Gui Ruiyan

Aristotle · 亚里士多德
Physics · 物理学

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Physics — Reading notes

Reflections · Apple Notes

Revised 12 December 2022

In this note / 篇目

I

184a 10
To know things is to know their starting points: is this well founded?

184a 20
How can there be things more knowable by nature yet not so to us? What does knowable mean?

A human being knows things in her particular way. As she knows only particular things, she remains fettered in a natural attitude. She starts to get confused, however, and wants to investigate the causes of things. From here she starts to go beyond her particular build and tries to determine the ground of the world’s making. Things can be knowable because things are knowable by nature, and this universal is inherent in the particulars; otherwise it’s impossible that things get harmonized into one. Yet as this universal itself is also a particular universal, not everyone can know it from the start. So she knows the universal from the particulars and gradually she comes to be in a particular way: that she particularly knows the universal. Yet wouldn’t this knowledge again be disjointed from every particular life? Would she not hold one particular perspective? This problem is avoided in two ways. First for every universal is particular as the universal, so that it is a particular kind of particular. The universal is that which self-particularizes, so that every knowledge of her goes over the boundaries and is always both particular and not particular. And this same thing goes for herself, as she desires to know the universal, and that includes her own particular way of being. As she knows her self, she is beyond herself and becomes self-sufficient in thought. So this is what is meant when Aristotle says that one starts from what is knowable to us, as what is particularly and unreflectively given, to what is knowable by nature, that is the universal singular. Natural attitude is the unamazed and uninterested attitude toward things, or amazed yet not rigorous enough to radically shape a fruitful reflection.

184b 10
A peculiar position; to start from the universal. Is this kind of the opposite to Plato’s method?

II

192b 10
A self-principle of natural things.

192b 20
Nature is a principle and is necessary. A table does not will to change into something else because its principle lies outside, but the material wills to change.

193a 1
Nature is a principle; a substance has a principle in itself. Other properties belong to substance but are not its nature and do not have nature in themselves.

193a 5
Self-obviousness might be lacking to some people.

193a 25
Underlying material is nature?

193a 30
Form is nature?

193b 5
Separable, the form and the thing, in speech.

193b 10
Actuality superior than potentiality; form superior than material.

193b 10
Even if we say material is nature of crafted beings, forms are still nature, as are for non-crafted beings: like human. But is this a potential drawing close of form to material?

193b 15
Nature as pouring forth to nature as possessed. Nature, something that grows, is spoken of not as what it grows from, different from medicine(which is called medical, not healthy), but is spoken of in relation to what it grows into. Teleology.

193b 20
Lack and contrary.

193b 35
Separation from movement.

194a 1
Ideas are less separable than mathematical objects from nature. Reverse geometry.

194a 35
An end is twofold: the last thing and the for-the-sake-of-which. Nature is, as the form, the last thing and the best. This is premised on the analogy between natural science and craft. Potential conflicts: are sun and human beings forms as telos or are they principles? Are forms principles or ends?

194b 25
Form is a kind of cause. Four causes are presented. Yet is form not spoken of as an end previously? And are the four causes always present?

195b 1
Remote causes: wandering causes?

195b 5
Different precisions of accounts.

195b 15
Different ways to present causes in account.

195b 35
Chance as cause.

196b 30
Definition of luck and chance.

196b 15
Things come to be might not have end.

197a 5
Luck and thought are concerned with the same things: luck must be about deliberate choice.

197b 20
Definition of chance.

197b 35
Contrary to nature: internal cause? How can nature become its contrary: if it’s nature?

198a 10
Luck and chance are necessarily posterior to thinking and nature: for chance is coincidental and inferior to the intrinsic; and chance itself is merely indefinite, not nothing.

198a 25
The causes except for the material causes are often conflated.

198a 30
Immovable things.

198b 5
The form is immovable; what are other things entirely immovable? Why the distinction?

198b 20
A conflict between causes: necessity present vs telos absent.

198b 30
Sounds like Aristotle’s countering theory of evolution.

199a 5
Is it not already established that luck is for the sake of something?

199a 10
A seemingly imposed equivalence between nature and craft.

199b 10
The undifferentiated first: a seed.

199b 15
The very essence of nature: the very nature of nature.

200a 20
Mathematics is necessary in one direction; but things come to be are necessary in the double direction from end to material and from material to end.

200a 30
End is independent from material and rules over material and has to be studied more.

200b 5
The account can gather material in itself and itself is the formal cause and the end; yet the account itself is again a starting point for the end.

III

200b 20
Necessary seeming conditions for motion: place, void, time.

200b 25
Some things are actual, some potential, some potential and actual. Movement is relative.

201a 5
A correspondence between being and movement.

201a 10
Movement is only when it’s actualized. But what is actualization itself? Are not all actualizations movements?

201a 25
An immovable mover.

201a 30
Actualization itself is different from movement because it can be actualization of its being, which is not a potential.

201b 10
The complete actualization of a potential is no movement.

201b 25
Movement is mistaken to some categories because it’s indefinite; but it’s indefinite in the sense that it has to involve both categories in itself.

202a 5
Movement of one sort is always in two directions for contact is needed. The mover bear in itself a form that regulates the movement as a cause.

202a 15
The same being of movement, but separate accounts.

202b 10
The activation is not the same for both in the sense of having the same being, but rather the potential being actualized is the same for both. The movement is the same for both in the sense that movement is always the actualization of a potential, which necessarily involves a non-actualization in itself. The inhibition is the non-actualization.

203b 5
The unlimited is thought to only be a starting point.

203b 25
If what’s outside is unlimited, it also has unlimited body and multitude, since it’s here and can only be here in continuity of body. And unlimited place is also necessarily followed by unlimited body because what’s unlimited in possibility is unlimited in actuality.

204a 10
The unlimited cannot be separate from perceptibles, because it has magnitude and should be divisible, as we speak of unlimited in mathematics and bodies. But if it is a coincident of perceptibles, it cannot be an element or starting point.

204a 20
But unlimited cannot be an active starting point, since then every part of it will be itself unlimited, composed of many unlimiteds: this is impossible. But if it is indivisible it cannot be active, for what’s actual (body) has a quantity. So far in physics, there’s no unlimited itself as an actual body.

204b 1
This conclusion doesn’t exclude the possibility of an intelligible unlimited itself as a non-body.

204b 15
Unlimited body is not composite if the elements are limited in number, for one element being unlimited will destroy others or all elements unlimited will create a body with unlimited extension.

204b 30
A simple unlimited body from which elements come to be is impossible for it’s not observed anywhere. And it’s not even possible for the whole universe to come to be of one element, since things transform from contraries to contraries.

205a 15
If there is an unlimited body, the place any body takes will be unlimited, and there will be no determination on rest and motion.

205b 1
A body has to match its place and vice versa. To say the unlimited is not moving is not enough; but the not moving has to be explained through its nature.

Limitedness is polarity.

206a 20
A radical difference between potential and actual unlimitedness.

206b 1
The unlimited is not the substance: but with a limited thing, always one thing followed by another.

206b 20
The unlimited in addition is by infinitely reaching for the limit; the unlimited in division is by infinitely dividing up; each suppose a pre-limited magnitude. There is no unlimited in exceeding every definite magnitude in addition, for that will premise an actual unlimited that can always be unendingly traversed.

207a 1
Unlimited is not what nothing is outside of, but what something is always an outside of.

207a 10
Unlimited is not complete, for complete needs an end that nothing is outside of. A ring is not unlimited in a strict sense, for it can go unendingly, yet the next outside is merely distinct to the previous one, but the same throughout the course. So a circle has a limit but can go unendingly.

207a 20
The dignity of the unlimited is derived from that of the complete. Unlimited is like the matter of the form, which is a whole. If the unlimited should define perceptibles it would define intelligibles as well, which is absurd.

IV

208b 20
Space not only is position, but also a natural capacity.

209a 1
That without which nothing can exist but it can exist without others comes first.

209a 10
A point can not be distinguished from its place.

209a 15
Space has magnitude but no body; thus corporeal and incorporeal at the same time.

209b 5
Space might be matter or form. It might also be general or particular.

209b 25
Place is neither form nor matter since it’s not dependent upon the thing but encompasses it.

210a 10
What is a place that passes away?

211a 15
Place is questioned for movement.

211a 35
What is continuous with the encompassing is a part of the whole, while the discrete is in the same place. The continuous is moved with the encompassing, the discrete is moved in the encompassing.

211b 10
A place is the limit of the encompassing body, form that of the encompassed.

211b 20
A place is no intrinsic extension of space because then when a vessel changes place, the part moving inside will also change place as it’s now in a different part of the extension. But it’s not the case, as it’s still moving inside the same place in the same vessel. A change of place would then result into a place moving in another place, ad infinitum. Place then has to be unmoving and hence not the extension of bodies.

212a 20
Place is the first immovable limit of what encompasses the thing.

212b 10
Is the heaven not a whole? Can a whole not be encompassed by a limit? Is there a limit that does not encompass?

212b 25
Only movable bodies have places.

212b 30
The things of same kind have no limits within themselves and is in their proper place.

214b 30
If there’s void there’s no movement. A void allows for no differentiation.

218a 5
Time is not composed of nows; now is not a part of time because it is not a measured one that’s of the same kind as other parts.

218a 10
The paradox of now: 1.if now were distinct ones, then the current now should be and the previous now should pass away; 2.but since it is distinct it passes away not simultaneous with the current now, but has to already have passed away. So it can only 3.pass away in another now that’s different from the current now. But it cannot pass away in itself, since then it will exist; it cannot pass away in the next now, since it’s no different from passing away from the current now. Then it’s passed away not in the current now or the next now but still another, then there will be unlimited nows in between that it should pass in; which is impossible.

218a 25
Now cannot be one and the same too, because now is a limit and limits are many in everything limited. Plus, if now is one and the same, then all nows will be the same now, and millions of years will be simultaneous.

218b 1
A part of revolution can be a time; but revolution itself is not time itself, as if there is another heaven there will be another time.

219a 15
A thorough layered foundation of time on magnitude and movement and the being by which the movement starts and ends with. This raises a puzzle: how is that which is more universal founded upon the more particular without losing its universal equalness?

219a 25
Movement is the proper place where we perceive time.

219b 1
Time is a number belonging to change with respect to the before and after. This suggests partiality.

219b 5
Time is what we count, not what we count with.

219b 10
Simultaneous time that is measured by nows distinct in being.

219b 25
Now is distinct as in its account because it limits the motion in its respective before and after; but as long as that which makes now be what it is (the thing that’s in spatial movement, not the thing that unconditionally is) is the same, nows are the same.

220a 10
Different from a point that one has to impose a stop to form the double limit and cut into to lines when it’s moving, a now, since it’s about what’s in movement, is naturally a distinct one that is continuous in itself.

220a 15
So it’s natural that now should be more like a limit as an extreme instead of a point or a part(it’s a duration); also because now is no part of time. So now defines time as the one that moves defines motion, and is continuous and is counted as continuous because what it belongs to is continuous.

220b 20
The interdependence of movement and time. Time is the measurement of movement by a unit movement. Things are in time so far as it can be measured by movement; and this is the essential form of being in time.

221a 25
How are things encompassed in time - because time is an ideal duration.

221b 1
Movement removes what is present. Is this true?

221b 10
Rest is measured by time. Rest is something that has a potential to move. There are beings or non-beings that always are or always are not.

223b 10
Is time not also measured by movement?

V

250b 15
Is there always movement?

251a 1
Is the cycle the same as “the intermediate times”?

251a 20
The things movable have to pre-exist if movements come to be; but the movable has to change into the being moved from the merely movable, and this actualization of a potential will be caused outside itself: it’s not causa sui. But what about a causa sui?

251b 10
If movement comes to be, there is a before to movement; yet before cannot be if there is no time (is before and after only in time?) and if there is time there has to be movement already. As there is always now, there is always time, and there is always movement.

252a 15
Nature is orderly and has ratio.

252a 25
Empedocles only shows the causes for aggregation and disaggregation but not for their alternation.

252a 35
The mere fact that something always is or comes to be is not enough: the cause also needs to be demonstrated.

252b 1
Of starting points that are eternal there’s no other cause. But some eternal things do have a starting point.

254b 10
Some intrinsic movements are by nature, some contrary to nature. Intrinsic movements are movements that do not only belong to the things or as their parts.

255a 5
There are things that move by nature yet should not have moved by themselves.

255a 15
Things that move themselves have to be of different parts affecting and affected.

255a 30
Things can have by nature or contrary to nature potentials to be moved or moving. So to move by nature is different from to move by itself, as the natural movement can be divided into the active and passive potentials. And as potential is hard to be characterized, the mover becomes not evident.

255b 35
It’s difficult to determine the mover as it can be an active cause or a disinhibition of the potential.

256a 15
There’s a first mover, and it doesn’t contradict with the fact that movement always is, if the first mover always is.

256b 20
The moved, the means by which something is moved, the mover. That which moves in such a way as to not be that by which something is moved should be immovable (a pure mover). It is reasonable (not yet necessary) to suppose such a mover exists.

257a 1
If something is moving and moved by another moved thing at the same time, and is moved necessarily, the moving and the moved are of either the same nature or different natures. Yet both are not quite right. Hence the moving thing cannot be moved by another moved thing, but has to be either moved by itself or immovable.

257b 10
Movement is the incomplete actualization of potential.

257b 15
It’s not possible for each of the two parts to move each other.

257b 30
It is necessary to have an immovable mover because the self-moved mover is only self-moved in its different parts, then at least one part will not be moved. The whole argument for an immovable mover is repeated on the level of parts.

258b 1
A primary mover or moved, at least the moved, might be potentially divisible but actually undivided if it needs to retain its nature. Aristotle is more loose on the mover perhaps because the mover is more primary and is always somehow retained.

258b 20
Since there are self-movers, and self-movers are necessarily made of parts, hence have magnitudes, its cause (which is its unmoving part) should then be involved in the very movement, which means it cannot not be without change. Yet it is unmoving, then it has to be all the time. The real determination here is rather if the mover, or some mover, should be constant throughout time, or several (unlimited number of) movers instantly appearing and disappearing.

259a 10
Since one is enough, and limited number is better, there’s one prime mover.

259a 15
Because the movement is continuous, the mover is continuous too.

260a 1
The first being moved is eternal as well, for if anything shall move it shall be moved by something else in movement, then it’s fair to deduce a first moved that in turn moves everything else.

260a 25
Spatial movement is the most primary. For increase or decrease in magnitude depends on alteration, as increase is for something else to be added onto something alike, and alteration is this movement. But alteration cannot be brought about without being affected, and affection requires changes in proximity of one thing to something else. In this sense, alteration is dependent upon spatial movement.

261a 15
Teleology: posterior in order but prior in nature.

261b 1
Continuity of motion is based on oneness of the prime mover, not the contrary; only spatial motion is continuous. The successive motion would be interrupted by an interval of time.

266b 1
It’s impossible for a limited magnitude to have an unlimited capacity or an unlimited magnitude a limited capacity. The first because with unlimited capacity there would be no time at all for the effect, yet the limited magnitude prescribes a certain effect; so that by continually adding the capacity, eventually there would be the same effect taking the same time, which is synonymous to having an unlimited capacity: yet this is impossible, for this some time (potentially unlimited) is still not no time (actively unlimited). The second because with unlimited magnitude, every limited part of it would have some limited capacity based on the first principle, whereas these magnitudes can be infinitely added up, so as their capacities. So that its capacity cannot be limited.

266b 30
How is it possible when the first mover is not contacting the moved for the moved to continue moving? We have to say what moves makes the moved capable of causing movement: but the mover (the one next to the moved, not the first mover) and the moved still should stop at the same time.

267b 5
The immovable mover is at the center or the circumference.

267b 25
The eternal mover has no magnitude. This is proven because if there’s magnitude, it’s either limited or unlimited. A limited magnitude cannot allow for unlimited movement or unlimited time; also, a limited magnitude cannot have unlimited capacity to move an unlimited number of things, for an unlimited capacity on one thing always takes no time, which is impossible. Since it’s also impossible for an unlimited magnitude to have limited capacity, only unlimited magnitude has unlimited capacity. (For simply by saying that limited magnitude has no unlimited capacity does not mean its opposite will necessarily have unlimited capacity; if it were possible for unlimited magnitude to have limited capacity, argumentation would have to distinguish under what circumstances it were possible, in order to give a full account. If infinite magnitude were only possible to have finite capacity, then this would already be sufficient for the proof that prime mover has no magnitude). But there’s sadly no unlimited magnitude in nature. Thus the prime mover must have no magnitude.

VI

184b 15
One versus many, immovable versus moving starting points.

185a 1
The investigation of starting points is not an investigation of nature, though the understanding of nature involves a thinking of and from the starting points.

185b 15
It’s limits that are indivisible, not limited things.

185b 20
All beings are one in account means all beings are nothing.

185b 30
One to many is but one way being is meant, in the sense of being of many qualities.

186a 10
It’s absurd to say that the starting point of change lies only within things, as if change didn’t come all at once.

186a 25
Even if the thing is not separable from its paleness, they are nonetheless distinct.

186b 1
If Parmenides assumes being to be one, then what is, being distinct from being, is not. This is absurd. Thus being has to be meant in many ways.

186b 5
Yet if it’s the other way around, that it’s not being that belongs to the thing, but things belong to being, being still cannot be one. For in that case, all coincidents contained in being will not be.

186b 15
Beings can be divided for they are not coincidents. Coincidents are coincidents when 1.one thing can belong or not belong to another thing, or 2.one account has to rely upon one other account of the whole in order to be complete. Neither signifies being.

186b 30
If two things are coincidents of something, so is what they compose of; if not, not. Yet human is assumed to be just being. Then its two constituents will be just being too. So the universe will be composed of indivisible things. Being shall thus be meant in more than one way.

187a 1
If being is meant one way, not being will or will not exist (depending on the interpretation of ὁτι) because now everything is not simply not. But no matter what it’s not likely to say that all beings are one for beings and just being are still different: ontological difference.

187a 15
Anaxagoras is the subversion of Plato that for him matter is one but forms are many.

187b 20
Because sizes are certain of things, great and small, the indefinite dyad, cannot be solely ruling.

188a 5
Segregation will never be complete because attributes are never separate from things.

188a 15
Regarding the coming to be of things, Anaxagoras ignores how things can come to be not being a mixture, and how things can come to be according to a whole, not merely as parts. So parts can be separate from each other, and parts can be separate from wholes.

188a 20
Contraries are posited for all thinkers as starting points.

188a 25
A little qualification: not contrary things, but the first contraries, are starting points.

188a 30
This can be understood as things come to be from contrary things and not from random things. This also applies to composites: order and disorder, for instance.

188b 25
There seems necessary to be a third thing that contraries affect.

189b 10
A triad is needed: two contraries cannot affect each other as substance, plus substance itself cannot be contrary to itself, so that the underlying thing will be a new starting point different from the contraries. There is only one pair of contraries for substance, since all other contraries are derivatives within one genus.

190a 1
A simple thing that comes to be can be either like the human that comes to be musical, or the unmusical that comes to be musical. A compound is an unmusical human that comes to be a musical human. There’s a difference between what comes to be and from what it comes to be.

190a 10
Something comes to be and remains, while others don’t.

190a 35
Things come to be in many ways, substances come to be simply, while others come to be as a tode ti. Yet if this is the case, how can substances be said to come to be?

190b 1
Only if substances come to be from substances can they be said to come to be.

190b 25
The thing that simply comes to be is the underlying subject, yet the underlying subject is twofold: in one sense, it is a this something that comes to be another this something, like gold to statue; in the other sense, it is an opposite or deprivation that receives or rejects the form. The thus created presence and absence are the two things said by some people as the only two starting points.

191a 5
Scientifically knowable by analogy.

191a 10
It is not clear yet if the underlying thing is a substance, that is, a this something. Or, as a third starting point, it is not a thing, but an absence that effects.

191b 10
If we consider how not being can be meant in two ways, as purely and intrinsically not being, and as coincidentally not being, we could see how being can come incidentally from not being. So, it is necessary for there to be a third underlying thing, to mediate for a radicalization of presence and absence.

192a 1
Earlier thinkers treat potentiality and lack as one, which is false. For potentiality intrinsically lets things come to be but coincidentally is not, while lack coincidentally lets things come to be but intrinsically is not. Even if Plato speaks of a dyad he still treats the dyad as one indeterminate thing.

So the underlying thing is both a substance that has a positive content and the amorphous thing which remains. These two senses are interdependent. The sense of the underlying thing that leans more towards tode ti points to something determinate yet dynamical, as a solution for the substantiation and radicalization of being and its opposite. The more amorphous one occurs when the lack or opposite is not as intrinsically incapable of giving rise to.

VII

207b 1
For number there is a least limit but no limit on greatness, the least being one while the greatest being the fact that any magnitude can always be considered double the numbers of half the unit, like 1 cm can always actively be 10 mm. But for magnitudes there’s no smallest limit but a greatest limit, for any perception imposes a limit onto magnitude.

208a 1
The unlimited is a cause as matter is. The being for it is lack, while the intrinsically underlying subject is what’s continuous and perceptible.

208a 5
It’s not necessary for there to be an unlimited perceptible body to allow for coming to be, for passing away is another form of coming to be.

208a 10
Everything that makes contact with other things is limited, but not every limited thing makes contact with other things.

208a 15
It’s absurd to trust in things thought instead of things that really are. Thinking is as unlimited as time and movement, for what is taken always changes. No magnitude, however, can be unlimited in thought. Time->movement->magnitude->being.

210a 20
Part-whole relation seems to be differentiated from species-genus relationship.

210a 30
Only when what is in something and what it is in are parts of one whole can a thing be said of being in itself.

210b 25
Place can be said to be in something as an attribute is in something.

210b 30
Place is no matter or form, for these are parts of what is in a place; place relates only as to a whole.

213b 10
People believe that a void has to exist if bodies need to be separate and moving, so one thing needs not contain everything else.

214a 5
It is a question as whether a place that contains a color can be said to be a void, or because a color is of a tangible body it is not.

214a 10
Apart from a place without tangible body, a void is also said to be a place without this something, so as to be matter. But matter cannot be separate from the thing.

214a 25
It’s not necessary for there to be an independent place, or void, to allow for movement, because things can make way for each other simultaneously.

217a 30
Some people argue that since there’s extension and compression, otherwise there’s no movement that’s not circular (everything giving way at the same time), it’s necessary that there’s void. Yet it’s not necessary if magnitude comes to be with alteration of a thing. Matter potentially is great and small, and can actively be either.

217b 15
Rare and dense not only determine light and heavy but also soft and hard. The latter pair pertains to the thing’s affectabiliy. Affectability only pertains to the being of the thing, but has nothing to do with how much void is in a thing.

VIII

224a 25
The mover and the moved can move coincidentally, intrinsically but according to its part, or intrinsically according to itself.

224b 1
That from which and that to which are both different from that which moves. Form does not move, but the thing moves.

224b 30
Intrinsic changes come from contraries.

225a 20
Coming to be is not a movement for a thing that is not for a thing that is not cannot be actively in movement.

225b 10
Substance doesn’t move. Nor is a relation, for one of the relata could change without the other doing so, thus only a coincidental change (are relata not intrinsic parts of a relationship? it is not wrong to say relata could change without essentially affecting the relationship itself). Also there’s no movement of movement.

Is there a coming to be of movement? I suppose not. For if there is, then there will be a time at the end of which movement has come to be, and before that time there would only be rest. So the thing would be resting for an interval and starts moving instantaneously; the point at which the thing starts to move would both be moving and resting. Yet this is impossible. The limit should be continuous. So the movement will not have come to be. The fundamental principle here is that movement belongs intrinsically to a thing, and the thing has to be one, so rest and movement has to be continuous with each other. Thus there is no instantaneous transformation as such. Yet if something new is born through the change, then one can say that something has come to be.

226a 25
Movement with respect to quality has nothing to do with the quality of a substance. For a change of the substance would be simply coming to be.

226b 5
Qualitative changes can be by degrees. Yet it is still not yet a change in the magnitude of a thing until it is actively quantified.

226b 10
There’s no intermediary between contradictories.

226b 27
If a change is continuous, the change leaves no interval in the thing, and whether it leaves an interval in time is no matter.

227a 1
The successive is what follows after the starting point without things of the same kind in between. This allows for things of different kinds to be in between.

227a 10
Continuity is a kind of contiguity, for what are contiguous have their extremities touching, whereas what are continuous turn the touching extremities into one thing.

227a 20
Succession->contiguity->continuity.

227a 25
Units and points are different for units exist in succession while points in contiguity. There’s also no intermediate between units: does this mean that units refer more to the coming to be?

227b 25
A movement is unconditionally one if it has no intermission in time, that in which the thing moves remains the same throughout, and the thing remains one in number.

228a 5
If a state and the activity belonging to it is one and the same, then every movement in which the substance is the same will be one. Yet this seems problematic.

228b 30
A movement is also called one if it’s regular. Regularity can be more and less. If a movement is continuous but irregular, it is one but less so. Yet if a movement is contiguous it is not regular and is not one.

229a 20
Movements from a contrary and to its contrary are the different in being though same in number. Movements from a contrary and from its contrary are not contrary movements because they might be moving to an intermediary, and the movements are trying to lose instead of gaining contrariety, and the movements are defined by its wherefore not its wherefrom.

229b 1
Only movements from contraries to contraries are contrary movements for movement is from something to something.

229b 10
For changes, contraries will be to something and from something, for there’s only one being involved.

230a 1
Rests in contraries are contrary both to each other, and contrary to movements away from them respectively. But a rest is not opposed to the movement toward it because the rest would be a natural consequence of the movement.

230a 5
Absence of change is not rest. What’s contrary to absence of change of the thing is both its passing away and its non-being.

230b 1
A puzzle arises: are there comings to be and passings away in accord to nature and contrary to nature? Would there be a contrariety between a change forced and a change by nature? This contrariety does arise, however, as one passing away would be pleasant and the other of a painful sort, that is, not unconditionally.

230b 25
There are still two puzzles. First, coming to rest seems different from coming to a stop, as the first is gradual and the second is instantaneous, the cause of this seems to be the first is when the thing is forced, the second when the thing by nature moves to its own place. The second puzzle is that when a thing starts to move, it seems to both remain and move out, so as to have contraries in itself. But can a thing be said to rest if it moves? Or rather it seems more like the thing itself is torn to two contrary directions, so movements are more contraries than movement to rest.

IX

231a 25
A line cannot be composed of points for points are indivisible and have no extremities.

231b 1
If points make up continuity they have to make contact as separate wholes, which cannot be continuous.

231b 5
Does this mean that lines and points, nows and time are of the same kind? Or merely time between nows would again signify more nows?

231b 10
It seems to say the intermediate is not of another kind so as to allow nows to succeed each other, but is again divisible into more divisibles.

232b 20
Continuity is redefined as that which is always divisible into divisibles.

233a 1
For there’s always movement in time, and movement can always be faster or slower, time and magnitude have to be continuous in order to be divided.

233a 20
Time is always inseparable from magnitude when talking about movement. So Zeno’s problem is that he ignores this essential relationship, and he mistakenly takes the infinity of divisions to be the infinity of extremities, and asks how can one in a time limited in extremity traverse an unlimited magnitude, when in fact time is itself also unlimited.

233a 35
But since magnitudes and times can often be taken as limited wholes, and are limited wholes, if time is limited, magnitude is limited.

233b 30
Nothing continuous is without parts.

234a 25
Nothing in movement is in the now. Accordingly nothing is at rest in the now either.
Even if a now is the same when divided into two times, the problem is still there, that now a thing will move and rest simultaneously.

234b 10
Everything that is changing has to be divisible so that its parts can be in what it changes from and what it changes to, though these in which changing parts are need not be extremes.

234b 20
Two ways of dividing movements: according to time and according to parts.

235a 10
Time, movement, being-in-movement (when something is actively in the state of movement), the thing itself that is in movement, and what the movement is with respect to (like place, magnitude, color etc.), can all be divisible.

235b 30
When something has changed, it is in what it has changed to. Because change is not contiguous, what is not yet in what the thing has changed into when the thing has changed cannot instantaneously jump to what it has changed into.

236a 1
The primary time in which a thing has changed is indivisible, for it cannot be that it has changed in any one of the parts; but if it were changing throughout all parts, the changing cannot constitute having changed at the end. What primary means is that the thing has changed as a whole, not because of anything else. So if a thing has changed in a primary time, it can only have changed in every of its parts.

236a 10
There’s a primary time in which a change is completed, but no primary time in which a change has started. For a primary time cannot be indivisible if it allows for a starting point. If there were a starting point of change, the indivisible time it starts, being a now, would be next to other nows before change has started; further, at its limit (taken as a continuous one) of starting point rest will be one with having changed, which is unmediated and absurd. So having a starting point would make the primary time divisible, which is already established as false. So it can only be an indivisible limit and a whole that recapitulates everything prior. The end as a limit is not a limit of time’s passage, but rather a limit of the thing as it completes the thing.

236a 30
There’s no primary part of change, as primary change has to be of a whole. If there were a primary part of change, with the same reasoning, this part would again have another primary part in itself, thus an infinite number of primary parts will be produced, then which one is the true primary part will be undetermined.

236b 1
Here Aristotle seems to clarify what he means above: the thing that changes and what it changes in are both divisible. Yet what the thing changes into is not divisible. This amounts to saying that the completion is not divisible, at least not intrinsically. Thus there are no primary parts regarding the thing and the time.

236b 15
Only in movement with respect to quality can there be intrinsic indivisibility and primary parts. So it’s possible to conceive of one thing changing qualitatively for its parts changing qualitatively first.

237a 1
Since every movement in its primary time is in any of its parts, it only makes sense that it could always be taken to be different divisions of the movement, so as to always be moving prior to it.

As a whole changes, the change has to be present in every part of the whole; yet the part is no independent or primary thing with its own change, unless it’s a qualitative transformation, but a phase of changing and a step of having changed within the whole. That is none of these is an active whole, but only a potential division. The primary time then is actively indivisible but potentially divisible, and divisible only according to its being whole; the primacy of the primary time is not given by its being any time, but by its being for the thing itself as a completed whole. The parts then have to be dependent upon the wholes, but cannot themselves be unlimited independent things.

237a 5
For there are unlimited nows, the thing will have changed for unlimited times at unlimited nows.

237a 20
What has changed has been changing previously, and what is changing also has changed previously.

237b 20
In whatever along which or during which, being different from for which, there’s no primary.

237b 25
An unlimited time cannot cover a limited magnitude unless it’s for reiteration.

238a 15
It’s impossible for a thing to be always coming to be or passing away, for unlimited time is not for a limited thing. It’s also the case that unlimited movement is not for limited time.

238a 30
It’s also impossible for an unlimited magnitude to traverse a limited one or vice versa, or for an unlimited magnitude to traverse an unlimited one, in limited time.

238b 25
Coming to a stop is in time for what’s in movement.

239a 1
There’s no primary time for coming to stop or being in movement, for primary time is only for having come to stop and other kinds of completion.

239a 20
Accordingly, it’s impossible to speak as if a moving thing moving in its primary time would have any primary place in particular; that is, not as a whole. For to say a thing has a primary place is not the same as to say a thing is at rest. Even though at every slice of the moment the thing with its parts stay at the same place, it is still on the move, and is no independent interval in which the thing is at rest. So not only temporally, spatially there’s also the part-whole relationship of a movement.

240b 10
What is without parts can only be coincidentally moving, while what is with parts and its parts can be intrinsically moving.

241b 1
The limits imposed upon spatial movement might be different than those imposed by the contraries; but insofar as it’s capable of being cut, it admits of limits, and is in this way limited.

241b 10
It’s another question to consider if movements, taken together, are unlimited in time. And if there’s ultimately only one movement: the unlimited circular movement.

X

241b 35
Everything in movement is moved by something, so if a thing moves intrinsically as a whole, it is moved by its part which is the true source of movement.

241b 40
What ceases moving might not be stopped because something else is at rest, but if it’s at rest due to something else ceasing movement, it is moved by something else.

242a 40
Once this is accepted, everything in movement must be moved by something, for every whole, being divisible, will not move if parts don’t move, and if only one part moves it’s not moving intrinsically and primarily as part of a whole, so everything is moved by something else.

242b 55
It’s only possible for a movement to be unlimited in a limited time if the movement is made by many things. These things, however, will be either in contact with or be continuous to each other, thus composing one, if the mover causes movement with respect to place by bodily movement. Then again one thing will have unlimited movement in limited time, which really is impossible.

243a 30
The prime mover, not as the for-the-sake-of-which, but as the starting point from which movement proceeds, is always together with the thing moved.

243a 35
Three sorts of movers.

243a 15
Four species of causes of spatial movement: pull, push, carry and rotate.

243b 1
Throwing is a push that imparts movement into the thing.

244a 1
Push and pull are more primary, as rotation is a combination of two and carrying is effected by something pulled or pushed.

244b 5
Affection is the underlying perceptible qualities brought about by other perceptibles.

245b 10
Since we refer to altered bronze still as bronze, but the bronze statue as a statue, configuration and coming to be of states is no alteration.

246a 10
Since states are either completion or the passing away of this completion, these are not alterations either.

246b 5
Also, since states are always related to things as a mode of being for a thing toward affections, it is not a thing that can primarily change, but change only coincidentally. Thus it intrinsically is no alteration.

247a 1
When virtues or vices come to be or simply be activated in the soul, the perceptual part of the soul is necessarily altered. Since every virtue of character is a state with regards to bodily pleasure and pain, so perception has to be involved.

247b 1
But for states of thinking there’s neither alteration nor coming to be. For knowledge is understanding coming to rest, but there’s no coming to be of a coming to rest. This means that knowledge is not something separable from understanding but its very essence. And knowledge actively is when something else, that is, the particular, is present, but not because it is moved by the perception so as to build the knowledge to completion, but rather instantaneously conjures up the completed knowledge together with its perception. There seems to be two dimensions of soul’s movement: thing-soul, and soul-soul. Thing to soul there’s no intermediary, yet soul also has its internal movement. As knowledge is conjured up with respect to thing, there’s no coming to be; but since the thing itself comes to be, the soul would’ve moved in correspondence.

248b 1
If circular movement and linear movement are commensurable, their lengths have to be commensurable. What seems intuitively commensurable, however, is not actually commensurable.

248b 15
Homonyms seem to be incommensurables, yet even some words that have the same meaning when applied are incommensurable.

249a 1
Then it seems that the commensurablility depends upon the recipients, if distinct incommensurable, if same commensurable.

249a 5
If two things are commensurable, it seems that what they belong to have no differentiae in itself or respectively (one cannot say one color is more color like than the other, or blue is bluer than red, unless coincidentally).

249b 15
Should we regard things that change or the changes themselves as what determine the kinds as commensurable or not?

249b 20
Quantity-inequality, quality-dissimilarity, coming to be-distinctness (or, if substance were number, also inequality).

250a 10
Inertia is discussed; it’s not necessary that a capacity lesser than the original capacity could move what could be moved by the original strength at all.

250a 30
This seems like a bold claim, to say qualitative change or coming to be can also have their own common measure.

250b 5
This seems to be a qualification of the above statement: for some alterations and comings to be, half the time would not necessarily be followed by half the effect, for the half might not be the quantitative middle with respect to the time taken. Or it might simply be a parallel to the former case, reads “the half will not do it half time”.

252b 30
Even if all movements have their limits, they can still be one and the same, combining into something eternal and continuous.

253a 1
For a thing to be sometimes moving and sometimes not, it’s nothing absurd to say that its cause of movement is sometimes present and sometimes not.

253a 10
In fact the movement is always present somehow in a thing and does not come to be.

253b 10
If it’s accepted that sometimes it’s the whole that is moved (actively) but not any divisible part of it, it’s also to be denied that all things are always in movement.

262a 10
Moving spatially in a circle is different from circular movement for it can turn back upon coming to the starting point.

263a 15
The genuine resolution of Zeno’s paradox is to state the primacy of actual continuity over potential division.

264a 1
A new argument: if at one time a thing is, at another it is not, then in between times there’s a time of coming to be; the whole time taken of a thing’s coming to be is then greater than itself, which is absurd.

264a 15
If a movement is continuous the direction will be set as intended at its start. Yet the linear movement that turns back upon itself has two contrary directions at the same time. Even if the direction is not there from the start but is renewed at every instant, at one moment the thing will have two contrary movements at the same time. Or if one considers these contrary movements are not present in the same parts, one would see the part that first touches the limit would turn back and run counter to what succeeds, which is undeniably absurd.

264b 20
If a thing that is moved should always be preceded by its opposite kind of rest, and everything that is not always moved by this kind of movement (not as a body might not always move with the movement of its heart, which means the whole and its part would be preceded by different kinds of rest; but as a thing itself might not always move with the same species of movement) should also be alike preceded, it’s clear turning back will be preceded by a rest.

264b 5
With time being continuous one can only say that movement is successive.

264b 20
What this seems to mean is: because any point on circumference is a starting point and an ending point, so it is always moving to something both as an end and a start; but for linear movement, throughout the movement the starting point and the end point remain the same and are repeated in every step of the process. So there’s no chance that the start and end points of a linear movement be renewed constantly.

The observation that some movement stops right at the moment when a circle is completed is of no matter here, for not every spatial movement in a circle is a circular movement. What is a circular movement must have the starting point of movement and the end point unified; and starting point of movement is not the same as the starting spatial position of movement. The movement starts in a place, but the place itself doesn’t start the movement. What is the point here is then not every movement in a circle will be unlimited and continuous, but rather if there’s any one intelligible movement that is both unlimited and continuous, it can only be circular. Unlimited linear movement cannot be said to be one movement. And even if one can say that bounded rectilinear motion is also unlimited and in a way continuous, for a thing moves across the angle part by part, this continuity is not primary but is derivative from the most continuous circling movement. That is, without the truly continuous movement, the separate parts of a rectilinear motion cannot even be unified into one in the first place. Just as a motion in virtue of itself ends at its limit, the rectilinear motion along the lines of a square, for instance, will end at the cross angle where the starting point of one line and the end point of another coincide. This makes it impossible to be one without the continuity provided by time. For of course there are many motions, and how can these motions be of one thing instead of infinitely many? Only when they are gathered into one continuous motion. So rectilinear motion cannot be one and continuous for its continuity comes from the natural continuity of circular movement, not the other way around.