Walter Benjamin · 瓦尔特·本雅明
Critique of Violence · 暴力批判
Undated 未注日期
暴力批判——散记
Reflections · Pages
本雅明暴力论
认为“为了目的可以不择手段”的自然法学派和认为“有一个正当手段可以保证目的正当”的社会法学派都是错的。而前者错得多一点儿。前者忽视了暴力作为手段有自己的独立于目的的评判标准,而后者忽视了对手段的评判不能完全不考虑其本质是作为什么目的的手段。暴力是法的前提,也是法的保障;但无法可依的暴力是不能持久与普遍化的。暴力是对法的执行和决断,而法则阐明和解释了暴力运行的区域,以避免暴力遭遇过强的反作用力。这是法的本质,即力与力之间的争斗和妥协。但在这里,暴力与法的另一个维度被开启了,一个没有目的和手段分野的维度。暴力是法的手段,但同时也是法的本质,与法是一体的;而暴力的本质是力的彰显。也就是说,暴力并不是“为了法”,而是法与暴力都是力的显示。这就是神话暴力。而破法的暴力则是神圣暴力,一种因其破法的本质而恰恰是非-暴力。在内容上,神圣暴力只会给出作为指导的戒律,并给出一个救赎性的审判。因此,当神说“不可杀人”时,祂并不是指“如果杀人你会下地狱”,祂也不是指“如果杀人你要承担我不可知的怒火(这样神的恩典和救赎就无法被妥善理解;而且不可知与无限大并非是等价的)”,而是指导人们和平共处。现代人将这个律令理解为法,是因为一个现代的对生命权利的理解,尽管这个理解并非没有问题。
对本雅明来说,非暴力手段是可能的,一是出于人的同情和良知,二是出于一个更高力量的制裁,三是出于教育,四是出于力的平衡。尽管霍布斯是对的,二可以更安全地保障非暴力手段,但它设定了一个更高的持续的暴力,一种「和平恐怖主义」,就像「机动警察:和平保卫战」里面一样。
四代表一种更高的秩序与团体,而不是一个更高的力量。在四这种情况下,裁夺者是扮演理性这个角色,而不是主权者这一角色。换句话说,四这个情况就是,如果我们爆发战争,那两边都不会好过,所以战争不在考虑范围内;因此要达到尽可能的公平;但任意一边都有自己的看法,因此需要场外求助一个客观的第三方进行裁夺,哪怕这第三方没有任何力量。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
Benjamin on Violence
Both the natural-law school, which holds that “any means may be used for an end,” and the school of social law, which holds that “a just means can guarantee the justice of an end,” are wrong. The former is a little more wrong. It ignores that violence as a means has standards of judgment independent of its ends; the latter ignores that judging means cannot wholly disregard the ends for which they are essentially means. Violence is law’s precondition and its guarantee. But violence without a law to rely on cannot endure or become universal. Violence executes and decides law, while law elucidates and explains the domain in which violence operates, preventing violence from encountering too powerful a counterforce. This is law’s essence: struggle and compromise between forces. Yet here another dimension of violence and law opens, a dimension without the division between ends and means. Violence is law’s means, but also its essence, one with law; the essence of violence is the manifestation of force. Violence, in other words, is not “for law”: both law and violence are displays of force. This is mythic violence. Law-destroying violence, by contrast, is divine violence, which is precisely nonviolence by virtue of its law-destroying essence. In content, divine violence gives only guiding commandments and a redemptive judgment. When God says “Do not kill,” therefore, he does not mean “If you kill, you will go to hell,” nor “If you kill, you must bear my unknowable wrath”—this would make grace and redemption impossible to understand properly; moreover, unknowability and infinite magnitude are not equivalent. Rather, he guides people toward peaceful coexistence. Modern people understand this commandment as law because of a modern understanding of the right to life, though that understanding is not without problems.
For Benjamin, nonviolent means are possible through, first, human sympathy and conscience; second, the sanctions of a higher power; third, education; and fourth, a balance of forces. Although Hobbes is right that the second can more securely guarantee nonviolent means, it establishes a higher, continuing violence, a “terrorism of peace,” like that in Patlabor 2: The Movie.
The fourth represents a higher order and association, rather than a higher power. Here the adjudicator plays the role of reason, not that of the sovereign. In other words, the situation is this: if war breaks out, neither side will fare well, so war is excluded from consideration; we must therefore achieve as much fairness as possible. But each side has its own view, so an objective third party must be called in from outside to adjudicate, even if that third party has no power at all.