Jacques Derrida · 雅克·德里达
Writing, pharmakon, and presence · 书写、药与在场
Undated 未注日期
书写、药与在场——散记
Reflections · Pages
想要把握德里达的问题,就必须意识到他的希腊渊源:λόγος和διάνοια的区分,以及其和书写的区分
The irreducibility of Pharmakon to Eros
Pharmakon denotes a substance that can positively alter a state of subjectivity, and in so doing, it in turn alters the subject’s structure of desire, viz the sexuality thereof. In saying so, Pharmakon is nonetheless irreducible to Eros. To be sure, Eros is almost always accompanied by Pharmakon and vice versa, but they are two differentiated moments. The most important difference that delineates both is that Pharmakon always implies positive entity while Eros is always a lack. Pharmakon alters mental states or physical features by ways of somatic and positive intervention, as a molecule or a chemical that’s substantial might do. Pharmakon is thus the penetrator, or the universal Phallus. Eros is, on the other hand, that crack within the subject that cannot be definitively fulfilled, that always extends beyond itself to incite penetration and to digest it. The Pharmakon is a harbinger of that which stands and withstands, that which produces and gives form to subjectivity. Eros is that which always exceeds and is lacking in that subjectivity, which implies a sexual aspect.
我在想,假如我们把德里达仅仅当成是一个反对“在场”的哲学家,那我们就只能说他是一个胡塞尔或者海德格尔的解释者或发展者;这并非没有道理,但这似乎忽视了德里达自己对海德格尔的批评显示的他的特异之处。
对于德里达来说,海德格尔将存在的自行设置把握为林中空地的张开和持守自身、从中光得以透入并使在场与缺席交相辉映,是最后为哲学建筑进行奠基的工作(尽管是海德格尔宣告了哲学的终结)。这个奠基本身是绝对在场的:缺席仅仅发生在它的内部并持守在内部;一个原初的生发点。德里达对海德格尔的批评正是对这个原初在场的批评:他认为,原初在场的空间内部必然包括了一个缺席的他者,并且这个缺席将同样延展到外部。
可以用海德格尔和德里达对言说的不同态度解释两者的分歧。海德格尔认为言说最为贴近存在,存在在活着的、说话着的语言中自行设置,言说是本真地朝向了存在,张开了存在的场域,在言说中,意义得到了本质性的张开并持守了自身。在这里,事物被本质性地带入了存在视域“在场着”的空间。而德里达似乎反对这种看法。他也许会认为,当存在自行设置时,这个存在张开的空间、在场与缺席的最终归属就已经失却了。林中空地无法在其中已经存在了存在者的情况下持守住自己的在场,一个空的在场;相反的,存在一旦投入了、献祭了自身,它就消逝了;取而代之的是永远将要已经到来者、无限被延迟的絕對者。因此,林中空地的在场永远伴随着它必然的缺席;因此在言说中,永远已经存在着书写,这不仅仅是绝对意义的缺席,也是意义被允许张开的空间的缺席。
可以说,德里达想做的,不是类似早期维特根斯坦(?)做的,去说“不可思者只可沉默”,而是试图去解构这个不可说也不可思的絕對者,调转祂的方向:“不可思者在思中消解。”最后我们得到的不是黑格尔式的绝对精神的自我实现(?),甚至不是海德格尔式的不可奠基之奠基的发现,这类从世界外部出发的体察,而是尼采式的、世界内部的奔流和差异化。
“同样延展到外部”意思是,不在局限在在场的空间之内,而是把在场的空间自己也包裹进了在场与缺席的奔流
AI translated the non-English passages; original English passages are preserved. The mixed-language original is available under Original.
To grasp Derrida’s problem, one must recognize his Greek sources: the distinction between λόγος and διάνοια, and their distinction from writing.
The irreducibility of Pharmakon to Eros
Pharmakon denotes a substance that can positively alter a state of subjectivity, and in so doing, it in turn alters the subject’s structure of desire, viz the sexuality thereof. In saying so, Pharmakon is nonetheless irreducible to Eros. To be sure, Eros is almost always accompanied by Pharmakon and vice versa, but they are two differentiated moments. The most important difference that delineates both is that Pharmakon always implies positive entity while Eros is always a lack. Pharmakon alters mental states or physical features by ways of somatic and positive intervention, as a molecule or a chemical that’s substantial might do. Pharmakon is thus the penetrator, or the universal Phallus. Eros is, on the other hand, that crack within the subject that cannot be definitively fulfilled, that always extends beyond itself to incite penetration and to digest it. The Pharmakon is a harbinger of that which stands and withstands, that which produces and gives form to subjectivity. Eros is that which always exceeds and is lacking in that subjectivity, which implies a sexual aspect.
I am thinking that if we regard Derrida merely as a philosopher opposed to “presence,” we can only call him an interpreter or developer of Husserl or Heidegger. This is not unreasonable, but it seems to neglect Derrida’s distinctiveness as shown in his own criticism of Heidegger.
For Derrida, Heidegger’s understanding of Being’s self-positing as the opening and self-preservation of the clearing, through which light enters and lets presence and absence illuminate one another, is the final work of laying a foundation for philosophy’s edifice, even though Heidegger declares philosophy’s end. This foundation itself is absolutely present: absence occurs only within it and is preserved there, an originary point of emergence. Derrida’s criticism of Heidegger is precisely a criticism of this originary presence. He holds that the interior of originary presence’s space necessarily includes an absent other, and that this absence likewise extends outside.
Their divergence can be explained through their different attitudes toward speech. Heidegger considers speech closest to Being. Being posits itself in living, speaking language; speech is authentically directed toward Being, opening its field. In speech, meaning essentially opens and preserves itself. Things are essentially brought into the “presencing” space of Being’s horizon. Derrida seems to oppose this. He might hold that when Being posits itself, the space it opens, the ultimate home of presence and absence, has already been lost. Once beings exist within it, the clearing cannot preserve its own presence, an empty presence. On the contrary, once Being commits and sacrifices itself, it vanishes. In its place comes what will always already have arrived, the infinitely deferred Absolute. The clearing’s presence is therefore always accompanied by its necessary absence. Writing thus always already exists within speech: this is not only the absence of absolute meaning, but also the absence of the space in which meaning is allowed to open.
We might say that Derrida’s aim is not to do something like the early Wittgenstein (?) and say, “Of what cannot be thought, one can only be silent.” Instead, he attempts to deconstruct this unsayable, unthinkable Absolute and reverse its direction: “The unthinkable dissolves within thought.” What we ultimately obtain is neither the Hegelian self-realization of absolute spirit (?) nor even the Heideggerian discovery of an ungroundable grounding, those insights beginning outside the world, but Nietzschean currents and differentiation within the world.
“Likewise extends outside” means that absence is no longer confined within the space of presence, but envelops that space itself within the currents of presence and absence.
非中文段落由 AI 翻译,中文原文保持不变。中英混合原稿可通过“原文”按钮查看。
想要把握德里达的问题,就必须意识到他的希腊渊源:λόγος和διάνοια的区分,以及其和书写的区分
药(Pharmakon)不可还原为爱欲(Eros)
药意指一种能够肯定性地改变主体性状态的物质(substance),并在这样做的同时,反过来改变主体的欲望结构,即其性活动。尽管如此,药仍然不可还原为爱欲。确实,爱欲几乎总是伴随着药,反之亦然,但它们是两个彼此区分的环节。划分两者的最重要差异在于,药总是意味着肯定性的实体,而爱欲总是匮乏。药通过身体性的、肯定性的介入改变精神状态或身体特征,就像一个具有实在性的分子或化学物质所能做的那样。因此,药是穿透者,或者说普遍的菲勒斯。另一方面,爱欲则是主体内部无法最终得到充实的裂隙,它总是超出自身,去诱发穿透并消化穿透。药是那站立并抵抗者的先驱,是那生产主体性并赋予其形式者的先驱。爱欲则是在这一主体性中始终超出且匮乏的东西,它蕴含了一个性的方面。
我在想,假如我们把德里达仅仅当成是一个反对“在场”的哲学家,那我们就只能说他是一个胡塞尔或者海德格尔的解释者或发展者;这并非没有道理,但这似乎忽视了德里达自己对海德格尔的批评显示的他的特异之处。
对于德里达来说,海德格尔将存在的自行设置把握为林中空地的张开和持守自身、从中光得以透入并使在场与缺席交相辉映,是最后为哲学建筑进行奠基的工作(尽管是海德格尔宣告了哲学的终结)。这个奠基本身是绝对在场的:缺席仅仅发生在它的内部并持守在内部;一个原初的生发点。德里达对海德格尔的批评正是对这个原初在场的批评:他认为,原初在场的空间内部必然包括了一个缺席的他者,并且这个缺席将同样延展到外部。
可以用海德格尔和德里达对言说的不同态度解释两者的分歧。海德格尔认为言说最为贴近存在,存在在活着的、说话着的语言中自行设置,言说是本真地朝向了存在,张开了存在的场域,在言说中,意义得到了本质性的张开并持守了自身。在这里,事物被本质性地带入了存在视域“在场着”的空间。而德里达似乎反对这种看法。他也许会认为,当存在自行设置时,这个存在张开的空间、在场与缺席的最终归属就已经失却了。林中空地无法在其中已经存在了存在者的情况下持守住自己的在场,一个空的在场;相反的,存在一旦投入了、献祭了自身,它就消逝了;取而代之的是永远将要已经到来者、无限被延迟的絕對者。因此,林中空地的在场永远伴随着它必然的缺席;因此在言说中,永远已经存在着书写,这不仅仅是绝对意义的缺席,也是意义被允许张开的空间的缺席。
可以说,德里达想做的,不是类似早期维特根斯坦(?)做的,去说“不可思者只可沉默”,而是试图去解构这个不可说也不可思的絕對者,调转祂的方向:“不可思者在思中消解。”最后我们得到的不是黑格尔式的绝对精神的自我实现(?),甚至不是海德格尔式的不可奠基之奠基的发现,这类从世界外部出发的体察,而是尼采式的、世界内部的奔流和差异化。
“同样延展到外部”意思是,不在局限在在场的空间之内,而是把在场的空间自己也包裹进了在场与缺席的奔流