Sigmund Freud · 西格蒙德·弗洛伊德
Beyond the Pleasure Principle · 超越快乐原则
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超越快乐原则
Douban · Bidasari
Source revised / 来源修订: 27 February 2025
1. 意识系统(Pcs-Cs)里,驱力「被绑定(bound)」于表征,在诸表征的网络中被分解满足;那些暂时无法被绑定的驱力则被压抑进无意识系统(Ucs)。这些没有被绑定的驱力同样无法被满足,只是坚持着自身,向Pcs-Cs发出表征的要求。这些要求随后被转译,同时进入诸表征的网络,以象征代偿而非以直接意向性的形式获得满足,即「无意识自我-意识自我(unconscious ego-conscious ego)」。
2. 可以有一些驱力无法在Cs中获得任何表征以及相伴的满足,哪怕是以象征代偿的形式。从Ucs到Cs之间没有办法建立起稳定的回路。压抑物试图向Cs回归获得表征,但却被Cs中占主导的驱力再次压抑,而无法获得一个稳定的表征系统。这种情况下,哪怕一个特殊的驱力获得了满足,普遍的这一类驱力却没有对应的一整个可以绑定分解这一类驱力的普遍的表征系统。这就是表征的短路,即「解绑的无意识过程(the unbound processes of unconscious)」。这样的驱力因为没有被绑定,也就无法在表征的网络中差异化,而是成了单纯在Ucs里坚持自身的白痴式的能指,总是维持着同样的强度,即「强迫性重复的同一性(the identity of repetition compulsion)」。正因为如此,精神分析治疗的终结不在于给出了一个具体的解释,而在于给出了一个普遍的解释系统,使驱力得以安全地迂回进入Cs,获得一个稳定的表征回路,并以此从Ucs接入Cs,消解阻抗。
3. 可是如果有一些驱力就是无法被满足呢?去绑定Ucs中的驱力就是去时间化那永恒无时的事物。失败因此某种意义上是必然的。永远有Cs无法去表征的剩余。这种情况下,精神分析有什么可以贡献的呢?这就是超越快乐原则的意义。这指的不仅仅是理论上对死驱力的发现,更意味着一种新的精神分析伦理:精神分析的目的不再是给出一个解读,甚至不再只是建立一个表征回路;现在,这个目的变成了如何通过这个回路更好地享受症状。
4. 为了达成这个目的,分析家要做的是重新去解释Ucs和Cs之间的关系。更重要的是,分析家要说服案主接受这个新的诠释。这之后,不再是压抑物从Ucs回归Cs并以此强迫Cs去被动地表征那未被表征者,而是Cs主动追求那不可表征者。这意味着,Cs要将Ucs和自己的症状视作自己的一部分,也就是那「无时的过去」,而自己并非是被动地遭受着症状,而是内在于Cs就有着朝向了Ucs的「无有」和「解绑」的驱力,也就是「死驱力」。症状因此成为了内在于Cs之自身超越的「圣兆」。
5. 由此,弗洛伊德的思辨结构实际上是,首先,任何对痛苦的强迫性重复都来自于对「绑定」的尝试,而只有在驱力完成绑定后,快乐原则才有意义,因为只有在绑定之后驱力才获得表征,快乐或者说驱力的释放才成为可能。但同样,任何对痛苦的坚持都意味着另一个驱力超出Cs的「不可能」的享受,否则对痛苦的坚持就无法理解,而如果不是这一不可能的享受,Cs也没有必要去压抑这一坚持、让这一驱力的坚持成为痛苦了。但是同时这一驱力的坚持又是内在于同一个自我的,因此相对于Cs并内在于Cs,这一不可能的享受于Cs来说无非于Cs享受着它自己的解体,而Cs要结束治疗所要最终接受的也是这一点,到这里,才完全达成Ucs和Cs的和解。
6. 由此驱力和快乐原则的关系也可以得到澄清。首先,儿童性活动的发现奠定了最原初的自恋模型:这里的自恋是儿童身体中诸分散的性驱力的自我满足。同时,这些分散的性驱力最开始都几乎彼此独立地湮灭,由此在这个阶段任意一个性驱力都内在地直接是死驱力。这也是最接近无限的快乐原则的状态。但是,性驱力要获得满足必须去绑定其它驱力,使其它驱力成为自己的对象。可这意味着诸分散驱力的综合;这一阶段,诸驱力可能维持之前彼此独立湮灭的情况,但更可能的是彼此掣肘,直到有些驱力无法被直接满足,而必须通过诸驱力系统构建的回路获得补偿。这当中尤其重要的是母亲乳房的缺失。这一缺失直接导致了口驱力的积蓄。这时的性驱力才终于从死驱力那里获得了自主性和独立性。独立开来的性驱力由此开始构建起现实原则,通过诸对象来迂回地获得满足;但性驱力无非是对死驱力的重复罢了,也就是性驱力对柏拉图的阿里斯托芬式整体的追求依然是在追求一个原初状态,也就是希望通过构建出的这一整体回归那失却了的、驱力其满足的直接性,也就是希望通过中介构建出生命的全体以直接地进入死亡。这样,在现实原则和快乐原则之间,也就是性驱力的迂回要求和死驱力的直接要求之间,一个自我就被构成了。强迫性重复因此就是一个没有被完全绑定容纳入全体的驱力的自身坚持,由此,如果它持续生成着Cs对Ucs的重复的绑定,那它就具有性驱力的生命功能;而如果它无法被完全绑定,反而威胁了已经被绑定下来的诸驱力系统,使得诸驱力最终退回其无中介的直接性,那它就是反生命的死驱力。将死转化为生就意味着将这一威胁生命的解绑本身把握成一种生生,也就是将强迫性重复本身转化为圣兆。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
1. In the conscious system (Pcs-Cs), drives are “bound” to representations and obtain satisfaction through their distribution across a network of representations; drives that cannot for the time being be bound are repressed into the unconscious system (Ucs). These unbound drives likewise cannot be satisfied. They merely persist in themselves, issuing demands for representation to Pcs-Cs. These demands are subsequently translated and enter the network of representations, obtaining satisfaction through symbolic compensation rather than in a directly intentional form: the “unconscious ego–conscious ego.”
2. Some drives may be unable to obtain any representation in Cs, together with the satisfaction that accompanies it, even in the form of symbolic compensation. No stable circuit can be established between Ucs and Cs. The repressed attempts to return from Ucs to Cs and obtain representation, but is repressed again by the drives dominant in Cs, and cannot acquire a stable system of representations. In this situation, even if one particular drive is satisfied, this general class of drives has no corresponding general system of representations capable of binding and distributing the entire class. This is a short circuit of representation: “the unbound processes of unconscious.” Because such a drive is not bound, it cannot be differentiated within the network of representations. Instead, it becomes an idiotic signifier that merely persists in Ucs, always maintaining the same intensity: “the identity of repetition compulsion.” For precisely this reason, psychoanalytic treatment ends not when it provides a particular interpretation, but when it provides a general system of interpretation, allowing the drive to enter Cs safely by a detour, acquire a stable circuit of representations, and thereby connect Ucs to Cs and dissolve resistance.
3. But what if some drives simply cannot be satisfied? To bind the drives in Ucs is to temporalize what is eternally without time. Failure is therefore, in a certain sense, inevitable. There is always a remainder that Cs cannot represent. What, then, can psychoanalysis contribute? This is the significance of going beyond the pleasure principle. It means not merely the theoretical discovery of the death drive, but also a new psychoanalytic ethics: the aim of psychoanalysis is no longer to provide an interpretation, nor even merely to establish a circuit of representations. Its aim now becomes how to enjoy the symptom better through this circuit.
4. To achieve this aim, the analyst must reinterpret the relationship between Ucs and Cs. More crucially, the analyst must persuade the analysand to accept this new interpretation. Thereafter, it is no longer the repressed that returns from Ucs to Cs, thereby compelling Cs passively to represent the unrepresented; rather, Cs actively pursues the unrepresentable. This means that Cs must regard Ucs and its own symptom as part of itself, namely, as that “timeless past.” It does not passively suffer the symptom. Rather, within Cs itself there is already a drive toward the “nothingness” and “unbinding” of Ucs: the “death drive.” The symptom thus becomes the “sinthome” (圣兆) of a self-transcendence immanent to Cs.
5. Freud’s speculative structure is therefore as follows. First, every compulsive repetition of pain arises from an attempt at “binding,” and the pleasure principle has significance only once a drive has been bound, since it is only after binding that the drive obtains representation and pleasure—or the release of the drive—becomes possible. Yet, equally, every persistence in pain implies another drive’s “impossible” enjoyment beyond Cs. Otherwise, persistence in pain would be unintelligible; and were it not for this impossible enjoyment, Cs would have no need to repress this persistence and make the drive’s persistence painful. At the same time, however, this drive’s persistence is immanent to the same ego. Thus, relative to Cs and immanent to it, this impossible enjoyment amounts, for Cs, to enjoying its own dissolution. This is also what Cs must finally accept for treatment to end. Only here is the reconciliation of Ucs and Cs fully achieved.
6. The relationship between drives and the pleasure principle can thereby also be clarified. First, the discovery of infantile sexual activity grounds the most primordial model of narcissism: narcissism here is the self-satisfaction of the dispersed sexual drives in the child’s body. Initially, these dispersed sexual drives also extinguish themselves almost independently of one another. At this stage, therefore, any sexual drive is intrinsically and immediately a death drive. This is also the state closest to an unrestricted pleasure principle. Yet, to obtain satisfaction, a sexual drive must bind other drives, making them its objects. This entails a synthesis of the dispersed drives. At this stage, the drives may retain their previous condition of independent extinction, but more probably they constrain one another, until some drives can no longer be satisfied directly and must obtain compensation through the circuit constructed by the system of drives. Particularly significant here is the absence of the mother’s breast. This absence directly causes an accumulation of the oral drive. Only now does the sexual drive finally gain autonomy and independence from the death drive. The sexual drive, having become independent, thus begins to construct the reality principle, obtaining satisfaction indirectly through objects. Yet the sexual drive is merely a repetition of the death drive. That is, the sexual drive’s pursuit of the whole described by Aristophanes in Plato still pursues an original state: it hopes, through the construction of this whole, to return to the lost immediacy of the drive’s satisfaction. In other words, it hopes, through mediation, to construct the totality of life so as to enter death directly. An ego is thus constituted between the reality principle and the pleasure principle—that is, between the sexual drive’s demand for a detour and the death drive’s demand for immediacy. Repetition compulsion is therefore the persistence in itself of a drive that has not been completely bound and accommodated within the whole. If it continually generates Cs’s repeated binding of Ucs, it has the life function of the sexual drive; but if it cannot be completely bound and instead threatens the already bound system of drives, causing them finally to retreat into their unmediated immediacy, then it is the anti-life death drive. To transform death into life means to grasp this life-threatening unbinding itself as a generation of life: to transform repetition compulsion itself into a sinthome.