Gui Ruiyan

Aristotle · 亚里士多德
Metaphysics · 形而上学

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Metaphysics — Reading notes

Reflections · Apple Notes

Revised 31 January 2023

In this note / 篇目

1

980a 21
Why stretch “out” toward knowing?

980b 21
Sight, memory and hearing make up learning.

981a 1
Memory completes experience.

981b 1
The sign of people who know is to teach.

981b 20
Wisdom and leisure.

982a 20
Arithmetic is more precise than geometry as it’s simpler.

982b 10
The way of wondering.

982b 20
By the way of ignorance people philosophize, by the way of knowing people know.

983b 20
The material cause is that from which things come to be but itself subsides.

984b 20
A “history” of causality: material cause to dynamic cause: but is dynamic cause also the cause for the beautiful?

987b 20
For Plato, great and small partake of one in producing forms; sensible objects-mathematical objects-forms-one. Infinite for him is emergent out of a dyad but is itself not a category.

988a 1
But this is problematic since it’s not right the infinite shall come from the material as the material is used up in production whereas the form remains active and generates many.

988b
Formal cause is for rest and being.

993b 10
The cause of difficulty not in things but in us.

994b 1
Two different kinds of finitude: completion or circulation. In circulation, as the first thing is finite but everlasting, it’s to be reasoned that the last thing, which can turn back into the first thing and is not complete if the first thing is not destroyed, shall be everlasting but finite.

994b 30
We don’t know what is infinite by addition or division. Causes are not like lines, that lines one needs to force a limit while itself remains unlimited, whereas causes naturally need to be limited.

2

1003a 21
The highest causes belong to some nature in its own right. Those who were seeking the elements have to search for the sources too.

1003b 1
Being has multiple meanings but points to one primary meaning. How?

1003b 10
So is the primary nature determined as thinghood?

1003b 20
One perception and one kind of knowledge. Being and oneness are one and the same.

1004a 10
The negation and deprivation of highest causes also belong to the same study. Deprivation works like a green apple contra a red apple, which has a deprivation of red; but infinity is negation of finitude.

1004a 20
Oppositeness is a certain kind of difference and difference a certain kind of otherness. These are all spoken of in many ways.

1004a 30
Even the pointing to can be meant in many ways. It’s an impasse: how can what is one be many?

1004b 1
The study of oneness is not the study of number.

1004b 20
Sophistry and dialectic concern the same things as philosophy only because being is common for all things; sophistry is seeming without being while dialectic is only tentative at everything philosophy seeks to know.

1005a 20
Should mathematical axioms and thinghood belong to the same study?

1005a 30
Some natural philosophers say things appropriately about being as being; though there’s still being higher than nature as nature is only one class.

1005b 1
It seems implied that truth must be presented in a logical way and this should be preparatory.

1005b 10
The most certain principle: non-hypothetical, necessary for anyone who knows anything to have and “arrive having”, and never in error.

1005b 20
Proposition - ultimate opinion? Perhaps it’s only opinion in the perspective of opinionated people.

1006a 1
Lack of education: something simply cannot be demonstrated.

1006a 20
One can demonstrate the principle by refutation, so that the one who disputes is responsible for stating a determinate meaning (instead of proving something is or is not the case), and in that way submits to reason. What follows is a demonstration by refutation.

1006b 10
What is one cannot mean what is not, but can have many things that belong to one.

1007a 10
The attributes are infinite, while the definitions are limited.

1007a 20
Thinghood cannot be at the same time the very thing it is not; otherwise Thinghood itself will be incidental and there’s no being.

1007b 1
Yet all incidental things are predicates of the underlying thing; if there’s no thinghood, there’s no underlying thing. Things are said to be incidental in two ways: 1. The incidentals are incidental to each other because they belong to the same thing; 2. The incidentals are incidental to a particular thing. So that in the first sense A is incidental to B only insofar as they are incidental to C; in the latter sense A is incidental to an underlying thing C, but B is said neither to be incidental to A nor A+C (ad infinitum), but only to C.

1007b 30
That which is indeterminate is that which is potentially: that is what is not.

1008a 10
If all things are and are not altogether, then everything is one; if all things are and are not in turn, then nothing can be meaningfully said; if all things are not while some things are, then the opposite to the things that are not are determinate. If all things are while some things are not in the same time, these exceptions will be agreed upon.

1008a 20
Ontology practiced as evaluation and life.

1009a 1
If things really are and are not at the same time, at least there will be degrees of such things, so that things are more than they are not or the other way.

1028a 10
Being meant as what something is and a this and of what sort or how much something is.

1028a 30
The independent thing is a particular, but its Thinghood is not meant in a particular way.

1028b 1
What is being is the same as what is Thinghood.

1029a 1
Four ways of meaning Thinghood: what a thing keeps on being in order to be at all; the universal; the general class; the underlying thing. The underlying thing seems more to be form.

1029a 10
When all things are stripped away what is left is not the underlying thing but the material. Being is made definite by its attributes.

1029a 30
The third kind: form.

1029b 3
Proceed from the less knowable to the more knowable; from the perceptible to the knowable; from the particular to the universal. A thorough subversion of his method.

1041a 20
When asking why one is not asking, in A is B, about A or B, for they have to be evident and present; so “because a thing is itself” is too general (even if each thing is indivisible in itself, so that “itself” denotes something singular and definite) to be an effective answer.

1041b 1
When one is asking about a simple thing, one must divide even the simple things up into parts; as to ask why is the material in this form.

1041b 10
The whole itself is a particular. For otherwise it will not be a whole but mere material.

1041b 30
Independent things are put together by nature and in accordance with nature.

3

1048a 30
Being in potency.

1048b 1
By analogy.

1048b 20
Infinite is potential in the sense that it always involves being at work and is not separate from the actual.

1048b 30
Difference between complete action and incomplete action: complete in its doing things in a state of having done them. Being-at-work is such a complete action.

1049b 10
Being-at-work takes precedence over any source of motion. For any potency itself has to be brought about as a potency of something, and this something pre-exists and is at work.

1050a 20
Sometimes motion, or the incomplete, can be displayed as an end(making the incomplete into something complete). For end is work, work is being-at-work, and it extends to being-at-work-staying-complete.

1050a 30
A thing can be simply put at work, or its work is a new thing.

1050b 1
Being-at-work is form and is Thinghood.

1050b 10
Potency is not capable of not being present, but is capable of not being at work. So is capable of not being, and is destructible.

1050b 20
What is indestructible is not in potency, but all of them are at work. But this does not imply the converse, that whatever is at work is indestructible. Potency then is an obstruction to being at work.

1051a 1
If forms themselves are to be of the nature of potencies, there will be even higher forms being at work.

1069a 30
Ancients inquire and determine Thinghood to be particular but contemporaries stand on a logical point of view and assume for universal.

1069b 1
It’s fair to conclude that for perceptible things the everlasting are changeable too. So the everlasting has a peculiar signification.

1071b 20
There is always motion; there is always something that is capable of causing motion; there is always something that will cause motion; there is always something that is at work causing motion. So there are everlasting independent things without material whose very being is being at work.

1072a 10
A thing has to be the same and be moved, generated and destroyed at the same time. So it has to be moving in virtue of itself, yet it needs to move in virtue of an other; but this other shall be the first one, which generates both the thing itself and the other thing. An identity of identity and difference.

1072a 20
There’s a certain ceaseless motion that’s always moving in a circle. This is so not only to reason but in fact.

1072a 30
A being-at-work causes motion but is itself unmoved. The thing desired is inferior to the thing thought, but they both set things in motion. Thinking precedes desiring, action of the thing thought precedes thinking. The thing thought belongs to an array of objects, of which Thinghood is primary.

1072b 1
One and simple are different. Oneness can be a measure to the many, but what is simple simply is. Here the source is simple for it does not measure things opposite to itself, but is itself the very ordered whole. The prime mover is analogous to the good that in the manner of something loved it produces motion, as it produces spatial movement in the way that a desired object or a thought object moves desire or thought, itself being unmoved. Yet it does not mean it is itself a thought object.

1072b 10
The characterization of primary source.

1072b 20
Can intellect be something thought? Things are received into thought, yet thought is contemplated in thinking; every thinking is a thinking thinking itself. But if human beings are only doing it for a short time, where is the limit: sleep and death perhaps?

1073b 1
Astronomy is the mathematical study closest to philosophy. For numbers and geometry are not concerned with thinghood.

1074a 30
Motion cannot be for the sake of motion, but has to be for the sake of a divine body: so in one sense the stars are carried, yet in another it is the unmoving source. But to what extent can other things have this duplicity?

1074b 1
Being-at-work-staying-itself does not contain material.

It seems that the sources can be many in number, though there has to be a primary source; but yet this number of things cannot have magnitudes.

1074b 20
Intellect is not divine if it thinks nothing; yet if it thinks something, then it relies upon the thing it thinks and only potentially is. It’s hence mysterious if it’s actively thinking or only a power to potentially think.

1074b 30
Thinking is not a motion, for a motion in this sense can only be for the worse. If thinking is a potency, then it is less honorable than the thing thought. But since worst things can be thought, yet thinking is the most divine, the worse things have to be avoided and thinking has to be a thinking of thinking, if it wants to be the best.

1075a 1
In some cases, thinking can be a thinking of itself.

1075a 10
The composite intellect can only reach the best in a whole stretch of time: is this true for the thinking that thinks itself?

1075b 20
Combined with 1075b 1, contraries have material, but material has no contraries. Hence we can see how for Aristotle potency is not a different kind on the horizontal level, but the bottom part of a hierarchy.

4

989a 20
Even if someone supposes multiple bodies to be the causes of coming to be, the original problems remain, and a new problem arises, as now there is no common matter underlying the multiple bodies, and qualitative changes become impossible.

989b 1
It’s absurd to say that at the source a thing is mixed, for things have to first be unmixed in order to be mixed later, and things cannot be mixed anyway as wanted, and things when mixed can always be separated. So sources have to be double, according to Anaxagoras.

990b 1
The introduction of forms is not helpful because forms are as many a duplication as the things caused by them. If things cannot be counted, forms cannot be counted too.

990b 10
With the forms duplicating everything, there will be infinite forms of things that should not be considered to have forms, like negations, relations or past images.

990b 20
Forms will thus abolish things, which should be primary wholes of which forms are but parts. And beings like categories that cannot be called things will also be forms.

990b 30
Forms are common traits shared intrinsically by independent things in independent things, hence are thinghood.

991a 20
Forms are considered to be causes because they do not move things, do not assist the knowledge of other things or things themselves for they are set apart from things. But it’s problematic to say forms are like patterns one looks to, for patterns can be there or not there without affecting the likeness of the image, and patterns can be many and need not be only one, and patterns can also be of patterns, so that patterns are images.

991b 1
If forms are thinghoods they cannot be separate from things. There are causes of being and becoming other than forms, so forms are not separate causes.

991b 10
Forms cannot be numbers because a number is always a number of things. Without things there would be neither number nor ratios of numbers, yet what are those things before numbers? These things can only be units, yet it’s difficult to say these units are homogenous or heterogeneous by the account of numbers alone.

991b 30
Even with eidetic numbers, the problem still persists, for even though now an original source of numbers is given, this is still a number; and the cause of its being a number lies not in numbers but in the beings of the things numbered. If the things can be meant in different ways as units, one and numbers can also be meant differently.

992a 10
Different classes of things would have different kinds of magnitudes as their sources, which are qualitatively different. Plato admits of this often. This doctrine has to have its limits, so as to allow for analogical deductions from a common source of qualitatively different things; yet it still shows how numbers are the sources of things is a difficult claim.

992a 30
What’s important is not just to find the sources, but also to account for the way sources relate to appearances.

992b 1
Plato and his followers have turned philosophy into mathematics, but their doctrine of forms do not account for the real cause for the sake of which things are produced (that is, the content is not explained, but only a formal ontology of things is given; for instance, we only now why one thing is one, but we don’t know how itself strives to be one and the good, and also what kind of oneness it is striving for). The underlying thing is also turned into mathematical things, though in fact the mathematical should be but a distinction within the material. The doctrine of great and small is just ignorant of the source of forms themselves.

992b 10
Platonists can only speak of one itself but not how all things are one. Even that there’s a one itself is problematic for there’s no one highest genus.

992b 10
The doctrine of forms ignores a fourth kind of being, that is the geometrical numbers, like a square number or a solid number.

992b 20
Any inquiry into the source has to be an inquiry into independent things. For people learn the elements first through familiar things but not otherwise. Even if something comes as innate knowledge, this can only become understandable and evident with regards to experience with independent things.

5

996a 20
Different things have different sources. Mathematical things, for instance, do not have good as the for the sake of which, or any source of motion.

996b 10
The knowledge of the good is the most ruling knowledge because others are for the sake of it. Yet as the knowledge of Thinghood is a knowledge to the first causes and the most knowable, it is also primary.

996b 30
Logic is different from first philosophy for logic has a wider application. Yet logic in itself as a knowledge should be a knowledge of things; is Thinghood then more primary, or logical things?

997a 20
It’s not reasonable to have one kind of knowledge that covers all beings, for if that, there would still remain a universal logic, which is different from first philosophy.

997a 30
Universal logic is also very different from first philosophy so as to not cover all beings.

997b 10
Forms become some everlasting perceptibles according to what some people say.

997b 20
The conception of mathematical things as things in between is difficult for it posits a motionless world that nonetheless needs to account for motion. It’s like to assume there are animals between perishable animals and animals in themselves.

997b 30
If land surveying, contra geometry, is about perishable things, why is this knowledge not perishable?

998a 10
Mathematical things are not separate from perceptibles, but they are not in them. Otherwise two things would be in the same place and what is immobile would move.

Forms seem to be causes that stop the thing in the middle from fully realizing its end, a place where one and many interact. Form seems to be a force of opening up.

998a 20
What are the genuine sources, first constituents or classes of things? Since definitions come from classes, they seem also to be sources of things defined.

998b 10
Thinghood is only spoken in one single articulation (is this contradicting what Aristotle later says about thinghood?). Even if we accept classes as sources, are the first classes or the last classes truer sources?

998b 20
As it’s impossible for a genus to be predicated of a differentia of its species, or for a species to be predicated of the differentia in itself, the differentia has to be outside the genus. Hence there is no all-encompassing genus.

998b 30
In this sense, differentiae would also be sources just like the highest genera are sources. But this would make infinite sources.

999a 1
If what is indivisible is more source like, then it makes sense that the lowest species would be more primary for it’s not divided like the genus has to be for genus is not directly a genus of particular things.

999a 10
Of things that have a prior and a posterior, the prior things are more primary, and there seems to be nothing more primary than those individual prior things; like there is no number number that is prior to two, for the genera can only appear when individual species are present, thus posterior to two. Of things that have no prior or posterior, it’s the good that is more primary, so as genera would include both good and bad, the good thing within it would be more primary. Thus it’s not the general class of things but rather the predicates of individual things that are more source like.

999a 20
Yet if the good thing or number two is considered more primary, it’s considered a source apart from and separable from the things it’s a source of, and as a predicate of the individual things (goodness and priority). So it is primary because it’s universal. Have arrived at a full circle.

999a 30
The most difficult question: is there anything apart from particulars?

999b 1
If everything’s perception, there’s nothing everlasting, and there would be no coming into being for the series of generation either would not stop or would stop at nothingness. If there’s no possibility of having come to be there’s no coming to be. So if there’s nothing completed and at rest in the end there’s nothing moving.

999b 10
If the material is ungenerated, the forms should be more so as the two ends of a coming to be. Otherwise we would only have an amorphous mass. Yet this is so complicated, as not every form is set apart from the particulars. And it’s also unclear if Thinghood is one or many.

1000a 1
Are sources one in number or one in kind? If one in kind, then it is not possible to speak of “one kind” or “one oneness”. Yet if source is one in number, it’s impossible for it to split into multiple individuals.

1000a 20
It seems more plausible to say that destructible things and indestructible things have different sources.

1000b 20
If there are different sources, are they themselves destructible or not respectively?

1001a 20
A lot of natural scientists say oneness or being is no independent thing but belonging to something else. But if this is the case, oneness is not one, and no universal thing would exist.

1001b 10
Zeno claims that one itself, being indivisible, is non being, for when added to or subtracted from a thing, it doesn’t change the thing. But he made a mistake, as not every magnitude can be subtracted from or added to every other, and though there’s no change in magnitude of the thing, there’s more of it in number.

1001b 20
If we say number comes from one itself and another nature, we still need to decide what that nature is, and how it should give forth magnitude as different from number.

1001b 30
So are number and geometrical elements independent things?

1002a 1
Surfaces and the like are more primary than extended bodies to constitute thinghood for bodies cannot be without these but not the other way around.

1002a 20
Yet the surfaces and lines and points seem not to constitute thinghood. For they by themselves are not organized into a body, and as solids or surfaces or lines or points they are all neutral so as to contain no shape whatsoever. Number alone thus cannot be the thinghood.

1002a 30
Independent things come to be or pass away. But lines do not come to be (from something) or pass away (into something else); rather, they are or are not. Just like nows, as nows are and instantaneously are not; as a boundary, it has no being whatsoever.

1003a 1
If elements are not in potency, then something else must be more primary, for potency is more primary. Yet if they are in potency, then it’s always a possibility that none of the things are. This problem of potency is related to the former one, namely whether there are forms or not; if there are, how come from them, being sources, there are also particulars. This dualism necessitates the conception of potency.

6

1009a 10
Some need persuasion while others brute force to go about things. So for people at an impasse believing false things, one engages with their thinking and is able to cure their ignorance; but with people arguing for arguments’ sake, one only refutes their arguments.

1009a 20
For what is not cannot come to be, and what comes to be necessarily is, one can say things are always mixed in contraries at the same time. Yet contraries are not present in the same respect, for one is active the other is potential. Plus there are things with no becomings whatsoever.

1009b 1
Truth about appearances seems to come out of perceptible things. What many people believe, thus, can very well be false, for nothing prevents them from thinking coincidentally the same.

1010a 10
A thing that’s losing has some of what it’s losing, and must already be something of what it’s becoming.

1010a 20
A quantitative change does not imply a change in form. Also, only what’s on earth is changing constantly, but the vast heavens are not.

1010b 1
If we consider perceptions to be not false, appearances are different from perceptions and can be true or untrue.

1010b 10
Even among perceptions there’s order and hierarchy; for sight judges color better than hardness, and bitterness is judged better by taste than by hearing.

1010b 20
No perception disagrees on attributes with another at different times, but only disagrees on thinghood. So even within perceptions, there are necessities.

1010b 30
If all there is is what’s perceptible, there will be nothing if there’s no soul. Yet there is the underlying thing which can allow for perceptions, that is, a more fundamental sense of perceptibles. There must be a prior or an outside of perception that grounds perception, though always perceptible.

1011a 10
People who repeat these arguments are not doing so in action. Their mistake lies in demanding a reason for what has no reason.

1011a 20
Even what appears can be grouped into different respects, places, categories, to different people, so any truth of appearance will not be unconditional. So that truth of appearance will not be unconditionally both true and false.

1011b 1
If there’s thinking, it’s necessary that the thinking is always related to some definite thing. If not, the thinker himself would be something thought or thinkable, and this would result in infinite relationships. So thinking itself cannot be thinkable.

1011b 20
There’s not anything between contradictories.

1011b 30
The thing between contradictories is either partaking of both like gray is of black and white, or partaking of neither. If the latter, then, it could not allow for change. If the former, again it seems the change does not occur from opposites, for something turns into white from something that is already white. A more familiar example comes from Meno, that one does not know what one wants to know, and if one already knows one needs not search for it.

1012a 10
The in-between thing itself would again allow for its own affirmation and denial, hence a new in-between is produced, ad infinitum. And since every one is a thing, not a part, this infinity is a bad infinity.

The trick here seems to be, one of course can accept an intermediary, yet the intermediary is not an independent thing, but a continuity connecting both ends of a change as dictated by one thing. So the contraries are reproduced in every part, but not as a mixture of separate things.

1012a 20
The definition arises from the necessity that they mean something, since the articulation of which the word is a sign will be a definition.

1012b 1
It’s more reasonable to combat the Heracleitean arguments by first asking them to mean something, instead of first inquiring if things are really so.

1012b 10
If what’s true to assert is what’s false to deny, then to assert something cannot be to deny something. Hence the statement that everything can be asserted and everything can be denied has to be contradictory. Yet if the first part is true, the second part has to be true as well. So neither of the part can be true.

1012b 20
If exceptions are made, so that the person who says “everything is true” also says “only ‘everything is false’ is not true”, he should also say: the statement that denies my last statement again is not true; ad infinitum.

7

1012b 34
Source means that part of a thing which one might first move. Or that from which each thing might best come into being. Or that constituent from which something first comes into being. Or that by whose choice what’s moved is moved. Or that from which a thing is first known.

1013b 1
Aside from the fourfold causes, another kind is those many things that come between the primary mover and the end. This kind is closer to form, for form is also an allowing of end as end, itself being a kind of stoppage.

1013b 10
A thing can have many different causes. Two things can cause each other in different ways. The presence and absence of a thing are both causes.

1013b 30
Forms of causes are many, but causes are still under forms; and those of the same form can only follow upon one another, so there can be no infinitely mixed causes; thus causes are always countable in kind and number. The same cause could work incidentally or intrinsically. Or to cause as a particular or a universal. Or to cause potentially or to cause actively.

1014a 10
Consequences should correspond to causes. Particular and universal can be intertwined in being spoken of.

1014a 30
Element means that out of which something is composed as the first constituent not divisible in kind into a different kind, being either altogether indivisible or divisible but not into a new kind.

1014b 1
People also call what’s one and indivisible and useful for many things an element; but unlike the elements of the former kind, these elements can only be one and unique in each thing, whereas a thing can have many the same former kind of constituents. Genera in this sense are also elements.

1014b 20
Nature means the coming into being of things born. But it also means the first thing present in a growing thing, from which it grows. And growth can either be a growing upon or a growing into one; a growing upon has nothing besides contact, but a growing into one needs the thing it touches to grow together by continuity and quantity, though still as different parts. Like heart grows together with hand for heart is continuous with the body that is also continuous with hand, and they grow together in size.

1014b 30
Nature also means the primary thing from which any of the beings that are not by nature is or comes to be.

1015a 10
Nature also means Thinghood of things. Or form. The primary meaning of nature is the thinghood of things that have in themselves a source of motion in their own right. In the sense that it determines the presence of a source of motion, itself is a source of motion.

1015a 20
Necessary means that without which it’s not possible to live. Or those things without which good could not be or come about, or evil be cast away or avoided. Or force and compulsion.

1015a 30
The more primary meaning of necessity is what is incapable of being otherwise.

1015b 10
Some things are necessary because of something else; some things are necessary by themselves, making others necessary. The primary meaning of necessity is the simple.

1016a 1
What’s continuous will have one motion.

1016a 20
Things are called one if their underlying thing is undifferentiated or indivisible. In this sense genera are like materials. Some are undifferentiated by sense perception, like water or wine; some are by understanding, like that of two triangles.

1016a 30
Another way of saying one is when the articulation is indivisible into something else. Though every articulation is divisible within itself. For instance, human can be divided into animal and speaking, but human as the very articulation itself is not divisible into that of an animal. Once it’s divided, the articulation is lost.

1016b 1
Those things of which the thinking is indivisible are one most of all; and independent things are one most of all.

1016b 20
To be one is to be a source of a number; and it’s the same as to be the first measure of a class of beings.

1016b 30
Things can be one by analogy: this seems to be different from being one by species or genus or number. This occurs when A is to B is the same as C is to D. The looseness ascends in order: what’s one in number is necessarily one in species, but not the other way. Can a thing one in number be said to be like itself?

1018a 10
Things are called different that are other but are the same in some respect.

1018a 20
Things said to be opposites are contradictories, contraries, relative terms, lacking and having, and the extremes from which things come into being and into which they pass away. Whatever things do not admit of being present at the same time in something that is receptive of both of them are said to be opposed, either themselves or what they are made of.

Contradictories allow for no middle thing. Contraries always would allow for a middle in which they are again reproduced continuously. Lacking and having are spoken of as being of a thing that is an other that belongs, so it is not two things that can be present in one thing at different times but only the presence and absence of one thing. The extremes do not belong to a thing but are ends to and from which things come to be and pass away, for instance, something becomes too small to remain the same thing.

1018b 30
The primary sense of precedence is precedence in knowledge. According to reason the universal takes precedence but to sense perception it’s the particular. And for reason the attributes take precedence to the whole.

1019a 10
The part precedes the whole and material precedes the independent thing potentially, but in being at work it’s the other way around. For things are not if they are not first possible, but possibility is not actively present until a thing is actively present. So the potency precedes as that which allows a thing to be, but being at work precedes as that which masters the potency. So some things are capable of being without others as a result of coming to be, like the whole, while others are so because of destruction, like the part.

1019a 20
Potency means a source of motion or of change, either in something else or in something as something else. This necessarily involves its copulate, that it’s also the source of being moved and changed by something else.

1019a 30
Potency also means that which can be changed for the better or unchanged for the worse.

1019b 1
It seems that potency occurs when that something else does not have an overwhelming power over the thing under discussion, so as to be its very essence. Yet as potency is dependent on something that is, a potency can be somehow controlled by what is present.

1019b 20
One is said to be incapable if one does not have the source completely, or simply is not at the time or condition to naturally have it.

1020a 10
A so-much can be potentially divided into ones, being a multitude if into units, a magnitude if into measures.

1020a 20
Something has a so-much intrinsically, like a line, the particular line being determined by its so much; some has it coincidentally, like an educated thing. So no matter how big a particular educated thing can be, it remains the same; yet a line being of different sizes would be essentially different. And some so-much is in the thinghood, while others are relative attributes or states, like long and short. So though as the magnitude is determined a thing is intrinsically said to be big or small, other things remaining the same, this bigness is itself again dependent upon the magnitude. In this sense, what is relative is not what is coincidental, for things can be coincidentally big and intrinsically big. The earth is intrinsically big because it has a magnitude that is bigger than most of the things we compare it with. Relativity signifies this: “compared to what, this something is intrinsically/coincidentally big.” Even if something is only relatively big, its bigness in relation to certain things is still intrinsic. Comparison to others is not internal to the thing. So when you first say something is big, you already fix the reference, and if the size is coincidental, it is coincidental within this fixed reference.

1020a 30
Things can be so much coincidentally either as the educated thing is said to be so much, or as time is said to be so much. For time is so much only because the thing is divisible; if the thing is indivisible, its time wouldn’t be a so much. In the former case, the thing’s magnitude is the only so much; in the latter one, time as an attribute itself has its own so much, dependent upon the thing’s so much. The so much of time is incidental if the magnitude of the thing is also incidental.

1020b 1
Quantity also has a quality and an of what sort, for six is one six.

1020b 30
There’s a quantitative relativity and a relativity of acting to being acted upon.

1021a 1
There are three kinds of quantitative relativity: numerical and determinate (one to three), numerical but indeterminate (one to many), numerically indeterminate (line to circle). This relativity can also be applied to other categories, as what is one in thinghood is the same, what is one in quality is the similar, and what is one in amount is equal. Further, what is one is a numerical measure.

1021a 20
Numerical relations can also be actively or potentially present. This is fully discussed in Physics.

1021a 30
What is relative is not what is simply related to something else, but what by its very thought or knowledge refers or is referred to something else. So the thinkable is not the relative to the thinking, for the thinkable is merely a thing related to thinking, but not at all determined as a what. The thinkable hence contributes nothing to the knowledge of what a thinking is, and is not really a “something else”, for it is confined in the circle.

1021b 1
What’s relative can also be because what have it are relative, like bigness is relative because what is big is relative.

1022a 10
An end is a limit, and it’s not a start. Yet it might very well be both for certain things: like a line has two ends. A source is always a limit, but a limit is not always a source.

1022b 20
Is thinghood an attribute? It seems Aristotle is saying that, even though some attributes can be coincidental and some be intrinsic, all attributes are dependent upon motion. Yet if all attributes are alterable or already altered, how can there be intrinsic attributes? It seems the only possible explanation is this: having attributes makes a thing capable of being altered, while some alteration is non-essential, some can be destructive. Like if bigness is removed from mountains, or colorfulness from visible things. Yet different from substance or thinghood, which is strictly in the particular thing (though it’s still unclear if it in itself is a universal), attributes are always universal, so that everything moves within the space of attributes; attributes can leave the thing, and the thing will remain a thing, though not necessarily the original one. Plus, attributes always are contraries, but it seems unclear if thinghood has its contrary. Also, for the movement is always regulated through and in the thing, the attribute altered is also mastered by the thing. Also, the intrinsic attribute necessarily follows upon the thinghood but is not thinghood itself: like water necessarily is divisible, but what is divisible is not water. Or one other example, the triangle is in its thinghood, that is, from its first appearance and revelation, a figure with three sides, and can only be produced this way; it only follows upon this definition that its angles add up to two right angles. So in this sense thinghood is a strict starting point.

1022b 30
Lacking is meant for what does not have something that it is natural to have, even though it may not be natural for this very thing to have it. For instance, plant can be said to lack eyes. It’s natural to have eyes, though not natural for plants.

1023a 10
Having is meant in one way as keeping something else in accordance with something’s own nature or impulse. Also, what obstructs something from moving or acting by its own impulse is said to have hold of it.

1023a 30
Material can correspond to genus and species, as what melts has water as material, but statue has bronze. The form is an end. Is it a kind of end? Is it a for the sake of which?

1023b 1
The composite independent thing is made of sensible material but the form is made of intelligible material.

1023b 30
A whole can mean that from which no part is absent whose absence would make the thing stops having its nature, or that which includes many things and makes them into one thing. The first sense is more strict and stresses perfection. The second is more loose and can happen in two ways: either each part is a one that is encompassed by the whole, as particulars are encompassed by the universal; or each part makes up the whole into a continuous one and is itself no longer a separate one. With the former it’s more like a set, the latter more like an organic gathering.

1024a 1
Any quantity in which position makes no difference is spoken of as “all”, while any in which it does make a difference is called a whole. What is both all and whole is that which admits of both conditions, like wax is all because it is always changeable so position is no matter, but it’s whole because it always comes to a stop and at rest there is a difference of positioning.

1024a 20
One is not a defective two, but a human without a leg is a defective human. Also none of the things in which position makes no difference can be defective. For example, water and fire cannot be defective. A thing can be defective only if it is continuous, made of distinct parts, and is irretrievably lacking a part that is neither so decisive that would alter the thinghood altogether nor too unessential.

1024b 1
A kind is meant in three ways: as a continuous generation of the same form (so a kind in this sense is always of some material), as a first progenitor of the same form, or as a material (for genera are also considered material).

1024b 20
Things are said to be false either because they are not what they appear to be, or because they simply are not.

1024b 30
Aristotle claims that a simple statement is always true, only if they cannot be put together they become one false thing.

1025a 10
Sophist perhaps is better than someone ignorant for he willingly deceives and is hence actually knowing; but in another sense he is worse off with respect to his moral character for he is voluntarily doing wrong things.

8

1025b 3
People inquire after particular classes of beings, but not being as being itself.

1025b 10
They busy themselves with hypotheses and only point to the primary sense of being, but not clarify.

1025b 20
Artifacts, insofar as they are treated as artifacts, are produced and have their source of motion in the producer.

1026a 1
As there are two contemplative thinkings: the thinking of natural things and the thinking of things without material. So for natural scientists it’s imperative to also pay attention to the soul insofar as it’s without material.

1026a 10
The first contemplative study concerns things that are both separate and motionless.

1026a 30
The primary theological study is universal in the sense that it is first. So that it is not the common denominator, but the divine highest.

1026b 20
Sophistry is concerned with what’s incidental. What’s incidental is something close to what is not. An incidental thing does not come to be, but rather gets attached to what really comes to be and itself has no being. But if incidental things do not come to be, how do they appear?

1026b 30
For there are causes and sources that are for the most part, there’s also what’s incidental.

1027a 30
It’s evident that there are sources and causes that come and go without coming into being or passing away, for otherwise all things would be by necessity. All things that happen indeed have their particular cause at any particular time, and can always be traced backwards. And at every moment the incidence is anchored into necessity by its prior cause. This chain of causes can always trace back until the very starting point. But so long as there’s incidence and chance, only the way things chance to be is determined by necessity; so one should be careful in determining if the first origin is actually from the material.

1027b 20
True being is combination that is harmonized and false non-beings are separation into simpler beings. Yet the affirmation and denial of such contradictories are topics of thinking, which is another story than being itself. True and false as such are in thinking, but not in simply being in its governing sense. So the incidental, its cause being indeterminate, and true (or false) being, its cause being in thinking, should now be set aside for a while, and only simple being should be inquired into for the moment. For they both concern the primary sense of being and do not reveal anything outside it, hence derivative.

9

1029b 13
Even white is necessarily in a surface, white is different from surface and has to be defined apart from it, if it can be defined at all. The paradox here is this: white belongs to a surface, so whiteness itself has to be defined apart from a surface, yet it has to entail a surface as well. And surely the addition of both white and surface cannot define whiteness for whiteness is already present in it. Only the articulation that does not already contain the thing in question can have a definition of it.

1029b 30
A definition can neither contain too much things unnecessary nor too little as to omit what’s necessary.

1030a 10
There’s definition only when the statement articulates some primary thing, and things of this kind are all those that are not articulated by attributing one thing to another.

1030a 10
A species of a genus seems the only thing to have definition, for it is not shared by or attributed to anything else.

1030b 1
Only when a group of words means something as simply one, that is, as a this, is it a definition.

1030b 20
For attributes that in virtue of themselves belong to something else, like femaleness to animal, whiteness to surface, or equality to amount, they have no definitions as those of independent things. It seems by addition what is meant is not an addition of words, but an addition of independent things, whereas each independent thing is itself internally defined. Yet it still seems unclear how Aristotle conceives such independent and internal definitions. It can only be said that each attribute, itself being an attribute, has to belong to a thing, but a thing, even if it always includes in its definition multiple words, remains a this.

1030b 30
If an attribute intrinsically refers to the thing it belongs to, then when added to the thing the meaning already present in it would be said twice. So if the attribute has a what-it-is-for-it-to-be, there will be a thing present in the very same thing, and an infinite regress is the result. So not only is there no primary being for an attribute, there’s also no primary being for a thing added with an attribute. For if the attribute thus added has intrinsic being, an infinite regress would occur as it has above; but if it has no intrinsic being, it is not different from just articulating the thing itself.

It seems what Aristotle is trying to convey here is that, for an attribute, if it had thinghood, all its contents would also be thingfied. But an attribute intrinsically belongs to a thing, so the consequence would be that a thing becomes present in another thing, which is absurd. Whereas even though independent things refer to other things in their definitions, they do not refer to them as others, but as gathered into one’s own. Like a number is defined as such and such, yet all the such and such belong to it, not the other way around. It seems that a definition is unconcealment of things, whereas a definition of attributes can only be unconcealment of the unconcealment. An addition of terms only becomes an articulation when it is gathered into one by a tode ti.

1031a 20
It seems that with incidentals, a thing and its being should be different. For if they were the same, thinghood in itself would allow for incidentals, and being A would not be different from being A+B. If we say this is because we are considering incidentals, it still doesn’t feel right to equate the incidental extremes of the syllogism. It would work if you say a pale person is incidentally the same as an educated person for there’s a substrate of thinghood; but if thinghood itself can be altered, there’s no underlying identity whatsoever. On that account, thinghood should be differentiated from any incidental.

1031a 30
It is a question that if some independent things can be the what it is for something to be.

1031b 1
It seems necessary that some intrinsic beings should be thinghood, for if they are not, being good will be different from good, and being-being will be different from being. Then there will be an infinite regress and no knowledge is possible.

1031b 10
Participation is different from underlying, for what underlies is present in the thing it underlies, while what is shared is different from and beyond the independent things. According to some people, perhaps to some version of Plato, a form is not generative, but only to be shared in by extant things. Yet for Aristotle, forms, being thinghood, have to generate things into particular ones (instantiation). For that which is only to be participated in, it has no active and particular being, for if it has, it has something that cannot be shared that is primarily for itself; yet if it’s no particular thing, the thing itself would be detached from its thinghood. The only solution for Aristotle is then to make the forms generative of their own particulars.

1032a 1
A further consequence of this generative account is that, for non-incidental things, what something is (form) and what it is for something to be (cause) should be the same; if they are different, the cause would have its own form, otherwise it’s not different, and this form again would have a different cause, ad infinitum.

1032a 10
One might raise the question of thinghood for he takes the thing to be incidental, one might also resolve the same question for he takes the thing to be a necessary instantiation of the thinghood.

1032a 20
For natural beings, their origin is in nature, they come out of a nature that is material and come into a nature that is a form, whereas that by the action of which they come into being is the same form in another.

1032b 1
For products, or artifacts, they have origins as forms in the soul that are without material. And even contrary things in a sense have the same form, for they are merely absence and presence of the same form.

1032b 10
Of the process of coming into being and its motion, the part called thinking starts from the source and the form, and the part called making starts from the completion of thinking.

1032b 30
It is evident that for some product to come to be some part of it is already present.

1033a 1
But is this preceding part, like material, included in the articulation of a thing? Sometimes material is included in the articulation, like that of a bronze sphere. Yet one must be careful here and see the material is included in an altered form (wooden instead of wood) and its original form is treated in a way that’s similar to the deprivation of the thing that later comes to be. For a lack or that which resembles a lack is not really material, for the thing most of all comes out of that lack, in the sense that it comes to the outside of it. But a thing comes out of a material as it retains it.

1033a 30
What comes into being comes about by the action of something, that is, from which the source of its generation comes. And there’s also an out of something (material in its altered sense) and a something it becomes. And neither the out of something nor the form it becomes is made. But only the incidental thing in which the material becomes unified with the form is produced. For if the form is itself produced it is produced out of something, but this would entail another underlying thing. This underlying thing cannot be sensual material, for a bronze sphere comes from bronze, but the sphere itself is in the soul and cannot be produced from bronze. Yet if the sphere is produced, it has to be produced from something. This something can be none other than intellectual material, which is itself form. So as form is produced out of form, the intellectual material is itself a form that needs to be produced, ad infinitum.

1033b 1
So form and what it is for something to be does not itself come to be.

1033b 10
Everything that comes to be is a composite of material and form, the form being put into the material.

1033b 20
Here, Aristotle seems to say that there’s no form that is an independent thing, but each is a universal kind. So the material out of which a thing is generated is a this, and the thing generated is a this of this sort. So every this would have a this sort, just like every particular would have its general kind. And with natural things, even the begetters are things of the same kind, but not forms themselves, so forms are much less independent and much more universal like with natural things. Things are different for their material, but their forms are the same. This seems to differ from Aristotle‘s earlier account of forms not being merely universals. Yet this is not a problem if we consider how the dependence of forms is spoken in a qualified vein, and how he is actually emphasizing the fact that a universal form has to have its particular and is always involved in its own instantiation.

1034a 10
Some things can come to be both by nature and by art because the material through which the coming to be is enabled is of such a sort as to be capable of starting to move by itself and by others, and capable of being moved in a particular way.

1034b 1
A parallelism between things by nature and things by art.

1034b 10
If an independent thing needs to come to be, a different independent thing that makes it has to be fully at work and present beforehand. But with a so much, there’s no need for a different thing, but only a thing that can potentially receive both.

1034b 20
Since definition is an articulation that has parts, is it necessary for an articulation of the whole to include the articulations of its parts?

1035a 1
Material is part of the composite thing, but is no part of the form. Parts of the form are parts of the articulation that comprise the form.

1035a 30
Material parts are sources into which things with these parts pass away. But forms are immaterial and do not pass away.

1035b 10
Of the articulations of forms, some of their parts are more primary than the whole. So it is not true to say that acute angle is a division of right angle, but rather right angle is a part contained in the articulation of an acute angle. Sensually, a finger is part of the body, but intellectually, the articulation of body is part of the articulation of finger. So the whole can be the most primary part.

1035b 20
For the composite thing, its thinghood and form or some part of it are more primary than the composite whole. Material and bodily parts (the body divides into these parts as if into material) can be more primary than the composite thing in a sense, but in another sense it’s not, for it cannot leave the whole and remain what it is, namely the material upon which a form is applied. Some bodily parts in which thinghood primarily is are as primary as the whole.

1035b 30
The division between ultimate material and general material. Ultimate material is that which presents the particular.

1036a 10
Mathematical things present in perceptibles taken not as perceptibles are intelligible materials.

1036b 1
Even if a thing is not seen to be separated, it doesn’t mean that it’s not.

1036b 10
An impasse arises as to how to be sure that what are taken as forms are really forms? Since it is possible that forms are just like materials. Couldn’t there be a form of forms and couldn’t forms be like material? But then everything would be one.

1037a 1
There will be no part included in the articulation of a universal circle, for the form itself as itself and the what it is for something to be are both immaterial. But with some imperceptible things, there is also intelligent material included. Are parts here treated the same as material? I don’t think that’s the case. For the parts of a circle are already identified as (im)perceptible and divisible segments. These are not included in the articulation of circle because the articulation is universal. For a particular articulation it is possible to have material.

1037a 10
If Socrates is the name of his soul, then it has two meanings, for some people also mean the composite with this name; but if Socrates only means the composite, the particular is reduced to the universal, for Socrates’ thinghood is only the universal.

The composite thing has in its articulation material and formal parts, whereas the form only has an articulation of formal parts. Thinghood or form so far primarily seems to be the universal and material the particular. The universal necessarily generates its particular, but is in this sense inseparable from particulars. As thinghood primarily is the universal, if the universal has no particular generated, all things would primarily be the same: this is question about the difference between Socrates and being Socrates.

1037b 1
Anything that has another thing underlying it as the material cannot be primary and its thinghood cannot be identified with itself, for anything that has material is indeterminate in a way and is thus distanced from simple being and is always involved in non-being. This does not include any form or attribute that is in relation to other forms.

1037b 20
How could a definition be one, when the genera and differentiae are different, for differences are contraries, and the general class cannot share in contraries at the same time; even when the general class does share those specific differences, the question still remains as differences are many and the general class is one.

1083a 1
First to consider is definition by division. If genera are like material, it’s clear that specific differences are like forms, and a definition would be an articulation consisting of specific differences. Though ofttimes only that difference which brings the statement to completion is enough.

1038a 30
There’s no order or sequence in the definition through division once the last statement is arrived at.

1038b 10
It’s impossible for the universal to be thinghood.

1038b 20
Any part of the articulation of an independent thing would itself only be an independent thing, for attributes are not more primary than independent things. But suppose a universal were an independent thing, it would then have an articulation. Even this articulation is not as universal as to contain everything there is for thinghood, it is still thinghood of something. But it would be a thinghood of independent things, then there would be thinghood of thinghood, which is absurd. What’s more, the universal, being present in the thing, would be an independent thing in an independent thing, which is also absurd, though in a different direction, the former absurdity being a result of the particular belonging to the universal, the latter being of the universal being present in the particular.

1038b 30
In general, if the universals are independent things, there will be nothing particular but kinds.

1039a 10
Though parts of an independent thing can only themselves be independent things, they cannot be so actively, but have to be so in potency.

1039a 20
Now an impasse is that there seems to be no definition of anything for there’s no articulation of parts as independent things.

1039a 30
If animal is the same universal for all species, and is a constituent thing of all species, it is absurd that it should be one and the same. But if for every species there’s a different animal, it’s also absurd. For each species would be unbounded and be outside everything else that used to be called animal, and animal itself would be many things. Further, as human being consists of forms of which animal is one, and animal contained in a species would be the thinghood of that species, it’s impossible for animal to be the form of one and thinghood of another, and every species would have its own animal. Yet how could that for which the animal aside from itself is the thinghood itself be an animal?

1040a 1
There’s no definition or articulation of perceptible things, and no knowledge, but only opinions.

1040a 20
If one should claim the parts to belong to one when in a whole but belong to many when separate, he should also say that the parts belong to each other when in the whole, thus also to many. And for parts are more primary than the compound, if the compound is separate and independent from the rest of things, the parts should be more so. Or nothing should be separate or independent.

1040a 30
Also it’s clear that the form has to be shared by many and no part in a definition should only belong to one. For forms are known through many particulars. And the same thing can be shown by the definition people give to unique things, like the sun, for they add many things to it, and it’s as if when they’re taken away the sun would cease being itself, but the sun should be an independent thing and always remain; the definition also implies that if another thing of the same kind should appear it would also be a sun, but that’s also not possible, for the sun is unique and one. So of whatever is one, no matter it’s everlasting or not, there’s an impasse as to how can it be defined by many things.

1040b 10
Thus it’s clear that most of what seem to be independent things are only potencies or are so only in potency.

1040b 20
Oneness and being, though close to thinghood, cannot be thinghood. For thinghood is not anything that can be shared, but is strictly one. For thinghood is one with what is one, and when thinghood is one in number all particular things (and their potential thinghoods) are one in number; either case, thinghood is strictly one and the same with what it is or its parts, and cannot be a common feature. So thinghood is less like a collection but more like a unification.

10

1042a 10
What is the source of independent things, and what are independent things? This is the first question. Then thinghood is identified as the source, yet thinghood has many meanings. It is considered to be a universal class. And since thinghood has its articulation, kinds of definitions and things in virtue of themselves are discussed. This discussion of intrinsic being is prepared by the discussion on definition because only with an articulation is the definition revealed as a whole with different parts, and only here is it essential to differentiate between intrinsic and incidental beings in order to determine which parts cannot be left out from the essential articulation. But if definition has its parts, how should one reconcile the contradiction between one and many? And it turns out that the universal or the general class is no thinghood.

1042a 20
Some claim mathematical things and forms have being apart from perceptible things, so these would be candidates for thinghood.

1042a 30
Material is not actively a this, but potentially it is a this. Form is actively a this, and being a this, is separate from its articulation. These are two kinds of underlying things. The third kind is composed of these.

1042b 1
Any sort of change accompanies change of thinghood, but not vice versa.

1042a 30
Of the independent things, some are separate simply, for they have material involved in their articulations and have thus particularity. But some articulations, like defined forms, cannot be simply separate from others or there would be trouble and paradoxes. So one can say formal separation is more difficult to be described than material separation, for the material one goes with sense perception and needs no further account.

1043a 1
What is attributed to the material as specific differences is itself its being-at-work. Though material is being as potency, in some sense it still reveals an active being. And it makes sense for different things would have different potencies, and different materials would have different ways of being-at-work and articulation, e.g. water can be condensed, sound can be mixed, wood can be shaped.

1043b 1
The fact that one name can mean different things, and thinghood has different meanings has no bearing on our inquiry, for it is already evident that only one sense of thinghood is primary, namely that of the form. Other senses merely point to it.

1043b 10
One cannot say that a house is bricks plus order or combination, for combination is not a thing to be added. Things are in order. Order is not a constituent of the thing, but a cause for it. Now this thing called order might be thinghood itself, and it is either eternal or is destructible, though not destructible in the sense that it undergoes destruction, but rather it can come to be and pass away instantaneously, without the process of motion, because it cannot be a composite but must come and leave as a whole, otherwise it would require another order imposed onto it. And it seems that this order is not really form, for form is eternal and ungenerated, but a this is made when form and material are mixed together.

1043b 20
So this order is the this for destructible and composite things, yet whether itself is separate from the composite is unclear, though for some things it’s clearly not the case, like houses and furnitures, for they are not when the particulars are not. It’s not possible for a human being to be without there first being a human being, so when a particular is not there’s still that ordering, whereas before the production of a house there needs to be no house (that means the ordering of it needs not be before production, though the form of a house surely precedes its production) ever produced, and the order only comes to be after the first house is produced. Or perhaps these things, like artifacts, themselves are not really independent things?

1043b 30
People claim that it’s necessary for a definition to include material since it has to be something attributed to something, and for this reason there cannot be thinghood consisting of merely intelligent things. But this claim is mistaken by a misconception of material, for these people do not see that there is also intellectual material. So just as with a two-footed animal, animal is the material upon which the form of two-footedness is acting, and the material here is the potency that is ruled and exhausted in being-at-work-staying-itself. But is this really so unproblematic?

1044a 1
It’s clear then that when people say number is the definition of things, they miss the mark by not accounting for that extra thing which orders the units into one whole, and so they miss the definition and the thinghood. Though the thing in a sense is a number, for its articulation is finite and divisible into indivisible parts, and whatever is added to or subtracted from it would make it a different thing. Thinghood is one not in the way a unit or a point is, but is rather a complete being-at-work-staying-itself, and a particular nature.

1044b 10
For natural things that are eternal like heavenly bodies, or for things that are by nature but not independent, there’s no material cause, or at least not in the way we mean it.

1044b 20
Since some things, especially forms, can be and not be without coming to be or passing away, contraries would come from one another through different ways. So a pale person would come to be from a swarthy person directly, but white could be said to come from black only indirectly in the sense that the thing that is black would come to be white.

1044b 30
The material relates to contraries, but in what way? Is material potentially both, or potentially one and its being opposite is a deprivation against nature? And can something formed already become material for another thing? Or is it rather that the material has a potency of itself to become one thing, and the formed thing for another? Like body in itself has potential for decay, but animal as such has a different potency? And in order for anything to change, it has to be changed into its material first, so animal back to its corpse (and the corpse is not an end or a completion that comes out of the animal, but a source that animal returns to), and from the corpse again to animal.

1045a 30
The impasse is solved when the parts of an articulation are treated as intellectual material while the whole, being a this, as a form. And since there’s this duality of form and material, it is no longer a question to find the thing that unites both. For things that come to be, aside from the maker, the only thing that is responsible for a thing being actively itself is its thinghood, and the form is what it is for it to be. So the form is being at work and the composite thing is thus informed and comes to be and stays itself. Without this dualism, if all were forms or all were materials, there would be no thing at all.

1045b 1
But some things do not even have intellectual material but are immediately one. Just as some of the things that are, or a this, or an of-this-sort, or a so-much, or a what it is for something to be, are particular ones. These have no definitions but simply are.

1045b 20
The highest level of material and form are one and the same thing. So the prior dualism is in a sense obliterated, but in another sense not. It is obliterated in the sense that material being material is a potency that is non-being, so as to be only ruled by the form, so this is an evasion strategy to avoid having different forms all together; it is not obliterated in the sense that it has to remain not form and different from the form, so inherent in forms there seems to be some higher forms that are again separable from the intellectual material. And this does no harm to the account, for Aristotle is merely trying to resolve the impasse that how it is possible for a definition to be composed of parts. In a certain sense, then, since the material is exhausted within the form, the form is one with the potency when it is in the material; yet in another sense, as exhausted material is still material, and the form is inexhaustible but always generative, the highest forms are separable and pure, thus undefinable. And this separation seems to be no problem (really?) for material always receives forms and becomes one with the forms.

So for a composite thing, its thinghood as the cause of its being is an ordering of material parts, and this order is also the form. So the form is essentially one with the thing in the same way thinghood is one with the thing. And for thinghood to rule material it has to be a being-at-work-staying-itself. And inherent to forms there’s the same structure of form-material dualism, yet there the material is exhausted and the thing would be really eternal and independent. What’s more, every form can be altered into some material, like animality can be the form and rationality the material, or rationality the form and animality the material. So there’s always polarity of form-material dualism in intelligence. But there are things even higher than these, that not only does there not appear to be material, there really is no material at all. For even things with intellectual material might have causes that bring them out of potency into active being, for all things change on the ground of a source. And forms can be both material and form, so there has to be an active source that activates and informs forms, and is thus a form of forms. This is the divine nous. So here’s an hierarchy: divine nous -> active forms -> compound forms (-> material forms) -> compound things -> material.

11

1046a 10
Potency primarily is a source of change in some other thing or in the same thing as other.

1046a 20
In a sense the potencies in acting and being acted upon are one, for they cannot be separate; yet in another sense they are not, for the passive potency is in one thing while the active in another.

1046a 30
Insofar as something is a natural whole, it cannot be passive to itself, since there’s no other. Every potency is contrary to an incapacity in the same thing for the same thing.

1046b 1
Some potencies can be rational and some irrational. All potencies that include reason are themselves capable of contrary effects, while the irrational ones each have only one effect. This is because a reasoned account always reveals the thing and its opposite through deprivation; reason is always a simultaneous collection of things, though only one thing is proper to the account while its contrary is incidental, whereas within a thing both contraries cannot be present at the same time. So within the rational potency, there’s counterforce; but within the irrational one there’s only unforce or exhaustion of force. If a thing is hot, it cannot be both hot and cold, so it is only capable of heating; but a reasoned account reveals both health and sickness, and is capable of causing either.

1046b 20
Contrary things are contained in one source, namely the reasoned account.

1047a 20
What is capable is that which would be in no way incapable if it so happened that the being-at-work of which it is said to have the potency were present. That is, if something is actively present, it’s definitely not incapable of being present; yet it does not mean that only if a thing is actively present is it capable of being so.

1047a 30
Being-at-work seems primarily to converge in meaning with being-at-work-staying-complete. And it also comes to be applied to motions. For this, being-in-motion is said to belong to things that have active being, for it is close to being-at-work-staying-complete, that the thing in motion has activity and shares the complete being in a way. For the thing in motion remains to a large part the distinct thing, though incomplete, or at least changes from a distinct thing to another distinct thing; completion is being-at-work-staying-itself through which the potency is exhausted, while the incomplete moving thing is being-at-work which also allows into itself a potency that in turn allows for a different being-at-work to rub against the original one. So if we solely pay attention to things capable of motion, we see that its material informed by A is again informed by B, whereas the thing itself is not staying itself as A but actively becoming another, and what B is or how many B is is unclear. So for being-at-work, it’s ruling forms against each other within the unruly material; but for being-at-work-staying-itself, it’s one ruling form with its ruled material. And being-at-work as motion is but a derivative sense of being-at-work-staying-itself.

1047b 10
Some people claim that what will not be the case can be possible, in the sense that nothing is impossible. But this comes from a wrong assumption that if what is not the case can be possible, then everything will be possible. For falsity is different from impossibility.

1047b 20
If A is necessarily the case when B is, then A is necessarily capable of being the case when B is capable. But this also means that if A is necessarily capable of being the case when B is capable, then A is necessarily the case when B is; for A is necessarily capable of being the case when B is capable means that A is possible at the same time and in the same way as B is, so that their respective realizations should be at the same time and in the same way; that is, when one is no longer merely possible, the other should also be not merely possible, because potencies are defined by their actualizations. And when potencies are necessarily together, their actualizations would also be necessarily together. So when I say one is necessarily capable of seeing well if he is capable of drawing well, I mean when he actually draws well, he should also see well.

1048a 1
Some potencies are innate while others require prior activity.

1048a 10
A rational potency inheres in the soul perhaps as a body of knowledge that has its intellectual material and is capable of affecting or not affecting other things. Yet its potency is not simply affecting or not affecting, but affecting in contrary ways. So the same thing, being a knowledge that is indivisible as a whole, would necessarily have contrary potencies. Yet this seems impossible. For as was proved above, if A is necessarily capable of being the case when B is capable, A will necessarily be the case when B is capable. For irrational potencies do not belong together necessarily but only incidentally. What is hot is capable of cooling off something else only coincidentally, when that other thing is even hotter; what is black can become white and black not insofar as it is black, but for its being a colored thing that changes first into a white thing and then from there back to a black thing. What has the potency, then, can only be otherwise in the sense of being different than it is now, but cannot be otherwise in the sense of being whatever there is, like contraries. But medical knowledge seems necessarily capable of both healing and poisoning, healing and poisoning should be necessarily co-present. Yet this is impossible. Then choice and desire will be introduced as that which renders one of the pair more proper and authoritative.

If potency is material, and form is always the active being, how can there be a potency for acting? The potency for being acted upon is easier to understand, for the material allows the thing to be otherwise and be informed by something else. The potency for acting, however, is more difficult. Let’s speak of a composite thing. This thing has a passive potency if its material allows for a different information. But it has an active potency if it can inform others. It is in potency because its activity of information is inhibited by its material for it can always be otherwise, and the information is never complete. But once the original material that stores away that activity is fully conquered, the forming activity would start to permeate other materials, since materials are continuous. Hence, that composite thing has an active potency when its material stops being otherwise. So a doctor has the active potency when all his material is affected and starts to affect other things. The form in itself has no potency, only the composite thing, just as the material in itself does not change and has no potency for change.

1048a 10
Whatever something chiefly desires is what it will do whenever what it is capable of is present and it approaches its passive object. For instance, if one desires to learn, she will learn whenever she is able to and learn what is proper for her desire. So something has a potency only as a desire, and a desire is present when it has the object present in a certain condition, and itself is conditioned in a certain way. Without desire, the thing is not capable of any action, for the disinhibition is present in those conditions and by establishing these conditions the obstacles are removed.

1048a 20
So even if one wish or desire to do two things at the same time, it’s not possible, as the objects present are in certain conditions and not in others.

1048a 30
Now as potency in the sense of motion is looked into, one should turn to another sense in relation to also another sense of being-at-work. For now potency is not a potency to move or be moved, but a potency to be or not be.

1048b 1
There’s no need to define everything, but one can also see in one glance by analogy. Different senses of being-at-work have the same relation to different senses of potency, yet they themselves are not alike. For some are like thinghood to material (simple being-at-work-staying-itself), some are like motion to potency.

1048b 10
There is, however, another sense of potency. For some potency allows something to simply be, but something can never simply be. This means that something can be brought out of potency completely, while something could never be fully brought out of potency but is always involved in non-being, like infinity. Infinity is not potential in the sense that it can be somehow at some time be realized (perhaps except in pure thought) as a separate being, but always is preserved as a potency.

1048b 30
A differentiation between being-at-work and motion is finally achieved. Being-at-work is that action in which the end is present, e.g. one is happy and is in a state of having been happy at the same time. Or one lives and at the same time is in a state of having lived. Any action that does not have the end in itself is an incomplete action. And being left on itself the complete action would be its own limit and in this sense also unlimited.

1049a 10
A thing can come into activity out from potency if it is not inhibited by anything else. Like a thing in thinking is a desire that can be realized only if nothing prevents it. But this issue is already addressed previously. The new issue here is that even potency itself is a consequence of previous activity. So a potential house is a potential house if nothing else prevents it from being a house in potency. So disinhibition not only allows potency to change into activity, but also allows potency itself to be in the first place. And the source of this disinhibition can be either external or internal, just as the inhibition can be either.

1049a 20
A box is in potency in bronze, and bronze is potentially in earth, earth potentially in air, and air in fire. So in order for something to be, the potency or material that makes it should first be made and prepared. There might be a first material.

1049a 30
Underlying things differ only in this sense: whether it is a this, or a one.

1049b 1
The underlying thing that is not a this is material or attribute, and an of what sort. These are indeterminate (really? in what sense? for it seems to me pure thisness is somehow even more indeterminate, though for Aristotle a this seems never to be a bare thisness).

This is a very different conception of material from modern or postmodern thinking. Material is the basis for instantiation only in the sense that it is universal and hence many, and only form is the source of oneness. So a thing is one because of its form, but it is not the only one because it has a kind and hence universal, so the form has to regenerate itself over the universal kind. This only happens with incidental and composite beings in which the material is not exhausted. Yet in this way the form regenerating would have many of its own copies and be itself universal and used by other things as material. So there’s always this polarity at work until one gets to the ultimate source of all activity: the divine nous.

1050a 30
If the putting to use of some potency generates at the end of it something else, like a house at the end of building, it is the activity that is more like an end in the end product. And for other being-at-works that have nothing else as an end besides themselves, they themselves are present as ends.

1050b 1
Now it’s clear that thinghood and form are being-at-work.

1050b 20
The motion that is everlasting is the circular motion of heaven, in which the end is unified with the start, and is no longer contradictory. So in one sense this movement is immaterial.

1050b 30
Things that undergo change mimic the indestructible things. And both knowledge and motion allow contradictories, for they are potencies; and if this is the case and if there are forms of these, there would be a thing as is the being-at-work of motion that is more motion than motion itself, and there would also be a thing that’s more knowing than knowledge itself.

1051a 20
When choosing, one of the opposite things being at work is always better than the potential being of both, while the active being of the other one is worse.

1051a 30
It seems that only when a thing in potency is discovered is it in potency; what is concealed is revealed as concealed. And this revelation seems to be a prior being-at-work.

1051b 10
The original sense of truth as unconcealment. Some things are always combined and one, hence are, while some others are always separate and many, hence are not; but some others have potency for both combination and separation, so can be true or false on different occasions. But those statements on primary though compound things can only either be always true or always false. Truth and falsity are categories for thought, and thinking is dependent upon things. These are determinations for compound things.

1051b 20
For simple and primary things, they either simply are with no need for combination or are not with no need for separation. So their truth and falsity consist of affirmation and denial. Yet falsity is really not possible for these things, so one is not deceived about these things, but merely ignorant of them for not touching them. So instead of falsity there is untruth as ignorance.

12

1052b 1
Oneness is meant in four ways: the continuous, the whole, the particular and the universal. What is continuous is the whole if it is continuous in virtue of itself, and more so if its motion is one and indivisible. What is indivisible in thinking can be either one in number or one in form, being one in form is the universal and being one in number is the particular. What is responsible for the oneness of the independent things would be one in the primary sense: does this mean the universal is the primary sense?

1052b 10
One must distinguish between what a name is and what things this name is applied to. For the things might be closer to the meaning of the name, this one other thing is closer to the name itself. The name of oneness then is indivisibility and wholeness, or what it is to be a this, or separateness in place or form or thinking; but it especially is that primary measure of each class of things, and in the most governing sense that measure of the class of things with quantity.

1052b 20
Oneness is the source of number as number.

1052b 30
Measure or source is one and indivisible. Yet is this not circular: that which is a measure is one, and that which is one is a measure? But it is circular only if measure and oneness are taken to be different and separate things.

1053a 1
This seems to suggest that qualities like wetness and dryness can also be measured by amount. This seems to not contradict what he says in Categories (or does it?) for there qualities admit of a more or less; yet is this more or less characterized by amount? How can a quality have a measure that is common and indivisible?

1052a 20
One thing could have different measures. And measures are indivisible in different ways, like a meter is taken to be indivisible but a unit is actually indivisible.

1053b 1
The knower and perceiver are the measure of things, but only in this sense: just like one recognize how tall one is by being measured by some ruler out there, one uses knowledge as a measure after it itself is measured by things out there. And it’s clear that an amount is the more governing sense of oneness, and next a kind. What is one is simply indivisible or taken as indivisible.

1053b 20
Being and oneness cannot be general classes for they are attributed to things in the most universal way and require things outside themselves to generate differences; but they cannot be independent things separate from the rest either.

1053b 30
Since what is true of oneness holds true in a similar way for all things (so that each thing itself is a oneness of a kind) and oneness is meant in many ways, it’s not enough to say oneness is itself its own nature, but one must inquire all things and all ways to discover in general what oneness means.

1054a 10
Just as for the class of colors the oneness belongs to a particular color, e.g. whiteness, and for a number of things the source is one particular independent thing, it is clear that being and oneness are attributed to things but are not things themselves. So oneness and being merely stand toward all things, so that when they are added to a thing as a predication, no meaning is added.

1054a 20
One and many are contraries and not contradictories. But if they are not contradictories they allow for a middle thing. What is the thing that is middle to one and many? Is it number or magnitude as such?

1054b 20
For one and many are not contradictories, manyness does not apply to things that are not when oneness should be applied to things that are, since oneness means being. But both are applied to things that are.

1054b 30
Difference and otherness are different. Otherness is a general way of characterization, so that anything is other than or same as anything else. But with difference there is a specific structure of underlying sameness. So of course what is other in one respect is the same in another, and they are contraries that form a certain continuum, just like black and white do. But difference is specifically structured as underlaid by one same thing. Black and white things are others, but only different when they belong to one same general class. Black things, however, are not underlaid by whiteness, so in the same sense, others are not underlaid by sameness.

1055a 10
Contrariety is the complete difference.

1055a 20
One thing can only be contrary to one other thing. For it’s neither possible for one extreme to be more extreme than itself nor possible for one interval to have more than two ends.

1055a 30
What differs the most are contraries, for what do not belong to the same genus do not differ, whereas what belong to the same genus, like power, thing, or state and condition, differ the most as contraries.

1055b 10
Deprivation is a certain kind of contradiction, but it can be said that the thing itself is deprived or the material is deprived. For hotness is deprived of coldness completely, but the hot thing is deprived of cold only in a limited way. So deprivation allows for a middle in certain cases, but not contradiction. Contradiction is more primary because anything is either A or not A, but not anything is either A or B, unless there is material that is receptive of that continuum of A and B. So everything is either white or not white, but only that which is capable of being white, namely, a colored thing, can be black. Also, not every deprivation is a contrariety, for a deprivation might be of thinghood itself, but contrariety is present in material as formed by thinghood. So white and black are contraries, black is a deprivation of whiteness; yet the deprivation of thinghood is a deprivation, but not a contrariety, for the deprivation of one thinghood would be another thing, but not the other end of the same continuum (since it cannot be simple non-being). A dog is a deprivation of catness, but is not a contrary to cat. So deprivation can refer to both contradiction and contrariety.

1055b 20
Here Aristotle switches to a less rigorous usage of contrariety. What he means, however, is essentially the same: some “contrarieties” are deprivations of the sort that for which only certain particulars are deprived, while some are deprivations of the whole thing. Both are deprivations but not both allow for a middle. So deprivations of contrarieties can mean contradictories, or extremes, or contraries. And these are examples from the non-rigorous daily usage of these terms.

1056a 1
How is one opposed to many? How is equal opposed to great and small? For equal is not opposed to only one of the dyad, nor is it opposed to both separately, since one contrary cannot be opposed to two different contraries.

1056a 20
Equal seems to be a middle between great and small. And what is a middle cannot be opposed to both ends as a complete contrary.

1056a 30
Equality then can only be opposed to the dyad as a joint negation of them. The middle can be opposed to both ends as that which is neither of the two ends. Yet this deprivation is not of the sort that is depriving a thing of its thinghood. Rather, this deprivation is present for things which are of such a nature that there is some sort of in-between and interval. This kind of deprivation is the most important in Nicomachean Ethics.

1056b 20
There are many structures, rigorous or not, to articulate the relation between oneness and manyness. First is one - few (deficient) - equal - many (excessive); here one and many are extremes. Second is one (few) - many (much), here they are relative terms. Third is strictly one - many, as every number is a multitude that is measured by one; fewness here is not a deficiency, but rather a proximity to the source. Or if one wants to take this one step further, even proximity can be obliterated, one and many thus become contradictories instead of contraries. Yet as was already argued previously, this step cannot be taken.

1057a 1
Aristotle here seems to say this, that one is opposed to many as if relative terms. For one is less relative to two, and two relative to three and so on. Yet this continuum cannot go on unlimited, for one is not merely less than two, it is also indivisible. So its smallness is not relative. But as one is a measure, it seems that it is related to something it measures, and is thus a relative term in that other sense of a knowledge related to something known. But here one needs to be careful again, since knowledge is itself measured by the thing and is relative in this sense, but one does not require another measure. Hence one is opposed to many as if relative terms only to an extent. Its opposition preserves more of a meaning of contrarieties.

1057a 10
So one and many are contraries when they are taken as indivisibility and divisibility. It is not difficult to see how one can be more or less indivisible as if in a continuum, for things can become more harmonized and continuous, or they can be less so and more separable. One is then the absolute indivisible, and a greater multitude would be something more capable of being divided (taken as one multitude). Though here Aristotle seems not to differentiate indivisibility and undividedness. Or one and many can be opposed as relative terms, if one is taken solely as a measure of something. What this means is that one is not separated from the many but is handled in conjunction with the many as a measure. For one can be intrinsically separate from the many, for it is the absolute measure; but as long as it is a measure, it should be placed together with the thing measured and thus related.

Relative terms in the second sense are not contradictories. Contradictories are not in any relation. The only relation contradictories hold is a non-relation or an incidental relation. But relative terms have a necessary relationship to each other. Like a measure, as long as it’s taken as a measure, is related to the measured. But a cat is not so related to a house.

1057a 20
In-between things have to be of the same general class as the extremes. For if not, there would be change first into something outside the general class, for any change happens first into the things in between. But any change into the outside is only incidental, like a color into a shape. So it’s impossible.

1057b 1
There’s nothing in between contradictories. There’s also nothing in between relative terms that are not contraries.

1057b 10
There will be specific differences in a general class that which takes precedence over the contraries as the species thus created. For example, black and white are two extremes of color, but their differences come from absorption and reflection of light. So absorption and reflection would be contraries of a prior sort. And light would be a general class prior to color. This makes clear that Aristotle never treats genera and species as separate, but always a systemic body of knowledge in which different layers interpenetrate. So that one general class might be a reflection of one other general class greater than itself. One can also imagine how different contraries in different species can be recapitulated into a more fundamental contrariety: like hot and cold, wet and dry, strong and weak into fire and earth. And these contraries are resulted from complicated interactions of different contrarieties.

1057b 20
This construction, however, is constructed into an hierarchy. For as the differences cannot be internal to the general class but have to come from its outside, the contraries are generated by a prior contrariety. So is anything in-between the contraries within the same genus composed of prior sources which only then are compounded with the genus. Otherwise the thing would be simply uncompounded so no difference is added onto it (animal cannot be compounded with cat for cat is already animal compounded with an external difference). Then what if the contrariety finally is traced back to those ultimate sources that are contraries but do not belong to the same general class? Then the things in-between generated by the sources would retroactively constitute a general class that reconstitutes the independent sources into a first contrariety that reflects the pair of sources. So the first sources generate the first genus but are independent in a way from this genus, whereas the first in-between things belong to this first genus but are composed of those first sources reflected into the contraries. Lower kinds follow and are thus generated. So the first sources are first contraries only in a qualified sense. This seems to be the only way to reconcile all the difficult claims. In-between things are not composed of sources, for sources are not contraries that are same in kind, though they are truly prior contraries. So the last statement reads: “all in-between things are in the same general class as contraries and are between contraries, and are all composed of those contraries”. This can be understood so that sources are not included as constituent contraries, but are contraries on a prior ephemeral ur-ground. And their products are independent things that can only retroactively belong to one general class (but one that prohibits change), in which only the reflections of the sources appear.

Or another interpretation is that the “contraries not in the same general class” actually only refers to contraries as in pairs. So there’s no prior pair of contraries but they are the first in the same class. Yet this still needs to solve the question as how can differences be inside the genus. So this interpretation seems less sound.

Why is there no immanent difference? For if one thing is one, it is internally the same and is incapable of generating any difference, otherwise it will not be one and the same. So any differentiation whatsoever must be generated from the outside.

1058a 1
A genus is that which is the same in both things, having a non-incidental specific difference in each thing. So it’s not only a horse and a man are both animals, they must be animals in specific differences. So it seems differences and genera have to be interdependent.

1058a 10
Difference is otherness that belongs to a genus.

1058a 20
Being other in species is to be indivisible contraries in the same genus. Whereas divisibility would allow contrary in-between things, not different species.

1058a 20
Species is neither the same nor different from the genus. Though it seems meaningful to ask if species is other than genus. Also, things differ from others in genus not in the sense of contrarieties, for contraries only exist in the same genus. This, however, can be interpreted otherwise.

1058b 1
Attempts to resolve the impasse as why some differences are more primary than others. It might be some differences are more fitting and essential to the nature of the genus. It might also be some differences are related more to the articulation and others more to the material.

1058b 10
But wouldn’t material differences sometimes matter greatly?

1058b 30
Previous claims are overthrown: now we need to consider contraries and oppositions as in genus. Where can we find the middle of things different in genus? Destructibility and indestructibility are among this kind, for they necessarily belong to things. A thing cannot be incidentally destructible or not. And this thing cannot change from being indestructible to being destructible. It seems to me that divisibility and indivisibility should belong to this kind too. So if this is the case, how do we determine a new differentiation between contradictories and contraries?

One possible solution comes from these statements. First, things can be different in genus. This means there’s some ungraspable kind underlying different genera. Second, contradictories are said to have no in-between things for in-between things are most likely to change. But now what if some in-between things do not change? So indestructible and destructible things are contraries instead of contradictories, because they have in-between things, but they are a special kind in which these in-between things do not change on this spectrum. And the independent sources are contraries in this sense, that they do not belong to one same general class, but they nonetheless constitute the first general class and belong to that primal sameness, and are contraries in a specific sense. And the statement in 1058a 20 needs not be dismissed. The quote runs as follows: “For it is necessary that the difference of things that differ in species be a contrariety, and this belongs only to things which are in the same genus”. If we interpret the this here as referring to the difference instead of the contrariety, the implication would then become that a difference in species necessarily belongs to the same genus, but a contrariety needs not. So the first sources can very well be a pair of contraries.

13

The whole Book K is a succinct synopsis.

1059a 20
One sort of knowledge is about the contraries. But sources are not contraries. Is this a retraction or is this already inherent in earlier thinking?

1059b 20
Material of mathematical things.

1059b 30
Both species and general classes seem to have a claim on authority to be ultimate sources.

1061a 10
All differences can be traced back to first differences or first contraries. And first contraries are somehow within being. And it makes no difference to say oneness or being for even if they are not the same they are interchangeable.

1061a 30
Eidetic reduction.

1061b 10
Dialectic and sophistry are concerned with attributes, not beings as such.

1061b 20
Philosophy does not select a certain part of being with desired attributes but studies being insofar as each part is. Therefore wisdom is to harmonize all parts and to ground all particular knowledges in their ontological status. To reflect on the being of each part is to see how each part fits into the whole and what is its position in the order in relation to source.

1062a 10
There’s no demonstration of the law of non-contradiction simply; but it is possible in relation to a person by refutation.

1062b 30
A falsity resides in this: everything comes from what is; but clearly what is white comes from what is not white; so what is not has to be what is. But this reasoning is false for what is not is but is in potency. And being in potency is different from being in activity, and there’s always otherness inherent in being.

1063a 20
This seems to refer to khora.

1065a 30
Fortune is an incidental cause in the things that are by choice.

1065b 10
Motion is always with respect to and stays in its category of being. So material moves only as material, composite thing as composite thing, and being-at-work as being-at-work. So what has being comes out of potency only in the sense that a form that is not in this material is now received into this material, but not the material itself changes into a form.

1068b 20
Motion only belongs to quality, quantity and place. And when a thing moves, its thinghood does not move; its relation to other things does not move, at least not intrinsically, for it cannot change its relation solely by itself, like its being bigger than another thing depends upon the other thing staying the same, or its becoming a measure depends upon itself being measured first; its being in movement or being moved also does not move. Changes in quality, quantity and place are all ways of incorporating otherness into itself (attribute into material, thing onto thing, the thing there into here), but change in relation is impossible to do this for that otherness is predetermined as an unincorporated otherness. For a relation is always determined as something eternally out there, it cannot be incorporated. But an attribute is a thing that is defined as something that is capable of being received into material, thus can be incorporated.

14

1069b 10
Material has to be capable of changing between the contraries. And one thing in active being changes from some other thing in potency. Yet it’s also said that things that belong to different categories do not change into one another. Unless these things belong to that which is composed of both being-at-work and potency.

So composite thing changes from one to another, but material does not change into a form or a thing, and form changes neither into material or a thing. Rather, it’s the thing that changes from one potency into a being-at-work. It is, in other words, the way by which different forms are ordered into the material that changes.

1069b 30
Even potencies are determinate to an extent, by their material. Then why aren’t potencies simply determined as one but infinite? For what’s one is the intellect, if potency were also one it would simply actively be. For what is one simply is. Everything would be predetermined one thing and there’s no possibility.

1070a 1
Neither the ultimate material nor the ultimate form comes into being.

1070a 10
The material is a this by coming forth into appearance. Material has being by way of having contact instead of having grown together, so that it is not growing into one with the thing but is always present as an otherness. Forms grow together, like hand grows together with heart and they become parts of one indivisible whole. But material is always divisible and added onto the thing, so can always be stripped away. The nature of a thing is a this and an active condition into which it comes. The third kind is the particular thing that consists of these.

1070a 20
Artifacts seem to not have separate forms (why? is it because before the first house there’s no separate house crafted, so the form has no separate being outside this material here? whereas an animal always has its form separate in another material?), or only their arts have. But these arts do not invent forms. Forms are not invented. Things that cause motion precede the things moved, but things that are causes in the sense of rational patterns are simultaneous with what they produce.

1070a 30
Yet if these patterns are only present when the things produced are present, would some of them still remain there afterwards? For instance, some part of the soul might still be present, like intellect, after the person is absent, in his writings or account. So it’s clear that there’s no need for there to be forms, since the patterns can always be reproduced from one particular to another particular.

To reconstruct the argument, it seems to be something like this. First, there are no forms separate from the particulars. And this is because some beings do not have forms ready-at-hand preceding them, and these are products, for every product is handled only in a process of real-life ongoing construction. So already there are beings that do not have forms. Also, no rational pattern is present outside any particular, and this is true even for natural beings. For one does not necessarily need a thing of the same form preceding it in order for it to be, but it can very well be caused by chance, fortune and other mover, and the pattern will simply be in the particular material; also even if one thing has another thing similar in form to it preceding itself, that very first precedent in this genealogy also has its own form that is simultaneous only with itself. So this precedence is only incidental. Then how to explain the fact that there really seem to be similar things? Because surely what is already here can reproduce itself in another and thus remain afterwards, but this does not necessarily entail that there’s a universal, for a particular can pass down itself into another particular, and this heritage needs not be a universal form. A simple likeness would do.

1070b 1
Causes and sources are all different for different things. Yet spoken by way of analogy they are also the same. There’s no one element common to all things, for things composed of elements are different from the elements. Where can that difference come from if there’s only one ultimate source?

1070b 10
For this reason, none of the elements could be either an independent thing or a relative thing, as if it could generate either category all by itself, for it requires an added external difference, a source of a different sort; but rather the elements have to all be of different sorts, so different categories can be generated from different sorts.

1070b 20
Elements are also different from sources. Elements are constituents of things, but there are external sources of motion generating things and putting forms into the material. Different things also have different movers.

1070b 30
The prime mover is referred to here as that one-above-many external cause which sets forms into materials.

1071a 1
In one sense, the separate and independent thing is more primary than and thus the cause that is the same of things like attributes and motions. And the primary independent things seem to be those that can sustain themselves. So souls and bodies, or intellects, desires and bodies, are causes. But in another sense, being-at-work and potency are by analogy the same sources for things. And these patterns fit with earlier ones, for soul is the form of forms, body the material, desire the composite. While being at work is also the form, both separate and composite, potency the material.

1071a 10
Being-at-work and potency would be different for different materials with different forms. One thing to be emphasized here: material allows otherness into the thing, but not any kind of otherness, rather only the deprivation of the present form. And it seems the mover is again outside the matrix of form-material. What is the mover in the intellect-desire-body matrix? Is it the desire?

What is the relation of these structures? Are they analogies of each other? Are they simply the same? Are they repetitions?

1071a 20
The sources for particular things are also particular. So for things different in kind, their sources are also different in kind, but only the same by analogy. For things different in number, their sources are also different in number.

1071a 30
So all things have the same cause by analogy, in the sense that the four causes, form, deprivation, material and mover, for any independent thing would be the causes for others as others are dependent upon independent things. The thing completely at work is the cause for everything. Yet all things also have different causes, as many as there are primary contraries. To note: these discussions are all on perceptible things.

It seems then for perceptible things the sources themselves have instantiations, perhaps thanks to the involvement of material. So the form keeps the particular into one, but the material, being necessarily many as unexhausted, generates things into many ones. And it makes the forms and sources themselves into particulars. Though these particulars can still be categorized into more primary sources, but the instantiations are not reducible to these primary sources. So that particulars will have their own forms and movers as particulars, and these will be the same and different depending on how this is meant. So that the sources themselves can be treated as those things they are the sources of: they might be treated as the same in kind and thus has one primary source, or they might be treated again as different particulars that are responsible for the instantiations, hence different. Or they might be the same by analogy and thus have one primary source that is also self-splitting and ephemeral. In another sense, the world of sources is now getting reflected into by the world of things. All these are because of the inexhaustible material. Things will be different with intelligible things.

15

1076b 10
Mathematical things cannot be present in perceptible things for they are indivisible.

1076b 20
Also mathematical things cannot be simply separate for simple lines would be separate from lines as together with a solid.

1076b 30
It’s also the case with numbers, as there will be perceptible units as in perceptible numbers, perceptible units as separate from numbers, units as in intelligible numbers, etc.

1077a 1
If they were separate, astronomy and geometry would be no science.

1077a 10
If there were intelligible senses there would be intelligible animals. This is awesome! And if these are senses there will be even more intelligible senses.

1077a 20
Though mathematical things are supposed to be separate from and more primary than perceptible things, in truth they are derivative from them. Just like what has no soul is derivative from what has soul.

1077a 30
Mathematical things are neither forms, for only bodies or solids seem ensouled and complete, nor material, for it’s not evident how a thing can be composed of points.

1077b 1
Things prior in articulation are not necessarily prior in thinghood. For instance, attributes are prior in articulation, but they cannot be unless by being attributed to things; and when separated, they do not belong to things and have thus no being.

1077b 20
Demonstrations can always be about certain things but not only insofar as they are these. For instance, mathematics concerns itself with those magnitudes themselves of those things the sort of which can have magnitudes. But it’s only about the magnitudes of those things, not about those things themselves. For discourse has this power to separate and combine. And incidental attributes can be stripped away from the mathematical things in account, yet the mathematical things still are not really separate.

1078a 30
A human being can be treated as indivisible and as a solid. Both are right, for a thing has its potency to be otherwise. The good and the beautiful are different, for the good are always with actions.

1078b 10
Those friends of the forms are Heracliteans in the sense that they are persuaded everything in perception is in flux. So if there were any knowledge it cannot be any perception.

1078b 30
Socrates is credited with arguments by example and universal definition. And dialectic had not yet been developed enough to examine things from contrary assumptions, like what Plato did in his dialogues.

1079a 20
It seems that the ratio of two to one that links oneness and the dyad is more primary than either of the relata. Or there will be a number itself that includes both and is hence more primary.

1080a 30
Three possibilities for numbers that are natures and thinghoods: 1. each number is distinct from others, and so are their units; 2. each number is comparable with others, and so are their units; 3. each number is distinct from others, but each unit within each number is comparable among themselves (the unit of two is different from the unit of three, but the two units that compose two are comparable forms).

1080b 20
Pythagoreans make units into perceptible things and magnitudes. So for them they do not seem to have the notion of eidetic numbers, but they are rather devotees to mathesis universalis that all things are ratios.

1081a 10
If all units are indistinct, there would be no thinghood as such. For three would not be essentially different from four, for the extra unit added is nothing different from the thing itself, while the thing itself cannot be added to itself.

1081a 20
But units cannot be totally incomparable either. For the units are generated together out of the same source, and if one unit is prior and the other is derivative, one unit will also be prior to the number while the other derivative, then where to situate the number?

1081a 30
If all units were incomparable, there would be one unit for one, and two units for two, yet number three would already be present in number two. Yet this should not be, for number three would have its own units separate from all prior units.

1081b 1
It’s impossible to say at the same time that there is a first unit and second unit after the one and that there is a first two, for the first two is composed not of the first unit and the second unit following the one, but the one and the first unit following it.

1081b 20
It turns out that to say all units are incomparable is not really different from saying all units are comparable, for no eidetic number can be produced this way, but all numbers thus produced are produced by addition.

1081b 30
If eidetic numbers were produced, four would be composed of an eidetic two that is the dyad limited by the one and the dyad itself. Yet which one dyad is the truly two? Neither, for two itself is that which includes the first unit. And if two is composed of units, then two is not a product of the dyad, for the element is one instead of a dyad. All of these show how this whole doctrine of eidetic number is ridiculous and impossible.

1082a 1
Even if we say only units that are not within the same number are distinct, this is still inconceivable. For ten is composed of two fives. If five has units different than what ten has, how could they be thus composed?

1082a 20
Also there seems to be no separate twoness apart from two units. For a separate nature can be attached to another thing by participation or wholeness, but this is achieved through contact, mixture or placement. In what way is twoness one apart from the two units? Twoness really does not look like one whole.

1082a 30
The units in the first two generate all other twos, like twos in four and eight, for the first two is the most primary. But the twos in the first four also generate all other fours. So what is derivative can become the primary source, and a form can be composed of forms, like the first four is composed of twos that generate other twos in all other fours. It’s just like saying an animal is composed of animals. This refers to the cosmos in Timaeus.

1082b 1
What is equal is undifferentiated. What more reason could anyone give?

1082b 10
If one unit from two is added to another from three, will this two be prior to three? Will this be posterior to two?

1082b 20
If numbers were forms, they can never be undifferentiated. For in three there would be a two that’s also a form like the first two, and forms would be composed of forms. And there will be one highest form that all other forms are its parts. For this is impossible, as forms are independent and separate, there can be no addition whatsoever. For in addition, one number necessarily contains a part that is equal to the prior number, and equality means being undifferentiated. And division into parts is also impossible, for now eight would be divided into two fours, each is less than eight itself but equal to four itself, so four in itself must be contained in eight as a part. If one were to say the four in eight is different than four itself, what else can equality mean? All these would lead to ludicrous consequences.

1083a 10
Numbers differ in amount, but units cannot. Also units are without attribute, thus not differing in kind either. And since the qualities of numbers are derivative from their amount, the units as homogeneous precede the difference. So one needs to mark out from the beginning if a unit were different from another, how could they be called one? And if they were not ones, what are we talking about?

1083a 30
Those who believe that there are only mathematical numbers but a certain one is the source are simply mistaken. For they do not recognize the fact that once a first one is admitted, all numbers would have their own firsts, and this position will soon collapse into the one that holds there are eidetic numbers.

1083b 10
Or numbers are not separate at all, then there’s no problem of whether units are different or the same, for these determinations now depend on similarities and dissimilarities in perception. And as numbers are not separate, there’s no need to determine how, them being different, can they again be related to each other; or how, them being the same in themselves, can they allow for differences and duplications. But one other impossibility thrusts up: numbers cannot be the same as magnitudes. This already hints at Aristotle’s resolution, which lies in making numbers not separate active beings, but beings in potencies of things.

1084a 10
If numbers were separate active beings, they would be either actively infinite or actively finite. For infinity belongs to numbers. Yet neither is possible. For infinity is neither odd nor even, and it would need a being that actively corresponds to it. But there really seems to be an infinity. So numbers cannot be separate beings, but have to inhere in the material, and be thus gathered into one thing as active being and its potencies, so the twos contained in four are only potentially there. It is also right to say that different numbers have different units, for the units are potencies now realized in different forms. So as one is potentially two, or two potentially one, all positions can be reconciled.

1084b 30
As people take numbers and units to be actively present, they hunt for contrary things. For they say the unit is both a source and a derivative, which can be correct, only if qualified as thinghood to material.

1085a 1
One consequence is that the units, being more like the one, should be prior to two. But they say two is prior. This is contradictory if without qualifications. Also, three can be taken as one thing, and five too, for both are active beings, and consequently they can make up two, which should be an eight. And what would this two in turn be composed of, since each number is just as immaterial?

1085a 10
Since numbers are in succession, it is an impasse whether they themselves succeed one another or their units do. If they are continuous there’s no such question, for there’s no separate whole; but here, unit is one whole, two another. And things derivative from numbers, like lines and surfaces, encounter the same impasse. If they are all produced from the great and small, how do they obtain these qualitative differences? And what about those other attributes of magnitudes that do not themselves make up those magnitudes directly, but should necessarily accompany any particular magnitude as a particular attribute, like curvedness and straightness of a line? Do they not also come from the great and small?

Any particular curvature or straightness is not intrinsic to the particular line so long as what matters is its magnitude, just as any particular magnitude is not intrinsic so long as what matters is the thinghood. But one particular magnitude must necessarily be accompanied by one particular curvature as an actively revealed and maintained potency, so it’s necessary that it has a curvature as such. But it does not matter if this particular curvature is intrinsic or incidental, what matters is that the curvature as such is always actively present, and it has to be generated by something. And since magnitude as such is generated by the great and small, shouldn’t its necessary accompaniment, i.e. curvature as such, also be generated by the same source? But the source of curvature seems to be the curved and the straight, which is qualitatively different from the great and the small, and their respective particularizations are incidental to each other. By this argument, great and small should not be the ultimate source. Just as the source for human being to have color lies in his being an animal, but the source for particularization of color as such lies in his skin, which is separate from the source for any particularization of the human being, that being his soul. So when A is present, B is necessarily present only if A itself is its necessary source, or A has a source in itself that necessarily generates B, though it needs not be necessary that this source always generates A. What is needed is only that when A is present, that source be present, and B would necessarily be produced. In other words, the source can be merely a necessary source for A, but has to be a sufficient source for B. Either case, they must share a common source, yet it’s not clear that great and small sufficiently produce curved and straight. So the dyad can only explain the magnitude itself, but not how the magnitude is presented.

1085b 1
These people have no way of deciding if points are material for lines or not, or what’s the same thing, if points accompany lines.

1085b 10
Those who say multitude as such generate numbers encounter the same impasse as those who say it’s the dyad that generate. For instance, each unit cannot be one itself, hence is only a product of multitude and one itself. But how can a unit be of multitude? Or if it’s made of part of the multitude, that part being indivisible, it’s not really made of multitude and one, but one and one. Plus, the multitude of indivisible parts is another number, which is presupposed even before any number is generated.

1086b 10
Those who set universals as if independent particulars are incurring inconveniences.

1087a 20
Knowledge has two senses: one in potency, as the indeterminate universal, the other in being at work, as the determinate particular. So a universal color is seen alongside the particular color as material for the particular, but the universal color can also be thought into being-at-work and particularized, while the particular perception of color is worked into its sensible material.

1087b 1
Contraries are not the sources of everything, for they always belong to an underlying thing.

1087b 20
What exceeds and what is exceeded are two opposites more universal than the dyad, according to some. For it relates not merely to size, but to everything in magnitude or degree. But it’s still problematic.

1088a 1
So it seems for Aristotle one is a measure, and one that is not separate from the kind of multitude being measured. There’s no separate one itself, as it seems.

1088a 20
Great and small are relatives, and relatives cannot be one independent thing or material, for it always involves an other as an other, and it is only an attribute dependent upon quality and quantity but never material as such. This is actually treating Plato’s doctrine at its face value and interpreting his naming of the dyad literally.

1088b 10
If two were the smallest number, and to it alone is fewness or one attributed, which is already absurd, what would be the number that is the greatest? There’s none, but all such numbers should be attributed by both. So those who claim ten or ten thousand is the greatest number is simply mistaken.

1088b 20
What is composed of elements has material and admits of being otherwise, hence is never everlasting.

1089a 20
Since being and non-being both have many meanings, it’s necessary for the sense to be pinned down first before saying “being requires non-being to be, otherwise all will be one”. And non-being is not meant as something false in this sense, for what is false is unsound and to be fought off by truth, but this kind of non-being is actually the ur-ground for being. This non-being can be none other than potency.

1089b 10
There are sorts of speaking of being other than thinghood, and the dyad cannot generate these other sorts. If they inquire into this they see how different kinds of potencies contribute to these other ways of being many. Also they make the dyad into one thing as opposite the one, but they forget how the dyad can be of many sorts to. And where does this manyness of the many come from, if it is only of one sort in itself?

1089b 20
It’s necessary to posit a potency for each thing and not to posit a potency for thinghood to be a thing in its own right of a different sort, e.g. a relative. One of the kinds of being cannot be another kind in potency. But this raises a question, that how are there many kinds of beings? For they are many because of one material, yet their materials must be differentiated.

1089b 30
If this and of what sort are kept apart, it’s conceivable how one this can be many potentially; but how is it possible to have actively many independent things, each one an active this? Without the thisness being of a sort, wouldn’t all such ones be reduced to simply one? And if the this is apart from amount, how can there be many ones? So it does not seem that potencies of different kinds are really that apart.

1090a 10
It seems those who uphold the mathematical numbers do not treat numbers as cause of anything or of any use, but rather as indifferent things itself by itself. For theorems of arithmetic can be perfectly applied to perceptible things, and it’s not necessary that only until abstractions are attained to can perceptible things be calculated, or that without the abstractions there are no perceptible numbers. So perceptible things could very well be causes for mathematical ones, though mathematical things are neutral and indifferent. Yet if mathematical numbers are not sources, how do they have independent being?

The point here is this: if mathematical numbers are causes, them being neutral and indifferent is contradictory. And without pure mathematical units, the perceptible things still have definite magnitudes and numbers, even if not pure as such. So these cannot be causes.

1090a 30
The problem Pythagoreans encounter is not so much that numbers become separate from bodies, but rather they claim bodies to be made of numbers. Thus what is heavy is made of what has no weight at all.

1090b 10
Points and lines and solids are limits for things, and limits are not separate from things.

1090b 20
It seems deep down Aristotle has this conviction that nature is throughly intelligible in itself, and there’s nothing imposed upon it to make it intelligible. Intelligibility is inherent. So even without independent numbers things are still calculated and understood.

1091b 20
It’s unreasonable to say good is one, and one is the ultimate source, for then everything is good. Poets are also aware of this difficulty, so they make Zeus, that one which is later in appearance, rule instead of the first gods.

1092a 1
And then multitude will be badness, and everything will be bad too. And the good and the bad are seats for each other and destroy each other. And good will be the potency for bad and bad for good. These are necessary consequences when contraries are sources, and sources are elements in things, and one is a source, and numbers are primary independent things thus making manyness a source too, and numbers are in turn sources for all things that are.

1092b 1
Why all things made of contraries perish, but not numbers?

1092b 20
If ratios are harmonies of numbers, and harmonies thinghoods, then numbers are materials, for a number is always a number of things, and these things are used to construct a ratio.

1092b 30
It’s also difficult to determine in what sense a numerical ratio is good. Also numbers are of material, but cannot be of numbers too, for then everything will be of merely differences in quantity, and things would be reduced to merely products. Yet if everything is number, this would become a necessary consequence. Also, it seems if everything is number, and number is necessarily universal, then a lot of unlike things would be alike. Unless one were to say that everything has its own singular number, yet this seems unreasonable, for we do assign the same number to different things; and if everything has its own incomparable and singular number, how do we count and add things? If A is one, B is two, is three a combination of AB? Then there will already be two As and Bs, and how is three a singular one when it comes from A and B, in what way does it come to be? Is it by mixing or placement? But this is already something outside merely mathematics and numbers. Is there a specific number for kinds of addition too? Or are these ways of addition determined by these singular numbers themselves? But then why signify all these with only universal addition? At any rate, nothing is really determined by these sayings alone. And what is determined as eidetic number is necessarily supplemented by other aspects of being.

So it seems that Aristotle is not really arguing against the “possibility” of Plato’s doctrine, but rather its imprecision and inconveniences. So the doctrine of eidetic number cannot really naively be understood as relating simply to numbers, but is always a number of things. But this already requires a further inquiry into thinghood as such, which cannot be treated again as merely numbers. Otherwise there will be forms of forms till infinity, while each form is separate from any other. Unless numbers can be treated as potencies too. But he fails to notice, or pretends not to notice, that Plato has already introduced potency into his doctrine by introducing the dyad. So he really does not divert from Plato’s teaching, except he does not treat the dyad as an active two.

1093b 20
Mathematical things have attributes that are universal by analogy. Some qualities and potencies of number do belong in the list that includes beautiful, but they are incidental attributes (potencies) to numbers, numbers themselves are not the Beautiful.

16

It seems that a material and a form can be mutually converted. So what used to be a material can now be treated as a form, and vice versa. But this conversion has its limits. If we formulate it in this way, the letter preceding being the form, the letter preceded being the material, a negation being the contrary, these would be clear.

First, there are the highest and independent sources. These sources, however, first start to interact and work each other into the material in which each and its contrary could inform the material. Suppose there are five sources, A, B, C, D, and E.

These sources then create an ephemeral plane of being, in which ontological regions are demarcated, and sources get transformed into contraries with in-between things. So we have AB, -AB, AC, -AC, etc., co-constituting the primary level.

But these derivatives again constitute materials or forms for other things. So we could see new products like (AB)C, like two qualities, for two is a product derivative from magnitude and thinghood, but quality is itself the primary kind. We also could see new products like A(BC), so we have one/this horse, where one is primary, but horse is derivative from two other things. And all forms could then be affecting and affected by any other form, except that which is already contained inside itself. It means that there is no such thing as A(AB) or (AB)A. But it is possible that the form and material be reversed, since they are nothing but polarities; so rationality could be the material that animality is working on, and AB could be reversed into BA. At this level, all forms are countable and determinate, and the material is also determinate, for it’s exhausted by the form. So for an articulation like white horse, both white and horse are determinate, and the intellectual material is as determinate as its form.

Yet as the forms go further and further in being enriched, as the form becomes something like a conglomeration of nearly unlimited other things, the intellectual material becomes no longer delineated. It becomes fuzzy and ambiguous, for it is now so complicated within itself. This is also the case with the form. The form that is at work and reveals itself is itself a derived product, which has other forms in potency. So the form-material structure is duplicated within the form itself. Just as (AB)C has AB contained inside itself, now this structure is reproduced to such an extent that it’s no longer determinable. But as long as one part is that which is at work, we call that a form, but now the form has actually become an indeterminate this; whereas the other part is that which is in potency, that allows for other forms to inform itself, becomes hyle, or pure material. The reason why form always seems clearer and more defined than material is not because of its content, for the being of a statue is no less ambiguous than bronze, and a bronze is even simpler; rather, it’s for the fact that form is always grasped as one and this, hence limiting, while material, even if simpler in articulation, always allows for what’s otherwise into itself, hence allowing for an inherent manyness and infinity. This clarity exuded by form, then, comes not from its content or articulation, but rather from its being at one end of the polarity, that of oneness and limit, while the other end is occupied by manyness and materiality. In other words, this clarity is an hypothetical clarity, and this is why for Aristotle universals are far removed from thinghood as such. Forms are beings-at-work, but not attributes.

So form is what is one, and material is what allows something otherwise into itself while the thing remains one.