Charles Darwin · 查尔斯·达尔文
On the Origin of Species · 物种起源
2025,莱布尼茨、达尔文和尼采
Douban · Bidasari
Source revised / 来源修订: 30 June 2026
1. 达尔文在「物种起源」结尾处给了演化论一个莱布尼茨式的解读,即所有物种都在神制定的法则下向完美,即复杂现实性,前进。但这明显不符合演化论的内涵。事实上,达尔文的革命是非常激进的:他革新了「意义之意义」。在「物种起源」的倒数第二章,他反对两种生物学意义生成的机制,一种是由神指定的永恒生物本质,一种是表面上重要器官的相似性。换句话说,他反对意义的「本质论」和「效用论」。相反,他重新提出了一种贵族式的意义生成机制:即「谱系学」。意义是通过历史谱系所建立对起源的沉淀与重新开掘。
2. 但是达尔文知道「谱系学」本身依赖于更高贵的一门科学,即「地理学」。没有地理学,谱系学只能给当下存在者以意义。可地理学并不仅仅保存那些胜利者、那些历史上的成功,也保存失败者和例外。这也是尼采的方法论,是依赖于地理学的谱系学:如果仅仅只有独立于地理学的谱系学,那我们就只能是古董历史学家(antiquarian historian),而不能发现那些例外、那些比末人更高贵的差异和例外。
3. 尼采因此与达尔文一样反对莱布尼茨的目的论,哪怕权力意志学说和莱布尼茨的单子论极为相似。但重要的是,首先,「普全数学」或者其所指涉的「前定和谐」对尼采来说并不是世界的条件,反而是权力意志的后果,只有诸单子被磨平了差异的情况下,混沌才会堕落成前定和谐;其次,莱布尼茨的学说中缺少「永恒轮回」,而依然秉持着一种「进步」的信念。这里同样要提出的是,我认为德勒兹将「永恒轮回」理解成「差异者的永恒轮回」似乎是一种误解;或者说至少应该将其理解为「大致相同者在永恒轮回中被权力意志差异化」。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
1. At the end of On the Origin of Species, Darwin offers a Leibnizian interpretation of evolution: all species advance under laws laid down by God toward perfection, that is, complex reality. Yet this plainly does not accord with what evolutionary theory entails. Darwin’s revolution is in fact extremely radical: he transforms “the meaning of meaning.” In the penultimate chapter of On the Origin of Species, he rejects two mechanisms by which biological meaning is generated: one is an eternal biological essence designated by God; the other is similarity among organs that appear important. In other words, he rejects both “essentialist” and “utilitarian” accounts of meaning. Instead, he puts forward anew an aristocratic mechanism for the generation of meaning: “genealogy.” Meaning is the sedimentation and renewed excavation of origins established through historical lineage.
2. But Darwin knows that “genealogy” itself depends on a nobler science: “geography.” Without geography, genealogy can confer meaning only upon what exists in the present. Geography, however, preserves not only the victors and the successes of history, but also the defeated and the exceptions. This is also Nietzsche’s method: genealogy grounded in geography. If we had only a genealogy independent of geography, we could only be antiquarian historians, unable to discover those exceptions, those differences and exceptions nobler than the last man.
3. Like Darwin, Nietzsche therefore rejects Leibniz’s teleology, even though the doctrine of the will to power closely resembles Leibniz’s monadology. What matters, however, is, first, that “universal mathematics” (mathesis universalis), or the “pre-established harmony” to which it refers, is not for Nietzsche a condition of the world, but a consequence of the will to power. Only when differences among monads have been worn smooth can chaos degenerate into pre-established harmony. Second, Leibniz’s doctrine lacks “eternal return” and continues to uphold a belief in “progress.” It should also be said here that I think Deleuze’s interpretation of “eternal return” as “the eternal return of what differs” seems to be a misreading; or, at the very least, it should be understood as “what is roughly the same being differentiated by the will to power in eternal return.”