Aristotle · 亚里士多德
Number and mathematics · 数与数学
Undated 未注日期
数与数学——散记
Reflections · Pages
古希腊的数在根本上是可理解可学习之物。因此柏拉图只将科学奠基在对理念的探究上,而亚里士多德则要求对感觉物的抽象(也就是仅仅关注感觉物的有限部分,而去除物的潜能)。这与现代经典数学中的“无限精确”的数已经差异开了。
而在亚那里,数作为感觉物的抽象的好处在于,对数进行计算时随时可以展开对单位的更换,因为单位实际上就是被抽象官能所选取的衡量尺度,因此是可变更的;所以除法才不会是问题。
并且,亚那里的整体性并非来自于理念,而是来自于自然可感的存在,来自接触和连接
这样终于可以搞懂形而上学最后几卷在讲什么了,其实就是说柏拉图不必要地把数学给抬高了,然而数学实际上就是一个和可感物关联的区域而已;如果要讨论理念就按第一哲学的形式讨论,没有必要去把存在硬往数身上套;比起“有多少”,更重要的是“是什么”。
亚里士多德对柏拉图的根本颠覆在于将计数和测量的“行动”引入了对数的内在本质的决定当中。从他以后,数不再是理念,而是依赖于存在的一性通过计数而获得决定的一种属性。将一性的单位进行最高程度的抽象,就获得了“作为纯粹单位的单位”之间的运算法则,并可以普遍地应用到一切可计数之物上。奇偶性也就不再是决定数的理念,而是被数所决定的属性之属性。
而这个的直接后果有两个:1.数字将不再被自在地考虑,而将被视为测量的伴生物被考察,这直接影响了欧几里得的探究,因为欧几里得不再探讨每个数的数性,而是仅仅探讨每个数之间的测量关系
2.也正是为此,亚里士多德为理论算学的可能性做出了奠基,理论算学因此压抑了理念数学而成为了现代数学的基本范式
亚里士多德对柏拉图理念数学说的批评最致命的一点就在于理念数如何被计算,也就是理念数如何过渡到数学算数。这个似乎可以从理念内容的沉淀这个角度去解决,所以最后数学算数仅仅保有了一与多的纯粹形式,而其理念内容则成为了沉淀的意义,需要被重新激活。但问题还是因为柏拉图这个未成文学说缺失的部分太多了,只能知道有理念数这个东西在,但具体怎么构成体系的只能靠猜。什么时候读读图宾根学派的东西,看看是怎么重构的。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
Ancient Greek numbers are fundamentally things that can be understood and learned. Plato therefore grounds science solely in inquiry into Ideas, whereas Aristotle requires abstraction from sensible things: attending only to a limited part of sensible things and removing their potentiality. This already differs from the “infinitely precise” numbers of modern classical mathematics.
For Aristotle, the advantage of number as an abstraction from sensible things is that, when calculating with numbers, one can always change the unit. The unit is actually the measuring standard selected by the faculty of abstraction, and can therefore be changed. Division thus presents no problem.
Moreover, wholeness in Aristotle comes not from Ideas, but from naturally sensible being, from contact and connection.
Now I can finally understand what the last books of the Metaphysics are saying. The point is really that Plato unnecessarily elevates mathematics, whereas mathematics is merely a domain related to sensible things. If one wants to discuss Ideas, one should do so in the form of first philosophy; there is no need to force being into number. More important than “how many” is “what it is.”
Aristotle’s fundamental overturning of Plato consists in introducing the “acts” of counting and measuring into the determination of number’s intrinsic essence. After him, number is no longer an Idea, but a property dependent on being’s oneness and determined through counting. By abstracting units of oneness to the highest degree, one obtains rules of operation between “units as pure units,” which can be applied universally to everything countable. Oddness and evenness are thus no longer Ideas determining numbers, but properties of properties determined by numbers.
This has two direct consequences: 1. Numbers will no longer be considered in themselves, but investigated as accompaniments of measurement. This directly influences Euclid’s inquiry: he no longer investigates the numerical nature of each number, but only the relations of measurement between numbers.
2. For this very reason, Aristotle lays the foundation for the possibility of theoretical arithmetic. Theoretical arithmetic thus suppresses eidetic mathematics and becomes the basic paradigm of modern mathematics.
The most fatal point in Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s doctrine of eidetic mathematics concerns how eidetic numbers can be calculated: how eidetic number passes into mathematical arithmetic. This could perhaps be resolved from the perspective of the sedimentation of eidetic content. Mathematical arithmetic would ultimately retain only the pure form of one and many, while its eidetic content became sedimented meaning requiring reactivation. But the problem remains that too much of Plato’s unwritten doctrine is missing. We can only know that there is such a thing as eidetic number; how it forms a system can only be guessed. I should read the Tübingen school sometime and see how they reconstruct it.