Aristotle · 亚里士多德
Nicomachean Ethics · 尼各马可伦理学
Undated 未注日期
Nicomachean Ethics — Reading notes
Reflections · Apple Notes
Revised 23 July 2022
1
1094a 25
Knowledge to aim at what the action is directed
1094b 10
Why is on the city level more divine than individual? It certainly is grander and more difficult; how are they the same though? Same in kind?
1095a 10
Following feelings; knowledge vs action; form desires
1095b
Hermeneutic circle; one should proceed from things known to us; the ability to acquire beginnings
1096a 20
Idea is not quantitative (it does not cover a series) but it still is split into substance vs relative; many ways can good be said; so on a vertical plane the good can be spoken of in many categories, and on a horizontal plane the good can be spoken of in many particulars
1096a 30
Moreover since Man itself and a man do not differ in account, it’s not necessary to go to an idea of man.
1096b 5
A strange argument; but we do want to hold eternal good instead of passing ones.
1097a 10
A comparison to 1094a 25, in which a best (human) good that encompasses all achievable goods is spoken of
1097b 20
Happiness most complete; anti-utilitarianism. An end choiceworthy in itself is not the same as happiness; like a jazz band you can play your part and enjoy it and see it conform to a larger whole and enjoy it as well; there’s no conflict but is in harmony. But do they have intrinsic value when they fail to bring about happiness? It yes, what would that value depend upon? Is it perhaps its being the necessary condition/constituent (though not the sufficient) for happiness? Then it’s implied some ends are not valuable in themselves because if they fail to bring out what they promise they are immediately of no value.
Thus we have two possible interpretations. First being the positive one, that virtue is a content of happiness, that it does not lose itself in happiness. Second being the negative one, that virtue always has the potential to bring out happiness and is necessary for happiness to appear.
1099b 5
Happiness requires a supplement of external good; though it still remains the self-sufficient end; but how to reconcile these views? Is it simply not need any further?
1100a 5
Misfortune
1100b 30
The previous question in 1099b 5 answered here; self-sufficiency in a loose sense, that is stability.
1101b
Praise is for things undervalued; celebration is for happiness.
2,3
1103a 15
Virtue of thought from teaching and virtue of character from habit.
1103a 20
Virtue of character is not by nature, habituation is not nature.
1103a 30
A prior capacity to act virtuously, though not yet forming a habit.
1103b 5
The goal of legislation is to habituate.
1103b 10
A teaching of craft is analogous to a repetition of similar actions.
1103a 30
The purpose of this book is to become good; this is virtue of thought?
1104a 5
Actions under particular cases are not ruled by arts; but agents are compared to doctors and navigators; what’s the significance?
1104a 15
Use evident cases as guidance to not evident.
1104a 20
But is this really the case? Isn’t a virtuous person extraordinary? What about saints? Is it the mean or the right judgement of when an action should be done?
1104b 1
A spiral movement or a correspondence of form and content?
1104b 5
Virtue of character is all about pleasure and pain.
1104b 10
Can you model pleasure and pain by education?
1105a 15
Virtue is about pleasure and pain.
1105a 20
Becoming and being.
1105a 30
A virtuous action has to be conscious and voluntary, and has to be founded upon an axiological stance, that is, acting for the action’s own value. The source of action has to be involved. Thus action all by itself can only offer the chance of becoming good.
1105b 15
Philosophy as medicine and illness.
1105b 25
Pleasure and pain are implied by but not the same as feelings.
1106a 20
Virtue is a state, or a horizon, in which feelings appear in the good way and are good.
1106b 10
The mean is further elaborated; numerical or objective mean is differentiated from the relative mean.
1106b 15
How is virtue more exact than art?
1106b 20
The distinction between pleasure and pain and feelings are made to rashly; so are pleasure and pain generalizations of feelings? Virtue seems to be the state in relation to good feelings, to be virtuous is then to make good feelings.
1107a 5
Here the problem of the mean is solved; virtue is a mean in essence, but when considered in relation to good, virtue is an extremity.
1107a 25
Strange; virtue can both be sort of an extremity and a mean, but vice cannot be so; and is stated that a mean and extremities are mutually exclusive. Are these on different planes?
1107b 5
Not in all types, I suppose it’s the pleasure of virtue.
1108a 1
Names can sometimes not correspond to the content.
1108a 20
Not the way I expected; truthfulness seems to be more of an extreme, as opposed to untruth; this over-mean-understatement model seems to be not at first intuitive to me.
1108b 5
This is also very unintuitive; the spiteful person, in effect, sounds much more similar to the envious. Does the spiteful person enjoy others’ fortunes? It seems that a better word can be substituted.
1109a 10
Some extremes can be more opposed to the mean, so cowardice is opposed to bravery, not rashness. It might be in object itself, or it might be in our natural tendency.
1109b 20
Perception and particular.
1110a 15
As long as people have the principle of action within themselves, they always remain voluntary to a certain degree, though an evil action is never done for its own sake, thus if not mixed with aspirations of the good it will not be voluntary. Then are there only these categories: what about radical evil, the pure will to exert evil?
1110b 10
A retort against the claim that one is forced by pleasant or fine things. First, everyone in that sense will be forced. Second, we feel forced and painful under the force, but willing to act under pleasure or good; so the forcing has to be distinguished from pleasure; compulsion is different from causation or motivation. Third, pleasure and fine things have to be intellected. But what about cases of cybernetics or brave new world situation(though it’s only vulgar pleasure); so these are mixed situations? Then voluntariness seems to be to act according a belief about what is fine and pleasant, which is to follow a natural teleological course. Thus it’s different from freedom to choose; or is it?
1110b 20
Non-willing is different from unwilling.
1110b 25
Actions caused by ignorance is different from actions done in ignorance.
1111a 1
Only ignorance of the particular, but not that of the universal or the principle of decision can be pardoned.
1111a 25
Is animal capable of acting voluntarily?
1111b 1
A supplementary argument is given, that factually you always know what ought to be desired, hence this is always voluntary.
1112b 5
Crafts are prone to fail, hence have to be guaranteed by knowledge. Thus an art is different from a science.
1112b 15
Means to end is deliberated; what’s deliberated is up to ourselves. What is necessary as a science is not deliberated.
1112b 20
An inquiry that proceeds backward in time in order to establish continuity and felicity, since the end is supreme over the present and has to be posited in actuality.
1113a 5
As long as a deliberation is traced back to the first cause, it is decided upon.
1113b 1
Excellent person is a measure of true values.
1114a 20
A temporal determination of responsibility.
1115b 30
Imitation.
1117a 20
State of character is different from rational calculation, though it’s also in accordance to reason(a decision). It’s because bravery has to be faced with dangers and chance in order to really stand firm, instead of a prior resolution of all difficulties.
1117b 20
Pleasant in the end, but not pleasant during the exercise of virtue.
1118b 30
Pleasure and pain are two dimensions in which temperance and intemperance can be judged. The pleasure one feels and the pain when the pleasure is deprived.
1119a 30
Particular actions, due to chance and particular circumstances, might be more involuntary than the forming of cowardice. But this account seems to differ from the previous one in which the action is totally under control. But it actually is not, since 1115a 1 states that action is under control “when particulars are known”.
4,5
1120b 1
an asymmetrical relationship between giving and taking; giving or using wealth is more properly virtuous than mere taking, taking is only necessary. Why?
1120b 10
Inheritors of wealth seem to be more generous.
1121a 25
Giving wrongly is easier to cure than not giving at all.
1121b 1
This seems strange; isn’t generosity largely unrelated to source? Generous person necessarily takes rightly, but his essence lies elsewhere? Taking rightly then seems to be a necessary condition; only those who care about the right ways of getting the money will care about where to spend it rightly.
1123a 15
Both the expenses and the objects have to be magnificent, fitting and fine.
1123b 5
Great things and vanity; greater things are different than great things.
1124a 20
What does “seem” mean in Aristotle?
1124b 5
Imitation.
1125a 30
Noble lie. Why not always speak of the truth? How this makes him more moderate? Can you speak too much truth? Because speaking truth is a mark of the great, thus greatness might hurt the inferior, and a magnanimous person restrains that. Or magnanimous person does not want truth to be tainted by the many. Or, truth when shared with the many will be more inferior than those shared with friends, so when conversing with the many he chooses the most convenient. Or, because the inferiors just look too pathetic...
1126a 10
Evil destroys itself.
1127a 15
Truthfulness is concerned with social life.
1127b 1
Truthfulness here is unrelated to justice.
1127b 30
The extreme deficiency is boastful.
1128a 10
Characters are judged by movements.
1129a 15
A state that’s a contrary has no contrary activities. A runner can run fast or slow, but a good person cannot be bad.
1129a 20
An articulation of the evidence of things.
1129b 5
Not only to choose what is good if without qualification, but to only choose what’s good for us.
1129b 15
Justice and political happiness.
1129b 30
Justice as the complete virtue that connects singular virtues into a whole. This is different from magnanimity which is an additional virtue.
1130a 10
(Complete) Virtue is justice; but virtue is only partial and singular, justice is when virtues appear as a whole. So virtue and justice are two sides of the same coin, one is more other-related.
Special justice is concerned with others, but is not concerned with a whole. It is the virtue of being fair to others; which is different from merely common dealings with others. How is this different? Perhaps it’s more concerned with substantial benefits than mental or spiritual. Or, in the case of justice, the person is more in a ruling position; thus is a special part that aspires to the whole. Or justice is more concerned with harmony and equality?
1130b 25
An education to make a good man perhaps differ from the prescription of the law to make good citizens.
1131a 30
Most intriguing; but if the good is more willing to give than to receive(perhaps not without qualification, like honor would be exceptional) then shouldn’t the proportion be different somehow? Or it’s because of distribution but not a voluntary gift from the good?
1132a 15
Rectificatory justice is more abstracted from qualities of the parties involved.
1132b 5
This seems not the type of arbitration prescribed by property law; equality is aimed at rather than the sanctity of private property. Or rather this seems to be more like an origin for private property consciousnesses. When a harm is done, the part grabbed has to be returned to restore equality.
1132b 25
The conflict between rectification and reciprocity.
1133a 10
How to equalize these products?
1133a 25
Need and desire?
1134a 25
Distinction between just and politically just. Politically just has to concern the law, ruling and being ruled.
1134b 20
Decision, feelings and justice. It seems that an unjust person does injustice with decision, and hence is more wicked.
1134b 15
Justice in the household.
1135a 10
A taxonomy: just—>a just action that is contrary to action of injustice—>an action of justice that rectifies injustice
1135b 25
Whenever his decision is the cause, he is wicked.
1137a 5
Decision seems to be more deeply rooted in state.
1137a 20
Doing acts of justice is not merely to do just actions, but to be in a certain state when acting them out.
Now justice is finally clarified as something human; so the genus and species of justice is linked by the fact that good and fine things have to be shared with others; hence telling jokes or speaking of truth does not have this aspect of giving what is good even it is good without qualification (wealth is not treated by the virtuous as good without qualification) and is concerned with equality in this sharing, that is to treat others as others.
6,7
1138b 20
The intermediate is determined by correct reason. It is requisite, to target at the intermediate, the reason has to be correct.
1139a 20
Beasts can be voluntary but do not have actions.
1139a 25
A decision can be good only when the reason is true and the desire is correct.
1139a 35
Decision is not the goal, but has to be goal-directed; character and thought has to be unified.
1139b 15
Why discuss science first?
1140a 20
Craft and fortune.
1140b 5
Mysterious; end in acting well itself?
1140b 15
Principles of things achievable in action are ends for actions?
1140b 25
Bizarre; seems to be saying that a voluntary error in craft signifies a higher capacity?
1141b 5
Not human good the wise man is looking for.
1142a 20
Are principles not universals? Principles are reached through induction, so by experience; but what’s the difference between principles of knowledge and principles of understanding?
1142b 15
Deliberation is not belief since it’s an action of inquiry.
1143a
What is comprehension?
1143a 25
Capacities or states?
1144b 1
This seems circular; prudence is useful for attaining the right good, a deliberative decision on good actions that aim at the good; but only a good man can be prudent.
1145a 1
It seems that cleverness is a gift; but prudence itself is involved in circularity.
Seems virtues of thought is no longer a mean.
1145a 20
Divine man.
1145b 5
Prove common beliefs.
If one knows what is good and intermediate but does not act as correct reason prescribes, one is incontinent?
1148b 30
Homosexuality is bestial.
Bestial incontinence seems to defy the former definition that one must know what’s good.
1149b 1
Can appetites follow reason? Spirit acts in accordance with reason’s arbitration of what’s right, but appetites only follow what’s pleasant.
1149b 20
Wanton aggression justly provokes anger since anger is felt in pain; and as wanton aggression is pleasant and unjust, incontinence of appetites is more unjust.
1150a 30
Intemperance is when people decide to pursue pleasure, incontinence when people decide but fail to not pursue, soft when one decide but cannot withstand the pains. Pleasures are overcome, pains are withstood.
1151a 15
Virtue teaches correct belief.
1151b 1
Continent person seems to abide by any belief, but this abiding is coincidental as a means, but in itself this abiding needs to be about the truth of his decision.
1151b 30
One can be too little motivated to stick to the decision, since he finds no pleasure in sticking to it or not.
1152a 30
Training is nature for human beings.
Some people say: Pleasure is a becoming, not an end......
1153a 1
Since pleasure is a becoming, a becoming can be good or bad, pleasure can also be good or bad. But pleasures thus are good and bad coincidentally. And pleasures themselves differ as without qualification or contingent.
1153a 10
But actually pleasures are not becomings, but ends in themselves that arise from activities.
1153a 15
Pleasures are activities unimpeded; activity-entelechy.
1153b 30
There’s something divine in everything so that people perhaps pursue the same pleasure after all.
1154b 20
Curative pleasures and natural pleasures.
1154b 25
Will the naturally pleasant in us perish too? I think yes; so what we can do is to balance out; but then can these pleasures still be called natural as opposed to curative?
8,9
1155a 5
Is love a proper modern substitute for friendship?
1155a 20
Friendship seems to be more general. Animals have friendships; what’s the difference?
1155a 25
It seems that friendship is more overarching than justice.
1156a 10
Do friends have to be aware of each other’s feelings in the same way?
1157b 20
Living together is prerequisite for friendship; distance does matter.
1158a 1
How is this “for oneself” different from other incomplete friendships?
1158a 15
Complete friendship is like an excess; an excess is usually directed at a single person. Why?
1158a 25
No one can endure the Good itself if he were in pain.
1158a 35
Superior in power have to be superior in virtue to reach the proportionate good required for friendship with the good person. Why proportionate? Perhaps that a father, if he is to be good, has to be a good father and not just a more general good man?
1158b 30
What does quantity and worth mean? Proportionate vs numerical? It seems to mean that the better you are does not make you a proportionately better friend, since you can get too good.
1159a 25
Being loved is enjoyed in its own right.
1159b 1
Loving is the virtue of friends.
Accusation happens when of the friends of utility, one person expects his friend to follow a character decision but he follows an exchange one; or vice versa.
1160a 25
Political or communal friendship aims at the advantageous.
1163a 20
The controlling element lies in decision in friends of virtue.
1165a 10
Reciprocity is not fair.
1165b 10
Debasement of friendship.
1166a 20
Everyone wants good accorded to his own thinking part while he himself remains the same.
1166a 25
He never regrets; while regret is a good feeling for incontinent person, not so for an excellent man. The excellent man doesn’t regret, so is not in conflict with one thing, thus always shares the same pleasure and the same distress.
1166b 20
A vicious person doesn’t enjoy or feel distressed by the same thing.
1167a 30
Common will vs common individual “interest”
1168a 5
An asymmetry between producing and product. Actuality.
1169a 5
Desire for the fine is better than the desire for the advantageous. Then is there a fundamental difference between city and man?
1169b 5
What about honor?
1169b 35
Observation of neighbors is easier.
1171a 1
Uncanny if you really think about it.
10
1172a 35
It’s wrong to say pleasure is base in order to achieve the intermediary.
1172b 5
True arguments are most useful because they harmonize with facts.
1173b 1
It’s impossible to be pleased quickly. Pleasure is not fast or slow; it’s not a movement in which every point of location can be determined throughout time; a feeling does not have determinable position; one might say a feeling changes fast, but each state of feeling in itself is positive.
1175a 1
Pleasure is not an object but an activity that accompanies the state. Pleasure completes activity; but is itself also an uninhibited activity.
1175b 30
Pleasure and activities are hardly distinguished.
1176a 1
Is pleasure now different from activity? How?
1176b 30
Some activities seem choiceworthy in themselves but are not, like amusement.
1179a 20
What we do and how we live control the answers to questions of our actions. Reasoning and facticity are inseparable to each other. A double harmony: arguments harmonize with facts in order to be true; and truth harmonizes again with action in order to be truly effective.
1179b 15
A premise of audience; a milder form of preaching to the choir.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
1
1094a 25
借知识瞄准行动所指向者。
1094b 10
为什么城邦层面的比个体层面的更神圣?它当然更宏大,也更困难;但二者如何相同?种类相同?
1095a 10
追随感受;知识与行动;塑造欲望。
1095b
诠释学循环;应从我们已知的事物出发;获得开端的能力。
1096a 20
理念并非数量性的,不涵盖一个序列,但它仍被分为本体与关系;善可以用多种方式述说。因此,在纵向平面上,善可以在多种范畴中被述说;在横向平面上,善可以在多种特殊事物中被述说。
1096a 30
此外,既然“人本身”与某个人在论述上没有差别,就没有必要走向人的理念。
1096b 5
一个奇怪的论证;但我们确实想持有永恒的善,而非流逝的善。
1097a 10
与1094a 25比较,那里谈到一种涵盖所有可达成之善的最高的人之善。
1097b 20
幸福最为完整;反功利主义。自身值得选择的目的,不等于幸福。就像爵士乐队,你可以演奏自己的声部并享受它,也可以看到它符合更大的整体,并同样享受这一点;两者没有冲突,而是和谐。但当这些目的未能带来幸福时,它们仍有内在价值吗?如果有,这价值依赖于什么?也许依赖于它作为幸福的必要条件或组成部分,尽管不是充分条件?那么,这就意味着有些目的并非自身有价值,因为一旦未能带来其所承诺者,它们就立刻毫无价值。
因此,我们有两种可能的解读。第一种是肯定性的:德性是幸福的内容,不在幸福中丧失自身。第二种是否定性的:德性总有带来幸福的潜能,并且是幸福出现的必要条件。
1099b 5
幸福需要外部善的补充,却仍是自足的目的;这两种看法如何调和?是否只是说,不再需要更多?
1100a 5
厄运。
1100b 30
1099b 5中的问题在此得到回答:宽松意义上的自足,即稳定性。
1101b
赞许用于价值被低估的事物;颂扬用于幸福。
2,3
1103a 15
思想的德性来自教导,品格的德性来自习惯。
1103a 20
品格的德性不是自然的,习惯化不是自然。
1103a 30
先有依德性行动的能力,虽然尚未形成习惯。
1103b 5
立法的目标是习惯化。
1103b 10
技艺的教导类似于相似行动的重复。
1103a 30
本书的目的是变得善好;这是思想的德性吗?
1104a 5
具体情境中的行动不受技艺支配;但行动者却被比作医生和航海者,这有什么意义?
1104a 15
以显明的事例指导不显明的事例。
1104a 20
但果真如此吗?有德性的人难道不是超常的吗?圣人呢?关键是中道,还是对何时应当行动的正确判断?
1104b 1
螺旋运动,还是形式与内容的对应?
1104b 5
品格的德性完全关乎快乐和痛苦。
1104b 10
能否通过教育来塑造快乐与痛苦?
1105a 15
德性关乎快乐与痛苦。
1105a 20
生成与存在。
1105a 30
有德性的行动必须是有意识且自愿的,并且必须奠基于一种价值论立场,即为了行动自身的价值而行动。行动的源头必须参与其中。因此,单纯的行动本身只能提供变得善好的机会。
1105b 15
哲学作为医药与疾病。
1105b 25
感受蕴含快乐与痛苦,却不等同于快乐与痛苦。
1106a 20
德性是一种状态或视域,在其中,感受以善好的方式出现,并且是善好的。
1106b 10
进一步阐明中道:数目或客观的中间,与相对的中道被区分开。
1106b 15
德性如何比技艺更精确?
1106b 20
快乐和痛苦与感受之间的区分作得太仓促;那么,快乐和痛苦是感受的概括吗?德性似乎是与善好感受相关的状态,因此,有德性就是产生善好的感受。
1107a 5
中道的问题在此得到解决:德性在本质上是中道,但相对于善来考虑,德性是极端。
1107a 25
奇怪:德性既可以是某种极端,又可以是中道,但恶德却不可以;而且这里说,中道与极端互相排斥。这些是在不同平面上吗?
1107b 5
并非所有种类;我猜指的是德性的快乐。
1108a 1
名称有时可能不对应内容。
1108a 20
并非我预期的方式:诚实似乎更像一个与不诚实相对的极端;这种夸大—中道—低估的模型,乍看对我并不直观。
1108b 5
这也很不直观:幸灾乐祸者实际上听起来与嫉妒者更相似。幸灾乐祸者会享受他人的好运吗?似乎可以换一个更恰当的词。
1109a 10
某些极端可以与中道更为对立,所以与勇敢对立的是怯懦,而非鲁莽。这可能在对象本身,也可能在我们的自然倾向中。
1109b 20
知觉与特殊者。
1110a 15
只要行动原则在自身之内,人们就始终在一定程度上保持自愿,尽管恶行从不为其自身而被实行,因此若不混合着对善的向往,就不会是自愿的。那么,只有这些范畴吗?根本恶,即纯粹意欲行恶的意志,又如何?
1110b 10
反驳人被快乐或美好事物强迫的说法。第一,在这个意义上,每个人都会是被强迫的。第二,受到强力时,我们感到被迫和痛苦,但在快乐或善的影响下,却愿意行动;所以强迫必须与快乐区分,强制不同于因果作用或动机。第三,快乐与美好之物必须被理智理解。但控制论或《美丽新世界》式的情境又如何,尽管其中只是庸俗的快乐?这些是混合情境吗?那么,自愿似乎就是按照关于何为美好与快乐的信念来行动,也就是遵循一个自然的目的论进程。因此,它不同于选择的自由;还是并非如此?
1110b 20
非自愿(non-willing)不同于不情愿(unwilling)。
1110b 25
由无知造成的行动,不同于在无知中做出的行动。
1111a 1
只有对特殊情形的无知可以被宽恕,对普遍者或决断原则的无知却不可以。
1111a 25
动物能够自愿地行动吗?
1111b 1
给出一个补充论证:事实上,你总知道什么应当被欲求,因此这总是自愿的。
1112b 5
技艺容易失败,因此必须由知识来保障。所以技艺不同于科学。
1112b 15
被审议的是通向目的的手段;被审议者取决于我们自身。作为科学的必然者,不被审议。
1112b 20
一种在时间上倒退的探究,以建立连续性与顺遂,因为目的高于当下,必须被设定于现实中。
1113a 5
只要审议被追溯至第一原因,就作出了决断。
1113b 1
卓越的人是真实价值的尺度。
1114a 20
对责任的时间性规定。
1115b 30
模仿。
1117a 20
品格状态不同于理性计算,尽管它也符合理性,即一种决断。这是因为勇敢必须面对危险与机运,才能真正站稳,而非预先解决一切困难。
1117b 20
最终是快乐的,但在行使德性时并不快乐。
1118b 30
快乐与痛苦是判断节制与不节制的两个维度:所感到的快乐,以及快乐被剥夺时的痛苦。
1119a 30
由于机运和具体情境,特殊行动可能比怯懦的形成更为非自愿。但这似乎不同于此前行动完全受控制的论述。实际上并非如此,因为1115a 1说的是,“当具体情形被知晓时”,行动才受控制。
4,5
1120b 1
给予与获取之间的不对称关系:给予或使用财富,比单纯获取更恰当地具有德性;获取只是必要的。为什么?
1120b 10
继承财富的人似乎更慷慨。
1121a 25
错误地给予,比完全不给予更容易医治。
1121b 1
这似乎很奇怪:慷慨不是大体与来源无关吗?慷慨者必定正确地获取,但他的本质在别处?那么,正确获取似乎是必要条件:只有关心如何正确得到金钱的人,才会关心如何正确花费。
1123a 15
支出与对象都必须宏伟、适切而美好。
1123b 5
伟大之事与虚荣;更伟大之事不同于伟大之事。
1124a 20
“似乎”在亚里士多德那里意味着什么?
1124b 5
模仿。
1125a 30
高贵的谎言。为什么不总说真话?这如何使他更适度?真话会说得太多吗?因为说真话是伟大者的标志,而伟大可能伤害低下者,所以高尚者对此加以克制。或者,高尚者不愿真理被众人玷污。或者,与众人分享的真理会比与朋友分享的更低等,所以与众人交谈时,他选择最方便的说法。或者,因为低下者看起来实在太可怜……
1126a 10
恶毁灭自身。
1127a 15
诚实关乎社会生活。
1127b 1
这里的诚实与正义无关。
1127b 30
极端的不足是自夸。
1128a 10
品格通过举动来判断。
1129a 15
一种作为相反者的状态,不会有相反的活动。跑者可以跑得快或慢,但善人不可能是恶的。
1129a 20
对事物明见性的阐明。
1129b 5
不仅选择无条件地善的东西,而是只选择对我们善的东西。
1129b 15
正义与政治幸福。
1129b 30
正义作为完整的德性,把单个德性联系为整体。这不同于作为附加德性的高尚。
1130a 10
完整的德性就是正义;但德性只是部分的、单个的,正义则是诸德性呈现为整体时的情形。所以德性与正义是一体两面,其中一面更多关联他人。
特殊正义关乎他人,却不关乎整体。它是公平对待他人的德性,不同于单纯与他人的一般交往。有什么不同?也许它更多关乎实质利益,而非心理或精神利益。或者,在正义中,此人更多处于统治的位置,因此是一个向往整体的特殊部分。或者,正义更多关乎和谐与平等?
1130b 25
旨在造就善人的教育,或许不同于旨在造就好公民的法律规定。
1131a 30
极为有趣;但如果善人更愿给予而非接受,也许并非无条件如此,比如荣誉可能是例外,那么比例是否应当有所不同?或者,因为这是分配,而非善人自愿的赠予?
1132a 15
矫正正义更多地抽离了有关各方的性质。
1132b 5
这似乎不是财产法规定的那种仲裁;其目标是平等,而非私有财产的神圣性。或者更确切地说,这似乎更像私有财产意识的起源。损害发生后,被夺取的部分必须归还,以恢复平等。
1132b 25
矫正与互惠之间的冲突。
1133a 10
如何使这些产品相等?
1133a 25
需要与欲望?
1134a 25
正义与政治正义的区别。政治正义必须关乎法律、统治与被统治。
1134b 20
决断、感受与正义。不义者似乎是在决断中行不义,因此更加邪恶。
1134b 15
家庭中的正义。
1135a 10
一种分类:正义——>与不义行动相反的正义行动——>矫正不义的正义行为。
1135b 25
只要他的决断是原因,他就是邪恶的。
1137a 5
决断似乎更深地扎根于状态。
1137a 20
实行正义行为,不只是做出正义的行动,还必须在实行时处于某种状态。
现在,正义终于被澄清为属人的东西:正义的属与种由这样的事实联系起来,即善好与美好之物必须同他人分享。因此,讲笑话或说真话没有这种给予善好者的面向,即使所给予者是无条件的善,尽管有德性者不把财富视作无条件的善;正义还关乎分享中的平等,即把他人作为他人来对待。
6,7
1138b 20
中道由正确理性规定。要瞄准中道,理性就必须正确。
1139a 20
野兽可以是自愿的,却没有行动。
1139a 25
只有理性为真、欲望正确时,决断才能善好。
1139a 35
决断不是目标,但必须指向目标;品格与思想必须统一。
1139b 15
为什么先讨论科学?
1140a 20
技艺与机运。
1140b 5
神秘:目的在于善好地行动本身?
1140b 15
行动中可达成之物的原则,是行动的目的?
1140b 25
奇怪:似乎在说,技艺中的自愿失误表明更高的能力?
1141b 5
智者所寻求的不是人之善。
1142a 20
原则不是普遍者吗?原则通过归纳而达到,因此通过经验;但知识的原则与理解的原则有什么不同?
1142b 15
审议不是信念,因为它是一种探究活动。
1143a
什么是领会?
1143a 25
能力还是状态?
1144b 1
这似乎是循环:审慎有助于达到正确的善,是对以善为目标的善好行动的审议决断;但只有善人才能审慎。
1145a 1
机敏似乎是一种天赋;但审慎本身卷入了循环。
思想的德性似乎不再是中道。
1145a 20
神圣之人。
1145b 5
证明共同信念。
一个人如果知道何为善与中道,却不按正确理性的规定行动,就是不能自制吗?
1148b 30
同性恋是兽性的。
兽性的不能自制似乎违背了先前的定义,即一个人必须知道何为善。
1149b 1
欲望能追随理性吗?血气按照理性对何为正确的裁定行事,但欲望只追随快乐。
1149b 20
肆意侵害正当地激起愤怒,因为愤怒是在痛苦中感受的;而肆意侵害是快乐且不义的,因此欲望的不能自制更为不义。
1150a 30
不节制,是决断去追求快乐;不能自制,是决断不追求,却未能做到;软弱,是作出决断却无法承受痛苦。快乐需要克服,痛苦需要承受。
1151a 15
德性教导正确的信念。
1151b 1
能自制者似乎坚持任何信念,但这种坚持作为手段是偶然的;就其自身而言,这种坚持必须关乎其决断的真实性。
1151b 30
一个人可能缺乏足够的动力坚持决断,因为无论坚持与否,他都找不到快乐。
1152a 30
训练是人的自然。
有人说:快乐是一种生成,而非目的……
1153a 1
既然快乐是一种生成,而生成可以好或坏,快乐也可以好或坏。但如此,快乐只是偶然地好或坏。而快乐本身也分为无条件的与有条件的。
1153a 10
但事实上,快乐不是生成,而是从活动中产生的自身目的。
1153a 15
快乐是不受阻碍的活动;活动—圆成(entelechy)。
1153b 30
万物中都有某种神圣的东西,因此人们也许终究追求的是同一种快乐。
1154b 20
医治性的快乐与自然的快乐。
1154b 25
我们身上自然令人快乐之物也会消亡吗?我认为会;所以我们能做的就是平衡。但如此,这些快乐还可以相对于医治性的快乐而被称为自然的吗?
8,9
1155a 5
爱可以作为友谊的恰当现代替代词吗?
1155a 20
友谊似乎更一般。动物也有友谊;区别何在?
1155a 25
友谊似乎比正义更具统摄性。
1156a 10
朋友必须以同样方式意识到彼此的感情吗?
1157b 20
共同生活是友谊的前提;距离确实重要。
1158a 1
这种“为了自身”与其它不完整的友谊有何不同?
1158a 15
完整的友谊如同一种过量;过量通常指向单独一个人。为什么?
1158a 25
一个人若处于痛苦中,即便是善本身,他也无法忍受。
1158a 35
权力上优越者,也必须在德性上优越,才能达到与善人结交所需的相称之善。为什么是相称的?也许,一个父亲若要善好,就必须是好父亲,而不只是更一般意义上的好人?
1158b 30
数量与价值意味着什么?比例相称与数目相等?似乎是说,你越善好,并不意味着你按比例成为更好的朋友,因为你可能过于善好。
1159a 25
被爱本身就令人享受。
1159b 1
爱是朋友的德性。
功利友谊中,当一人期待朋友依品格作出决断,自己却依交换作出决断,或者反过来,就会出现责备。
1160a 25
政治或共同体的友谊,以有利者为目标。
1163a 20
德性友谊中,起支配作用的因素在于决断。
1165a 10
互惠并不公平。
1165b 10
友谊的败坏。
1166a 20
每个人都希望善归于自己的思考部分,而自己仍保持相同。
1166a 25
他从不后悔;后悔对不能自制者而言是好感受,对卓越者却不是。卓越者不后悔,因此不与某物相冲突,也就始终分享相同的快乐与相同的痛苦。
1166b 20
恶德者不会因同一事物而享受或痛苦。
1167a 30
共同意志与共同的个人“利益”。
1168a 5
生产与产物之间的不对称。现实性。
1169a 5
对美好者的欲望,优于对有利者的欲望。那么,城邦与人之间是否有根本差异?
1169b 5
荣誉呢?
1169b 35
观察身边的人更容易。
1171a 1
如果认真想一想,便觉得诡异。
10
1172a 35
为了达到中道而说快乐是卑下的,这是错误的。
1172b 5
真实的论证最为有用,因为它们与事实和谐。
1173b 1
不可能快速地快乐。快乐没有快慢;它不是一种在时间中每个位置都可确定的运动。感受没有可确定的位置;可以说感受变化得快,但每个感受状态自身都是肯定的。
1175a 1
快乐不是对象,而是伴随状态的活动。快乐使活动完整,但它自身也是不受阻碍的活动。
1175b 30
快乐与活动几乎无法区分。
1176a 1
快乐现在不同于活动了吗?如何不同?
1176b 30
有些活动似乎自身值得选择,实际上却不是,比如消遣。
1179a 20
我们做什么、如何生活,支配着对我们行动问题的回答。推理与事实性不可分离。一种双重和谐:论证与事实和谐,才能为真;真理又与行动和谐,才能真正有效。
1179b 15
对听众的预设:一种较温和的向信众布道。