Aristotle · 亚里士多德
Metaphysics · 形而上学
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Metaphysics — Reading notes
Reflections · Apple Notes
Revised 31 January 2023
1
980a 21
Why stretch “out” toward knowing?
980b 21
Sight, memory and hearing make up learning.
981a 1
Memory completes experience.
981b 1
The sign of people who know is to teach.
981b 20
Wisdom and leisure.
982a 20
Arithmetic is more precise than geometry as it’s simpler.
982b 10
The way of wondering.
982b 20
By the way of ignorance people philosophize, by the way of knowing people know.
983b 20
The material cause is that from which things come to be but itself subsides.
984b 20
A “history” of causality: material cause to dynamic cause: but is dynamic cause also the cause for the beautiful?
987b 20
For Plato, great and small partake of one in producing forms; sensible objects-mathematical objects-forms-one. Infinite for him is emergent out of a dyad but is itself not a category.
988a 1
But this is problematic since it’s not right the infinite shall come from the material as the material is used up in production whereas the form remains active and generates many.
988b
Formal cause is for rest and being.
993b 10
The cause of difficulty not in things but in us.
994b 1
Two different kinds of finitude: completion or circulation. In circulation, as the first thing is finite but everlasting, it’s to be reasoned that the last thing, which can turn back into the first thing and is not complete if the first thing is not destroyed, shall be everlasting but finite.
994b 30
We don’t know what is infinite by addition or division. Causes are not like lines, that lines one needs to force a limit while itself remains unlimited, whereas causes naturally need to be limited.
2
1003a 21
The highest causes belong to some nature in its own right. Those who were seeking the elements have to search for the sources too.
1003b 1
Being has multiple meanings but points to one primary meaning. How?
1003b 10
So is the primary nature determined as thinghood?
1003b 20
One perception and one kind of knowledge. Being and oneness are one and the same.
1004a 10
The negation and deprivation of highest causes also belong to the same study. Deprivation works like a green apple contra a red apple, which has a deprivation of red; but infinity is negation of finitude.
1004a 20
Oppositeness is a certain kind of difference and difference a certain kind of otherness. These are all spoken of in many ways.
1004a 30
Even the pointing to can be meant in many ways. It’s an impasse: how can what is one be many?
1004b 1
The study of oneness is not the study of number.
1004b 20
Sophistry and dialectic concern the same things as philosophy only because being is common for all things; sophistry is seeming without being while dialectic is only tentative at everything philosophy seeks to know.
1005a 20
Should mathematical axioms and thinghood belong to the same study?
1005a 30
Some natural philosophers say things appropriately about being as being; though there’s still being higher than nature as nature is only one class.
1005b 1
It seems implied that truth must be presented in a logical way and this should be preparatory.
1005b 10
The most certain principle: non-hypothetical, necessary for anyone who knows anything to have and “arrive having”, and never in error.
1005b 20
Proposition - ultimate opinion? Perhaps it’s only opinion in the perspective of opinionated people.
1006a 1
Lack of education: something simply cannot be demonstrated.
1006a 20
One can demonstrate the principle by refutation, so that the one who disputes is responsible for stating a determinate meaning (instead of proving something is or is not the case), and in that way submits to reason. What follows is a demonstration by refutation.
1006b 10
What is one cannot mean what is not, but can have many things that belong to one.
1007a 10
The attributes are infinite, while the definitions are limited.
1007a 20
Thinghood cannot be at the same time the very thing it is not; otherwise Thinghood itself will be incidental and there’s no being.
1007b 1
Yet all incidental things are predicates of the underlying thing; if there’s no thinghood, there’s no underlying thing. Things are said to be incidental in two ways: 1. The incidentals are incidental to each other because they belong to the same thing; 2. The incidentals are incidental to a particular thing. So that in the first sense A is incidental to B only insofar as they are incidental to C; in the latter sense A is incidental to an underlying thing C, but B is said neither to be incidental to A nor A+C (ad infinitum), but only to C.
1007b 30
That which is indeterminate is that which is potentially: that is what is not.
1008a 10
If all things are and are not altogether, then everything is one; if all things are and are not in turn, then nothing can be meaningfully said; if all things are not while some things are, then the opposite to the things that are not are determinate. If all things are while some things are not in the same time, these exceptions will be agreed upon.
1008a 20
Ontology practiced as evaluation and life.
1009a 1
If things really are and are not at the same time, at least there will be degrees of such things, so that things are more than they are not or the other way.
1028a 10
Being meant as what something is and a this and of what sort or how much something is.
1028a 30
The independent thing is a particular, but its Thinghood is not meant in a particular way.
1028b 1
What is being is the same as what is Thinghood.
1029a 1
Four ways of meaning Thinghood: what a thing keeps on being in order to be at all; the universal; the general class; the underlying thing. The underlying thing seems more to be form.
1029a 10
When all things are stripped away what is left is not the underlying thing but the material. Being is made definite by its attributes.
1029a 30
The third kind: form.
1029b 3
Proceed from the less knowable to the more knowable; from the perceptible to the knowable; from the particular to the universal. A thorough subversion of his method.
1041a 20
When asking why one is not asking, in A is B, about A or B, for they have to be evident and present; so “because a thing is itself” is too general (even if each thing is indivisible in itself, so that “itself” denotes something singular and definite) to be an effective answer.
1041b 1
When one is asking about a simple thing, one must divide even the simple things up into parts; as to ask why is the material in this form.
1041b 10
The whole itself is a particular. For otherwise it will not be a whole but mere material.
1041b 30
Independent things are put together by nature and in accordance with nature.
3
1048a 30
Being in potency.
1048b 1
By analogy.
1048b 20
Infinite is potential in the sense that it always involves being at work and is not separate from the actual.
1048b 30
Difference between complete action and incomplete action: complete in its doing things in a state of having done them. Being-at-work is such a complete action.
1049b 10
Being-at-work takes precedence over any source of motion. For any potency itself has to be brought about as a potency of something, and this something pre-exists and is at work.
1050a 20
Sometimes motion, or the incomplete, can be displayed as an end(making the incomplete into something complete). For end is work, work is being-at-work, and it extends to being-at-work-staying-complete.
1050a 30
A thing can be simply put at work, or its work is a new thing.
1050b 1
Being-at-work is form and is Thinghood.
1050b 10
Potency is not capable of not being present, but is capable of not being at work. So is capable of not being, and is destructible.
1050b 20
What is indestructible is not in potency, but all of them are at work. But this does not imply the converse, that whatever is at work is indestructible. Potency then is an obstruction to being at work.
1051a 1
If forms themselves are to be of the nature of potencies, there will be even higher forms being at work.
1069a 30
Ancients inquire and determine Thinghood to be particular but contemporaries stand on a logical point of view and assume for universal.
1069b 1
It’s fair to conclude that for perceptible things the everlasting are changeable too. So the everlasting has a peculiar signification.
1071b 20
There is always motion; there is always something that is capable of causing motion; there is always something that will cause motion; there is always something that is at work causing motion. So there are everlasting independent things without material whose very being is being at work.
1072a 10
A thing has to be the same and be moved, generated and destroyed at the same time. So it has to be moving in virtue of itself, yet it needs to move in virtue of an other; but this other shall be the first one, which generates both the thing itself and the other thing. An identity of identity and difference.
1072a 20
There’s a certain ceaseless motion that’s always moving in a circle. This is so not only to reason but in fact.
1072a 30
A being-at-work causes motion but is itself unmoved. The thing desired is inferior to the thing thought, but they both set things in motion. Thinking precedes desiring, action of the thing thought precedes thinking. The thing thought belongs to an array of objects, of which Thinghood is primary.
1072b 1
One and simple are different. Oneness can be a measure to the many, but what is simple simply is. Here the source is simple for it does not measure things opposite to itself, but is itself the very ordered whole. The prime mover is analogous to the good that in the manner of something loved it produces motion, as it produces spatial movement in the way that a desired object or a thought object moves desire or thought, itself being unmoved. Yet it does not mean it is itself a thought object.
1072b 10
The characterization of primary source.
1072b 20
Can intellect be something thought? Things are received into thought, yet thought is contemplated in thinking; every thinking is a thinking thinking itself. But if human beings are only doing it for a short time, where is the limit: sleep and death perhaps?
1073b 1
Astronomy is the mathematical study closest to philosophy. For numbers and geometry are not concerned with thinghood.
1074a 30
Motion cannot be for the sake of motion, but has to be for the sake of a divine body: so in one sense the stars are carried, yet in another it is the unmoving source. But to what extent can other things have this duplicity?
1074b 1
Being-at-work-staying-itself does not contain material.
It seems that the sources can be many in number, though there has to be a primary source; but yet this number of things cannot have magnitudes.
1074b 20
Intellect is not divine if it thinks nothing; yet if it thinks something, then it relies upon the thing it thinks and only potentially is. It’s hence mysterious if it’s actively thinking or only a power to potentially think.
1074b 30
Thinking is not a motion, for a motion in this sense can only be for the worse. If thinking is a potency, then it is less honorable than the thing thought. But since worst things can be thought, yet thinking is the most divine, the worse things have to be avoided and thinking has to be a thinking of thinking, if it wants to be the best.
1075a 1
In some cases, thinking can be a thinking of itself.
1075a 10
The composite intellect can only reach the best in a whole stretch of time: is this true for the thinking that thinks itself?
1075b 20
Combined with 1075b 1, contraries have material, but material has no contraries. Hence we can see how for Aristotle potency is not a different kind on the horizontal level, but the bottom part of a hierarchy.
4
989a 20
Even if someone supposes multiple bodies to be the causes of coming to be, the original problems remain, and a new problem arises, as now there is no common matter underlying the multiple bodies, and qualitative changes become impossible.
989b 1
It’s absurd to say that at the source a thing is mixed, for things have to first be unmixed in order to be mixed later, and things cannot be mixed anyway as wanted, and things when mixed can always be separated. So sources have to be double, according to Anaxagoras.
990b 1
The introduction of forms is not helpful because forms are as many a duplication as the things caused by them. If things cannot be counted, forms cannot be counted too.
990b 10
With the forms duplicating everything, there will be infinite forms of things that should not be considered to have forms, like negations, relations or past images.
990b 20
Forms will thus abolish things, which should be primary wholes of which forms are but parts. And beings like categories that cannot be called things will also be forms.
990b 30
Forms are common traits shared intrinsically by independent things in independent things, hence are thinghood.
991a 20
Forms are considered to be causes because they do not move things, do not assist the knowledge of other things or things themselves for they are set apart from things. But it’s problematic to say forms are like patterns one looks to, for patterns can be there or not there without affecting the likeness of the image, and patterns can be many and need not be only one, and patterns can also be of patterns, so that patterns are images.
991b 1
If forms are thinghoods they cannot be separate from things. There are causes of being and becoming other than forms, so forms are not separate causes.
991b 10
Forms cannot be numbers because a number is always a number of things. Without things there would be neither number nor ratios of numbers, yet what are those things before numbers? These things can only be units, yet it’s difficult to say these units are homogenous or heterogeneous by the account of numbers alone.
991b 30
Even with eidetic numbers, the problem still persists, for even though now an original source of numbers is given, this is still a number; and the cause of its being a number lies not in numbers but in the beings of the things numbered. If the things can be meant in different ways as units, one and numbers can also be meant differently.
992a 10
Different classes of things would have different kinds of magnitudes as their sources, which are qualitatively different. Plato admits of this often. This doctrine has to have its limits, so as to allow for analogical deductions from a common source of qualitatively different things; yet it still shows how numbers are the sources of things is a difficult claim.
992a 30
What’s important is not just to find the sources, but also to account for the way sources relate to appearances.
992b 1
Plato and his followers have turned philosophy into mathematics, but their doctrine of forms do not account for the real cause for the sake of which things are produced (that is, the content is not explained, but only a formal ontology of things is given; for instance, we only now why one thing is one, but we don’t know how itself strives to be one and the good, and also what kind of oneness it is striving for). The underlying thing is also turned into mathematical things, though in fact the mathematical should be but a distinction within the material. The doctrine of great and small is just ignorant of the source of forms themselves.
992b 10
Platonists can only speak of one itself but not how all things are one. Even that there’s a one itself is problematic for there’s no one highest genus.
992b 10
The doctrine of forms ignores a fourth kind of being, that is the geometrical numbers, like a square number or a solid number.
992b 20
Any inquiry into the source has to be an inquiry into independent things. For people learn the elements first through familiar things but not otherwise. Even if something comes as innate knowledge, this can only become understandable and evident with regards to experience with independent things.
5
996a 20
Different things have different sources. Mathematical things, for instance, do not have good as the for the sake of which, or any source of motion.
996b 10
The knowledge of the good is the most ruling knowledge because others are for the sake of it. Yet as the knowledge of Thinghood is a knowledge to the first causes and the most knowable, it is also primary.
996b 30
Logic is different from first philosophy for logic has a wider application. Yet logic in itself as a knowledge should be a knowledge of things; is Thinghood then more primary, or logical things?
997a 20
It’s not reasonable to have one kind of knowledge that covers all beings, for if that, there would still remain a universal logic, which is different from first philosophy.
997a 30
Universal logic is also very different from first philosophy so as to not cover all beings.
997b 10
Forms become some everlasting perceptibles according to what some people say.
997b 20
The conception of mathematical things as things in between is difficult for it posits a motionless world that nonetheless needs to account for motion. It’s like to assume there are animals between perishable animals and animals in themselves.
997b 30
If land surveying, contra geometry, is about perishable things, why is this knowledge not perishable?
998a 10
Mathematical things are not separate from perceptibles, but they are not in them. Otherwise two things would be in the same place and what is immobile would move.
Forms seem to be causes that stop the thing in the middle from fully realizing its end, a place where one and many interact. Form seems to be a force of opening up.
998a 20
What are the genuine sources, first constituents or classes of things? Since definitions come from classes, they seem also to be sources of things defined.
998b 10
Thinghood is only spoken in one single articulation (is this contradicting what Aristotle later says about thinghood?). Even if we accept classes as sources, are the first classes or the last classes truer sources?
998b 20
As it’s impossible for a genus to be predicated of a differentia of its species, or for a species to be predicated of the differentia in itself, the differentia has to be outside the genus. Hence there is no all-encompassing genus.
998b 30
In this sense, differentiae would also be sources just like the highest genera are sources. But this would make infinite sources.
999a 1
If what is indivisible is more source like, then it makes sense that the lowest species would be more primary for it’s not divided like the genus has to be for genus is not directly a genus of particular things.
999a 10
Of things that have a prior and a posterior, the prior things are more primary, and there seems to be nothing more primary than those individual prior things; like there is no number number that is prior to two, for the genera can only appear when individual species are present, thus posterior to two. Of things that have no prior or posterior, it’s the good that is more primary, so as genera would include both good and bad, the good thing within it would be more primary. Thus it’s not the general class of things but rather the predicates of individual things that are more source like.
999a 20
Yet if the good thing or number two is considered more primary, it’s considered a source apart from and separable from the things it’s a source of, and as a predicate of the individual things (goodness and priority). So it is primary because it’s universal. Have arrived at a full circle.
999a 30
The most difficult question: is there anything apart from particulars?
999b 1
If everything’s perception, there’s nothing everlasting, and there would be no coming into being for the series of generation either would not stop or would stop at nothingness. If there’s no possibility of having come to be there’s no coming to be. So if there’s nothing completed and at rest in the end there’s nothing moving.
999b 10
If the material is ungenerated, the forms should be more so as the two ends of a coming to be. Otherwise we would only have an amorphous mass. Yet this is so complicated, as not every form is set apart from the particulars. And it’s also unclear if Thinghood is one or many.
1000a 1
Are sources one in number or one in kind? If one in kind, then it is not possible to speak of “one kind” or “one oneness”. Yet if source is one in number, it’s impossible for it to split into multiple individuals.
1000a 20
It seems more plausible to say that destructible things and indestructible things have different sources.
1000b 20
If there are different sources, are they themselves destructible or not respectively?
1001a 20
A lot of natural scientists say oneness or being is no independent thing but belonging to something else. But if this is the case, oneness is not one, and no universal thing would exist.
1001b 10
Zeno claims that one itself, being indivisible, is non being, for when added to or subtracted from a thing, it doesn’t change the thing. But he made a mistake, as not every magnitude can be subtracted from or added to every other, and though there’s no change in magnitude of the thing, there’s more of it in number.
1001b 20
If we say number comes from one itself and another nature, we still need to decide what that nature is, and how it should give forth magnitude as different from number.
1001b 30
So are number and geometrical elements independent things?
1002a 1
Surfaces and the like are more primary than extended bodies to constitute thinghood for bodies cannot be without these but not the other way around.
1002a 20
Yet the surfaces and lines and points seem not to constitute thinghood. For they by themselves are not organized into a body, and as solids or surfaces or lines or points they are all neutral so as to contain no shape whatsoever. Number alone thus cannot be the thinghood.
1002a 30
Independent things come to be or pass away. But lines do not come to be (from something) or pass away (into something else); rather, they are or are not. Just like nows, as nows are and instantaneously are not; as a boundary, it has no being whatsoever.
1003a 1
If elements are not in potency, then something else must be more primary, for potency is more primary. Yet if they are in potency, then it’s always a possibility that none of the things are. This problem of potency is related to the former one, namely whether there are forms or not; if there are, how come from them, being sources, there are also particulars. This dualism necessitates the conception of potency.
6
1009a 10
Some need persuasion while others brute force to go about things. So for people at an impasse believing false things, one engages with their thinking and is able to cure their ignorance; but with people arguing for arguments’ sake, one only refutes their arguments.
1009a 20
For what is not cannot come to be, and what comes to be necessarily is, one can say things are always mixed in contraries at the same time. Yet contraries are not present in the same respect, for one is active the other is potential. Plus there are things with no becomings whatsoever.
1009b 1
Truth about appearances seems to come out of perceptible things. What many people believe, thus, can very well be false, for nothing prevents them from thinking coincidentally the same.
1010a 10
A thing that’s losing has some of what it’s losing, and must already be something of what it’s becoming.
1010a 20
A quantitative change does not imply a change in form. Also, only what’s on earth is changing constantly, but the vast heavens are not.
1010b 1
If we consider perceptions to be not false, appearances are different from perceptions and can be true or untrue.
1010b 10
Even among perceptions there’s order and hierarchy; for sight judges color better than hardness, and bitterness is judged better by taste than by hearing.
1010b 20
No perception disagrees on attributes with another at different times, but only disagrees on thinghood. So even within perceptions, there are necessities.
1010b 30
If all there is is what’s perceptible, there will be nothing if there’s no soul. Yet there is the underlying thing which can allow for perceptions, that is, a more fundamental sense of perceptibles. There must be a prior or an outside of perception that grounds perception, though always perceptible.
1011a 10
People who repeat these arguments are not doing so in action. Their mistake lies in demanding a reason for what has no reason.
1011a 20
Even what appears can be grouped into different respects, places, categories, to different people, so any truth of appearance will not be unconditional. So that truth of appearance will not be unconditionally both true and false.
1011b 1
If there’s thinking, it’s necessary that the thinking is always related to some definite thing. If not, the thinker himself would be something thought or thinkable, and this would result in infinite relationships. So thinking itself cannot be thinkable.
1011b 20
There’s not anything between contradictories.
1011b 30
The thing between contradictories is either partaking of both like gray is of black and white, or partaking of neither. If the latter, then, it could not allow for change. If the former, again it seems the change does not occur from opposites, for something turns into white from something that is already white. A more familiar example comes from Meno, that one does not know what one wants to know, and if one already knows one needs not search for it.
1012a 10
The in-between thing itself would again allow for its own affirmation and denial, hence a new in-between is produced, ad infinitum. And since every one is a thing, not a part, this infinity is a bad infinity.
The trick here seems to be, one of course can accept an intermediary, yet the intermediary is not an independent thing, but a continuity connecting both ends of a change as dictated by one thing. So the contraries are reproduced in every part, but not as a mixture of separate things.
1012a 20
The definition arises from the necessity that they mean something, since the articulation of which the word is a sign will be a definition.
1012b 1
It’s more reasonable to combat the Heracleitean arguments by first asking them to mean something, instead of first inquiring if things are really so.
1012b 10
If what’s true to assert is what’s false to deny, then to assert something cannot be to deny something. Hence the statement that everything can be asserted and everything can be denied has to be contradictory. Yet if the first part is true, the second part has to be true as well. So neither of the part can be true.
1012b 20
If exceptions are made, so that the person who says “everything is true” also says “only ‘everything is false’ is not true”, he should also say: the statement that denies my last statement again is not true; ad infinitum.
7
1012b 34
Source means that part of a thing which one might first move. Or that from which each thing might best come into being. Or that constituent from which something first comes into being. Or that by whose choice what’s moved is moved. Or that from which a thing is first known.
1013b 1
Aside from the fourfold causes, another kind is those many things that come between the primary mover and the end. This kind is closer to form, for form is also an allowing of end as end, itself being a kind of stoppage.
1013b 10
A thing can have many different causes. Two things can cause each other in different ways. The presence and absence of a thing are both causes.
1013b 30
Forms of causes are many, but causes are still under forms; and those of the same form can only follow upon one another, so there can be no infinitely mixed causes; thus causes are always countable in kind and number. The same cause could work incidentally or intrinsically. Or to cause as a particular or a universal. Or to cause potentially or to cause actively.
1014a 10
Consequences should correspond to causes. Particular and universal can be intertwined in being spoken of.
1014a 30
Element means that out of which something is composed as the first constituent not divisible in kind into a different kind, being either altogether indivisible or divisible but not into a new kind.
1014b 1
People also call what’s one and indivisible and useful for many things an element; but unlike the elements of the former kind, these elements can only be one and unique in each thing, whereas a thing can have many the same former kind of constituents. Genera in this sense are also elements.
1014b 20
Nature means the coming into being of things born. But it also means the first thing present in a growing thing, from which it grows. And growth can either be a growing upon or a growing into one; a growing upon has nothing besides contact, but a growing into one needs the thing it touches to grow together by continuity and quantity, though still as different parts. Like heart grows together with hand for heart is continuous with the body that is also continuous with hand, and they grow together in size.
1014b 30
Nature also means the primary thing from which any of the beings that are not by nature is or comes to be.
1015a 10
Nature also means Thinghood of things. Or form. The primary meaning of nature is the thinghood of things that have in themselves a source of motion in their own right. In the sense that it determines the presence of a source of motion, itself is a source of motion.
1015a 20
Necessary means that without which it’s not possible to live. Or those things without which good could not be or come about, or evil be cast away or avoided. Or force and compulsion.
1015a 30
The more primary meaning of necessity is what is incapable of being otherwise.
1015b 10
Some things are necessary because of something else; some things are necessary by themselves, making others necessary. The primary meaning of necessity is the simple.
1016a 1
What’s continuous will have one motion.
1016a 20
Things are called one if their underlying thing is undifferentiated or indivisible. In this sense genera are like materials. Some are undifferentiated by sense perception, like water or wine; some are by understanding, like that of two triangles.
1016a 30
Another way of saying one is when the articulation is indivisible into something else. Though every articulation is divisible within itself. For instance, human can be divided into animal and speaking, but human as the very articulation itself is not divisible into that of an animal. Once it’s divided, the articulation is lost.
1016b 1
Those things of which the thinking is indivisible are one most of all; and independent things are one most of all.
1016b 20
To be one is to be a source of a number; and it’s the same as to be the first measure of a class of beings.
1016b 30
Things can be one by analogy: this seems to be different from being one by species or genus or number. This occurs when A is to B is the same as C is to D. The looseness ascends in order: what’s one in number is necessarily one in species, but not the other way. Can a thing one in number be said to be like itself?
1018a 10
Things are called different that are other but are the same in some respect.
1018a 20
Things said to be opposites are contradictories, contraries, relative terms, lacking and having, and the extremes from which things come into being and into which they pass away. Whatever things do not admit of being present at the same time in something that is receptive of both of them are said to be opposed, either themselves or what they are made of.
Contradictories allow for no middle thing. Contraries always would allow for a middle in which they are again reproduced continuously. Lacking and having are spoken of as being of a thing that is an other that belongs, so it is not two things that can be present in one thing at different times but only the presence and absence of one thing. The extremes do not belong to a thing but are ends to and from which things come to be and pass away, for instance, something becomes too small to remain the same thing.
1018b 30
The primary sense of precedence is precedence in knowledge. According to reason the universal takes precedence but to sense perception it’s the particular. And for reason the attributes take precedence to the whole.
1019a 10
The part precedes the whole and material precedes the independent thing potentially, but in being at work it’s the other way around. For things are not if they are not first possible, but possibility is not actively present until a thing is actively present. So the potency precedes as that which allows a thing to be, but being at work precedes as that which masters the potency. So some things are capable of being without others as a result of coming to be, like the whole, while others are so because of destruction, like the part.
1019a 20
Potency means a source of motion or of change, either in something else or in something as something else. This necessarily involves its copulate, that it’s also the source of being moved and changed by something else.
1019a 30
Potency also means that which can be changed for the better or unchanged for the worse.
1019b 1
It seems that potency occurs when that something else does not have an overwhelming power over the thing under discussion, so as to be its very essence. Yet as potency is dependent on something that is, a potency can be somehow controlled by what is present.
1019b 20
One is said to be incapable if one does not have the source completely, or simply is not at the time or condition to naturally have it.
1020a 10
A so-much can be potentially divided into ones, being a multitude if into units, a magnitude if into measures.
1020a 20
Something has a so-much intrinsically, like a line, the particular line being determined by its so much; some has it coincidentally, like an educated thing. So no matter how big a particular educated thing can be, it remains the same; yet a line being of different sizes would be essentially different. And some so-much is in the thinghood, while others are relative attributes or states, like long and short. So though as the magnitude is determined a thing is intrinsically said to be big or small, other things remaining the same, this bigness is itself again dependent upon the magnitude. In this sense, what is relative is not what is coincidental, for things can be coincidentally big and intrinsically big. The earth is intrinsically big because it has a magnitude that is bigger than most of the things we compare it with. Relativity signifies this: “compared to what, this something is intrinsically/coincidentally big.” Even if something is only relatively big, its bigness in relation to certain things is still intrinsic. Comparison to others is not internal to the thing. So when you first say something is big, you already fix the reference, and if the size is coincidental, it is coincidental within this fixed reference.
1020a 30
Things can be so much coincidentally either as the educated thing is said to be so much, or as time is said to be so much. For time is so much only because the thing is divisible; if the thing is indivisible, its time wouldn’t be a so much. In the former case, the thing’s magnitude is the only so much; in the latter one, time as an attribute itself has its own so much, dependent upon the thing’s so much. The so much of time is incidental if the magnitude of the thing is also incidental.
1020b 1
Quantity also has a quality and an of what sort, for six is one six.
1020b 30
There’s a quantitative relativity and a relativity of acting to being acted upon.
1021a 1
There are three kinds of quantitative relativity: numerical and determinate (one to three), numerical but indeterminate (one to many), numerically indeterminate (line to circle). This relativity can also be applied to other categories, as what is one in thinghood is the same, what is one in quality is the similar, and what is one in amount is equal. Further, what is one is a numerical measure.
1021a 20
Numerical relations can also be actively or potentially present. This is fully discussed in Physics.
1021a 30
What is relative is not what is simply related to something else, but what by its very thought or knowledge refers or is referred to something else. So the thinkable is not the relative to the thinking, for the thinkable is merely a thing related to thinking, but not at all determined as a what. The thinkable hence contributes nothing to the knowledge of what a thinking is, and is not really a “something else”, for it is confined in the circle.
1021b 1
What’s relative can also be because what have it are relative, like bigness is relative because what is big is relative.
1022a 10
An end is a limit, and it’s not a start. Yet it might very well be both for certain things: like a line has two ends. A source is always a limit, but a limit is not always a source.
1022b 20
Is thinghood an attribute? It seems Aristotle is saying that, even though some attributes can be coincidental and some be intrinsic, all attributes are dependent upon motion. Yet if all attributes are alterable or already altered, how can there be intrinsic attributes? It seems the only possible explanation is this: having attributes makes a thing capable of being altered, while some alteration is non-essential, some can be destructive. Like if bigness is removed from mountains, or colorfulness from visible things. Yet different from substance or thinghood, which is strictly in the particular thing (though it’s still unclear if it in itself is a universal), attributes are always universal, so that everything moves within the space of attributes; attributes can leave the thing, and the thing will remain a thing, though not necessarily the original one. Plus, attributes always are contraries, but it seems unclear if thinghood has its contrary. Also, for the movement is always regulated through and in the thing, the attribute altered is also mastered by the thing. Also, the intrinsic attribute necessarily follows upon the thinghood but is not thinghood itself: like water necessarily is divisible, but what is divisible is not water. Or one other example, the triangle is in its thinghood, that is, from its first appearance and revelation, a figure with three sides, and can only be produced this way; it only follows upon this definition that its angles add up to two right angles. So in this sense thinghood is a strict starting point.
1022b 30
Lacking is meant for what does not have something that it is natural to have, even though it may not be natural for this very thing to have it. For instance, plant can be said to lack eyes. It’s natural to have eyes, though not natural for plants.
1023a 10
Having is meant in one way as keeping something else in accordance with something’s own nature or impulse. Also, what obstructs something from moving or acting by its own impulse is said to have hold of it.
1023a 30
Material can correspond to genus and species, as what melts has water as material, but statue has bronze. The form is an end. Is it a kind of end? Is it a for the sake of which?
1023b 1
The composite independent thing is made of sensible material but the form is made of intelligible material.
1023b 30
A whole can mean that from which no part is absent whose absence would make the thing stops having its nature, or that which includes many things and makes them into one thing. The first sense is more strict and stresses perfection. The second is more loose and can happen in two ways: either each part is a one that is encompassed by the whole, as particulars are encompassed by the universal; or each part makes up the whole into a continuous one and is itself no longer a separate one. With the former it’s more like a set, the latter more like an organic gathering.
1024a 1
Any quantity in which position makes no difference is spoken of as “all”, while any in which it does make a difference is called a whole. What is both all and whole is that which admits of both conditions, like wax is all because it is always changeable so position is no matter, but it’s whole because it always comes to a stop and at rest there is a difference of positioning.
1024a 20
One is not a defective two, but a human without a leg is a defective human. Also none of the things in which position makes no difference can be defective. For example, water and fire cannot be defective. A thing can be defective only if it is continuous, made of distinct parts, and is irretrievably lacking a part that is neither so decisive that would alter the thinghood altogether nor too unessential.
1024b 1
A kind is meant in three ways: as a continuous generation of the same form (so a kind in this sense is always of some material), as a first progenitor of the same form, or as a material (for genera are also considered material).
1024b 20
Things are said to be false either because they are not what they appear to be, or because they simply are not.
1024b 30
Aristotle claims that a simple statement is always true, only if they cannot be put together they become one false thing.
1025a 10
Sophist perhaps is better than someone ignorant for he willingly deceives and is hence actually knowing; but in another sense he is worse off with respect to his moral character for he is voluntarily doing wrong things.
8
1025b 3
People inquire after particular classes of beings, but not being as being itself.
1025b 10
They busy themselves with hypotheses and only point to the primary sense of being, but not clarify.
1025b 20
Artifacts, insofar as they are treated as artifacts, are produced and have their source of motion in the producer.
1026a 1
As there are two contemplative thinkings: the thinking of natural things and the thinking of things without material. So for natural scientists it’s imperative to also pay attention to the soul insofar as it’s without material.
1026a 10
The first contemplative study concerns things that are both separate and motionless.
1026a 30
The primary theological study is universal in the sense that it is first. So that it is not the common denominator, but the divine highest.
1026b 20
Sophistry is concerned with what’s incidental. What’s incidental is something close to what is not. An incidental thing does not come to be, but rather gets attached to what really comes to be and itself has no being. But if incidental things do not come to be, how do they appear?
1026b 30
For there are causes and sources that are for the most part, there’s also what’s incidental.
1027a 30
It’s evident that there are sources and causes that come and go without coming into being or passing away, for otherwise all things would be by necessity. All things that happen indeed have their particular cause at any particular time, and can always be traced backwards. And at every moment the incidence is anchored into necessity by its prior cause. This chain of causes can always trace back until the very starting point. But so long as there’s incidence and chance, only the way things chance to be is determined by necessity; so one should be careful in determining if the first origin is actually from the material.
1027b 20
True being is combination that is harmonized and false non-beings are separation into simpler beings. Yet the affirmation and denial of such contradictories are topics of thinking, which is another story than being itself. True and false as such are in thinking, but not in simply being in its governing sense. So the incidental, its cause being indeterminate, and true (or false) being, its cause being in thinking, should now be set aside for a while, and only simple being should be inquired into for the moment. For they both concern the primary sense of being and do not reveal anything outside it, hence derivative.
9
1029b 13
Even white is necessarily in a surface, white is different from surface and has to be defined apart from it, if it can be defined at all. The paradox here is this: white belongs to a surface, so whiteness itself has to be defined apart from a surface, yet it has to entail a surface as well. And surely the addition of both white and surface cannot define whiteness for whiteness is already present in it. Only the articulation that does not already contain the thing in question can have a definition of it.
1029b 30
A definition can neither contain too much things unnecessary nor too little as to omit what’s necessary.
1030a 10
There’s definition only when the statement articulates some primary thing, and things of this kind are all those that are not articulated by attributing one thing to another.
1030a 10
A species of a genus seems the only thing to have definition, for it is not shared by or attributed to anything else.
1030b 1
Only when a group of words means something as simply one, that is, as a this, is it a definition.
1030b 20
For attributes that in virtue of themselves belong to something else, like femaleness to animal, whiteness to surface, or equality to amount, they have no definitions as those of independent things. It seems by addition what is meant is not an addition of words, but an addition of independent things, whereas each independent thing is itself internally defined. Yet it still seems unclear how Aristotle conceives such independent and internal definitions. It can only be said that each attribute, itself being an attribute, has to belong to a thing, but a thing, even if it always includes in its definition multiple words, remains a this.
1030b 30
If an attribute intrinsically refers to the thing it belongs to, then when added to the thing the meaning already present in it would be said twice. So if the attribute has a what-it-is-for-it-to-be, there will be a thing present in the very same thing, and an infinite regress is the result. So not only is there no primary being for an attribute, there’s also no primary being for a thing added with an attribute. For if the attribute thus added has intrinsic being, an infinite regress would occur as it has above; but if it has no intrinsic being, it is not different from just articulating the thing itself.
It seems what Aristotle is trying to convey here is that, for an attribute, if it had thinghood, all its contents would also be thingfied. But an attribute intrinsically belongs to a thing, so the consequence would be that a thing becomes present in another thing, which is absurd. Whereas even though independent things refer to other things in their definitions, they do not refer to them as others, but as gathered into one’s own. Like a number is defined as such and such, yet all the such and such belong to it, not the other way around. It seems that a definition is unconcealment of things, whereas a definition of attributes can only be unconcealment of the unconcealment. An addition of terms only becomes an articulation when it is gathered into one by a tode ti.
1031a 20
It seems that with incidentals, a thing and its being should be different. For if they were the same, thinghood in itself would allow for incidentals, and being A would not be different from being A+B. If we say this is because we are considering incidentals, it still doesn’t feel right to equate the incidental extremes of the syllogism. It would work if you say a pale person is incidentally the same as an educated person for there’s a substrate of thinghood; but if thinghood itself can be altered, there’s no underlying identity whatsoever. On that account, thinghood should be differentiated from any incidental.
1031a 30
It is a question that if some independent things can be the what it is for something to be.
1031b 1
It seems necessary that some intrinsic beings should be thinghood, for if they are not, being good will be different from good, and being-being will be different from being. Then there will be an infinite regress and no knowledge is possible.
1031b 10
Participation is different from underlying, for what underlies is present in the thing it underlies, while what is shared is different from and beyond the independent things. According to some people, perhaps to some version of Plato, a form is not generative, but only to be shared in by extant things. Yet for Aristotle, forms, being thinghood, have to generate things into particular ones (instantiation). For that which is only to be participated in, it has no active and particular being, for if it has, it has something that cannot be shared that is primarily for itself; yet if it’s no particular thing, the thing itself would be detached from its thinghood. The only solution for Aristotle is then to make the forms generative of their own particulars.
1032a 1
A further consequence of this generative account is that, for non-incidental things, what something is (form) and what it is for something to be (cause) should be the same; if they are different, the cause would have its own form, otherwise it’s not different, and this form again would have a different cause, ad infinitum.
1032a 10
One might raise the question of thinghood for he takes the thing to be incidental, one might also resolve the same question for he takes the thing to be a necessary instantiation of the thinghood.
1032a 20
For natural beings, their origin is in nature, they come out of a nature that is material and come into a nature that is a form, whereas that by the action of which they come into being is the same form in another.
1032b 1
For products, or artifacts, they have origins as forms in the soul that are without material. And even contrary things in a sense have the same form, for they are merely absence and presence of the same form.
1032b 10
Of the process of coming into being and its motion, the part called thinking starts from the source and the form, and the part called making starts from the completion of thinking.
1032b 30
It is evident that for some product to come to be some part of it is already present.
1033a 1
But is this preceding part, like material, included in the articulation of a thing? Sometimes material is included in the articulation, like that of a bronze sphere. Yet one must be careful here and see the material is included in an altered form (wooden instead of wood) and its original form is treated in a way that’s similar to the deprivation of the thing that later comes to be. For a lack or that which resembles a lack is not really material, for the thing most of all comes out of that lack, in the sense that it comes to the outside of it. But a thing comes out of a material as it retains it.
1033a 30
What comes into being comes about by the action of something, that is, from which the source of its generation comes. And there’s also an out of something (material in its altered sense) and a something it becomes. And neither the out of something nor the form it becomes is made. But only the incidental thing in which the material becomes unified with the form is produced. For if the form is itself produced it is produced out of something, but this would entail another underlying thing. This underlying thing cannot be sensual material, for a bronze sphere comes from bronze, but the sphere itself is in the soul and cannot be produced from bronze. Yet if the sphere is produced, it has to be produced from something. This something can be none other than intellectual material, which is itself form. So as form is produced out of form, the intellectual material is itself a form that needs to be produced, ad infinitum.
1033b 1
So form and what it is for something to be does not itself come to be.
1033b 10
Everything that comes to be is a composite of material and form, the form being put into the material.
1033b 20
Here, Aristotle seems to say that there’s no form that is an independent thing, but each is a universal kind. So the material out of which a thing is generated is a this, and the thing generated is a this of this sort. So every this would have a this sort, just like every particular would have its general kind. And with natural things, even the begetters are things of the same kind, but not forms themselves, so forms are much less independent and much more universal like with natural things. Things are different for their material, but their forms are the same. This seems to differ from Aristotle‘s earlier account of forms not being merely universals. Yet this is not a problem if we consider how the dependence of forms is spoken in a qualified vein, and how he is actually emphasizing the fact that a universal form has to have its particular and is always involved in its own instantiation.
1034a 10
Some things can come to be both by nature and by art because the material through which the coming to be is enabled is of such a sort as to be capable of starting to move by itself and by others, and capable of being moved in a particular way.
1034b 1
A parallelism between things by nature and things by art.
1034b 10
If an independent thing needs to come to be, a different independent thing that makes it has to be fully at work and present beforehand. But with a so much, there’s no need for a different thing, but only a thing that can potentially receive both.
1034b 20
Since definition is an articulation that has parts, is it necessary for an articulation of the whole to include the articulations of its parts?
1035a 1
Material is part of the composite thing, but is no part of the form. Parts of the form are parts of the articulation that comprise the form.
1035a 30
Material parts are sources into which things with these parts pass away. But forms are immaterial and do not pass away.
1035b 10
Of the articulations of forms, some of their parts are more primary than the whole. So it is not true to say that acute angle is a division of right angle, but rather right angle is a part contained in the articulation of an acute angle. Sensually, a finger is part of the body, but intellectually, the articulation of body is part of the articulation of finger. So the whole can be the most primary part.
1035b 20
For the composite thing, its thinghood and form or some part of it are more primary than the composite whole. Material and bodily parts (the body divides into these parts as if into material) can be more primary than the composite thing in a sense, but in another sense it’s not, for it cannot leave the whole and remain what it is, namely the material upon which a form is applied. Some bodily parts in which thinghood primarily is are as primary as the whole.
1035b 30
The division between ultimate material and general material. Ultimate material is that which presents the particular.
1036a 10
Mathematical things present in perceptibles taken not as perceptibles are intelligible materials.
1036b 1
Even if a thing is not seen to be separated, it doesn’t mean that it’s not.
1036b 10
An impasse arises as to how to be sure that what are taken as forms are really forms? Since it is possible that forms are just like materials. Couldn’t there be a form of forms and couldn’t forms be like material? But then everything would be one.
1037a 1
There will be no part included in the articulation of a universal circle, for the form itself as itself and the what it is for something to be are both immaterial. But with some imperceptible things, there is also intelligent material included. Are parts here treated the same as material? I don’t think that’s the case. For the parts of a circle are already identified as (im)perceptible and divisible segments. These are not included in the articulation of circle because the articulation is universal. For a particular articulation it is possible to have material.
1037a 10
If Socrates is the name of his soul, then it has two meanings, for some people also mean the composite with this name; but if Socrates only means the composite, the particular is reduced to the universal, for Socrates’ thinghood is only the universal.
The composite thing has in its articulation material and formal parts, whereas the form only has an articulation of formal parts. Thinghood or form so far primarily seems to be the universal and material the particular. The universal necessarily generates its particular, but is in this sense inseparable from particulars. As thinghood primarily is the universal, if the universal has no particular generated, all things would primarily be the same: this is question about the difference between Socrates and being Socrates.
1037b 1
Anything that has another thing underlying it as the material cannot be primary and its thinghood cannot be identified with itself, for anything that has material is indeterminate in a way and is thus distanced from simple being and is always involved in non-being. This does not include any form or attribute that is in relation to other forms.
1037b 20
How could a definition be one, when the genera and differentiae are different, for differences are contraries, and the general class cannot share in contraries at the same time; even when the general class does share those specific differences, the question still remains as differences are many and the general class is one.
1083a 1
First to consider is definition by division. If genera are like material, it’s clear that specific differences are like forms, and a definition would be an articulation consisting of specific differences. Though ofttimes only that difference which brings the statement to completion is enough.
1038a 30
There’s no order or sequence in the definition through division once the last statement is arrived at.
1038b 10
It’s impossible for the universal to be thinghood.
1038b 20
Any part of the articulation of an independent thing would itself only be an independent thing, for attributes are not more primary than independent things. But suppose a universal were an independent thing, it would then have an articulation. Even this articulation is not as universal as to contain everything there is for thinghood, it is still thinghood of something. But it would be a thinghood of independent things, then there would be thinghood of thinghood, which is absurd. What’s more, the universal, being present in the thing, would be an independent thing in an independent thing, which is also absurd, though in a different direction, the former absurdity being a result of the particular belonging to the universal, the latter being of the universal being present in the particular.
1038b 30
In general, if the universals are independent things, there will be nothing particular but kinds.
1039a 10
Though parts of an independent thing can only themselves be independent things, they cannot be so actively, but have to be so in potency.
1039a 20
Now an impasse is that there seems to be no definition of anything for there’s no articulation of parts as independent things.
1039a 30
If animal is the same universal for all species, and is a constituent thing of all species, it is absurd that it should be one and the same. But if for every species there’s a different animal, it’s also absurd. For each species would be unbounded and be outside everything else that used to be called animal, and animal itself would be many things. Further, as human being consists of forms of which animal is one, and animal contained in a species would be the thinghood of that species, it’s impossible for animal to be the form of one and thinghood of another, and every species would have its own animal. Yet how could that for which the animal aside from itself is the thinghood itself be an animal?
1040a 1
There’s no definition or articulation of perceptible things, and no knowledge, but only opinions.
1040a 20
If one should claim the parts to belong to one when in a whole but belong to many when separate, he should also say that the parts belong to each other when in the whole, thus also to many. And for parts are more primary than the compound, if the compound is separate and independent from the rest of things, the parts should be more so. Or nothing should be separate or independent.
1040a 30
Also it’s clear that the form has to be shared by many and no part in a definition should only belong to one. For forms are known through many particulars. And the same thing can be shown by the definition people give to unique things, like the sun, for they add many things to it, and it’s as if when they’re taken away the sun would cease being itself, but the sun should be an independent thing and always remain; the definition also implies that if another thing of the same kind should appear it would also be a sun, but that’s also not possible, for the sun is unique and one. So of whatever is one, no matter it’s everlasting or not, there’s an impasse as to how can it be defined by many things.
1040b 10
Thus it’s clear that most of what seem to be independent things are only potencies or are so only in potency.
1040b 20
Oneness and being, though close to thinghood, cannot be thinghood. For thinghood is not anything that can be shared, but is strictly one. For thinghood is one with what is one, and when thinghood is one in number all particular things (and their potential thinghoods) are one in number; either case, thinghood is strictly one and the same with what it is or its parts, and cannot be a common feature. So thinghood is less like a collection but more like a unification.
10
1042a 10
What is the source of independent things, and what are independent things? This is the first question. Then thinghood is identified as the source, yet thinghood has many meanings. It is considered to be a universal class. And since thinghood has its articulation, kinds of definitions and things in virtue of themselves are discussed. This discussion of intrinsic being is prepared by the discussion on definition because only with an articulation is the definition revealed as a whole with different parts, and only here is it essential to differentiate between intrinsic and incidental beings in order to determine which parts cannot be left out from the essential articulation. But if definition has its parts, how should one reconcile the contradiction between one and many? And it turns out that the universal or the general class is no thinghood.
1042a 20
Some claim mathematical things and forms have being apart from perceptible things, so these would be candidates for thinghood.
1042a 30
Material is not actively a this, but potentially it is a this. Form is actively a this, and being a this, is separate from its articulation. These are two kinds of underlying things. The third kind is composed of these.
1042b 1
Any sort of change accompanies change of thinghood, but not vice versa.
1042a 30
Of the independent things, some are separate simply, for they have material involved in their articulations and have thus particularity. But some articulations, like defined forms, cannot be simply separate from others or there would be trouble and paradoxes. So one can say formal separation is more difficult to be described than material separation, for the material one goes with sense perception and needs no further account.
1043a 1
What is attributed to the material as specific differences is itself its being-at-work. Though material is being as potency, in some sense it still reveals an active being. And it makes sense for different things would have different potencies, and different materials would have different ways of being-at-work and articulation, e.g. water can be condensed, sound can be mixed, wood can be shaped.
1043b 1
The fact that one name can mean different things, and thinghood has different meanings has no bearing on our inquiry, for it is already evident that only one sense of thinghood is primary, namely that of the form. Other senses merely point to it.
1043b 10
One cannot say that a house is bricks plus order or combination, for combination is not a thing to be added. Things are in order. Order is not a constituent of the thing, but a cause for it. Now this thing called order might be thinghood itself, and it is either eternal or is destructible, though not destructible in the sense that it undergoes destruction, but rather it can come to be and pass away instantaneously, without the process of motion, because it cannot be a composite but must come and leave as a whole, otherwise it would require another order imposed onto it. And it seems that this order is not really form, for form is eternal and ungenerated, but a this is made when form and material are mixed together.
1043b 20
So this order is the this for destructible and composite things, yet whether itself is separate from the composite is unclear, though for some things it’s clearly not the case, like houses and furnitures, for they are not when the particulars are not. It’s not possible for a human being to be without there first being a human being, so when a particular is not there’s still that ordering, whereas before the production of a house there needs to be no house (that means the ordering of it needs not be before production, though the form of a house surely precedes its production) ever produced, and the order only comes to be after the first house is produced. Or perhaps these things, like artifacts, themselves are not really independent things?
1043b 30
People claim that it’s necessary for a definition to include material since it has to be something attributed to something, and for this reason there cannot be thinghood consisting of merely intelligent things. But this claim is mistaken by a misconception of material, for these people do not see that there is also intellectual material. So just as with a two-footed animal, animal is the material upon which the form of two-footedness is acting, and the material here is the potency that is ruled and exhausted in being-at-work-staying-itself. But is this really so unproblematic?
1044a 1
It’s clear then that when people say number is the definition of things, they miss the mark by not accounting for that extra thing which orders the units into one whole, and so they miss the definition and the thinghood. Though the thing in a sense is a number, for its articulation is finite and divisible into indivisible parts, and whatever is added to or subtracted from it would make it a different thing. Thinghood is one not in the way a unit or a point is, but is rather a complete being-at-work-staying-itself, and a particular nature.
1044b 10
For natural things that are eternal like heavenly bodies, or for things that are by nature but not independent, there’s no material cause, or at least not in the way we mean it.
1044b 20
Since some things, especially forms, can be and not be without coming to be or passing away, contraries would come from one another through different ways. So a pale person would come to be from a swarthy person directly, but white could be said to come from black only indirectly in the sense that the thing that is black would come to be white.
1044b 30
The material relates to contraries, but in what way? Is material potentially both, or potentially one and its being opposite is a deprivation against nature? And can something formed already become material for another thing? Or is it rather that the material has a potency of itself to become one thing, and the formed thing for another? Like body in itself has potential for decay, but animal as such has a different potency? And in order for anything to change, it has to be changed into its material first, so animal back to its corpse (and the corpse is not an end or a completion that comes out of the animal, but a source that animal returns to), and from the corpse again to animal.
1045a 30
The impasse is solved when the parts of an articulation are treated as intellectual material while the whole, being a this, as a form. And since there’s this duality of form and material, it is no longer a question to find the thing that unites both. For things that come to be, aside from the maker, the only thing that is responsible for a thing being actively itself is its thinghood, and the form is what it is for it to be. So the form is being at work and the composite thing is thus informed and comes to be and stays itself. Without this dualism, if all were forms or all were materials, there would be no thing at all.
1045b 1
But some things do not even have intellectual material but are immediately one. Just as some of the things that are, or a this, or an of-this-sort, or a so-much, or a what it is for something to be, are particular ones. These have no definitions but simply are.
1045b 20
The highest level of material and form are one and the same thing. So the prior dualism is in a sense obliterated, but in another sense not. It is obliterated in the sense that material being material is a potency that is non-being, so as to be only ruled by the form, so this is an evasion strategy to avoid having different forms all together; it is not obliterated in the sense that it has to remain not form and different from the form, so inherent in forms there seems to be some higher forms that are again separable from the intellectual material. And this does no harm to the account, for Aristotle is merely trying to resolve the impasse that how it is possible for a definition to be composed of parts. In a certain sense, then, since the material is exhausted within the form, the form is one with the potency when it is in the material; yet in another sense, as exhausted material is still material, and the form is inexhaustible but always generative, the highest forms are separable and pure, thus undefinable. And this separation seems to be no problem (really?) for material always receives forms and becomes one with the forms.
So for a composite thing, its thinghood as the cause of its being is an ordering of material parts, and this order is also the form. So the form is essentially one with the thing in the same way thinghood is one with the thing. And for thinghood to rule material it has to be a being-at-work-staying-itself. And inherent to forms there’s the same structure of form-material dualism, yet there the material is exhausted and the thing would be really eternal and independent. What’s more, every form can be altered into some material, like animality can be the form and rationality the material, or rationality the form and animality the material. So there’s always polarity of form-material dualism in intelligence. But there are things even higher than these, that not only does there not appear to be material, there really is no material at all. For even things with intellectual material might have causes that bring them out of potency into active being, for all things change on the ground of a source. And forms can be both material and form, so there has to be an active source that activates and informs forms, and is thus a form of forms. This is the divine nous. So here’s an hierarchy: divine nous -> active forms -> compound forms (-> material forms) -> compound things -> material.
11
1046a 10
Potency primarily is a source of change in some other thing or in the same thing as other.
1046a 20
In a sense the potencies in acting and being acted upon are one, for they cannot be separate; yet in another sense they are not, for the passive potency is in one thing while the active in another.
1046a 30
Insofar as something is a natural whole, it cannot be passive to itself, since there’s no other. Every potency is contrary to an incapacity in the same thing for the same thing.
1046b 1
Some potencies can be rational and some irrational. All potencies that include reason are themselves capable of contrary effects, while the irrational ones each have only one effect. This is because a reasoned account always reveals the thing and its opposite through deprivation; reason is always a simultaneous collection of things, though only one thing is proper to the account while its contrary is incidental, whereas within a thing both contraries cannot be present at the same time. So within the rational potency, there’s counterforce; but within the irrational one there’s only unforce or exhaustion of force. If a thing is hot, it cannot be both hot and cold, so it is only capable of heating; but a reasoned account reveals both health and sickness, and is capable of causing either.
1046b 20
Contrary things are contained in one source, namely the reasoned account.
1047a 20
What is capable is that which would be in no way incapable if it so happened that the being-at-work of which it is said to have the potency were present. That is, if something is actively present, it’s definitely not incapable of being present; yet it does not mean that only if a thing is actively present is it capable of being so.
1047a 30
Being-at-work seems primarily to converge in meaning with being-at-work-staying-complete. And it also comes to be applied to motions. For this, being-in-motion is said to belong to things that have active being, for it is close to being-at-work-staying-complete, that the thing in motion has activity and shares the complete being in a way. For the thing in motion remains to a large part the distinct thing, though incomplete, or at least changes from a distinct thing to another distinct thing; completion is being-at-work-staying-itself through which the potency is exhausted, while the incomplete moving thing is being-at-work which also allows into itself a potency that in turn allows for a different being-at-work to rub against the original one. So if we solely pay attention to things capable of motion, we see that its material informed by A is again informed by B, whereas the thing itself is not staying itself as A but actively becoming another, and what B is or how many B is is unclear. So for being-at-work, it’s ruling forms against each other within the unruly material; but for being-at-work-staying-itself, it’s one ruling form with its ruled material. And being-at-work as motion is but a derivative sense of being-at-work-staying-itself.
1047b 10
Some people claim that what will not be the case can be possible, in the sense that nothing is impossible. But this comes from a wrong assumption that if what is not the case can be possible, then everything will be possible. For falsity is different from impossibility.
1047b 20
If A is necessarily the case when B is, then A is necessarily capable of being the case when B is capable. But this also means that if A is necessarily capable of being the case when B is capable, then A is necessarily the case when B is; for A is necessarily capable of being the case when B is capable means that A is possible at the same time and in the same way as B is, so that their respective realizations should be at the same time and in the same way; that is, when one is no longer merely possible, the other should also be not merely possible, because potencies are defined by their actualizations. And when potencies are necessarily together, their actualizations would also be necessarily together. So when I say one is necessarily capable of seeing well if he is capable of drawing well, I mean when he actually draws well, he should also see well.
1048a 1
Some potencies are innate while others require prior activity.
1048a 10
A rational potency inheres in the soul perhaps as a body of knowledge that has its intellectual material and is capable of affecting or not affecting other things. Yet its potency is not simply affecting or not affecting, but affecting in contrary ways. So the same thing, being a knowledge that is indivisible as a whole, would necessarily have contrary potencies. Yet this seems impossible. For as was proved above, if A is necessarily capable of being the case when B is capable, A will necessarily be the case when B is capable. For irrational potencies do not belong together necessarily but only incidentally. What is hot is capable of cooling off something else only coincidentally, when that other thing is even hotter; what is black can become white and black not insofar as it is black, but for its being a colored thing that changes first into a white thing and then from there back to a black thing. What has the potency, then, can only be otherwise in the sense of being different than it is now, but cannot be otherwise in the sense of being whatever there is, like contraries. But medical knowledge seems necessarily capable of both healing and poisoning, healing and poisoning should be necessarily co-present. Yet this is impossible. Then choice and desire will be introduced as that which renders one of the pair more proper and authoritative.
If potency is material, and form is always the active being, how can there be a potency for acting? The potency for being acted upon is easier to understand, for the material allows the thing to be otherwise and be informed by something else. The potency for acting, however, is more difficult. Let’s speak of a composite thing. This thing has a passive potency if its material allows for a different information. But it has an active potency if it can inform others. It is in potency because its activity of information is inhibited by its material for it can always be otherwise, and the information is never complete. But once the original material that stores away that activity is fully conquered, the forming activity would start to permeate other materials, since materials are continuous. Hence, that composite thing has an active potency when its material stops being otherwise. So a doctor has the active potency when all his material is affected and starts to affect other things. The form in itself has no potency, only the composite thing, just as the material in itself does not change and has no potency for change.
1048a 10
Whatever something chiefly desires is what it will do whenever what it is capable of is present and it approaches its passive object. For instance, if one desires to learn, she will learn whenever she is able to and learn what is proper for her desire. So something has a potency only as a desire, and a desire is present when it has the object present in a certain condition, and itself is conditioned in a certain way. Without desire, the thing is not capable of any action, for the disinhibition is present in those conditions and by establishing these conditions the obstacles are removed.
1048a 20
So even if one wish or desire to do two things at the same time, it’s not possible, as the objects present are in certain conditions and not in others.
1048a 30
Now as potency in the sense of motion is looked into, one should turn to another sense in relation to also another sense of being-at-work. For now potency is not a potency to move or be moved, but a potency to be or not be.
1048b 1
There’s no need to define everything, but one can also see in one glance by analogy. Different senses of being-at-work have the same relation to different senses of potency, yet they themselves are not alike. For some are like thinghood to material (simple being-at-work-staying-itself), some are like motion to potency.
1048b 10
There is, however, another sense of potency. For some potency allows something to simply be, but something can never simply be. This means that something can be brought out of potency completely, while something could never be fully brought out of potency but is always involved in non-being, like infinity. Infinity is not potential in the sense that it can be somehow at some time be realized (perhaps except in pure thought) as a separate being, but always is preserved as a potency.
1048b 30
A differentiation between being-at-work and motion is finally achieved. Being-at-work is that action in which the end is present, e.g. one is happy and is in a state of having been happy at the same time. Or one lives and at the same time is in a state of having lived. Any action that does not have the end in itself is an incomplete action. And being left on itself the complete action would be its own limit and in this sense also unlimited.
1049a 10
A thing can come into activity out from potency if it is not inhibited by anything else. Like a thing in thinking is a desire that can be realized only if nothing prevents it. But this issue is already addressed previously. The new issue here is that even potency itself is a consequence of previous activity. So a potential house is a potential house if nothing else prevents it from being a house in potency. So disinhibition not only allows potency to change into activity, but also allows potency itself to be in the first place. And the source of this disinhibition can be either external or internal, just as the inhibition can be either.
1049a 20
A box is in potency in bronze, and bronze is potentially in earth, earth potentially in air, and air in fire. So in order for something to be, the potency or material that makes it should first be made and prepared. There might be a first material.
1049a 30
Underlying things differ only in this sense: whether it is a this, or a one.
1049b 1
The underlying thing that is not a this is material or attribute, and an of what sort. These are indeterminate (really? in what sense? for it seems to me pure thisness is somehow even more indeterminate, though for Aristotle a this seems never to be a bare thisness).
This is a very different conception of material from modern or postmodern thinking. Material is the basis for instantiation only in the sense that it is universal and hence many, and only form is the source of oneness. So a thing is one because of its form, but it is not the only one because it has a kind and hence universal, so the form has to regenerate itself over the universal kind. This only happens with incidental and composite beings in which the material is not exhausted. Yet in this way the form regenerating would have many of its own copies and be itself universal and used by other things as material. So there’s always this polarity at work until one gets to the ultimate source of all activity: the divine nous.
1050a 30
If the putting to use of some potency generates at the end of it something else, like a house at the end of building, it is the activity that is more like an end in the end product. And for other being-at-works that have nothing else as an end besides themselves, they themselves are present as ends.
1050b 1
Now it’s clear that thinghood and form are being-at-work.
1050b 20
The motion that is everlasting is the circular motion of heaven, in which the end is unified with the start, and is no longer contradictory. So in one sense this movement is immaterial.
1050b 30
Things that undergo change mimic the indestructible things. And both knowledge and motion allow contradictories, for they are potencies; and if this is the case and if there are forms of these, there would be a thing as is the being-at-work of motion that is more motion than motion itself, and there would also be a thing that’s more knowing than knowledge itself.
1051a 20
When choosing, one of the opposite things being at work is always better than the potential being of both, while the active being of the other one is worse.
1051a 30
It seems that only when a thing in potency is discovered is it in potency; what is concealed is revealed as concealed. And this revelation seems to be a prior being-at-work.
1051b 10
The original sense of truth as unconcealment. Some things are always combined and one, hence are, while some others are always separate and many, hence are not; but some others have potency for both combination and separation, so can be true or false on different occasions. But those statements on primary though compound things can only either be always true or always false. Truth and falsity are categories for thought, and thinking is dependent upon things. These are determinations for compound things.
1051b 20
For simple and primary things, they either simply are with no need for combination or are not with no need for separation. So their truth and falsity consist of affirmation and denial. Yet falsity is really not possible for these things, so one is not deceived about these things, but merely ignorant of them for not touching them. So instead of falsity there is untruth as ignorance.
12
1052b 1
Oneness is meant in four ways: the continuous, the whole, the particular and the universal. What is continuous is the whole if it is continuous in virtue of itself, and more so if its motion is one and indivisible. What is indivisible in thinking can be either one in number or one in form, being one in form is the universal and being one in number is the particular. What is responsible for the oneness of the independent things would be one in the primary sense: does this mean the universal is the primary sense?
1052b 10
One must distinguish between what a name is and what things this name is applied to. For the things might be closer to the meaning of the name, this one other thing is closer to the name itself. The name of oneness then is indivisibility and wholeness, or what it is to be a this, or separateness in place or form or thinking; but it especially is that primary measure of each class of things, and in the most governing sense that measure of the class of things with quantity.
1052b 20
Oneness is the source of number as number.
1052b 30
Measure or source is one and indivisible. Yet is this not circular: that which is a measure is one, and that which is one is a measure? But it is circular only if measure and oneness are taken to be different and separate things.
1053a 1
This seems to suggest that qualities like wetness and dryness can also be measured by amount. This seems to not contradict what he says in Categories (or does it?) for there qualities admit of a more or less; yet is this more or less characterized by amount? How can a quality have a measure that is common and indivisible?
1052a 20
One thing could have different measures. And measures are indivisible in different ways, like a meter is taken to be indivisible but a unit is actually indivisible.
1053b 1
The knower and perceiver are the measure of things, but only in this sense: just like one recognize how tall one is by being measured by some ruler out there, one uses knowledge as a measure after it itself is measured by things out there. And it’s clear that an amount is the more governing sense of oneness, and next a kind. What is one is simply indivisible or taken as indivisible.
1053b 20
Being and oneness cannot be general classes for they are attributed to things in the most universal way and require things outside themselves to generate differences; but they cannot be independent things separate from the rest either.
1053b 30
Since what is true of oneness holds true in a similar way for all things (so that each thing itself is a oneness of a kind) and oneness is meant in many ways, it’s not enough to say oneness is itself its own nature, but one must inquire all things and all ways to discover in general what oneness means.
1054a 10
Just as for the class of colors the oneness belongs to a particular color, e.g. whiteness, and for a number of things the source is one particular independent thing, it is clear that being and oneness are attributed to things but are not things themselves. So oneness and being merely stand toward all things, so that when they are added to a thing as a predication, no meaning is added.
1054a 20
One and many are contraries and not contradictories. But if they are not contradictories they allow for a middle thing. What is the thing that is middle to one and many? Is it number or magnitude as such?
1054b 20
For one and many are not contradictories, manyness does not apply to things that are not when oneness should be applied to things that are, since oneness means being. But both are applied to things that are.
1054b 30
Difference and otherness are different. Otherness is a general way of characterization, so that anything is other than or same as anything else. But with difference there is a specific structure of underlying sameness. So of course what is other in one respect is the same in another, and they are contraries that form a certain continuum, just like black and white do. But difference is specifically structured as underlaid by one same thing. Black and white things are others, but only different when they belong to one same general class. Black things, however, are not underlaid by whiteness, so in the same sense, others are not underlaid by sameness.
1055a 10
Contrariety is the complete difference.
1055a 20
One thing can only be contrary to one other thing. For it’s neither possible for one extreme to be more extreme than itself nor possible for one interval to have more than two ends.
1055a 30
What differs the most are contraries, for what do not belong to the same genus do not differ, whereas what belong to the same genus, like power, thing, or state and condition, differ the most as contraries.
1055b 10
Deprivation is a certain kind of contradiction, but it can be said that the thing itself is deprived or the material is deprived. For hotness is deprived of coldness completely, but the hot thing is deprived of cold only in a limited way. So deprivation allows for a middle in certain cases, but not contradiction. Contradiction is more primary because anything is either A or not A, but not anything is either A or B, unless there is material that is receptive of that continuum of A and B. So everything is either white or not white, but only that which is capable of being white, namely, a colored thing, can be black. Also, not every deprivation is a contrariety, for a deprivation might be of thinghood itself, but contrariety is present in material as formed by thinghood. So white and black are contraries, black is a deprivation of whiteness; yet the deprivation of thinghood is a deprivation, but not a contrariety, for the deprivation of one thinghood would be another thing, but not the other end of the same continuum (since it cannot be simple non-being). A dog is a deprivation of catness, but is not a contrary to cat. So deprivation can refer to both contradiction and contrariety.
1055b 20
Here Aristotle switches to a less rigorous usage of contrariety. What he means, however, is essentially the same: some “contrarieties” are deprivations of the sort that for which only certain particulars are deprived, while some are deprivations of the whole thing. Both are deprivations but not both allow for a middle. So deprivations of contrarieties can mean contradictories, or extremes, or contraries. And these are examples from the non-rigorous daily usage of these terms.
1056a 1
How is one opposed to many? How is equal opposed to great and small? For equal is not opposed to only one of the dyad, nor is it opposed to both separately, since one contrary cannot be opposed to two different contraries.
1056a 20
Equal seems to be a middle between great and small. And what is a middle cannot be opposed to both ends as a complete contrary.
1056a 30
Equality then can only be opposed to the dyad as a joint negation of them. The middle can be opposed to both ends as that which is neither of the two ends. Yet this deprivation is not of the sort that is depriving a thing of its thinghood. Rather, this deprivation is present for things which are of such a nature that there is some sort of in-between and interval. This kind of deprivation is the most important in Nicomachean Ethics.
1056b 20
There are many structures, rigorous or not, to articulate the relation between oneness and manyness. First is one - few (deficient) - equal - many (excessive); here one and many are extremes. Second is one (few) - many (much), here they are relative terms. Third is strictly one - many, as every number is a multitude that is measured by one; fewness here is not a deficiency, but rather a proximity to the source. Or if one wants to take this one step further, even proximity can be obliterated, one and many thus become contradictories instead of contraries. Yet as was already argued previously, this step cannot be taken.
1057a 1
Aristotle here seems to say this, that one is opposed to many as if relative terms. For one is less relative to two, and two relative to three and so on. Yet this continuum cannot go on unlimited, for one is not merely less than two, it is also indivisible. So its smallness is not relative. But as one is a measure, it seems that it is related to something it measures, and is thus a relative term in that other sense of a knowledge related to something known. But here one needs to be careful again, since knowledge is itself measured by the thing and is relative in this sense, but one does not require another measure. Hence one is opposed to many as if relative terms only to an extent. Its opposition preserves more of a meaning of contrarieties.
1057a 10
So one and many are contraries when they are taken as indivisibility and divisibility. It is not difficult to see how one can be more or less indivisible as if in a continuum, for things can become more harmonized and continuous, or they can be less so and more separable. One is then the absolute indivisible, and a greater multitude would be something more capable of being divided (taken as one multitude). Though here Aristotle seems not to differentiate indivisibility and undividedness. Or one and many can be opposed as relative terms, if one is taken solely as a measure of something. What this means is that one is not separated from the many but is handled in conjunction with the many as a measure. For one can be intrinsically separate from the many, for it is the absolute measure; but as long as it is a measure, it should be placed together with the thing measured and thus related.
Relative terms in the second sense are not contradictories. Contradictories are not in any relation. The only relation contradictories hold is a non-relation or an incidental relation. But relative terms have a necessary relationship to each other. Like a measure, as long as it’s taken as a measure, is related to the measured. But a cat is not so related to a house.
1057a 20
In-between things have to be of the same general class as the extremes. For if not, there would be change first into something outside the general class, for any change happens first into the things in between. But any change into the outside is only incidental, like a color into a shape. So it’s impossible.
1057b 1
There’s nothing in between contradictories. There’s also nothing in between relative terms that are not contraries.
1057b 10
There will be specific differences in a general class that which takes precedence over the contraries as the species thus created. For example, black and white are two extremes of color, but their differences come from absorption and reflection of light. So absorption and reflection would be contraries of a prior sort. And light would be a general class prior to color. This makes clear that Aristotle never treats genera and species as separate, but always a systemic body of knowledge in which different layers interpenetrate. So that one general class might be a reflection of one other general class greater than itself. One can also imagine how different contraries in different species can be recapitulated into a more fundamental contrariety: like hot and cold, wet and dry, strong and weak into fire and earth. And these contraries are resulted from complicated interactions of different contrarieties.
1057b 20
This construction, however, is constructed into an hierarchy. For as the differences cannot be internal to the general class but have to come from its outside, the contraries are generated by a prior contrariety. So is anything in-between the contraries within the same genus composed of prior sources which only then are compounded with the genus. Otherwise the thing would be simply uncompounded so no difference is added onto it (animal cannot be compounded with cat for cat is already animal compounded with an external difference). Then what if the contrariety finally is traced back to those ultimate sources that are contraries but do not belong to the same general class? Then the things in-between generated by the sources would retroactively constitute a general class that reconstitutes the independent sources into a first contrariety that reflects the pair of sources. So the first sources generate the first genus but are independent in a way from this genus, whereas the first in-between things belong to this first genus but are composed of those first sources reflected into the contraries. Lower kinds follow and are thus generated. So the first sources are first contraries only in a qualified sense. This seems to be the only way to reconcile all the difficult claims. In-between things are not composed of sources, for sources are not contraries that are same in kind, though they are truly prior contraries. So the last statement reads: “all in-between things are in the same general class as contraries and are between contraries, and are all composed of those contraries”. This can be understood so that sources are not included as constituent contraries, but are contraries on a prior ephemeral ur-ground. And their products are independent things that can only retroactively belong to one general class (but one that prohibits change), in which only the reflections of the sources appear.
Or another interpretation is that the “contraries not in the same general class” actually only refers to contraries as in pairs. So there’s no prior pair of contraries but they are the first in the same class. Yet this still needs to solve the question as how can differences be inside the genus. So this interpretation seems less sound.
Why is there no immanent difference? For if one thing is one, it is internally the same and is incapable of generating any difference, otherwise it will not be one and the same. So any differentiation whatsoever must be generated from the outside.
1058a 1
A genus is that which is the same in both things, having a non-incidental specific difference in each thing. So it’s not only a horse and a man are both animals, they must be animals in specific differences. So it seems differences and genera have to be interdependent.
1058a 10
Difference is otherness that belongs to a genus.
1058a 20
Being other in species is to be indivisible contraries in the same genus. Whereas divisibility would allow contrary in-between things, not different species.
1058a 20
Species is neither the same nor different from the genus. Though it seems meaningful to ask if species is other than genus. Also, things differ from others in genus not in the sense of contrarieties, for contraries only exist in the same genus. This, however, can be interpreted otherwise.
1058b 1
Attempts to resolve the impasse as why some differences are more primary than others. It might be some differences are more fitting and essential to the nature of the genus. It might also be some differences are related more to the articulation and others more to the material.
1058b 10
But wouldn’t material differences sometimes matter greatly?
1058b 30
Previous claims are overthrown: now we need to consider contraries and oppositions as in genus. Where can we find the middle of things different in genus? Destructibility and indestructibility are among this kind, for they necessarily belong to things. A thing cannot be incidentally destructible or not. And this thing cannot change from being indestructible to being destructible. It seems to me that divisibility and indivisibility should belong to this kind too. So if this is the case, how do we determine a new differentiation between contradictories and contraries?
One possible solution comes from these statements. First, things can be different in genus. This means there’s some ungraspable kind underlying different genera. Second, contradictories are said to have no in-between things for in-between things are most likely to change. But now what if some in-between things do not change? So indestructible and destructible things are contraries instead of contradictories, because they have in-between things, but they are a special kind in which these in-between things do not change on this spectrum. And the independent sources are contraries in this sense, that they do not belong to one same general class, but they nonetheless constitute the first general class and belong to that primal sameness, and are contraries in a specific sense. And the statement in 1058a 20 needs not be dismissed. The quote runs as follows: “For it is necessary that the difference of things that differ in species be a contrariety, and this belongs only to things which are in the same genus”. If we interpret the this here as referring to the difference instead of the contrariety, the implication would then become that a difference in species necessarily belongs to the same genus, but a contrariety needs not. So the first sources can very well be a pair of contraries.
13
The whole Book K is a succinct synopsis.
1059a 20
One sort of knowledge is about the contraries. But sources are not contraries. Is this a retraction or is this already inherent in earlier thinking?
1059b 20
Material of mathematical things.
1059b 30
Both species and general classes seem to have a claim on authority to be ultimate sources.
1061a 10
All differences can be traced back to first differences or first contraries. And first contraries are somehow within being. And it makes no difference to say oneness or being for even if they are not the same they are interchangeable.
1061a 30
Eidetic reduction.
1061b 10
Dialectic and sophistry are concerned with attributes, not beings as such.
1061b 20
Philosophy does not select a certain part of being with desired attributes but studies being insofar as each part is. Therefore wisdom is to harmonize all parts and to ground all particular knowledges in their ontological status. To reflect on the being of each part is to see how each part fits into the whole and what is its position in the order in relation to source.
1062a 10
There’s no demonstration of the law of non-contradiction simply; but it is possible in relation to a person by refutation.
1062b 30
A falsity resides in this: everything comes from what is; but clearly what is white comes from what is not white; so what is not has to be what is. But this reasoning is false for what is not is but is in potency. And being in potency is different from being in activity, and there’s always otherness inherent in being.
1063a 20
This seems to refer to khora.
1065a 30
Fortune is an incidental cause in the things that are by choice.
1065b 10
Motion is always with respect to and stays in its category of being. So material moves only as material, composite thing as composite thing, and being-at-work as being-at-work. So what has being comes out of potency only in the sense that a form that is not in this material is now received into this material, but not the material itself changes into a form.
1068b 20
Motion only belongs to quality, quantity and place. And when a thing moves, its thinghood does not move; its relation to other things does not move, at least not intrinsically, for it cannot change its relation solely by itself, like its being bigger than another thing depends upon the other thing staying the same, or its becoming a measure depends upon itself being measured first; its being in movement or being moved also does not move. Changes in quality, quantity and place are all ways of incorporating otherness into itself (attribute into material, thing onto thing, the thing there into here), but change in relation is impossible to do this for that otherness is predetermined as an unincorporated otherness. For a relation is always determined as something eternally out there, it cannot be incorporated. But an attribute is a thing that is defined as something that is capable of being received into material, thus can be incorporated.
14
1069b 10
Material has to be capable of changing between the contraries. And one thing in active being changes from some other thing in potency. Yet it’s also said that things that belong to different categories do not change into one another. Unless these things belong to that which is composed of both being-at-work and potency.
So composite thing changes from one to another, but material does not change into a form or a thing, and form changes neither into material or a thing. Rather, it’s the thing that changes from one potency into a being-at-work. It is, in other words, the way by which different forms are ordered into the material that changes.
1069b 30
Even potencies are determinate to an extent, by their material. Then why aren’t potencies simply determined as one but infinite? For what’s one is the intellect, if potency were also one it would simply actively be. For what is one simply is. Everything would be predetermined one thing and there’s no possibility.
1070a 1
Neither the ultimate material nor the ultimate form comes into being.
1070a 10
The material is a this by coming forth into appearance. Material has being by way of having contact instead of having grown together, so that it is not growing into one with the thing but is always present as an otherness. Forms grow together, like hand grows together with heart and they become parts of one indivisible whole. But material is always divisible and added onto the thing, so can always be stripped away. The nature of a thing is a this and an active condition into which it comes. The third kind is the particular thing that consists of these.
1070a 20
Artifacts seem to not have separate forms (why? is it because before the first house there’s no separate house crafted, so the form has no separate being outside this material here? whereas an animal always has its form separate in another material?), or only their arts have. But these arts do not invent forms. Forms are not invented. Things that cause motion precede the things moved, but things that are causes in the sense of rational patterns are simultaneous with what they produce.
1070a 30
Yet if these patterns are only present when the things produced are present, would some of them still remain there afterwards? For instance, some part of the soul might still be present, like intellect, after the person is absent, in his writings or account. So it’s clear that there’s no need for there to be forms, since the patterns can always be reproduced from one particular to another particular.
To reconstruct the argument, it seems to be something like this. First, there are no forms separate from the particulars. And this is because some beings do not have forms ready-at-hand preceding them, and these are products, for every product is handled only in a process of real-life ongoing construction. So already there are beings that do not have forms. Also, no rational pattern is present outside any particular, and this is true even for natural beings. For one does not necessarily need a thing of the same form preceding it in order for it to be, but it can very well be caused by chance, fortune and other mover, and the pattern will simply be in the particular material; also even if one thing has another thing similar in form to it preceding itself, that very first precedent in this genealogy also has its own form that is simultaneous only with itself. So this precedence is only incidental. Then how to explain the fact that there really seem to be similar things? Because surely what is already here can reproduce itself in another and thus remain afterwards, but this does not necessarily entail that there’s a universal, for a particular can pass down itself into another particular, and this heritage needs not be a universal form. A simple likeness would do.
1070b 1
Causes and sources are all different for different things. Yet spoken by way of analogy they are also the same. There’s no one element common to all things, for things composed of elements are different from the elements. Where can that difference come from if there’s only one ultimate source?
1070b 10
For this reason, none of the elements could be either an independent thing or a relative thing, as if it could generate either category all by itself, for it requires an added external difference, a source of a different sort; but rather the elements have to all be of different sorts, so different categories can be generated from different sorts.
1070b 20
Elements are also different from sources. Elements are constituents of things, but there are external sources of motion generating things and putting forms into the material. Different things also have different movers.
1070b 30
The prime mover is referred to here as that one-above-many external cause which sets forms into materials.
1071a 1
In one sense, the separate and independent thing is more primary than and thus the cause that is the same of things like attributes and motions. And the primary independent things seem to be those that can sustain themselves. So souls and bodies, or intellects, desires and bodies, are causes. But in another sense, being-at-work and potency are by analogy the same sources for things. And these patterns fit with earlier ones, for soul is the form of forms, body the material, desire the composite. While being at work is also the form, both separate and composite, potency the material.
1071a 10
Being-at-work and potency would be different for different materials with different forms. One thing to be emphasized here: material allows otherness into the thing, but not any kind of otherness, rather only the deprivation of the present form. And it seems the mover is again outside the matrix of form-material. What is the mover in the intellect-desire-body matrix? Is it the desire?
What is the relation of these structures? Are they analogies of each other? Are they simply the same? Are they repetitions?
1071a 20
The sources for particular things are also particular. So for things different in kind, their sources are also different in kind, but only the same by analogy. For things different in number, their sources are also different in number.
1071a 30
So all things have the same cause by analogy, in the sense that the four causes, form, deprivation, material and mover, for any independent thing would be the causes for others as others are dependent upon independent things. The thing completely at work is the cause for everything. Yet all things also have different causes, as many as there are primary contraries. To note: these discussions are all on perceptible things.
It seems then for perceptible things the sources themselves have instantiations, perhaps thanks to the involvement of material. So the form keeps the particular into one, but the material, being necessarily many as unexhausted, generates things into many ones. And it makes the forms and sources themselves into particulars. Though these particulars can still be categorized into more primary sources, but the instantiations are not reducible to these primary sources. So that particulars will have their own forms and movers as particulars, and these will be the same and different depending on how this is meant. So that the sources themselves can be treated as those things they are the sources of: they might be treated as the same in kind and thus has one primary source, or they might be treated again as different particulars that are responsible for the instantiations, hence different. Or they might be the same by analogy and thus have one primary source that is also self-splitting and ephemeral. In another sense, the world of sources is now getting reflected into by the world of things. All these are because of the inexhaustible material. Things will be different with intelligible things.
15
1076b 10
Mathematical things cannot be present in perceptible things for they are indivisible.
1076b 20
Also mathematical things cannot be simply separate for simple lines would be separate from lines as together with a solid.
1076b 30
It’s also the case with numbers, as there will be perceptible units as in perceptible numbers, perceptible units as separate from numbers, units as in intelligible numbers, etc.
1077a 1
If they were separate, astronomy and geometry would be no science.
1077a 10
If there were intelligible senses there would be intelligible animals. This is awesome! And if these are senses there will be even more intelligible senses.
1077a 20
Though mathematical things are supposed to be separate from and more primary than perceptible things, in truth they are derivative from them. Just like what has no soul is derivative from what has soul.
1077a 30
Mathematical things are neither forms, for only bodies or solids seem ensouled and complete, nor material, for it’s not evident how a thing can be composed of points.
1077b 1
Things prior in articulation are not necessarily prior in thinghood. For instance, attributes are prior in articulation, but they cannot be unless by being attributed to things; and when separated, they do not belong to things and have thus no being.
1077b 20
Demonstrations can always be about certain things but not only insofar as they are these. For instance, mathematics concerns itself with those magnitudes themselves of those things the sort of which can have magnitudes. But it’s only about the magnitudes of those things, not about those things themselves. For discourse has this power to separate and combine. And incidental attributes can be stripped away from the mathematical things in account, yet the mathematical things still are not really separate.
1078a 30
A human being can be treated as indivisible and as a solid. Both are right, for a thing has its potency to be otherwise. The good and the beautiful are different, for the good are always with actions.
1078b 10
Those friends of the forms are Heracliteans in the sense that they are persuaded everything in perception is in flux. So if there were any knowledge it cannot be any perception.
1078b 30
Socrates is credited with arguments by example and universal definition. And dialectic had not yet been developed enough to examine things from contrary assumptions, like what Plato did in his dialogues.
1079a 20
It seems that the ratio of two to one that links oneness and the dyad is more primary than either of the relata. Or there will be a number itself that includes both and is hence more primary.
1080a 30
Three possibilities for numbers that are natures and thinghoods: 1. each number is distinct from others, and so are their units; 2. each number is comparable with others, and so are their units; 3. each number is distinct from others, but each unit within each number is comparable among themselves (the unit of two is different from the unit of three, but the two units that compose two are comparable forms).
1080b 20
Pythagoreans make units into perceptible things and magnitudes. So for them they do not seem to have the notion of eidetic numbers, but they are rather devotees to mathesis universalis that all things are ratios.
1081a 10
If all units are indistinct, there would be no thinghood as such. For three would not be essentially different from four, for the extra unit added is nothing different from the thing itself, while the thing itself cannot be added to itself.
1081a 20
But units cannot be totally incomparable either. For the units are generated together out of the same source, and if one unit is prior and the other is derivative, one unit will also be prior to the number while the other derivative, then where to situate the number?
1081a 30
If all units were incomparable, there would be one unit for one, and two units for two, yet number three would already be present in number two. Yet this should not be, for number three would have its own units separate from all prior units.
1081b 1
It’s impossible to say at the same time that there is a first unit and second unit after the one and that there is a first two, for the first two is composed not of the first unit and the second unit following the one, but the one and the first unit following it.
1081b 20
It turns out that to say all units are incomparable is not really different from saying all units are comparable, for no eidetic number can be produced this way, but all numbers thus produced are produced by addition.
1081b 30
If eidetic numbers were produced, four would be composed of an eidetic two that is the dyad limited by the one and the dyad itself. Yet which one dyad is the truly two? Neither, for two itself is that which includes the first unit. And if two is composed of units, then two is not a product of the dyad, for the element is one instead of a dyad. All of these show how this whole doctrine of eidetic number is ridiculous and impossible.
1082a 1
Even if we say only units that are not within the same number are distinct, this is still inconceivable. For ten is composed of two fives. If five has units different than what ten has, how could they be thus composed?
1082a 20
Also there seems to be no separate twoness apart from two units. For a separate nature can be attached to another thing by participation or wholeness, but this is achieved through contact, mixture or placement. In what way is twoness one apart from the two units? Twoness really does not look like one whole.
1082a 30
The units in the first two generate all other twos, like twos in four and eight, for the first two is the most primary. But the twos in the first four also generate all other fours. So what is derivative can become the primary source, and a form can be composed of forms, like the first four is composed of twos that generate other twos in all other fours. It’s just like saying an animal is composed of animals. This refers to the cosmos in Timaeus.
1082b 1
What is equal is undifferentiated. What more reason could anyone give?
1082b 10
If one unit from two is added to another from three, will this two be prior to three? Will this be posterior to two?
1082b 20
If numbers were forms, they can never be undifferentiated. For in three there would be a two that’s also a form like the first two, and forms would be composed of forms. And there will be one highest form that all other forms are its parts. For this is impossible, as forms are independent and separate, there can be no addition whatsoever. For in addition, one number necessarily contains a part that is equal to the prior number, and equality means being undifferentiated. And division into parts is also impossible, for now eight would be divided into two fours, each is less than eight itself but equal to four itself, so four in itself must be contained in eight as a part. If one were to say the four in eight is different than four itself, what else can equality mean? All these would lead to ludicrous consequences.
1083a 10
Numbers differ in amount, but units cannot. Also units are without attribute, thus not differing in kind either. And since the qualities of numbers are derivative from their amount, the units as homogeneous precede the difference. So one needs to mark out from the beginning if a unit were different from another, how could they be called one? And if they were not ones, what are we talking about?
1083a 30
Those who believe that there are only mathematical numbers but a certain one is the source are simply mistaken. For they do not recognize the fact that once a first one is admitted, all numbers would have their own firsts, and this position will soon collapse into the one that holds there are eidetic numbers.
1083b 10
Or numbers are not separate at all, then there’s no problem of whether units are different or the same, for these determinations now depend on similarities and dissimilarities in perception. And as numbers are not separate, there’s no need to determine how, them being different, can they again be related to each other; or how, them being the same in themselves, can they allow for differences and duplications. But one other impossibility thrusts up: numbers cannot be the same as magnitudes. This already hints at Aristotle’s resolution, which lies in making numbers not separate active beings, but beings in potencies of things.
1084a 10
If numbers were separate active beings, they would be either actively infinite or actively finite. For infinity belongs to numbers. Yet neither is possible. For infinity is neither odd nor even, and it would need a being that actively corresponds to it. But there really seems to be an infinity. So numbers cannot be separate beings, but have to inhere in the material, and be thus gathered into one thing as active being and its potencies, so the twos contained in four are only potentially there. It is also right to say that different numbers have different units, for the units are potencies now realized in different forms. So as one is potentially two, or two potentially one, all positions can be reconciled.
1084b 30
As people take numbers and units to be actively present, they hunt for contrary things. For they say the unit is both a source and a derivative, which can be correct, only if qualified as thinghood to material.
1085a 1
One consequence is that the units, being more like the one, should be prior to two. But they say two is prior. This is contradictory if without qualifications. Also, three can be taken as one thing, and five too, for both are active beings, and consequently they can make up two, which should be an eight. And what would this two in turn be composed of, since each number is just as immaterial?
1085a 10
Since numbers are in succession, it is an impasse whether they themselves succeed one another or their units do. If they are continuous there’s no such question, for there’s no separate whole; but here, unit is one whole, two another. And things derivative from numbers, like lines and surfaces, encounter the same impasse. If they are all produced from the great and small, how do they obtain these qualitative differences? And what about those other attributes of magnitudes that do not themselves make up those magnitudes directly, but should necessarily accompany any particular magnitude as a particular attribute, like curvedness and straightness of a line? Do they not also come from the great and small?
Any particular curvature or straightness is not intrinsic to the particular line so long as what matters is its magnitude, just as any particular magnitude is not intrinsic so long as what matters is the thinghood. But one particular magnitude must necessarily be accompanied by one particular curvature as an actively revealed and maintained potency, so it’s necessary that it has a curvature as such. But it does not matter if this particular curvature is intrinsic or incidental, what matters is that the curvature as such is always actively present, and it has to be generated by something. And since magnitude as such is generated by the great and small, shouldn’t its necessary accompaniment, i.e. curvature as such, also be generated by the same source? But the source of curvature seems to be the curved and the straight, which is qualitatively different from the great and the small, and their respective particularizations are incidental to each other. By this argument, great and small should not be the ultimate source. Just as the source for human being to have color lies in his being an animal, but the source for particularization of color as such lies in his skin, which is separate from the source for any particularization of the human being, that being his soul. So when A is present, B is necessarily present only if A itself is its necessary source, or A has a source in itself that necessarily generates B, though it needs not be necessary that this source always generates A. What is needed is only that when A is present, that source be present, and B would necessarily be produced. In other words, the source can be merely a necessary source for A, but has to be a sufficient source for B. Either case, they must share a common source, yet it’s not clear that great and small sufficiently produce curved and straight. So the dyad can only explain the magnitude itself, but not how the magnitude is presented.
1085b 1
These people have no way of deciding if points are material for lines or not, or what’s the same thing, if points accompany lines.
1085b 10
Those who say multitude as such generate numbers encounter the same impasse as those who say it’s the dyad that generate. For instance, each unit cannot be one itself, hence is only a product of multitude and one itself. But how can a unit be of multitude? Or if it’s made of part of the multitude, that part being indivisible, it’s not really made of multitude and one, but one and one. Plus, the multitude of indivisible parts is another number, which is presupposed even before any number is generated.
1086b 10
Those who set universals as if independent particulars are incurring inconveniences.
1087a 20
Knowledge has two senses: one in potency, as the indeterminate universal, the other in being at work, as the determinate particular. So a universal color is seen alongside the particular color as material for the particular, but the universal color can also be thought into being-at-work and particularized, while the particular perception of color is worked into its sensible material.
1087b 1
Contraries are not the sources of everything, for they always belong to an underlying thing.
1087b 20
What exceeds and what is exceeded are two opposites more universal than the dyad, according to some. For it relates not merely to size, but to everything in magnitude or degree. But it’s still problematic.
1088a 1
So it seems for Aristotle one is a measure, and one that is not separate from the kind of multitude being measured. There’s no separate one itself, as it seems.
1088a 20
Great and small are relatives, and relatives cannot be one independent thing or material, for it always involves an other as an other, and it is only an attribute dependent upon quality and quantity but never material as such. This is actually treating Plato’s doctrine at its face value and interpreting his naming of the dyad literally.
1088b 10
If two were the smallest number, and to it alone is fewness or one attributed, which is already absurd, what would be the number that is the greatest? There’s none, but all such numbers should be attributed by both. So those who claim ten or ten thousand is the greatest number is simply mistaken.
1088b 20
What is composed of elements has material and admits of being otherwise, hence is never everlasting.
1089a 20
Since being and non-being both have many meanings, it’s necessary for the sense to be pinned down first before saying “being requires non-being to be, otherwise all will be one”. And non-being is not meant as something false in this sense, for what is false is unsound and to be fought off by truth, but this kind of non-being is actually the ur-ground for being. This non-being can be none other than potency.
1089b 10
There are sorts of speaking of being other than thinghood, and the dyad cannot generate these other sorts. If they inquire into this they see how different kinds of potencies contribute to these other ways of being many. Also they make the dyad into one thing as opposite the one, but they forget how the dyad can be of many sorts to. And where does this manyness of the many come from, if it is only of one sort in itself?
1089b 20
It’s necessary to posit a potency for each thing and not to posit a potency for thinghood to be a thing in its own right of a different sort, e.g. a relative. One of the kinds of being cannot be another kind in potency. But this raises a question, that how are there many kinds of beings? For they are many because of one material, yet their materials must be differentiated.
1089b 30
If this and of what sort are kept apart, it’s conceivable how one this can be many potentially; but how is it possible to have actively many independent things, each one an active this? Without the thisness being of a sort, wouldn’t all such ones be reduced to simply one? And if the this is apart from amount, how can there be many ones? So it does not seem that potencies of different kinds are really that apart.
1090a 10
It seems those who uphold the mathematical numbers do not treat numbers as cause of anything or of any use, but rather as indifferent things itself by itself. For theorems of arithmetic can be perfectly applied to perceptible things, and it’s not necessary that only until abstractions are attained to can perceptible things be calculated, or that without the abstractions there are no perceptible numbers. So perceptible things could very well be causes for mathematical ones, though mathematical things are neutral and indifferent. Yet if mathematical numbers are not sources, how do they have independent being?
The point here is this: if mathematical numbers are causes, them being neutral and indifferent is contradictory. And without pure mathematical units, the perceptible things still have definite magnitudes and numbers, even if not pure as such. So these cannot be causes.
1090a 30
The problem Pythagoreans encounter is not so much that numbers become separate from bodies, but rather they claim bodies to be made of numbers. Thus what is heavy is made of what has no weight at all.
1090b 10
Points and lines and solids are limits for things, and limits are not separate from things.
1090b 20
It seems deep down Aristotle has this conviction that nature is throughly intelligible in itself, and there’s nothing imposed upon it to make it intelligible. Intelligibility is inherent. So even without independent numbers things are still calculated and understood.
1091b 20
It’s unreasonable to say good is one, and one is the ultimate source, for then everything is good. Poets are also aware of this difficulty, so they make Zeus, that one which is later in appearance, rule instead of the first gods.
1092a 1
And then multitude will be badness, and everything will be bad too. And the good and the bad are seats for each other and destroy each other. And good will be the potency for bad and bad for good. These are necessary consequences when contraries are sources, and sources are elements in things, and one is a source, and numbers are primary independent things thus making manyness a source too, and numbers are in turn sources for all things that are.
1092b 1
Why all things made of contraries perish, but not numbers?
1092b 20
If ratios are harmonies of numbers, and harmonies thinghoods, then numbers are materials, for a number is always a number of things, and these things are used to construct a ratio.
1092b 30
It’s also difficult to determine in what sense a numerical ratio is good. Also numbers are of material, but cannot be of numbers too, for then everything will be of merely differences in quantity, and things would be reduced to merely products. Yet if everything is number, this would become a necessary consequence. Also, it seems if everything is number, and number is necessarily universal, then a lot of unlike things would be alike. Unless one were to say that everything has its own singular number, yet this seems unreasonable, for we do assign the same number to different things; and if everything has its own incomparable and singular number, how do we count and add things? If A is one, B is two, is three a combination of AB? Then there will already be two As and Bs, and how is three a singular one when it comes from A and B, in what way does it come to be? Is it by mixing or placement? But this is already something outside merely mathematics and numbers. Is there a specific number for kinds of addition too? Or are these ways of addition determined by these singular numbers themselves? But then why signify all these with only universal addition? At any rate, nothing is really determined by these sayings alone. And what is determined as eidetic number is necessarily supplemented by other aspects of being.
So it seems that Aristotle is not really arguing against the “possibility” of Plato’s doctrine, but rather its imprecision and inconveniences. So the doctrine of eidetic number cannot really naively be understood as relating simply to numbers, but is always a number of things. But this already requires a further inquiry into thinghood as such, which cannot be treated again as merely numbers. Otherwise there will be forms of forms till infinity, while each form is separate from any other. Unless numbers can be treated as potencies too. But he fails to notice, or pretends not to notice, that Plato has already introduced potency into his doctrine by introducing the dyad. So he really does not divert from Plato’s teaching, except he does not treat the dyad as an active two.
1093b 20
Mathematical things have attributes that are universal by analogy. Some qualities and potencies of number do belong in the list that includes beautiful, but they are incidental attributes (potencies) to numbers, numbers themselves are not the Beautiful.
16
It seems that a material and a form can be mutually converted. So what used to be a material can now be treated as a form, and vice versa. But this conversion has its limits. If we formulate it in this way, the letter preceding being the form, the letter preceded being the material, a negation being the contrary, these would be clear.
First, there are the highest and independent sources. These sources, however, first start to interact and work each other into the material in which each and its contrary could inform the material. Suppose there are five sources, A, B, C, D, and E.
These sources then create an ephemeral plane of being, in which ontological regions are demarcated, and sources get transformed into contraries with in-between things. So we have AB, -AB, AC, -AC, etc., co-constituting the primary level.
But these derivatives again constitute materials or forms for other things. So we could see new products like (AB)C, like two qualities, for two is a product derivative from magnitude and thinghood, but quality is itself the primary kind. We also could see new products like A(BC), so we have one/this horse, where one is primary, but horse is derivative from two other things. And all forms could then be affecting and affected by any other form, except that which is already contained inside itself. It means that there is no such thing as A(AB) or (AB)A. But it is possible that the form and material be reversed, since they are nothing but polarities; so rationality could be the material that animality is working on, and AB could be reversed into BA. At this level, all forms are countable and determinate, and the material is also determinate, for it’s exhausted by the form. So for an articulation like white horse, both white and horse are determinate, and the intellectual material is as determinate as its form.
Yet as the forms go further and further in being enriched, as the form becomes something like a conglomeration of nearly unlimited other things, the intellectual material becomes no longer delineated. It becomes fuzzy and ambiguous, for it is now so complicated within itself. This is also the case with the form. The form that is at work and reveals itself is itself a derived product, which has other forms in potency. So the form-material structure is duplicated within the form itself. Just as (AB)C has AB contained inside itself, now this structure is reproduced to such an extent that it’s no longer determinable. But as long as one part is that which is at work, we call that a form, but now the form has actually become an indeterminate this; whereas the other part is that which is in potency, that allows for other forms to inform itself, becomes hyle, or pure material. The reason why form always seems clearer and more defined than material is not because of its content, for the being of a statue is no less ambiguous than bronze, and a bronze is even simpler; rather, it’s for the fact that form is always grasped as one and this, hence limiting, while material, even if simpler in articulation, always allows for what’s otherwise into itself, hence allowing for an inherent manyness and infinity. This clarity exuded by form, then, comes not from its content or articulation, but rather from its being at one end of the polarity, that of oneness and limit, while the other end is occupied by manyness and materiality. In other words, this clarity is an hypothetical clarity, and this is why for Aristotle universals are far removed from thinghood as such. Forms are beings-at-work, but not attributes.
So form is what is one, and material is what allows something otherwise into itself while the thing remains one.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
1
980a 21
为什么“向外”伸展而趋于知?
980b 21
视觉、记忆与听觉构成学习。
981a 1
记忆完成经验。
981b 1
知者的标志是教导。
981b 20
智慧与闲暇。
982a 20
算术比几何更精确,因为更简单。
982b 10
惊异之路。
982b 20
人经由无知从事哲学,经由知而知。
983b 20
质料因是事物由之生成、而自身留存者。
984b 20
因果的“历史”:从质料因到动力因;但动力因也是美之因吗?
987b 20
对柏拉图,大与小分有一而产出形式;可感对象—数学对象—形式—一。对他,无限从二元组涌现,但自身不是范畴。
988a 1
但这有问题,因为无限不应来自材料:材料在生产中用尽,而形式保持活跃、生成众多。
988b
形式因关乎静止与存在。
993b 10
困难的原因不在事物,而在我们。
994b 1
两种不同的有限性:完成或循环。循环中,第一个东西有限而永恒,可据此推论:最后一个东西能转回第一个,且若第一个不毁灭,它就不完整,因此也应永恒而有限。
994b 30
我们不认识在增加或划分上无限的东西。因不像线:线自身无限,须强加界限;因却自然需要有限。
2
1003a 21
最高因属于某种凭自身的自然。寻求元素者也必须寻找本原。
1003b 1
存在有多种意义,却指向一个首要意义。如何?
1003b 10
那么,首要自然被规定为本体性(Thinghood)吗?
1003b 20
一种感知与一种知识。存在与一性是同一个东西。
1004a 10
最高因的否定与剥夺也属于同一研究。剥夺如青苹果对红苹果,青苹果缺少红;无限却是有限的否定。
1004a 20
相反性是某种差异,差异是某种他异。这些都以多种方式言说。
1004a 30
连“指向”也可有多种意义。这是困局:一如何是多?
1004b 1
对一性的研究不是对数的研究。
1004b 20
诡辩与辩证法涉及同哲学一样的事物,仅因存在为一切共有;诡辩有貌而无实,辩证法对哲学所求知的一切仅作试探。
1005a 20
数学公理与本体性应属于同一研究吗?
1005a 30
有些自然哲学家对存在之为存在说得恰当;但仍有高于自然的存在,因为自然只是一类。
1005b 1
似乎暗示真理必须以逻辑方式呈现,而这应是预备工作。
1005b 10
最确定的原则:非假设,任何认识任何事物者都必须拥有、且“已拥有着到来”,永不出错。
1005b 20
命题——最终意见?也许只在执意见者的视角中,它才是意见。
1006a 1
缺乏教养:有些东西就是无法证明。
1006a 20
可通过反驳证明原则,使争辩者负责陈述一个确定意义(而不是证明某事是或不是如此),从而服从理性。随后是反驳式证明。
1006b 10
一者不能意味非其所是者,却可有属于一者的多种东西。
1007a 10
属性无限,定义有限。
1007a 20
本体性不能同时恰是它所不是者;否则本体性自身将是偶属性的,就没有存在。
1007b 1
但一切偶属性之物都是底层事物的谓词;没有本体性,就无底层事物。偶属性有两种说法:1. 诸偶属性彼此偶属性地关联,因为它们属于同一物;2. 诸偶属性属于一个特定事物。因此第一义中,A对B是偶属性,仅就两者对C偶属性而言;第二义中,A对底层事物C偶属性,但B不被说成对A或A+C偶属性(以至无限),而仅对C。
1007b 30
不确定者就是潜在者,即非存在者。
1008a 10
若一切同时是且不是,则一切为一;若一切轮流是且不是,则无法有意义地说什么;若一切不是而有些是,则那些不是者的对立面确定。若一切是而同时有些不是,则会承认这些例外。
1008a 20
作为评价与生活来实践的本体论。
1009a 1
若事物确实同时是且不是,至少会有程度,使事物更多地是而非不是,或反过来。
1028a 10
存在意为某物是什么、一个这个,以及某物何种或多少。
1028a 30
独立事物是特殊者,但其本体性并非以特殊方式意指。
1028b 1
何为存在,与何为本体性是同一问题。
1029a 1
本体性的四种意义:一物为能存在而持续所是者;共相;一般类别;底层事物。底层事物似乎更是形式。
1029a 10
剥去一切后留下的不是底层事物,而是材料。存在由属性确定。
1029a 30
第三种:形式。
1029b 3
从较不可知到较可知,从可感到可知,从特殊到普遍。对其方法的彻底颠覆。
1041a 20
问为什么时,在A是B中,并非问A或B,因为它们必须显明且在场;所以“因为一物是自身”过于一般(即便每物自身不可分,因而“自身”指某孤异确定者),不足为有效答案。
1041b 1
问一个简单事物时,连简单事物也须分成部分;如问材料为什么具有此形式。
1041b 10
整体自身是特殊者。否则就不是整体,只是材料。
1041b 30
独立事物由自然、依自然而结合。
3
1048a 30
潜能中的存在。
1048b 1
通过类比。
1048b 20
无限是潜在的,意为它总涉及在活动中存在,且不与现实者分离。
1048b 30
完整与不完整行动的差异:完整者在做某事时已处于做成的状态。在活动中存在(being-at-work)就是这种完整行动。
1049b 10
在活动中存在先于任何运动本原。因为任一潜能自身必须作为某物的潜能被带来,而此物先在且正活动。
1050a 20
有时运动、或不完整者,可展示为目的(使不完整者完整)。因为目的是活动,活动是在活动中存在,并延伸到在活动中保持完满(being-at-work-staying-complete)。
1050a 30
一物可单纯被置于活动中,或其活动是一个新事物。
1050b 1
在活动中存在是形式,是本体性。
1050b 10
潜能不能不在场,却能不活动。所以能不存在,是可毁灭的。
1050b 20
不可毁灭者不在潜能中,而全在活动。但这不意味逆命题成立,即凡在活动者都不可毁灭。因此潜能是在活动中存在的阻碍。
1051a 1
若形式自身具有潜能的自然,就会有更高的形式在活动。
1069a 30
古人探究并确定本体性是特殊的,今人却站在逻辑视点,假定为普遍的。
1069b 1
可合理断定:对可感事物,永恒者也可变化。所以永恒有特殊意涵。
1071b 20
总有运动;总有能造成运动者;总有将造成运动者;总有正在造成运动者。因此有永恒、无材料的独立事物,其存在本身就是在活动中存在。
1072a 10
一物必须同一,同时被动、生成、毁灭。因此必须凭自身运动,却又须凭它者运动;但这它者应是第一者,同时生成事物自身与另一事物。同一与差异的同一。
1072a 20
有某种不息运动,始终循环。不只在理性中如此,事实也如此。
1072a 30
在活动中存在者造成运动,自身却不动。欲求对象低于思想对象,但两者都使事物运动。思先于欲求,被思者的活动先于思。被思者属于一个对象序列,其中本体性首要。
1072b 1
一与简单不同。一性可衡量多,而简单者只是存在。这里本原简单,因为不衡量自身对立之物,而自身就是有序整体。第一推动者类比于善,以被爱者方式产出运动:它产出空间运动,方式如欲求或思想对象推动欲求或思,自身不动。但这不意味它自身就是思想对象。
1072b 10
对首要本原的刻画。
1072b 20
理智能是被思者吗?事物被接收入思想,但思想在思中被观照;每个思都是思自身的思。但若人只短暂如此,界限在哪:或许睡眠与死亡?
1073b 1
天文学是最接近哲学的数学研究。因为数与几何不涉及本体性。
1074a 30
运动不能为了运动,而必须为神圣身体:所以一义上星体被携带,另一义上它又是不动本原。但其它事物在多大程度上可有这种双重性?
1074b 1
在活动中保持自身不含材料。
本原似乎可以数量上众多,尽管必须有首要本原;但这些有数目的东西不能有大小。
1074b 20
理智若无所思就不神圣;但若思某物,就依赖所思者,仅潜在地存在。所以它是在主动思,还是仅有潜在思的力量,颇为神秘。
1074b 30
思不是运动,因为此意义的运动只能向更坏者。若思是潜能,就不如被思者尊贵。但既然最坏者可被思,而思最神圣,若思要最善,就须避免坏事物,且须是对思的思。
1075a 1
某些情况中,思可以是思自身。
1075a 10
复合理智只能在整段时间中抵达最善:这对思自身的思也真吗?
1075b 20
结合1075b 1:相反者有材料,材料却无相反者。由此可见,对亚里士多德,潜能不是水平层面另一种类,而是层级底部。
4
989a 20
即便设多个身体为生成之因,原问题仍在,又生新问题:如今无共同质料承托多个身体,性质变化就不可能。
989b 1
说一物在本原处混合是荒谬的,因为须先未混合才能后来混合,事物也不能任意混合,而且混合后总可分离。所以按阿那克萨戈拉,本原必须双重。
990b 1
引入形式无助,因为形式与所造成的事物一样多,只是复制。若事物无法计数,形式也无法计数。
990b 10
形式复制一切,就会有无限多本不应有形式者的形式,如否定、关系、过去图像。
990b 20
形式遂取消事物;事物本该是首要整体,形式只是部分。范畴等不能称为事物的存在者也成形式。
990b 30
形式是独立事物在独立事物中内在共享的共同特征,因此是本体性。
991a 20
形式被视为因,因为它们与事物分离,所以不推动事物,不助于认识其它事物或事物自身。但说形式如供人参照的范型有问题,因为范型在不在都不影响图像的相似,范型可多、不必仅一,且范型也可有范型,因而范型是图像。
991b 1
若形式是本体性,就不能与事物分离。形式之外还有存在与生成之因,所以形式不是独立的因。
991b 10
形式不能是数,因为数总是事物之数。无事物则无数或数的比例,但数之前的事物是什么?只能是单位,但仅凭数难以说这些单位同质还是异质。
991b 30
即便理念数也仍有此问题:虽给了数的原初本原,它仍是数;它之为数的原因不在数,而在被计数事物的存在。若事物作为单位可有不同意义,一与数也可有不同意义。
992a 10
不同类事物以不同种大小为本原,质上不同。柏拉图常承认这一点。此学说必须有限度,才容许从一个共同本原类比推导质上不同的东西;但仍显示“数是事物本原”是困难主张。
992a 30
关键不只找本原,也要交代本原如何与显现关联。
992b 1
柏拉图及追随者将哲学变成数学,但形式学说不说明事物为何而产出的真实原因(即未解释内容,只给出形式本体论;如只知一物为何是一,却不知它如何自身努力成为一与善,也不知它努力何种一性)。底层事物也变成数学事物,尽管数学者实际只应是材料内部的区分。大小学说正是忽视形式自身的本原。
992b 10
柏拉图主义者只能谈一本身,而非一切如何为一。连有一本身也有问题,因为没有一个最高属。
992b 10
形式学说忽视第四种存在,即几何数,如平方数或立方数。
992b 20
对本原的任何探究都须是对独立事物的探究。因为人首先通过熟悉事物学习元素,而非反过来。即便某物是天赋知识,也唯有联系独立事物的经验才变得可理解、显明。
5
996a 20
不同事物有不同本原。例如,数学事物不以善为所为之故,也无运动本原。
996b 10
善的知识最具统治性,因为其它知识为它之故。但本体性知识是第一因、最可知者的知识,也首要。
996b 30
逻辑异于第一哲学,因为应用更广。但逻辑自身作为知识应是事物的知识;那么本体性更首要,还是逻辑事物?
997a 20
有一种知识覆盖所有存在者并不合理,因为如此仍会留下异于第一哲学的普遍逻辑。
997a 30
普遍逻辑也与第一哲学十分不同,以至不覆盖所有存在者。
997b 10
照某些人说法,形式成了某种永恒可感者。
997b 20
把数学事物构想为中间者很困难,因为设定了不动世界,却仍需解释运动。如假定可毁灭动物与动物自身之间还有动物。
997b 30
若土地测量区别于几何,关乎可毁灭之物,此知识为何不毁灭?
998a 10
数学事物不与可感者分离,却也不在其中。否则两物同处一地,不动者会运动。
形式似是阻止中间事物完全实现目的的因,是一与多互动之处。形式似是一种开启之力。
998a 20
真正本原是什么:最初构成者,还是事物类别?定义既来自类别,类别似乎也是被定义事物的本原。
998b 10
本体性只以单一表述言说(这与亚里士多德后来关于本体性的话矛盾吗?)。即便接受类别为本原,最初类别还是最后类别更真为本原?
998b 20
属不可能述谓其种的种差,种也不可能述谓种差自身,故种差必须在属之外。因此无包罗一切的属。
998b 30
此意义上,种差与最高属一样也会是本原。但这将使本原无限。
999a 1
若不可分者更像本原,最低种更首要就合理,因为它不像属那样必须被划分:属不直接是特殊事物的属。
999a 10
有先后者,先者更首要,似乎无物比那些个别先者更首要;如没有先于二的数之数,因为属唯有个别种在场才出现,因而后于二。无先后者,善更首要;属既含善恶,其中善者就更首要。因此更像本原的不是事物一般类别,而是个别事物的谓词。
999a 20
但若善者或数二更首要,它就被视为外在且可分离于它作为本原所涉及事物的本原,并是个别事物的谓词(善性与优先性)。所以它首要,因为普遍。绕了完整一圈。
999a 30
最困难的问题:特殊者之外有任何东西吗?
999b 1
若一切是感知,就无永恒者,也无生成,因为生成系列或不停,或停在无。若无已生成的可能,就无生成。所以若最终没有完成且静止者,就没有运动者。
999b 10
若材料不生成,形式作为生成的另一端应更如此。否则只有无定形团块。但这很复杂,因为不是每个形式都与特殊者分离。本体性是一还是多也不清楚。
1000a 1
本原数量上一,还是种类上一?若种类上一,就不可能说“一种”或“一个一性”。但若本原数量上一,就不可能分裂为多个个体。
1000a 20
说可毁灭与不可毁灭事物有不同本原,似更可信。
1000b 20
若本原不同,它们自身是否也各自可毁灭或不可毁灭?
1001a 20
许多自然科学家说,一性或存在不是独立事物,而属于它物。但若如此,一性就不是一,也不会有任何普遍事物。
1001b 10
芝诺称一本身不可分,所以非存在,因为加于或减自一物都不改变它。但他错了:不是每种大小都能加于或减自其它每种;而且即便事物大小不变,数量也更多。
1001b 20
若说数来自一本身与另一自然,仍需确定该自然是什么,以及如何产出区别于数的大小。
1001b 30
那么,数与几何元素是独立事物吗?
1002a 1
面及类似者在构成本体性上比广延身体更首要,因为身体不可无它们,反之不然。
1002a 20
但面、线、点似乎不构成本体性。它们自身不组织成身体;作为体、面、线、点,全都中性,不含任何形状。因此单凭数不能成为本体性。
1002a 30
独立事物生成或消逝。但线不(从某物)生成或(进入它物)消逝,而只是是或不是。如当下存在又瞬间不在;作为界限,它根本无存在。
1003a 1
若元素不在潜能中,则必有它物更首要,因为潜能更首要。但若元素在潜能中,就总可能没有任何事物存在。这潜能问题与前题相关,即有无形式;若有,形式既是本原,怎么又从中有特殊者?这一二元论使潜能概念必不可少。
6
1009a 10
有些人需说服,有些需强力才能行事。所以对困于信假之人,参与其思,可治其无知;对为争辩而争辩者,只反驳其论证。
1009a 20
非存在者不能生成,生成者必然存在,故可说事物总同时混合于相反者。但相反者不在同一方面在场,一者主动,一者潜在。且还有完全不生成的事物。
1009b 1
关于显现的真理似来自可感事物。因此多数人相信者很可能假,因为无物阻止他们偶然想同样的事。
1010a 10
正在失去者仍有一些正在失去之物,也必须已是正在变成者的某种样子。
1010a 20
量变不蕴涵形式变化。而且只有地上之物不断变化,广阔天宇并非如此。
1010b 1
若认为感知不假,显现不同于感知,可以真也可以不真。
1010b 10
感知之间也有秩序与层级;如视觉判断颜色胜于硬度,味觉判断苦味胜于听觉。
1010b 20
不同时间的感知对属性不分歧,只对本体性分歧。所以即便感知内部也有必然性。
1010b 30
若一切存在者皆可感,则无灵魂就无任何东西。但还有使感知可能的底层事物,即更根本意义的可感者。必须有先于或外在于感知、为感知奠基者,尽管总是可感的。
1011a 10
重复这些论证者,在行动中并不如此。其错在向无理由者索取理由。
1011a 20
连显现者也可依不同方面、地点、范畴、向不同的人分类,所以任何显现真理都非无条件。因此显现真理不会无条件地既真又假。
1011b 1
若有思,思就必总关联某确定之物。否则思者自身会是被思或可思者,导致无限关系。所以思自身不可思。
1011b 20
矛盾者之间无物。
1011b 30
矛盾者中间的东西或分有两者,如灰分有黑白,或两者皆不分有。若后者,就不能容许变化;若前者,变化似乎又不从对立者发生,因为某物从已白者变白。更熟悉的例子来自《美诺》:人不知道想知道者,而若已知就无须寻找。
1012a 10
中间者自身又容许其肯定与否定,因而产生新的中间者,以至无限。且每个都是一物而非部分,所以这无限是坏无限。
这里的技巧似是:当然可接受中介,但中介不是独立事物,而是由一个事物规定、连接变化两端的连续体。因此相反者在每一部分重现,却不是分离事物的混合。
1012a 20
定义来自他们必须意指某物这一必然性,因为词所作为符号指示的表述就是定义。
1012b 1
反击赫拉克利特式论证,更合理的是先要求他们意指某物,而非先问事物是否真如此。
1012b 10
若断言为真者否认为假,断言某物就不能是否认某物。因此“一切可断言,一切可否认”必自相矛盾。但若前半真,后半也必真。所以两半都不可能真。
1012b 20
若开例外,说“一切真”者又说“只有‘一切假’不真”,他也应说:否认我上一陈述的陈述又不真;以至无限。
7
1012b 34
本原意为一物中人可最先推动的部分,或每物从之最好地生成者,或某物最初由之生成的构成者,或被动者依其选择而被推动者,或一物最初由之被认识者。
1013b 1
四因之外,另一种是第一推动者与目的之间的众多事物。这类更近形式,因为形式也容许目的成其为目的,自身是一种停顿。
1013b 10
一物可有许多不同原因。两物可以不同方式互为因。事物的在场与缺席都是因。
1013b 30
因的形式众多,但因仍在形式之下;同形式者只能彼此接续,所以不能有无限混杂的因;因此因的种类与数量总可数。同一因可偶属性地或内在地起作用,或作为特殊者或共相造成,或潜在或主动地造成。
1014a 10
结果应对应原因。言说中,特殊与普遍可交织。
1014a 30
元素意为某物由之组成的第一构成者,在种类上不能分为异类,或完全不可分,或可分却不成新类。
1014b 1
人也把一、不可分且对许多事物有用者叫元素;但不同于前类元素,这类在每物中只能有一个且唯一,而一物可有许多同类的前种构成者。这意义上的属也是元素。
1014b 20
自然意为生出之物的生成,也指生长者中首先在场、它由之生长者。生长或为长在上面,或为长成一体;长在上面仅有接触,长成一体则要求所触之物以连续与数量一起生长,尽管仍是不同部分。如心与手一起长,因为心连续于身体,身体也连续于手,它们大小一起增长。
1014b 30
自然也意为任何非自然存在者由之存在或生成的首要事物。
1015a 10
自然也意为事物的本体性,或形式。自然首义是那些凭自身在内部具有运动本原之物的本体性。就它规定运动本原的在场而言,自身是运动本原。
1015a 20
必然意为无之便无法生活者,或无之则善不能存在或产生、恶不能驱除或避免者,或强力与强迫。
1015a 30
必然性更首要的意义是不能以其它方式存在者。
1015b 10
有些东西因它物而必然,有些凭自身必然,使它物必然。必然性首义是简单者。
1016a 1
连续者有一个运动。
1016a 20
底层事物无差别或不可分时,诸物被称为一。这意义上,属如材料。有些在感官知觉上无差别,如水或酒;有些在理解上,如两个三角形。
1016a 30
另一种说一的方式,是其表述不能分为其它东西,尽管每个表述自身内部可分。例如,人可分为动物与言说,但人作为这个表述本身不能分成动物的表述。一分开,表述便失去。
1016b 1
对其所作的思不可分之物最是一;独立事物最是一。
1016b 20
为一就是为数的本原;也就是为一类存在者的第一尺度。
1016b 30
事物可依类比为一:这似不同于在种、属或数上为一。当A之于B同于C之于D时如此。宽松程度依次上升:数量上一者必种上一,反之不然。数量上一物能说像自身吗?
1018a 10
它异却某方面相同者,称为不同。
1018a 20
称为对立者的有矛盾者、相反者、关系项、缺乏与具有,以及事物由之生成、向之消逝的极端。凡不能同时出现于能接受两者的一物中者,称为对立,或自身对立,或其构成材料对立。
矛盾者不容中间物。相反者总容许一个中间,两者在其中又连续重现。缺乏与具有,说的是属于一物的另一物,所以不是两物可在不同时间出现于一物,而仅是一物的在场与缺席。极端不属于一物,而是生成、消逝所离开与趋向的终端,如某物变得太小而不能保持同一事物。
1018b 30
优先首义是知识中的优先。对理性,共相优先;对感知,特殊者优先。对理性,属性先于整体。
1019a 10
潜在地,部分先于整体,材料先于独立事物;在活动中则相反。事物若非首先可能便不存在,但可能性在一物现实在场前不现实在场。所以潜能作为容许事物存在者在先,在活动中存在作为掌管潜能者在先。有些东西因生成而能无它物存在,如整体;有些因毁灭而如此,如部分。
1019a 20
潜能意为运动或变化本原,或在它物中,或在某物作为它物时。这必涉及其对应者:它也是被它物推动、改变的本原。
1019a 30
潜能也指能够变得更好、或能不变得更坏者。
1019b 1
潜能似乎发生于那个它物对所谈事物并无压倒力量、未成为其本质本身时。但潜能依赖某个存在者,所以某种程度上可被在场者掌控。
1019b 20
若不完整拥有本原,或不处于自然拥有它的时间、条件,就称无能。
1020a 10
某个“多少”可潜在分为诸一,分为单位则为数多,分为度量则为大小。
1020a 20
有些东西内在具有“多少”,如线,特定线由其多少规定;有些偶属性地具有,如有教养之物。所以任一有教养之物无论多大,都保持同一;但线大小不同就本质不同。有些多少在本体性中,另一些是关系属性或状态,如长短。因此,大小已定、其它条件不变时,一物虽被内在地说成大或小,这大自身又依赖其大小。这意义上,相对者不是偶属性者,因为事物可偶属性地大,也可内在地大。地球内在地大,因为其大小大于我们所比较的大多数东西。相对性标示:“相较于什么,这东西内在/偶属性地大。”即使某物仅相对地大,它相对于某些事物的大仍内在。与它物比较不是事物内部的。所以最初说某物大时,就已固定参照;若大小偶属性,就是在这一固定参照内偶属性。
1020a 30
事物可偶属性地有多少,或如有教养之物被说成有多少,或如时间有多少。时间有多少,仅因为事物可分;若事物不可分,其时间就无多少。前种情况,事物大小是唯一的多少;后种,时间作为属性自身有自己的多少,依赖事物的多少。若事物大小偶属性,则时间多少也偶属性。
1020b 1
量也有质与何种,因为六是一个六。
1020b 30
有数量关系性,也有作用与被作用的关系性。
1021a 1
数量关系性有三种:数值确定(一对三)、有数值但不确定(一对多)、数值不确定(线对圆)。这关系性也可用于其它范畴:本体性上一者是同一,质上一者是相似,量上一者是相等。进一步说,一者是数的尺度。
1021a 20
数的关系也可现实或潜在地在场。这在《物理学》中充分讨论。
1021a 30
关系者不是单纯与它物相关者,而是凭其思或知识本身指向或被指向它物者。所以可思者不是相对于思的关系者,因为可思者只是与思相关的一物,却根本未被规定为一个什么。因此,可思者无助于认识思是什么,并不真正是“它物”,因为它限在这个圆圈内。
1021b 1
某物具关系性,也可因拥有它者具关系性,如大之所以相对,是因为大者相对。
1022a 10
终点是界限,不是起点。但对某些东西,很可能两者皆是:如线有两个端点。本原总是界限,界限却不总是本原。
1022b 20
本体性是属性吗?亚里士多德似乎在说,虽然有些属性偶属性,有些内在,所有属性都依赖运动。但若一切属性都可变或已变,如何会有内在属性?唯一可能解释似是:有属性让一物可被改变,有些变化非本质,有些会毁灭。如从山移除大,从可见物移除色彩。但本体或本体性严格在特殊事物中(尽管其自身是否共相仍不清),属性却总普遍,所以一切在属性空间中运动;属性可离开事物,事物仍是一物,尽管未必还是原物。而且属性总是相反者,本体性有无相反者却不清楚。运动总通过并在事物中受规制,所以改变的属性也被事物掌管。内在属性必随本体性,却非本体性自身:如水必可分,但可分者不是水。又如三角形在其本体性中,即从最初显现与揭示起,就是三边图形,只能如此产出;其内角和为两直角,只从此定义推出。因此,本体性是严格起点。
1022b 30
缺乏指没有自然应有之物,即便这一特定事物自然并不应有。如可说植物缺乏眼睛。有眼睛是自然的,尽管对植物不自然。
1023a 10
具有的一义是依某物自身自然或冲动持守它物。阻止某物依自身冲动运动或活动者,也被说成把持它。
1023a 30
材料可对应属与种,如可熔者以水为材料,雕像却以青铜为材料。形式是目的。它是一种终点吗?是所为之故吗?
1023b 1
复合独立事物由可感材料构成,形式却由可理解材料构成。
1023b 30
整体可意为没有缺少任何一旦缺少就使事物失去其自然的部分者,或包含众多并使之成一物者。首义更严格,强调完美;次义更宽,可有两种方式:每部分各是一,被整体包容,如特殊者被共相包容;或每部分组成连续的一,自身不再是分离的一。前者更像集合,后者更像有机汇聚。
1024a 1
位置无关紧要的量称“全部”,位置有影响的量称整体。既全部又整体者容许两种条件,如蜡是全部,因为总可变,位置无关;又是整体,因为总会停止,静止时位置有差别。
1024a 20
一不是残缺的二,但少一条腿的人是残缺的人。位置无关紧要者都不可能残缺,例如水火不能残缺。一物只有连续、由不同部分构成,且不可恢复地缺少一个既非关键到足以彻底改变本体性、又非太不重要的部分,才可残缺。
1024b 1
种类有三义:同一形式的连续生成(此义种类总属某材料)、同一形式的首位祖先,或材料(因为属也被视为材料)。
1024b 20
事物被称假,或因非其显现所是,或因根本不存在。
1024b 30
亚里士多德称简单陈述总真,唯有不能合在一起时,才成一个假的东西。
1025a 10
诡辩者或许胜于无知者,因为有意欺骗,实际有知;但另一义上,他在道德品格上更坏,因为自愿做错事。
8
1025b 3
人探究特定类别的存在者,而非存在之为存在本身。
1025b 10
他们忙于假设,只指向存在首义,却不澄清。
1025b 20
人工制品就被当作人工制品而言,是被生产的,其运动本原在生产者中。
1026a 1
观照之思有两种:思自然事物,思无材料事物。所以自然科学家也必须关注灵魂就其无材料而言。
1026a 10
第一观照研究关乎既分离又不动者。
1026a 30
首要神学研究在其为第一的意义上普遍。所以它不是公分母,而是神圣最高者。
1026b 20
诡辩关乎偶属性者。偶属性者近于非存在。偶属性之物不生成,而附着于真正生成者,自身无存在。但若偶属性之物不生成,又如何显现?
1026b 30
因为有大多数情况下成立的因与本原,也就有偶属性者。
1027a 30
显然有些本原与因来去,却不生成或消逝,否则一切皆必然。每个发生的东西确实在任一特定时间有其特定原因,总可往回追溯。每个时刻,偶发由其在先原因锚定于必然。这条因链总可追溯到最初起点。但只要有偶发与偶然,必然所规定的就仅是事物偶然如此的方式;所以判断最初起源是否实际来自材料时,应谨慎。
1027b 20
真的存在是协调的组合,假的非存在则是分离为更简单的存在者。但对这些矛盾者的肯定与否定是思的主题,与存在自身是另一回事。真与假自身在思中,而非存在主导意义上的单纯存在。因此,偶属性者因其原因不确定,真的(或假的)存在因其原因在思中,现应暂且搁置,此刻仅探究简单存在。因为两者都关涉存在首义,不揭示其外任何东西,故是派生的。
9
1029b 13
即便白必在表面中,白仍异于表面,若可定义就须独立于表面定义。悖论是:白属于表面,所以白性自身须独立于表面定义,却又必须包含表面。而白与表面相加当然不能定义白性,因为白性已在其中。唯有尚未包含所问之物的表述,才可给出其定义。
1029b 30
定义既不可含太多不必要者,也不可太少而遗漏必要者。
1030a 10
唯有陈述表述某首要事物时才有定义,这类事物皆非通过把一物赋予另一物来表述者。
1030a 10
一个属的种似是唯一有定义者,因为它不被其它任何东西共享,也不赋予它物。
1030b 1
唯有一组词将某物意指为单纯的一,即一个这个,才是定义。
1030b 20
对凭自身属于它物的属性,如雌性属于动物、白性属于表面、相等属于量,它们没有独立事物那样的定义。这里相加似不指词相加,而指独立事物相加,每个独立事物自身内部已定义。但亚里士多德如何构想这种独立、内部的定义,仍不清楚。只能说,每个属性作为属性必须属于一物;而一物即使定义中总含多个词,仍是一个这个。
1030b 30
若属性内在地指向所归属事物,则加到该物上时,其中已有的意义会说两次。所以若属性有其“为存在而所是”,同一物中就有一物,结果是无限倒退。因此不只属性没有首要存在,一物加上属性也没有首要存在。若如此加上的属性有内在存在,会如前发生无限倒退;若没有,就与只表述事物自身无别。
亚里士多德似想说:若属性有本体性,其全部内容也将事物化。但属性内在属于一物,后果便是一物在另一物中在场,这荒谬。独立事物虽在定义中指向它物,却不将它们指作他者,而指作聚入自己所有者。如数被定义为如此这般,但所有如此这般都属于它,反之不然。定义似是事物去蔽,属性定义却只能是去蔽之去蔽。诸词相加只有被一个这个(tode ti)聚为一时,才成表述。
1031a 20
偶属性者那里,一物与其存在似应不同。若相同,本体性自身将容许偶属性,作为A就与作为A+B无别。若说这是因考虑偶属性者,把三段论两端的偶属性者等同仍不妥。说苍白者偶然同于有教养者可以,因为有本体性的基底;但若本体性自身可变,就无任何底层同一。因此应区分本体性与一切偶属性。
1031a 30
某些独立事物能否是某物“为存在而所是”,是个问题。
1031b 1
某些内在存在必是本体性;否则作为善会异于善,作为存在会异于存在。如此无限倒退,知识不可能。
1031b 10
分有异于奠基:底层者在其承托之物中在场,共享者却异于且超出独立事物。按某些人,或某版本的柏拉图,形式不生成,只供已有事物分有。但对亚里士多德,形式作为本体性必须把事物生成为特殊者(实例化)。仅供分有者无现实、特殊存在;若有,就有不可共享而首先为自身者;但若非特殊事物,事物自身又与本体性脱离。所以亚里士多德唯一解法是让形式生成自己的特殊者。
1032a 1
此生成论的进一步后果:对非偶属性事物,某物是什么(形式)与某物为存在而所是(因)应同一;若不同,因会有自己的形式,否则无差别,而这形式又有不同原因,以至无限。
1032a 10
人可能因将事物视为偶属性而提出本体性问题,也可能因将事物视为本体性的必然实例而解决同一问题。
1032a 20
自然存在者起源于自然,从作为材料的自然出来,进入作为形式的自然;而其由之作用而生成者,是另一物中相同的形式。
1032b 1
产品或人工制品以灵魂中无材料的形式为起源。甚至相反事物某意义上也有同一形式,因为只是同一形式的缺席与在场。
1032b 10
生成过程及其运动中,称为思的部分从本原与形式开始,称为制作的部分从思完成处开始。
1032b 30
显然,一个产品要生成,其某部分已在场。
1033a 1
但如材料这样的在先部分,包含在事物表述中吗?有时包含,如青铜球。但须谨慎:材料以变化形式被包含(“木制的”而非“木”),其原形式以类似后来生成之物的缺失的方式被处理。因为缺失或类似缺失者并非真正材料,事物最主要从缺失出来,意为来到其外;但事物从材料出来时仍保留材料。
1033a 30
生成者通过某物作用发生,即其生成本原由之而来者。也有一个“由某物”(变化意义上的材料)及所变成的某物。“由某物”与所成为的形式都不被制作;仅材料与形式统一其中的偶属性事物被产出。若形式自身被产出,就从某物产出,这将包含另一底层事物。此底层者不能是感性材料,因为青铜球来自青铜,但球自身在灵魂中,不能由青铜产出。若球被产出,又必须从某物产出。这只能是理智材料,而理智材料自身是形式。所以形式从形式产出,理智材料自身又需被产出,以至无限。
1033b 1
所以形式及某物为存在而所是,自身不生成。
1033b 10
凡生成者都是材料与形式的复合,形式被放入材料。
1033b 20
这里亚里士多德似说,没有形式是独立事物,每个都是普遍种类。所以事物由之生成的材料是一个这个,生成之物是这种这个。每个这个都有这种,正如每个特殊者有一般类别。自然事物中,连生育者也是同类事物,而非形式自身,所以形式更不独立、更像普遍者。事物因材料而不同,形式相同。这似异于此前“形式不只是共相”的说法。但若考虑形式的依赖性以限定方式言说,且他实际强调普遍形式必须有特殊者、总参与自身实例化,就不成问题。
1034a 10
有些东西既可由自然也可由技艺生成,因为使生成可能的材料具有如下性质:能自行或由他者开始运动,并能以特定方式被推动。
1034b 1
自然事物与技艺事物间的平行。
1034b 10
若独立事物需生成,制作它的另一独立事物必须预先充分活动且在场。但对某个多少,无须另一事物,只需能潜在接受两者的一物。
1034b 20
定义是有部分的表述,整体表述是否必含部分的表述?
1035a 1
材料是复合物的部分,却非形式部分。形式部分是构成形式之表述的部分。
1035a 30
材料部分是有这些部分的事物消逝所进入的本原。但形式无材料,不消逝。
1035b 10
形式表述中,有些部分比整体更首要。因此不能说锐角是直角的划分,而应说直角是锐角表述所含部分。感性上,手指是身体部分;理智上,身体表述是手指表述的部分。所以整体可为最首要部分。
1035b 20
对复合物,其本体性与形式或其中某部分,比复合整体更首要。材料与身体部分(身体分解成这些部分如分解成材料)某意义上可比复合物首要,另一意义上却不然,因为无法离开整体而仍是其所是,即承受形式的材料。本体性首先所在的某些身体部分,与整体同样首要。
1035b 30
最终材料与一般材料的区分。最终材料呈现特殊者。
1036a 10
可感者中在不作为可感者考虑时所呈现的数学事物,是可理解材料。
1036b 1
即便未见一物分离,也不意味它不分离。
1036b 10
困局是,如何确定被当作形式者真是形式?因为形式可能就像材料。难道不能有形式之形式,形式难道不能像材料?但那样一切将是一。
1037a 1
普遍圆的表述不含任何部分,因为形式自身作为自身、以及某物为存在而所是,都无材料。但有些不可感事物也含理智材料。这里部分被等同材料吗?我不认为如此。因为圆的部分已被认作(不)可感且可分的弧段。这些不含于圆表述,是因为表述普遍。特殊表述可以有材料。
1037a 10
若苏格拉底是其灵魂之名,就有两义,因为有人也用此名意指复合物;但若苏格拉底仅指复合物,特殊者就被还原为共相,因为苏格拉底的本体性只是共相。
复合物的表述含材料与形式部分,形式却只有形式部分的表述。目前,本体性或形式主要似是共相,材料是特殊者。共相必生成其特殊者,但因此不可与特殊者分离。本体性既主要是共相,若共相不生成特殊者,一切首先都会相同:这关乎苏格拉底与作为苏格拉底的差别。
1037b 1
凡有另一物作为材料承托者都不能首要,其本体性不能与自身等同,因为有材料者某意义上不确定,因而远离简单存在,总涉及非存在。这不包括与其它形式相关的任何形式或属性。
1037b 20
属与种差不同,定义如何为一?差异是相反者,一般类别不能同时分有相反者;即使一般类别确实分有那些种差,问题仍在,因为差异多、类别一。
1083a 1
先考虑划分式定义。若属如材料,种差显然如形式,定义便是由种差组成的表述。但通常仅完成陈述的那个差异就够。
1038a 30
一旦抵达最后陈述,划分式定义中就无秩序或先后。
1038b 10
共相不可能是本体性。
1038b 20
独立事物表述的任一部分自身只能是独立事物,因为属性不比独立事物更首要。但若假设共相是独立事物,就有其表述。即使此表述未普遍到包含本体性的一切,仍是某物本体性。但它会是独立事物的本体性,于是有本体性的本体性,荒谬。更且,共相在事物中在场,就会是独立事物中的独立事物,同样荒谬,却方向不同:前一荒谬来自特殊者属于共相,后一来自共相在特殊者中在场。
1038b 30
总之,若共相是独立事物,就不会有特殊者,只有种类。
1039a 10
独立事物的部分虽自身只能是独立事物,却不能现实地如此,而必须潜在地如此。
1039a 20
现在困局是,似乎什么都无定义,因为没有把部分作为独立事物的表述。
1039a 30
若动物是所有种的同一共相,且是所有种的构成事物,它竟是一且同一,便荒谬。但若每种有不同动物,也荒谬。因为每种会无限,外在于过去被称作动物的一切,动物自身也成多物。进一步,人由形式组成,其中之一是动物,而种中所含动物会是该种的本体性;动物不可能是此者的形式又是彼者的本体性,每种遂有自己的动物。但以自身之外的动物为本体性者,如何自身又是动物?
1040a 1
可感事物没有定义或表述,也无知识,只有意见。
1040a 20
若声称部分在整体中属于一,分离时属于多,也应说部分在整体中彼此相属,因此也属多。且部分比复合物更首要,若复合物与其余事物分离且独立,部分应更如此。否则无物分离或独立。
1040a 30
形式显然也必须被众多共享,定义任何部分都不应只属于一者。因为形式通过许多特殊者被认识。对太阳等唯一事物给出的定义也显示同一点:人添入许多东西,仿佛取走它们太阳就不再是自身,但太阳应是独立事物,始终留存;定义也蕴涵,若出现另一同类事物,它也会是太阳,但这又不可能,因为太阳唯一且一。所以凡一者,不论是否永恒,都有如何由众多东西定义的困局。
1040b 10
因此显然,大多数看似独立事物者,只是潜能,或仅潜在地如此。
1040b 20
一性与存在虽近本体性,却不可能是本体性。因为本体性不是可共享者,而严格是一。本体性与一者为一;本体性数量上一时,全部特殊事物(及其潜在本体性)数量上一;两种情况中,本体性都严格与其所是者或部分为一且同一,不可能是共同特征。因此,本体性更像统一,而非集合。
10
1042a 10
独立事物的本原是什么,独立事物是什么?这是第一问题。随后本体性被认作本原,但本体性有多义。它被视为普遍类别。又因本体性有其表述,便讨论定义种类与凭自身的事物。定义讨论为内在存在讨论作准备,因为唯有表述才把定义揭示为具有不同部分的整体,也唯在此必须区分内在与偶属性存在,确定本质表述中哪些部分不可遗漏。但定义若有部分,如何调和一与多的矛盾?结果发现,共相或一般类别不是本体性。
1042a 20
有些人称数学事物与形式有脱离可感事物的存在,所以它们是本体性的候选者。
1042a 30
材料现实上非一个这个,潜在上却是。形式现实上是一个这个,且作为这个,与其表述分离。这是两种底层事物。第三种由二者组成。
1042b 1
任何变化都伴随本体性变化,反之不然。
1042a 30
独立事物中,有些直接分离,因为表述涉及材料,遂有特殊性。但某些表述,如被定义的形式,不能直接与它物分离,否则产生困难与悖论。因此可说,形式分离比材料分离更难描述,因为材料分离伴随感知,无须进一步说明。
1043a 1
作为种差赋予材料者,自身就是其在活动中存在。材料虽作为潜能存在,某意义上仍揭示现实存在。这合理,因为不同事物有不同潜能,不同材料有不同活动与表述方式,如水可凝结、声音可混合、木可塑形。
1043b 1
一个名称可意味不同事物、本体性有不同意义,这不影响探究,因为已显然只有形式这一种本体性意义首要。其它意义只是指向它。
1043b 10
不能说房屋是砖加秩序或组合,因为组合不是可加上的事物。事物处于秩序中。秩序不是构成者,而是原因。这个叫秩序的东西或许就是本体性自身;它或永恒,或可毁灭,但不是经历毁灭过程,而是可以瞬间生成消逝,无运动过程,因为它不能是复合物,必须整体来去,否则又需另一秩序施于它。而这秩序似不真正是形式,因为形式永恒不生成,但这个由形式与材料混合而制作。
1043b 20
所以此秩序是可毁灭复合物的这个,但它自身是否与复合物分离不清;某些东西显然不分离,如房屋家具,因为特殊者不在,它们就不在。人不可能在此前无人时存在,所以某特殊者不在时,仍有那排序;而制作一栋房屋前,无须曾制作过房屋(即其排序无须在制作前存在,尽管房屋形式当然先于制作),秩序只在第一栋房屋制成后生成。或许这些人工制品自身并非真正独立事物?
1043b 30
有人称定义必含材料,因为必须是某物赋予某物,因此不能有仅由理智事物构成的本体性。但此说错在误解材料,未见也有理智材料。如两足动物,动物是两足形式作用的材料,此材料就是被在活动中保持自身所统治、穷尽的潜能。但真如此没有问题吗?
1044a 1
所以说数是事物定义者显然失准,因为未交代将单位排序为整体的额外东西,遂错过定义与本体性。尽管一物某意义上是数,因为其表述有限,可分为不可分部分,增减任何东西都会使它不同。本体性为一不是单位或点那样的一,而是完整的在活动中保持自身,是特殊自然。
1044b 10
对天体等永恒自然事物,或自然却不独立之物,没有质料因,至少不是我们所意指的方式。
1044b 20
某些东西,尤其形式,可以是或不是,而不生成消逝,所以相反者以不同方式相互产生。苍白者可直接从黝黑者生成,但白只可间接说从黑来,即黑的事物变白。
1044b 30
材料关联相反者,但如何?材料潜在是两者,还是潜在是一者、其相反是违反自然的剥夺?已成形者能成为另一物材料吗?还是材料自身有变成一物的潜能,成形物又有变成另一物的潜能?如身体自身有腐坏潜能,而动物自身有不同潜能?任何东西要变,必须先变回材料,所以动物回到尸体(尸体不是动物产出的目的或完成,而是动物返回的本原),再从尸体成为动物。
1045a 30
将表述部分视为理智材料、整体作为这个视为形式,困局就解决。既有形式与材料的二元性,再寻找统一两者的东西就不成问题。对生成者,制作者之外,唯一负责使事物现实是自身者,就是本体性;形式就是其为存在而所是。因此形式在活动,复合物遂被赋形,生成并保持自身。无此二元性,若全是形式或全是材料,就根本无物。
1045b 1
但某些东西连理智材料也没有,直接为一。如有些存在者、这个、这种、多少、或某物为存在而所是,是特殊的一。这些无定义,只是存在。
1045b 20
最高层材料与形式是同一物。因此此前二元论某义上消除,另一义上未消除。消除在于材料作为材料是非存在的潜能,只受形式统治,所以这是避免不同形式全在一起的规避策略;未消除在于材料必须仍非形式、异于形式,所以形式内部似有某些更高形式,又可与理智材料分离。这无损说明,因为亚里士多德只是试图解决定义如何可能由部分构成的困局。因此,某义上,材料在形式中穷尽,形式在材料中时便与潜能为一;另一义上,被穷尽材料仍是材料,形式不可穷尽且总生成,所以最高形式分离、纯粹,因而不可定义。这分离似无问题(真的吗?),因为材料总接受形式,与形式为一。
因此,对复合物,本体性作为其存在之因,是材料部分的排序,此秩序也是形式。所以形式本质上与事物为一,方式同本体性与事物为一。本体性要统治材料,必须在活动中保持自身。形式内部有同样的形式—材料二元结构,但那里材料被穷尽,事物真正永恒、独立。而且每个形式都可转为某种材料,如动物性是形式、理性是材料,或理性是形式、动物性是材料。因此理智中总有形式—材料二元性的极性。但还有更高者,不只看似无材料,而真完全无材料。即便有理智材料的事物,也可能有使它们从潜能进入现实存在的原因,因为一切依据本原而变。形式既可为材料又可为形式,就必须有主动本原激活并赋形于形式,因而是形式之形式。这是神圣努斯(nous)。所以有层级:神圣努斯 -> 主动形式 -> 复合形式(-> 材料形式)-> 复合事物 -> 材料。
11
1046a 10
潜能首先是在它物中、或同物作为它者时的变化本原。
1046a 20
某义上,作用与被作用的潜能是一,因为不可分离;另一义上非一,因为被动潜能在一物,主动潜能在另一物。
1046a 30
就某物是自然整体而言,不能被自身作用,因为没有他者。每个潜能都与同一物对于同一事物的无能相反。
1046b 1
有些潜能理性,有些非理性。一切含理性的潜能自身能产出相反结果,非理性潜能则各仅一果。因为理性说明总经剥夺揭示一物及其相反;理性总同时汇集事物,尽管只有一物正属于说明,其相反者偶属性;而一物中两相反者不能同时在场。因此理性潜能中有反力,非理性潜能中仅有无力或力的耗尽。若一物热,不能既热又冷,只能加热;但理性说明同时揭示健康与疾病,能造成任一。
1046b 20
相反事物包含于一个本原,即理性说明。
1047a 20
有能力者,是若其被说成具有潜能的那种在活动中存在恰好在场,就绝不会无能者。即某物现实在场,就一定不是不能在场;但不意味着唯有现实在场才有此能力。
1047a 30
在活动中存在,首要意义似与在活动中保持完满汇合。它也用于运动。因此在运动中存在被说成属于有现实存在者,因为它接近在活动中保持完满:运动者有活动,某方式分享完整存在。运动者尽管不完整,仍很大程度上保持确定事物,或至少从一个确定事物变为另一个;完成是在活动中保持自身,潜能由此穷尽;不完整运动者却是在活动中存在,同时容纳潜能,潜能又容许另一活动与原活动摩擦。因此只关注能运动之物时,可见其材料被A赋形又被B赋形,事物自身不作为A保持自身,而现实地成为它者,B是什么、有多少B都不清楚。因此,在活动中存在是统治的形式在难驯材料中彼此相争;在活动中保持自身却是一个统治形式及其被统治材料。作为运动的在活动中存在,只是保持自身之活动的派生意义。
1047b 10
有人称不会发生者也可可能,意为无事不可能。但这来自错误假设:若非事实者可可能,一切便可能。虚假不同于不可能。
1047b 20
若B成立时A必成立,则B可能时A必可能。但这也意味,若B可能时A必可能,则B成立时A必成立;因为前者意味着A与B同时、同方式可能,所以各自实现也应同时、同方式;即一者不再仅可能时,另一者也应不再仅可能,因为潜能由其现实化定义。潜能必然相伴,现实化也必然相伴。所以说能画好者必能看好,意思是他实际画好时,也应看好。
1048a 1
有些潜能天生,有些要求先前活动。
1048a 10
理性潜能内在于灵魂,或作为有其理智材料、能作用或不作用于它物的知识体。但潜能不只是作用或不作用,而是以相反方式作用。所以同一物作为整体不可分的知识,必有相反潜能。但这似不可能。因为如前已证,若B可能时A必可能,则B可能时A必成立。非理性潜能并非必然相伴,只偶然相伴。热者只能偶然使它物冷却,即它物更热时;黑者能变白变黑,不是就它黑,而是作为有色物先变白再变黑。因此有潜能者只能在不同于现在的意义上成为其它,而不能在成为任意东西、如相反者的意义上如此。但医学知识似必既能治愈又能下毒,治愈与下毒便应必然共在。但这不可能。于是引入选择与欲望,使二者之一更正当、更有权威。
若潜能是材料,形式总是现实存在,如何有作用潜能?被作用潜能易懂,因为材料让事物可以不同、被它物赋形。但作用潜能更难。说一个复合物:若材料容许不同赋形,它有被动潜能;若能赋形它物,则有主动潜能。它处在潜能中,因为赋形活动受材料抑制,材料总可不同,赋形永不完整。但一旦储存该活动的原材料被完全征服,赋形活动就开始渗透其它材料,因为材料连续。因此,材料不再不同之时,复合物有主动潜能。医生的全部材料受作用并开始作用于它物时,便有主动潜能。形式自身无潜能,只有复合物有,正如材料自身不变化,也无变化潜能。
1048a 10
某物主要欲求什么,只要其能力所及者在场、且它接近被动对象,就会做什么。如欲求学习者,一有能力就学,且学适于欲求者。所以某物仅作为欲望有潜能;欲望在其对象以一定条件在场、其自身也以一定方式受条件规定时在场。无欲望,就无任何行动能力,因为解除抑制在这些条件中,建立条件便移除障碍。
1048a 20
因此即便希望或欲求同时做两事,也不可能,因为在场对象处于某些条件而非其它条件。
1048a 30
既已考察运动意义的潜能,应转向另一意义,关联在活动中存在的另一意义。如今潜能不是动或被动的潜能,而是是或不是的潜能。
1048b 1
无须定义一切,也可通过类比一眼看出。在活动中存在的不同意义,对潜能的不同意义有同一关系,但自身并不相像。有些如本体性对材料(简单的在活动中保持自身),有些如运动对潜能。
1048b 10
但潜能另有一义。有些潜能让某物单纯存在,有些东西却永不能单纯存在。即某物可完全被带出潜能,某物却永不能完全带出,总涉及非存在,如无限。无限潜在,不是说它某时可实现为分离存在(或许纯思中除外),而是始终保存为潜能。
1048b 30
终于区分在活动中存在与运动。在活动中存在是目的在其内在场的行动,如人幸福,同时处于已幸福的状态;或人生活,同时处于已生活的状态。目的不在自身内的行动都是不完整行动。完整行动若自行存在,就是自身界限,此意义上也无限定。
1049a 10
若不受它物抑制,一物可从潜能进入活动。如思中的一物是欲望,只在无物阻止时实现。但前面已处理此问题。新问题是,连潜能自身也是先前活动的结果。因此,潜在房屋之为潜在房屋,是若无其它东西阻止它潜在为房屋。所以解除抑制不仅让潜能变活动,也让潜能首先存在。解除抑制的本原可外可内,正如抑制也可如此。
1049a 20
箱子潜在于青铜,青铜潜在于土,土潜在于气,气潜在于火。所以某物要存在,构成它的潜能或材料必须先被制作、准备。也许有第一材料。
1049a 30
底层事物只在此义不同:它是一个这个,还是一个一。
1049b 1
不是这个的底层者,是材料或属性,是何种。它们不确定(真的吗?何种意义?我看来纯粹此性某意义上甚至更不确定,尽管对亚里士多德,一个这个似乎从非裸此性)。
这与现代或后现代思维的材料构想很不同。材料作为实例化基础,仅因它普遍、因而众多,唯形式是一性的源头。因此一物为一由于形式,但并非唯一,因为有种类、因而普遍,所以形式必须在普遍种类上重新生成自身。这只发生于材料未穷尽的偶属性复合存在。但如此重新生成的形式会有许多自身副本,自身也普遍,被它物用作材料。所以这极性总在运作,直至抵达一切活动的终极本原:神圣努斯。
1050a 30
若运用某潜能在终点生成它物,如建造终点的房屋,则在最终产物中,活动更像目的。其它活动若除自身外别无目的,则自身作为目的在场。
1050b 1
现在清楚,本体性与形式是在活动中存在。
1050b 20
永恒运动是天的圆周运动,其中终点与起点统一,不再矛盾。所以某义上,这运动无材料。
1050b 30
经历变化者模仿不可毁灭者。知识与运动都容许矛盾者,因为是潜能;若如此,且有其形式,就会有作为运动之活动存在的某物,比运动自身更运动,也会有比知识自身更有知者。
1051a 20
选择时,对立事物之一的现实活动总胜于两者的潜在存在,另一者的现实存在则更差。
1051a 30
似乎唯有潜能中的一物被发现,它才在潜能中;遮蔽者被揭示为遮蔽。这揭示似是先前的在活动中存在。
1051b 10
真理作为去蔽的原初意义。有些东西总结合且一,因而存在;另一些总分离且多,因而不存在;还有些有结合与分离两种潜能,所以不同场合可真可假。但关于首要、虽复合事物的陈述,只能总真或总假。真假是思的范畴,思依赖事物。这些是对复合物的规定。
1051b 20
对简单首要者,它们或直接存在而无须结合,或不存在而无须分离。所以其真假在于肯定与否定。但对这些事物,虚假实不可能,人不会受骗,只因未触及而无知。因此没有虚假,而有作为无知的不真。
12
1052b 1
一性有四义:连续、整体、特殊、普遍。连续者若凭自身连续就是整体,若运动一且不可分则更如此。思中不可分者可数量上一,也可形式上一;形式上一是共相,数量上一是特殊者。负责独立事物一性者,是首义的一:这意味共相是首义吗?
1052b 10
须区分名称是什么与名称用于哪些东西。那些事物可能更近名称的意义,这另一物却更近名称自身。因此一性之名是不可分与整体性,或成为这个,或位置、形式、思上的分离;尤其是每类事物的首要尺度,最主导意义上是有量事物这一类的尺度。
1052b 20
一性是数之为数的本原。
1052b 30
尺度或本原一且不可分。但这不循环吗:尺度是一,一是尺度?只有把尺度与一性当作不同、分离之物时,才循环。
1053a 1
这似表明湿、干等质也能用量衡量。似不矛盾于《范畴篇》(还是矛盾?),因为那里质容许较多较少;但这多寡由量刻画吗?质如何有共同且不可分的尺度?
1052a 20
一物可有不同尺度。尺度以不同方式不可分,如米被当作不可分,单位却实际不可分。
1053b 1
知者与感知者是事物尺度,但仅在此意义:如通过外面某尺测量而认识自身多高,知识先被外面事物衡量,才被用作尺度。显然,量是一性的更主导意义,其次是种类。一者单纯不可分,或被当作不可分。
1053b 20
存在与一性不能是一般类别,因为以最普遍方式赋予事物,且要求自身外的东西生成差异;但它们也不能是与其余事物分离的独立事物。
1053b 30
一性所真也以类似方式对一切成立(每物自身是某种一性),且一性有多义,所以只说一性自身是其自然还不够,必须探究一切事物与方式,发现一性一般意味什么。
1054a 10
正如颜色类的一性属于特定颜色,如白性;一组事物的本原是一个特定独立事物;显然存在与一性赋予事物,却非事物自身。所以一性与存在只是面向一切事物,作为谓词加到一物上时,不增加意义。
1054a 20
一与多是相反者,不是矛盾者。但若非矛盾,就容许中间物。一与多之间是什么?是数或大小本身吗?
1054b 20
一与多非矛盾者,所以不能因一性意为存在,就把一性用于存在者、多性用于非存在者。两者都用于存在者。
1054b 30
差异与他异不同。他异是一般刻画方式,任何东西都异于或同于其它任何东西;差异却有底层同一的特定结构。当然,某方面他异者在另一方面相同,且它们是形成连续体的相反者,如黑白。但差异专门被结构化为由同一物承托。黑物与白物互为他者,却仅当同属一个一般类别才不同。黑物不由白性承托,所以同样意义上,他者不由同一性承托。
1055a 10
相反性是完全差异。
1055a 20
一物只能与另一物相反。因为一极端不可能比自身更极端,一个间隔也不可能有两个以上端点。
1055a 30
差异最大者为相反者,因为不同属者不差异,同属者,如力量、事物、状态条件,作为相反者差异最大。
1055b 10
剥夺是某种矛盾,但可说事物自身被剥夺,也可说材料被剥夺。热性完全缺乏冷性,热物却仅有限地缺冷。所以剥夺在某些情况容许中间,矛盾不容。矛盾更首要,因为任何东西不是A就是非A,但未必不是A就是B,除非有接受A/B连续体的材料。因此一切不是白就是非白,但唯能白者,即有色物,才可黑。也非每种剥夺都是相反,因为剥夺可涉及本体性自身,而相反性在本体性赋形的材料中在场。白黑相反,黑是白性剥夺;但本体性剥夺是剥夺,却非相反,因为剥夺一种本体性会成另一事物,而非同一连续体另一端(它不能是简单非存在)。狗是猫性的剥夺,却非猫的相反。所以剥夺可指矛盾,也可指相反。
1055b 20
这里亚里士多德转用较不严格的相反性用法。但实质意思相同:某些“相反性”是只有特定特殊者被剥夺的剥夺,有些却是整个事物的剥夺。两者皆剥夺,却非都容中间。所以相反性的剥夺可意味矛盾者、极端或相反者。这些例子来自词语不严格的日常用法。
1056a 1
一如何对立于多?相等如何对立于大小?相等既非只对立于二元之一,也非分别对立于两者,因为一个相反者不能对立于两个不同相反者。
1056a 20
相等似是大小之间的中间。中间者不能作为完全相反者与两端对立。
1056a 30
因此相等只能作为对二元的共同否定,与其对立。中间者可作为非两端中任一者,与两端对立。但这剥夺不是剥夺一物本体性,而出现在自然上有某种中间与间隔的事物中。这种剥夺在《尼各马可伦理学》中最重要。
1056b 20
表述一与多关系有许多严格或不严格结构。第一,一—少(不足)—等—多(过度),这里一多是极端。第二,一(少)—多(众),这里是关系项。第三,严格的一—多,每个数都是由一衡量的数多;少在此非不足,而是接近本原。若再走一步,连接近也可取消,一多遂成矛盾而非相反。但如前已论证,不能走这一步。
1057a 1
亚里士多德似说,一与多像关系项那样对立。一相对二少,二相对三少,等等。但连续体不可无限延续,因为一不只比二少,也不可分。所以其小非相对。但一作为尺度,似与所衡量者相关,因而在知识关联所知物的另一意义上是关系项。但又须谨慎,知识自身被事物衡量,在此义上相对,一却不要求另一个尺度。因此,一与多仅某程度上像关系项那样对立,其对立更多保留相反性意义。
1057a 10
因此,一多被看作不可分与可分时,是相反者。不难看出,一如何像连续体中那样较多或较少地不可分:事物可更协调连续,也可更少如此、更可分离。一就是绝对不可分,更大数多则是更可划分者(被看作一个数多)。但亚里士多德这里似未区分不可分与未被分。或若一仅被视为某物尺度,一多可作为关系项对立。即一不与多分离,而作为尺度与多共同处理。一可内在地与多分离,因为是绝对尺度;但只要是尺度,就应与被衡量物放在一起,因而相关。
第二义的关系项不是矛盾者。矛盾者不处于任何关系,其唯一关系是无关系或偶属性关系。但关系项彼此有必然关系。如尺度只要被视为尺度,就关联被衡量者。猫却不如此关联房屋。
1057a 20
中间物须与两端同一一般类别。否则会先变到该类别之外,因为任何变化先到中间者。但向类别外的变化仅偶属性,如颜色变成形状。所以不可能。
1057b 1
矛盾者间无物。非相反者的关系项之间也无物。
1057b 10
一般类别中有种差,先于由此创造为种的相反者。如黑白是颜色两端,但其差异来自吸收与反射光。因此吸收反射是更在先一类相反者,光是先于颜色的一般类别。这清楚表明,亚里士多德从不把属种分开,而总视为不同层次相互渗透的系统知识体。因此一个一般类别可能是比自身更大的一般类别的映照。也可想象,不同种中不同相反者如何归结为更根本相反性:如冷热、干湿、强弱归为火土。这些相反者由不同相反性的复杂互动产生。
1057b 20
但这构造是层级。差异不能内在于一般类别,须来自外部,所以相反者由在先相反性生成。同属中两相反者的任何中间物,也由在先本原组成,然后才与属复合。否则事物只是未复合者,无差异加于它(动物不能与猫复合,因为猫已是动物与外部差异的复合)。若相反性最终追到那些相反却不同属的终极本原,会怎样?由本原生成的中间物将回溯构成一般类别,把独立本原重构为映照这一对本原的第一相反性。所以第一本原生成第一属,却某方式独立于它;第一中间物属于第一属,却由映照为相反者的第一本原组成。较低种类随之生成。因此第一本原仅在限定意义上是第一相反者。这似是调和一切困难主张的唯一方式。中间物不由本原组成,因为本原不是同类相反者,尽管确为在先相反者。所以最后陈述读作:“一切中间物与相反者同属一个一般类别,位于相反者之间,且全由这些相反者组成。”可理解为:本原不作为构成性相反者被包含,而是在先、短暂的原初根据上的相反者。其产物是独立事物,只能回溯地同属一个一般类别(但此类别禁止变化),其中只出现本原的映照。
另一解读是,“不同一般类别的相反者”实际上仅指作为成对者的相反者。因此没有在先一对相反者,它们就是同类中最初者。但仍需解决差异如何能在属内部。所以此解读似较不可靠。
为什么没有内在差异?因为一物若一,内部便同一,无力生成任何差异,否则就非一且同一。所以一切差异化都必从外部生成。
1058a 1
属是两物相同者,在每物中有非偶属性种差。所以不只是马与人都是动物,而必须在种差中是动物。因此差异与属似必相互依赖。
1058a 10
差异是属于一个属的他异。
1058a 20
种上的他异,是同属中不可分的相反者。可分则容许相反的中间物,而非不同种。
1058a 20
种既不同于属,也不与属相同,尽管问种是否他异于属似有意义。事物在属上异于它物,也不是相反性意义的不同,因为相反者仅在同属中存在。但这可另作解释。
1058b 1
试图解决为何某些差异比另一些首要的困局。可能有些差异更符合属的自然、更本质;也可能有些更关表述,有些更关材料。
1058b 10
但材料差异有时难道不极重要?
1058b 30
此前主张被推翻:现在需考虑属层面的相反与对立。哪里找到不同属事物的中间?可毁灭与不可毁灭属此类,因为必然属于事物。一物不能偶然可毁灭或不可毁灭,也不能从不可毁灭变成可毁灭。我认为可分与不可分也应属此类。若如此,如何重新区分矛盾与相反?
一种可能解法来自这些陈述。首先,事物可在属上不同。这意为不同属底下有某个不可把握的种类。其次,矛盾者被说成无中间物,因为中间物最有可能变化。但若有些中间物不变呢?不可毁灭与可毁灭者便是相反而非矛盾,因为有中间物;但属于特殊种类,中间物不在此谱段上变化。独立本原也在此义上相反:虽不属同一一般类别,仍构成第一一般类别,属于原初同一,在特定意义上相反。1058a 20也无须舍弃。原句:“种上不同事物的差异必为相反性,而这只属于同属事物。”若把此处这理解为指差异而非相反性,便意为种差必在同属中,相反性却不必。因此第一本原完全可以是一对相反者。
13
整卷K是简明综述。
1059a 20
一种知识关乎相反者。但本原不是相反者。这是撤回前说,还是早已内在于此前思想?
1059b 20
数学事物的材料。
1059b 30
种与一般类别似都要求作为终极本原的权威。
1061a 10
一切差异可追到第一差异或第一相反者。第一相反者又某方式在存在内部。说一性或存在没有差别,因为即使两者不相同,也可互换。
1061a 30
理念还原。
1061b 10
辩证法与诡辩关乎属性,而非存在者自身。
1061b 20
哲学不挑选带有所欲属性的某部分存在,而就每部分存在而言研究存在。因此智慧是协调全部部分,把所有特殊知识奠基于其本体论地位。反思每部分存在,就是看它如何嵌入整体,在相对于本原的秩序中居何位置。
1062a 10
无矛盾律没有单纯证明;但可相对于某人,通过反驳证明。
1062b 30
一种错误如下:一切来自存在者;但白显然来自非白;所以非存在者必是存在者。此推理错误,因为非存在者也存在,却潜在地存在。潜在存在异于活动存在,存在中总内在有他异。
1063a 20
这似指向容受者(khora)。
1065a 30
机运是依选择发生之物中的偶属性原因。
1065b 10
运动总相对于并留在其存在范畴。所以材料仅作为材料运动,复合物作为复合物运动,在活动中存在作为在活动中存在运动。因此存在者走出潜能,只意为原不在此材料中的形式如今被接收入材料,而非材料自身变成形式。
1068b 20
运动只属于质、量、位置。一物运动时,本体性不运动;与它物的关系也不运动,至少不内在地运动,因为不能单凭自身改变关系,如比它物大依赖它物保持同一,成为尺度依赖先被衡量;其处于运动或被推动也不运动。质、量、位置变化都是将他异纳入自身的方式(属性入材料,物加于物,彼处之物到此处),但关系变化不能如此,因为那他异已预先规定为未被纳入的他异。关系总被规定为永在外面者,不可纳入。属性却被定义为能被材料接受的东西,因此可纳入。
14
1069b 10
材料必须能在相反者间变化。现实存在的一物从潜在的另一物变化而来。但又说不同范畴之物不相互转变。除非这些东西属于由在活动中存在与潜能共同组成者。
所以复合物从一物变另一物,材料不变形式或事物,形式也不变材料或事物。变化的是事物从一种潜能变为在活动中存在。换言之,变化的是不同形式被排序入材料的方式。
1069b 30
连潜能也某程度上由材料规定。那潜能为何不简单规定为一,而是无限?因为一者是理智;潜能若也一,就直接现实存在。因为一者直接存在。一切会预先确定为一个东西,无可能性。
1070a 1
最终材料与最终形式都不生成。
1070a 10
材料通过进入显现成为这个。材料以接触而非共同长成的方式存在,不与事物长成一体,始终作为他异在场。形式共同长成,如手与心一起生长,成为一个不可分整体的部分。但材料总可分,是加在事物上者,故总可剥去。一物的自然是一个这个,是其所进入的现实状态。第三种是由这些组成的特殊事物。
1070a 20
人工制品似无分离形式(为什么?是因第一房屋之前没有分离的房屋已被制成,所以形式在此处材料之外无分离存在?动物却总在另一材料中有分离形式?),或只有技艺有。但技艺不发明形式。形式不被发明。运动之因先于被动者,但作为理性范型的因与产物同时。
1070a 30
但若范型只在产物在场时在场,有些会在事后仍留下吗?如人不在后,灵魂某部分,如理智,或仍在其写作或说明中在场。因此显然不需要形式存在,因为范型总可从一个特殊者在另一特殊者中重现。
重构论证,似如下:首先,没有与特殊者分离的形式。因为某些存在者此前没有现成形式,即产品;每个产品只在现实持续建构过程中被处理。因此已有无形式的存在者。而且,任何理性范型都不在所有特殊者之外在场,自然存在者也如此。一物要存在,不必已有同形式之物在先,它完全可由偶然、机运或其它推动者造成,范型只在特殊材料中;即便有形式相似的在先者,此谱系最初先例也有只与自身同时的形式。所以这在先仅偶属性。那如何解释似确有相似事物?因为已有者当然可在另一物中复制自身,遂在事后留存,但不必蕴涵共相,因为特殊者可把自身传给另一特殊者,此传承不必是普遍形式。单纯相似就够。
1070b 1
不同事物的因与本原全不同,但依类比说又相同。没有一元素为所有事物共有,因为元素组成者异于元素。若仅一终极本原,差异何来?
1070b 10
因此,元素不能是独立事物或关系事物,仿佛仅凭自身即可生成任一范畴,因为它要求附加外部差异、异类本原;相反,元素必须全属不同种类,才能从不同种类生成不同范畴。
1070b 20
元素也异于本原。元素构成事物,但有外部运动本原生成事物、将形式放入材料。不同事物也有不同推动者。
1070b 30
这里第一推动者被说成将形式置于材料的多上之一的外因。
1071a 1
某义上,分离独立事物更首要,因此是属性、运动等事物共同的原因。首要独立事物似是能自持者。所以灵魂与身体,或理智、欲望、身体,是因。另一义上,在活动中存在与潜能类比地是事物共同本原。这些模式符合此前模式,因为灵魂是形式之形式,身体是材料,欲望是复合物。而在活动中存在也是形式,既分离又复合,潜能是材料。
1071a 10
对不同形式的不同材料,在活动中存在与潜能各不同。应强调:材料让他异进入事物,但非任意他异,只是现有形式的剥夺。推动者似又在形式—材料结构之外。理智—欲望—身体结构中的推动者是什么?欲望吗?
这些结构有何关系?彼此类比吗?单纯相同吗?是重复吗?
1071a 20
特殊事物的本原也特殊。所以种类不同者,本原也种类不同,仅依类比相同。数量不同者,本原也数量不同。
1071a 30
所以一切依类比有同一原因:任何独立事物的四因——形式、剥夺、材料、推动者——也是其它事物的因,因为其它事物依赖独立事物。完全在活动中的事物是一切之因。但一切也有不同原因,与首要相反者一样多。须注意:这些讨论全关乎可感事物。
因此,对可感事物,本原自身似也有实例,或因材料介入。形式将特殊者保持为一,材料却因未穷尽而必然多,将事物生成为多个一;也使形式与本原自身成为特殊者。虽这些特殊者仍可归入更首要本原,实例却不可还原为这些首要本原。因此,特殊者作为特殊者有自己的形式与推动者,依意指方式可同可异。所以本原自身可被当作其所奠基之物:或视为同类,因而有一首要本原;或又视为负责实例化的不同特殊者,因而不同;或依类比相同,因而有一自我分裂且短暂的首要本原。另一意义上,事物世界现在映入本原世界。一切皆因不可穷尽的材料。可理解事物则会不同。
15
1076b 10
数学事物不能在可感事物中在场,因为它们不可分。
1076b 20
数学事物也不能简单分离,否则单纯线会与同立体一起的线分离。
1076b 30
数也如此:会有可感数中的可感单位、与数分离的可感单位、可理解数中的单位,等等。
1077a 1
若它们分离,天文学与几何就不是科学。
1077a 10
若有可理解的感官,就有可理解的动物。太妙了!若这些也是感官,还会有更可理解的感官。
1077a 20
数学事物虽被认为与可感事物分离且更首要,实际却从中派生,如无灵魂者派生于有灵魂者。
1077a 30
数学事物既非形式,因为唯身体或立体似有灵魂且完整;也非材料,因为不清楚事物如何由点组成。
1077b 1
表述上在先者不必本体性上在先。如属性表述在先,却只能被赋予事物而存在;分离时,不属于事物,因而无存在。
1077b 20
证明总可关于某些事物,却非仅就其为这些事物而言。如数学研究可有大小的那类事物的大小自身,只关其大小,不关事物自身。言说有这种分离与组合之力。说明中可剥去数学事物的偶属性,但数学事物仍非真正分离。
1078a 30
人可被视为不可分,也可被视为立体。两者皆对,因为一物有成为其它的潜能。善与美不同,因为善总伴行动。
1078b 10
形式之友是赫拉克利特主义者,就他们确信感知中一切流变而言。因此若有知识,必非任何感知。
1078b 30
苏格拉底被归功于举例论证与普遍定义。当时辩证法还不足以像柏拉图对话那样,从相反假设考察事物。
1079a 20
连接一性与二元的二比一比例,似比任一关系项首要。或将有一个数本身包含两者,因而更首要。
1080a 30
作为自然与本体性的数有三种可能:1. 每数异于它数,其单位亦然;2. 每数可与它数比较,其单位亦然;3. 每数异于它数,但每数内部的单位彼此可比(二的单位异于三的单位,但组成二的两单位是可比形式)。
1080b 20
毕达哥拉斯派把单位变成可感事物与大小。所以似无理念数概念,毋宁献身于一切皆比例的普全数学(mathesis universalis)。
1081a 10
若所有单位无差别,就无本体性自身。三不会本质异于四,因为新增单位无异于事物自身,而事物自身不能加到自身。
1081a 20
但单位也不能完全不可比。因为单位从同一本原一起生成;若一单位在先、另一派生,一个单位也会先于数、另一个派生,那数置于何处?
1081a 30
若全部单位不可比,一有一个单位,二有两个单位,但三已在二中在场。然而不应如此,因为三应有与一切在先单位分离的自己的单位。
1081b 1
不能同时说一之后有第一、第二单位,又说有第一二,因为第一二不是由一之后第一、第二单位组成,而由一及其后第一单位组成。
1081b 20
结果是,所有单位不可比与所有单位可比并无实质差异,因为如此不能产出理念数,所有如此产出的数都由相加产出。
1081b 30
若产出理念数,四会由一个理念二——被一限定的二元——与二元自身组成。但哪个二元真正是二?都不是,因为二本身包含第一单位。若二由单位组成,二就非二元产物,因为元素是一而非二元。所有这些显示整个理念数学说荒谬且不可能。
1082a 1
即便说只有不同数中的单位有别,仍不可理解。因为十由两个五组成。若五的单位异于十,如何如此组成?
1082a 20
也似无两单位之外的分离二性。分离自然可通过分有或整体性附着它物,但靠接触、混合、放置做到。二性如何在两单位之外为一?二性实不像一个整体。
1082a 30
第一二中的单位生成所有其它二,如四、八中的二,因为第一二最首要。但第一四中的二又生成所有其它四。所以派生者可成为首要本原,形式可由形式组成,如第一四由生成其它一切四中其它二的诸二组成。如说动物由动物组成。这指向《蒂迈欧》的宇宙。
1082b 1
相等者无差别。还能给出什么理由?
1082b 10
二的一单位加上三的一单位,这个二会先于三吗?会后于二吗?
1082b 20
若数是形式,永不可能无差别。因为三中有一个二,与第一二一样也是形式,形式遂由形式组成;且会有一个最高形式,其它形式皆为其部分。但形式独立分离,这不可能,因此根本不能相加。因为相加时,一数必含等于在先数的部分,而相等意味无差别。也不能分为部分,因为八会分为两个四,每个小于八自身,却等于四自身,所以四自身必作为部分包含于八。若说八中之四异于四自身,相等还能意味什么?这些都会导致可笑后果。
1083a 10
数在量上不同,单位不能。单位也无属性,故种类也不异。数的质派生于量,所以同质单位先于差异。因此须从开端指明:若一单位异于另一,怎么还能称一?若它们不是诸一,我们又在说什么?
1083a 30
相信只有数学数、但以某个一为本原者,纯粹错了。因为未认识到一旦承认第一一,所有数都会有自己的第一,此立场很快坍塌为承认理念数的立场。
1083b 10
或数根本不分离,就无单位异同问题,因为规定现依赖感知中的相似不相似。数不分离,就无须确定它们既异如何又相关,或自身既同如何容许差异与复制。但另一不可能突现:数不能同于大小。这已暗示亚里士多德解法:让数不是分离的现实存在,而是事物潜能中的存在。
1084a 10
若数是分离的现实存在,就或现实无限或现实有限,因为无限属于数。但两者皆不可能。无限既非奇非偶,还需现实对应它的存在。但确实似有无限。因此数不能是分离存在,必须内在于材料,遂聚为一个作为现实存在及其潜能的事物,四中诸二便仅潜在。说不同数有不同单位也对,因为单位如今是在不同形式中实现的潜能。因此一潜在是二、二潜在是一,所有立场可调和。
1084b 30
人把数与单位视为现实在场,便追逐相反主张。说单位既本原又派生者,可以正确,但须限定为本体性对材料。
1085a 1
后果之一,单位更像一,应先于二。他们却说二在先。无限定就矛盾。且三可视为一物,五亦然,因为都现实存在,遂可组成二,而这应是八。这二又由什么组成,既然每个数同样无材料?
1085a 10
数相继,困局在于是数自身彼此接续,还是其单位。若连续,就无此问题,因为无分离整体;但这里单位是整体,二是另一整体。由数派生的线、面也遇同一困局。若全由大小产出,如何获得这些质差?还有大小的其它属性,本身不直接组成大小,却应作为特定属性必然伴随任一特定大小,如线的曲直:难道不也来自大小?
只要重要的是大小,特定曲直便不内在于特定线,正如只要重要的是本体性,特定大小便不内在。但一特定大小必伴随一特定曲度,作为现实揭示并保持的潜能,所以必须有曲度自身。但这特定曲度内在或偶属性并不重要,重要的是曲度自身总现实在场,须由某物生成。大小自身由大小二元生成,其必然伴随者、曲度自身,难道不应也由同一本原生成?但曲度本原似是曲与直,与大与小质上不同,各自特殊化彼此偶属性。依此论证,大与小不应是终极本原。如人有颜色的本原在其为动物,但颜色自身特殊化的本原在皮肤,与人任何特殊化的本原、即灵魂分离。所以A在场时B必在场,仅当A自身是其必然本原,或A自身中有必生成B的本原,尽管不必此本原总生成A。只需A在场时本原在场,B便必产出。换言之,本原可只是A的必要本原,却必须是B的充分本原。不论哪种,二者须共享本原,但大小是否充分产出曲直并不清楚。所以二元只解释大小自身,不解释大小如何呈现。
1085b 1
这些人无法决定点是否线的材料,或同样的问题,点是否伴随线。
1085b 10
说数多自身生成数者,与说二元生成者遇同一困局。如每单位不能是一本身,只能是数多与一本身产物。但单位如何出于数多?若由数多一部分组成,该部分不可分,实际就非数多与一组成,而是一与一。且不可分部分的数多是另一数,在任何数生成之前已被预设。
1086b 10
把共相设得仿佛独立特殊者,会招致麻烦。
1087a 20
知识有两义:潜在的知识,作为不确定共相;在活动中的知识,作为确定特殊者。因此普遍颜色与特殊颜色一起被看见,作为特殊者的材料;但普遍颜色也可被思入活动而特殊化,特殊颜色感知则被化为其感性材料。
1087b 1
相反者非一切本原,因为总属于底层事物。
1087b 20
有人说,超出者与被超出者是比二元更普遍的两个对立,因为不只关联大小,也关联一切大小或程度。但仍有问题。
1088a 1
所以对亚里士多德,一似是尺度,且不与被衡量的数多种类分离。似无分离的一本身。
1088a 20
大与小是关系者,而关系者不能是一个独立事物或材料,因为总包含作为他者的他者,只是依赖质与量的属性,绝非材料自身。这实际是按字面接受柏拉图学说,字面解释其对二元的命名。
1088b 10
若二是最小数,少或一仅赋予它——这已荒谬——最大数是什么?没有,但所有这些数都应被赋予两者。所以说十或万是最大数者,纯粹错误。
1088b 20
元素组成者有材料,容许其它可能,故永不永恒。
1089a 20
存在与非存在都有多义,所以说“存在要求非存在才能存在,否则一切为一”前,必须先固定意义。此义非存在不指虚假,因为虚假不可靠,须被真理驱除;这种非存在却实际是存在的原初根据。这非存在只能是潜能。
1089b 10
存在有本体性之外的说法,二元不能生成这些其它种类。若探究它们,会看到不同潜能如何促成其它多的存在方式。他们也把二元变成与一对立的一物,却忘了二元也可有多种。若多自身仅一种,多之多又何来?
1089b 20
须为每物设潜能,而非设一种让本体性成为另一种类、如关系者、凭自身存在之物的潜能。一种存在不能潜在是另一种。但这提出问题:如何有多种存在?因为由一种材料而多,其材料却必须有别。
1089b 30
若这个与何种分开,可理解一个这个如何潜在多;但如何有现实的多个独立事物,每个都是现实的这个?若此性不属某种,这些一难道不全还原为单一?若这个与量分离,如何有多个一?所以不同种类潜能似并非真那么分开。
1090a 10
支持数学数者似不把数当任何东西之因或有用者,而当自身自在、无关切的事物。算术定理可完美用于可感事物,不必只有达到抽象才可计算可感者,也非没有抽象就没有可感数。所以可感事物完全可为数学事物之因,尽管数学事物中性、无关切。但若数学数不是本原,如何有独立存在?
此处要点:若数学数是因,中性且无关切就矛盾。而无纯数学单位,可感事物仍有确定大小与数量,尽管非纯粹者。所以这些不能是因。
1090a 30
毕达哥拉斯派问题与其说是数与身体分离,不如说是他们称身体由数组成。于是重者由完全无重者组成。
1090b 10
点、线、体是事物界限,界限不与事物分离。
1090b 20
亚里士多德深处似坚信自然自身彻底可理解,无须加上任何东西使之可理解。可理解性内在。因此即使无独立数,事物仍被计算、理解。
1091b 20
说善是一、一是终极本原,不合理,因为如此一切皆善。诗人也意识到困难,所以让较晚出现的宙斯统治,而非最初诸神。
1092a 1
于是数多将是恶,一切也皆恶。善恶互为所在,彼此毁灭。善是恶的潜能,恶是善的潜能。当相反者是本原、本原是事物中元素、一是本原、数是首要独立事物因而数多也是本原、数又是一切存在者本原时,这些都是必然后果。
1092b 1
为何一切由相反者构成的事物都毁灭,数却不?
1092b 20
若比例是数的和谐,和谐是本体性,则数是材料,因为数总是事物之数,而这些事物被用于构造比例。
1092b 30
也难确定数比在何义上善。数属于材料,却不能又属于数,否则一切仅有量差,事物将还原为单纯产物。但若一切是数,这就是必然后果。而且若一切是数、数必普遍,许多不相似者会相似。除非说每物有自身孤异的数,但似不合理,因为我们确给不同物同一数;若每物有不可比的孤异数,如何计数相加?若A是一、B是二,三是AB组合吗?那么已有两个A与B;三既来自A、B,如何又是孤异的一,以何方式生成?混合还是放置?但这已超出纯数学与数。相加方式也有特定数吗?还是相加方式由孤异数自身规定?但那为何只以普遍加法标示一切?不论如何,单这些话没真正规定什么。被规定为理念数者必被存在其它方面补充。
因此,亚里士多德似不真正反对柏拉图学说的“可能性”,而反对不精确与诸麻烦。理念数学说不能天真理解为只关数,而总是事物之数。但这已要求进一步探究本体性自身,不能又仅作数处理。否则形式之形式以至无限,而每形式与其它形式分离。除非数也可当潜能。但他没注意,或装作没注意,柏拉图已通过二元把潜能引入学说。所以他其实不偏离柏拉图教导,只是不把二元视为现实的二。
1093b 20
数学事物有依类比普遍的属性。数的某些质与潜能确属包含美的清单,但只是数的偶属性(潜能),数自身不是美。
16
材料与形式似可互换。因此原为材料者现可当形式,反之亦然。但互换有限度。若如下表述:前字母为形式,后字母为材料,否定为相反者,就清楚。
首先有最高、独立本原。但这些本原先开始互动,把彼此化为材料,使各自及其相反者能赋形于材料。假定有五本原A、B、C、D、E。
这些本原创造短暂存在平面,其中划定本体论区域,本原转成有中间物的相反者。于是有AB、-AB、AC、-AC等,共构首要层面。
但这些派生物又构成它物的材料或形式。因此可见(AB)C等新产物,如“两种质”:二是大小与本体性派生的产物,质自身却是首要种类。也可见A(BC),如“一/这匹马”:一首要,马却派生于另两物。所有形式都可作用并被其它形式作用,唯已包含自身内者除外。即无A(AB)或(AB)A。但形式材料可倒转,因为只是极性;理性可为动物性作用的材料,AB可倒为BA。此层一切形式可数且确定,材料也确定,因为被形式穷尽。因此对白马这样的表述,白与马皆确定,理智材料与形式同样确定。
但形式不断丰富,成为近乎无限它物的聚合时,理智材料不再有清晰界线。它模糊歧义,因为内部已如此复杂。形式也如此。活动并揭示自身的形式自身是派生产物,潜在含其它形式。所以形式—材料结构在形式自身内复制。如(AB)C自身内含AB,现在这结构被复制到不再可规定。但只要一部分在活动,就称形式,如今形式却实际成了不确定的这个;另一部分在潜能中,容许其它形式赋形于自身,成为质料(hyle),或纯材料。形式总显得比材料更清楚确定,不是因内容,因为雕像存在不比青铜少歧义,青铜甚至更简单;而是因形式总被把握为一与这个,故限定,材料即使表述更简单,也总让其它可能进入自身,容许内在的多与无限。因此形式的清晰不来自内容或表述,而来自它占据极性一端、一性与界限的一端,另一端由多性与材料性占据。换言之,这是假设性的清晰,所以对亚里士多德,共相远离本体性自身。形式是在活动中的存在者,不是属性。
所以形式是一者,材料是容许其它可能进入自身、而事物仍为一者。