Aristotle · 亚里士多德
Physics · 物理学
Undated 未注日期
物理学——散记
Reflections · Pages
亚物理学中的三个疑难:
1.为什么物总自然地向某个地方移动?因为宇宙不是无限大的,否则就一定会有实无穷的问题,因此宇宙是有边界的。有边界就意味着有其自然区分的地方。
2.为什么某物占据的空间不能是一个地方?因为“占据的空间”是完全同质化的,无论是整体还是部分都占据着同样的空间,因此假如空间就是地方,就会面临地方里面套着无限个地方的情况。地方因此必须是异质且可区分的,而且整体和部分的层次也可以分清楚的。因此地方被定义为不动的边界。
3.为什么箭矢出弦后依然保持运动?这是因为弦激活了空气,使空气可以持续激发运动。力不是直接持续作用在箭矢上,因为力需要接触,也因此需要彼此连接的空气传递此力。这与蒂迈欧的解决方案不同,蒂迈欧的“循环互替”运动在亚看来只能解决“为什么事物运动”而不能解决“为什么箭矢离弦还在运动”。
关于第二个疑难:为什么不能说整体占据了一个空间,部分则是对整体空间的再次划分,如此将实无穷转化成潜无穷?然而这是不行的,因为整体和部分所占据的空间是同质的,其根据仅仅是“被占据”,因此整体和部分所占据的空间总是处于同一个本体论层级,没有办法区分出潜在与实在。但是整体和部分的边界是有实在和潜在的区分的,整体有其不动的边界,而部分也有其自己不动的边界,一切地方都因此被刻画完成。边界是刻画描摹出来的:实在的边界可以开放出内部潜在的边界。
哪怕对于线来说也是一样的,并不是占据的长度是更大的占据的长度的部分,而是不同的边界规定了实在的整体与潜在的部分。
因此重点不是空间的可分性,可分性是事物的本性,也是实在与潜在之差异可能的条件(“可”分性);重点是空间的同质性允许这一实在与潜在的分割被取消,让被分出来的部分与未分的整体同样地占据。这才是亚真正的反驳。
虽然诸物的边界可以重叠,但分有边界依然将诸物差异开;而仅仅讨论纯粹的对某空间的占有,整体与部分是无法单独从这一点被差异开的,因为有无数的事物及事物的集合会占有或正占有着这同一块空间,空间因此无法把物与物、整体与部分区分开来。
所以其实可以化简为一个定义问题:如果地方被定义为“被某个事物所占据的”,那地方就将可以指涉无限的事物,地方就相应地可以指涉无限的其它地方,这是荒谬的,否则我们不能有意义地描述地方;因此只能把它定义为“一个被事物独一占据的空间,而此事物不会占据另一个空间”,这就将占据转化成了边界问题了
亚里士多德的时间论
时间是对物运动的计数,而这种计数仰赖于设置一种运动为计数单位。因此时间测量运动,而运动测量时间。时间在某种意义上是由现在构成的,但现在不是时间的部分,因为现在是一种绵延。现在连接着过去和未来,因为在运动中的物在运动时保持着稳定性,而现在是对运动之物的对应,因为运动之物的稳定性保证了上个现在和下个现在的连续性。因此现在并不能类比于线段上的点;同一个点作为起始和终结必须被划分到不同的两条线段上,因此当中有着断裂和停顿,而绵延的现在没有停顿。现在因此只能是运动的边界,却不是“现在点”也不是“部分时间”。同样,由于时间的测量要求运动之间的通约性,因此运动需要有同质性;这并不意味着运动本身要是均质的,而只要求(意义重大的)运动彼此之间有前定和谐。此外,由于时间的计数要求前端和尾端保持一致,圆周运动就成为了时间最可理解的表征对象,太阳-钟表的意义才得以指定。
此外,由于时间成为了计数,时间因此被理想化了(进入了灵魂和理解的范畴)并包围了一切运动;如果没有运动,时间就不会“存在”,但如果存在运动,时间必然超出一切运动。只是这里亚里士多德并没有澄清这是否是因为灵魂的运动独立于自然的运动。
亚里士多德物理学遭遇的最大挑战其实不是四因说的划界问题,也不是自然与技艺的等式问题,而是更本源的:他想要决定自然的本质为何,这不就意味着他想要确定“自然之自然”吗?
所以亚里士多德从开始就告诉你了:要是拿幽邃解明晰,看不见是你的事。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
Three Difficulties in Aristotle’s Physics:
1. Why do things always move naturally toward some place? Because the cosmos is not infinitely large; otherwise there would necessarily be a problem of actual infinity. The cosmos therefore has boundaries, and having boundaries means having naturally differentiated places.
2. Why cannot the space a thing occupies be a place? Because “occupied space” is wholly homogeneous: whole and parts alike occupy the same space. If space were place, we would therefore face infinitely many places nested within a place. Place must instead be heterogeneous and distinguishable, with the levels of whole and part also distinguishable. Place is therefore defined as an unmoving boundary.
3. Why does an arrow remain in motion after leaving the bowstring? Because the string activates the air, allowing it to continue stimulating motion. Force does not act directly and continuously upon the arrow, because force requires contact and therefore needs interconnected air to transmit it. This differs from Timaeus’ solution. Aristotle thinks Timaeus’ motion of “circular mutual replacement” can explain only “why things move,” not “why an arrow keeps moving after leaving the string.”
Concerning the second difficulty: why can we not say that the whole occupies a space, while parts are further divisions of the whole’s space, thereby converting actual infinity into potential infinity? This will not work, because the spaces occupied by whole and parts are homogeneous, grounded solely in “being occupied.” They therefore always belong to the same ontological level, with no way to distinguish potentiality and actuality. The boundaries of whole and parts, however, do admit a distinction between actual and potential. The whole has its unmoving boundary, while each part has its own unmoving boundary; all places are thereby delineated. Boundaries are traced out: an actual boundary can open up potential boundaries within it.
The same holds even for a line. It is not that an occupied length is part of a greater occupied length; rather, different boundaries determine the actual whole and its potential parts.
The point is therefore not space’s divisibility. Divisibility is the nature of things and the condition making the difference between actuality and potentiality possible: the possibility of division. The point is that space’s homogeneity allows this division between actuality and potentiality to be canceled, letting divided parts and the undivided whole occupy in the same way. This is Aristotle’s real objection.
Although things’ boundaries can overlap, their having boundaries still differentiates them. Merely discussing the pure occupation of some space cannot by itself differentiate whole and parts, because countless things and collections of things will occupy or are occupying the same space. Space thus cannot distinguish thing from thing, or whole from part.
This can actually be reduced to a problem of definition. If place is defined as “what is occupied by a thing,” place can refer to infinitely many things, and correspondingly to infinitely many other places. This is absurd; otherwise we cannot describe place meaningfully. We must therefore define it as “a space uniquely occupied by a thing that does not occupy another space.” This converts occupation into a problem of boundaries.
Aristotle’s Theory of Time
Time is the numbering of things’ motion, and this numbering depends on establishing a motion as the unit of counting. Time therefore measures motion, and motion measures time. In a sense, time is constituted by nows, but the now is not a part of time, because the now is a duration. The now connects past and future because the moving thing preserves stability in moving, and the now corresponds to the moving thing. Its stability guarantees continuity between the previous and following now. The now therefore cannot be compared to a point on a line segment. The same point, as beginning and end, must be assigned to two different segments, introducing a break and a pause; the enduring now has no pause. The now can therefore only be motion’s boundary, not a “now-point” or a “part of time.” Likewise, because measuring time requires commensurability among motions, motions need homogeneity. This does not mean that motion itself must be uniform, only that significant motions have a pre-established harmony among them. Furthermore, because numbering time requires consistency between leading and trailing ends, circular motion becomes time’s most intelligible object of representation, allowing the meaning of sun and clock to be specified.
Moreover, because time becomes a numbering, it is idealized, entering the domain of soul and understanding, and encompasses all motion. Without motion, time would not “exist”; if motion exists, however, time necessarily exceeds every motion. Aristotle does not clarify here whether this is because the soul’s motion is independent of natural motion.
The greatest challenge confronting Aristotle’s physics is not really how to demarcate the four causes, or the equation of nature and art, but something more originary: he wants to determine what nature’s essence is. Does this not mean he wants to determine the “nature of nature”?
So Aristotle tells you from the start: if you use the obscure to explain the clear, your failure to see is your own problem.