Aristotle · 亚里士多德
Physics · 物理学
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Physics — Reading notes
Reflections · Apple Notes
Revised 12 December 2022
I
184a 10
To know things is to know their starting points: is this well founded?
184a 20
How can there be things more knowable by nature yet not so to us? What does knowable mean?
A human being knows things in her particular way. As she knows only particular things, she remains fettered in a natural attitude. She starts to get confused, however, and wants to investigate the causes of things. From here she starts to go beyond her particular build and tries to determine the ground of the world’s making. Things can be knowable because things are knowable by nature, and this universal is inherent in the particulars; otherwise it’s impossible that things get harmonized into one. Yet as this universal itself is also a particular universal, not everyone can know it from the start. So she knows the universal from the particulars and gradually she comes to be in a particular way: that she particularly knows the universal. Yet wouldn’t this knowledge again be disjointed from every particular life? Would she not hold one particular perspective? This problem is avoided in two ways. First for every universal is particular as the universal, so that it is a particular kind of particular. The universal is that which self-particularizes, so that every knowledge of her goes over the boundaries and is always both particular and not particular. And this same thing goes for herself, as she desires to know the universal, and that includes her own particular way of being. As she knows her self, she is beyond herself and becomes self-sufficient in thought. So this is what is meant when Aristotle says that one starts from what is knowable to us, as what is particularly and unreflectively given, to what is knowable by nature, that is the universal singular. Natural attitude is the unamazed and uninterested attitude toward things, or amazed yet not rigorous enough to radically shape a fruitful reflection.
184b 10
A peculiar position; to start from the universal. Is this kind of the opposite to Plato’s method?
II
192b 10
A self-principle of natural things.
192b 20
Nature is a principle and is necessary. A table does not will to change into something else because its principle lies outside, but the material wills to change.
193a 1
Nature is a principle; a substance has a principle in itself. Other properties belong to substance but are not its nature and do not have nature in themselves.
193a 5
Self-obviousness might be lacking to some people.
193a 25
Underlying material is nature?
193a 30
Form is nature?
193b 5
Separable, the form and the thing, in speech.
193b 10
Actuality superior than potentiality; form superior than material.
193b 10
Even if we say material is nature of crafted beings, forms are still nature, as are for non-crafted beings: like human. But is this a potential drawing close of form to material?
193b 15
Nature as pouring forth to nature as possessed. Nature, something that grows, is spoken of not as what it grows from, different from medicine(which is called medical, not healthy), but is spoken of in relation to what it grows into. Teleology.
193b 20
Lack and contrary.
193b 35
Separation from movement.
194a 1
Ideas are less separable than mathematical objects from nature. Reverse geometry.
194a 35
An end is twofold: the last thing and the for-the-sake-of-which. Nature is, as the form, the last thing and the best. This is premised on the analogy between natural science and craft. Potential conflicts: are sun and human beings forms as telos or are they principles? Are forms principles or ends?
194b 25
Form is a kind of cause. Four causes are presented. Yet is form not spoken of as an end previously? And are the four causes always present?
195b 1
Remote causes: wandering causes?
195b 5
Different precisions of accounts.
195b 15
Different ways to present causes in account.
195b 35
Chance as cause.
196b 30
Definition of luck and chance.
196b 15
Things come to be might not have end.
197a 5
Luck and thought are concerned with the same things: luck must be about deliberate choice.
197b 20
Definition of chance.
197b 35
Contrary to nature: internal cause? How can nature become its contrary: if it’s nature?
198a 10
Luck and chance are necessarily posterior to thinking and nature: for chance is coincidental and inferior to the intrinsic; and chance itself is merely indefinite, not nothing.
198a 25
The causes except for the material causes are often conflated.
198a 30
Immovable things.
198b 5
The form is immovable; what are other things entirely immovable? Why the distinction?
198b 20
A conflict between causes: necessity present vs telos absent.
198b 30
Sounds like Aristotle’s countering theory of evolution.
199a 5
Is it not already established that luck is for the sake of something?
199a 10
A seemingly imposed equivalence between nature and craft.
199b 10
The undifferentiated first: a seed.
199b 15
The very essence of nature: the very nature of nature.
200a 20
Mathematics is necessary in one direction; but things come to be are necessary in the double direction from end to material and from material to end.
200a 30
End is independent from material and rules over material and has to be studied more.
200b 5
The account can gather material in itself and itself is the formal cause and the end; yet the account itself is again a starting point for the end.
III
200b 20
Necessary seeming conditions for motion: place, void, time.
200b 25
Some things are actual, some potential, some potential and actual. Movement is relative.
201a 5
A correspondence between being and movement.
201a 10
Movement is only when it’s actualized. But what is actualization itself? Are not all actualizations movements?
201a 25
An immovable mover.
201a 30
Actualization itself is different from movement because it can be actualization of its being, which is not a potential.
201b 10
The complete actualization of a potential is no movement.
201b 25
Movement is mistaken to some categories because it’s indefinite; but it’s indefinite in the sense that it has to involve both categories in itself.
202a 5
Movement of one sort is always in two directions for contact is needed. The mover bear in itself a form that regulates the movement as a cause.
202a 15
The same being of movement, but separate accounts.
202b 10
The activation is not the same for both in the sense of having the same being, but rather the potential being actualized is the same for both. The movement is the same for both in the sense that movement is always the actualization of a potential, which necessarily involves a non-actualization in itself. The inhibition is the non-actualization.
203b 5
The unlimited is thought to only be a starting point.
203b 25
If what’s outside is unlimited, it also has unlimited body and multitude, since it’s here and can only be here in continuity of body. And unlimited place is also necessarily followed by unlimited body because what’s unlimited in possibility is unlimited in actuality.
204a 10
The unlimited cannot be separate from perceptibles, because it has magnitude and should be divisible, as we speak of unlimited in mathematics and bodies. But if it is a coincident of perceptibles, it cannot be an element or starting point.
204a 20
But unlimited cannot be an active starting point, since then every part of it will be itself unlimited, composed of many unlimiteds: this is impossible. But if it is indivisible it cannot be active, for what’s actual (body) has a quantity. So far in physics, there’s no unlimited itself as an actual body.
204b 1
This conclusion doesn’t exclude the possibility of an intelligible unlimited itself as a non-body.
204b 15
Unlimited body is not composite if the elements are limited in number, for one element being unlimited will destroy others or all elements unlimited will create a body with unlimited extension.
204b 30
A simple unlimited body from which elements come to be is impossible for it’s not observed anywhere. And it’s not even possible for the whole universe to come to be of one element, since things transform from contraries to contraries.
205a 15
If there is an unlimited body, the place any body takes will be unlimited, and there will be no determination on rest and motion.
205b 1
A body has to match its place and vice versa. To say the unlimited is not moving is not enough; but the not moving has to be explained through its nature.
Limitedness is polarity.
206a 20
A radical difference between potential and actual unlimitedness.
206b 1
The unlimited is not the substance: but with a limited thing, always one thing followed by another.
206b 20
The unlimited in addition is by infinitely reaching for the limit; the unlimited in division is by infinitely dividing up; each suppose a pre-limited magnitude. There is no unlimited in exceeding every definite magnitude in addition, for that will premise an actual unlimited that can always be unendingly traversed.
207a 1
Unlimited is not what nothing is outside of, but what something is always an outside of.
207a 10
Unlimited is not complete, for complete needs an end that nothing is outside of. A ring is not unlimited in a strict sense, for it can go unendingly, yet the next outside is merely distinct to the previous one, but the same throughout the course. So a circle has a limit but can go unendingly.
207a 20
The dignity of the unlimited is derived from that of the complete. Unlimited is like the matter of the form, which is a whole. If the unlimited should define perceptibles it would define intelligibles as well, which is absurd.
IV
208b 20
Space not only is position, but also a natural capacity.
209a 1
That without which nothing can exist but it can exist without others comes first.
209a 10
A point can not be distinguished from its place.
209a 15
Space has magnitude but no body; thus corporeal and incorporeal at the same time.
209b 5
Space might be matter or form. It might also be general or particular.
209b 25
Place is neither form nor matter since it’s not dependent upon the thing but encompasses it.
210a 10
What is a place that passes away?
211a 15
Place is questioned for movement.
211a 35
What is continuous with the encompassing is a part of the whole, while the discrete is in the same place. The continuous is moved with the encompassing, the discrete is moved in the encompassing.
211b 10
A place is the limit of the encompassing body, form that of the encompassed.
211b 20
A place is no intrinsic extension of space because then when a vessel changes place, the part moving inside will also change place as it’s now in a different part of the extension. But it’s not the case, as it’s still moving inside the same place in the same vessel. A change of place would then result into a place moving in another place, ad infinitum. Place then has to be unmoving and hence not the extension of bodies.
212a 20
Place is the first immovable limit of what encompasses the thing.
212b 10
Is the heaven not a whole? Can a whole not be encompassed by a limit? Is there a limit that does not encompass?
212b 25
Only movable bodies have places.
212b 30
The things of same kind have no limits within themselves and is in their proper place.
214b 30
If there’s void there’s no movement. A void allows for no differentiation.
218a 5
Time is not composed of nows; now is not a part of time because it is not a measured one that’s of the same kind as other parts.
218a 10
The paradox of now: 1.if now were distinct ones, then the current now should be and the previous now should pass away; 2.but since it is distinct it passes away not simultaneous with the current now, but has to already have passed away. So it can only 3.pass away in another now that’s different from the current now. But it cannot pass away in itself, since then it will exist; it cannot pass away in the next now, since it’s no different from passing away from the current now. Then it’s passed away not in the current now or the next now but still another, then there will be unlimited nows in between that it should pass in; which is impossible.
218a 25
Now cannot be one and the same too, because now is a limit and limits are many in everything limited. Plus, if now is one and the same, then all nows will be the same now, and millions of years will be simultaneous.
218b 1
A part of revolution can be a time; but revolution itself is not time itself, as if there is another heaven there will be another time.
219a 15
A thorough layered foundation of time on magnitude and movement and the being by which the movement starts and ends with. This raises a puzzle: how is that which is more universal founded upon the more particular without losing its universal equalness?
219a 25
Movement is the proper place where we perceive time.
219b 1
Time is a number belonging to change with respect to the before and after. This suggests partiality.
219b 5
Time is what we count, not what we count with.
219b 10
Simultaneous time that is measured by nows distinct in being.
219b 25
Now is distinct as in its account because it limits the motion in its respective before and after; but as long as that which makes now be what it is (the thing that’s in spatial movement, not the thing that unconditionally is) is the same, nows are the same.
220a 10
Different from a point that one has to impose a stop to form the double limit and cut into to lines when it’s moving, a now, since it’s about what’s in movement, is naturally a distinct one that is continuous in itself.
220a 15
So it’s natural that now should be more like a limit as an extreme instead of a point or a part(it’s a duration); also because now is no part of time. So now defines time as the one that moves defines motion, and is continuous and is counted as continuous because what it belongs to is continuous.
220b 20
The interdependence of movement and time. Time is the measurement of movement by a unit movement. Things are in time so far as it can be measured by movement; and this is the essential form of being in time.
221a 25
How are things encompassed in time - because time is an ideal duration.
221b 1
Movement removes what is present. Is this true?
221b 10
Rest is measured by time. Rest is something that has a potential to move. There are beings or non-beings that always are or always are not.
223b 10
Is time not also measured by movement?
V
250b 15
Is there always movement?
251a 1
Is the cycle the same as “the intermediate times”?
251a 20
The things movable have to pre-exist if movements come to be; but the movable has to change into the being moved from the merely movable, and this actualization of a potential will be caused outside itself: it’s not causa sui. But what about a causa sui?
251b 10
If movement comes to be, there is a before to movement; yet before cannot be if there is no time (is before and after only in time?) and if there is time there has to be movement already. As there is always now, there is always time, and there is always movement.
252a 15
Nature is orderly and has ratio.
252a 25
Empedocles only shows the causes for aggregation and disaggregation but not for their alternation.
252a 35
The mere fact that something always is or comes to be is not enough: the cause also needs to be demonstrated.
252b 1
Of starting points that are eternal there’s no other cause. But some eternal things do have a starting point.
254b 10
Some intrinsic movements are by nature, some contrary to nature. Intrinsic movements are movements that do not only belong to the things or as their parts.
255a 5
There are things that move by nature yet should not have moved by themselves.
255a 15
Things that move themselves have to be of different parts affecting and affected.
255a 30
Things can have by nature or contrary to nature potentials to be moved or moving. So to move by nature is different from to move by itself, as the natural movement can be divided into the active and passive potentials. And as potential is hard to be characterized, the mover becomes not evident.
255b 35
It’s difficult to determine the mover as it can be an active cause or a disinhibition of the potential.
256a 15
There’s a first mover, and it doesn’t contradict with the fact that movement always is, if the first mover always is.
256b 20
The moved, the means by which something is moved, the mover. That which moves in such a way as to not be that by which something is moved should be immovable (a pure mover). It is reasonable (not yet necessary) to suppose such a mover exists.
257a 1
If something is moving and moved by another moved thing at the same time, and is moved necessarily, the moving and the moved are of either the same nature or different natures. Yet both are not quite right. Hence the moving thing cannot be moved by another moved thing, but has to be either moved by itself or immovable.
257b 10
Movement is the incomplete actualization of potential.
257b 15
It’s not possible for each of the two parts to move each other.
257b 30
It is necessary to have an immovable mover because the self-moved mover is only self-moved in its different parts, then at least one part will not be moved. The whole argument for an immovable mover is repeated on the level of parts.
258b 1
A primary mover or moved, at least the moved, might be potentially divisible but actually undivided if it needs to retain its nature. Aristotle is more loose on the mover perhaps because the mover is more primary and is always somehow retained.
258b 20
Since there are self-movers, and self-movers are necessarily made of parts, hence have magnitudes, its cause (which is its unmoving part) should then be involved in the very movement, which means it cannot not be without change. Yet it is unmoving, then it has to be all the time. The real determination here is rather if the mover, or some mover, should be constant throughout time, or several (unlimited number of) movers instantly appearing and disappearing.
259a 10
Since one is enough, and limited number is better, there’s one prime mover.
259a 15
Because the movement is continuous, the mover is continuous too.
260a 1
The first being moved is eternal as well, for if anything shall move it shall be moved by something else in movement, then it’s fair to deduce a first moved that in turn moves everything else.
260a 25
Spatial movement is the most primary. For increase or decrease in magnitude depends on alteration, as increase is for something else to be added onto something alike, and alteration is this movement. But alteration cannot be brought about without being affected, and affection requires changes in proximity of one thing to something else. In this sense, alteration is dependent upon spatial movement.
261a 15
Teleology: posterior in order but prior in nature.
261b 1
Continuity of motion is based on oneness of the prime mover, not the contrary; only spatial motion is continuous. The successive motion would be interrupted by an interval of time.
266b 1
It’s impossible for a limited magnitude to have an unlimited capacity or an unlimited magnitude a limited capacity. The first because with unlimited capacity there would be no time at all for the effect, yet the limited magnitude prescribes a certain effect; so that by continually adding the capacity, eventually there would be the same effect taking the same time, which is synonymous to having an unlimited capacity: yet this is impossible, for this some time (potentially unlimited) is still not no time (actively unlimited). The second because with unlimited magnitude, every limited part of it would have some limited capacity based on the first principle, whereas these magnitudes can be infinitely added up, so as their capacities. So that its capacity cannot be limited.
266b 30
How is it possible when the first mover is not contacting the moved for the moved to continue moving? We have to say what moves makes the moved capable of causing movement: but the mover (the one next to the moved, not the first mover) and the moved still should stop at the same time.
267b 5
The immovable mover is at the center or the circumference.
267b 25
The eternal mover has no magnitude. This is proven because if there’s magnitude, it’s either limited or unlimited. A limited magnitude cannot allow for unlimited movement or unlimited time; also, a limited magnitude cannot have unlimited capacity to move an unlimited number of things, for an unlimited capacity on one thing always takes no time, which is impossible. Since it’s also impossible for an unlimited magnitude to have limited capacity, only unlimited magnitude has unlimited capacity. (For simply by saying that limited magnitude has no unlimited capacity does not mean its opposite will necessarily have unlimited capacity; if it were possible for unlimited magnitude to have limited capacity, argumentation would have to distinguish under what circumstances it were possible, in order to give a full account. If infinite magnitude were only possible to have finite capacity, then this would already be sufficient for the proof that prime mover has no magnitude). But there’s sadly no unlimited magnitude in nature. Thus the prime mover must have no magnitude.
VI
184b 15
One versus many, immovable versus moving starting points.
185a 1
The investigation of starting points is not an investigation of nature, though the understanding of nature involves a thinking of and from the starting points.
185b 15
It’s limits that are indivisible, not limited things.
185b 20
All beings are one in account means all beings are nothing.
185b 30
One to many is but one way being is meant, in the sense of being of many qualities.
186a 10
It’s absurd to say that the starting point of change lies only within things, as if change didn’t come all at once.
186a 25
Even if the thing is not separable from its paleness, they are nonetheless distinct.
186b 1
If Parmenides assumes being to be one, then what is, being distinct from being, is not. This is absurd. Thus being has to be meant in many ways.
186b 5
Yet if it’s the other way around, that it’s not being that belongs to the thing, but things belong to being, being still cannot be one. For in that case, all coincidents contained in being will not be.
186b 15
Beings can be divided for they are not coincidents. Coincidents are coincidents when 1.one thing can belong or not belong to another thing, or 2.one account has to rely upon one other account of the whole in order to be complete. Neither signifies being.
186b 30
If two things are coincidents of something, so is what they compose of; if not, not. Yet human is assumed to be just being. Then its two constituents will be just being too. So the universe will be composed of indivisible things. Being shall thus be meant in more than one way.
187a 1
If being is meant one way, not being will or will not exist (depending on the interpretation of ὁτι) because now everything is not simply not. But no matter what it’s not likely to say that all beings are one for beings and just being are still different: ontological difference.
187a 15
Anaxagoras is the subversion of Plato that for him matter is one but forms are many.
187b 20
Because sizes are certain of things, great and small, the indefinite dyad, cannot be solely ruling.
188a 5
Segregation will never be complete because attributes are never separate from things.
188a 15
Regarding the coming to be of things, Anaxagoras ignores how things can come to be not being a mixture, and how things can come to be according to a whole, not merely as parts. So parts can be separate from each other, and parts can be separate from wholes.
188a 20
Contraries are posited for all thinkers as starting points.
188a 25
A little qualification: not contrary things, but the first contraries, are starting points.
188a 30
This can be understood as things come to be from contrary things and not from random things. This also applies to composites: order and disorder, for instance.
188b 25
There seems necessary to be a third thing that contraries affect.
189b 10
A triad is needed: two contraries cannot affect each other as substance, plus substance itself cannot be contrary to itself, so that the underlying thing will be a new starting point different from the contraries. There is only one pair of contraries for substance, since all other contraries are derivatives within one genus.
190a 1
A simple thing that comes to be can be either like the human that comes to be musical, or the unmusical that comes to be musical. A compound is an unmusical human that comes to be a musical human. There’s a difference between what comes to be and from what it comes to be.
190a 10
Something comes to be and remains, while others don’t.
190a 35
Things come to be in many ways, substances come to be simply, while others come to be as a tode ti. Yet if this is the case, how can substances be said to come to be?
190b 1
Only if substances come to be from substances can they be said to come to be.
190b 25
The thing that simply comes to be is the underlying subject, yet the underlying subject is twofold: in one sense, it is a this something that comes to be another this something, like gold to statue; in the other sense, it is an opposite or deprivation that receives or rejects the form. The thus created presence and absence are the two things said by some people as the only two starting points.
191a 5
Scientifically knowable by analogy.
191a 10
It is not clear yet if the underlying thing is a substance, that is, a this something. Or, as a third starting point, it is not a thing, but an absence that effects.
191b 10
If we consider how not being can be meant in two ways, as purely and intrinsically not being, and as coincidentally not being, we could see how being can come incidentally from not being. So, it is necessary for there to be a third underlying thing, to mediate for a radicalization of presence and absence.
192a 1
Earlier thinkers treat potentiality and lack as one, which is false. For potentiality intrinsically lets things come to be but coincidentally is not, while lack coincidentally lets things come to be but intrinsically is not. Even if Plato speaks of a dyad he still treats the dyad as one indeterminate thing.
So the underlying thing is both a substance that has a positive content and the amorphous thing which remains. These two senses are interdependent. The sense of the underlying thing that leans more towards tode ti points to something determinate yet dynamical, as a solution for the substantiation and radicalization of being and its opposite. The more amorphous one occurs when the lack or opposite is not as intrinsically incapable of giving rise to.
VII
207b 1
For number there is a least limit but no limit on greatness, the least being one while the greatest being the fact that any magnitude can always be considered double the numbers of half the unit, like 1 cm can always actively be 10 mm. But for magnitudes there’s no smallest limit but a greatest limit, for any perception imposes a limit onto magnitude.
208a 1
The unlimited is a cause as matter is. The being for it is lack, while the intrinsically underlying subject is what’s continuous and perceptible.
208a 5
It’s not necessary for there to be an unlimited perceptible body to allow for coming to be, for passing away is another form of coming to be.
208a 10
Everything that makes contact with other things is limited, but not every limited thing makes contact with other things.
208a 15
It’s absurd to trust in things thought instead of things that really are. Thinking is as unlimited as time and movement, for what is taken always changes. No magnitude, however, can be unlimited in thought. Time->movement->magnitude->being.
210a 20
Part-whole relation seems to be differentiated from species-genus relationship.
210a 30
Only when what is in something and what it is in are parts of one whole can a thing be said of being in itself.
210b 25
Place can be said to be in something as an attribute is in something.
210b 30
Place is no matter or form, for these are parts of what is in a place; place relates only as to a whole.
213b 10
People believe that a void has to exist if bodies need to be separate and moving, so one thing needs not contain everything else.
214a 5
It is a question as whether a place that contains a color can be said to be a void, or because a color is of a tangible body it is not.
214a 10
Apart from a place without tangible body, a void is also said to be a place without this something, so as to be matter. But matter cannot be separate from the thing.
214a 25
It’s not necessary for there to be an independent place, or void, to allow for movement, because things can make way for each other simultaneously.
217a 30
Some people argue that since there’s extension and compression, otherwise there’s no movement that’s not circular (everything giving way at the same time), it’s necessary that there’s void. Yet it’s not necessary if magnitude comes to be with alteration of a thing. Matter potentially is great and small, and can actively be either.
217b 15
Rare and dense not only determine light and heavy but also soft and hard. The latter pair pertains to the thing’s affectabiliy. Affectability only pertains to the being of the thing, but has nothing to do with how much void is in a thing.
VIII
224a 25
The mover and the moved can move coincidentally, intrinsically but according to its part, or intrinsically according to itself.
224b 1
That from which and that to which are both different from that which moves. Form does not move, but the thing moves.
224b 30
Intrinsic changes come from contraries.
225a 20
Coming to be is not a movement for a thing that is not for a thing that is not cannot be actively in movement.
225b 10
Substance doesn’t move. Nor is a relation, for one of the relata could change without the other doing so, thus only a coincidental change (are relata not intrinsic parts of a relationship? it is not wrong to say relata could change without essentially affecting the relationship itself). Also there’s no movement of movement.
Is there a coming to be of movement? I suppose not. For if there is, then there will be a time at the end of which movement has come to be, and before that time there would only be rest. So the thing would be resting for an interval and starts moving instantaneously; the point at which the thing starts to move would both be moving and resting. Yet this is impossible. The limit should be continuous. So the movement will not have come to be. The fundamental principle here is that movement belongs intrinsically to a thing, and the thing has to be one, so rest and movement has to be continuous with each other. Thus there is no instantaneous transformation as such. Yet if something new is born through the change, then one can say that something has come to be.
226a 25
Movement with respect to quality has nothing to do with the quality of a substance. For a change of the substance would be simply coming to be.
226b 5
Qualitative changes can be by degrees. Yet it is still not yet a change in the magnitude of a thing until it is actively quantified.
226b 10
There’s no intermediary between contradictories.
226b 27
If a change is continuous, the change leaves no interval in the thing, and whether it leaves an interval in time is no matter.
227a 1
The successive is what follows after the starting point without things of the same kind in between. This allows for things of different kinds to be in between.
227a 10
Continuity is a kind of contiguity, for what are contiguous have their extremities touching, whereas what are continuous turn the touching extremities into one thing.
227a 20
Succession->contiguity->continuity.
227a 25
Units and points are different for units exist in succession while points in contiguity. There’s also no intermediate between units: does this mean that units refer more to the coming to be?
227b 25
A movement is unconditionally one if it has no intermission in time, that in which the thing moves remains the same throughout, and the thing remains one in number.
228a 5
If a state and the activity belonging to it is one and the same, then every movement in which the substance is the same will be one. Yet this seems problematic.
228b 30
A movement is also called one if it’s regular. Regularity can be more and less. If a movement is continuous but irregular, it is one but less so. Yet if a movement is contiguous it is not regular and is not one.
229a 20
Movements from a contrary and to its contrary are the different in being though same in number. Movements from a contrary and from its contrary are not contrary movements because they might be moving to an intermediary, and the movements are trying to lose instead of gaining contrariety, and the movements are defined by its wherefore not its wherefrom.
229b 1
Only movements from contraries to contraries are contrary movements for movement is from something to something.
229b 10
For changes, contraries will be to something and from something, for there’s only one being involved.
230a 1
Rests in contraries are contrary both to each other, and contrary to movements away from them respectively. But a rest is not opposed to the movement toward it because the rest would be a natural consequence of the movement.
230a 5
Absence of change is not rest. What’s contrary to absence of change of the thing is both its passing away and its non-being.
230b 1
A puzzle arises: are there comings to be and passings away in accord to nature and contrary to nature? Would there be a contrariety between a change forced and a change by nature? This contrariety does arise, however, as one passing away would be pleasant and the other of a painful sort, that is, not unconditionally.
230b 25
There are still two puzzles. First, coming to rest seems different from coming to a stop, as the first is gradual and the second is instantaneous, the cause of this seems to be the first is when the thing is forced, the second when the thing by nature moves to its own place. The second puzzle is that when a thing starts to move, it seems to both remain and move out, so as to have contraries in itself. But can a thing be said to rest if it moves? Or rather it seems more like the thing itself is torn to two contrary directions, so movements are more contraries than movement to rest.
IX
231a 25
A line cannot be composed of points for points are indivisible and have no extremities.
231b 1
If points make up continuity they have to make contact as separate wholes, which cannot be continuous.
231b 5
Does this mean that lines and points, nows and time are of the same kind? Or merely time between nows would again signify more nows?
231b 10
It seems to say the intermediate is not of another kind so as to allow nows to succeed each other, but is again divisible into more divisibles.
232b 20
Continuity is redefined as that which is always divisible into divisibles.
233a 1
For there’s always movement in time, and movement can always be faster or slower, time and magnitude have to be continuous in order to be divided.
233a 20
Time is always inseparable from magnitude when talking about movement. So Zeno’s problem is that he ignores this essential relationship, and he mistakenly takes the infinity of divisions to be the infinity of extremities, and asks how can one in a time limited in extremity traverse an unlimited magnitude, when in fact time is itself also unlimited.
233a 35
But since magnitudes and times can often be taken as limited wholes, and are limited wholes, if time is limited, magnitude is limited.
233b 30
Nothing continuous is without parts.
234a 25
Nothing in movement is in the now. Accordingly nothing is at rest in the now either.
Even if a now is the same when divided into two times, the problem is still there, that now a thing will move and rest simultaneously.
234b 10
Everything that is changing has to be divisible so that its parts can be in what it changes from and what it changes to, though these in which changing parts are need not be extremes.
234b 20
Two ways of dividing movements: according to time and according to parts.
235a 10
Time, movement, being-in-movement (when something is actively in the state of movement), the thing itself that is in movement, and what the movement is with respect to (like place, magnitude, color etc.), can all be divisible.
235b 30
When something has changed, it is in what it has changed to. Because change is not contiguous, what is not yet in what the thing has changed into when the thing has changed cannot instantaneously jump to what it has changed into.
236a 1
The primary time in which a thing has changed is indivisible, for it cannot be that it has changed in any one of the parts; but if it were changing throughout all parts, the changing cannot constitute having changed at the end. What primary means is that the thing has changed as a whole, not because of anything else. So if a thing has changed in a primary time, it can only have changed in every of its parts.
236a 10
There’s a primary time in which a change is completed, but no primary time in which a change has started. For a primary time cannot be indivisible if it allows for a starting point. If there were a starting point of change, the indivisible time it starts, being a now, would be next to other nows before change has started; further, at its limit (taken as a continuous one) of starting point rest will be one with having changed, which is unmediated and absurd. So having a starting point would make the primary time divisible, which is already established as false. So it can only be an indivisible limit and a whole that recapitulates everything prior. The end as a limit is not a limit of time’s passage, but rather a limit of the thing as it completes the thing.
236a 30
There’s no primary part of change, as primary change has to be of a whole. If there were a primary part of change, with the same reasoning, this part would again have another primary part in itself, thus an infinite number of primary parts will be produced, then which one is the true primary part will be undetermined.
236b 1
Here Aristotle seems to clarify what he means above: the thing that changes and what it changes in are both divisible. Yet what the thing changes into is not divisible. This amounts to saying that the completion is not divisible, at least not intrinsically. Thus there are no primary parts regarding the thing and the time.
236b 15
Only in movement with respect to quality can there be intrinsic indivisibility and primary parts. So it’s possible to conceive of one thing changing qualitatively for its parts changing qualitatively first.
237a 1
Since every movement in its primary time is in any of its parts, it only makes sense that it could always be taken to be different divisions of the movement, so as to always be moving prior to it.
As a whole changes, the change has to be present in every part of the whole; yet the part is no independent or primary thing with its own change, unless it’s a qualitative transformation, but a phase of changing and a step of having changed within the whole. That is none of these is an active whole, but only a potential division. The primary time then is actively indivisible but potentially divisible, and divisible only according to its being whole; the primacy of the primary time is not given by its being any time, but by its being for the thing itself as a completed whole. The parts then have to be dependent upon the wholes, but cannot themselves be unlimited independent things.
237a 5
For there are unlimited nows, the thing will have changed for unlimited times at unlimited nows.
237a 20
What has changed has been changing previously, and what is changing also has changed previously.
237b 20
In whatever along which or during which, being different from for which, there’s no primary.
237b 25
An unlimited time cannot cover a limited magnitude unless it’s for reiteration.
238a 15
It’s impossible for a thing to be always coming to be or passing away, for unlimited time is not for a limited thing. It’s also the case that unlimited movement is not for limited time.
238a 30
It’s also impossible for an unlimited magnitude to traverse a limited one or vice versa, or for an unlimited magnitude to traverse an unlimited one, in limited time.
238b 25
Coming to a stop is in time for what’s in movement.
239a 1
There’s no primary time for coming to stop or being in movement, for primary time is only for having come to stop and other kinds of completion.
239a 20
Accordingly, it’s impossible to speak as if a moving thing moving in its primary time would have any primary place in particular; that is, not as a whole. For to say a thing has a primary place is not the same as to say a thing is at rest. Even though at every slice of the moment the thing with its parts stay at the same place, it is still on the move, and is no independent interval in which the thing is at rest. So not only temporally, spatially there’s also the part-whole relationship of a movement.
240b 10
What is without parts can only be coincidentally moving, while what is with parts and its parts can be intrinsically moving.
241b 1
The limits imposed upon spatial movement might be different than those imposed by the contraries; but insofar as it’s capable of being cut, it admits of limits, and is in this way limited.
241b 10
It’s another question to consider if movements, taken together, are unlimited in time. And if there’s ultimately only one movement: the unlimited circular movement.
X
241b 35
Everything in movement is moved by something, so if a thing moves intrinsically as a whole, it is moved by its part which is the true source of movement.
241b 40
What ceases moving might not be stopped because something else is at rest, but if it’s at rest due to something else ceasing movement, it is moved by something else.
242a 40
Once this is accepted, everything in movement must be moved by something, for every whole, being divisible, will not move if parts don’t move, and if only one part moves it’s not moving intrinsically and primarily as part of a whole, so everything is moved by something else.
242b 55
It’s only possible for a movement to be unlimited in a limited time if the movement is made by many things. These things, however, will be either in contact with or be continuous to each other, thus composing one, if the mover causes movement with respect to place by bodily movement. Then again one thing will have unlimited movement in limited time, which really is impossible.
243a 30
The prime mover, not as the for-the-sake-of-which, but as the starting point from which movement proceeds, is always together with the thing moved.
243a 35
Three sorts of movers.
243a 15
Four species of causes of spatial movement: pull, push, carry and rotate.
243b 1
Throwing is a push that imparts movement into the thing.
244a 1
Push and pull are more primary, as rotation is a combination of two and carrying is effected by something pulled or pushed.
244b 5
Affection is the underlying perceptible qualities brought about by other perceptibles.
245b 10
Since we refer to altered bronze still as bronze, but the bronze statue as a statue, configuration and coming to be of states is no alteration.
246a 10
Since states are either completion or the passing away of this completion, these are not alterations either.
246b 5
Also, since states are always related to things as a mode of being for a thing toward affections, it is not a thing that can primarily change, but change only coincidentally. Thus it intrinsically is no alteration.
247a 1
When virtues or vices come to be or simply be activated in the soul, the perceptual part of the soul is necessarily altered. Since every virtue of character is a state with regards to bodily pleasure and pain, so perception has to be involved.
247b 1
But for states of thinking there’s neither alteration nor coming to be. For knowledge is understanding coming to rest, but there’s no coming to be of a coming to rest. This means that knowledge is not something separable from understanding but its very essence. And knowledge actively is when something else, that is, the particular, is present, but not because it is moved by the perception so as to build the knowledge to completion, but rather instantaneously conjures up the completed knowledge together with its perception. There seems to be two dimensions of soul’s movement: thing-soul, and soul-soul. Thing to soul there’s no intermediary, yet soul also has its internal movement. As knowledge is conjured up with respect to thing, there’s no coming to be; but since the thing itself comes to be, the soul would’ve moved in correspondence.
248b 1
If circular movement and linear movement are commensurable, their lengths have to be commensurable. What seems intuitively commensurable, however, is not actually commensurable.
248b 15
Homonyms seem to be incommensurables, yet even some words that have the same meaning when applied are incommensurable.
249a 1
Then it seems that the commensurablility depends upon the recipients, if distinct incommensurable, if same commensurable.
249a 5
If two things are commensurable, it seems that what they belong to have no differentiae in itself or respectively (one cannot say one color is more color like than the other, or blue is bluer than red, unless coincidentally).
249b 15
Should we regard things that change or the changes themselves as what determine the kinds as commensurable or not?
249b 20
Quantity-inequality, quality-dissimilarity, coming to be-distinctness (or, if substance were number, also inequality).
250a 10
Inertia is discussed; it’s not necessary that a capacity lesser than the original capacity could move what could be moved by the original strength at all.
250a 30
This seems like a bold claim, to say qualitative change or coming to be can also have their own common measure.
250b 5
This seems to be a qualification of the above statement: for some alterations and comings to be, half the time would not necessarily be followed by half the effect, for the half might not be the quantitative middle with respect to the time taken. Or it might simply be a parallel to the former case, reads “the half will not do it half time”.
252b 30
Even if all movements have their limits, they can still be one and the same, combining into something eternal and continuous.
253a 1
For a thing to be sometimes moving and sometimes not, it’s nothing absurd to say that its cause of movement is sometimes present and sometimes not.
253a 10
In fact the movement is always present somehow in a thing and does not come to be.
253b 10
If it’s accepted that sometimes it’s the whole that is moved (actively) but not any divisible part of it, it’s also to be denied that all things are always in movement.
262a 10
Moving spatially in a circle is different from circular movement for it can turn back upon coming to the starting point.
263a 15
The genuine resolution of Zeno’s paradox is to state the primacy of actual continuity over potential division.
264a 1
A new argument: if at one time a thing is, at another it is not, then in between times there’s a time of coming to be; the whole time taken of a thing’s coming to be is then greater than itself, which is absurd.
264a 15
If a movement is continuous the direction will be set as intended at its start. Yet the linear movement that turns back upon itself has two contrary directions at the same time. Even if the direction is not there from the start but is renewed at every instant, at one moment the thing will have two contrary movements at the same time. Or if one considers these contrary movements are not present in the same parts, one would see the part that first touches the limit would turn back and run counter to what succeeds, which is undeniably absurd.
264b 20
If a thing that is moved should always be preceded by its opposite kind of rest, and everything that is not always moved by this kind of movement (not as a body might not always move with the movement of its heart, which means the whole and its part would be preceded by different kinds of rest; but as a thing itself might not always move with the same species of movement) should also be alike preceded, it’s clear turning back will be preceded by a rest.
264b 5
With time being continuous one can only say that movement is successive.
264b 20
What this seems to mean is: because any point on circumference is a starting point and an ending point, so it is always moving to something both as an end and a start; but for linear movement, throughout the movement the starting point and the end point remain the same and are repeated in every step of the process. So there’s no chance that the start and end points of a linear movement be renewed constantly.
The observation that some movement stops right at the moment when a circle is completed is of no matter here, for not every spatial movement in a circle is a circular movement. What is a circular movement must have the starting point of movement and the end point unified; and starting point of movement is not the same as the starting spatial position of movement. The movement starts in a place, but the place itself doesn’t start the movement. What is the point here is then not every movement in a circle will be unlimited and continuous, but rather if there’s any one intelligible movement that is both unlimited and continuous, it can only be circular. Unlimited linear movement cannot be said to be one movement. And even if one can say that bounded rectilinear motion is also unlimited and in a way continuous, for a thing moves across the angle part by part, this continuity is not primary but is derivative from the most continuous circling movement. That is, without the truly continuous movement, the separate parts of a rectilinear motion cannot even be unified into one in the first place. Just as a motion in virtue of itself ends at its limit, the rectilinear motion along the lines of a square, for instance, will end at the cross angle where the starting point of one line and the end point of another coincide. This makes it impossible to be one without the continuity provided by time. For of course there are many motions, and how can these motions be of one thing instead of infinitely many? Only when they are gathered into one continuous motion. So rectilinear motion cannot be one and continuous for its continuity comes from the natural continuity of circular movement, not the other way around.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
I
184a 10
认识事物就是认识其本原:这一点有充分根据吗?
184a 20
怎么会有本性上更可知、对我们却并非如此的东西?可知意味着什么?
一个人以她特殊的方式认识事物。她只认识特殊事物时,仍受自然态度束缚。但她开始困惑,想要研究事物的原因。从这里,她开始超越自身特殊的构造,试图规定世界生成的根据。事物能够被认识,因为事物依本性可知,而这一普遍者内在于特殊者之中;否则,事物不可能和谐地统一。然而,这一普遍者本身也是一个特殊的普遍者,所以并非每个人一开始就能认识它。于是,她从特殊者认识普遍者,并逐渐以一种特殊方式存在:她特殊地认识普遍者。但这一认识岂不又与每种特殊生活脱节?她岂不仍持有一个特殊视角?这一问题通过两种方式避免。首先,每个普遍者作为普遍者都是特殊的,所以它是一种特殊的特殊者。普遍者是自我特殊化者,因而她的每次认识都越过边界,总是既特殊又不特殊。她自身同样如此,因为她欲求认识普遍者,而这包括她自己特殊的存在方式。在认识自己时,她超出自身,在思想中成为自足的。所以,亚里士多德说从对我们可知者,即特殊而未经反思的被给予者,出发,走向依本性可知者,即普遍的单称者,意思就在这里。自然态度是不惊异、无兴趣地对待事物的态度,或虽惊异,却不够严格,无法彻底形成富于成效的反思。
184b 10
一种特别的立场:从普遍者出发。这是否有点与柏拉图的方法相反?
II
192b 10
自然物的自身原则。
192b 20
自然是原则,且是必然的。桌子不欲变成别的东西,因为其原则在外部,但材料欲求变化。
193a 1
自然是原则;本体在自身中具有原则。其他性质属于本体,却不是它的自然,在自身中也没有自然。
193a 5
有些人可能缺乏自明性。
193a 25
作为底层的材料就是自然?
193a 30
形式就是自然?
193b 5
形式与事物在言说中可分离。
193b 10
现实性优于潜能;形式优于材料。
193b 10
即便说材料是人工存在物的自然,形式仍是自然,正如对于非人工存在物,比如人,形式是自然一样。但这是否潜在地使形式向材料靠近?
193b 15
作为涌出的自然,走向作为被拥有者的自然。自然,即生长之物,并不是就其从何生长而言;这一点与医术不同(医术的产物称为医疗性的,而非健康的);它是相对于其长成之物而言。目的论。
193b 20
缺失与相反者。
193b 35
与运动分离。
194a 1
理念比数学对象更难与自然分离。反向的几何学。
194a 35
目的有两重:最后之物与所为之故。自然作为形式,是最后之物,也是最好之物。这以自然科学与技艺之间的类比为前提。潜在冲突:太阳与人是作为目的的形式,还是原则?形式是原则还是目的?
194b 25
形式是一种原因。四因在此提出。但此前不是把形式说成目的吗?四因总是在场吗?
195b 1
远因:游移的原因?
195b 5
说明有不同的精确程度。
195b 15
在说明中呈现原因的不同方式。
195b 35
偶然作为原因。
196b 30
机运与偶然的定义。
196b 15
生成之物可能没有目的。
197a 5
机运与思想涉及同样的事物:机运必须关乎经过考虑的选择。
197b 20
偶然的定义。
197b 35
违反自然:内因?自然如果是自然,怎么能成为自己的反面?
198a 10
机运与偶然必然后于思考与自然:因为偶然是偶属性的,低于内在者;而偶然本身只是未定,并非无。
198a 25
除了质料因之外,其他原因常被混同。
198a 30
不动之物。
198b 5
形式是不动的;还有哪些东西完全不动?为何作此区分?
198b 20
原因之间的冲突:必然性在场,目的缺席。
198b 30
听起来像亚里士多德在反驳演化论。
199a 5
不是已经确定机运有所为了吗?
199a 10
自然与技艺之间看似被强加的等同。
199b 10
未分化的最初者:种子。
199b 15
自然自身的本质:自然自身的自然。
200a 20
数学的必然性是单向的;生成之物则在从目的到材料、从材料到目的的双向上具有必然性。
200a 30
目的独立于材料,统治材料,需要更多研究。
200b 5
说明可以把材料聚集在自身之中,自身就是形式因与目的;但说明本身又是目的的一个本原。
III
200b 20
看似运动所必需的条件:位置、虚空、时间。
200b 25
有些东西是现实的,有些是潜在的,有些既潜在又现实。运动是相对的。
201a 5
存在与运动之间的对应。
201a 10
运动只有在现实化时才有。但现实化本身是什么?难道所有现实化不都是运动吗?
201a 25
一个不动的推动者。
201a 30
现实化自身不同于运动,因为它可以是其存在的现实化,而那并非一个潜能。
201b 10
潜能的完整现实化不是运动。
201b 25
运动因为未定而被误归入某些范畴;但它的未定性在于,它必须把两个范畴都包含在自身之中。
202a 5
某一类运动总是双向的,因为需要接触。推动者在自身中带有一个形式,作为原因调节运动。
202a 15
运动的存在相同,说明却不同。
202b 10
激活对双方相同,并不是说双方具有同一存在,而是说双方被现实化的潜能相同。运动对双方相同,是因为运动总是潜能的现实化,而这必然在自身中包含一种未现实化。抑制就是这种未现实化。
203b 5
无限者被认为只能是本原。
203b 25
如果外部是无限的,它也就具有无限的物体与数量,因为它在这里,并且只能通过物体的连续性在这里。而无限的位置也必然伴随无限的物体,因为可能性上无限者,在现实性上也无限。
204a 10
无限者不能与可感者分离,因为它具有大小,应当可分,正如我们在数学和物体中谈无限。但如果它是可感者的偶属性,就不能是元素或本原。
204a 20
但无限者不能是活动的本原,因为那样它的每个部分自身都会无限,由许多无限者组成:这是不可能的。但若它不可分,就不能活动,因为现实者(物体)具有数量。至此,在物理学中,没有作为现实物体的无限者自身。
204b 1
这个结论并不排除作为非物体、可思的无限者自身的可能性。
204b 15
如果元素的数目有限,无限物体就不是复合的;因为一个元素无限便会摧毁其他元素,而所有元素都无限则会创造出一个广延无限的物体。
204b 30
一个元素由之生成的、简单的无限物体不可能存在,因为它在任何地方都未被观察到。而且,连整个宇宙由一个元素生成也不可能,因为事物从相反者转化为相反者。
205a 15
如果有一个无限物体,任何物体所占的位置都会无限,静止与运动也就没有规定性。
205b 1
物体必须与其位置相配,反之亦然。说无限者不动还不够;这种不动必须通过它的自然而得到解释。
有限性就是极性。
206a 20
潜在无限与现实无限之间的根本差异。
206b 1
无限者不是本体:而是对于一个有限事物,总有一物接着另一物。
206b 20
增加中的无限,是无限地趋近界限;分割中的无限,是无限地分割;两者都预设一个预先有限的大小。增加中没有超出每个确定大小的无限,因为这将预设一个总能无尽穿越的现实无限者。
207a 1
无限者不是没有任何东西在其外部者,而是总有某物在其外部者。
207a 10
无限者并不完整,因为完整需要一个没有任何东西在其外部的终点。圆环在严格意义上并不无限,因为它虽能无尽进行,下一个外部却仅与前一个不同,在整个过程中仍是相同的。所以圆有界限,却能无尽进行。
207a 20
无限者的尊严来自完整者的尊严。无限者好比形式的质料,而形式是整体。如果无限者能够规定可感者,它也就能够规定可思者,这是荒谬的。
IV
208b 20
空间不仅是方位,也是一种自然能力。
209a 1
没有它任何东西都不能存在、而它却能不依赖其他东西存在者,在先。
209a 10
点不能与其位置区分。
209a 15
空间有大小而无物体;因而同时有形体又无形体。
209b 5
空间可能是质料,也可能是形式。它也可能是一般的,或特殊的。
209b 25
位置既不是形式,也不是质料,因为它不依赖事物,而是包围事物。
210a 10
消逝的位置是什么?
211a 15
为了运动而追问位置。
211a 35
与包围者连续者是整体的一部分,而分离者则在同一个位置中。连续者与包围者一起被移动,分离者则在包围者之中被移动。
211b 10
位置是包围物体的界限,形式则是被包围物体的界限。
211b 20
位置不是空间内在的广延,因为那样当容器改变位置时,在其内部运动的部分也会改变位置,因为它现在处于广延的另一个部分。但事实并非如此,因为它仍在同一个容器的同一个位置内运动。位置的改变于是会导致一个位置在另一个位置中运动,如此无穷。位置因此必须不动,从而不是物体的广延。
212a 20
位置是包围事物者的第一个不动界限。
212b 10
天不是整体吗?整体不能被界限包围吗?有不进行包围的界限吗?
212b 25
只有可动物体才有位置。
212b 30
同类事物内部没有界限,并处在各自适当的位置。
214b 30
如果有虚空,就没有运动。虚空不容许任何区分。
218a 5
时间不由诸当下组成;当下不是时间的一部分,因为它不是一个与其他部分同类、被度量的单位。
218a 10
当下的悖论:1.如果诸当下彼此不同,那么当前的当下应当存在,之前的当下应当消逝;2.但既然它是不同的,它就不与当前当下同时消逝,而必须已经消逝。所以,它只能3.在另一个不同于当前当下的当下中消逝。但它不能在自身中消逝,否则它就仍存在;也不能在下一个当下中消逝,因为那与在当前当下中消逝没有区别。那么,它不是在当前当下或下一个当下,而是在再另一个当下中消逝,于是中间将有无限多个它应当在其中消逝的当下;这是不可能的。
218a 25
当下也不能是同一个,因为当下是界限,而在一切有限者中界限都有多个。此外,如果当下是同一个,那么所有当下都会是同一个当下,数百万年都将同时。
218b 1
旋转的一部分可以是一段时间;但旋转自身不是时间自身,因为假如还有另一个天,就会有另一个时间。
219a 15
时间在大小、运动,以及使运动开始和结束的存在者之上的彻底分层奠基。这提出一个难题:更普遍者如何奠基于更特殊者,而不丧失其普遍的平等性?
219a 25
运动是我们知觉时间的恰当所在。
219b 1
时间是就先后而言属于变化的数。这暗示了部分性。
219b 5
时间是我们所数者,而非我们用来数的东西。
219b 10
同时的时间,由在存在上不同的诸当下来度量。
219b 25
当下在其说明中是不同的,因为它在各自的先后中界定运动;但只要使当下成为其所是者(进行空间运动的事物,而非无条件存在的事物)相同,诸当下就相同。
220a 10
点在运动时,必须施加一个停顿,才能形成双重界限并切成两条线;当下则不同,因为它关乎运动中的东西,所以它自然是一个在自身中连续的不同者。
220a 15
所以,当下自然更像作为端点的界限,而非点或部分(它是一段绵延);也因为当下不是时间的一部分。因此,当下规定时间,正如运动者规定运动;而它之所以连续,并作为连续者被计数,是因为它所属于者连续。
220b 20
运动与时间的相互依赖。时间是通过单位运动对运动的度量。事物就其能够被运动度量而言处于时间中;这就是在时间中存在的本质形式。
221a 25
事物如何被包含在时间中——因为时间是一段理念的绵延。
221b 1
运动移除在场者。这是真的吗?
221b 10
静止由时间度量。静止者是有运动潜能者。有些存在者或非存在者总是存在,或总是不存在。
223b 10
时间不也由运动度量吗?
V
250b 15
运动总是存在吗?
251a 1
循环与“中间的时间”相同吗?
251a 20
如果运动生成,可动者就必须先存在;但可动者必须从仅仅可动变为被动,而这一潜能的现实化在其自身外部得到原因:它不是自因。但自因又如何呢?
251b 10
如果运动生成,运动就有一个先前;但若无时间,就不能有先前(先后只在时间中吗?),而若有时间,就必须已经有运动。既然总有当下,就总有时间,也就总有运动。
252a 15
自然有秩序,也有比例。
252a 25
恩培多克勒只展示聚合与分离的原因,却没有展示两者交替的原因。
252a 35
仅仅某物一直存在或生成这一事实还不够:还需要证明其原因。
252b 1
永恒的本原没有其他原因。但有些永恒事物确实有本原。
254b 10
有些内在运动依自然而行,有些则违反自然。内在运动不是那些仅仅属于事物,或属于事物之部分的运动。
255a 5
有些事物依自然而动,却不应是自行运动。
255a 15
自行运动的事物必须有施加作用与承受作用的不同部分。
255a 30
事物可以依自然或违反自然地具有被动或推动的潜能。所以,依自然而动不同于自行运动,因为自然运动可分为主动与被动的潜能。而潜能难以刻画,所以推动者变得不明显。
255b 35
推动者难以确定,因为它可能是主动的原因,也可能只是解除对潜能的抑制。
256a 15
有一个第一推动者;如果第一推动者一直存在,这就不与运动一直存在的事实矛盾。
256b 20
被动者、某物借以被推动的手段、推动者。以不作为某物借以被推动的手段之方式推动者,应当是不动的(一个纯粹推动者)。假定有这样的推动者是合理的(尚非必然)。
257a 1
如果某物在推动的同时被另一个被动之物推动,而且必然被推动,那么推动与被动或者具有同样的自然,或者具有不同的自然。但两者都不太对。因此,推动之物不能被另一个被动之物推动,而必须或者自行运动,或者不动。
257b 10
运动是潜能的不完整现实化。
257b 15
两个部分不可能各自推动对方。
257b 30
必须有一个不动的推动者,因为自我推动的推动者只是在其不同部分中自我推动,那么至少有一个部分不被推动。关于不动推动者的整个论证,在部分的层次上重复了一遍。
258b 1
一个首要推动者或被动者,至少被动者,如果需要保持其自然,就可能潜在地可分、现实地却不分。亚里士多德对推动者的要求比较宽松,或许因为推动者更加首要,总会以某种方式保留。
258b 20
既然有自我推动者,而自我推动者必然由部分组成,因而有大小,那么它的原因(即其不动的部分)就应当卷入运动本身,这意味着它不可能没有变化。然而它是不动的,所以必须始终存在。这里真正需要确定的,毋宁是推动者,或某个推动者,是否贯穿时间保持恒定,还是有多个(无限多个)推动者瞬间出现又消失。
259a 10
既然一个已经足够,而有限的数目更好,那么就有一个第一推动者。
259a 15
因为运动连续,所以推动者也连续。
260a 1
第一个被动者也是永恒的,因为任何东西若要运动,就得由另一个运动着的东西推动,那么推导出一个依次推动其他一切的最初被动者便是合理的。
260a 25
空间运动最为首要。因为大小的增加或减少依赖性质变化:增加是把别的东西添加到相似者上,而性质变化就是这种运动。但性质变化若不受作用就不可能发生,而受作用要求一物与他物的接近程度改变。在这个意义上,性质变化依赖空间运动。
261a 15
目的论:次序上在后,本性上在先。
261b 1
运动的连续性以第一推动者的一为基础,而非相反;只有空间运动是连续的。相继的运动会被一段时间间隔打断。
266b 1
有限大小不可能具有无限能力,无限大小也不可能具有有限能力。前者是因为,具有无限能力时,产生效果将完全不需要时间,但有限大小规定了某种确定效果;于是,通过不断增加能力,最终会有同一个效果花费同样时间,这相当于具有无限能力。然而这是不可能的,因为这某个时间(潜在地无限)仍不是没有时间(现实地无限)。后者是因为,对于无限大小,根据第一个原则,其每个有限部分都会有某种有限能力,而这些大小可以无限相加,其能力也一样。所以,它的能力不能有限。
266b 30
当第一推动者不再接触被动者,被动者怎么可能继续运动?必须说,推动者使被动者有能力引起运动;但推动者(紧邻被动者的那个,而非第一推动者)与被动者仍应同时停止。
267b 5
不动的推动者在中心或圆周。
267b 25
永恒推动者没有大小。证明如下:如果有大小,它就或者有限,或者无限。有限大小不容许无限运动或无限时间;而且,有限大小不可能有无限能力去推动无限多个事物,因为无限能力作用于一个事物总不花时间,这是不可能的。既然无限大小也不可能具有有限能力,那么只有无限大小才有无限能力。(因为仅仅说有限大小没有无限能力,并不意味着其反面必然有无限能力;如果无限大小可能有有限能力,论证就必须区分它在何种情况下可能,才能给出完整说明。如果无限大小只可能具有有限能力,那么这就已足以证明第一推动者没有大小。)但遗憾的是,自然中没有无限大小。因此,第一推动者必须没有大小。
VI
184b 15
一与多、不动与运动的本原。
185a 1
对本原的研究不是对自然的研究,虽然理解自然包含对本原的思考以及从本原出发的思考。
185b 15
不可分的是界限,而非有限事物。
185b 20
所有存在者在说明上为一,意味着所有存在者都是无。
185b 30
从一到多,只是存在的一种意指方式,即具有多种性质的存在。
186a 10
说变化的本原只在事物内部是荒谬的,仿佛变化不是一同到来。
186a 25
即使事物不能与其苍白分离,两者仍然不同。
186b 1
如果巴门尼德假定存在是一,那么存在着的东西既然不同于存在,就不存在。这是荒谬的。因此,存在必须以多种方式被意指。
186b 5
但如果反过来,不是存在属于事物,而是事物属于存在,存在仍不可能是一。因为那样,存在中所含的一切偶属性都将不存在。
186b 15
存在者可以分割,因为它们不是偶属性。偶属性之为偶属性,是当1.某物可以属于或不属于另一物,或2.一个说明必须依赖整体的另一个说明才能完整。这两者都不表示存在。
186b 30
如果两物是某物的偶属性,那么它们组成的东西也是;如果不是,则也不是。然而人被假定为存在本身。那么,其两个构成者也会是存在本身。所以宇宙将由不可分者组成。因此,存在必须以不止一种方式被意指。
187a 1
如果存在只有一种意指方式,非存在就将存在或不存在(取决于对ὁτι的解释),因为现在一切都不再只是非存在。但无论如何,都不大可能说所有存在者为一,因为存在者与存在本身仍然不同:本体论差异。
187a 15
阿那克萨戈拉是对柏拉图的颠覆:对他而言,质料为一,形式为多。
187b 20
因为事物的大小是确定的,大与小,即未定的二,不能独自统治。
188a 5
分离永远无法完整,因为属性从不与事物分开。
188a 15
关于事物的生成,阿那克萨戈拉忽略了事物如何并非作为混合物而生成,以及如何依整体生成,而非仅作为部分。所以,部分可以彼此分离,部分也可以与整体分离。
188a 20
所有思想家都把相反者设为本原。
188a 25
一点限定:不是相反的事物,而是最初的相反者,才是本原。
188a 30
这可以理解为,事物从相反事物生成,而非从任意事物生成。这也适用于复合物:例如秩序与无序。
188b 25
似乎必须有相反者施以作用的第三者。
189b 10
需要一个三元组:两个相反者不能作为本体相互作用,加之本体自身不能与自身相反,所以底层之物将成为不同于相反者的新本原。本体只有一对相反者,因为所有其他相反者都是同一个属内部的派生者。
190a 1
生成的简单事物,既可以像成为通晓音乐者的人,也可以像成为通晓音乐者的不通音乐者。复合物则是不通音乐的人变成通晓音乐的人。生成者与它由之生成者之间有差别。
190a 10
有些东西生成并留存,另一些则不然。
190a 35
事物以多种方式生成;本体单纯地生成,而其他东西作为一个这个某物(tode ti)生成。但若如此,怎么能说本体生成呢?
190b 1
只有本体从本体生成,才能说它们生成。
190b 25
单纯生成者是底层主体,但底层主体有两重:一个意义上,它是一个成为另一个这个某物的这个某物,比如金成为雕像;另一个意义上,它是接受或拒绝形式的相反者或缺失。由此创造的在场与缺席,被有些人说成仅有的两个本原。
191a 5
通过类比而在科学上可知。
191a 10
尚不清楚底层之物是否是一个本体,即一个这个某物。或者,作为第三个本原,它不是事物,而是产生作用的缺席。
191b 10
如果考虑非存在的两种意指方式,即纯粹内在地不存在,以及偶属性地不存在,就能看到存在如何偶属性地从非存在而来。所以,必须有一个第三的底层之物进行中介,让在场与缺席彻底化。
192a 1
先前思想家把潜能与缺失当作一回事,这是错误的。因为潜能内在地让事物生成,却偶属性地不存在;缺失则偶属性地让事物生成,却内在地不存在。即使柏拉图谈二元,他仍把二元当作一个未定之物。
所以,底层之物既是有肯定内容的本体,也是留存的无定形之物。这两个意义相互依赖。底层之物较偏向这个某物的意义,指向某种确定却动态的东西,作为存在及其对立面的本体化与彻底化的解决办法。较无定形的意义,则出现于缺失或对立面在内在上并非那么无力于产生的地方。
VII
207b 1
数有最小界限,却没有最大界限,最小者是一,而最大者在于:任何大小总可被看成以一半单位计量时数目的两倍,比如1厘米总可现实地是10毫米。但大小没有最小界限,却有最大界限,因为任何知觉都对大小施加界限。
208a 1
无限者如同质料一样是原因。它的存在是缺失,而内在的底层主体则是连续且可感者。
208a 5
不必有无限的可感物体才能允许生成,因为消逝是生成的另一种形式。
208a 10
与其他事物接触的一切都有限,但并非每个有限事物都与其他事物接触。
208a 15
相信思想之物而非真实存在之物,是荒谬的。思考如时间与运动一样无限,因为所取者总在变化。然而,没有大小能在思想中无限。时间->运动->大小->存在。
210a 20
部分—整体关系似乎与种—属关系被区分开来。
210a 30
只有当处在某物之中者与它所处的某物是同一个整体的部分时,才能说一个事物在自身之中。
210b 25
位置可以被说成在某物之中,如同属性在某物之中。
210b 30
位置不是质料或形式,因为这些是位于某位置之物的部分;位置只与整体相联系。
213b 10
人们认为,如果物体需要分离并运动,那么虚空就必须存在,这样一个事物才不必包含其他一切。
214a 5
一个问题是:包含颜色的位置能否被称为虚空,还是因为颜色属于可触的物体,它就不是虚空。
214a 10
除了没有可触物体的位置,虚空也被说成没有这个某物的位置,从而成为质料。但质料不能与事物分离。
214a 25
不必有独立的位置或虚空才能允许运动,因为事物可以同时相互让位。
217a 30
有些人论证说,既然有伸展与压缩,否则就不会有非圆周的运动(一切同时让位),那么就必须有虚空。但如果大小随着事物的性质变化而生成,就不必如此。质料潜在地是大和小,现实地则可以是其中任一者。
217b 15
稀与密不仅决定轻与重,也决定软与硬。后一对涉及事物的可受作用性。可受作用性只关乎事物的存在,与事物中有多少虚空无关。
VIII
224a 25
推动者与被动者可以偶属性地运动,也可以内在地但依其部分运动,或者内在地依自身运动。
224b 1
由之而动者与动之所向者,都不同于运动之物。形式不运动,事物运动。
224b 30
内在变化来自相反者。
225a 20
生成不是运动,因为不存在的事物——因为不存在的事物不可能现实地运动。
225b 10
本体不运动。关系也不运动,因为一个关系项可以改变而另一个不变,所以只是偶属性变化(关系项不是关系的内在部分吗?说关系项可以变化而不在本质上影响关系本身,并没有错)。也没有运动的运动。
运动有生成吗?我想没有。因为若有,就会有一段时间,运动在其末尾已生成,而那段时间之前只有静止。所以,事物将静止一段时间,然后瞬间开始运动;在事物开始运动的那个点,它会既运动又静止。但这是不可能的。界限应当连续。所以运动不会已生成。这里的根本原则是:运动内在地属于事物,而事物必须是一,所以静止与运动必须彼此连续。因此,不存在这样的瞬间转化。但如果通过变化有新东西诞生,就可以说某物生成了。
226a 25
关于性质的运动,与本体的性质无关。因为本体的变化将只是生成。
226b 5
性质变化可以有程度。但在它被现实地量化之前,仍不是事物大小的变化。
226b 10
矛盾者之间没有中间者。
226b 27
如果变化连续,变化就在事物中不留下间隔;至于是否在时间中留下间隔,则无关紧要。
227a 1
相继者是在本原之后跟随者,中间没有同类事物。这容许异类事物处在中间。
227a 10
连续是毗邻的一种,因为毗邻者的端点相接触,而连续者使接触的端点成为同一个东西。
227a 20
相继->毗邻->连续。
227a 25
单位与点不同,因为单位相继而存在,点则毗邻而存在。单位之间也没有中间者:这是否意味着单位更多指向生成?
227b 25
如果运动在时间上没有间歇,事物在其中运动者始终相同,而事物在数目上保持为一,那么该运动就是无条件的一。
228a 5
如果状态与属于它的活动是同一个东西,那么本体相同的每个运动都会是一。但这似乎有问题。
228b 30
运动若规则,也被称为一。规则性有多有少。如果运动连续却不规则,它仍是一,但程度较低。然而,如果运动只是毗邻的,它就不规则,也不是一。
229a 20
从一个相反者出发的运动与朝向其相反者的运动,在存在上不同,虽在数目上相同。从一个相反者出发与从其相反者出发的运动,并非相反运动,因为它们可能朝向中间者,而且这些运动试图丧失而非获得相反性;运动由其所向而非其所自来界定。
229b 1
只有从相反者到相反者的运动才是相反运动,因为运动是从某物到某物。
229b 10
对于变化,相反者将是朝向某物与从某物离开,因为只涉及一个存在者。
230a 1
在相反者中的静止既彼此相反,也分别与离开它们的运动相反。但静止并不与朝向它的运动相对,因为静止会是该运动的自然后果。
230a 5
缺少变化不是静止。与事物不变相反的,既有它的消逝,也有它的不存在。
230b 1
一个难题出现:有依自然与违反自然的生成、消逝吗?强迫的变化与依自然的变化之间会有相反性吗?不过,这种相反性确实会出现:一种消逝令人愉快,另一种则令人痛苦,也就是说,并非无条件地相反。
230b 25
还有两个难题。首先,趋于静止似乎不同于达到停止,因为前者逐渐发生,后者瞬间发生;其原因似乎是,前者发生在事物受强迫时,后者发生在事物依自然运动到自身位置时。第二个难题是,事物开始运动时,似乎既留在原处又离开,因而在自身中拥有相反者。但一个事物若在运动,还能说它静止吗?或者,毋宁说事物本身被朝两个相反方向撕扯,所以两个运动之间比运动与静止之间更为相反。
IX
231a 25
线不能由点组成,因为点不可分,没有端点。
231b 1
如果点组成连续性,它们就必须作为分离的整体相互接触,而这不可能连续。
231b 5
这是否意味着线与点、诸当下与时间属于同一类?还是仅仅意味着诸当下之间的时间又会表示更多当下?
231b 10
似乎是在说,中间者不是让诸当下得以相继的异类,而是又可分割为更多可分者。
232b 20
连续性被重新定义为总可分割为可分者的东西。
233a 1
因为时间中总有运动,而运动总可以更快或更慢,所以时间与大小必须连续,才能被分割。
233a 20
谈运动时,时间总与大小不可分离。所以芝诺的问题在于,他忽视了这一本质关系,把分割的无限误作端点的无限,并问:一个人如何在端点有限的时间中穿越无限的大小?但事实上,时间自身也无限。
233a 35
不过,大小与时间常可被视为有限整体,而且确实是有限整体,因此,若时间有限,大小也有限。
233b 30
没有连续者是不含部分的。
234a 25
没有运动着的东西在当下之中。相应地,也没有东西在当下中静止。
即使当下在被分为两段时间时是同一个,问题仍然存在:事物现在将同时运动与静止。
234b 10
一切变化者都必须可分,使其部分能分别处于它从之变化者与它变向者之中,虽然这些变化着的部分所处者不必是两个极端。
234b 20
分割运动的两种方式:依时间,或依部分。
235a 10
时间、运动、在运动中存在(某物现实地处于运动状态时)、运动中的事物自身,以及运动所关于者(如位置、大小、颜色等),都可分割。
235b 30
某物已变化时,就处在它已变成者之中。因为变化并非毗邻的,在事物已变化时还未处于其变成者之中的东西,不能瞬间跳到它已变成者之中。
236a 1
事物已变化的首要时间不可分,因为不能说它在任一部分中已变化;但如果它在所有部分中都还在变化,这种变化就不能在末尾构成已变化。首要意味着事物作为整体已变化,而不是因为别的东西。所以,如果事物在一个首要时间中已变化,它就只能是在其每个部分中都已变化。
236a 10
有变化已完成的首要时间,却没有变化已开始的首要时间。因为首要时间若容许起点,就不能不可分。如果变化有起点,那么它开始的那个不可分时间,作为一个当下,将邻接变化开始之前的其他当下;进一步,在起点的界限处(视其为连续的一),静止将与已变化合一,这没有中介,是荒谬的。所以,具有起点会使首要时间可分,而这已被确定为错误。因此,它只能是一个不可分的界限、一个概括先前一切的整体。终点作为界限,不是时间流逝的界限,而是事物的界限,因为它完成事物。
236a 30
变化没有首要部分,因为首要变化必须属于整体。如果变化有一个首要部分,依同样的推理,这部分自身又会有另一个首要部分,由此将产生无限多个首要部分,那么哪一个才是真正的首要部分就无法确定。
236b 1
亚里士多德在这里似乎澄清了上文的意思:变化的事物与它在其中变化者都可分。然而,事物变成者不可分。这等于说,完成不可分,至少并非内在地可分。所以就事物与时间而言,没有首要部分。
236b 15
只有在关于性质的运动中,才会有内在的不可分性与首要部分。所以,可以设想一个事物因其部分先发生性质变化而发生性质变化。
237a 1
既然每个运动在其首要时间中都处在其任何部分中,就有理由认为,它总可被看作运动的不同分割,从而总在它之前已经运动。
整体变化时,变化必须在整体的每个部分中呈现;然而,除非是性质转化,部分不是具有自身变化的独立或首要之物,而是整体中变化的一个阶段、已变化的一步。也就是说,这些都不是现实的整体,而只是潜在分割。因此,首要时间现实地不可分,潜在地可分,而且只依其作为整体才可分;首要时间的首要性,不是由它作为某段时间给出的,而是由它对于事物本身作为已完成整体的存在给出的。部分因此必须依赖整体,却不能自身成为无限多个独立事物。
237a 5
因为有无限多个当下,事物就将在无限多个当下已变化无限多次。
237a 20
已变化者先前一直在变化,而正在变化者先前也已经变化。
237b 20
在任何沿之而行或在其期间者中,不同于为之而行者,没有首要者。
237b 25
无限时间不能覆盖有限大小,除非用于反复。
238a 15
事物不可能一直生成或消逝,因为无限时间不属于有限事物。同样,无限运动不属于有限时间。
238a 30
无限大小在有限时间内穿越有限大小,或反之,或无限大小穿越无限大小,也都不可能。
238b 25
对运动中的事物而言,趋于停止在时间中发生。
239a 1
趋于停止或正在运动没有首要时间,因为首要时间只属于已停止及其他种类的完成。
239a 20
相应地,不能说一个在其首要时间中运动的事物,会有某个特殊的首要位置,即不作为整体的位置。因为说事物有首要位置,不等于说事物静止。即使在每个瞬间切片,事物及其部分都处于同一个位置,它也仍在运动,那并不是事物在其中静止的独立间隔。所以,不仅在时间上,在空间上也有运动的部分—整体关系。
240b 10
没有部分者只能偶属性地运动,而有部分者及其部分可以内在地运动。
241b 1
施加于空间运动的界限,可能不同于相反者施加的界限;但只要它能被切分,就容许界限,并在这个意义上有限。
241b 10
把诸运动合起来考虑,它们是否在时间上无限,是另一个问题。还有,归根到底是否只有一个运动:无限的圆周运动。
X
241b 35
一切运动者都由某物推动,所以,如果一个事物作为整体内在地运动,它就是由其部分推动的,而这部分才是运动的真正来源。
241b 40
停止运动者未必是因为别的东西静止而停止;但如果它因别的东西停止运动而静止,它就是被别的东西推动的。
242a 40
一旦接受这一点,一切运动者就必然被某物推动,因为每个整体都可分,部分不动时整体就不会运动;而若只有一个部分运动,它就不是作为整体的部分内在而首要地运动。所以一切都由别的东西推动。
242b 55
只有当运动由许多事物作出时,它才可能在有限时间内无限。然而,如果推动者通过身体运动引起位置运动,这些事物就会彼此接触或连续,从而组成一。那么,又会有一个事物在有限时间内作无限运动,这确实不可能。
243a 30
第一推动者,不是作为所为之故,而是作为运动由之而出的本原,总与被动之物在一起。
243a 35
三类推动者。
243a 15
空间运动的四种原因:拉、推、携带、旋转。
243b 1
投掷是一种把运动传给事物的推。
244a 1
推与拉更为首要,因为旋转是两者的结合,而携带由被拉或被推的东西实现。
244b 5
受作用是由其他可感者引起的底层可感性质。
245b 10
既然我们仍把性质改变的青铜称为青铜,却把青铜雕像称为雕像,那么构形与状态的生成就不是性质变化。
246a 10
既然状态或者是完成,或者是这一完成的消逝,那么这些也不是性质变化。
246b 5
而且,状态总是作为事物面对受作用时的一种存在方式而与事物相关,所以它不是可以首要地变化的事物,只能偶属性地变化。因此,它在内在上不是性质变化。
247a 1
当德性或恶习在灵魂中生成,或仅仅被激活时,灵魂的知觉部分必然发生性质变化。因为每种品格德性都是关乎身体快乐与痛苦的状态,所以知觉必然参与其中。
247b 1
但思想状态既没有性质变化,也没有生成。因为知识是理解趋于静止,但趋于静止没有生成。这意味着知识不是可与理解分离的东西,而是理解自身的本质。而当别的东西,即特殊者,在场时,知识就现实地存在;这并不是因为知识被知觉推动而建构至完成,而是知觉与已完成的知识一起被瞬间唤起。灵魂的运动似乎有两个维度:事物—灵魂,与灵魂—灵魂。从事物到灵魂没有中间者,但灵魂也有其内部运动。知识相对于事物被唤起,所以没有生成;但事物本身既然生成,灵魂便也会相应地运动。
248b 1
如果圆周运动与直线运动可通约,它们的长度就必须可通约。但直觉上似乎可通约者,实际上并不可通约。
248b 15
同名异义者似乎不可通约,但甚至有些使用时含义相同的词也不可通约。
249a 1
于是,可通约性似乎依赖接受者;接受者不同就不可通约,相同就可通约。
249a 5
如果两物可通约,它们所属于者自身或分别看来似乎没有种差(不能说一种颜色比另一种更像颜色,或蓝比红更蓝,除非是偶属性地说)。
249b 15
应当把变化的事物,还是变化本身,看成决定诸种是否可通约者?
249b 20
数量—不等,性质—不相似,生成—不同(或如果本体是数,也是不等)。
250a 10
这里讨论了惯性:比原能力小的能力,根本未必能推动原力量所能推动者。
250a 30
说性质变化或生成也可以有其共同尺度,似乎是个大胆的主张。
250b 5
这似乎是对上述陈述的限定:对于某些性质变化与生成,一半时间未必伴随一半效果,因为这一半可能不是相对于所费时间的数量中点。或者,它也可能只是与前面的情况平行,读作“一半不会在一半时间内完成它”。
252b 30
即便所有运动各有界限,它们仍可以是同一个,结合成某种永恒连续者。
253a 1
对于有时运动、有时不动的事物,说它的运动原因有时在场、有时不在场,并无荒谬。
253a 10
事实上,运动总以某种方式在事物中呈现,并不生成。
253b 10
如果承认,有时被(现实地)推动的是整体,而不是其任何可分部分,那么也就必须否认所有事物总在运动。
262a 10
在圆形轨迹中作空间运动不同于圆周运动,因为它可以在到达起点时折返。
263a 15
芝诺悖论的真正解决,是声明现实连续性相对于潜在分割的首要性。
264a 1
一个新论证:如果事物在一时存在,在另一时不存在,那么两时之间就有一段生成的时间;于是事物生成所费的整个时间就比其自身更大,这是荒谬的。
264a 15
如果运动连续,方向在开始时就会被设为所趋向者。但折返的直线运动同时有两个相反方向。即便方向并非从开始就在,而是在每个瞬间更新,事物也会在某一刻同时具有两个相反运动。或者,如果认为这些相反运动不在同样的部分中呈现,就会看到先触及界限的部分折返,与随后而来的部分迎面相撞,这无疑荒谬。
264b 20
如果一个被推动的事物总应先处在与该运动相反的静止中,而一切并非总以这类运动被推动者(不是说物体可能不总随其心脏的运动而动——那意味着整体与部分此前会有不同种类的静止——而是说事物自身可能不总以同一种运动而动)也应同样先处于静止,那么显然,折返之前会有静止。
264b 5
时间虽连续,我们却只能说运动相继。
264b 20
这似乎意味着:因为圆周上的任何点既是起点又是终点,所以它总是在朝既作为终点又作为起点者运动;但对直线运动,在整个运动中,起点与终点保持相同,并在过程的每一步中重复。所以,直线运动的起点与终点不可能不断更新。
观察到某种运动恰在完成一圈的时刻停止,在这里并无影响,因为并非每种在圆形轨迹中的空间运动都是圆周运动。真正的圆周运动必须把运动的起点与终点统一起来;而运动的起点不同于运动开始的空间位置。运动在一个位置开始,但不是位置自身开始运动。所以,这里的要点不是每种沿圆的运动都将无限且连续,而是如果有一个既无限又连续的可思运动,它就只能是圆周的。无限直线运动不能被称为一个运动。而即使可以说有界的折线运动也无限,并在某种意义上连续,因为事物逐部分地越过转角,这种连续性也非首要,而是派生自最连续的圆周运动。也就是说,没有真正连续的运动,折线运动的分离部分最初甚至都无法统一为一。正如运动凭自身在其界限处结束,例如,沿正方形各边的折线运动,会在一条线的起点与另一条线的终点重合的交角处结束。这使它在没有时间提供的连续性时不可能为一。因为当然有许多运动,那么这些运动如何能属于同一个事物,而不是无限多个事物?只有当它们被聚集成一个连续运动时才可能。因此,折线运动不能自身为一且连续,因为它的连续性来自圆周运动的自然连续性,而非相反。