Franz Brentano · 弗朗茨·布伦塔诺
Temporality and intentionality · 时间性与意向性
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时间性与意向性——散记
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布伦塔诺的原初综合理论
布伦塔诺的时间问题是和意识问题紧密联系在一起的。对布伦塔诺来说,意识的根本结构是意向性,也就是总是对某物的意识。而这个结构造成的结果就是,对某物的意识自身也要被意识B所意识,而意识B也要被更高层次的意识C所意识,ad infinitum。解决这里无限退行的问题,他采用的策略是很简单的:任何对“某物的意识自身也要被意识”的坚持都预设了意识与其对象都是只能两两结对的意向原子;而布伦塔诺则认为意识是一个复杂整体。因此,对意识的意识还是意识;这是一个前反思的整体。然而反思毕竟是可能的;我们确实可以去划分诸多层次,比如对某物的意识,对意识的意识等等;布伦塔诺由此发展了前反思的整体,将这个整体视作两个构成部分的原初综合:一个是原生对象,一个是次生对象,原生对象是现实的领域,而次生对象则是潜能的领域。原生对象就是被直接感知给予的对象,次生对象则是这个给予性所伴随的意识活动。布伦塔诺遵从亚里士多德的规定,潜能一次只能作为一种特定的样态被实现,因此任何原生对象都是确定的,次生对象不能同时作为原生对象(这防止了无限退行)。换句话说,意识结构被分为两部分,一是最开始我被给予的对象A作为原生对象,一是伴随A的意识活动B作为次生对象;相对于A,B更具有活性,但也相应的更不稳定,甚至不能被妥帖地称作一个“对象”。如果B要被稳定地对象化、获得实现,那B必须反过来变成另一个A在回忆中被给予,而与其对应的意识活动也会作为新的B而出现。总结下来就是,A-B的对应关系被保留,但并不需要一个B-C关系再去意识B、因为这个假定的B-C意识关系已经作为整体的构成部分、作为意识的未显明内容被纳入意识内部的活性潜能中了,而一旦被显明,这个B-C关系就会成为新的A-B关系而占据填充先前的结构。而这个伴生性的次生对象、也就是意识的活性内容,正是想象力官能对意识内容的不断重现与重构,也就是意识时间,或者更确切地说,时间意识。
布伦塔诺对休谟与洛克时间理论的批评
休谟与洛克将时间定义为“思维表征/意识感知的连续”,也就是表征1被表征2取代的过程。布伦塔诺认为这种构想(尽管洛克确实意识到了第一个问题)忽略了两点:1.表征1也具有内在的时间性,哪怕它并非表征2,它仍然需要一段持续;而与其相关,2.任何一个表征的单位都已经预设了时间性本身,因为一个表征并不是单独被给出,而总是与过去和未来之表征同时(共时地)被以顺时顺序被给出;在共时性中同时被展现出的过去和未来本身已经预设了时间差异了。因此,如果时间仅仅只是表征1与表征2的顺序交替,那时间将不可能存在;因为在表征2被给出时,表征1已经不再被意识到、或者取得存在。时间如果要被给出,那表征1必然在同时给出表征2作为其未来。因此,当我认为时间是诸表征的交替时,我已经预先设定了交替作为时间的本质结构了;而这是一个循环论证吗?
所以相当于,休谟-洛克(洛克意识到了这个问题)的结构是表征A→表征B;而布伦塔诺认为,A→B的过程实际上得被描述为(A之A→B)→(B之A→B),而再次必须被描述为「A之(A之A→B)→(B之A→B)」→「B之(A之A→B)→(B之A→B)」,ad infinitum
换一种悖论去演示此处布伦塔诺的思路:当我说时间是A→B,时间已经被作为一个整体被把握,而在这个整体中A和B的顺序已经被预先给出了;如果我要说是A导致了B,或者A先于B发生,那这已经是作为无可辩驳的事实被预先给出了,而将成为重言式,因为A已经于其内部蕴含了A→B的次序
而所谓的回溯时间实际上是从另一个方向出发的描述;也就是在B内部同样蕴含了A→B,因此从B出发同样得以完成对A→B的重构,而这从另一个层次看又并不是回溯,因为B之A→B同样在A处已经被给出了
这一整个运动的整体被命名为“命运”
需要澄清的是,这里并不是某个决定论问题,也不是对时间之直观给予的抽象化问题,同样不是对时间的平整化造成的结果;哪怕我此时此刻将自己的所经历视作现在,这个现在已经具有了现在之结构了;如果将现在视作连接过去与未来的中心点,那我所经历的此时此刻已经于其内部包含了它所连接的两端的“痕迹”并因此确立自己为现在了;所以最后得到的实际是“现在”的自我给予
布伦塔诺的时间问题
布伦塔诺认为时间问题在亚里士多德处没有被妥善处理,因为亚里士多德(除了在其心理学中)在物理学中将时间认作是附属于运动的产物。运动是逻辑上先于时间的,时间是对运动的计数。这个构想类似于几何学的线段;时间是作为“现在”被给予在运动的线段上的,同时作为一个独立的现在连接起其它的诸现在。布伦塔诺认为这种构想的不足之处:1.尽管用运动解释了时间,可是却无法再解释运动、或者时间差异是如何诞生的;2.这种构想预设了一个永恒计数着的灵魂,却没有对这种灵魂进行描述和澄清;3.这种构想实际上是将任何过去与未来都放入了统一的“诸现在”的运动中,仿佛都是在场着被给予的(不论差异与先后问题),而这与实际上的直观经验不符,因为过去未来并不仅仅只是“另一个现在”,更是对现在之限制处、现在所不能触碰的缺场处
因此亚的时间论并没有触及到对时间的直观感受、过去现在将来的被给予的差异和时间的计数原理
如果说,回忆或预期将过去、未来带入现在的感知中,这也无法解决问题;因为事实上回忆与预期都已经预设了“另一个”时间,当我进行回忆时,我所回忆的那个景象已经过去了,我才可以回忆;也就是说这里又一次陷入了循环,如果我认为是回忆使过去呈现,那就不得不意识到正是时间之过去从一开始就已经发生了,才使得我可以去回忆
亚那不需要计数者,亚物理学的那段意思是,因为时间是被数的数(与个体同一),不是用来计数的数,所以不需要被某个主体来数
亚那里说了,有运动的前后相继就有时间,不需要主体
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
Brentano’s Theory of Originary Synthesis
Brentano’s problem of time is intimately connected to the problem of consciousness. For Brentano, consciousness’s fundamental structure is intentionality: it is always consciousness of something. This structure has the consequence that consciousness of something must itself be conscious to a consciousness B, while B must be conscious to a higher consciousness C, ad infinitum. His strategy for resolving this infinite regress is simple. Insisting that any “consciousness of something must itself be conscious” presupposes that consciousness and its object are intentional atoms that can only pair off. Brentano instead considers consciousness a complex whole. Consciousness of consciousness is therefore still consciousness: a prereflective whole. Yet reflection is possible after all. We can indeed distinguish many levels, consciousness of something, consciousness of consciousness, and so forth. Brentano therefore develops the prereflective whole into an originary synthesis of two constitutive parts: a primary object and a secondary object. The primary object belongs to the domain of actuality; the secondary to the domain of potentiality. The primary object is the object directly given in perception; the secondary object is the conscious activity accompanying this givenness. Brentano follows Aristotle’s determination that potentiality can be actualized in only one determinate mode at a time. Every primary object is therefore determinate, and a secondary object cannot simultaneously be a primary object, preventing infinite regress. In other words, consciousness’s structure has two parts: the initially given object A as primary object, and the conscious activity B accompanying A as secondary object. Relative to A, B is more active, but correspondingly more unstable, and cannot even properly be called an “object.” If B is to be stably objectified and actualized, it must conversely become another A given in recollection, while the corresponding conscious activity appears as a new B. In summary, the A–B correspondence is preserved, without requiring a B–C relation to make B conscious, because this supposed B–C relation of consciousness is already included within consciousness’s active potentiality as a constitutive part of the whole, an unmanifest content of consciousness. Once made manifest, the B–C relation becomes a new A–B relation, occupying and filling the preceding structure. This accompanying secondary object, consciousness’s active content, is precisely the imaginative faculty’s continual re-presentation and reconstruction of conscious content: conscious time, or more exactly, time-consciousness.
Brentano’s Criticism of Hume’s and Locke’s Theories of Time
Hume and Locke define time as “the succession of mental representations or conscious perceptions,” the process by which representation 1 is replaced by representation 2. Brentano thinks this conception overlooks two points, although Locke does recognize the first. 1. Representation 1 also has immanent temporality: even though it is not representation 2, it still requires a duration. Relatedly, 2. every unit of representation already presupposes temporality itself, because a representation is not given alone, but always given simultaneously, synchronically, with representations of past and future in a temporally ordered sequence. The past and future exhibited together within synchrony already presuppose temporal difference. If time were merely the successive alternation of representations 1 and 2, it could not exist, because when representation 2 is given, representation 1 is no longer conscious or existent. For time to be given, representation 1 must simultaneously give representation 2 as its future. When I consider time an alternation of representations, I have therefore already presupposed alternation as time’s essential structure. Is this circular reasoning?
In effect, the Hume–Locke structure, with Locke recognizing the problem, is representation A → representation B. Brentano thinks the process A → B must actually be described as (A’s A → B) → (B’s A → B), which must again be described as [A’s (A’s A → B) → (B’s A → B)] → [B’s (A’s A → B) → (B’s A → B)], ad infinitum.
Another paradox illustrates Brentano’s thought here. When I say time is A → B, time has already been grasped as a whole in which the sequence of A and B is given in advance. If I say A causes B, or A occurs before B, this has already been given as an indisputable fact and becomes a tautology, because A already contains the order A → B within itself.
So-called retrospective time is actually a description starting from the other direction. B likewise contains A → B within itself, so starting from B also permits the reconstruction of A → B. Yet from another level this is not retrospective, because B’s A → B is likewise already given at A.
The whole of this movement is named “destiny.”
To clarify: this is neither a question of determinism, nor of abstracting from time’s intuitive givenness, nor a result of flattening time. Even if I consider what I experience here and now as the present, this present already has the structure of the present. If the present is the central point connecting past and future, the here and now I experience already contains the “traces” of the two ends it connects, thereby establishing itself as present. What we finally obtain is actually the self-giving of the “present.”
Brentano’s Problem of Time
Brentano thinks Aristotle does not adequately handle the problem of time, because Aristotle, apart from in his psychology, treats time in the Physics as a product belonging to motion. Motion is logically prior to time; time is the numbering of motion. This conception resembles a geometrical line segment. Time is given as a “now” on the line segment of motion, simultaneously connecting other nows as an independent now. Brentano sees three deficiencies. 1. Although motion explains time, it cannot then explain motion, or how temporal difference arises. 2. This conception presupposes an eternally counting soul without describing or clarifying it. 3. It actually places every past and future within the unified movement of “nows,” as though all were given in presence, regardless of difference and succession. This conflicts with actual intuitive experience, because past and future are not merely “another now,” but limits of the now, absences the now cannot touch.
Aristotle’s theory of time therefore does not reach the intuitive feeling of time, the differences in the givenness of past, present, and future, or the principle of time’s numbering.
Saying that recollection or anticipation brings past and future into present perception does not resolve the problem either. Recollection and anticipation already presuppose “another” time. I can recollect a scene only because it has already passed. We thus fall into a circle again. If I think recollection makes the past appear, I must recognize that time’s having passed has already occurred from the beginning, making recollection possible.
Aristotle does not need a counter. The passage in the Physics means that because time is number counted, identical with the individual, rather than number used to count, it need not be counted by a subject.
Aristotle says that where there is before-and-after succession in motion, there is time. No subject is needed.