Gui Ruiyan

Aristotle · 亚里士多德
Nicomachean Ethics · 尼各马可伦理学

Undated 未注日期

Nicomachean Ethics — Reading notes

Reflections · Apple Notes

Revised 23 July 2022

In this note / 篇目

1

1094a 25
Knowledge to aim at what the action is directed

1094b 10
Why is on the city level more divine than individual? It certainly is grander and more difficult; how are they the same though? Same in kind?

1095a 10
Following feelings; knowledge vs action; form desires

1095b
Hermeneutic circle; one should proceed from things known to us; the ability to acquire beginnings

1096a 20
Idea is not quantitative (it does not cover a series) but it still is split into substance vs relative; many ways can good be said; so on a vertical plane the good can be spoken of in many categories, and on a horizontal plane the good can be spoken of in many particulars

1096a 30
Moreover since Man itself and a man do not differ in account, it’s not necessary to go to an idea of man.

1096b 5
A strange argument; but we do want to hold eternal good instead of passing ones.

1097a 10
A comparison to 1094a 25, in which a best (human) good that encompasses all achievable goods is spoken of

1097b 20
Happiness most complete; anti-utilitarianism. An end choiceworthy in itself is not the same as happiness; like a jazz band you can play your part and enjoy it and see it conform to a larger whole and enjoy it as well; there’s no conflict but is in harmony. But do they have intrinsic value when they fail to bring about happiness? It yes, what would that value depend upon? Is it perhaps its being the necessary condition/constituent (though not the sufficient) for happiness? Then it’s implied some ends are not valuable in themselves because if they fail to bring out what they promise they are immediately of no value.

Thus we have two possible interpretations. First being the positive one, that virtue is a content of happiness, that it does not lose itself in happiness. Second being the negative one, that virtue always has the potential to bring out happiness and is necessary for happiness to appear.

1099b 5
Happiness requires a supplement of external good; though it still remains the self-sufficient end; but how to reconcile these views? Is it simply not need any further?

1100a 5
Misfortune

1100b 30
The previous question in 1099b 5 answered here; self-sufficiency in a loose sense, that is stability.

1101b
Praise is for things undervalued; celebration is for happiness.

2,3

1103a 15
Virtue of thought from teaching and virtue of character from habit.

1103a 20
Virtue of character is not by nature, habituation is not nature.

1103a 30
A prior capacity to act virtuously, though not yet forming a habit.

1103b 5
The goal of legislation is to habituate.

1103b 10
A teaching of craft is analogous to a repetition of similar actions.

1103a 30
The purpose of this book is to become good; this is virtue of thought?

1104a 5
Actions under particular cases are not ruled by arts; but agents are compared to doctors and navigators; what’s the significance?

1104a 15
Use evident cases as guidance to not evident.

1104a 20
But is this really the case? Isn’t a virtuous person extraordinary? What about saints? Is it the mean or the right judgement of when an action should be done?

1104b 1
A spiral movement or a correspondence of form and content?

1104b 5
Virtue of character is all about pleasure and pain.

1104b 10
Can you model pleasure and pain by education?

1105a 15
Virtue is about pleasure and pain.

1105a 20
Becoming and being.

1105a 30
A virtuous action has to be conscious and voluntary, and has to be founded upon an axiological stance, that is, acting for the action’s own value. The source of action has to be involved. Thus action all by itself can only offer the chance of becoming good.

1105b 15
Philosophy as medicine and illness.

1105b 25
Pleasure and pain are implied by but not the same as feelings.

1106a 20
Virtue is a state, or a horizon, in which feelings appear in the good way and are good.

1106b 10
The mean is further elaborated; numerical or objective mean is differentiated from the relative mean.

1106b 15
How is virtue more exact than art?

1106b 20
The distinction between pleasure and pain and feelings are made to rashly; so are pleasure and pain generalizations of feelings? Virtue seems to be the state in relation to good feelings, to be virtuous is then to make good feelings.

1107a 5
Here the problem of the mean is solved; virtue is a mean in essence, but when considered in relation to good, virtue is an extremity.

1107a 25
Strange; virtue can both be sort of an extremity and a mean, but vice cannot be so; and is stated that a mean and extremities are mutually exclusive. Are these on different planes?

1107b 5
Not in all types, I suppose it’s the pleasure of virtue.

1108a 1
Names can sometimes not correspond to the content.

1108a 20
Not the way I expected; truthfulness seems to be more of an extreme, as opposed to untruth; this over-mean-understatement model seems to be not at first intuitive to me.

1108b 5
This is also very unintuitive; the spiteful person, in effect, sounds much more similar to the envious. Does the spiteful person enjoy others’ fortunes? It seems that a better word can be substituted.

1109a 10
Some extremes can be more opposed to the mean, so cowardice is opposed to bravery, not rashness. It might be in object itself, or it might be in our natural tendency.

1109b 20
Perception and particular.

1110a 15
As long as people have the principle of action within themselves, they always remain voluntary to a certain degree, though an evil action is never done for its own sake, thus if not mixed with aspirations of the good it will not be voluntary. Then are there only these categories: what about radical evil, the pure will to exert evil?

1110b 10
A retort against the claim that one is forced by pleasant or fine things. First, everyone in that sense will be forced. Second, we feel forced and painful under the force, but willing to act under pleasure or good; so the forcing has to be distinguished from pleasure; compulsion is different from causation or motivation. Third, pleasure and fine things have to be intellected. But what about cases of cybernetics or brave new world situation(though it’s only vulgar pleasure); so these are mixed situations? Then voluntariness seems to be to act according a belief about what is fine and pleasant, which is to follow a natural teleological course. Thus it’s different from freedom to choose; or is it?

1110b 20
Non-willing is different from unwilling.

1110b 25
Actions caused by ignorance is different from actions done in ignorance.

1111a 1
Only ignorance of the particular, but not that of the universal or the principle of decision can be pardoned.

1111a 25
Is animal capable of acting voluntarily?

1111b 1
A supplementary argument is given, that factually you always know what ought to be desired, hence this is always voluntary.

1112b 5
Crafts are prone to fail, hence have to be guaranteed by knowledge. Thus an art is different from a science.

1112b 15
Means to end is deliberated; what’s deliberated is up to ourselves. What is necessary as a science is not deliberated.

1112b 20
An inquiry that proceeds backward in time in order to establish continuity and felicity, since the end is supreme over the present and has to be posited in actuality.

1113a 5
As long as a deliberation is traced back to the first cause, it is decided upon.

1113b 1
Excellent person is a measure of true values.

1114a 20
A temporal determination of responsibility.

1115b 30
Imitation.

1117a 20
State of character is different from rational calculation, though it’s also in accordance to reason(a decision). It’s because bravery has to be faced with dangers and chance in order to really stand firm, instead of a prior resolution of all difficulties.

1117b 20
Pleasant in the end, but not pleasant during the exercise of virtue.

1118b 30
Pleasure and pain are two dimensions in which temperance and intemperance can be judged. The pleasure one feels and the pain when the pleasure is deprived.

1119a 30
Particular actions, due to chance and particular circumstances, might be more involuntary than the forming of cowardice. But this account seems to differ from the previous one in which the action is totally under control. But it actually is not, since 1115a 1 states that action is under control “when particulars are known”.

4,5

1120b 1
an asymmetrical relationship between giving and taking; giving or using wealth is more properly virtuous than mere taking, taking is only necessary. Why?

1120b 10
Inheritors of wealth seem to be more generous.

1121a 25
Giving wrongly is easier to cure than not giving at all.

1121b 1
This seems strange; isn’t generosity largely unrelated to source? Generous person necessarily takes rightly, but his essence lies elsewhere? Taking rightly then seems to be a necessary condition; only those who care about the right ways of getting the money will care about where to spend it rightly.

1123a 15
Both the expenses and the objects have to be magnificent, fitting and fine.

1123b 5
Great things and vanity; greater things are different than great things.

1124a 20
What does “seem” mean in Aristotle?

1124b 5
Imitation.

1125a 30
Noble lie. Why not always speak of the truth? How this makes him more moderate? Can you speak too much truth? Because speaking truth is a mark of the great, thus greatness might hurt the inferior, and a magnanimous person restrains that. Or magnanimous person does not want truth to be tainted by the many. Or, truth when shared with the many will be more inferior than those shared with friends, so when conversing with the many he chooses the most convenient. Or, because the inferiors just look too pathetic...

1126a 10
Evil destroys itself.

1127a 15
Truthfulness is concerned with social life.

1127b 1
Truthfulness here is unrelated to justice.

1127b 30
The extreme deficiency is boastful.

1128a 10
Characters are judged by movements.

1129a 15
A state that’s a contrary has no contrary activities. A runner can run fast or slow, but a good person cannot be bad.

1129a 20
An articulation of the evidence of things.

1129b 5
Not only to choose what is good if without qualification, but to only choose what’s good for us.

1129b 15
Justice and political happiness.

1129b 30
Justice as the complete virtue that connects singular virtues into a whole. This is different from magnanimity which is an additional virtue.

1130a 10
(Complete) Virtue is justice; but virtue is only partial and singular, justice is when virtues appear as a whole. So virtue and justice are two sides of the same coin, one is more other-related.

Special justice is concerned with others, but is not concerned with a whole. It is the virtue of being fair to others; which is different from merely common dealings with others. How is this different? Perhaps it’s more concerned with substantial benefits than mental or spiritual. Or, in the case of justice, the person is more in a ruling position; thus is a special part that aspires to the whole. Or justice is more concerned with harmony and equality?

1130b 25
An education to make a good man perhaps differ from the prescription of the law to make good citizens.

1131a 30
Most intriguing; but if the good is more willing to give than to receive(perhaps not without qualification, like honor would be exceptional) then shouldn’t the proportion be different somehow? Or it’s because of distribution but not a voluntary gift from the good?

1132a 15
Rectificatory justice is more abstracted from qualities of the parties involved.

1132b 5
This seems not the type of arbitration prescribed by property law; equality is aimed at rather than the sanctity of private property. Or rather this seems to be more like an origin for private property consciousnesses. When a harm is done, the part grabbed has to be returned to restore equality.

1132b 25
The conflict between rectification and reciprocity.

1133a 10
How to equalize these products?

1133a 25
Need and desire?

1134a 25
Distinction between just and politically just. Politically just has to concern the law, ruling and being ruled.

1134b 20
Decision, feelings and justice. It seems that an unjust person does injustice with decision, and hence is more wicked.

1134b 15
Justice in the household.

1135a 10
A taxonomy: just—>a just action that is contrary to action of injustice—>an action of justice that rectifies injustice

1135b 25
Whenever his decision is the cause, he is wicked.

1137a 5
Decision seems to be more deeply rooted in state.

1137a 20
Doing acts of justice is not merely to do just actions, but to be in a certain state when acting them out.

Now justice is finally clarified as something human; so the genus and species of justice is linked by the fact that good and fine things have to be shared with others; hence telling jokes or speaking of truth does not have this aspect of giving what is good even it is good without qualification (wealth is not treated by the virtuous as good without qualification) and is concerned with equality in this sharing, that is to treat others as others.

6,7

1138b 20
The intermediate is determined by correct reason. It is requisite, to target at the intermediate, the reason has to be correct.

1139a 20
Beasts can be voluntary but do not have actions.

1139a 25
A decision can be good only when the reason is true and the desire is correct.

1139a 35
Decision is not the goal, but has to be goal-directed; character and thought has to be unified.

1139b 15
Why discuss science first?

1140a 20
Craft and fortune.

1140b 5
Mysterious; end in acting well itself?

1140b 15
Principles of things achievable in action are ends for actions?

1140b 25
Bizarre; seems to be saying that a voluntary error in craft signifies a higher capacity?

1141b 5
Not human good the wise man is looking for.

1142a 20
Are principles not universals? Principles are reached through induction, so by experience; but what’s the difference between principles of knowledge and principles of understanding?

1142b 15
Deliberation is not belief since it’s an action of inquiry.

1143a
What is comprehension?

1143a 25
Capacities or states?

1144b 1
This seems circular; prudence is useful for attaining the right good, a deliberative decision on good actions that aim at the good; but only a good man can be prudent.

1145a 1
It seems that cleverness is a gift; but prudence itself is involved in circularity.

Seems virtues of thought is no longer a mean.

1145a 20
Divine man.

1145b 5
Prove common beliefs.

If one knows what is good and intermediate but does not act as correct reason prescribes, one is incontinent?

1148b 30
Homosexuality is bestial.

Bestial incontinence seems to defy the former definition that one must know what’s good.

1149b 1
Can appetites follow reason? Spirit acts in accordance with reason’s arbitration of what’s right, but appetites only follow what’s pleasant.

1149b 20
Wanton aggression justly provokes anger since anger is felt in pain; and as wanton aggression is pleasant and unjust, incontinence of appetites is more unjust.

1150a 30
Intemperance is when people decide to pursue pleasure, incontinence when people decide but fail to not pursue, soft when one decide but cannot withstand the pains. Pleasures are overcome, pains are withstood.

1151a 15
Virtue teaches correct belief.

1151b 1
Continent person seems to abide by any belief, but this abiding is coincidental as a means, but in itself this abiding needs to be about the truth of his decision.

1151b 30
One can be too little motivated to stick to the decision, since he finds no pleasure in sticking to it or not.

1152a 30
Training is nature for human beings.

Some people say: Pleasure is a becoming, not an end......

1153a 1
Since pleasure is a becoming, a becoming can be good or bad, pleasure can also be good or bad. But pleasures thus are good and bad coincidentally. And pleasures themselves differ as without qualification or contingent.

1153a 10
But actually pleasures are not becomings, but ends in themselves that arise from activities.

1153a 15
Pleasures are activities unimpeded; activity-entelechy.

1153b 30
There’s something divine in everything so that people perhaps pursue the same pleasure after all.

1154b 20
Curative pleasures and natural pleasures.

1154b 25
Will the naturally pleasant in us perish too? I think yes; so what we can do is to balance out; but then can these pleasures still be called natural as opposed to curative?

8,9

1155a 5
Is love a proper modern substitute for friendship?

1155a 20
Friendship seems to be more general. Animals have friendships; what’s the difference?

1155a 25
It seems that friendship is more overarching than justice.

1156a 10
Do friends have to be aware of each other’s feelings in the same way?

1157b 20
Living together is prerequisite for friendship; distance does matter.

1158a 1
How is this “for oneself” different from other incomplete friendships?

1158a 15
Complete friendship is like an excess; an excess is usually directed at a single person. Why?

1158a 25
No one can endure the Good itself if he were in pain.

1158a 35
Superior in power have to be superior in virtue to reach the proportionate good required for friendship with the good person. Why proportionate? Perhaps that a father, if he is to be good, has to be a good father and not just a more general good man?

1158b 30
What does quantity and worth mean? Proportionate vs numerical? It seems to mean that the better you are does not make you a proportionately better friend, since you can get too good.

1159a 25
Being loved is enjoyed in its own right.

1159b 1
Loving is the virtue of friends.

Accusation happens when of the friends of utility, one person expects his friend to follow a character decision but he follows an exchange one; or vice versa.

1160a 25
Political or communal friendship aims at the advantageous.

1163a 20
The controlling element lies in decision in friends of virtue.

1165a 10
Reciprocity is not fair.

1165b 10
Debasement of friendship.

1166a 20
Everyone wants good accorded to his own thinking part while he himself remains the same.

1166a 25
He never regrets; while regret is a good feeling for incontinent person, not so for an excellent man. The excellent man doesn’t regret, so is not in conflict with one thing, thus always shares the same pleasure and the same distress.

1166b 20
A vicious person doesn’t enjoy or feel distressed by the same thing.

1167a 30
Common will vs common individual “interest”

1168a 5
An asymmetry between producing and product. Actuality.

1169a 5
Desire for the fine is better than the desire for the advantageous. Then is there a fundamental difference between city and man?

1169b 5
What about honor?

1169b 35
Observation of neighbors is easier.

1171a 1
Uncanny if you really think about it.

10

1172a 35
It’s wrong to say pleasure is base in order to achieve the intermediary.

1172b 5
True arguments are most useful because they harmonize with facts.

1173b 1
It’s impossible to be pleased quickly. Pleasure is not fast or slow; it’s not a movement in which every point of location can be determined throughout time; a feeling does not have determinable position; one might say a feeling changes fast, but each state of feeling in itself is positive.

1175a 1
Pleasure is not an object but an activity that accompanies the state. Pleasure completes activity; but is itself also an uninhibited activity.

1175b 30
Pleasure and activities are hardly distinguished.

1176a 1
Is pleasure now different from activity? How?

1176b 30
Some activities seem choiceworthy in themselves but are not, like amusement.

1179a 20
What we do and how we live control the answers to questions of our actions. Reasoning and facticity are inseparable to each other. A double harmony: arguments harmonize with facts in order to be true; and truth harmonizes again with action in order to be truly effective.

1179b 15
A premise of audience; a milder form of preaching to the choir.