Aristotle · 亚里士多德
Place, Space, and Matter · 区域、空间与质料
亚里士多德对柏拉图的空间观念的阐释
亚在这一点上很清楚,他是完全理解了柏在「蒂迈欧篇」中对空间的讨论才认为柏实际是在讨论「质料」的。这当然不是说柏的「空间」就是亚意义上的「质料」,也不是说亚没有曲解柏,而是说亚比大多数人想的要更理解柏的关切,其曲解因此也更隐晦。这里很基本的一个认识是,不论是空间还是质料对柏和亚来说都属于一种特别的抽象,即“向下的抽象”,或者我更习惯称呼它为“模糊化抽象(abstraction of obfuscation)”,与向上的“清晰化抽象(abstraction of clarification)”相对立。意思是,这种抽象是呈现为一个问题,而非一个解答:它是将杂多给呈现为一个同质物,而非将形式同质料分离。比如说,我们可以说“圆的理念”是对圆形的清晰化抽象,因为其将唯一的形式从诸多承载形式者中剥离了出来;但“平均的圆”则是对圆形的模糊化抽象,因为它是将所有诸多的圆给考虑进去了。当然,这最终会有一个短路,就是向下到了极致,我们反而会达到至上者:这就是绝对者的二分(diremption),绝对的质料即绝对的理念;但至少在意谓的层面,这两者是截然不同的。如果透过这一层去解读亚对柏空间观念的阐释,很明显亚是清晰地理解到空间对柏来说正是这一向下的抽象。这也意味着当亚在讨论「区域(topos)」与质料的不同时,即质料不独立于物体,但区域可以独立于物体,他实际上在讨论的并非是柏的「空间(khora)」观念,而是他自己的“清晰化抽象出的”可以与物体分离开的那种空间观念,也就是“包围物的固定限制”这个观念。既然在意谓层面,“区域”包含了“限制”这个内容,那它必然是与形式关联而非质料,因此它必然是向上而非向下的抽象。由此他不会是在指涉柏的空间观念。并且,这个所谓的区域与质料的不同,就其描述来说,也不是那么正确,因为区域并不是真正独立于所有物体,而仅仅是可以独立于被包围的物体而已;我们并不知道这是否是亚对之前学说的修改还是对这一疑难之伪性的揭示。同样,在「论生成与毁灭」中,亚指出柏并未决定空间是否独立于物体,他的洞察或许是正确的,但这不能说明他认为柏并未认定空间是否是质料;因为,哪怕我们认可上面对区域与质料基于彼此相对于物体的可分离性的区分不是伪区分,我们也没法认为柏的「空间」相对于物体的可分离性是符合这一区分的物理性的描述的,或者,恰恰因为柏没有明确「空间」是否相对于物体是可分离的,亚才得以认定柏的「空间」就是「质料」。简单来说就是,在柏那里,对「空间」的文本描述和亚的「质料」确实是完全同外延(coextensive)的。关键因此在于为什么柏有意在文本中对这两个概念进行混淆。最后,并不是说因为柏那里运动优先于变化,变化本质就是运动,所以质料本质上是空间,这是非常肤浅的一种论述,因为如果运动优先于变化,那空间当然优先于质料,也就不可能与质料同外延了,而且,事实上仅基于文本来看这也是错误的,因为原初三角形的运动同样依赖于容器对原型的质与力的模仿;同样,并不是因为亚那里「质」和「量」是两种不同的范畴,所以他认为运动和变化也必须是平等但不同的两种活动,所以他认为空间和质料必须决然不同,所以他提出区域和质料可能的区别,这也是一种误解,因为实际上更重要的是范畴和范畴之间共同的指向(pros hen),运动和变化一样都是物体的潜能的实现,正如区域和质料一样都是对物体的抽象,区域关涉于物体与其它物体的关系,而质料关涉于物体与其诸形式属性的关系,而亚明确知道柏的「空间」观念,哪怕和区域一样关涉于物体与其它物体的关系,其模糊性决定了它与质料而非区域形式分享同一个本体论层级。
所以,总结来说,当亚区分开区域和质料时,他并不是在试图区分柏的「空间」观念和他自己的「质料」观念,这首先与他在别处直截了当的给两者划等号的表达矛盾,而且与他使用「区域」而非「空间」的措辞矛盾,已知亚明确区分了「区域」和「空间」;相反地,亚在做这个区分时,恰恰是在区分他自己的「区域」观念和柏的「空间」观念,因为他那里柏的「空间」观念完全等同于「质料」观念,而不同于「区域」这一形式侧观念。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
Aristotle is quite clear on this point: it is precisely because he fully understands Plato’s discussion of space in the Timaeus that he takes Plato to be discussing “matter.” This is certainly not to say that Plato’s “space” is “matter” in Aristotle’s sense, nor that Aristotle has not distorted Plato. Rather, Aristotle understands Plato’s concerns better than most people suppose, and his distortion is therefore subtler. A basic recognition here is that, for both Plato and Aristotle, space and matter belong to a particular kind of abstraction: “downward abstraction,” or what I prefer to call “abstraction of obfuscation,” in contrast to the upward “abstraction of clarification.” What this means is that such an abstraction presents itself as a problem rather than an answer: it presents a manifold as something homogeneous, rather than separating form from matter. For example, we can call the “Idea of the circle” an abstraction of clarification from circular figures, because it strips the single form away from the many bearers of that form; the “average circle,” however, is an abstraction of obfuscation from circular figures, because it takes all those many circles into account. Of course, this ultimately involves a short circuit: when we descend to the furthest extreme, we instead arrive at the highest. This is the diremption of the absolute: absolute matter is absolute Idea. At least at the level of signification, however, the two are utterly different. Read Aristotle’s interpretation of Plato’s conception of space through this distinction, and it becomes apparent that Aristotle clearly understands space, for Plato, as precisely this downward abstraction. This also means that when Aristotle discusses the difference between “place” (topos) and matter—namely, that matter is not independent of body, whereas place can be—he is not actually discussing Plato’s conception of “space” (khora). He is discussing his own conception of a space separable from body, obtained through an “abstraction of clarification”: the conception of “the fixed limit of the surrounding body.” Since “place” includes “limit” in its signification, it must be associated with form rather than matter, and must therefore be an upward rather than a downward abstraction. He cannot, then, be referring to Plato’s conception of space. Moreover, this purported difference between place and matter is not entirely correct as described: place is not truly independent of all bodies, but can only be independent of the body surrounded. We do not know whether this is Aristotle’s revision of an earlier doctrine or his exposure of the difficulty as spurious. Likewise, in On Generation and Corruption, Aristotle observes that Plato has not decided whether space is independent of body. His insight may be correct, but this does not show that he thinks Plato has not settled whether space is matter. For even if we accept that the distinction made above between place and matter, based on their respective separability from body, is not a spurious distinction, we still cannot suppose that the separability of Plato’s “space” from body conforms to the physical description involved in that distinction. Or perhaps it is precisely because Plato does not make clear whether “space” is separable from body that Aristotle can identify Plato’s “space” with “matter.” Simply put, Plato’s textual description of “space” is indeed entirely coextensive with Aristotle’s “matter.” The crucial question, then, is why Plato deliberately conflates these two concepts in the text. Finally, the argument is not that, because motion is prior to change for Plato and change is essentially motion, matter is therefore essentially space. That is a very superficial account: if motion were prior to change, space would of course be prior to matter, and could not be coextensive with it. Indeed, even on purely textual grounds, this account is mistaken, since the motion of the primordial triangles also depends on the receptacle’s imitation of the qualities and powers of the archetypes. Likewise, it is a misunderstanding to argue that, because “quality” and “quantity” are two different categories for Aristotle, he therefore thinks that motion and change must also be two activities that are equal in status but distinct; that he consequently thinks space and matter must be radically different; and that this is why he proposes a possible distinction between place and matter. What matters more is the categories’ common reference (pros hen). Motion, like change, is the actualization of a body’s potentiality, just as place and matter are both abstractions from body. Place concerns a body’s relations to other bodies, while matter concerns a body’s relations to its formal attributes. Aristotle clearly knows that, even though Plato’s conception of “space,” like place, concerns a body’s relations to other bodies, its indeterminacy means that it shares the same ontological level as matter, rather than the form of place.
To sum up, when Aristotle distinguishes place from matter, he is not trying to distinguish Plato’s conception of “space” from his own conception of “matter.” Such a reading would first contradict his explicit identification of the two elsewhere; it would also contradict his use of “place” rather than “space,” given that Aristotle clearly distinguishes “place” from “space.” Rather, in making this distinction, Aristotle is precisely distinguishing his own conception of “place” from Plato’s conception of “space”: for him, Plato’s conception of “space” is wholly equivalent to the conception of “matter,” and differs from “place,” a conception on the side of form.