Sigmund Freud · 西格蒙德·弗洛伊德
Sexuality, drives, and the ego · 性、驱力与自我
Undated 未注日期
性、驱力与自我——散记
Reflections · Pages
其实弗洛伊德的泛性论真的不是那么庸俗的东西……简单来说,其泛性论是以对幼儿性行为的发现为根据的。幼儿是无理性的那部分生命,而性则是它追求自足快感的方式。性的重要性因此在于,1.在无家长介入的情况下,幼儿拥有完全的对自身性快感的支配能力,2.因此幼儿性行为永远是一种自足与过剩。
比如说,鼠人幼年对快感的追求遭到了父亲的阻止,因此产生了对父亲的恨意。而这一恨意在接受了“父亲的形象”之后被压抑。爱-恨矩阵就在这时被完成了构建。但原初压抑必然要求二次压抑,因为在被父亲阻止后,父亲的禁令本身就构成了指向原乐的指符;换句话说,原初压抑一旦发生,禁止本身就带来快感,因此连禁止本身也需要被禁止。这就导致了二次压抑以及三次、四次乃至无数次。但任何一次新的禁止都是在重复享乐,因为任何禁止都指向了禁令的外部。这就是强迫性重复。没有任何重复不是因为其快感。
鼠人在之后将自己的恋爱境遇认同为父亲的境遇,这里最重要的不是他与父亲命运的相似点,而是其不同点。他的父亲最终选择了白富美,而他自己则依然在林黛玉和薛宝钗之间犹豫。那是什么迫使了他作出这样的认同呢?一方面,这一认同是对“父亲的形象”的皈依,但另一方面,他作为症状的犹豫不决也是对父亲的背叛。他的病症在这里所以可以被认定为是困在“爱-恨矩阵”之间,在禁令与享乐之间。而这一享乐,由于意识本身是一种审查程序,绕过了意识,而只在无意识中发生。这就是无意识的享乐。
拉康对弗洛伊德的一个重要的“再发现”在于,真正要去理解症状,需要的不是去理解症状背后的“涵义”,而是症状普遍发生的结构
Bernet论弗洛伊德的自我理论
姑且认为驱力是二元的,也就是性驱力和自我保存驱力。而这两种驱力也确实是无法还原为另一者的。(因此荣格如果要坚持驱力一元论必须给出驱力是如何不断差异化的。)
这两种驱力差异的理由不能奠定于快乐原则和现实原则。性驱力看似跟从快乐原则,然而实际上性永远是在现实条件下达成的快乐,并且总是朝向对象的;更不要说性行为本身就包括了生命延续的手段。而生存驱力看似跟从现实原则,但实际上却服务于快乐的达成,此外,如果没有快乐,生存驱力就只是盲目的,甚至会自我结束(自杀)。
使这个问题更加复杂的是以下的生成论:性驱力预设了享受快感的主体自我,因此预设了自我保存的驱力;但自我保存的驱力同样预设了对自我这一对象的爱和力比多投注,甚至自我保存本质上就是趋利避害(满足快乐并规避风险),两者相互预设。或许可以说,被性驱力预设的生存驱力指涉的是驱力器官本身,但这样器官与器官之间的断裂状态就无法结合成为一个整体自我。
换句话说,自我保存的驱力保存的是自我的理想形象,但这个形象如果没有力比多的投注就无法拥有价值,因为无法成为带来快乐的对象。但无论将哪个驱力解释为原初的都会遭遇问题;如果说性驱力更为原初,那对力比多进行投资的原-自我的存在就无法解释。如果说自我保存驱力更为原初,那就必须解释一个完整的、理想的自我(而不是器官的堆叠)是如何在脱离爱欲的塑造的情况下诞生的,因为很明显,人类的自我保存远远超出了单纯保存器官生命的意义。
那如果说两者虽然差异开了,但鉴于上面所说的暧昧性,两者拥有共同的起源呢?弗洛伊德因此提出了原初自恋的理论,来指涉两者尚未差异开来的状态。然而,尽管在临床上很有效,这个理论本身并不足够融贯。第一个问题,自我的诞生与两种驱力的差异化仍然没有得到解释。第二,原初自恋忽视了在婴儿时期驱力身体就已经向外敞开了,自恋因此永远已经是一个自反的、也就是次生的自恋了。原初自恋只是一个起源神话。
尽管诸驱力确实已经能被统一到一个自身性中,但这离自我还很远。因此,要统一驱力自身性、作为力比多投资者的自我、作为爱欲对象的自我、自我保存的自我与自我意识,以弗洛伊德的第一个理论是做不到的。
所以要问人类的性驱力:谁在享受?还要问自我保存驱力:谁被保存?如果答案都是“我”的话,那就必须讨论从分裂的驱力器官当中,自我是如何构成的。而享受的我和被保存的我很可能是numerically identical但essentially different的,因此自我即他者。但只说这个就是废话,重要的是具体自我性和他者性的结构刻画。
按Bernet论法,口欲与肛欲不是一个分期问题,而是一个欲望结构的问题。在口欲结构中,婴儿是无力的、但同样又是可自足的容器;在这个意义上,匮乏和对匮乏的填充限定了口欲结构。
肛欲结构则是通过对排泄物的生产与外部世界进行权力交互的结构;匮乏在口欲结构中仅仅表现为一种黏连于填充的情动;但在肛欲结构中却成为了不可追回的绝对匮乏;而这脱落的排泄物却同样为权力的最先锚定提供了场所,由此奠定了交换逻辑。在口欲结构中交换是不存在的;要么母亲乳房的喂养被婴儿视作理所当然的“食人”真理,要么可以通过吸手指等方式获得自我满足;尽管父母很可能会阻止孩子吸手指的习惯,但这并没有相当程度的力度或必然性,而且这样的行为很多时候都是已经在经历了肛欲结构之后回溯性生成的;更重要的是,口欲结构的禁止无涉于具体场所与运动的关系,因此无法构筑出一个稳定的意义空间(厕所)用于交换的确立(没有市场的交换不是交换),幼儿也没有反抗的能力;在这多种意义上,肛欲结构更恰切地是交换关系的原初形式。
简单来说,口欲结构总可以偷偷得到满足,但肛欲结构必然牵连进他人……
infantile sexuality
The problem of infantile sexuality emerges when the first seducer theory of Freud is challenged. The challenge comes from many respects. Firstly there’s an empirical gap between the clinical and nosological reality and the fantasy content elaborated by the client. It is common for a client to claim some figure as the first seducer but can show no evidence while he incessantly modifies his account considerably. The primary trauma is on the same par, that is it cannot be precisely located. This spurs Freud on to doubt if it is possible at all to find a primary trauma.
Being a trauma, it must be non-relatable. The Freudian conception of trauma in his first theory states that the primary trauma is a sexual encounter not recognized at the time back to infantile stage but retroactively made out; since its sexual character is not recognized at the time, it obfuscates the later judgment of its being so. However, to put aside for now the problem of locating the primary trauma, this traumatization is itself problematic. The hidden premise is the innocence of the child, viz his lack of sexual recognition. This entails two problems. First, how is it possible for absolute innocence to engender sexuality, given sexuality do exist at one point or another in our life? Second, if the child is sexually innocent, why would this primary scene be repressed in the first place?
One pervasive solution to the first problem is a contamination theory, which is characteristic of the biblical tradition as revealed by the account of the Fall. However, granted that innocence is the very beginning of everything, the later contamination can only come from somewhere else, be it God, society, biological processes of puberty, which are excluded from this beginning of everything and in this respect become nothing. If innocence can become sexual, it must already be sexual, no matter latently, potentially, or unconsciously.
The second problem is more complicated. If when the child was seduced he was yet unconscious of its sexual character, then it may either be forgotten like many other unimportant memories were or it was laid bare and lucid instead of getting repressed. If it is repressed and becomes symptomatic, its sexual character is already recognized. It may be argued that this recognition is retroactive and is not meted out at that very instant of seduction. But this merely displaces the problem; if there really is a retroactive recognition of the primary scene, then this primary scene would not be primary in the first place, since its sexual character is retroactively recognized, it would not be the very first encounter with sexuality which is nevertheless consequent upon it. In other words, if we admit the innocence of the primary scene, it cannot be primary, and thus undermines its very own innocence.
To take account of this aporia, Freud’s second theory posits a radically different structure. The seduction theory is abandoned, and the infant is supposed as always being sexual. This is the first development of infantile sexuality. The children, in this new framework, are not viewed as innocent asexual creatures, but sexually driven yet-to-be subjects. There is no longer a seducer, but rather a sexual object. This fundamental modification can have prevalent repercussions: it entails a de-victimization in the moral field. Even if a child, or to be sure, any human being, is enforced in non-consensual sexual relationships, we could not claim that he or she is a total passive object of the other’s desire. Enforcement thus does not naturally lead to absolute passiveness, and there is no such thing as absolute passiveness. And to be clear, this is not an effort to exonerate the child molesters or the sexual offenders, but to make room for a free realm of unconditional responsibility(or, depend on choice, unconditional irresponsibility to anything else) to desire and action that’s instantiated in any subject. There is no victim as such, or, to put it in terms less controversial, being a victim does not imply an elimination of possibilities for action.
弗洛伊德的第一个阶段,原初创伤与创伤的联动,力比多经济学(压抑的能量作为症状与“正常的”表征进行交换),封闭的交换体系,遇到的问题是:力比多到底“是什么”,原初创伤假如是来自外部“现实”又怎么被内部消化?
第二个阶段,对儿童性行为的发现,幻想结构,父亲的作用:父亲并不是造成原初创伤的变态者,而恰恰是儿童通过父亲的名字完成了自己的主体化,并允许了幻想和欲望的发生,症状是与幻想、性关系和父亲缠绕的;遇到的问题是,母亲的缺位让父亲没有完全符号化而是作为“原父”局限在了想象界,阉割作为想象而不是作为象征,因此弗洛伊德最后同样陷入了癔症:“原父”到底是谁?
我悟了,所以对拉康来说,德里达就是弗洛伊德
AI translated the non-English passages; original English passages are preserved. The mixed-language original is available under Original.
Freud’s pansexualism really is not something so vulgar… Simply put, it is grounded in the discovery of infantile sexual activity. The infant is that portion of life without reason, and sexuality is its way of pursuing self-sufficient pleasure. Sexuality is therefore important because: 1. without parental intervention, the infant has complete command over its own sexual pleasure; 2. infantile sexual activity is consequently always a kind of self-sufficiency and excess.
For example, the Rat Man’s pursuit of pleasure in childhood was stopped by his father, producing hatred of the father. This hatred was repressed after he accepted the ‘image of the father.’ The love–hate matrix was then fully constructed. Yet primal repression necessarily requires a second repression, because once the father has intervened, his prohibition itself becomes a sign pointing toward primal enjoyment. In other words, once primal repression occurs, prohibition itself brings pleasure, so prohibition itself must also be prohibited. This leads to a second repression, then a third, fourth, and indefinitely many more. Yet every new prohibition repeats enjoyment, because every prohibition points beyond the prohibition. This is repetition compulsion. There is no repetition that is not due to its pleasure.
Later, the Rat Man identifies his own romantic situation with his father’s. What matters most here is not the resemblance between their destinies but their difference. His father ultimately chose a wealthy, beautiful woman, while he himself remains undecided between a Lin Daiyu and a Xue Baochai. What compels this identification? On one hand, it is a conversion to the ‘image of the father’; on the other, his symptomatic indecision is also a betrayal of the father. His illness can thus be understood as being caught in the love–hate matrix, between prohibition and enjoyment. Because consciousness itself is a procedure of censorship, this enjoyment bypasses consciousness and occurs only in the unconscious. This is unconscious enjoyment.
One important ‘rediscovery’ of Freud by Lacan is that truly understanding symptoms requires understanding not the ‘meaning’ behind a symptom but the structure in which symptoms generally arise.
Bernet on Freud’s theory of the ego
Let us provisionally regard drives as dual: sexual drives and self-preservative drives. These two kinds are indeed irreducible to one another. Thus, if Jung wishes to maintain a monism of drives, he must explain how drives continually differentiate themselves.
The reason for their difference cannot be grounded in the pleasure principle and the reality principle. Sexual drives seem to follow the pleasure principle, yet sexuality is always pleasure attained under real conditions and is always directed toward objects—not to mention that sexual activity itself includes the means of continuing life. Self-preservative drives seem to follow the reality principle, yet in fact serve the attainment of pleasure. Moreover, without pleasure, self-preservative drives would be blind and might even terminate themselves in suicide.
The following genetic account further complicates the problem. Sexual drives presuppose a subjective ego enjoying pleasure and therefore presuppose self-preservative drives. Yet self-preservative drives likewise presuppose love and libidinal investment in the ego as an object. Indeed, self-preservation essentially means pursuing benefit and avoiding harm: satisfying pleasure and avoiding risk. The two presuppose one another. Perhaps one could say that the self-preservative drive presupposed by sexual drives refers to the drive-organ itself, but then the disconnected organs cannot be joined into a whole ego.
In other words, what the self-preservative drive preserves is an ideal image of the ego. Yet without libidinal investment this image has no value, because it cannot become an object bringing pleasure. Problems arise whichever drive is taken as originary. If sexual drives are more originary, the existence of the proto-ego making the libidinal investment cannot be explained. If self-preservative drives are more originary, one must explain how a complete, ideal ego—not merely a pile of organs—arises without being shaped by eros, since human self-preservation clearly far exceeds merely preserving the life of organs.
What if the two are distinct yet, given the ambiguity above, share an origin? Freud thus proposes primary narcissism to designate their as-yet-undifferentiated state. Yet although clinically very effective, this theory is not sufficiently coherent. First, the birth of the ego and the differentiation of the two kinds of drives remain unexplained. Second, primary narcissism overlooks that the drive-body is already open outward in infancy. Narcissism is therefore always already reflexive, and thus secondary. Primary narcissism is merely a myth of origin.
Although drives can indeed already be unified into a selfhood, this is still far from an ego. Freud’s first theory therefore cannot unify the selfhood of drives, the ego as libidinal investor, the ego as erotic object, the self-preserving ego, and self-consciousness.
We must therefore ask of human sexual drives: who enjoys? And of self-preservative drives: who is preserved? If the answer to both is ‘I,’ we must discuss how the ego is constituted from divided drive-organs. The enjoying I and the preserved I may well be numerically identical but essentially different, so the self is the other. Merely saying this is empty talk, however. What matters is a concrete structural characterization of selfhood and otherness.
In Bernet’s account, oral and anal desire concern not a division into developmental stages but a structure of desire. In the oral structure, the infant is a powerless yet potentially self-sufficient receptacle. In this sense, lack and the filling of lack delimit the oral structure.
The anal structure, by contrast, is a structure of power relations with the external world through the production of excrement. In the oral structure, lack appears merely as an affect attached to fulfillment; in the anal structure it becomes an irretrievable, absolute lack. Yet the detached excrement also provides a place for power’s first anchoring, thereby grounding the logic of exchange. Exchange does not exist in the oral structure: either feeding at the mother’s breast is taken by the infant as the self-evident truth of ‘cannibalism,’ or self-satisfaction can be obtained through sucking a finger and similar means. Although parents may discourage thumb-sucking, their intervention lacks sufficient force or necessity, and such behavior is often produced retrospectively after the anal structure has already been experienced. More importantly, prohibition in the oral structure does not concern the relation between a specific place and movement, and therefore cannot construct a stable space of meaning—the toilet—for establishing exchange. Exchange without a marketplace is not exchange. Nor does the infant have the capacity to resist. In these several senses, the anal structure is more properly the originary form of exchange relations.
Simply put, the oral structure can always be satisfied secretly, whereas the anal structure necessarily implicates others…
infantile sexuality
The problem of infantile sexuality emerges when the first seducer theory of Freud is challenged. The challenge comes from many respects. Firstly there’s an empirical gap between the clinical and nosological reality and the fantasy content elaborated by the client. It is common for a client to claim some figure as the first seducer but can show no evidence while he incessantly modifies his account considerably. The primary trauma is on the same par, that is it cannot be precisely located. This spurs Freud on to doubt if it is possible at all to find a primary trauma.
Being a trauma, it must be non-relatable. The Freudian conception of trauma in his first theory states that the primary trauma is a sexual encounter not recognized at the time back to infantile stage but retroactively made out; since its sexual character is not recognized at the time, it obfuscates the later judgment of its being so. However, to put aside for now the problem of locating the primary trauma, this traumatization is itself problematic. The hidden premise is the innocence of the child, viz his lack of sexual recognition. This entails two problems. First, how is it possible for absolute innocence to engender sexuality, given sexuality do exist at one point or another in our life? Second, if the child is sexually innocent, why would this primary scene be repressed in the first place?
One pervasive solution to the first problem is a contamination theory, which is characteristic of the biblical tradition as revealed by the account of the Fall. However, granted that innocence is the very beginning of everything, the later contamination can only come from somewhere else, be it God, society, biological processes of puberty, which are excluded from this beginning of everything and in this respect become nothing. If innocence can become sexual, it must already be sexual, no matter latently, potentially, or unconsciously.
The second problem is more complicated. If when the child was seduced he was yet unconscious of its sexual character, then it may either be forgotten like many other unimportant memories were or it was laid bare and lucid instead of getting repressed. If it is repressed and becomes symptomatic, its sexual character is already recognized. It may be argued that this recognition is retroactive and is not meted out at that very instant of seduction. But this merely displaces the problem; if there really is a retroactive recognition of the primary scene, then this primary scene would not be primary in the first place, since its sexual character is retroactively recognized, it would not be the very first encounter with sexuality which is nevertheless consequent upon it. In other words, if we admit the innocence of the primary scene, it cannot be primary, and thus undermines its very own innocence.
To take account of this aporia, Freud’s second theory posits a radically different structure. The seduction theory is abandoned, and the infant is supposed as always being sexual. This is the first development of infantile sexuality. The children, in this new framework, are not viewed as innocent asexual creatures, but sexually driven yet-to-be subjects. There is no longer a seducer, but rather a sexual object. This fundamental modification can have prevalent repercussions: it entails a de-victimization in the moral field. Even if a child, or to be sure, any human being, is enforced in non-consensual sexual relationships, we could not claim that he or she is a total passive object of the other’s desire. Enforcement thus does not naturally lead to absolute passiveness, and there is no such thing as absolute passiveness. And to be clear, this is not an effort to exonerate the child molesters or the sexual offenders, but to make room for a free realm of unconditional responsibility(or, depend on choice, unconditional irresponsibility to anything else) to desire and action that’s instantiated in any subject. There is no victim as such, or, to put it in terms less controversial, being a victim does not imply an elimination of possibilities for action.
Freud’s first stage: the linkage of primal trauma and subsequent trauma, a libidinal economy in which repressed energy as symptom is exchanged with ‘normal’ representations, a closed system of exchange. Its problems are: what exactly ‘is’ libido, and if primal trauma comes from external ‘reality,’ how is it digested internally?
The second stage: the discovery of children’s sexual activity, the structure of fantasy, and the father’s role. The father is not the pervert who causes primal trauma. Rather, the child accomplishes its subjectivation through the father’s name, allowing fantasy and desire to arise. Symptoms are entangled with fantasy, sexual relations, and the father. The problem encountered is that the mother’s absence prevents the father from being fully symbolized, leaving him confined to the imaginary as the ‘primal father.’ Castration is imaginary rather than symbolic. Freud therefore ultimately falls into hysteria himself: who exactly is the ‘primal father’?
I get it now: for Lacan, Derrida is Freud.
非中文段落由 AI 翻译,中文原文保持不变。中英混合原稿可通过“原文”按钮查看。
其实弗洛伊德的泛性论真的不是那么庸俗的东西……简单来说,其泛性论是以对幼儿性行为的发现为根据的。幼儿是无理性的那部分生命,而性则是它追求自足快感的方式。性的重要性因此在于,1.在无家长介入的情况下,幼儿拥有完全的对自身性快感的支配能力,2.因此幼儿性行为永远是一种自足与过剩。
比如说,鼠人幼年对快感的追求遭到了父亲的阻止,因此产生了对父亲的恨意。而这一恨意在接受了“父亲的形象”之后被压抑。爱-恨矩阵就在这时被完成了构建。但原初压抑必然要求二次压抑,因为在被父亲阻止后,父亲的禁令本身就构成了指向原乐的指符;换句话说,原初压抑一旦发生,禁止本身就带来快感,因此连禁止本身也需要被禁止。这就导致了二次压抑以及三次、四次乃至无数次。但任何一次新的禁止都是在重复享乐,因为任何禁止都指向了禁令的外部。这就是强迫性重复。没有任何重复不是因为其快感。
鼠人在之后将自己的恋爱境遇认同为父亲的境遇,这里最重要的不是他与父亲命运的相似点,而是其不同点。他的父亲最终选择了白富美,而他自己则依然在林黛玉和薛宝钗之间犹豫。那是什么迫使了他作出这样的认同呢?一方面,这一认同是对“父亲的形象”的皈依,但另一方面,他作为症状的犹豫不决也是对父亲的背叛。他的病症在这里所以可以被认定为是困在“爱-恨矩阵”之间,在禁令与享乐之间。而这一享乐,由于意识本身是一种审查程序,绕过了意识,而只在无意识中发生。这就是无意识的享乐。
拉康对弗洛伊德的一个重要的“再发现”在于,真正要去理解症状,需要的不是去理解症状背后的“涵义”,而是症状普遍发生的结构
Bernet论弗洛伊德的自我理论
姑且认为驱力是二元的,也就是性驱力和自我保存驱力。而这两种驱力也确实是无法还原为另一者的。(因此荣格如果要坚持驱力一元论必须给出驱力是如何不断差异化的。)
这两种驱力差异的理由不能奠定于快乐原则和现实原则。性驱力看似跟从快乐原则,然而实际上性永远是在现实条件下达成的快乐,并且总是朝向对象的;更不要说性行为本身就包括了生命延续的手段。而生存驱力看似跟从现实原则,但实际上却服务于快乐的达成,此外,如果没有快乐,生存驱力就只是盲目的,甚至会自我结束(自杀)。
使这个问题更加复杂的是以下的生成论:性驱力预设了享受快感的主体自我,因此预设了自我保存的驱力;但自我保存的驱力同样预设了对自我这一对象的爱和力比多投注,甚至自我保存本质上就是趋利避害(满足快乐并规避风险),两者相互预设。或许可以说,被性驱力预设的生存驱力指涉的是驱力器官本身,但这样器官与器官之间的断裂状态就无法结合成为一个整体自我。
换句话说,自我保存的驱力保存的是自我的理想形象,但这个形象如果没有力比多的投注就无法拥有价值,因为无法成为带来快乐的对象。但无论将哪个驱力解释为原初的都会遭遇问题;如果说性驱力更为原初,那对力比多进行投资的原-自我的存在就无法解释。如果说自我保存驱力更为原初,那就必须解释一个完整的、理想的自我(而不是器官的堆叠)是如何在脱离爱欲的塑造的情况下诞生的,因为很明显,人类的自我保存远远超出了单纯保存器官生命的意义。
那如果说两者虽然差异开了,但鉴于上面所说的暧昧性,两者拥有共同的起源呢?弗洛伊德因此提出了原初自恋的理论,来指涉两者尚未差异开来的状态。然而,尽管在临床上很有效,这个理论本身并不足够融贯。第一个问题,自我的诞生与两种驱力的差异化仍然没有得到解释。第二,原初自恋忽视了在婴儿时期驱力身体就已经向外敞开了,自恋因此永远已经是一个自反的、也就是次生的自恋了。原初自恋只是一个起源神话。
尽管诸驱力确实已经能被统一到一个自身性中,但这离自我还很远。因此,要统一驱力自身性、作为力比多投资者的自我、作为爱欲对象的自我、自我保存的自我与自我意识,以弗洛伊德的第一个理论是做不到的。
所以要问人类的性驱力:谁在享受?还要问自我保存驱力:谁被保存?如果答案都是“我”的话,那就必须讨论从分裂的驱力器官当中,自我是如何构成的。而享受的我和被保存的我很可能是numerically identical但essentially different的,因此自我即他者。但只说这个就是废话,重要的是具体自我性和他者性的结构刻画。
按Bernet论法,口欲与肛欲不是一个分期问题,而是一个欲望结构的问题。在口欲结构中,婴儿是无力的、但同样又是可自足的容器;在这个意义上,匮乏和对匮乏的填充限定了口欲结构。
肛欲结构则是通过对排泄物的生产与外部世界进行权力交互的结构;匮乏在口欲结构中仅仅表现为一种黏连于填充的情动;但在肛欲结构中却成为了不可追回的绝对匮乏;而这脱落的排泄物却同样为权力的最先锚定提供了场所,由此奠定了交换逻辑。在口欲结构中交换是不存在的;要么母亲乳房的喂养被婴儿视作理所当然的“食人”真理,要么可以通过吸手指等方式获得自我满足;尽管父母很可能会阻止孩子吸手指的习惯,但这并没有相当程度的力度或必然性,而且这样的行为很多时候都是已经在经历了肛欲结构之后回溯性生成的;更重要的是,口欲结构的禁止无涉于具体场所与运动的关系,因此无法构筑出一个稳定的意义空间(厕所)用于交换的确立(没有市场的交换不是交换),幼儿也没有反抗的能力;在这多种意义上,肛欲结构更恰切地是交换关系的原初形式。
简单来说,口欲结构总可以偷偷得到满足,但肛欲结构必然牵连进他人……
儿童性活动
儿童性活动的问题,在弗洛伊德最初的诱惑者理论受到挑战时出现。挑战来自许多方面。首先,临床及疾病分类学上的现实,与案主铺陈的幻想内容之间,存在一个经验上的缺口。案主经常宣称某个人物是最初的诱惑者,却无法提出证据,同时还不断大幅修改自己的叙述。原初创伤也处在同样的地位,即它无法被精确定位。这推动弗洛伊德开始怀疑,究竟是否有可能找到一种原初创伤。
既然是创伤,它就必定无法被讲述。弗洛伊德最初理论中的创伤概念认为,原初创伤是一次发生在儿童时期、当时并未被辨认为性遭遇,而是在回溯中才被认出的性遭遇;由于其性特征在当时并未被认识,这也就使后来对其性特征的判断变得模糊。然而,暂且把定位原初创伤的问题放到一边,这一创伤化本身就是成问题的。其隐藏前提是儿童的纯真,即儿童缺乏对性的认识。这带来两个问题。第一,既然性活动确实会在我们生命中的某个时刻存在,那么绝对的纯真如何可能产生性活动?第二,如果儿童在性上是纯真的,这一原初场景为什么一开始就会受到压抑?
对第一个问题,一种普遍的解答是污染理论,它是圣经传统的特征,正如堕落的叙述所揭示的那样。然而,如果纯真是一切的最初开端,那么后来的污染就只能来自别处,无论是神、社会,还是青春期的生物学过程;这些都被排除在这一切的开端之外,并在这个意义上成了无。如果纯真能够变成有性的,那么它必定早已是有性的,无论是潜藏地、潜能地,还是无意识地。
第二个问题更加复杂。如果儿童在受到诱惑时尚未意识到其性特征,那么这件事要么会像其它许多不重要的记忆一样被遗忘,要么就会坦然清楚地呈现,而不会受到压抑。如果它受到压抑并成为症状,它的性特征就已经被认识了。或许有人会说,这一认识是回溯性的,并非在诱惑发生的那一刻就被赋予。但这只是在转移问题;如果确实存在对原初场景的回溯性认识,那么这一原初场景一开始就不可能是原初的,因为其性特征是在回溯中才被认识的,它便不会是与性活动的最初遭遇,而性活动却又被说成是随它而来的。换句话说,如果我们承认原初场景的纯真,它就不可能是原初的,因而也就破坏了它自己的纯真。
为了说明这一困局,弗洛伊德的第二种理论设定了一种根本不同的结构。诱惑理论被放弃,而婴儿被假定为始终是有性的。这是儿童性活动理论的第一次发展。在这一新框架中,儿童不再被看作纯真的无性生物,而是受到性驱力驱动、尚在形成中的主体。不再有诱惑者,取而代之的是性对象。这一根本改动可以带来广泛的影响:它在道德领域蕴含了一种去受害者化。即便一个儿童,或者更确切地说,任何一个人,被强迫卷入未经同意的性关系,我们也不能宣称他或她完全是他者欲望的被动对象。强迫因此不会自然地导致绝对被动,也不存在绝对被动这样的东西。需要说明的是,这并不是试图为猥亵儿童者或性侵犯者开脱,而是为了给每个主体所实例化的欲望与行动留出一个自由领域,在其中主体承担无条件的责任(或者,依照选择,无条件地不向其它任何东西负责)。没有受害者本身,或者,用较少争议的说法,被置于受害者的位置并不意味着行动可能性的消除。
弗洛伊德的第一个阶段,原初创伤与创伤的联动,力比多经济学(压抑的能量作为症状与“正常的”表征进行交换),封闭的交换体系,遇到的问题是:力比多到底“是什么”,原初创伤假如是来自外部“现实”又怎么被内部消化?
第二个阶段,对儿童性行为的发现,幻想结构,父亲的作用:父亲并不是造成原初创伤的变态者,而恰恰是儿童通过父亲的名字完成了自己的主体化,并允许了幻想和欲望的发生,症状是与幻想、性关系和父亲缠绕的;遇到的问题是,母亲的缺位让父亲没有完全符号化而是作为“原父”局限在了想象界,阉割作为想象而不是作为象征,因此弗洛伊德最后同样陷入了癔症:“原父”到底是谁?
我悟了,所以对拉康来说,德里达就是弗洛伊德