Gui Ruiyan

René Descartes · 勒内·笛卡尔
Meditations · 第一哲学沉思集

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Meditations — Reading notes

Reflections · Apple Notes

Revised 12 February 2024

In this note / 篇目

1

One problem seems that this is supposed to be a laid-out argument and not a series of meditations

I:
18 what is the urgency of razing everything down at one fell swoop? as opposed to a Baconion method of combing through or a Husserlian cross-examination

21 abandoned “God is good hence won’t deceive” argument, for God’s intention is not to be inquired into(wrong because he later picks it up again)

this seems like a twisted argument, for prior to this God’s omnipotence and perfection is to argue for his capability at deception; now imperfection is what causes deception; though it might have something to do with continuing with the hypothesis of the abandoned argument of “God’s no deceiver”

22 Descartes is aware that to imagine everything is deception is itself a deception

23 the greatest dramatic effect ever in modern philosophy

II:
24 very literary

the doubt that there might very well be something indubitable

25 one is persuaded to doubt everything; in order to be persuaded one has to exist, though it’s unclear if existence is a prerequisite or a concomitant of thinking, in other words, if one must first exist so that one could think, or that the “thinking” that is persuaded simply is, and I lean towards the second interpretation, since thinking is the essence of human existence; one other ambiguity is whether thinking only illuminates being, making it known, or it posits being, so that it shares a much more intimate relationship to being

—-> it is also a questionable argument since the omnipotent devil might simply fabricate your whole “experience of thinking”; by the instillation image Descartes already assumes “I” to be independent; what should be concluded rather seems more like “something must exist in order for these supposed falsities to exist”, instead of “I exist”; this is Kant’s critique, the “I” still seems in any way whatsoever capable of being an “image”, not the “original”, since “I” do experience my thinking

—-> this argument still seems salvageable if only the form of “I” is there and not yet content; in other words, if we say “I” as an image or an experiencing of thinking is doubtable, there is an “I” that is entirely other to this who is the cause of this “I” is not doubtable; though one could very much imagine how this other “I” is the devil himself

—-> “every time I pronounce” seems utterly temporal; cogitatum

26 the evidence from the sensible

27 this seemingly affirms the temporal nature of cogito

28 imagination disjoined from thinking

29 a prelude to Kantian philosophy; that which enables in me imagination, sensing etc and that which is imagined or sensed

the power to imagine constitutes part of thought; a priori sensing

sense examines bodies, imagination produces images of these bodies and take them into thinking

30 the knowledge of a particular body; unlike a general body (generally imagined and operated matter) as talked about in METHOD

it seems that change refutes distinctness; for those aspects of wax that have changed or are capable of being changed are marked aside as indistinct; what is capable of change is capable of ambiguity and confusion as conditions and circumstances change

31 the insight of infinity of possible variations of matter goes beyond finite imagination; hence reason is beyond imagination

attention at examination of reason clarifies thought and object

32 we see something present without judging separately any of its properties, we know “wax” without stripping it down to its kernel; hence our vision supposedly identifies the thing itself as a whole composed of these parts, in other words, it might be that we visually see the whole as “wax” instead of seeing merely “wax” properties and having to mark out one independent kernel of being “wax”, so knowledge comes from a sensible image; yet we say we see human beings while the wholes we see are not certain identifiable images; hence we clearly are using our reason

imagination is equivalent to common sense; this could mean that as sensation is strictly particular, imagination is common but still impure

a perception with human mind is more distinct for human mind is a higher faculty than imagination or sensation

33 if I see wax distinctly, then my seeing is distinct, and my existence should be most distinct

I’m not sure if the argument “if an object gets more distinct then the subject is even more distinct” actually holds; though one apparently could say when the object is not distinct, one can doubt if the subject is actually performing the act distinctly since when one sees something unclear one doubts one’s own eyesight

the thing that makes my intellectual perception of a body more distinct redounds to the distinctness of mind; but mind itself is resourceful even without any aid from the perception of a body

III:
34 I’m certain of my modes of thinking

35 I’m certain that I exist; but I’m also certain of certainty itself

—-> but this really is a postulate for it might happen that what I perceive distinctly is false

a radical suspension requires not only see those ideas as inside, but also as totally unrelated to the outside; in other words, not just that one only distinctly sees ideas, but these distinct ideas are unoriginated from sense; here a reversal, instead of measuring ideas against things, things are measured against ideas

36 Descartes seemingly backtracks and sees the problem detected from 25

37 thoughts are “like” images; images of images

thoughts as nouns and thoughts as statements

ideas are clear and distinct, hence true; even when subjects are false, the enunciation itself does actually happen and is true; judgements again are only false in reference to outside but not inside

38 another place where Descartes seems to backtrack a little, so that instead of treating all ideas as unoriginated from sense, he recounts how he used to believe the opposite because of his natural impulse

39 another internal faculty that produces ideas against my will

this argument is supported by the fact that ideas might not resemble sensible things at all

40 a hierarchy of ideas: ideas are equal insofar as they are inside me; but supreme ideas have higher objective reality, because other ideas depend upon them being real, then substances, then properties of substances

—-> reality about cause is passed into effect; hence the least real idea points to the most real thing; what is objective and formal reality? I suppose formal simply means that these ideas exist in my mind, whereas objective means the things these ideas represent are real; only ideas have objective reality

—-> the argument that cause contains more reality than effect seems unconvincing: is redemption not more real than the fall, even when the fall historically causes redemption? what about perfection and progress?

41 Descartes seems ambiguous on the status regarding ideas; what kind of reality do they entertain and how imperfect are they? Why are they imperfect? Different from Plato it seems

an exposition of the line of argument: the formal reality of an object cannot be transferred onto the idea of that object, namely, a stone is real but a unicorn is not, but the ideas of them are both real because the mind produces both; yet their respective formal reality determine how “absurd” (objectively real) these ideas are

42 it’s impossible for there to be no formal reality, or that simply objective reality is enough to cause objective reality; for infinite regress is ludicrous

—-> the denouement of all developments: 1. not believe in anything outside ego or that there is an outside origin for ideas; 2. see instead that because ideas have objective reality, there must be something outside that causes these objective realities, that are formally more real; 3. if there is something whose objective reality suggests something formally more real than ego, there must be something outside

—-> then one needs to pursue this excessive objectively real idea, determine if there even is one

43 two kinds of falsities: one formal falsity, that of judgement and relating things inside to things outside; one other that in ideas when they represent non-things to be things

—-> so that all ideas of sensible bodies can potentially refer to non-things hence have no objective reality whatsoever; and even if they do have some objective reality there is no reason to believe it not derivative from the idea of myself

45 the idea of God has objective reality independent from me; this means that first, this idea is objectively real, and this is the case (?) because this could be distinctly and clearly discerned without help from outside world: idea of substance, infinite, etc.; the idea of God is a priori and clear

—-> the only remaining question then is to ask if this objective reality goes beyond my power

—-> it does because “infinity” is not just a privation of finitude but has much more reality than finitude (not convincing), and therefore must be formally prior to finitude, since its idea is objectively more real than that derived from myself as a finite being

46 God is the most clear and distinct idea because every other idea that I believe to be clear and distinct is contained in the idea of God

47 Descartes foresees one version of the criticism I raised against him at 40; so that he argues even granted that progress is possible, in God there is no potency whatsoever, hence God is always greater than a redeemed ego, since he has no chance for even the fall; yet I think he fails to fully confront the question I have as it is, namely, the problem of the primacy of cause, and my question still stands valid, that what if the God as cause to the idea of God is lesser than the idea itself?

—-> actual infinity of God is postulated as opposed to potential infinity of progress

—-> my version in competition to his of the account might be that I take in something and start abstracting and elevating it to the status of ideas, with as many flaws, if not less, as his; Descartes’ problem is that he is not very careful with the concept of cause

48 narcissism: “I am my own lord”; if everything is derivative from myself, I would be omnipotent (which, again, seems unconvincing); yet this is refuted by a sense of powerlessness

49 “I” need a cause to be originated and preserved

—-> there is nothing that causes “I” to always exist; why not? let’s just suppose the soul is immortal and self-subsisting, is thought that thinks thought not good enough answer? though we do discover (atemporal) otherness in the self, on this Descartes is absolutely right, for whatever is in time is in danger, and only what is outside time can save that which is in time

50 here Descartes has more fully defended himself: the cause is not a temporal cause, but a divine and eternal cause that causes everything; yet this makes all former arguments on the idea of God seemingly superfluous; moreover, it’s not clear how a temporal causality couldn’t work to preserve the existence of “I” except the rejection of infinite regress

all perfections necessarily belong to God for otherwise there will be no unity in the idea that articulates all these perfections qua inseparable; for I would not be able to know how in idea to articulate these properties; in other words, “unity” means “these aspects qua aspects are inseparable”, and “unity” itself is not an isolatable trait that is later imposed upon this idea, but rather “unity” has to be naturally grown out of these aspects; so if the idea has all these aspects totally unified, and unity is a perfection, then God will be even more unified

52 Descartes judges truth better than falsity; seems gratuitous

2

IV:
53 trickery indicates power and cleverness, but ill will

54 incapability to err comes from God

yet there’s the other idea of absolute imperfection, that is, “nothingness”

how this is not indicative of an evil god, a demiurge?

55 Descartes realizes the defect of his argument, and he evades it by positing the incomprehensible telos of God

56 the “world” is given back: since God is other and omnipotent he could have created all things outside me

intellect perceives ideas and cannot err, what does it mean? Does it mean that I have ideas that are in my mind only I yet not know them? Or does it mean that I just don’t have those ideas once and ever, so I am not deprived because I never possess those? The best to go with the text seems to be: “I’m not entirely deprived of any idea, I just know that I don’t know it(or I lack it only negatively, that I see that I don’t know), and that’s okay because by that judgement I won’t err, since my intellect is finite so that some things are not supposed to be known, and if I’m certain that I’m uncertain of it, my will won’t give assent or denial.”

—-> what this equates to is simply that even though there’s a lot that one doesn’t know, this “not knowing” doesn’t itself constitute error, since it’s not as if there’s something and I, having no idea of it, believes there’s not, but simply I know that thing can possibly exist (since I have an idea of it), only I don’t precisely know

free choice is the only totally perfect faculty in “I”

57 divine will operates with more power and knowledge and is hence more resolute and expansive, but formally it exudes the same nature as human will

the will consists in when something is proposed to us by our intellect to affirm or deny to pursue or to shun we are moved in such a way that we sense that we are determined to it by no external force

58 freedom as a necessity; a will to do good free from all pathological inclinations

Descartes specifies his argument: no, it’s not will that results in imperfection, since will to good is perfect

the source of error: incompatibility between will and understanding, I will things that I don’t understand

59 a light from intellect guides the will to affirm or deny freely

without the natural light, all are dubious and can be willed indifferently

60 falsity and fault consists in will giving assent to what is not known by the intellect

this seems to have undermined my earlier interpretation of intellect being incapable of error: it seems that Descartes is saying rather “since my intellect are not given ideas that correspond to such and such things, I’m not supposed to even try to know them; it’s not as if I should have had those ideas about those things but can’t, and hence fail and err; I’m not given them at all, and it’s not my right to inquire into them; hence intellect by itself, perceiving its own ideas that are given to it, do not err.”

will is indivisible hence nothing can be taken away

61 what I believe to be a privation, that is, something that I will to know but cannot, is for God simply negation, that is, something he doesn’t let done; God hence doesn’t concur in privation as if it were an obstruction imposed onto me, but merely granted me and made something finite, so God is not to be blamed, as if he were the one who deliberately created evil and falsity

two ways to make my finite intellect and infinite will coherent: 1.render my intellect clear and distinct on everything I must deliberate, that is, if I were to will to know something, I should know it clear and distinct, and if I were not to will it, it shall remain obscure, in this way, my intellect is still finite and bounded by time, so that I know all things potentially; 2.I always remember not to make judgements on things I’m not sure of

—-> last resort: the whole is more perfect than the part, so the part of not itself perfect might make the totality perfect

—-> only the second way should work in this life

62 the ideas being clear and distinct come from something since they have objective reality, and they must be caused by that highest idea of highest reality, and again caused by that highest thing formally, and these ideas are not deceptions, since the highest thing doesn’t deceive

V:
Strange thing about this Meditation is why does Descartes try to prove yet again God’s existence and how prominent maths becomes in this section

65 clarity and distinctness of mathematical truths

why a second attempt to prove God’s existence? is the earlier attempt not sufficient?

66 this feels like such a sad reservation now

it’s not possible to separate existence from God’s essence, hence God must exist (in order to be thought about)

—-> but Descartes notices how this seems absurd, for my thought has no necessity

67 yet this only holds true for other attributes, e.g. a winged horse might not exist, but an existing God must exist, otherwise it would be self-contradictory

—-> the assumption here is that “being is a predicate”

—-> it seems as if two strategies of argumentation are at odds here: one is that in Meditation I if something is clearly and distinctly perceived, it is objectively true and exists; but in Meditation V if some attribute is clearly and distinctly perceived to belong to something than it would truly be the case, hence existence will truly belong to God

what matters in this proof is the a priori necessity for God to exist

68 what is important here is the fact that the idea of God or a supreme being necessarily assumes the unity of all perfections

—-> there’s both necessity and exclusivity to God being of all perfections, since I couldn’t think of any other being like this; because of this this thought is not for me to change or choose

70 this is quite complex psychological process: I am in doubt if I’m deceived when I do not entertain the absolute certainty I perceive by that instant

—-> but since there is God, who does not deceive, as long as I have that memory imprint of clarity and distinctness I can be sure of myself; if there were no God, I would in fear of being deceived; but since there is God, I could guarantee that whatever I once perceived clearly and distinctly would always be true, since God would make it this way and would not try to deceive me intentionally; basically the argument is that God makes error accidental in this world

—-> the logic here is still not clear enough for me; also is this not circular reasoning? because everything I perceive clearly and distinctly is true, so God must exist, and I conclude everything clearly and distinctly perceived is true?

VI:
71 since God exists, everything is capable of being created; I perceive in imagination material things clearly and distinctly as objects for pure mathematics, that increases the likelihood for them to exist, since they have to be closely present to mind to be imagined

72 difference between imagination and intellection: one is intuition, the other symbolic understanding

73 since imagination is a remainder outside my intellection, hence outside my essence, it is not deducible by necessity from my ego and is not contained in my ego; therefore it is more probable that an outside body should activate it; yet here there’s no necessity, for it only suggests something different from myself but not an outside corporeal body, and my perceiving something distinctly in imagination does not make it therefore true, since imagination could again easily alter it

74 different aspects of imagination; a mathematical one that is more clear versus a qualitative one

memory helps senses to get to imagination

75 there is always some inexorability or irreducibility of sensation to thought, manifest in the way that these ideas are forced on me, hence the bodies must exist outside me

the sensibles are in some way more vivid and distinct, hence must come from some place; how to reconcile this with other meditations? it feels the transition has something to do with God’s existence being proven

the correspondence between things and ideas seem to be a desperate last resort

76 the “knowledge” taught by nature regarding sensations is for a large part impulsive and unexamined convictions

—-> yet senses could go wrong and natural convictions do need assessments

77 Descartes realizes how his earlier reasoning doesn’t work, for even if sense (or for that matter imagination) should clearly and distinctly present a thing that thing is variable and alterable; plus the sensed object might be produced by some hidden faculty I yet not know and is hence not forced on me

78 this seems to answer the question in 70, that since I know God is no deceiver, I can be certain that whatever I feel certain about is made the same way which makes me feel certain; the apparent circularity of argument could be resolved by differentiating the certainty regarding God and that regarding other things, certainty in God is the primary kind, whereas other certainties follow from it and are only made strong founded on this primary certainty; or it might be retroactive, by my certainty in God I know about God which makes me even more certain

79 the faculty that actively produces ideas, instead of passively receiving, like the other sensing faculty does, of sensibles acts against my will, therefore the objective reality of these ideas must presuppose some other substance, either God, or corporeal substance, or some mediator

“contained eminently” seems to mean something is not within but deducible from something else

80 if God were a deceiver, he would give me such inclination to believe in external things while not actually creating these external things; but since he is not, this won’t happen

pure mathematics is the way to approach the truth of these bodies

“by ‘nature’ I understand nothing other than God himself or the ordered network of created things which was instituted by God”

81 a very specific kind of unity between body and mind: not merely a pilot in a ship

sensations of hunger and pain are nothing but confused modes of thinking

82 Descartes backtracks and claims that what he previously called “teachings of nature” are merely “teachings of habit to make reckless judgements”

—-> this kind of teaching belongs to a commingling between mind and body; for sensations are too obscure and confused to be taken as foundational rules for understanding

—-> “for admittedly I use the perceptions of the senses (which are properly given by nature only for signifying to the mind what things are useful or harmful to the composite of which it is a part, and to that extent they are clear and distinct enough) as reliable rules for immediately discerning what is the essence of bodies located outside us

85 a different line of inquiry into nature and error: how come that a nature, regardless if it deviates from its normal, hence “natural” course, could do something that harms itself; its nature is not corrupted since it still works and functions mechanically; if one says it deviates from its normal course this normality is only externally designated; so the first kind of nature seems to be mechanical nature

86 divisibility of body as opposed to indivisibility of mind; this establishes the difference in nature and also how sensations wouldn’t be immediate since bodies are divisible into parts

—-> brain as the only organ that affects mind

—-> different parts are affected yet only one sensation subsists in brain

—-> hence it’s best to always represent the most important aspect

90 the comparison to dreams breaks down at the point where Descartes realizes life is organized by memory into a rational whole whereas dreams do not permit such coherence