René Descartes · 勒内·笛卡尔
Meditations · 第一哲学沉思集
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第一哲学沉思集——散记
Reflections · Pages
简单论一下笛卡尔的本体论证明
首先来讲笛卡尔这个证明最基本的几个前设:
1.只要能被清晰明确地用理智认识到的都是真的,而真的意味着是与其对象符合的
2.因比果具有更高的现实性
3.“我”可以被清晰明确地认识到
4.理念是作为对对象的表征而存在的
他的证明步骤可以重构为:
1. 通过想象力进行操作与筛选,最终“我”得到了理念超出感官世界的结论。
2. 在理念世界中,有一些理念(感官理念)的对象已经被悬置了,而其内容可以从“我”这一对象中推导,因此这些理念拥有的现实性较低,即,这些理念是很多简单理念的混合
3.数学理念也是来自于对“我”这一对象的认识,因此数学也是简单理念的混合,因此也不具有最高的现实性
4.“我”是被直接认识的对象,也是几乎所有理念的源头
5.但在“我”当中还有着一个清晰且明确的理念,也就是“神”,因为“我”的理智要求必须有“神”存在,其它的理念才能获得确认,甚至包括“我”这个理念,因为“我”知道“我”的有限性要求了一个在先的无限性,因此“神”的理念更加先在
6.但是我不是已经对“我”彻底确证了吗?为什么我还需要一个“神”来为“我”奠基?这里其实是一个很有趣的转折:“我”的确证其实是对“我”之怀疑的确证,也就是说是掺杂了潜能的现实,或者说作为现实的潜能。而通过对“我”的知识,导向了对“神”的确定。这里其实是一种回溯奠基关系:我通过对“我”的有限性的认识,确证了“神”的无限性要先于我;也就是说,我对“我”的确定性是掺杂怀疑的,但这一掺杂怀疑的确定性建立在纯粹确定性上,而纯粹确定性就是“神”,这一纯粹确定性是超出了有限的“我”的
7.因此我有了“神”的理念,而这一理念是绝对真实的,也就是说,这一理念的对象必然存在,并生成这一理念,否则它不会拥有这样的真实性,而这一对象定然要更比理念实在,因此上帝必然存在
因为数学的真理其实就是各个更高项之间的关系,而这个关系是可以变化的,因此数学的真理也就可以发生变化,所以在与“本质”结合的情况下,数的定义就是“单位的多”,在与“绵延”结合的情况下,数的定义就是“连续的量”,所以数学的真理也是缺少那种最高的确定性,而依赖于第一哲学的范畴的
我现在比较倾向的两种cogito的诠释。1是,我思着,我知道我思着,一切被知道的都存在,所以我的思就是存在。2是,一切事物都存在着,所以我思也存在着,但只有我思是特殊的可以被“知道”的存在,而其它的存在都无法给予知识。两种解释似乎都可以贴合原文,且都行得通。
按第二种解读,其实其它事物的存在就是被“悬置”了,就是说它们完全可以存在,只是我们无法通达它们的存在;只有我思可以通达自身存在的明晰确定性。
第一种解读是肯定的,即,我思就是存在,因为我们有对它的完全知识;第二种解读是否定的,即,我们不知道其它的存在,只有我思的存在可以被知道。在第一种解读中,在和思被统一了,思就是在,表现为在。第二种解读中,在是被遮蔽的,只有在思中才向我们敞开。
1里存在就是光,2里存在是光发生的场所。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
A Brief Account of Descartes’ Ontological Proof
First, the proof’s most basic presuppositions:
1. Whatever can be cognized clearly and distinctly by the intellect is true, and truth means agreement with its object.
2. A cause possesses a higher degree of reality than its effect.
3. The “I” can be cognized clearly and distinctly.
4. Ideas exist as representations of objects.
The steps of his proof can be reconstructed as follows:
1. Through the operations and selections of imagination, “I” ultimately reach the conclusion that ideas exceed the sensory world.
2. In the world of ideas, the objects of some ideas, sensory ideas, have already been suspended, while their contents can be derived from the object “I.” These ideas therefore possess a lower degree of reality: they are mixtures of many simple ideas.
3. Mathematical ideas also come from cognition of the object “I.” Mathematics is therefore likewise a mixture of simple ideas and does not possess the highest degree of reality.
4. The “I” is the directly cognized object and the source of almost all ideas.
5. But within the “I” there is another clear and distinct idea: “God.” The intellect of the “I” requires “God” to exist for other ideas to be confirmed, even the idea of the “I.” “I” know that my finitude requires a prior infinity, so the idea of “God” is still more prior.
6. But have I not already completely confirmed the “I”? Why do I still need a “God” to ground it? Here there is a very interesting turn: confirmation of the “I” is actually confirmation of the “I” in its doubting. It is actuality mixed with potentiality, or potentiality as actuality. Knowledge of the “I” leads to certainty about “God.” This is a relation of retrospective grounding: through cognition of my finitude, I confirm that God’s infinity must precede me. My certainty of the “I” is mixed with doubt, yet this doubt-mixed certainty rests on pure certainty. Pure certainty is “God,” and exceeds the finite “I.”
7. I therefore have the idea of “God,” and this idea is absolutely true. Its object must exist and generate the idea, or the idea would not possess such truth. This object must possess still more reality than the idea. God therefore necessarily exists.
Mathematical truths are actually relations between higher terms, and these relations can change; mathematical truths can therefore change as well. In conjunction with “essence,” number is defined as “a multiplicity of units”; in conjunction with “duration,” it is defined as “continuous magnitude.” Mathematical truths thus also lack the highest certainty and depend on the categories of first philosophy.
I currently lean toward two interpretations of the cogito. 1. I think; I know that I think; everything known exists; therefore my thinking is existence. 2. Everything exists, so my thinking also exists. But only my thinking is the special kind of existence that can be “known”; other existences cannot furnish knowledge. Both interpretations seem to fit the original text and to work.
On the second reading, the existence of other things is actually “suspended.” They may perfectly well exist; we simply cannot access their existence. Only the cogito can access the clear certainty of its own existence.
The first reading is affirmative: the cogito is existence because we have complete knowledge of it. The second is negative: we do not know other existences; only the cogito’s existence can be known. In the first, being and thought are unified: thought is being, manifests as being. In the second, being is concealed and opens to us only in thought.
In 1, existence is light; in 2, existence is the place where light happens.