Aristotle · 亚里士多德
Politics · 政治学
Undated 未注日期
政治学——散记
Reflections · Pages
施论亚圣政治学的三个轴线
1.作为政治科学的奠基
尽管苏格拉底最先将哲学引入的城邦,但苏格拉底的意图仍然是“自然”的;他试图将灵魂视作自然的,而通过对灵魂的探查对事物本身进行探查;也就是说,灵魂的政治本质上是对整体自然进行的专题化。而在亚里士多德处,政治常识获得了保留的区域,尽管亚里士多德是处于哲学的领域对政治进行检验。换句话说,苏格拉底处政治哲学是作为第一哲学,而亚处政治哲学/科学是一处区域。
2.政治哲学的内容:人-城邦-公民
亚里士多德的政治学的第一原则:政治哲学是对“最好的政治”的追求,而“好”意味着“幸福”或“快乐”。人自然的天性会进行此种追求,而一群人进行此种追求便形成了城邦。这种追求最终引入了沉思的生活,也就是哲学的生活。
然而哲学不等于创制或者政治生活。立法者的根本目的在于行动,法本质上是无根的。只有在脱离并超越政治生活的情况下,才可以反思政治实践。在此种约束下,追求快乐与沉思的人与政治生活中的公民分离开了。城邦与公民是相对应的政治实体,也是人的沉思的对象。
3.政治学与现代性
现代性起源于前苏哲学中法的无根性。法,作为人的创制,是脱离于自然之物的。亚与柏拉图都反对此种解读,并认为灵魂与政治是自然的。因此政治需要达到的最高目标,快乐,要求人与自然的和谐,而非人与自然的分离。
现代性将人与自然分离开了;然而这种分离与前苏哲学的区别在于其分离后的连接方式不同。在现代性将人与自然分离之后,现代政治哲学试图解释此种分离的最初动因。其最后得出的理论是,自然自身逼迫着人反对自然。这就是自然状态的理论。而这直接导致自然-法的根本对立。而如果要将此种对立再次整合,这就要求对法无休止的变更:这就是历史主义。而同时,由于自然与自然差异被人的创制消解了,人的创制由此要求成为最为普遍的抽象;这就是自然法无关具体政治生活的普世性。也因此自然法可以奠基任何形式的政治,也相应可以反对任何形式的政治。这就是隐藏在霍布斯处的根本矛盾。用自然法为政治体制合法性背书是必然失败的。
相反,亚里士多德所关注的自然法要特殊得多,因为他根本上关心的是各个政治体制自身与自然和善的关系。换句话说,他更关心的是对诸城邦本身与自然与善相应的关系的考察,而不是脱离于自然的政治如何再与自然建立关系。
亚那里的政治学还是比较平面化的,相比起来现代性政治就明显有个深度或奠基问题了。
按施的看法,现代性政治讨论的都是合法性问题
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
Three Axes of Strauss’s Account of Aristotle’s Politics
1. The foundation of political science
Although Socrates first brought philosophy into the city, his intention remained “natural.” He tried to regard the soul as natural and investigate things themselves through investigating the soul. The politics of the soul was thus essentially a thematic treatment of nature as a whole. In Aristotle, however, political common sense receives a reserved domain, although Aristotle examines politics from within philosophy. In other words, political philosophy in Socrates is first philosophy, whereas in Aristotle political philosophy or science is a region.
2. The content of political philosophy: human being–city–citizen
The first principle of Aristotle’s politics: political philosophy pursues “the best politics,” and “good” means “happiness” or “pleasure.” Human nature naturally undertakes this pursuit; a group of people pursuing it forms a city. This pursuit ultimately introduces the contemplative, philosophical life.
Philosophy, however, is not equivalent to founding institutions or political life. The legislator’s fundamental purpose is action, and law is essentially groundless. Political practice can be reflected upon only by departing from and transcending political life. Under this constraint, the human being pursuing pleasure and contemplation separates from the citizen within political life. City and citizen are corresponding political entities, and objects of human contemplation.
3. Politics and modernity
Modernity originates in the groundlessness of law in pre-Socratic philosophy. Law, as a human creation, is detached from natural things. Aristotle and Plato both oppose this interpretation, holding that soul and politics are natural. The highest goal politics must attain, pleasure, therefore requires harmony between humanity and nature, rather than their separation.
Modernity separates humanity from nature. Yet this separation differs from that of pre-Socratic philosophy in the way the two are reconnected afterward. After modernity separates humanity and nature, modern political philosophy tries to explain the original motive for this separation. Its eventual theory is that nature itself compels humanity to oppose nature. This is the theory of the state of nature, which directly produces a fundamental opposition between nature and law. Reintegrating this opposition requires ceaseless changes to law: this is historicism. Meanwhile, because nature and natural differences have been dissolved by human creation, human creation demands to become the most universal abstraction. This is natural law’s universality, unrelated to concrete political life. Natural law can therefore ground any form of politics, and correspondingly oppose any form. This is the fundamental contradiction concealed in Hobbes. Using natural law to endorse the legitimacy of a political system must fail.
Aristotle’s concern with natural law, by contrast, is far more particular, because he fundamentally concerns himself with each political system’s own relation to nature and the good. In other words, he is more concerned with examining the relations corresponding to the cities themselves, nature, and the good, than with how politics detached from nature can establish a relation with nature anew.
Aristotelian politics is still relatively planar; modern politics, by comparison, clearly has a problem of depth or foundation.
According to Strauss, what modern politics discusses is always the problem of legitimacy.