Francis Bacon · 弗朗西斯·培根
Forms and scientific method · 形式与科学方法
Undated 未注日期
形式与科学方法——散记
Reflections · Pages
又仔细梳理了一下,关于培根对亚学的革新之处,大概在几个方面。
1. 亚那里,形式有形式侧和质料侧,而物则是形式与质料的统一。亚学里形式因指代物的形式,培根的形式因则指代形式侧和质料侧对形式本身的生成。
2. 由 1. 可得,亚关注形式与质料之间的深度上的交互关系。培根只关注平面上的交互关系。哪怕他对形式之形式侧与理念侧的关注也仅仅出于对这两侧与形式本身的关系的关注。换句话说,理念与质料之间的关系,与“参与论”的问题,对培根来说都不再是问题,而成为了不言自明的东西了。就像代数中,未知数x的可操作性遮蔽了理念之个体化的问题,培根那里,科学定律的可操作性同样遮蔽了形式与质料之间的交通的问题。相反的,在同一平面上的因果作用成为了主要的关注对象。
3. 亚的最终目的是一种沉思与静观,因此最根本的活动是来自于超乎人力的神圣努斯。这一目的起源于对 2. 中所描述的那种深度的构建。因为一种深度结构被构造完成,形式与自然之间有所区隔,形式脱离于人的身体。由于形式是真正的活动与因,因此尽管人力可以改变自然,但自然根本上是在理念的统摄下活动着的,因此人最高的目的在于用理智达到对永恒的直观。但对于培根来说,这一深度的问题在根本上被否决了。对他来说,真正重要的是处于同一平面上的因果如何作用。因此,当达到了对理念的直观,这意味着对更多个例的可能性的直观,而不意味着对理念本身的直观。
4. 由 3. 我们可以看到,培根不仅在目的上偏离了亚的轨道,他的方法也奠基于对亚学的这一叛离上。正是因为对平面性的关注,实验才成为了可能。因为只有个体与个体之间可以发生交互,实验才是可能的。定理对物体的绑缚是无需证明也无需疑问的。同样,个例与定理之间是否符合的问题也并非是质料与形式之间关系的问题。因为要问个例与定理是否符合,其实是在问这两者的内容是否符合,也就是说,如果假设a普遍地导致b,那特殊的a是否能导致特殊的b;但如果要问质料与形式之间的关系,那就不再是内容上的疑问了,而是层次上的疑问,因为我们不需要证明a的形式与a的个体包含了同样的内容,如果内容不同的话,a就不会是a的个体的形式,我们需要疑问的是,如果事先给定了形式与个体在内容上的一致性,形式与个体处在不同的层次是如何交通的?
5. 由于要确保 4. 当中的定理与个体的内容上的符合,我们必须要完成对两者共同的修缮。因此不能仅仅专注于个例的收集和实验,否则无法达到涵盖了总体可能性的定理;但同样不能预先将假设设定为定理,并通过对假设的认定反过来阻止实验。两者必须协调进行。柏与亚都由于对理念和形式的推崇,使后学忽视了对质料侧的关注,而直接跃入理念的场域,将彼此不矛盾的判断与意见视作具有内容的理念,并又根据深度的逻辑,将这些理念视作统御着质料的原型,从而导致了大量错误。培根因此其实是很康德的:“概念无直观则空,直观无概念则盲”。
其实培根最有意思的一点是他似乎是很早就最直接去质疑了形而上学的一-多范式,而因此可以称作德勒兹的先驱:物不是质料-形式,也不是元素-结构,也不是类-种,也不是变化-静止;没有二元项,即没有可定之二。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
Having sorted this out more carefully again, Bacon’s innovations over Aristotelianism seem to lie in several areas.
1. In Aristotle, form has a formal side and a material side, while the thing is the unity of form and matter. Aristotelian formal cause refers to the thing’s form; Bacon’s formal cause refers to the generation of form itself by its formal and material sides.
2. From 1, Aristotle is concerned with the interaction in depth between form and matter. Bacon is concerned only with interactions on a plane. Even his attention to form’s formal and eidetic sides arises solely from concern with their relation to form itself. In other words, the relation between Idea and matter, the problem of “participation,” ceases to be a problem for Bacon and becomes self-evident. Just as the operability of the unknown x in algebra conceals the problem of the individuation of the Idea, the operability of scientific laws in Bacon likewise conceals the problem of communication between form and matter. Causal interaction on the same plane becomes the primary object of concern instead.
3. Aristotle’s ultimate end is a kind of contemplation and tranquil beholding, so the most fundamental activity comes from divine nous, beyond human power. This end originates in the construction of the depth described in 2. Once a structure of depth has been constituted, form and nature are separated, and form is detached from the human body. Because form is true activity and cause, although human power can change nature, nature fundamentally operates under the governance of Ideas. Humanity’s highest end therefore lies in attaining intuition of the eternal through intellect. For Bacon, however, this problem of depth is fundamentally rejected. What really matters is how causality operates on the same plane. Attaining intuition of an Idea thus means intuiting the possibility of more instances, rather than intuiting the Idea itself.
4. From 3 we can see that Bacon departs from Aristotle not only in his end: his method is also founded on this defection from Aristotelianism. Precisely this concern with planarity makes experiment possible, because experiment is possible only if individuals can interact with individuals. A theorem’s binding of bodies requires neither proof nor questioning. Likewise, whether an instance conforms to a theorem is not a question of the relation between matter and form. Asking whether an instance conforms to a theorem really asks whether their contents agree: if a universally causes b, can a particular a cause a particular b? Asking about the relation between matter and form, however, is no longer a question of content, but of levels. We need not prove that the form of a and the individual a contain the same content; if their contents differed, a would not be the form of the individual a. What we need to ask is: given in advance that form and individual agree in content, how do they communicate across their different levels?
5. To ensure the agreement in content between theorem and individual in 4, we must revise both together. We cannot focus solely on collecting instances and experimenting, or we will never attain a theorem encompassing the totality of possibilities. But neither can we establish a hypothesis as a theorem in advance and then use our commitment to the hypothesis to obstruct experimentation. The two must proceed in coordination. Plato and Aristotle’s exaltation of Ideas and forms both led later thinkers to neglect the material side and leap directly into the domain of Ideas. They took mutually noncontradictory judgments and opinions for Ideas with content, then, following the logic of depth, treated these Ideas as archetypes governing matter, producing numerous errors. Bacon is therefore actually very Kantian: “Concepts without intuitions are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind.”
What is most interesting about Bacon is really that he seems to have questioned metaphysics’ one–many paradigm very directly at an early stage, and can therefore be called a precursor of Deleuze. Things are not matter–form, elements–structure, genus–species, or change–rest. There are no binary terms: no two that can be determined as such.