Aristotle · 亚里士多德
Nicomachean Ethics · 尼各马可伦理学
Undated 未注日期
尼各马可伦理学——散记
Reflections · Pages
亚的三个标准:合宜性,可能性和善好
合宜性和善好是用来判断目的的:合宜的判断即意味着目的的基本且必要,如食欲的满足、工作间隙适当的休息等;善好则是对目的价值的判断。可能性处于另一个平面,也就是手段的平面上;它只关注达成目的的手段是否当下存在。
尽管根本上,一切指向幸福/最终的善好的目的都可以被视作手段一种(甚至是德性),但这些手段在尚未被实现前仍然被视为目的一种。如果选择更为善好的目的而忽略了更为基本的需求,那就会产生目的彼此之前的挤压;哪怕当中有些更卑微的目的是必要的。
可能性、合宜性与善好可以被不同程度地组合。仅仅只有善好的例子可以举苏格拉底所构建出来的理想城邦,尽管他很反讽地试图论证其可能性。仅仅只有可能性的例子可以举在别人婚礼上朝新人大喊一声“我才是新娘!”,没有什么因素阻止这个行动的达成,但这个目的既不好,也不基本必要,甚至不正常。如果仅仅只有合宜性,那就可以类比于被困在沙漠中半死不活的时候想要喝一口水,因为一切手段都消失了而使这个行为成为不可能,尽管能满足基本的需要,还能延长生命而自然地是善好的。
关于合宜性和可能性的分别,「是,首相」里有一句台词说“我能随时引发三战却吃不到一份炒蛋?”是最生动的例子。这个语境下,引发三战是可能的却不合宜,吃炒蛋虽然合宜却讽刺性的不可能。
亚论行正义与行义事与做义人
行正义之事仅仅意味着自己的行动是正义的或者不正义的;这是一个整体规定。一个行为可以是正义的也可以是不正义的。
行正义或者根据正义行事则要特殊很多。这意味着行为人是主动自愿地去行动的,并且对此件行动的大多数特殊性都知情。而行不义则指的是不仅仅对这些都知情自愿,还强制性地伤害了另一方;如果仅仅是产生了伤害但受害者却是完全自愿的话,就不能被称作行不义,而只能是行不义之事,因此自杀就不是对自己行不义,因为自己完全自愿。
但行正义的人和行不义的人都不能相应地说是义人或恶人。因为尽管自愿知情,但首先自愿知情的程度有差别,另外自愿知情和自愿知情并在慎重考虑后做出选择是不一样的情况。一个人在酒后或者在盛怒下激情犯罪,或者偶尔起了恻隐之心救人一命,这无法代表他的习性,习性必须是要在一次一次相应行动的堆叠和习惯化中塑造的。因此,尽管一个人可以做不义之事甚至行不义,并需要为之负责任,但这是由于他对于塑造自己的习性负有责任,而不是因为他对这个行为本身负有责任。一个人过失杀人的惩罚根据因此不仅仅是他杀人本身,而是他过去没有很好地塑造自己的习性,让自己疏忽大意以至于犯下过失。但习性在进入行动中时很容易会遭遇阻碍和不可控因素,因此要判断一个人的习性究竟如何,最稳妥的是观察一个人是如何选择的。
如果一个人在经过慎重思考后选择了行不义与不义之事,那就说明他身为人的部分和他作为人行动的原则本身就是恶的。行动或判断上的失误可能是别的东西产生的干扰,但如果选择作恶那就是德性败坏了。
行动本身不代表着正义,而是这个行动是在什么状态下被完成的
因此一个人可能会作恶,但他认为自己做的是善,或者他开始的时候做的是善,但最后却弄巧成拙;这时他就是犯下了错误,尽管他的习性是好的。
A magnanimous person
A magnanimous person does not tell lies to friends, since only truth is worthy of his telling. But he does have occasions that he tells lies in front of many. That might be because 1.he is moderate, so that he has an inclination as strong to withhold showing his greatness before his inferior(since this is too unchallenging and trivial) as to speak the truth; 2.the many do not understand the truth and will thus depreciate it, and that is unworthy of truth; 3.the look of the many when they depreciate the truth is just too pathetic for the magnanimous person; 4.since they many won’t be able to understand the truth anyway, the magnanimous person only tells it to his friends, who are worthy of his attention and to the many only speaks of what is the most convenient.
所以讲真理永远伴随着其它的冲动
在对待不如自己的人时,真话是可说可不说的,因为说了或者不说都无损于自己的优越,因此优越者比起卑贱者更显示出宽厚;卑贱者因为想胜过其他卑贱者反而会显得更有攻击性,反而会更习惯用真话进行攻击
亚对幸福的初步刻画
幸福是人类的最高善;最高善不等于善本身,因此幸福是一个具体规定,而不是柏拉图式的理念。
幸福作为最高善意味着它不能与其它善并置,否则其它善将可以对幸福进行加减,而这是不被允许的。因此,幸福与其它善有本体论差异。
所有的善都朝向最高善。
最高善以外,善可以被分为内在善与外在善,而内在善在类上优于外在善。最高善是彻底的内在善,而其它善则是内在与外在的混合或纯粹的外在善。
内在善彼此之间有量度的差异和高下之分;一些内在善要比另一些内在善要更好。
幸福需要一个肯定性定义;因为最高善必须差别于其余的善,但又必须同时统领诸善中的最好者作为其部分(而不是包括所有的善),因此必须在定义中达到特殊的普遍规定。
幸福因此通过人类的特殊功能被定义为:听从美德而行动。尽管美德是好的,但并不是最高善,因为美德还需要被行动实现;由此,幸福区别于美德、快乐、荣誉等更高的善。但同时,幸福囊括了所有这些更高善作为自身的内容。
内在善可能会与幸福冲突,因为内在善之间会产生矛盾;但由于内在善并不是绝对善,因此彼此的价值各不相同;价值更高的内在善更加接近幸福,反之亦然,更加接近幸福的内在善价值更高;所以这样的冲突只会是表面的。事实上,偏离了幸福的内在善,即使仍然保有善的特征,无视幸福对它的追求也无法被正当化。
幸福总是以最高级形式出现;一个人可以比另一个人更接近幸福,但无法说比另一个人更幸福。一旦达到了幸福,其状态都是一致的:就是自足和无所求。
最后,外在条件可能会影响幸福的实现,但很难影响幸福的状态本身。一个经历过幸福的人将很难再次退回到不幸福,除非遭遇了巨大的灾难;但哪怕是这样,他也有更大的机会重新回到幸福的状态。
一条补注:幸福状态并不意味着对机运的压制,因为机运是无法压制的;因此幸福的自足状态并不是神的无忧虑状态,而是与机运相处的和谐状态;因为对机运的一味压制反而会损害理性的运动,所以幸福最后需要泰然让之
AI translated the non-English passages; original English passages are preserved. The mixed-language original is available under Original.
Aristotle’s three criteria: appropriateness, possibility, and goodness
Appropriateness and goodness judge ends. A judgment of appropriateness means that an end is basic and necessary, such as satisfying hunger or taking suitable rest between periods of work. Goodness judges an end’s value. Possibility lies on another plane, that of means: it concerns only whether the means of attaining an end presently exist.
Although fundamentally all ends directed toward happiness or the final good can be regarded as means—even virtue—these means are still regarded as ends before they are realized. If one chooses a better end while neglecting more basic needs, ends will crowd one another out, even though some of the humbler ends are necessary.
Possibility, appropriateness, and goodness can be combined to different degrees. An example of goodness alone is the ideal city Socrates constructs, although he rather ironically attempts to demonstrate its possibility. An example of possibility alone is shouting ‘I’m the bride!’ at a newlywed couple at someone else’s wedding. Nothing prevents the action from being performed, but the end is neither good nor basic and necessary, nor even normal. Appropriateness alone can be compared to wanting a sip of water while trapped half-dead in a desert: the disappearance of every means makes the act impossible, although it would satisfy a basic need and prolong life, and is therefore naturally good.
A line in Yes, Prime Minister offers the liveliest example of the distinction between appropriateness and possibility: ‘I can start World War Three whenever I like, but I can’t get a plate of scrambled eggs?’ In this context, starting World War Three is possible but inappropriate; eating scrambled eggs is appropriate but, ironically, impossible.
Aristotle on acting justly, doing a just deed, and being a just person
Doing a just deed means only that one’s action is just or unjust. This is a determination of the action as a whole. An action can be just or unjust.
Acting justly, or acting in accordance with justice, is much more specific. It means that the agent acts voluntarily and knows most of the action’s particulars. Acting unjustly means not only acting knowingly and voluntarily, but also forcibly harming another party. If harm merely occurs while the person harmed is entirely willing, it cannot be called acting unjustly, only doing an unjust deed. Suicide is therefore not acting unjustly toward oneself, because one is entirely willing.
Yet someone who acts justly or unjustly cannot thereby be called a just or wicked person. For although the act is voluntary and knowing, there are degrees of voluntariness and knowledge; moreover, acting voluntarily and knowingly differs from doing so after deliberate choice. A crime of passion committed in drunkenness or rage, or saving a life in a passing moment of compassion, cannot represent one’s character. Character must be formed through the accumulation and habituation of repeated corresponding actions. Thus, although someone may do an unjust deed or even act unjustly and must take responsibility for it, this is because they are responsible for forming their character, not because they are responsible for the action itself. The basis for punishing someone for involuntary manslaughter is therefore not merely the killing, but their failure in the past to form their character properly, allowing themselves to become careless and commit the error. Yet character, when it enters action, easily encounters obstacles and uncontrollable factors. The surest way of judging someone’s character is therefore to observe how they choose.
If someone chooses, after careful thought, to act unjustly and do unjust deeds, this shows that the human part of them and the very principle of their action as a human being are wicked. A mistake in action or judgment may arise from interference by something else; choosing to do evil, however, is corruption of virtue.
The action itself does not represent justice; what matters is the state in which it is performed.
Someone may therefore do evil while believing that they are doing good, or begin by doing good but end by making things worse. In such cases they have made a mistake, even though their character is good.
A magnanimous person
A magnanimous person does not tell lies to friends, since only truth is worthy of his telling. But he does have occasions that he tells lies in front of many. That might be because 1.he is moderate, so that he has an inclination as strong to withhold showing his greatness before his inferior(since this is too unchallenging and trivial) as to speak the truth; 2.the many do not understand the truth and will thus depreciate it, and that is unworthy of truth; 3.the look of the many when they depreciate the truth is just too pathetic for the magnanimous person; 4.since they many won’t be able to understand the truth anyway, the magnanimous person only tells it to his friends, who are worthy of his attention and to the many only speaks of what is the most convenient.
So telling the truth is always accompanied by other impulses.
When dealing with those inferior to oneself, telling the truth is optional: neither speaking nor remaining silent detracts from one’s superiority. The superior thus displays greater generosity than the base. The base, wanting to surpass others who are also base, instead appears more aggressive and is more accustomed to attacking with the truth.
Aristotle’s preliminary characterization of happiness
Happiness is the highest human good. The highest good is not the same as the Good itself, so happiness is a concrete determination rather than a Platonic Idea.
As the highest good, happiness cannot be placed alongside other goods; otherwise other goods could add to or subtract from happiness, which is inadmissible. There is therefore an ontological difference between happiness and other goods.
All goods are directed toward the highest good.
Apart from the highest good, goods can be divided into internal and external goods, with internal goods superior in kind to external goods. The highest good is entirely internal, while other goods mix the internal with the external or are purely external.
Internal goods differ in degree and rank: some are better than others.
Happiness requires a positive definition. The highest good must differ from the remaining goods while simultaneously gathering the best of them as its parts, rather than including all goods. Its definition must therefore attain a particular universal determination.
Happiness is thus defined through humanity’s distinctive function as acting in obedience to virtue. Although virtue is good, it is not the highest good, because virtue still needs to be realized in action. Happiness is thereby distinguished from higher goods such as virtue, pleasure, and honor. At the same time, happiness encompasses all these higher goods as its own content.
Internal goods may conflict with happiness because internal goods can contradict one another. Yet because internal goods are not absolute goods, their values differ. The more valuable internal goods are closer to happiness, and conversely, those closer to happiness are more valuable. Such conflicts can therefore only be superficial. In fact, even if an internal good that departs from happiness retains the character of a good, pursuing it without regard for happiness cannot be justified.
Happiness always appears in the superlative. One person can be closer to happiness than another, but cannot be said to be happier than another. Once happiness is attained, its state is the same: self-sufficiency and wanting nothing.
Finally, external conditions may affect the realization of happiness but can hardly affect the state of happiness itself. Someone who has experienced happiness will find it difficult to return to unhappiness unless struck by a great catastrophe. Even then, they have a greater chance of returning to happiness.
An additional note: the state of happiness does not mean suppressing fortune, because fortune cannot be suppressed. The self-sufficient state of happiness is therefore not a god’s freedom from care, but a state of harmonious coexistence with fortune. Relentlessly suppressing fortune would instead impair the movement of reason, so happiness ultimately requires a serene letting-be.
非中文段落由 AI 翻译,中文原文保持不变。中英混合原稿可通过“原文”按钮查看。
亚的三个标准:合宜性,可能性和善好
合宜性和善好是用来判断目的的:合宜的判断即意味着目的的基本且必要,如食欲的满足、工作间隙适当的休息等;善好则是对目的价值的判断。可能性处于另一个平面,也就是手段的平面上;它只关注达成目的的手段是否当下存在。
尽管根本上,一切指向幸福/最终的善好的目的都可以被视作手段一种(甚至是德性),但这些手段在尚未被实现前仍然被视为目的一种。如果选择更为善好的目的而忽略了更为基本的需求,那就会产生目的彼此之前的挤压;哪怕当中有些更卑微的目的是必要的。
可能性、合宜性与善好可以被不同程度地组合。仅仅只有善好的例子可以举苏格拉底所构建出来的理想城邦,尽管他很反讽地试图论证其可能性。仅仅只有可能性的例子可以举在别人婚礼上朝新人大喊一声“我才是新娘!”,没有什么因素阻止这个行动的达成,但这个目的既不好,也不基本必要,甚至不正常。如果仅仅只有合宜性,那就可以类比于被困在沙漠中半死不活的时候想要喝一口水,因为一切手段都消失了而使这个行为成为不可能,尽管能满足基本的需要,还能延长生命而自然地是善好的。
关于合宜性和可能性的分别,「是,首相」里有一句台词说“我能随时引发三战却吃不到一份炒蛋?”是最生动的例子。这个语境下,引发三战是可能的却不合宜,吃炒蛋虽然合宜却讽刺性的不可能。
亚论行正义与行义事与做义人
行正义之事仅仅意味着自己的行动是正义的或者不正义的;这是一个整体规定。一个行为可以是正义的也可以是不正义的。
行正义或者根据正义行事则要特殊很多。这意味着行为人是主动自愿地去行动的,并且对此件行动的大多数特殊性都知情。而行不义则指的是不仅仅对这些都知情自愿,还强制性地伤害了另一方;如果仅仅是产生了伤害但受害者却是完全自愿的话,就不能被称作行不义,而只能是行不义之事,因此自杀就不是对自己行不义,因为自己完全自愿。
但行正义的人和行不义的人都不能相应地说是义人或恶人。因为尽管自愿知情,但首先自愿知情的程度有差别,另外自愿知情和自愿知情并在慎重考虑后做出选择是不一样的情况。一个人在酒后或者在盛怒下激情犯罪,或者偶尔起了恻隐之心救人一命,这无法代表他的习性,习性必须是要在一次一次相应行动的堆叠和习惯化中塑造的。因此,尽管一个人可以做不义之事甚至行不义,并需要为之负责任,但这是由于他对于塑造自己的习性负有责任,而不是因为他对这个行为本身负有责任。一个人过失杀人的惩罚根据因此不仅仅是他杀人本身,而是他过去没有很好地塑造自己的习性,让自己疏忽大意以至于犯下过失。但习性在进入行动中时很容易会遭遇阻碍和不可控因素,因此要判断一个人的习性究竟如何,最稳妥的是观察一个人是如何选择的。
如果一个人在经过慎重思考后选择了行不义与不义之事,那就说明他身为人的部分和他作为人行动的原则本身就是恶的。行动或判断上的失误可能是别的东西产生的干扰,但如果选择作恶那就是德性败坏了。
行动本身不代表着正义,而是这个行动是在什么状态下被完成的
因此一个人可能会作恶,但他认为自己做的是善,或者他开始的时候做的是善,但最后却弄巧成拙;这时他就是犯下了错误,尽管他的习性是好的。
一个大度的人
一个大度的人不会对朋友说谎,因为只有真理值得他说出。但他确实有在多数人面前说谎的时候。这可能是因为:1.他是节制的,因此,他既倾向于说出真理,也同样强烈地倾向于不在不如自己的人面前展现自己的伟大(因为这太没有挑战性,也太琐碎);2.多数人无法理解真理,因而会贬低它,而这不配于真理;3.多数人贬低真理时的样子,对大度的人而言实在太可怜;4.既然多数人无论如何都无法理解真理,大度的人就只把真理告诉值得自己关注的朋友,而对多数人只说最便宜行事的话。
所以讲真理永远伴随着其它的冲动
在对待不如自己的人时,真话是可说可不说的,因为说了或者不说都无损于自己的优越,因此优越者比起卑贱者更显示出宽厚;卑贱者因为想胜过其他卑贱者反而会显得更有攻击性,反而会更习惯用真话进行攻击
亚对幸福的初步刻画
幸福是人类的最高善;最高善不等于善本身,因此幸福是一个具体规定,而不是柏拉图式的理念。
幸福作为最高善意味着它不能与其它善并置,否则其它善将可以对幸福进行加减,而这是不被允许的。因此,幸福与其它善有本体论差异。
所有的善都朝向最高善。
最高善以外,善可以被分为内在善与外在善,而内在善在类上优于外在善。最高善是彻底的内在善,而其它善则是内在与外在的混合或纯粹的外在善。
内在善彼此之间有量度的差异和高下之分;一些内在善要比另一些内在善要更好。
幸福需要一个肯定性定义;因为最高善必须差别于其余的善,但又必须同时统领诸善中的最好者作为其部分(而不是包括所有的善),因此必须在定义中达到特殊的普遍规定。
幸福因此通过人类的特殊功能被定义为:听从美德而行动。尽管美德是好的,但并不是最高善,因为美德还需要被行动实现;由此,幸福区别于美德、快乐、荣誉等更高的善。但同时,幸福囊括了所有这些更高善作为自身的内容。
内在善可能会与幸福冲突,因为内在善之间会产生矛盾;但由于内在善并不是绝对善,因此彼此的价值各不相同;价值更高的内在善更加接近幸福,反之亦然,更加接近幸福的内在善价值更高;所以这样的冲突只会是表面的。事实上,偏离了幸福的内在善,即使仍然保有善的特征,无视幸福对它的追求也无法被正当化。
幸福总是以最高级形式出现;一个人可以比另一个人更接近幸福,但无法说比另一个人更幸福。一旦达到了幸福,其状态都是一致的:就是自足和无所求。
最后,外在条件可能会影响幸福的实现,但很难影响幸福的状态本身。一个经历过幸福的人将很难再次退回到不幸福,除非遭遇了巨大的灾难;但哪怕是这样,他也有更大的机会重新回到幸福的状态。
一条补注:幸福状态并不意味着对机运的压制,因为机运是无法压制的;因此幸福的自足状态并不是神的无忧虑状态,而是与机运相处的和谐状态;因为对机运的一味压制反而会损害理性的运动,所以幸福最后需要泰然让之