghood是无规定的thisness,一方面又是本质规定(因此还是需要共相的作用)。我们无法决定哪个定义是优先的;如果是本质规定优先,那独立的物就因此得依靠其它共相才得以存在,那就不是独立的,就不会是最低的种;如果说thisness优先,那它就是无规定的,因此不能被获得知识。如果我们认为作为underlying subject的是质料,而本质规定是形式的话,这个矛盾依然无法避免;因为质料是被动接受形式的,并且可以被不同的形式改造;这相当于说,目前事物展现的形式是可以被改变的;是多个形式的作用;每个形式都是被更高层次的形式生成的,直到无限。这里就无限退行了。
这些问题之所以会产生,是因为亚对双重原则的坚持:Thinghood既是本质规定,又是无规定的thisness。他的体系是如何坚持这个双重原则的呢?事实上,他的逻辑是特定于古希腊哲学的逻辑,或称真理逻辑;他的哲学在意的是存在或真理的开显,也就是事物本身是如何呈现的。而事物本身的呈现就同时要求了“事物本身”和“呈现”。这两者被统一在了真理的作用中。举个例子,对于亚来说,“人是理性的动物”这个判断,并不是“理性”➕“动物”的抽象加减,而是有机的统一。也就是说,任何事物都是形式与质料的统一;形式必然要求质料,而质料必然要求形式;尽管在言说时我们可以分开言说,因为尽管总是被综合,到底被综合的还是两个原则。形式与质料的共同作用可以被这样分析;首先,对一个物进行理解需要genus和differentia,genus提供一个基本规定,然后由differentia(本身是一个不同的属)进行区分;而这个过程并不是形式的,而是,之前说的真理逻辑,会自己生成自己的对应物的现实过程。genus此时就被视作质料,被更高的differentia的原则进行目的论式的统握;质料因此实际上就是“潜在的形式”;这是永恒的activity,因为是永恒的,所以形式自我持存,而因为是activity,所以质料会不断舍弃其次等形式。也就是,更高的形式将次等的形式视作自我实现的质料;而最高的形式实际就是最低的种。也就是说,“人”作为物,是“理性”的形式在“动物”的质料中自我实现的结果;“动物”自身仍然是形式,不过同时也是人的潜在的形式,也就是质料。然而,因为最高的形式在质料中自我持存,它实际上是与质料相独立的;是它的自我实现使质料得以被认识,质料因此只是介质。而它的独立因此确定了其为“thisness”;同时是“thisness”又要“自我实现为物”,最高的形式反而成为了质料式的、无法被把握的thisness,而相反,质料成为了众多的形式;就得到了第一段矛盾发生的前提:既是thisness,又是规定本质的形式。
形式作为言说的质料,质料作为潜在的形式
最后又成了一多问题了,作为thisness的形式是怎么进入多被多表征的……
有点拉康的意思了,主人能指……
所以如果我们说,“人=理性的动物”,人的殊相和共相的矛盾只是被转嫁到了“理性动物”的殊相共相矛盾上;理性原则既是特异的,因此独立于动物,又必须被动物给实在化,因此被动物包含
或者换句话说,“人是理性的动物”,如果人是被理性和动物规定,那人就不会独立存在为主语,人就只是理性与动物的添加和,但添加方式没有被确定;因此人有自己的特殊性,是超出理性、动物或理性与动物的集合的;然而亚同时认为这个特殊性就是理性与动物的本质规定;唯一可能的就是,这里并不是简单的性质的加减,而是特殊性形式的普遍性自我实现,也就是“理性”原则对“动物”质料的层级化约束;但是特殊性和普遍性的矛盾还是没有消解,因为我们还是不知道特殊的理性是如何差异化自身进入普遍的动物的
Every being is one in number, hence comprehensible as one being differentiated from others; but it’s also one in kind, hence comprehensible as one being determinate in itself. Even more so, to be one in number it’s necessary to be one in kind, otherwise is not able to be understood as “one in number”; vice versa it’s necessary to be one in number so that it could be counted as “one”. This speaks for the inter-translatablility between universals and particulars, viz the Aristotelian dual division of genus and species. However, according to this dual principle we could never arrive at one highest genus, for assume the highest genus is Being, it should be indivisible viewed from the highest plane; if divided, it would not be one in number, so that we couldn’t say that there is one something called “Being”. And to be one in number, it has to be differentiated from something in the same highest plane, that would be non-being. But non-being doesn’t exist. Hence being is not the highest genus. And to be sure, there is no highest genus but highest genera.
If being is not the highest genus then what is being? For Aristotle there are highest genera as well as there’re lowest species, which in turn qualify the category Thinghood.
An examination of the thinghood clarifies its problematic nature. Thinghood is not a universal, hence not a form, for it signifies that very particular being which is not predicated; prime matter that would be. But Thinghood is also not simply material; since it also signifies the essence without which a thing would cease to be itself; a determination that which requires formal thought. So the Thinghood is a composite of both material and form. It might be characterized as if a Form is imposed upon the material, hence generating the Thing; but since the Thing is also material, it can be imposed by any other Form, hence is destructible. Then the Form of a Thing is actually a product of many different possible Forms; then the Form is again generated, ad infinitum.
The Aristotelian solution runs like this: the universal and the particular are subverted in order with correspondence to the Form and the material. It used to be the Form which is to be said of and hence universal; while the material the underlying subject as a singular. But under the Aristotelian modification, the Form is the particular center around which the material circulates in its imitation while the material is a potential for Forms to act on. So a Thing is composed of both material and Form without the Form being relativized: the Form remains selfsame in its generation, and the material is in constant destruction only to circulate to the original point of restoration. The Thing is then not a product of many forms, but a constant activity of one form.
But the problem of instantiation persists as it’s problematic, even contradictory, to account for the interrelation between Form and material. Aristotle actually claims absolute knowledge in his logic of truth, how he has knowledge of the self-realizing Form. The Form, then, as an absolute activity, should not be divisible, but it still has its different instances, no matter as forms or things; or otherwise we wouldn’t know it, and it would then stop being the Form as such. In other words, an absolute activity would surpass all determinations; but an indeterminate Form is a contradiction in terms.
AI translated the non-English passages; original English passages are preserved. The mixed-language original is available under Original.
Aristotle’s nous is a self-sufficient movement of thought that anchors the appearing of things by knowing their highest principles, or Ideas. Yet this self-sufficiency rests upon nous’s being determined: it is self-sufficient and free if and only if it does not cross its own limits. Nous has therefore already been limited. According to Aristotle’s syllogistic metaphysics, limitation or difference always comes from a generative principle introduced from outside. Nous is thus determined by Ideas higher than itself. Yet all Ideas are contained within nous, which has no thinkable outside. Put differently, to know all rational principles, nous must itself be undetermined. Yet it can be thought by itself and thereby acquire determination. As the highest determination it is undetermined, yet must still be a determination. This same contradiction appears in every being within Aristotle’s system.
I have been thinking about Thinghood again and feel that further clarification is needed… Aristotle’s two definitions of Thinghood, underlying subject and essential articulation, are actually synthesized together. Essential articulation already presupposes an underlying subject: without one, we cannot establish that a definition is essentially disclosed. Likewise, without essential articulation, the underlying subject cannot enter knowledge. Yet this also leads to contradiction. If discourse is a combination of concepts, we must ask about the respective priority of concept and object. If the object is prior, while we must think through concepts, we seem unable to question the legitimacy of our knowledge of the object: the object is already given. If the concept is prior, then the essence of things is determined by combinations of concepts, and we cannot ask whether these combinations reflect the object’s reality. Concepts originate in abstraction from objects, yet then determine the objects in return, which is clearly absurd.
Take ‘man is a rational animal.’ If we regard the human essence as a combination of the concepts, or universals, rational and animal, we must ask how this particular combination is itself possible, or even necessary. Moreover, the concepts rational and animal themselves come from abstraction from objects in their respective domains. Man’s essence as a being is ‘such and such,’ but each of these determinations must be abstracted from another object. That object is itself ‘such and such’ and therefore comes from still more fundamental objects. We thus obtain infinitely many objects and concepts, contradicting Aristotle’s finite system. If, on the other hand, human existence itself discloses a particular conceptual combination as its determination, we gain a definite point of reference but cannot know whether this particular existence, independent of the conceptual combination, is answered by the concepts. Could ‘man’ be nonrational, or even not an animal? Aristotle can resolve this paradox only by relying on an external function: intuition of the object directly reveals its corresponding conceptual relations.
Yet intuition of the object still bears a duality. The conceptual combination not yet separated from the object is form; the objectivity not yet separated from the conceptual combination is matter. Form and matter together constitute the elements of Thinghood. Form supplies the principle by which matter is combined, while matter supplies the passive material combined by the principle. Further examination discovers a repetition of this duality within the object’s composition. The matter combined is actually graspable universals—human heart and brain, hands and feet, mouth and nose—and therefore has a formal character. The combining form, the highest form transcending other forms, such as the rational principle, cannot be grasped by those forms but must be an object exceeding their determinations, and therefore has a material character. To characterize this more closely: the rational principle actively constraining matter must be actualized, so we can obtain nonrational people, weakly rational people, and people sometimes rational and sometimes not, because matter can receive different forms. Imperfect rational beings can and do actually exist as humans. What determines actual rationality is the rational principle itself. Reason can therefore either be affected by other forms, in which case it is not humanity’s highest determination, or itself contain forms opposed to itself, in which case it is contradictory. Either situation demonstrates the ambiguity of the form–matter distinction. If form exceeds other forms as the highest form, it becomes a fundamental given that cannot be questioned or thought back to, and thus has a material character. If form is placed within determinations, it passively receives determination from other forms and likewise has a material character.
Aristotle describes the unity of form and matter in intuition of the object as teleological self-realization. The highest form, such as the rational principle, performs an eternal cycle of self-realization upon actual beings under the genus animal, themselves unities of form and matter. Yet the problem is why such a highest form enters an actual cycle at all. Why does it require its own destruction to preserve itself? It seems that from the outset the highest form has already been given materiality, while matter has already been organized around a concept distinguished from it. These dual principles have thus already been fundamentally given in intuition. Aristotle attributes this intuitive capacity to nous. This echoes Heidegger’s synthesis of the duality of world and earth.
Yet when discussing the synthesis of dual principles, even if that synthesis is fundamentally given, we must acknowledge that we still have two separate principles. We cannot derive world from earth or earth from world, form from matter or matter from form, sensibility from understanding or understanding from sensibility, because both are always already synthesized and given. Whether Aristotle, Plotinus, or Kant, anyone maintaining a duality of principles must presuppose an external prior given—nous, analogy, apperception… They cannot achieve thinking without premises or conditions and therefore always remain separate from absolute truth.
Aristotle’s system is finite: it determines the highest genera and must also determine the lowest species. The question is what these lowest species are. The highest genera cannot receive further predicates but can only themselves be predicates, whereas the lowest species can receive any predicate but cannot themselves serve as predicates. In other words, the lowest species are what is called Thinghood, things themselves. Yet Aristotle understands Thinghood doubly. On one hand, he equates it with the underlying subject, the subject to which no further predication can be added. On the other, he equates it with essence: the predication whose removal makes a thing cease to be that thing, essential predication, which can be only its own predicate and cannot determine other things as a predicate. A contradiction arises: Thinghood is both undetermined thisness and essential determination, thus still requiring universals. We cannot decide which definition has priority. If essential determination comes first, the independent thing depends on other universals to exist, so it is not independent and cannot be the lowest species. If thisness comes first, it is undetermined and cannot be known. The contradiction remains if we regard the underlying subject as matter and essential determination as form. Matter passively receives form and can be altered by different forms. This means the form a thing currently exhibits can be changed and is the effect of several forms. Every form is generated by a higher form, and so on indefinitely. This produces an infinite regress.
These problems arise because Aristotle insists on dual principles: Thinghood is both essential determination and undetermined thisness. How does his system maintain this duality? His logic is in fact peculiar to ancient Greek philosophy, a logic of truth. His philosophy concerns the disclosure of Being or truth, how things themselves appear. The appearing of things themselves requires both ‘things themselves’ and ‘appearing,’ unified in the operation of truth. For Aristotle, for example, ‘man is a rational animal’ is not an abstract addition or subtraction of ‘rational’ + ‘animal,’ but an organic unity. Every thing is a unity of form and matter: form necessarily requires matter, and matter necessarily requires form. Although we can speak of them separately—because even if they are always synthesized, two principles are still what is synthesized—their joint operation can be analyzed as follows. Understanding a thing first requires genus and differentia. Genus supplies a basic determination, then differentia, itself a different genus, distinguishes it. This is not a formal process but, as mentioned, a logic of truth: an actual process generating its own correlate. Genus is then regarded as matter, teleologically gathered under the higher principle of differentia. Matter is thus really ‘potential form.’ This is eternal activity. Because it is eternal, form persists in itself; because it is activity, matter continually relinquishes its inferior forms. Higher form thus regards inferior forms as the matter of its self-realization. The highest form is actually the lowest species. ‘Man’ as a thing is the result of the form ‘rational’ realizing itself in the matter ‘animal.’ Animal remains a form in itself, but simultaneously humanity’s potential form, hence matter. Yet because the highest form persists in itself within matter, it is actually independent of matter. Its self-realization makes matter knowable; matter is therefore merely a medium. This independence establishes it as thisness. Because it is both thisness and must ‘realize itself as a thing,’ the highest form instead becomes a material-like, ungraspable thisness, while matter becomes a multiplicity of forms. We thereby obtain the premise of the contradiction in the first paragraph: it is both thisness and a form determining essence.
Form as the matter of discourse; matter as potential form.
In the end it becomes the one–many problem again: how form as thisness enters multiplicity and is represented by the many…
There is something Lacanian about this—the master-signifier…
So if we say ‘man = rational animal,’ the contradiction between humanity’s particularity and universality is merely transferred to the particularity and universality of ‘rational animal.’ The rational principle is distinctive and therefore independent of animality, yet must be actualized by animality and is therefore contained within it.
Or, in other words, ‘man is a rational animal.’ If man is determined by rational and animal, man cannot independently exist as subject but is merely their sum, whose manner of addition remains undetermined. Man therefore has a particularity exceeding rational, animal, or their collection. Yet Aristotle simultaneously regards this particularity as precisely the essential determination rational-animal. The only possibility is that this is not a simple addition and subtraction of properties but the universal self-realization of a particular form: the hierarchical constraint imposed by the principle rational upon the matter animal. Yet the contradiction between particularity and universality remains unresolved, because we still do not know how particular rationality differentiates itself into universal animality.
Every being is one in number, hence comprehensible as one being differentiated from others; but it’s also one in kind, hence comprehensible as one being determinate in itself. Even more so, to be one in number it’s necessary to be one in kind, otherwise is not able to be understood as “one in number”; vice versa it’s necessary to be one in number so that it could be counted as “one”. This speaks for the inter-translatablility between universals and particulars, viz the Aristotelian dual division of genus and species. However, according to this dual principle we could never arrive at one highest genus, for assume the highest genus is Being, it should be indivisible viewed from the highest plane; if divided, it would not be one in number, so that we couldn’t say that there is one something called “Being”. And to be one in number, it has to be differentiated from something in the same highest plane, that would be non-being. But non-being doesn’t exist. Hence being is not the highest genus. And to be sure, there is no highest genus but highest genera.
If being is not the highest genus then what is being? For Aristotle there are highest genera as well as there’re lowest species, which in turn qualify the category Thinghood.
An examination of the thinghood clarifies its problematic nature. Thinghood is not a universal, hence not a form, for it signifies that very particular being which is not predicated; prime matter that would be. But Thinghood is also not simply material; since it also signifies the essence without which a thing would cease to be itself; a determination that which requires formal thought. So the Thinghood is a composite of both material and form. It might be characterized as if a Form is imposed upon the material, hence generating the Thing; but since the Thing is also material, it can be imposed by any other Form, hence is destructible. Then the Form of a Thing is actually a product of many different possible Forms; then the Form is again generated, ad infinitum.
The Aristotelian solution runs like this: the universal and the particular are subverted in order with correspondence to the Form and the material. It used to be the Form which is to be said of and hence universal; while the material the underlying subject as a singular. But under the Aristotelian modification, the Form is the particular center around which the material circulates in its imitation while the material is a potential for Forms to act on. So a Thing is composed of both material and Form without the Form being relativized: the Form remains selfsame in its generation, and the material is in constant destruction only to circulate to the original point of restoration. The Thing is then not a product of many forms, but a constant activity of one form.
But the problem of instantiation persists as it’s problematic, even contradictory, to account for the interrelation between Form and material. Aristotle actually claims absolute knowledge in his logic of truth, how he has knowledge of the self-realizing Form. The Form, then, as an absolute activity, should not be divisible, but it still has its different instances, no matter as forms or things; or otherwise we wouldn’t know it, and it would then stop being the Form as such. In other words, an absolute activity would surpass all determinations; but an indeterminate Form is a contradiction in terms.
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亚里士多德的努斯是自足的思维运动,对物之显现进行锚定,也就是,对物之最高原则(理念)进行认识。然而,努斯这种自足性是建立在其被规定性之上的,也就是它自足且自由,当且仅当它没有跨越自己的界限的时候。也就是,努斯在这里已经被限制了。根据亚的三段论式形而上学,限制或差异永远来自外部导入的生成性原则;也就是,努斯受更高于它的理念规定。然而,一切理念又都被努斯包含,它没有一个可被思考的外部。换一种模式说,努斯要认识一切理性必须自身是无规定的;然而它却可以被自己思考而又获得规定,作为最高规定不被规定,但又还是要成为一个规定;这同样的矛盾也呈现在亚体系的任意存在者中。
又思考了Thinghood的问题,觉得还需要尝试进行进一步的澄清……亚里士多德对Thinghood的两个定义(underlying subject和essential articulation)其实是被综合在一块儿了;essential articulation已经预设了underlying subject;因为如果没有一个underlying subject,那我们无法决定一个定义是本质性被开显的;同样,如果没有essential articulation,那underlying subject将无法进入知识。但是这同时又会陷入矛盾的。假如言说是概念的组合,那我们得疑问概念与对象各自的优先性。如果对象优先,而我们必须通过概念思考,那我们似乎无法追问对象知识的合法性,对象已经是所予;如果概念优先,那事物的本质就被概念的组合规定了,那我们就无法追问这概念的组合是否反映了对象的真实,因为概念的来源是对对象的抽象,却又反过来规定对象,这就明显是荒谬的。
举例来说,“人是理性的动物”。如果我们认为,人的本质是理性和动物的概念(共相)组合,那我们就得追问这种特殊的组合自身是如何可能、甚至是必然的;更遑论理性和动物的概念本身也来自对其关涉领域对象的抽象;那人作为存在的本质是“such and such”,但这个“such and such”各自又要从另一个对象中被抽象出来;那那个对象本身又是“such and such”,因此又来自更根本的对象;这样就有了无穷的对象和概念,这就与亚的有限系统抵触了。但假如是人的存在本身作为规定开显出了特定的概念组合,我们尽管得到了一个确定的参照点,但我们却无法得知这个独立于概念组合的特定的存在是否被概念呼应;“人”是否可能不是理性的,甚至是否可以不是动物?对于亚来说,要解决这个悖论只能依赖于一个外部的功能:对对象的直观将直接地揭示其对应的概念关系。
然而对对象的直观仍然带有双重性;未从对象分离开来的概念组合是形式,而未从概念组合分离开来的对象性是质料。形式与质料一齐构成了Thinghood的要素;形式提供质料被组合起来的原则,而质料提供被原则组合起来的被动质素。而更进一步的检视将会从这对象组成内部得到双重性的重复:被组合起来的质料实际上是可把握的诸共相,如人的心脑、手足、口鼻等,因此具有形式性;而进行组合的形式、超越了诸形式的最高形式,如理性原则,无法被诸形式把握,而必须作为超出诸形式规定的对象,因此具有质料性。对这个情境做进一步刻画,主动对质料进行约束的理性原则必须被现实化,因此我们可以得到各非理性者、弱理性者、时理性时不理性者,因为质料可以接受各形式的塑造;现实中可以有、并且确实有不完美的理性者作为人;而对现实的理性进行规定的是理性原则本身;理性因此要么可以被其它形式影响,就不会是人的最高规定,要么自己就包含了与其自身相反的形式,就是矛盾的。无论是何种情况,都可以说明形式与质料区分的暧昧性。形式如果超出诸形式作为最高的形式,那它就成为了一个最根本的无法追问无法追思的所予,因此具有质料性;如果形式被放置在诸规定之内,那它同样是被动地受到其它形式的规定,而同样具有质料性。
亚将对对象的直观下,形式与质料的统一形容为目的论的自我实现。最高的形式,如理性原则,对动物属下的诸实在(同样是形式与质料的统一),进行永恒自我实现的循环。然而,面对的问题便是,这样的最高形式为什么会进入一个现实的循环;为什么它会要求自我的毁坏来自我保存?似乎从一开始,最高的形式就已经被给予了物质性,而物质也从一开始就被围绕一个与其区分的概念组织起来;这双重原则因此在根本上就已经被给予在了直观中。亚将这直观的能力归功于努斯(nous)。这与海德格尔的世界-大地的双重性的综合相呼应。
然而,当我们讨论双重原则的综合,哪怕这个综合在根本上被给予了,我们也不得不承认,这里我们还是得到了两个分离的原则。我们无法从大地推得世界或反之,无法从质料推得形式或反之,无法从知性推出感性或反之,因为它们两者都永远已经被综合并给予了。而无论是亚里士多德,普罗提诺,还是康德,如果要坚持原则的双重性,就必须预先设立一个外部的预先所予,如nous,类比,统觉……而无法做到无前提、无条件之思,因此永远与绝对真理相区隔。
亚里士多德的体系是一个有限体系,规定了最高的属们,也要规定最低的种们,那问题就是最低的种们是什么。最高属是不能再被添加谓词而只能自己作为谓词,而最低种则是可以被添加任何谓词,但自己不能再作为谓词。换句话说,最低种就是所谓的Thinghood,事物本身。但是亚对Thinghood的理解却是双重的,一方面他认为Thinghood等于underlying subject,也就是不能再被添加谓述的主语,一方面他又认为Thinghood等于本质,即被去除后物便不再为物的谓述,也就是本质谓述,只能作为自己的谓词而不能作为谓词规定其它事物。那这里就会诞生一种矛盾,一方面Thinghood是无规定的thisness,一方面又是本质规定(因此还是需要共相的作用)。我们无法决定哪个定义是优先的;如果是本质规定优先,那独立的物就因此得依靠其它共相才得以存在,那就不是独立的,就不会是最低的种;如果说thisness优先,那它就是无规定的,因此不能被获得知识。如果我们认为作为underlying subject的是质料,而本质规定是形式的话,这个矛盾依然无法避免;因为质料是被动接受形式的,并且可以被不同的形式改造;这相当于说,目前事物展现的形式是可以被改变的;是多个形式的作用;每个形式都是被更高层次的形式生成的,直到无限。这里就无限退行了。
这些问题之所以会产生,是因为亚对双重原则的坚持:Thinghood既是本质规定,又是无规定的thisness。他的体系是如何坚持这个双重原则的呢?事实上,他的逻辑是特定于古希腊哲学的逻辑,或称真理逻辑;他的哲学在意的是存在或真理的开显,也就是事物本身是如何呈现的。而事物本身的呈现就同时要求了“事物本身”和“呈现”。这两者被统一在了真理的作用中。举个例子,对于亚来说,“人是理性的动物”这个判断,并不是“理性”➕“动物”的抽象加减,而是有机的统一。也就是说,任何事物都是形式与质料的统一;形式必然要求质料,而质料必然要求形式;尽管在言说时我们可以分开言说,因为尽管总是被综合,到底被综合的还是两个原则。形式与质料的共同作用可以被这样分析;首先,对一个物进行理解需要genus和differentia,genus提供一个基本规定,然后由differentia(本身是一个不同的属)进行区分;而这个过程并不是形式的,而是,之前说的真理逻辑,会自己生成自己的对应物的现实过程。genus此时就被视作质料,被更高的differentia的原则进行目的论式的统握;质料因此实际上就是“潜在的形式”;这是永恒的activity,因为是永恒的,所以形式自我持存,而因为是activity,所以质料会不断舍弃其次等形式。也就是,更高的形式将次等的形式视作自我实现的质料;而最高的形式实际就是最低的种。也就是说,“人”作为物,是“理性”的形式在“动物”的质料中自我实现的结果;“动物”自身仍然是形式,不过同时也是人的潜在的形式,也就是质料。然而,因为最高的形式在质料中自我持存,它实际上是与质料相独立的;是它的自我实现使质料得以被认识,质料因此只是介质。而它的独立因此确定了其为“thisness”;同时是“thisness”又要“自我实现为物”,最高的形式反而成为了质料式的、无法被把握的thisness,而相反,质料成为了众多的形式;就得到了第一段矛盾发生的前提:既是thisness,又是规定本质的形式。
形式作为言说的质料,质料作为潜在的形式
最后又成了一多问题了,作为thisness的形式是怎么进入多被多表征的……
有点拉康的意思了,主人能指……
所以如果我们说,“人=理性的动物”,人的殊相和共相的矛盾只是被转嫁到了“理性动物”的殊相共相矛盾上;理性原则既是特异的,因此独立于动物,又必须被动物给实在化,因此被动物包含
或者换句话说,“人是理性的动物”,如果人是被理性和动物规定,那人就不会独立存在为主语,人就只是理性与动物的添加和,但添加方式没有被确定;因此人有自己的特殊性,是超出理性、动物或理性与动物的集合的;然而亚同时认为这个特殊性就是理性与动物的本质规定;唯一可能的就是,这里并不是简单的性质的加减,而是特殊性形式的普遍性自我实现,也就是“理性”原则对“动物”质料的层级化约束;但是特殊性和普遍性的矛盾还是没有消解,因为我们还是不知道特殊的理性是如何差异化自身进入普遍的动物的
每个存在者在数目上都是一,因此可以被理解为一个区别于其它存在者的存在者;但它在种类上也是一,因此可以被理解为一个自身具有规定性的存在者。更进一步,要在数目上为一,就必须在种类上为一,否则就无法被理解为“数目上的一”;反过来,它必须在数目上为一,才能被算作“一”。这说明了普遍者与特殊者之间的相互可译性,也就是亚里士多德对属和种的双重划分。然而,按照这一双重原则,我们永远无法达到一个最高属,因为假设最高属是存在,那么从最高平面来看,它应当不可分;如果被划分,它就不会在数目上为一,我们也就无法说有一个叫作“存在”的东西。而要在数目上为一,它必须与同一最高平面上的某物相区别,这某物就是非存在。但非存在并不存在。因此,存在不是最高属。确切地说,并没有一个最高属,而只有诸最高属。
如果存在不是最高属,那么存在是什么?对于亚里士多德来说,既有诸最高属,也有诸最低种,它们反过来规定了本体性(Thinghood)这一范畴。
对本体性的考察澄清了其问题所在。本体性不是普遍者,因此不是形式,因为它意指那不被述说的特殊存在者本身;那将是原初质料。但本体性也不单纯是材料,因为它也意指本质,没有本质,一个东西就不再是它自己;这是需要形式性思维的规定性。因此,本体性是材料与形式的复合物。它或许可以被描述为,形式施加于材料之上,由此生成事物;但由于事物同时也是材料,任何其它形式也都可以施加于它,因此它是可毁灭的。这样,一个事物的形式实际上就成了许多不同可能形式的产物;于是,形式又是被生成的,如此以至无穷。
亚里士多德的解决方式如下:普遍者与特殊者相对于形式与材料的次序被颠倒了。原先,形式是用来述说的,因此是普遍的;材料则是作为独异者的底层主体。但经过亚里士多德的调整,形式成了特殊的中心,材料在模仿这一中心的过程中环绕它运动,而材料则是形式可以对之施加活动的潜能。因此,一个事物由材料与形式共同构成,却不使形式相对化:形式在其生成中保持自身同一,材料则不断毁灭,只为循环回到复原的原初位置。这样,事物便不再是诸多形式的产物,而是一个形式的持续活动。
但实例化的问题仍然存在,因为说明形式与材料之间的相互关系是成问题的,甚至是矛盾的。亚里士多德实际上在其真理逻辑中宣称了绝对知识,即他如何认识那自我实现的形式。于是,作为绝对活动的形式应该不可分,但它仍有其不同的实例,无论作为形式还是作为事物;否则我们便无法认识它,而它也就不再是形式本身。换句话说,一种绝对活动将超出一切规定性;但一个没有规定性的形式,在措辞上就是矛盾。