René Descartes · 勒内·笛卡尔
Meditations · 第一哲学沉思集
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Meditations — Reading notes
Reflections · Apple Notes
Revised 12 February 2024
1
One problem seems that this is supposed to be a laid-out argument and not a series of meditations
I:
18 what is the urgency of razing everything down at one fell swoop? as opposed to a Baconion method of combing through or a Husserlian cross-examination
21 abandoned “God is good hence won’t deceive” argument, for God’s intention is not to be inquired into(wrong because he later picks it up again)
this seems like a twisted argument, for prior to this God’s omnipotence and perfection is to argue for his capability at deception; now imperfection is what causes deception; though it might have something to do with continuing with the hypothesis of the abandoned argument of “God’s no deceiver”
22 Descartes is aware that to imagine everything is deception is itself a deception
23 the greatest dramatic effect ever in modern philosophy
II:
24 very literary
the doubt that there might very well be something indubitable
25 one is persuaded to doubt everything; in order to be persuaded one has to exist, though it’s unclear if existence is a prerequisite or a concomitant of thinking, in other words, if one must first exist so that one could think, or that the “thinking” that is persuaded simply is, and I lean towards the second interpretation, since thinking is the essence of human existence; one other ambiguity is whether thinking only illuminates being, making it known, or it posits being, so that it shares a much more intimate relationship to being
—-> it is also a questionable argument since the omnipotent devil might simply fabricate your whole “experience of thinking”; by the instillation image Descartes already assumes “I” to be independent; what should be concluded rather seems more like “something must exist in order for these supposed falsities to exist”, instead of “I exist”; this is Kant’s critique, the “I” still seems in any way whatsoever capable of being an “image”, not the “original”, since “I” do experience my thinking
—-> this argument still seems salvageable if only the form of “I” is there and not yet content; in other words, if we say “I” as an image or an experiencing of thinking is doubtable, there is an “I” that is entirely other to this who is the cause of this “I” is not doubtable; though one could very much imagine how this other “I” is the devil himself
—-> “every time I pronounce” seems utterly temporal; cogitatum
26 the evidence from the sensible
27 this seemingly affirms the temporal nature of cogito
28 imagination disjoined from thinking
29 a prelude to Kantian philosophy; that which enables in me imagination, sensing etc and that which is imagined or sensed
the power to imagine constitutes part of thought; a priori sensing
sense examines bodies, imagination produces images of these bodies and take them into thinking
30 the knowledge of a particular body; unlike a general body (generally imagined and operated matter) as talked about in METHOD
it seems that change refutes distinctness; for those aspects of wax that have changed or are capable of being changed are marked aside as indistinct; what is capable of change is capable of ambiguity and confusion as conditions and circumstances change
31 the insight of infinity of possible variations of matter goes beyond finite imagination; hence reason is beyond imagination
attention at examination of reason clarifies thought and object
32 we see something present without judging separately any of its properties, we know “wax” without stripping it down to its kernel; hence our vision supposedly identifies the thing itself as a whole composed of these parts, in other words, it might be that we visually see the whole as “wax” instead of seeing merely “wax” properties and having to mark out one independent kernel of being “wax”, so knowledge comes from a sensible image; yet we say we see human beings while the wholes we see are not certain identifiable images; hence we clearly are using our reason
imagination is equivalent to common sense; this could mean that as sensation is strictly particular, imagination is common but still impure
a perception with human mind is more distinct for human mind is a higher faculty than imagination or sensation
33 if I see wax distinctly, then my seeing is distinct, and my existence should be most distinct
I’m not sure if the argument “if an object gets more distinct then the subject is even more distinct” actually holds; though one apparently could say when the object is not distinct, one can doubt if the subject is actually performing the act distinctly since when one sees something unclear one doubts one’s own eyesight
the thing that makes my intellectual perception of a body more distinct redounds to the distinctness of mind; but mind itself is resourceful even without any aid from the perception of a body
III:
34 I’m certain of my modes of thinking
35 I’m certain that I exist; but I’m also certain of certainty itself
—-> but this really is a postulate for it might happen that what I perceive distinctly is false
a radical suspension requires not only see those ideas as inside, but also as totally unrelated to the outside; in other words, not just that one only distinctly sees ideas, but these distinct ideas are unoriginated from sense; here a reversal, instead of measuring ideas against things, things are measured against ideas
36 Descartes seemingly backtracks and sees the problem detected from 25
37 thoughts are “like” images; images of images
thoughts as nouns and thoughts as statements
ideas are clear and distinct, hence true; even when subjects are false, the enunciation itself does actually happen and is true; judgements again are only false in reference to outside but not inside
38 another place where Descartes seems to backtrack a little, so that instead of treating all ideas as unoriginated from sense, he recounts how he used to believe the opposite because of his natural impulse
39 another internal faculty that produces ideas against my will
this argument is supported by the fact that ideas might not resemble sensible things at all
40 a hierarchy of ideas: ideas are equal insofar as they are inside me; but supreme ideas have higher objective reality, because other ideas depend upon them being real, then substances, then properties of substances
—-> reality about cause is passed into effect; hence the least real idea points to the most real thing; what is objective and formal reality? I suppose formal simply means that these ideas exist in my mind, whereas objective means the things these ideas represent are real; only ideas have objective reality
—-> the argument that cause contains more reality than effect seems unconvincing: is redemption not more real than the fall, even when the fall historically causes redemption? what about perfection and progress?
41 Descartes seems ambiguous on the status regarding ideas; what kind of reality do they entertain and how imperfect are they? Why are they imperfect? Different from Plato it seems
an exposition of the line of argument: the formal reality of an object cannot be transferred onto the idea of that object, namely, a stone is real but a unicorn is not, but the ideas of them are both real because the mind produces both; yet their respective formal reality determine how “absurd” (objectively real) these ideas are
42 it’s impossible for there to be no formal reality, or that simply objective reality is enough to cause objective reality; for infinite regress is ludicrous
—-> the denouement of all developments: 1. not believe in anything outside ego or that there is an outside origin for ideas; 2. see instead that because ideas have objective reality, there must be something outside that causes these objective realities, that are formally more real; 3. if there is something whose objective reality suggests something formally more real than ego, there must be something outside
—-> then one needs to pursue this excessive objectively real idea, determine if there even is one
43 two kinds of falsities: one formal falsity, that of judgement and relating things inside to things outside; one other that in ideas when they represent non-things to be things
—-> so that all ideas of sensible bodies can potentially refer to non-things hence have no objective reality whatsoever; and even if they do have some objective reality there is no reason to believe it not derivative from the idea of myself
45 the idea of God has objective reality independent from me; this means that first, this idea is objectively real, and this is the case (?) because this could be distinctly and clearly discerned without help from outside world: idea of substance, infinite, etc.; the idea of God is a priori and clear
—-> the only remaining question then is to ask if this objective reality goes beyond my power
—-> it does because “infinity” is not just a privation of finitude but has much more reality than finitude (not convincing), and therefore must be formally prior to finitude, since its idea is objectively more real than that derived from myself as a finite being
46 God is the most clear and distinct idea because every other idea that I believe to be clear and distinct is contained in the idea of God
47 Descartes foresees one version of the criticism I raised against him at 40; so that he argues even granted that progress is possible, in God there is no potency whatsoever, hence God is always greater than a redeemed ego, since he has no chance for even the fall; yet I think he fails to fully confront the question I have as it is, namely, the problem of the primacy of cause, and my question still stands valid, that what if the God as cause to the idea of God is lesser than the idea itself?
—-> actual infinity of God is postulated as opposed to potential infinity of progress
—-> my version in competition to his of the account might be that I take in something and start abstracting and elevating it to the status of ideas, with as many flaws, if not less, as his; Descartes’ problem is that he is not very careful with the concept of cause
48 narcissism: “I am my own lord”; if everything is derivative from myself, I would be omnipotent (which, again, seems unconvincing); yet this is refuted by a sense of powerlessness
49 “I” need a cause to be originated and preserved
—-> there is nothing that causes “I” to always exist; why not? let’s just suppose the soul is immortal and self-subsisting, is thought that thinks thought not good enough answer? though we do discover (atemporal) otherness in the self, on this Descartes is absolutely right, for whatever is in time is in danger, and only what is outside time can save that which is in time
50 here Descartes has more fully defended himself: the cause is not a temporal cause, but a divine and eternal cause that causes everything; yet this makes all former arguments on the idea of God seemingly superfluous; moreover, it’s not clear how a temporal causality couldn’t work to preserve the existence of “I” except the rejection of infinite regress
all perfections necessarily belong to God for otherwise there will be no unity in the idea that articulates all these perfections qua inseparable; for I would not be able to know how in idea to articulate these properties; in other words, “unity” means “these aspects qua aspects are inseparable”, and “unity” itself is not an isolatable trait that is later imposed upon this idea, but rather “unity” has to be naturally grown out of these aspects; so if the idea has all these aspects totally unified, and unity is a perfection, then God will be even more unified
52 Descartes judges truth better than falsity; seems gratuitous
2
IV:
53 trickery indicates power and cleverness, but ill will
54 incapability to err comes from God
yet there’s the other idea of absolute imperfection, that is, “nothingness”
how this is not indicative of an evil god, a demiurge?
55 Descartes realizes the defect of his argument, and he evades it by positing the incomprehensible telos of God
56 the “world” is given back: since God is other and omnipotent he could have created all things outside me
intellect perceives ideas and cannot err, what does it mean? Does it mean that I have ideas that are in my mind only I yet not know them? Or does it mean that I just don’t have those ideas once and ever, so I am not deprived because I never possess those? The best to go with the text seems to be: “I’m not entirely deprived of any idea, I just know that I don’t know it(or I lack it only negatively, that I see that I don’t know), and that’s okay because by that judgement I won’t err, since my intellect is finite so that some things are not supposed to be known, and if I’m certain that I’m uncertain of it, my will won’t give assent or denial.”
—-> what this equates to is simply that even though there’s a lot that one doesn’t know, this “not knowing” doesn’t itself constitute error, since it’s not as if there’s something and I, having no idea of it, believes there’s not, but simply I know that thing can possibly exist (since I have an idea of it), only I don’t precisely know
free choice is the only totally perfect faculty in “I”
57 divine will operates with more power and knowledge and is hence more resolute and expansive, but formally it exudes the same nature as human will
the will consists in when something is proposed to us by our intellect to affirm or deny to pursue or to shun we are moved in such a way that we sense that we are determined to it by no external force
58 freedom as a necessity; a will to do good free from all pathological inclinations
Descartes specifies his argument: no, it’s not will that results in imperfection, since will to good is perfect
the source of error: incompatibility between will and understanding, I will things that I don’t understand
59 a light from intellect guides the will to affirm or deny freely
without the natural light, all are dubious and can be willed indifferently
60 falsity and fault consists in will giving assent to what is not known by the intellect
this seems to have undermined my earlier interpretation of intellect being incapable of error: it seems that Descartes is saying rather “since my intellect are not given ideas that correspond to such and such things, I’m not supposed to even try to know them; it’s not as if I should have had those ideas about those things but can’t, and hence fail and err; I’m not given them at all, and it’s not my right to inquire into them; hence intellect by itself, perceiving its own ideas that are given to it, do not err.”
will is indivisible hence nothing can be taken away
61 what I believe to be a privation, that is, something that I will to know but cannot, is for God simply negation, that is, something he doesn’t let done; God hence doesn’t concur in privation as if it were an obstruction imposed onto me, but merely granted me and made something finite, so God is not to be blamed, as if he were the one who deliberately created evil and falsity
two ways to make my finite intellect and infinite will coherent: 1.render my intellect clear and distinct on everything I must deliberate, that is, if I were to will to know something, I should know it clear and distinct, and if I were not to will it, it shall remain obscure, in this way, my intellect is still finite and bounded by time, so that I know all things potentially; 2.I always remember not to make judgements on things I’m not sure of
—-> last resort: the whole is more perfect than the part, so the part of not itself perfect might make the totality perfect
—-> only the second way should work in this life
62 the ideas being clear and distinct come from something since they have objective reality, and they must be caused by that highest idea of highest reality, and again caused by that highest thing formally, and these ideas are not deceptions, since the highest thing doesn’t deceive
V:
Strange thing about this Meditation is why does Descartes try to prove yet again God’s existence and how prominent maths becomes in this section
65 clarity and distinctness of mathematical truths
why a second attempt to prove God’s existence? is the earlier attempt not sufficient?
66 this feels like such a sad reservation now
it’s not possible to separate existence from God’s essence, hence God must exist (in order to be thought about)
—-> but Descartes notices how this seems absurd, for my thought has no necessity
67 yet this only holds true for other attributes, e.g. a winged horse might not exist, but an existing God must exist, otherwise it would be self-contradictory
—-> the assumption here is that “being is a predicate”
—-> it seems as if two strategies of argumentation are at odds here: one is that in Meditation I if something is clearly and distinctly perceived, it is objectively true and exists; but in Meditation V if some attribute is clearly and distinctly perceived to belong to something than it would truly be the case, hence existence will truly belong to God
what matters in this proof is the a priori necessity for God to exist
68 what is important here is the fact that the idea of God or a supreme being necessarily assumes the unity of all perfections
—-> there’s both necessity and exclusivity to God being of all perfections, since I couldn’t think of any other being like this; because of this this thought is not for me to change or choose
70 this is quite complex psychological process: I am in doubt if I’m deceived when I do not entertain the absolute certainty I perceive by that instant
—-> but since there is God, who does not deceive, as long as I have that memory imprint of clarity and distinctness I can be sure of myself; if there were no God, I would in fear of being deceived; but since there is God, I could guarantee that whatever I once perceived clearly and distinctly would always be true, since God would make it this way and would not try to deceive me intentionally; basically the argument is that God makes error accidental in this world
—-> the logic here is still not clear enough for me; also is this not circular reasoning? because everything I perceive clearly and distinctly is true, so God must exist, and I conclude everything clearly and distinctly perceived is true?
VI:
71 since God exists, everything is capable of being created; I perceive in imagination material things clearly and distinctly as objects for pure mathematics, that increases the likelihood for them to exist, since they have to be closely present to mind to be imagined
72 difference between imagination and intellection: one is intuition, the other symbolic understanding
73 since imagination is a remainder outside my intellection, hence outside my essence, it is not deducible by necessity from my ego and is not contained in my ego; therefore it is more probable that an outside body should activate it; yet here there’s no necessity, for it only suggests something different from myself but not an outside corporeal body, and my perceiving something distinctly in imagination does not make it therefore true, since imagination could again easily alter it
74 different aspects of imagination; a mathematical one that is more clear versus a qualitative one
memory helps senses to get to imagination
75 there is always some inexorability or irreducibility of sensation to thought, manifest in the way that these ideas are forced on me, hence the bodies must exist outside me
the sensibles are in some way more vivid and distinct, hence must come from some place; how to reconcile this with other meditations? it feels the transition has something to do with God’s existence being proven
the correspondence between things and ideas seem to be a desperate last resort
76 the “knowledge” taught by nature regarding sensations is for a large part impulsive and unexamined convictions
—-> yet senses could go wrong and natural convictions do need assessments
77 Descartes realizes how his earlier reasoning doesn’t work, for even if sense (or for that matter imagination) should clearly and distinctly present a thing that thing is variable and alterable; plus the sensed object might be produced by some hidden faculty I yet not know and is hence not forced on me
78 this seems to answer the question in 70, that since I know God is no deceiver, I can be certain that whatever I feel certain about is made the same way which makes me feel certain; the apparent circularity of argument could be resolved by differentiating the certainty regarding God and that regarding other things, certainty in God is the primary kind, whereas other certainties follow from it and are only made strong founded on this primary certainty; or it might be retroactive, by my certainty in God I know about God which makes me even more certain
79 the faculty that actively produces ideas, instead of passively receiving, like the other sensing faculty does, of sensibles acts against my will, therefore the objective reality of these ideas must presuppose some other substance, either God, or corporeal substance, or some mediator
“contained eminently” seems to mean something is not within but deducible from something else
80 if God were a deceiver, he would give me such inclination to believe in external things while not actually creating these external things; but since he is not, this won’t happen
pure mathematics is the way to approach the truth of these bodies
“by ‘nature’ I understand nothing other than God himself or the ordered network of created things which was instituted by God”
81 a very specific kind of unity between body and mind: not merely a pilot in a ship
sensations of hunger and pain are nothing but confused modes of thinking
82 Descartes backtracks and claims that what he previously called “teachings of nature” are merely “teachings of habit to make reckless judgements”
—-> this kind of teaching belongs to a commingling between mind and body; for sensations are too obscure and confused to be taken as foundational rules for understanding
—-> “for admittedly I use the perceptions of the senses (which are properly given by nature only for signifying to the mind what things are useful or harmful to the composite of which it is a part, and to that extent they are clear and distinct enough) as reliable rules for immediately discerning what is the essence of bodies located outside us
85 a different line of inquiry into nature and error: how come that a nature, regardless if it deviates from its normal, hence “natural” course, could do something that harms itself; its nature is not corrupted since it still works and functions mechanically; if one says it deviates from its normal course this normality is only externally designated; so the first kind of nature seems to be mechanical nature
86 divisibility of body as opposed to indivisibility of mind; this establishes the difference in nature and also how sensations wouldn’t be immediate since bodies are divisible into parts
—-> brain as the only organ that affects mind
—-> different parts are affected yet only one sensation subsists in brain
—-> hence it’s best to always represent the most important aspect
90 the comparison to dreams breaks down at the point where Descartes realizes life is organized by memory into a rational whole whereas dreams do not permit such coherence
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
1
一个问题似乎在于,这本应是一套展开的论证,而非一系列沉思。
I:
18 为什么急于一举夷平一切,而不是采用培根式的梳理方法,或胡赛尔式的交叉审查?
21 放弃了“神是善的,因此不会欺骗”的论证,因为神的意图不可探问;这理解不对,因为他后来又重拾了这一论证。
这似乎是一个扭曲的论证:此前,神的全能与完美是用来论证其欺骗能力的;现在,不完美却成了欺骗的原因。不过,这也许与继续沿用被放弃的“神不是欺骗者”这一论证的假设有关。
22 笛卡尔意识到,想象一切都是欺骗,本身也是一种欺骗。
23 现代哲学中前所未有的最强戏剧效果。
II:
24 很有文学性。
怀疑:也许确实有某种不可怀疑者。
25 一个人被说服去怀疑一切;要被说服,他就必须存在。但不清楚存在是思考的前提,还是思考的伴随物。换句话说,是一个人必须先存在才能思考,还是被说服的“思考”本身就是存在?我倾向于第二种解读,因为思考是人的存在之本质。另一个歧义是,思考只是照亮存在、使存在被认识,还是思考设定存在,因而与存在具有更为亲密的关系?
—-> 这个论证也值得怀疑,因为全能的恶魔完全可能捏造你的整个“思考经验”;通过灌注的图景,笛卡尔已经预设了“我”是独立的。应当得出的结论似乎更像是“必须有某物存在,才能让这些所谓的虚假存在”,而非“我存在”。这是康德的批评:“我”无论如何似乎仍可能是一个“图像”,而非“原本”,因为“我”确实经验着自己的思考。
—-> 如果只有“我”的形式,而尚无内容,这一论证似乎仍可挽救。换句话说,如果我们说,作为图像或思考经验的“我”是可怀疑的,那么另一个与此完全不同、作为这个“我”之原因的“我”,则是不可怀疑的;虽然完全可以想象,这另一个“我”就是恶魔本人。
—-> “每当我说出”显得彻底是时间性的;cogitatum。
26 来自可感者的明见性。
27 这似乎确认了我思的时间性。
28 想象与思考被分开。
29 康德哲学的前奏:在我之中使想象、感觉等成为可能者,与被想象或被感觉者。
想象的能力构成思想的一部分;先天感觉。
感觉考察身体,想象产生这些身体的图像,并把它们带入思考。
30 对某个特殊身体的知识;不同于《方法谈》中所说的一般身体,即被一般地想象和操作的质料。
变化似乎反驳了明白性,因为蜡的那些已经改变或能够改变的方面,被划到不明白的一边;能够变化者,随着条件和情境改变,也就能够变得含混而混淆。
31 对质料可能变更之无限性的洞见,超出了有限想象,因此理性超出想象。
对理性考察的注意,使思想与对象清晰。
32 我们看见某物在场,而不分别判断它的任何属性;我们知道“蜡”,无须把它剥到核心。因此,视觉据称把事物本身识别为由这些部分构成的整体;换句话说,也许我们在视觉上把整体看作“蜡”,而不只是看到“蜡”的属性,再必须标出一个独立的成为“蜡”的核心,所以知识来自感性图像。但我们说自己看到了人,而所见整体却不是可以确定识别的图像,因此我们显然在使用理性。
想象等同于共同感觉;这或许意味着,感觉严格说来是特殊的,想象则是共同的,但仍不纯粹。
凭人心进行的知觉更明白,因为人心是比想象或感觉更高的官能。
33 如果我明白地看见蜡,那么我的观看就是明白的,我的存在也应当最为明白。
我不确定“如果对象更明白,主体就更加明白”这一论证是否成立;不过,显然可以说,当对象不明白时,也可以怀疑主体是否确实在明白地实行活动,因为看不清某物时,人会怀疑自己的视力。
使我对身体的理智知觉更加明白的东西,也增益了心灵的明白性;但即使没有任何身体知觉的帮助,心灵自身也有丰富的资源。
III:
34 我确定自己的思考样式。
35 我确定自己存在;但我也确定确定性本身。
—-> 但这实际上是一个公设,因为我明白地知觉到的东西,可能是假的。
彻底的悬置,不仅要求把那些观念看作内在的,还要把它们看作与外部完全无关。换句话说,不只是说人只明白地看见观念,还要说这些明白观念不起源于感觉。这里有一个逆转:不再以事物衡量观念,而是以观念衡量事物。
36 笛卡尔似乎往回走,注意到了25处发现的问题。
37 思想“像”图像;图像的图像。
作为名词的思想,与作为陈述的思想。
观念清楚明白,因此为真;即便主语是假的,陈述本身确实发生了,也是真的;判断也只在与外部的关系中为假,在内部则不为假。
38 笛卡尔似乎又稍稍后退:不再把所有观念都视为不起源于感觉,而是回顾自己过去如何因自然冲动而相信相反的看法。
39 另一种违背我意志而产生观念的内在官能。
观念可能与可感事物完全不相似,这一事实支持了上述论证。
40 观念的等级:观念就其在我内部而言是平等的;但最高观念具有更高的客观实在性,因为其它观念依赖于它们的实在;然后是本体,再然后是本体的属性。
—-> 原因的实在性传入结果,因此最不实在的观念指向最实在的事物。什么是客观实在性与形式实在性?我猜,形式只是指这些观念存在于我的心灵中,而客观则指这些观念所表征的事物是实在的;只有观念具有客观实在性。
—-> 原因包含比结果更多实在性,这个论证似乎不令人信服:救赎难道不比堕落更实在,即使堕落在历史上造成了救赎?完美与进步又如何?
41 笛卡尔对观念的地位似乎含糊:它们具有哪种实在性,又有多不完美?为什么不完美?似乎不同于柏拉图。
论证路线的说明:对象的形式实在性不能转移到该对象的观念上;石头是实在的,独角兽不是,但二者的观念都实在,因为心灵产生了两者。然而,它们各自的形式实在性,规定了这些观念有多“荒谬”,即有多少客观实在性。
42 不可能没有形式实在性,也不可能仅凭客观实在性就足以造成客观实在性,因为无限倒退是荒唐的。
—-> 全部展开的收束:1. 不相信自我之外的任何东西,也不相信观念有外部起源;2. 反过来看,因为观念有客观实在性,就必定有某种外部事物造成这些客观实在性,而这些事物在形式上更实在;3. 如果某物的客观实在性指向比自我在形式上更实在的某物,就必定有外部之物。
—-> 那么,就必须追寻这个客观实在性过量的观念,确定是否真有这样一个观念。
43 两种虚假:一种是形式虚假,即判断的虚假,将内在之物关联于外在之物;另一种则在观念中,即把非物表征为物。
—-> 因此,可感身体的一切观念,都可能指向非物,从而完全没有客观实在性;即使它们确有某种客观实在性,也没有理由相信它不是从关于我自己的观念中派生出来的。
45 神的观念具有独立于我的客观实在性。这首先意味着,这一观念在客观上是实在的,而之所以如此(?),是因为它无须外部世界的帮助,就可以被清楚明白地辨认:本体、无限等的观念;神的观念是先天且清楚的。
—-> 那么,剩下的唯一问题,就是问这种客观实在性是否超出我的能力。
—-> 它确实超出,因为“无限”不只是有限的缺失,而是比有限具有多得多的实在性,这并不令人信服;因此,它在形式上必须先于有限,因为它的观念在客观上比从我这个有限存在者派生的观念更实在。
46 神是最清楚明白的观念,因为其它一切我相信清楚明白的观念,都包含在神的观念之中。
47 笛卡尔预见了我在40处所作批评的某个版本:他论证说,即便承认进步是可能的,神之中也没有任何潜能,所以神始终比获救赎的自我更伟大,因为祂连堕落的机会都没有。但我认为,他没有充分面对我的问题本身,即原因的首要性问题。我的问题仍然有效:如果作为神之观念的原因的神,反而小于这一观念本身,又如何?
—-> 神的现实无限被设定为与进步的潜在无限相对。
—-> 与他的说明竞争,我的版本可以是:我摄取某物,开始抽象它,并将它提升到观念的地位;我的说法即使缺陷不比他的少,至少也不会更多。笛卡尔的问题在于,他对原因概念不够谨慎。
48 自恋:“我是自己的主人”;如果一切都从我自身派生,我就会是全能的,这同样似乎不令人信服;但无力感反驳了这一点。
49 “我”需要一个原因来获得起源与保存。
—-> 没有什么能使“我”始终存在;为什么没有?假设灵魂不朽、自存不就行了?思考思考的思想,难道不是足够好的答案吗?不过,我们确实在自我中发现了无时间的他异性,这一点笛卡尔完全正确:凡在时间之内者都处于危险中,唯有时间之外者才能拯救时间之内者。
50 在这里,笛卡尔更充分地为自己辩护了:原因不是时间性的原因,而是造成一切的神圣、永恒原因。但这似乎使此前关于神之观念的所有论证都显得多余。此外,除了拒绝无限倒退之外,并不清楚为什么时间性的因果关系就不能保存“我”的存在。
一切完美必然属于神,否则,将这些完美阐明为不可分者的观念就没有统一性,因为我将不知道如何在观念中把这些属性关联起来。换句话说,“统一”意味着“这些方面作为方面是不可分的”;统一性本身不是一个可被孤立、随后才加到观念上的特征,而必须从这些方面自然生长出来。所以,如果观念中的所有这些方面完全统一,而统一性是一种完美,那么神就会更加统一。
52 笛卡尔判定真理优于虚假;似乎没有根据。
2
IV:
53 欺骗表明力量和机敏,却表明恶意。
54 不会犯错的能力来自神。
但还有另一个绝对不完美的观念,即“虚无”。
这如何不指向一个恶神、一个造物主(demiurge)?
55 笛卡尔意识到论证的缺陷,并通过设定神不可理解的目的来回避它。
56 “世界”被交还回来:既然神是他者且全能,祂就可能创造了我之外的一切。
理智知觉观念而不会犯错,这意味着什么?是说我有只在心灵内部、却尚未认识的观念?还是说,我从来就没有那些观念,所以我并未被剥夺,因为我从未拥有它们?最符合文本的理解似乎是:“我并非完全被剥夺了任何观念,我只是知道自己不知道它;或者,我只是以否定的方式缺少它,即看到自己不知道。这没有问题,因为凭这一判断我不会犯错:既然理智有限,有些东西就不应被认识;如果我确定自己对它不确定,我的意志就不会赞同或否定。”
—-> 这无非是说,虽然一个人不知道很多东西,但“不知道”本身不构成错误。不是某物存在,而我因为毫无观念就相信它不存在;只是我知道它可能存在,因为我对它有一个观念,但我不知道得很精确。
自由选择是“我”之中唯一完全完美的官能。
57 神圣意志以更多力量和知识运作,因此更坚定、更广阔;但在形式上,它显露出与人的意志相同的自然。
意志在于:当理智向我们提出某物,要求肯定或否定、追求或回避时,我们以这样的方式被推动——感到自己并未被任何外力规定去做这件事。
58 自由作为一种必然性;不受任何病理性倾向影响的行善意志。
笛卡尔细化了他的论证:不,不完美不是由意志造成的,因为向善的意志是完美的。
错误的源头:意志与理解之间的不协调,我意愿自己不理解的事物。
59 来自理智的光,引导意志自由地肯定或否定。
没有自然之光,一切都可疑,都可以被无差别地意愿。
60 虚假与过失,在于意志赞同了理智所不知道的东西。
这似乎削弱了我先前对理智不会犯错的解读。笛卡尔似乎其实在说:“既然理智未被给予对应某些事物的观念,我就甚至不应尝试认识它们;并不是我本来应当有关于这些事物的观念,却无法拥有,因此失败并犯错。我根本没有被给予这些观念,也没有权利探问它们。因此,理智自身在知觉被给予它的自身观念时,不会犯错。”
意志不可分,因此没有什么可以从中拿走。
61 我认为是缺失的东西,即我想知道却无法知道者,对神而言只是一个否定,即祂不让发生的事情。因此,神并不参与缺失,仿佛缺失是加在我身上的阻碍;祂只是给予了我、制造了某种有限之物。所以,不应责怪神,仿佛是祂刻意创造了恶与虚假。
使我的有限理智与无限意志协调的两种方法:1. 让我的理智对一切必须审议的事物都清楚明白,即如果我意愿认识某物,就应当清楚明白地知道它;如果不意愿,它便保持含混。这样,理智仍是有限且受时间约束的,使我在潜能上知道一切;2. 我始终记得,不对自己不确定的事物作判断。
—-> 最后的退路:整体比部分更完美,因此自身不完美的部分,可能使全体完美。
—-> 今生应当只有第二种方法可行。
62 清楚明白的观念来自某物,因为它们有客观实在性;它们必然由具有最高实在性的最高观念造成,又在形式上由那个最高事物造成。这些观念不是欺骗,因为最高事物不欺骗。
V:
这一沉思奇怪之处在于,笛卡尔为什么再次尝试证明神的存在,以及数学在这一节为何变得如此突出。
65 数学真理的清楚明白。
为什么第二次尝试证明神存在?先前的尝试还不够吗?
66 现在,这感觉像是多么令人悲哀的保留。
不可能把存在与神的本质分离,因此神必定存在,才能被思考。
—-> 但笛卡尔注意到,这似乎荒谬,因为我的思想没有必然性。
67 然而,这只对其它属性成立,比如有翼的马可以不存在,但存在的神必须存在,否则就会自相矛盾。
—-> 这里的假设是:“存在是一个谓词。”
—-> 两种论证策略似乎在此冲突:一种是,在《第一沉思》中,如果某物被清楚明白地知觉,它就客观地为真并且存在;但在《第五沉思》中,如果某个属性被清楚明白地知觉为属于某物,那么事实就确实如此,因此存在就确实属于神。
这一证明的关键,是神存在的先天必然性。
68 这里重要的是,神或最高存在者的观念,必然假定一切完美的统一。
—-> 神具有一切完美,既有必然性,也有排他性,因为我无法想出任何别的这样的存在者;因此,这一思想不由我改变或选择。
70 这是相当复杂的心理过程:当我不再保持那一瞬间所知觉的绝对确定性时,我就怀疑自己是否受骗。
—-> 但既然有不欺骗的神,只要我保有清楚明白的记忆印迹,就可以确定自己。如果没有神,我会害怕受骗;但既然有神,我就能保证凡是曾经清楚明白知觉到的东西,永远为真,因为神会使其如此,不会试图有意欺骗我。基本论证就是:神使错误在这个世界中成为偶然的。
—-> 这里的逻辑对我仍不够清楚;而且,这难道不是循环论证?因为凡是清楚明白知觉到的东西都为真,所以神必定存在,然后我得出一切清楚明白知觉到的东西都为真?
VI:
71 既然神存在,一切都能够被创造。我在想象中清楚明白地把物质事物知觉为纯粹数学的对象,这增加了它们存在的可能性,因为它们必须紧密地呈现于心灵,才能被想象。
72 想象与理智活动的区别:一个是直观,另一个是符号性的理解。
73 既然想象是理智活动之外、因而本质之外的剩余,它就无法从自我中必然演绎出来,也不包含在自我之内。因此,更有可能是某个外部身体激活了它。但这里没有必然性,因为它只提示某个不同于我的东西,而非外部的有形身体;而我在想象中明白地知觉某物,也不使它因此为真,因为想象很容易再次改变它。
74 想象的不同方面:更清楚的数学方面,与性质方面。
记忆帮助感觉进入想象。
75 感觉对思想而言,总有某种无法抗拒或无法还原之处,表现为这些观念被强加给我,因此身体必定存在于我之外。
可感者在某种意义上更鲜活、更明白,因此必定来自某处;如何与其它沉思调和?感觉这一转变与神的存在已被证明有关。
事物与观念之间的对应,似乎是绝望中的最后退路。
76 自然教导的有关感觉的“知识”,很大程度上是冲动且未经审查的确信。
—-> 但感觉可能出错,自然确信也确实需要评估。
77 笛卡尔意识到先前的推理行不通,因为即使感觉,或者同样地,想象,清楚明白地呈现某物,该物仍是可变、可改的;此外,被感觉的对象可能由某种我尚不知道的隐蔽官能产生,因此并非被强加给我。
78 这似乎回答了70处的问题:既然我知道神不欺骗,就可以确定,凡令我感到确定者,都是以使我确定的那种方式被制造的。论证表面上的循环,可以通过区分关于神的确定性与关于其它事物的确定性来化解:对神的确定性是首要的,其它确定性从它而来,并且只有奠基于这一首要确定性,才变得稳固。或者,它可能是回溯性的:凭借对神的确定性,我认识神,而这又使我更加确定。
79 主动产生可感者观念的官能,不同于另一个被动接受的感觉官能,它违背我的意志运作。因此,这些观念的客观实在性必须预设另一种本体:神、有形本体,或某种中介。
“以卓越方式包含”似乎是指,某物不在另一物之内,却可从另一物演绎出来。
80 如果神是欺骗者,祂就会给予我相信外部事物的倾向,却不实际创造这些外部事物;但既然祂不是,这就不会发生。
纯粹数学是接近这些身体之真理的方式。
“我所理解的‘自然’,无非是神本身,或由神创立的受造物之有序网络。”
81 身体与心灵之间一种极其特殊的统一:不只是船中的舵手。
饥饿与痛苦的感觉,无非是混淆的思考样式。
82 笛卡尔又往回走,声称此前所谓“自然的教导”,只是“养成轻率判断的习惯所给予的教导”。
—-> 这种教导属于心灵与身体的混合;感觉太过含混、混淆,无法被当作理解的根本规则。
—-> “因为诚然,我把感官知觉——它们恰当地说,只是由自然给予心灵,用来标示哪些事物有益或有害于心灵所属的复合体,并且在这个程度上足够清楚明白——用作可靠规则,直接辨认我们之外诸身体的本质是什么。
85 关于自然与错误的另一条探究路线:一种自然,无论是否偏离其通常的、因而‘自然的’进程,怎么会做出伤害自身的事情?其自然并未败坏,因为它仍以机械方式工作和运作;如果说它偏离通常进程,这种通常性只是由外部指定的。所以,第一种自然似乎是机械自然。
86 身体的可分性,与心灵的不可分性相对;这确立了二者自然上的差异,也说明感觉为何不是直接的,因为身体可以分成部分。
—-> 脑是唯一影响心灵的器官。
—-> 不同部分受到作用,但脑中只保持一种感觉。
—-> 因此,最好始终表征最重要的方面。
90 与梦的类比,在笛卡尔意识到生活被记忆组织成一个理性整体、而梦不允许这种连贯性时,就瓦解了。