G. W. F. Hegel · 格奥尔格·威廉·弗里德里希·黑格尔
Phenomenology of Spirit · 精神现象学
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Phenomenology of Spirit — Reading notes
Apple Notes
Revised 19 September 2024
1
1.
Philosophy is in the execution (as if anatomy), and not in the “end” misplaced to the beginning. This is important for philosophy needs to reveal truth, and truth misplaced is no truth at all, and should not claim to be the most essential element.
2.
Philosophical work demands a presupposition-less system which in itself for itself is again a self-differentiating movement. This requires not opposition but dialectical movement.
3.
Knowing is a tarrying with and a surrendering to the real issue. To comprehend positively and to judge negatively is to understand the issue in itself and for itself.
4.
Culture and education is a dialectical process that begins with generalities and gradually enriches itself within itself.
5.
Truth is only truth as a whole, as a system. Philosophy strives for Science. Science is actualized Philosophy. Such inner necessity for Science has to be accompanied by outer necessity in actual history, which nevertheless is independent from all specifics: an actual but nonetheless transcendental history. See Jacob Klein.
6.
The Absolute is not bare intuition or assertion. It is not simply positivity. Rather, it has to take the form of the Notion and be discursive.
7.
Spirit desires intuition or feeling because it has done away with the rudimentary being but cannot gather itself in its new content; thus casting away its original content, it desires the return of some pure content or material.
8.
The New Science has abandoned the old content but is enfeebled to provide new content. Thus Spirit only sees the here and now and experience; which is but the supplement to the other extreme, the “feeling” of Romanticism. It only desires feeling because it knows no better remedy and has lost all power to “think” and “conceptualize” a new content. So this is twofold: first, it resorts to crude feeling because the new science itself has torn concepts asunder and relegated thought to experience (from Being to Subject), and is thus habituated to feeling and experience; on the other hand, being too much astray from the true path, it has forgotten all its previous efforts and can grope along only as it remembers most lately.
10.
“The power of Spirit is only as great as its expression, its depth only as deep as it dares to spread out and lose itself in its exposition.”
11.
The New contra The Old. The new science, a science of the subject, of the negative, against the science of being, of the posited absolute. Modern science vs philosophy. Against Aristotelianism that presupposes substantial forms and beings.
13.
Science in its incipience is universal, abstract and esoteric. Only in its full development it is enriched and fulfilled and becomes concrete and fully intelligible. It is only fully intelligible if it is intelligible to everyone. That is, if anyone can grasp its content. This is not possible with the empty formula. Rather Science has to reach out of itself and provide a concrete ladder for any consciousness.
14.~16.
The dynamic between the two sciences. The New Science is not forceful enough because it lacks its immanent force. Rather, it has assumed a formalism that is empty, the same it assumes an empty sentimentalism, and its endeavor an empty repetition.
17.
Spinoza. The realization that Substance qua God reduces the complexity of self-consciousness in Being to pure simplicity of Being, or on the other hand Thought becomes itself undifferentiated (the Idea of God), or finally is expounded the inert simplicity of Thought united to Being.
18.~22.
Substance is Subject. Being is Becoming. The simplicity of immediacy is the immediacy of mediation.
23.
“God” is Subject incomplete. For it anticipates the Subject by positing a meaningless negativity: God is the naming name. But God as such is only an inert principle, just as dialectics (the self-differentiating differentiation) not carried out is but an abstraction. God as a name is even worse, for its senselessness makes it a fixed point to which no predicate actually refers. Therefore it always remains indifferent to the whole process and content. Either way, the anticipated subject remains inert, and has to be destroyed and dissolved before it can be reconstituted. Absolute Freedom needs to be destroyed in order to become actual.
25.
Subjective Spirit and Objective Spirit. Subjective Spirit is when Spirit is thus for us, as it develops in us. Objective Spirit is when itself develops out of itself and reaches us and involves us. Zigzag motion: subject-object-subject; object-subject-object.
26.
The dialectical principle is the element. Yet it is nonetheless an abstraction. But it still requires actual labor to arrive at such abstraction. It marks the divide between two phases: pre-science natural consciousness and science proper. Yet one also has to notice that the two phases form a circle: Spirit in its self-development needs to involve the unspiritual. Spirit is a bone. The initiation of the natural consciousness into science therefore is, from the spiritual perspective, the actualization of Science.
27.~29.
It is therefore crucial to understand the twofold character of this [Phenomenology]. First, it is Hegel the wise man actualizing himself and his Spirit (recollecting his wisdom). Second, it is educational for others. It is not merely that which leads you to the system, but it itself is part of the system. The ladder is a necessary moment in the system, mediating the natural with the spiritual. In a way, one can say this book starts from us and shows the development for us, but not the development for itself. So it is necessary for Spirit to go through the same process spiritually.
30.~37.
The methodology and structure of [Phenomenology]. Spirit takes up the sedimented forms in its natural consciousness. It then thinks and dissolves these sediments and reactivates them in their originality. It loosens up those fixed thoughts and drives thinking onward.
38.~41.
A reconsideration of truth and falsity. The ultimate unity is neither truth nor falsity. It is the true shining forth in its falsity as falsity.
2
42.~46.
Mathematical truths are inert. Its matter is only existence, and its development of essence and life is only external to it, i.e. in a consciousness imposing measures and propositions and constructions unto it, the symptom being the lack of necessity of such constructions. Its truth resides only in the result and its motion disappears as soon as the subjective consciousness reaches an end. Also no theorem naturally “necessitates” the other theorem and drives to actualize itself in the other; that is, mathematical truth is always only retrospective, and even worse, it is retrospective without prospect. That is to say, it retrospectively constructs a ground, but not a source. Then, it concerns itself with dead Space in which Notion is supposed to inscribe its immanent differentiation; it grasps Time as a dead unit, which is supposed to be Notion itself.
58.
Treat something alien and unfamiliar as a new authority, thus opposing it or congratulating it, is due to the shame incurred by actually learning something.
59.~60.
The ratiocinative or argumentative attitude first negates all content, and even when it affirms content it affirms it as its own accidents and predicates. The abyss of absolute freedom.
63.
Because philosophy compels the subject and predicate to be unified in a transitive and reciprocal relationship, it has a different syntax that eludes most consciousnesses. It’s thereby difficult to comprehend for others, since such transitive language is the only language expressing the “essence” of a thing.
65.
The sublation of the form of proposition has to be not anchored in its immediate content, but also progress by itself in its own self-consciousness. Hence not only is “God is being” one such sublation, the sublation has to progress beyond itself and be carried out fully consciously until it traces the whole system.
66.
Here it is evident that the dialectical method is exclusive. It involves risks and therefore cannot start with a fixed point like the name “God”, lest it beaches before it sails. Rather it has to start from a Notion. It is therefore noteworthy that the Hegelian system is a “systemic perspective”, and such perspective has to be carefully constructed.
67.
There’s no such thing as self-evident notions. Philosophy requires training and labor. The shoe analogy is hilarious.
76.
The difficulty that involves Science in its relationship to the natural attitude is one of education. Science appears to natural consciousness as just another mode of knowledge. It has to convince the natural consciousness of its superiority without appealing merely to authority, and it has to explicate why its origination from the natural attitude is an elevation of consciousness.
78.
This explication of the origination of Science within natural consciousness has to be practically carried out: it is education not in the sense of cramming information, but instead a ritual of purification. It is “the path of despair”. This path is a path actually trodden. This first means that it has to be resolved upon and this resolution has to be fulfilled. But this also means that the way to fulfill such resolution is to carry this resolution to its bitter end, through all the “truths” encountered on the path: one has to totally lose oneself in the totality of all such “truths” in order to salvage it. In other words, this skepticism is neither merely personal nor attitudinal: it is an actualized skepticism, a fully confirmed despair that sees the desert of the phenomenal world in its whole expanse.
79.
The natural skepticism is one-sided and only sees pure nothingness in negation. This, however, is an entrapped consciousness that remains incomplete; it must be superseded in accordance to the spiritual methodology.
80.
The goal is set for such journey. Yet the goal is not the drive. The drive for natural life is its death as external transcendence; the drive for consciousness, however, is internal, for consciousness is the Notion of itself, and is hence the subject that goes beyond every limit it sets for itself. It is possible, however, that such infinitude is restrained in one station and dares not to go beyond, i.e. bad infinity, but it cannot be satiated by such infinity, and one way or another there will be some consciousness courageous and clever enough to traverse the whole journey, thus incorporating all other forms as its constituent parts.
3
82.
The paradigm where being in itself and being for another is distinguished is the traditional paradigm for phenomenal knowledge and shall be transformed by this very process of knowing.
83.
The distinction between for us and in itself is itself carried out through our consciousness as two moments within knowledge. That is to say transcendence is always an immanent transcendence, otherwise there always exists a transcendent standard for knowledge ad infinitum. And hence the standard is never external but always immanent, and has to be viewed immanently. This is to say that, if someone in perception denies understanding to be true because it is also “abstractly” not adequate, he is jumping ahead himself and missing the natural progression of consciousness; every standard must not be viewed in abstraction as if unordered, but must be understood as naturally connected. This implies the act of comparison is always a movement of consciousness and qua movement the criterion for such comparison is capable of change. The existence modifies the essence, and as its inner truth thus changed essence again modifies the existence.
85.
Therefore the truth of knowledge is not its object, but rather a different kind of knowledge. It is not a different piece of knowledge, but rather a different station, a different consciousness once and for all.
87.
An example of the scientific progression: it moves by logical necessity, the first in itself is by such necessity transformed into the second in itself for a consciousness. This is actually the first transition from consciousness to self-consciousness. Moreover, what for the consciousness is an experience (an encounter with a new object) is for the observer of this consciousness a necessary becoming; we see the development of this consciousness with formal clarity whereas the consciousness itself only is submerged in the content with an unreflective stance. This position of the observer is provided by the inculcating Spirit.
88.
“The way to Science is itself already Science.” But it is not the Science complete and adequate in itself, but only one part of Science, i.e. the science of experience of consciousness.
90.~92.
An external examination of sense-certainty. Sense-certainty is immediate knowing, yet it as a this (“I”) knows only a this. The point here being that it is merely a certainty and not yet a perception that grasps and orders all the sense data.
93.
Only now do we delve into this form of consciousness.
96.
The Truth of the particular of sense-certainty cannot be preserved and is negated by other such particulars. Some mediation is required to order these contradictory statements and all these truths provided by sense-certainty cannot be absolute truths. This new Truth is that these particulars are the most universal.
97.
Language is the more truthful as it expresses not what we mean but what is the truth of what we mean.
103.
Since all such particulars of sense-certainty are universals none of them have intrinsic truths. They have to be ordered. But this ordering can only be done in the following way. One “this” has to be differentiated from another “this”. Such differences are actualized by the distinction between consciousness and its object. That is, one “I” is different from another “I” because they have different objects; but they have different objects because they are different “I”s. Before the establishment of this one-one correspondence two objects can be for one “I” and are confused for this “I” that lies concealed from the consciousness’s gaze as inessential, as if it were not because they took the “I” to be a singular and particularly unchanging “I” that a contradiction arises; and when the consciousness becomes aware of the plurality of particular “I”s, it’s “forgotten” again about the objects being a plurality of particulars but assume that the different sensings are all pointing towards the same singular object, so that it wonders why the same thing should turn into a different thing.
105.
The observer is exhorted to put himself into this new form of sense-certainty (one-one correspondence). Now we are the “this I” that points to a “this object”.
106.
Correspondence is an act of pointing to. But in the pointing to the evanescent particular vanishes and becomes its own non-being. There is a delay or difference between “I” and the object and any pointing out always misses the mark. Or a better way to conceive of it is that both consciousnesses and objects are indenumerable. The differentiation between I and object creates the plurality of inhering heres and nows.
107.~109.
These paragraphs fully explicate the indenumerability of sense-certainty. By pointing out the particular, one misses the particular; yet the particular vanishes if missed, while the pointing itself is preserved and is to point out a being, hence the pointing again returns to the particular to which it is directed. Such back and forth movement delineates the manifold in unity of sense-certainty as mediated universal.
110.
“The sensuous This that is meant cannot be reached by language, which belongs to consciousness, i.e. to that which is inherently universal…… Consequently, what is called the unutterable is nothing else than the untrue, the irrational, what is merely meant [but is not actually expressed].”
111.
A setting up of the new stage. Perception is by principle universal and involves two moments of the same movement: the act and object of perception. But the object of perception is itself this movement (as in apperception or the perception of perception). Object and act are therefore merely formal distinctions.
112.
Perception is the truth for sense-certainty for it is the source of sensations being its instances.
113.~115.
All the particulars are exclusive of other particulars. Yet as universals they should interpenetrate. Thus they are kept apart as many separate properties yet united in one medium. Many-in-one. But this is also one-above-many which is not indifferent; rather a property always claims the oneness to itself (as the “thinghood” of the thing), and in this claiming oneness to itself actualizes Oneness as such, viz. an exclusion. The thing thus always changes its face as a plurality or as a unity, and through this movement eventually an interior where all permitted properties penetrate and an exterior where all other properties are excluded should be created, though this is yet only clear to us the onlookers.
116.
The danger of untruth and deception is introduced into perception because any perceived object is a unified universality, a Thing that is at once exclusive and encompassing, thus always involving in its self-identity an otherness. But since self-identity as the truth of perception is put onto the Thing, any falsity stems from the percipient.
117.
My experience with perception is therefore this: I encounter a contradiction between unity and plurality. Because properties are universals, they need to interpenetrate and be indifferent to each other; yet they must exclude others and be determinate and hence must usurp the One. In breaking up One into a plurality of properties properties become indifferent to others and stop being properties; properties have to be able to unite others to themselves in order to oppose them and hence have to be of one unity. Also it is worth noting that a regression is possible: that perception could potentially regress back to sense-certainty, or that one of its moments takes the same form as sense-certainty; the indifference of properties as simply singular self-relations that remain fundamentally indeterminate.
118.
Since consciousness runs into a cycle of turning its truth into untruth, it recognizes itself as the source of this untruth to be essential to perception as such. That is, since contradiction seems to be inevitable, consciousness recognizes itself, qua the root of such untruth, to be also inevitable and hence an element of it. Yet it tries to correct perceptions by eliminating its own effect paradoxically out of its own doing.
119.
Thus when the Thing is in truth One, consciousness is the medium that separates out a plurality of properties. And when the Thing is in truth Many, consciousness is the unifying faculty to organize all properties into one thing (one-above-many).
120.
Our perception changes in the following way. We trust that it is only in our consciousness things stand aloof to one another. We see them as determinate things, but they don’t oppose each other in our consciousness and there’s no determination coming from our consciousness in our consciousness, since all things are alike Ones in the medium of our consciousness (Humean empiricism, many-in-one). But exclusion such as makes Ones stems from determinateness. Exclusion such as in consciousness therefore has to come from determination intrinsic to things and not to consciousness. But this intrinsic determination means that the self-relation is intrinsic to things. Thus the Thing is in itself a “many-in-one”. To recap: first, things in us are determinate, and only things that can oppose one another are determinate; things cannot be determinate because of us, for in us they do not oppose one another; therefore, things are determinate in and for themselves; but this also means that things have intrinsic differences regardless of others and have self-differentiating properties, hence are in themselves self-relating, that they by themselves bring others in a unity in order to oppose them and are thus self-relating things. This argument is necessary because what we have to prove is “things are in themselves many-in-one without us”, hence one has to remove from the conception all elements in us. The first part of the argument effects such removal, the second part is an ontological argument. Many-in-one or self-relation is not the cause of determination, hence such self-relation in consciousness has nothing to do with the thing itself; but since it is an effect of determination it necessarily occurs in things themselves.
It is to be noted that throughout there is an asymmetry. Many-in-one or the Also is an element inherited from sense-certainty after its sublation. One-above-many or the One is the new element introduced to overcome the original contradiction. The new contradiction occurs when this newly introduced One necessarily produces Also; but if Also produces One that is the old contradiction. One produces Also naturally, but Also behooves consciousness to invent One to overcome its own contradictions.
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121.
If the Thing in itself is in truth a medium then all properties are “free matters”. It is then decided that consciousness is the power that unifies. But this power that unifies always descends to a plurality, only this time it happens primarily in consciousness and not in the Thing.
122.
Just as the Thing in itself reflects out of itself (as the One) into its opposite truth, our consciousness also reflects out of itself. This cycle is asymmetrical and convoluted: One is naturally mediated to Also; and the power of One resides either in the Thing or in consciousness, so when the Thing becomes an Also, consciousness becomes a One, which again becomes an Also, making the Thing back to a One. This is a fourfold ring-dance.
123.~128.
A new phase of perception. The Thing is no longer a simple self-identity, but rather a self-differentiation. But such self-differentiation is divided into two moments: firstly and essentially, it is a self differentiated from others; secondly, it is in itself a different thing and such difference is immanent. This is a critique of the Aristotelian definition of essence qua difference. The contradiction here is: difference is essential and immanent, yet such difference is not an actual or immanent difference; such a difference that is essential but not immanent is always a contradiction in terms. The Thing is both for itself and for another; the truth of one resides in the other, this is the true import of definitional difference. It is to be noted that again there is an asymmetry in such relation: it is for itself that it becomes another, and it becomes another for itself; itself is the end it strives for in such becoming. If it is purely for itself as something indeterminate, it destroys itself. In other words, a thing can either simply annihilate itself, or destroy itself in order to save itself. This is a choice asymmetrical.
129.~131.
With perception, everything is but abstraction of oneness in manyness through manyness. It grasps these individualities as essences which however always run into contradictions, since these essences are dependent upon others. Such universality is therefore conditioned universality. But once Understanding comes to the scene, universality becomes unconditioned and absolute, for Understanding grasps the unity of one and many and defines not individuals but conceptual universality as rules and laws of individuation.
132.
A characterization of Understanding. Understanding emerges out of the contradiction for perception, and now grasps things not as individuals but as laws of individuation; not as essences opposed to other essences in order to be determinate, but as generative principles of all such essences. In a sense they are like the Spinozist common notions. Just like essences are abstractions of the common notions, perceptions are abstractions from Understanding. And these common notions are present for Understanding as its objects.
134.~135.
The two moments of perception, the “being-for-itself” and “being-for-another” are united in Understanding, and become the content for Understanding. Though sensual data still separates the content of Understanding from its form, the formal consciousness only contemplates the movement of the two moments. That is, even though the law or common notion is abstracted from sensuality, what is contemplated is only the concept itself: this posits what Klein calls the “secondary intentionality”, instead of contemplating the relation between object and concept, it contemplates conceptuality itself. Previously, perception imposes essence and relation onto objects and dictates its moment, but now all moments are united and the object is transformed into concept as such.
136.
Force is the expression of itself in its self-impression. Expression is the dispersal of unity into a plurality of matters, impression the re-submergence of matters into itself. It is to be noted that this universal is not limited in scope: rather, its dispersal of matters is always infinite and it is all-encompassing. And Force proper as impression and Force as expression are again two moments that become independent and submerged alternately, and are differences in thought; expression is itself expressed and then impressed. If expression is in thought, the expressibility nonetheless resides in Force proper, and the distinction come up by thought is generated by Force proper, since Force is transitive and generative of its other. So this distinction of expression and impression is immanent to Force, and is itself expressed or impressed alternately as a distinction. And objectivity and subjectivity are but two extremes generated by “objective” Force. It is to be noted that here Hegel is employing the same contradiction that perception is unable to resolve because perception is one-sided, i.e. the contradiction of one and many separately distributed to consciousness and being, but since Force in itself permits this movement of differentiation, it easily resolves the contradiction by generating its own opposite.
137.
Solicitation is that which makes Force express itself. Yet this solicitation is but the impression of the expressibility of Force. Hence solicitation of another is but the expression of Force in itself. Solicitation therefore is but a product of Force in its own medium. Force is essentially a field. But a field nonetheless is excluded from others and remains one field (here again is an asymmetry between field and determinate one), and opposes itself to one. One thereby becomes an other that solicits the field, and is again submerged. But this gives a constant reappearing of the other, and the other is therefore an enduring Force. From one force we thereby see two forces; and the soliciting force is nonetheless solicited; and we now have two forces in a reciprocal relation.
139.
Content of the force is that it is either a medium or a one, and this distinction is not a real distinction, as is established, but only a distinction for us to better observe this consciousness; form of the force, however, is posited to be real since it arises with the new emergence of two forces and their mutual relation, which is more of a real distinction since it is a distinction between two forces at a higher ontological level, and not an inner distinction within one unified force. But again we see that the form is not different from its content since passivity or activity means nothing but if a force includes another generated by itself as an opposite or not, it is active if it opposes the other, and is passive if it simply includes the other; but this correspondence again can be subverted, since passive as a medium means active as a source.
141.
The realization of Force is to be substantially unrealized: Force is in its substance without substance, and is essentially nothing but its expression. That is, Force is in its essence nothing other than Thought.
143.
Consciousness therefore sees in Force proper its notional content and recognizes it as the notion. It sees the play of Forces and grasps it in its totality (since all forces are all-encompassing) as appearance. The play of appearance is the negative at work, the persistent negation. Notion therefore sees the negativity as its truth, but has not yet grasped this negativity in itself through the mediation of Forces, since it encounters it only through the mediation of this play of appearance. It is again to be stressed that, at this stage, the mediation is not external to the essence, but the essence is mediation: “This totality, as totality or as a universal, is what constitutes the inner, the play of Forces as a reflection of the inner into itself.” The play is mediation, and the play qua play is the totality is the negative and is the essence. The essence of truth is to grasp the play as a play. The asymmetry here is that play is itself to be grasped as a determining one.
146.
The nothingness of appearance is in itself the pure beyond. It is definitional that it should be unknowable, since it is void par excellence: it is the transitory effect of negation, or in Lacan’s term, it is the jouissance of signifier.
147.
The supersensible is the ground of the sensible. This is to say it is the horizon through which appearance is recognized as appearance. It is the ground where appearance shines forth in its own truth as a vanishing. The ground of appearance is itself not an appearance, just as primal light is not a color and blind darkness not black; asymmetry must be preserved.
148.
“What there is in this absolute flux is only difference as a universal difference, or as a difference into which the many antitheses have been resolved. This difference, as a universal difference, is consequently the simple element in the play of Force itself and what is true in it. It is the law of Force.”
149.~151.
Since laws express the vanishing of appearances as appearances, and appearances are many, there must be a plurality of laws. That is, since laws register the vanishing of appearances and thus make appearances into appearances, it must also make a plurality of such vanishings and pluralities. The one Law for the totality of all appearances therefore must be capable of division and modification by circumstances: “A must by necessity change into B, so as to make sure both are appearances qua appearances; but such necessity is a determinate necessity (A to B) and must be provided by a determinate law.” The pure Notion of law runs up against laws as such, for the pure notion of law is utterly indeterminate and incapable of generating real differences; and determinateness becomes a vanishing moment merely implicit in the law, which nonetheless must be expressed in its content. The determinate differences must be absorbed into the unity of the law as consequents of its inner necessity, which nonetheless are determinate sides of the law.
152.
What we want is a universal difference that generates specific differences. We want such differentiation, but seem not able to encounter it in laws, for laws have their twofoldness: in one way they are supposed to unite in their necessity all generated differences, in the other they are indifferent to what differences they generate. This is a very profound insight into the nature of mathematical physics: for in mathematical formulas we see no essential necessity why some factors are united in one formula and not others.
154.~155.
Because the laws and their Notion are in conflict, it is resolved that the Notion is in itself united to those differences, but loses such necessity in consciousness, or that what Understanding does is to dissolve the original unity of Notion and its laws in being: so that in one singular lightening Understanding perceives two different electricities, which are united in the original lightening. But this is only regression back to the play of Forces, so that laws are nothing but evanescent expressions, and Notions are Forces. The play of Forces is thereby introduced to the supersensible.
156.~158.
The asymmetry here is that though the content of change is the same, this change is nonetheless situated at a higher ontological level than appearances. Supersensible laws are not appearances even if they change as appearances do, and they become appearances only in respect to the second supersensible world. And Understanding learns something new: the law of appearance itself is that what is not self-same is self-attractive. That unlike becomes like and like becomes unlike; which is a law that is both self-same and self-differentiating; that ensures change since change is deep rooted in the foundation of things. And once the supersensible is changing, the law that dictates the appearances to change might also change, so as to clog the change of appearances. And because of the asymmetry a bad infinity is averted; the first supersensible world is not simply and equally reverted to appearances so as to constitute another beyond ad infinitum, but constitutes one world of changing principles. In other words, what emerges is not another higher world, but the inversion of all worlds.
159.~160.
This inverted world is not a higher world, nor is it a different world, but intrinsic to our world. It is intrinsic in our world first as imaginary and potential, then as actual. It is the worlding of worlds, and is the dialectical as such. Here finally Hegel has fleshed out the notion of dialectics: everything changes into its opposite. Method is explained in unity with content. These opposites are not Aristotelian categories such as hot and cold, for those are abstractions; rather, opposites are organic and asymmetrical, and are thereby concrete, so as to contain immanent drive to overcome themselves. Note the example of crime: the antithesis of crime is not good deed, but unfulfilled intention. Difference as an infinity.
162.
To ask about the split of Identity is already to abstract Identity and to oppose it to Difference. The differentiation always already happens. The unity is a unity of unity and difference.
163.
It is only in the “explanation” of forces or the absolute difference of all differences that the universal law of self-differentiating differentiation is clearly stated. Therefore it is only at this stage that consciousness becomes self-consciousness and recognizes itself as its own object.
164.
Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness. Consciousness without self-consciousness is trapped in a bad infinity of always moving on to know of something different without recognizing that all it knows is nothing but itself. Transcendence is always immanent. This self-consciousness is still only for itself and not for all consciousness.
5
166.
Truth and certainty become identical. Certainty of oneself is the truth of oneself.
167.
The movement is that the first moment is consciousness of being or existence; this moment is immediately superseded by consciousness of self as essence; but self in the second moment is without existence, and is dependent on the first moment.
168.
Desire is the unity of self-consciousness, the unity for self; Life is the unity of objective differentiation, the unity in itself (and not yet for itself).
169.
“Independence itself, in which the differences of the movement are resolved, the simple essence of Time which, in this equality with itself, has the stable shape of Space.”
171.
Life is on the one hand a passive medium that consumes all differences, and on the other a pure movement that disperses itself; the two moments are united in one process, but this process is precisely the death of its own process; death is a constituent of life. “Life is a living thing.”
172.
Death is nonetheless the Other to Life, and is nothing but consciousness. Life overreaches to its own death in consciousness.
174.
The same way the death of consciousness is none other than life as its desire.
175.
Therefore the desire of consciousness is life qua independent self-consciousness. For though Life is equally a ceaseless motion it nonetheless is object for another; the source of its motion or negation could possibly still reside in another and itself still a movement subjected to another. Only when it overreaches into consciousness as its own death does it overturn the hierarchy; Life now generates consciousness. And this overturning must be marked and actualized in consciousness itself as the birth of an objective living consciousness on equal terms with it.
177.
“What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is —— this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousness which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’.”
178.
Recognition.
184.
What we used to observe as the process of the play of Forces as a mediation between self-consciousnesses is now a truth recognized by the consciousnesses we are observing and are immanent to them. This is because previously the play of forces was yet an object for consciousness and hence mediated in the element of consciousness; only now it has become fully liberated as a self-sufficient subject and stands immediate to another subject. So now the process resides the in the immediacy, i.e. the extremes.
186.
It has become obvious in these paragraphs how the new shape of consciousness is an elevated recapitulation of previous shapes. That the new level is a new perspective to reconceive the prior moment. So is play of Forces now understood differently as the self-movement of an independent consciousness; and Life as yet an objective movement without subjectivity.
187.
The affirmation of consciousness is the death of life. This death is both an uprooting of oneself from life and a destruction of life for oneself. The former entails staking out one’s life, the latter entails killing. And the one also implies the other: through uprooting of oneself, one sees its own death reflected as the death of another; through killing, one sees the death of the other as death of oneself.
188.
But death as such must be preserved in life and in the movement. That is, the dead are to be reincorporated into the living. Survival is the truth of death. Unsurviving deaths are merely deaths falling away into indifference and thus unopposed become absolute freedoms that have no independent significance or enduring being. Natural Men according to Rousseau.
189.
Lords and slaves come to the scene as opposed extremes mediated by recognition. One is the essential consciousness for itself, the other a consciousness merely for another.
190.
The Lord wants the slave to be a reified consciousness, a consciousness independent but ready at hand, negated by him easily but also self-negative. So the Lord wants a Slave who is but a thing, and is made into a thing by his chains. Chains thereby mediate the Lord with the Slave. But he also wants his slaves to be self-consciousnesses and express themselves, so they must continue to negate: but such negation has to be shown as independent. Therefore, those negations have to be congealed in works. Chains subject negativity, and Works express it; Works are independent as they are things belonging to lords and by this power relation alone resist the negation of slaves, and thereby signify nothing but chains; whereas chains subject slaves and withstand their negation, and signify nothing but works. Lords, on the other hand, desire nothing but to negate the reified negations of the slaves, and achieves it through negating their works for their own enjoyment (which enjoyment is in the meantime to liberate them from their chains).
191.~193.
A lopsided recognition: lords see slaves as inessential but ipso facto see not truly independent consciousness but only dependent ones. Such consciousness is always entangled in ambiguities of the two moments: slaves as things but also as liberated equals. But also are slaves turning out to be things actually opposite to themselves, viz. they are nothing but liberated existences.
194.
Slaves are liberated by their absolute dread and because they are terrorized by the Absolute Lord. But they are thus seeing themselves in the lord qua their essential nature. They see lords to be their own essence, and thus incorporate the lord into themselves and their true being. But so far the lord is only standing opposite as a separate essence. Through the terror, however, such truth becomes immanent; by the negation of works, the lords actually negate the chains. The slave therefore recognizes both implicitly in himself and explicitly in his lord the negativity, and carries it out through labor: he negates as his lord commands and in such way eventually becomes his lord.
195.
In enjoyment negativity is only fleeting negation. It needs the permanence of work. Thus the slave as indicated by his work becomes the essential moment. He has a more genuine consciousness than his lord, since his lord, defined only by unreflective enjoyment, does not see himself in the work, since he sees his slaves as only things or automatons, and work remains essentially unintelligible to him as work (the classic fetishism of production: “is not the product self-sprung?”), and in this way he regresses back to the moment where he sees nothing but himself and sees himself as pure negativity (like a tyrant who inherits a kingdom and has to destroy it and reinstates the state of war); and once he sees himself in the work of slave, he is redefined as a slave, for now his slaves are his work of management. Therefore the asymmetry here is: either the master sees himself as nothing but a slave, or he reinstates war and fights for life and death and thus falls back to the cycle, where he came from. So either enjoyment remains pure enjoyment and regresses, or enjoyment develops into work of maintenance and is synthesized with work.
196.
Without the absolute terror, the formative activity (i.e. work) cannot actualize absolute freedom, but only relative freedom; without the formative activity, the freedom cannot be actualized but slips back to the state of war with the lords. Works are made to appease the lords, but in so doing, the slaves check the lords as subjects with particular desires. Yet such check is universalized by the absolute terror (slaves desperately come up with ever new ways and all ways to please the lord) and now, all things are workable, and enjoyable, and desirable, and checkable. Work is enjoyment is desire is freedom and is chain. “Man is born free but is everywhere in chains.”
6
197.
The independent self-consciousness only interprets itself as an abstraction. It does not see itself as self-differentiating. Only when it is forced back into itself, it gains a new potential. In servile consciousness, this potential remains nevertheless unfulfilled, for it still sees itself as separated between the lordly being-for-self and the reified objective consciousness and sinks to a bad infinity of “knowledge accumulation” or development of arts. Only we the observer can take on a new shape of consciousness, viz. the consciousness of a thinker. Through thinking consciousness becomes immediately its own object and is grounded in self-knowledge. Though so far the concrete development is only initiated.
199.
“What alone has importance is the difference posited by thought, or the difference which from the very first is not distinct from myself.” The truth of universal freedom is universal bondage.
200.
Stoicism is the universality of freedom of thought. Yet such freedom can easily fall back to the abstract since it sees itself unchained by reality or natural existence. Either way it can regress to contentless thought, where the determinateness itself qua reasonableness is but another abstract determination alien to consciousness and has to be negated in turn, and become either a tyrant or a slave, and this way thinking becomes tedium, boredom and drudgery.
201.
The abstract determination of determinateness is itself negated; so abstraction is itself abstracted. In this way, the abstract thought becomes a concrete thinking; the passive receptacle for stale categories becomes an active force.
202.
When this abstract passive thought of stoicism is fully carried out and actualized, it becomes the skeptic’s active thought of abstraction, and is concrete since it opposes itself against every real difference and therefore takes on as many attitudes and bears as many differences as life can have. And in this way it is universal and complete.
203.
A recapitulation of what has happened, though here it is pointed out that ethics might be immanently generated in the command of the master, and behind any thinking there is an ethicality.
204.~206.
Since skepticism always is the concrete negation of its contents, it is dependent on its own content. It negates every form only to relapse into the same form. It is disorderly and full of contradictions because it realizes its truth only in these inherent contradictions. But skepticism only realizes its truth in holding these contradictions separate, and seeing itself as simply divided between empiricism and nihilism in a bad infinity, without uniting them. The new shape of consciousness unites both ends. It is to be asked how Hegel’s own method leaves skepticism. I believe it is concerned with “shapes of consciousness” and thus grasps them in an ordered way.
207.
The unhappy consciousness is skepticism in its movement of bad infinity. Yet it has its essential nature already in potency.
208.
The unhappy consciousness grasps the unchangeable and the changeable as two opposites, one moment being more essential than the other. It is to be noted that opposition seems to only take the form of essential-inessential; for otherwise if both are inessential they are merely indifferent since neither constitutes the other, and if both are essential they are of one unity since they constitute each other.
209.
Again the asymmetry between absolute nothingness as the absolute unchangeable, and the act of negation as the solid feeling of unchangeable which nevertheless is only evanescence.
210.~212.
Either fall back to opposition, or reconcile with both ends. Consciousness knows itself to be the individually unchangeable individuality, thus knows itself as Spirit. The reconciliation takes on three steps. The first is immediate opposition. The second is confrontation with the individuated universality. The third is reabsorption of the individuality of consciousness to the universality. In the second moment, consciousness still regards itself to be inessential and the unchangeable individuated only for this consciousness, but not in itself. Only in the third moment it recognizes itself as produced by the unchangeable, so its representation of the unchangeable necessarily coincides with the unchangeable itself. Or rather, it requires this representation to indicate the beyond: by bringing it closer, it pushes it away. At the second stage, consciousness attributes this individuation (hence division between particular and universal) of the Unchangeable to itself and not to the Unchangeable.
213.
Either one loses oneself in chasing the formless universality, or one encounters and relates to universality incarnate.
214.
The dialectic now has progressed beyond the unreflective opposition between universality as the unchangeable and individuality as the changeable. It recognizes the necessity of an individuated universality. Yet this necessity still preserves the former opposition; previously this opposition is unmarked, that one does not see the necessity to relate them; now this relation has been manifested as necessary, but the what-ness of the relation becomes the question.
215.~217.
The first mode this consciousness takes inevitably regresses to the unreflective opposition between universality and individuality, and therefore to self-certainty. It tries to grasp the individuated universal, but the universal only always flees. It can only appeal to a feeling of the vanishing of the individual. It seeks only the grave of the universal which however is itself fleeting. Consciousness sees the universal as is presented immediately to consciousness, but this presentation is really a representation and is hence imperfect, for the universal, though is known incarnate, is still known as the Other and different from consciousness. That is, though the “universal content” is supposedly reconciled with the “particular form”, this is still seen as an object out there, hence the universal is still not the absolute universal that transitively relates back to consciousness, which relation is itself consciousness (pure thinking), but an immediate relation of devotion.
218.~221.
This fleetingness of the feeling heart is nonetheless fixed into constancy by work and desire. For the feeling heart perceives in its own feeling the auto-affected eternality. The unchangeable as an object is none other than the auto-affection of the feeling heart. This heart therefore is constant and has actual existence in the world. Thus the world becomes this feeling heart and vibrates with it in its sanctity; consciousness is always busy at particular works and desires, thus in any definite activity it is “continuously confirming its own certainty”, yet this confirmation, though more continuous and sustained than devotion, is yet incomplete, just as “all of time/enduring” is different from “outside of time/eternal.” Work and desire within the world is this other moment, which is again but a regression to the servile consciousness: it locates the essential and unchanging qualities of the world to be consciousness’s faculties and powers to command. Such powers belong to consciousness but their right is renounced to nature, for it is dependent on nature as the Unchangeable.
222.
The servile consciousness gratifies the unchangeable consciousness and renounces its own essential being (feeling for self). But this renunciation is nothing but its own act to put on a show of sacrifice, which is in every way an action. Renunciation of self is but self affirmation. In such a way, man and world again stand opposed as independent beings.
223.~226.
The bad infinity of pain and pleasure. As consciousness works and enjoys, it affirms itself; yet it knows such actions are inessential, thus feels wretched and is in haste to renounce these powers, for it sees these powers as petty and eclipsed by nature; yet even its renunciation is vain and boastful. It cannot but feel always impoverished. This however signifies to the consciousness its constant relation to the unchangeable, in this knowledge it is unified with the unchangeable.
227.
Priest or mediator is not a figure, but a figuration. He is ongoing and incessant mediation, as he brings the nothingness of consciousness and the being of Unchangeable together in one, as obviously consciousness itself as the particular individual cannot “do” since it has to be annulled; as consciousness qua individual “is not”, relation is the only thing that subsists for consciousness.
228.~300.
Instead of a direct correspondence of pleasure and pain between the two extremes, according to which one gains as the other loses essence, the third term of pure relation is introduced. Now, instead of granting essence directly to the absolute, consciousness only grants it to the mediator who interprets the absolute; renunciation is only before the mediator, and not directly over the absolute. This way, even when it grants being to things, it does not explicitly grant being to everything, and still holds its humility as the inessential moment. And when it renounces itself, its positivity does not directly accumulate to the other extreme, but passes through the interpretation of the mediator; and since it does not comprehend directly the absolute, the absolute remains a genuine and essential beyond for it. So its action of renunciation, though in principle posits the absolute, in reality or as taken by the consciousness could still content itself with its own humility. And even the renunciation as an action is carried out by an alien will; though this will does concur, it concurs with a mediating will, not the universal will, and is only carrying out an incomplete action. So now all speech and action and enjoyment become meaningless, for they do not directly relate to the world and hence have no content other than the mediator, the pure relation. When I give up my willing to another will, I do not admit into the willing a positive will that has any content (worldliness), but is purely negative. This pure relation is logos, Reason.
231.~233.
Reason is pure relation. Here there is no longer destruction nor negation of the world: for it is no longer a relation of more or less, of opposition, or of pain and pleasure. Rather, in this simple relation both extremes endure as mediated: mediation is not an absorption, but a letting free. This letting free has undergone two phases before it is actualized: first, consciousness sees all truths dependent on itself, that all truths are immanent to consciousness; second, consciousness sees the other (consciousness) simply as the self, as the self let free yet possessed.
234.~235.
Reason not comprehending its own path and recollecting in itself all its moments easily falls back to where it came from. Reason is a perspective on the whole and thus the sole truth of all “truths”. Reason in its pure immediacy is without truth and no reason at all. Without the whole progress comprehended in itself, by simply regarding itself as an abstraction, it cannot substantiate its own truth of simplicity; much less can it assert its own differences immanent to itself. Reason is the pure essentiality only when it is comprehended, and it is not comprehended unless it is grasped as an absolute negative essence established through and through in its negation.
236.
The two moments of Reason. Each moment on its own falls back to previous contradictions: Reason as a pure simplicity, or Reason comprehending differences unreflectively. Reason has to be a synthesis of both moments and reflects its own differences in itself, as a negative unity related to its own differences, hence as a singular individual from which a schema is projected. Unity of Apperception.
238.~239.
The idealism of simplicity always fails because it regards everything as belonging to consciousness, yet only in their simplicity: any difference therefore is extraneous to Reason, since Reason is always in itself simple. It has to revert to an exclusion so as to maintain its simplicity, thus creating noumena, and regresses to skepticism, only with skepticism it is to seek the negative Unchangeable as its object, with simple idealism it is to purify negatives (differences) from its positivity, only to reincorporate them, reverting to the second moment of unreflective empiricism.
7
240.
What in perception is a thing is now a notion for reason to consciously interpret itself as itself.
241.
Reason starts as a pure “I”. But a pure I (Cartesian ego) cannot fully see the rational immanently. It must bring out the differences in itself before it can fully enjoy itself.
242.
Reason therefore regresses to the immediacy of being. It sees sensuous things and is certain that they belong to it. So it observes beings. Yet it does not see these differences as immanent, so it sees them as immediate and opposite, viz. things are now enduring screens of my gaze and are to be interpreted. Prior to reason, things are annihilated and negated; now with reason, things are interpreted as beings and as rational.
244.
What pique the interest of reason are interpretables, so that they are actually universal.
245.
The first element of universalization is remembrance of the same, i.e. description. But descriptions are also a movement between the universal and the particular, the wholes versus details, and in this consciousness is involved as an infinite taxonomy. It also loses itself in this infinite process and forgets any necessity or order of nature, and loses all precision in description.
246.
For reason its object is itself in an alike movement of consciousness. Hence the marked differences (as essential differences, not simply perceived ones) are not merely for consciousness, but also inherent in Nature. Natural things are in themselves more or less for themselves. Animals distinguish themselves, so do plants in their limited way, but ores and what are lower are more difficult, since their differences are more indifferent to each other, hence the taxonomy more arbitrary; for now the differences descend to only perceived marks, but not essential and rational divisions, which only occur in real and actual nature. And in being contrasted or put together in a rational and essential way, the thing does not maintain itself in this relation, then the thing in its transmutation disturbs the taxonomy. This bespeaks the trouble about chemistry nomenclature that concerns Lavoisier, where every property of matter seems accidental and non-essential and changeable, hence no essential difference remains for the thing: gold can be fluid and change its color.
247.
But even in those stable systems always there are exceptional cases that disturb reason. This is inevitable because differences are themselves in antithesis to universality. Differences limit universality, which nonetheless transcends those limits qua universality. Hence observing reason from time to time has to fall back to mere iteration of perception marks.
248.
Now instead of indifferent taxonomical categories, observation concerns itself with dynamical laws that regulate the movements of these evolving categories. Also, it is worth noting that Hegel is recapitulating here all the stations traversed earlier with understanding, since these are movements preserved in reason. It is crucial to ask what changes and what is kept and what seeps into other stations. It is a general tendency that the deeper into the book the longer it gets.
249.
The maxim for reason: “what ought to be, in fact also is, and what only ought to be without actually being, has no truth.” Laws belong to Reason as Notion. Notions possess appearance and are true for observation.
250.
Reason at first took its truth to be alien to its Notion. Yet this is contradicted by its accepting laws that are imperfectly grounded in sensuous experience and are spoken of only in terms of analogy and probability. Hence laws must have an origin in consciousness and in their Notion, as dictated by Notion. But it nonetheless regards itself as imperfect, for it still retains the imagination of a simple immediate universality. Because the universality is not yet an immanently developing universality, consciousness strives to map what is stale in the notion to what is changing in sensuous reality as extrinsic to it, and deems itself imperfect when it does not see this universality in appearance in one swoop.
251.
Experiments are efforts to refine universalities. These universalities are predicates liberated from their actual substances and elevated off of them. They are therefore called, not bodies, but matters. It is to be noted here the refinement is not a simple abstraction of universalities, but a substantiation and differentiation of the self-developing Notion enshrouded in sensuous material, which is to be lifted off in its free movement: the Notion is law as how things behave differently and develop in their environments.
252.
Reason still instinctive is not aware of its own achievement of generating “a non-sensuous thing of sense, an incorporeal and yet objective being.”
254.~255.
Such universal object is now a self-moving object (instead of a universal imposed onto appearance in the form of probability, and this object is extracted from sensuous material through reflective experiments), and all other determinate objects at rest are dissolved in these self-moving organisms and are centered around them. This creates the division between inorganic and organic nature. It is to be noted that Hegel here is talking about animals not merely in the superficial sense, but also as animate beings, including the Leibnizian spermatic animals. The division of inorganic and organic natures is coincidental since the two natures are indifferent to each other, and hence has to be established in an external relationship of teleology.
256.
But the telos of an organism is not just external to its environing nature, but is also itself the circling flow.
257.
The organism is related to another as indifferent to it. Yet this indifference is superseded by its seeking and inclusion of the other. This seeking of a center only rediscovers what is already there from the beginning, for what is included is none other than the End itself in its reaching out. The other is not a mere means to the end, but is a means produced by the end itself as its necessary complement, and is end itself.
258.
For consciousness, the End seems to be posited both external to the actuality as its means and to the consciousness, as an object for consciousness.
260.
The two moments are for the organism first an external end to which any action of the organism is contingently related and is therefore petty and indifferent; but it is also dissolved in the universal End as a necessary moment and hence providential.
261.
To a Reason still enchained in its instinct for simple immediate universality of being these processes are only ambiguous and potential and not fully developed for it. Once End is regarded as transcendent, transcendence starts constitute its two aspects of being an end for consciousness and being an end for a thing, for these two are really identical, thinghood is for a thing its end as much as it is an end for consciousness. Thinghood is nothing but this doubling, and doubling is nothing but transcendence.
262.~266.
A depiction of this doubling: in form it is a doubling of thing versus consciousness, in content it is a doubling of thing versus thinghood. Transcendence thus regresses to picture thinking of inner and outer. The inner and outer are united in one substance by expressiveness. Inner is soul, outer is actual being. But some animals do not fully develop the inner-outer relationship, like vegetal life, and are therefore more indifferent moments. The Leibnizian world full of life and full of zombies.
269.
Souls are posited to be the inner that has their outer aspect expressed. These expressions are directly related to the inner and are thus distinguished from the general outer. And the relation between these terms must be observed to be without truth, for soul is a fluid and always changing its determination and aspect and permeates all shapes. Soul cannot be totally deciphered, nor its properties as expressed in the outer. This is because these properties are always reactive and reflective, and reflections are fluidity par excellence.
274.~275.
These properties can be considered either as quantitatively related or qualitatively. But quantitative relations are not essential and do not clarify the significance; and qualitative relations are not explicated by their outer manifestations but only their inner development, and as outer manifestations they are indifferent to one another as sensuous materials are indifferent to one another, and just as haphazard and coincidental, varying by every varying circumstance.
276.
Therefore anatomical parts must not be considered as staid external manifestations, but rather fluid processes of such externalization. That is, it must be comprehended as living. The outer has to be immanent to the inner.
279.
What is for understanding merely transition is here an object in its universal individuation. This is not to say that individuality is not present to understanding as oneness, but that individuality as oneness is still one-sided, and the individuality is not elevated and sublated to its proper form, but only dissolves in the flux and transition, and is not grasped as enduring through the transition. If one considers this objectification or elevation as a thematization one is not mistaken: before every object is dissolved in transition, but now this transition is itself the thematized object.
In every station, the clarification and the fulfillment of that station requires a recapitulation of everything that has happened earlier in its development in the perspective of this very station. So in the section of Reason every previous station is recomprehended in it as a preserved moment. Consciousness first sees only Being; then it sees the other consciousness; then it sees itself. It first sees itself pitted against being; then it sees itself embattled beside the other; then it sees itself confronting itself.
8
283.~287.
Outer is in itself the for another: it is the element of being for the organic nature. Outer contains an inner for it, as actual life is contained in inorganic life, and simple subsistence in actual life. For the outer, its inner is posited as a simple and universal inner that is indifferent to it, but is only expressed by the outer in numerical terms. Expressiveness entails an asymmetrical form of power, the expressed being more essential than its expression, and in terms of mirror reflection, the relation is not transitive. Therefore what happens is merely an imposition of the outer unto the inner in terms of number. The inner is combined with the outer into one unity; yet this unity is an indifferent unity, so that its two aspects are related in the dead tranquility of numbers, and not in the living process of development.
290.
It is intriguing how Hegel views quantitative relations. For him it seems mathematical relations, as he remarked in the preface, are indifferent relations in which two entities, though related, stand only aloof to each other as corresponding ends, and not as essentially constituting for the other. Since they are in one unity, they determine each other, and in this sense represent each other; yet because they stand aloof and indifferent, they determine each other only quantitatively and not essentially. This suggests that at least the opposition between indifference and determination is overcome, unlike in understanding; even in indifference, properties can now determine each other indifferently. Only this indifferent determination treats only what is inessential, or that the relation and determination qua quantitative is for it only an inessential aspect of the already synthesized content (One-Also). Further reference to 152.
291.
The organic inner and outer, comprising the inner proper, are laws and their outward manifestations; the inorganic inner and outer, comprising the outer proper, are staid properties and their outward relata. And the inorganic is subsumed under the organic as its outer proper, so that the organic universal destroys the staid inner being of the inorganic, and overstretches every magnitude.
292.
Genus is a living individual, yet it is not known as such a universal consciousness, but only a universal falling outside of the determinateness of number or numerical difference, as an abstract universal. The first is the soul of the individual, the second the species. And these two terms are opposite yet equivalent: the soul of a man is opposite to yet is nothing but his humanity.
294.
The systemicity of general universality as numerical series is always disrupted by the individuated universality of Earth and the dynamic differences it embraces in itself.
295.
World-history as the Spirit in its middling mediation and transitive movement is the self-systemization of the general universality and the individual universality. But organic Nature in itself is only the center of this self-development, and cannot be considered the whole, and therefore has no history in itself. It is ahistorical because its development is deemed inessential to itself: inorganicity is deemed inferior as a means to organism. This is a refutation of vitalism. Soul is ahistorical if it is not entangled in its skeleton and is thus transformed into Spirit. And in such a case, soul is always contemplated in its generality.
296.~297.
As organic nature is in its universality the individual Earth, and all the developed differences are inessential to Earth, we see nothing of necessity between Earth and its differences. But if instead of Earth one sees only the inorganic system, without mediation of the Spirit as world-history, all differences are but indifferent measurements and calculations. The two poles have to be mediated through world history to gain both necessity and intelligibility.
298.
Notion is realized both in organic and inorganic nature and holds them together in self-movement. It as essence and self-consciousness is not the genus that is divided between the self-sundering of a universal and the undifferentiated simplicity of an individual. Notion is Spirit as world history. Organic principle of movement is to be synthesized with inorganic rest and antipathy.
300.
The problem resides more in the attitude consciousness or reason takes: reason merely observes the movement and is scared of participating in it. Thus it sees laws as immediate beings and thus as merely indifferent parts and undeveloped in movement. Unlike us, who are both onlookers and occasionally actors.
302.
Laws now stand against Soul; laws are both the manifestations of individuality (which is the form all these laws take up) and the opponents against individuality (as itself a self-determining law). This opposition is only in the observing attitude of reason, which sees all beings, including individual souls, as an immediate being and ready at hand. We are no longer interested in the opposition between organism and inorganic nature, since this is recapitulated in the mediation of Spirit; now what reason observes is immediate Spirit (homo sacer!) as it relates to its own actual existence (custom). Further reference to Giorgio Agamben.
303.
Laws are living but ready at hand. So is active consciousness as such. It is an opposition between soul and its faculties, including of course its properties and its body as inorganic nature activated as universal inorganicity.
306.
Monadology. External circumstances are but the preordained destiny of the monad, as decorations inscribed on the inner surface of each monad. Each is a world unto itself. It is not to be neglected the overpowering presence of Leibniz in this stretch.
307.
The world takes on individual form as it takes on a viewpoint of the monad; but it is transformed by the monad insofar as it belongs to the singular monad as its own world.
309.
The superseded opposition between individuality and his world turns the object of observation into individuality as such a unified whole of him and his world.
310.
Now the soul and its activity is no longer indifferent to its body, and does not treat its body as a mere property. Rather, body is the product of the individual and his immediately given world.
311.
Body and its world is immanent to the soul.
312.
Body is the membrane between active consciousness and its reflected activity. Lacan, mirror-identification. In order to examine the activity itself, consciousness mistrusts the externalized activity, which is constantly changing and negative, and tries to look at a stable and enduring thing: a passivity to which activity is infused.
315.
Instead of observing the whole life, one sees and interprets the whole (which ipso facto is activity) in and through its rejected part, to which the whole is infused and transforming the part into a sign.
316.
This is how organs come to be taken as signs. For organs are things whence actions proceed. They are not actions and are hence stable, but they are also not deeds or products and are hence more infused and immanent to the source. Again this is a commentary on Leibniz, since organs are fundamental to his thought, as generative series closer to the unity. One is expected to notice here that once again world and consciousness regress to a quantitative relationship, where one end is more activity, and the other it is less activity.
317.
These organ expressions are not only manifestations of mediated activity, but also manifestations of reflections on these mediated activities. That is, as a mediation, organs are not only the channel through which activities are externalized, but also bridges with these externalizations as received back into oneself. They express how individuals view their own deeds.
318.
This inner expression however is just as contingent, and might require another inner expression, ad infinitum. Face is only but a mask.
**
319.~320.
Physiognomy only means the inner activity but is unable to locate this within the body, but constantly moves back and forth between the body and the deed, involving both extremes as antithetical in a bad infinity. Eventually what it can say is both insubstantial and unsubstantiated. The reason is because it sees the individual as but fixed by categories and does not see that activity and body are not involved in a static correspondence as two indifferent and contingent poles, but a transitive development as a whole. See Nietzsche on body and its habitual thought for comparison, for Nietzsche of course moves in a different direction.
9
322.
The passive being of organs therefore has to be dissolved in the actual carrying out of the individuality; that is, in the deed, the deed as it involves and develops the intention of the organ. Though externalized and variable, we must find a way to see how such a deed could obtain permanence, and not trying to regress back to physiognomy. Funniest paragraph.
323.
A different relation is that Spirit in its action reflects into itself and is the ultimate movement of individuality, yet this individuality is again indifferent to its outermost sphere. That is, Spirit has its own inner body as opposed to its outer body, and its expression is active within this organ as inner and acting causally on the other.
325.
This is to say, an organ of reflection is necessary in order to subsume an organ of objective production back into itself, for the organ is in itself only an actual existence indifferent to Spirit, and it must be related to Spirit through mediation of another organ that is itself the self-reflectedness and self-movement.
327.
Brain is this organ of self-reflection and being-within-itself-for-itself.
328.
If brain is the organ of self-consciousness, then the skull is its expression and the Thing it works on.
329.~330.
Brain is both the organic source for actualizing the skull and the mechanical cause acting on the actualized skull. The brain is itself again one organ and many organs in organic development. As a cause the brain is always self-determining and infinite, plus the indeterminateness of its relation to the skull, so the skull is nothing signitive of the spirit at all.
331.
“The actuality and existence of man is his skull-bone. This is how the relationship and the two sides of this relation are understood by the consciousness observing them.”
340.
The worst of Spirit is when it has fully alienated itself and stopped recognizing itself as Spirit, but rather as a bone. Because it has reached the peak of opposition and regarded itself as a dead corpse, and is therefore the most dejected, that it can reverse this recognition and see itself precisely as itself of a higher existence.
341.~343.
A very helpful and smooth recapitulation of what went before in this section.
344.
The twofold significance of “the being of spirit is a bone.” The first significance is reflective. First, spirit is possessed by a thing; reason is not itself without its object, and reason is possessed by its object. Consciousness defined by this attitude is the observing consciousness. But it also recognizes the negative truth, that the thing in being is necessarily mediated by the infinite judgement equating thing and self. This way the thing as reason stands over against reason as counter-reason, and the consciousness is but self-consciousness or being-for-self.
345.
The second significance, which is unreflective and sinks to a bad infinity of gibberish about signs.
346.
If reason only apprehends itself as an other, that is, if it observes itself as a thing unreflectively, it is the lowest and most dejected; yet if it again comprehends itself in its infinite judgement, then it is the highest.
347.
Reason recognizes itself in the other as all reality, and its object as its superseded and enduring self. It does not blindly sees itself as a pure object, but sees itself as the self-developing movement. But so far this is only in principle, and we need to recapitulate all previous moments to fulfill this newly emerging realization.
349.
What is newly constituted is the ethical world, or the life-world, in which all previous moments are united in their universal individuality.
350.
Such an ethical life presupposes a political life in a nation state as unified citizens. And the moments of such a life are fully explicit for consciousness.
354.~356.
Yet this ethical life is so far only instituted in principle and not yet in full actuality (for it is undeveloped in all its moments), for the ethical order is so far only standing over against the individual as a specific and limited being. And though the individual has already attained to his trust or belief in happiness (i.e. unity with the universal spirit), this happiness is not yet developed in all its recapitulated moments.
357.~359.
An introduction to what follows in order. What are given later appear first as individual and isolated moments of natural impulses, which pushes forward to ethical life as such; but these natural impulses are also self-contained, and ethical life has to recapitulate them in itself by a higher form and ascertain itself to be their essential truth. So in developing as these impulses do, they eventually recognize a higher truth, but there’s not yet explicit necessity to reach for that truth; it is only immanent to the ethical consciousness as such that such necessity explicitly holds. That is, consciousness, after attaining the recognition of ethical life, has to recapitulate all its moments to fulfill and substantiate its truthfulness; otherwise the ethical order will be lost to these moments as isolated satisfactions. The former leads up to unreflective ethical life, the latter as a reflection leads up to morality. In following sections, the latter viewpoint from morality where ethics is lost and has to be reconstituted is emphasized, and these forms are viewed in congruence to morality, because we are more familiar with this viewpoint; though it is not less necessary that how morality itself develops out of ethical substance and is first recognized as truth should be explicated. What one is expected to see, therefore, is how the moral self-consciousness tries to actualize itself in its other moments for itself. Why does Hegel decide to skip his step here?
10
360.~362.
A life in pursuit of happiness. Happiness, nevertheless, is but the self-enjoyment of self-consciousness. It enjoys itself immediately, and sees itself as transcending laws, customs and theories, entertaining a full moment of actuality of pure individuality, as unbounded by any universal mediation. Yet as soon as it enjoys itself, it sees itself subsisting in the other, and the other is therefore unified with it as a universal.
363.
As consciousness sees itself and relates to itself, it also sees that it sees itself not as gratifying, but its pleasure always dispatched by its own emptiness. This emptiness is no longer that of the unreflective simple being qua thinghood. On the contrary, this emptiness is the pure movement of abstraction and reduction. This pure movement, however, is only viewed in its abstract sense, not Notion as Notion itself in its concrete self-development, but Notion as a being, which is nothing but a circle. This circle is fate or necessity.
364.
The reason for this dilemma is that individuality sees itself as pure and absolute, standing over against the community and all universality; it therefore must transition to an equally absolute abstraction of the universal moment.
365.
This transition is unmediated. Two shapes are indifferent and their contents are opposite. One is the absolute negation of the other. What for consciousness is its deed or its actualization of essence turns out to be really that of an absolute other. Oedipus. For the feeling of pleasure is fleeting, as soon as the negation occurs it is subverted into pain, it never beholds itself in full contentment.
366.
To sum up the development. First, an individual sets itself as an immediate other aside from the ethical substance it belongs to. This individual has no conformation to rules or laws. Then, this individual has to be recognized as oneself and be negated. In such negation, it enjoys itself in pleasure. But this pleasure is fleeting, for as it negates itself, itself is lost, and has become only a moment. The pleasure is then lost to pain. But the being-for-self is negated not as a thing is negated by desire, but rather being-for-self is negated by the movement or thought or category, by self-contemplation and the shape it takes. That is, the enduring object of being-for-self in abstraction is negated by the being-in-itself of Notion which is equally abstract, viz. freedom negated by necessity. Because the individuality is unmediated, so is its negation also unmediated. Machiavelli, without virtue and order, one is easy prey to Fortuna.
367.
But the necessity of fate is but the necessity within consciousness, and is nothing but the law of heart.
368.~369.
The new form recognizes necessity immediately in its own freedom of heart. It therefore sees the ethical substance from which it steps aside as oppressing the true law and true necessity. It does not, however, recognize that this opposition of the real world is its necessary moment, and must be reproduced in itself, because it does not comprehend its own origin and has not yet recapitulated its previous development, but only takes the oppression as a given being. If it does, it will comprehend that it, as the mediated product of this oppression, must in itself always reproduce the same oppression, and such oppression can never be effaced in itself. That is why it unreflectively strives to abolish this opposition and annihilate reality.
370.~374.
This consciousness sees that its law of heart is really only a particular inclination and not a universal law. Its “universal law” really confronts it as a product that is itself oppression. It no longer recognizes itself either in its law nor in its action. It sees itself as a free universal that negates all such laws of heart, but in this way embraces all reality. No law stemming from the heart works as a universal law. It therefore realizes how the reality which it used to despise really contains the universal it aspires to, since these are laws which implicitly embrace the consciousness of all individuals.
376.~378.
What consciousness experiences in its twofoldness is even worse than madness. Madness is holding one essential and its contradiction implicit in fixed relation. This however is wandering reason, since it views both as essential and is fully aware of the duplicity of truth. This is the heart-throb of self-pity in self-conceit. But this raving of self-pity is not wrong either.
379.
What is this public order of all hearts is really the loss of all hearts. Such a reconciliation is really a slaughter of all. Perpetual peace is war perpetrated. The problem of Hobbes.
381.
Recognizing its mistake in the previous two shapes, consciousness now does not take itself aside from the ethical substance, but is intent on nullifying it. By nullifying individuality, the individual is resubsumed under the absolute order, which is but the whole recapitulation of previous movements, under the heading of “the way of the world.”
382.~383.
Virtue sees itself as the resolution of the dilemma, thus puts itself as opposite to the dilemma. It sacrifices individuality in the face of the way of the world, so as to give actuality to it and show its essence. That is to say, it tries to overcome the world by actualizing its absolute universality and order and purifying the world from its perversions, instead of an empty necessity in the case of pleasure, or a self-contradictory and disturbed order in the case of heart. It tries to achieve this through sacrificing individuality, which it deems to be the source of the problem and the premise of all later mistakes
384.~385.
At first, virtue signifies only gifts and powers. For virtues are here only directed at a remote purpose in faith and are therefore still dependent upon the world. This way they do not have their independent status but are abstract and are in relation to the world. They are virtues only wielded by individuals against individuals (for being against individuals is just to become an individual).
386.
But these virtues are not the good itself, therefore the truth of virtue is essentially a posturing. For what are sacrificed are inessential for the good itself, and the good “triumphs” no matter what. But what are sacrificed, being those individuated virtues, are nonetheless the first universals to nullify individuals; hence these universals sacrificed for an “other”, for an individual, are again in turn worthy and virtuous. In combatting evil, good becomes actual. Virtuous consciousness therefore tries to attack every actualized good and disentangle it from its perversion in the world. It seeks good only in combatting evil, and therefore actualizes good only in evil. By annihilating evil, virtue resurrects it, and must preserve itself in sacrificing itself. 圣人不死,大盗不止。
387.~389.
The world can also essentially sacrifice everything, including the good or the universal, for it sees the good as an indifferent object. If it sees it not as a dead object but as something that has intrinsic being, it regards it only as for itself and a passive instrument. Therefore, either vice is as equally virtuous as the virtuous consciousness (for it is as willing to sacrifice), or it is as invulnerable and unchangeable. The latter is because the vicious is either indifferent to what is pointed out as the good, or it is only concerned with the good so that it can make use of it and pervert it. The world perverts the good, but its perversion is only to realize the good. Virtue distinguishes the good in itself and the good for another, without realizing that what it deems to be the good in itself is only but what is good for itself, and is therefore “real” and “worldly”.
390.
The problem of virtue is not that virtue is inferior to vice, but rather that the content of virtue is not well-defined. If it is merely the sacrifice of individuality, it lacks all content.
391.~393.
A world of virtue. Theodicy.
394.
“Action is in its own self its truth and reality, and individuality in its setting-forth or expression is, in relation to action, the End in and for itself.”
395.
All the previous moments are now developed and recapitulated in Reason as its content, though still opposed to Reason itself as their form, or their genus.
The Hegelian method is the natural movement of: first, enumerating opposing moments (e.g. one vs also); second, developing a sublation, thus superseding the opposition in a new form (e.g. understanding); third, recapitulating previous moments under this new form (recapitulating the full process of development under this new perspective) so as to generate its new content, which is also the preservation of what went before (e.g. force); fourth, opposing this new content to the new form as is clarified by the content, thus going back to the first step (e.g. force vs law).
11
397.
Again a recapitulation is needed to fulfill the new form or category.
399.
Consciousness of an individual knows itself to have determinate being as the reality wherein it acts in its own element.
401.
There are no longer two realities. The intrinsic reality is now for consciousness only a show of reality, whereas the essence of the show stems from reality explicit within consciousness. The first unity of being and action is immediate; by the mere interest one has of the thing, one immediately begins to act, which already presupposes all circumstances of ends and means, and actualizing one’s individuality thereof.
402.
Yet the actualized work in its specificity corresponding to action seems to stand opposed to the universal individuality.
403.
Since the end of the action and the work done is a self-expression, there is no measure of good and bad. Every work expresses individuality equally.
404.
There is no regret, no comparison with what is “possible”, no reflection in work qua self-expression. Rather, one finds immediate joy in one’s work.
405.
Work is the particular actualization of a universal consciousness. Work is therefore for consciousness the sublation of its own work. Work is always reinterpreted and thus dissolved and reproduced.
406.
Consciousness learns of the antithesis between doing and being as a result in its confronting its work. In this learning, it knows this antithesis to be insurmountable, both as a beginning and as an end. For in its doing, it presupposes a specific being, yet this specific being is without content (since it is in itself nothing but absolute transition) but its pure doing.
407.
Doing and being fall apart into indifference and are only mutually related through accidents, which are passive means to the purpose.
408.
Contingency is itself contingent. Necessity is still implied in the notion of action, though they seem indifferent. Though the work seems to be indifferent to action, yet its negation is itself a work and a real doing to be negated, and shows itself to be really a necessary moment in the actualization of individuality. This is because at this stage the whole reality is already superseded by self-consciousness, so that any doing or negating is itself negated. Otherwise, without this truth having been grasped, consciousness will fall back to a bad infinity of working and negating.
409.
The true work is thereby produced as “the heart of the matter”.
411.
The matter in hand (is it important to distinguish matter in hand and heart of the matter?) has the form of an abstract universal, a genus of which all previous moments are its species.
412.
The consciousness busied by the matter in hand is the honest consciousness.
413.
This consciousness always consoles itself with the feeling of “done matter”. That is, it always says to itself: at least I got something done. In fact the honest conscience is but a busybody.
415.
The honest conscience is actually not honest at all, for it cannot simply abstract from the reality with its empty and abstract “matter” while it wishes to; it sees itself doing this while essentially it is also doing that; it does a specific thing while it means to do a general thing, and it seems to be doing a general thing while it essentially is only trivializing the matter. This is what “business” is. What it wants is to always busy itself and be occupied by “what is at hand”, so as to avert seeing its own truth. Nietzsche’s scholar. When things go poorly, it consoles itself with “at least it’s done” (generalization), and when things are done, it agitates itself with “why am I wasting my time?”
416.
The bad infinity of “the chase”. Since consciousness only sees an abstract unity of the moments, all moments fall outside this unity and take up their own forms as independent. They infinitely deceive themselves.
418.
The simple category has gained its content and is no longer a mere thought. Rather, it is objective and actual work, as a work (or a subject matter) for one and all, changeable yet enduring, and becomes thereby subject proper. Husserl: the intersubjective task of science as an ethical pursuit.
420.
The reconstitution of the ethical substance as was noted in advance, which substance is absolute, free, and authoritative.
422.
The determinate masses of laws are for consciousness its pregiven and hence immediate content of ethicality, which express directly the ethical substance.
424.
The form of declaration and proposition ethicality takes up immediately runs counter to its contingent content. What seems to be true and good immediately is really full of mediations or requires them.
425.
“In other words, such laws stop short at Ought, they have no actuality; they are not laws, but merely commandments.”
426.~428.
There is no such absolute or universal content. For such content is really no content at all, and its truth is an empty form. Hegel’s first critique of Kantian ethics, which he develops further in the next section. And reason as the dictator of laws is really only an examiner of them, to see if these laws are self-contradictory.
429.
The ethical substance is no longer standing over against the determinate laws as a separate being, but is itself the form under which these laws show themselves and are to be considered or tested as themselves. The laws are not given by reason, but given to reason.
430.
But if reason is only an examiner of laws, it is utterly impotent, and ethicality itself is devoid of content.
431.
Any self-contradiction in any ethical law stems not from the form but from the determination of its content. So the examination requires a first delineation of the ethical content, and is such development of content itself.
433.
If the content of laws and the form of laws are held separate, consciousness merely busies itself in trying to determine laws and making laws which again are no laws. It then regresses to business, i.e. shystery. See Montaigne and Rousseau on the multiplication of laws as the evil of society. Multiplication of laws hurts their authority.
434.
Honesty believes that such determinations of laws always already possess an authority, which is not true. But without this belief, these moments in isolation would only fall apart, and now examiners of laws would take all given laws as capricious, while lawgivers would dictate all kinds of laws without true ethical authority and are merely tyrannical.
435.
It is to be noted that there are three basic results of a development. Either one regresses, or one stays in the station, or one moves beyond and overcomes the current station. If one stays in the station, one either falls to one end and remains dead there, and is negated as a nothingness, or one starts to chase one end and the other and thus gets oneself caught in a bad infinity. In this example, if one does not overcome the present situation, one either becomes a tyrant and is killed, or one becomes an enemy of the state that has no law and is killed (absolute negation), or one becomes a shyster that naively deceives himself and others about the authority of laws (bad infinity).
437.
The absolute ethical substance is here fully instated in its form on its foundation. It is regarded as the institution of laws. Yet this institution has to recapitulate all earlier moments to fulfill its content, which in fulfilling must shake the foundation.
12
438.
“Reason is Spirit when its certainty of being all reality has been raised to truth, and it is conscious of itself as its own world, and of the world as itself.” Certainty is the form, truth is the developed content. “But [spiritual] essence that is in and for itself, and which is at the same time actual as consciousness and aware of itself, this is Spirit.”
440.
“Spirit is thus self-supporting, absolute, real being. All previous shapes of consciousness are abstract forms of it. They result from Spirit analyzing itself, distinguishing its moments, and dwelling for a while with each. This isolating of those moments presupposes Spirit itself and subsists therein; in other words, the isolation exists only in Spirit which is a concrete existence.” This is so crucial. The next part is also essential for understanding the stages Spirit undergoes: first, for and as the abstract in-itself, Spirit is Sense-certainty, Perception and Understanding; second, as it emphasizes the moment of for-itself, Spirit is self-consciousness; but when both moments are synthesized as the in-and-for-itself, consciousness qua self-consciousness is the consciousness that has Reason; but only when this Reason is not merely possessed but itself actualized is Spirit formed.
442.
The living ethical world needs to recapitulate all its moments and develop them. In its first recapitulation, it see its immediacy given in the world of laws as opposed to itself; the division is the traced to the divide between culture and faith; then, when these moments are brought back together, it is the Enlightenment.
444.
The two sides of Spirit, the ethical substance and the individuated consciousness of action, is mediated by self-consciousness and brought into mutual actualization.
445.
As the mediating self-consciousness, the mediation takes on either more of the side of immediate substance, i.e. a divine law, or of the side of substantial consciousness, i.e. a human law.
446.~450.
If self-consciousness takes on the form of human law, it is the form of a self-moving and self-comprehending and mediated ethical substance, i.e. the state. Yet it has to confront the uncomprehending, immediate and implicit essence of Divine Law, i.e. the family. The state is therefore here only a form, which is unfulfilled by the content of the development of family.
451.
The End of Family is always the immediate relation between the individual and the family. This is to say, the individual here is not a citizen for the universal, but an individual qua universal. Its object is not the citizen mediated by power and wealth, but an individual as such. It therefore sees the pure individuality: just as one sees a pure abstraction, such individuality is a dead individuality. Family is the shrine of the dead.
452.
Because of this immediacy to the pure individuated universal, family relates to its members as what they are, not as how they do. But because family is raised above the immediate nature and is itself ethical, it transfers their pure being to a pure doing: a conscious action of commemoration is imposed unto the dead. Funeral rituals are to preserve the dead individuals as elevated in their ethicality and preserved from the danger of falling back into Nature, the regression to non-self-conscious being.
453.
The burial of the dead is therefore the divine law par excellence. The Hegelian reading of Antigone. Here Antigone’s potential incestuousness is interpreted in the light of an intimated tension: Antigone is driven precisely by duty and not love. And this divinity of the individual is itself the all-powerful ground and earth on which the state is founded.
455.
The developed government diversifies into civil associations (if powerful families are these associations, they are not literal families, but familial-civil associations, such as mafias). But the state has to be drawn back to its beginnings from time to time and civil strife is absolutely necessary to renew the strength and unity of a state. Through these revolutions, the corruption of dependence and partisanship is eliminated, and the universal consciousness of freedom is reawakened; the unfree are killed and “freed” from the state as mere natural existences, the civil associations are submerged. This is Machiavelli’s “always bringing the state back to its beginnings.” And this is the sovereignty of the divine law: a purified family and a state funeral.
456.~459.
The development of the moments within family and an analysis of the family. Man and wife are attached by feeling, and see their relationship objectified in the child. The child grows independent and becomes separate from the immediate source, and only in the passing away of the parents can the child fully achieve its own being-for-self. Therefore, only as brothers and sisters are family members most simply and equally related. Apart from the age difference, there’s also sexual difference. Family for women is the universal element in which they live; they therefore see family as particularly ethical; but this ethicality is only purely substantiated in their brother, for as a mother or a wife there’s always non-ethical and contingent factor playing into the relationship: she is related to her husband by love, and related to her child by ownership. Men, however, see family simply as particular, since they possess their own universal element outside the family. Ethical life is therefore actualized in its universality in the sister-brother relationship. The sister becomes the guardian of divine law, and the brother becomes the citizen of the state. And they show themselves in their immediate relationship as two natural or immediate poles of universal determination, which is sexual difference.
461.
The fourfold: Nation, Family; Man, Woman. Nation is mediated with Family as the mediated substance, so are man and woman mediated as self-consciousnesses. Moreover, just as man is the mediator more on the side of nation, so is woman the mediator more on the side of family; they are mediated by child, but parents are mediated with their children through sisterhood and brotherhood, which fulfills the universal mediation of the nation and is again reflected back into family. And all previous moments are in equilibrium in this new whole.
462.
Vengeance is therefore brought into the city in its ethical form of Justice. The individual who suffers wrong in the city is reawakened in its power as a pure individual, a haunting ghost; but what it seeks is not simple retribution of blood (or it will not be “justice” proper), but rather the bringing to light and reason of his death. What the ghost seeks is “the reason why he has to die”. What the ghost seeks is that its death is not accidental to its being, but self-conscious. Therefore, the triumph of Athene and the transformation of Erinys in Aeschylus.
463.
Man is a downward movement, and woman is upward.
464.
Man and woman stands immediately to each other as opponents. They wage a perpetual war of universality against individuality; or the world against the holy, and the self-consciousness is entrapped in this perpetuation of strife.
465.
Tragedy is the collision between the essential and the inessential moments, resulting in a sacrifice of the inessential, rescuing the essential sublimity; comedy is the collision between the essential and the other essential moments, resulting in an absolute nihilism of all essences.
466.
The first stage for ethical consciousness is tragic, for it sees one side as inessential reality and tries to negate and sacrifice this reality in saving the essence.
467.
For the ethical consciousness, it has forgotten (or rather “repressed in memory”) all the one-sidedness it used to have. It sees itself as essentially the individuality of reality of the world; the world of fixed essence and its own fixity is superseding itself and superseded in the individual by the individuality. Ethical consciousness is not an essential consciousness, but a consciousness united with the movement of the world. It therefore believes that the world and its action shall fulfill its own law, that its right is guaranteed by reality itself, and the law is nothing more than what it knows as its own truth.
468.
For the individual consciousness, its knowledge nevertheless contradicts its own law. It knows its active self only as guilty of transgressing and criminal, for the world is divided between two laws. It either regresses into inaction and recollects all its repressed content, or it has to acknowledge its own guilt as a universally mediated individual, or it persists in its one-sidedness and pretends it has forgotten this prejudice. If it opts for the last, it will suffer revenge from the other law, which is also its own conscience. Hegelian interpretation of Oedipus as the unknowing knower.
470.
But the mere lack of knowledge is insufficient for ethical consciousness. Ethical consciousness has to eventually acknowledge its own guilt before it even acts, for it needs to recognize its truth only in actuality, which is its own opposite. It has to be tragic, that it sacrifices itself to save the actuality of its own essence.
471.
But the actuality itself, being the opposite to the essential law, must negate the significance of that law. What the ethical consciousness has done, therefore, becomes meaningless as an ethical action. It merely means a disposition, an inclination, or a nature (e.g. the feminine nature) in its fixity, without the self-moving reality backing it up.
472.
But the other law is no less destroyed. The vanishing of the vanishing. Characters (that is, fixed natures) and ethical powers alike contain the other in themselves, for they are actualized as much as in the other. In this mutual destruction, they see the omnipotent Destiny.
473.
The earlier strife is recapitulated here as a strife between Nature and State in the form of fratricide.
475.
War and Love are the principles of youth to attract Women, who are representatives of the individualities. War is the negative power that dissolves separation and renews freedom, that creates authentic individualities standing together (Heidegger), guarded and preserved as natural powers by their womenfolk. The warrior-lover, however, stands alone alongside his woman, and is soulless and dead to the nation.
479.
This new community of soulless spirits is a community of legal personalities. They are the realized form of the stoic consciousness, which is restricted to simple thought.
480.
The abstraction of legality is opposed to the unorganized content. See Evgeny Pashukanis. This empty category is nevertheless positive and recognized.
481.
Against the forms of individualities deprived of content there stands a singular individuality that is all essence and all content, which has absolute but arbitrary power, and is nothing but chaos. Hobbes’ Leviathan.
482.
On the side of the leviathan, consciousness is a mere madness. On the side of the subjects, consciousness is not only without content, but also losing its very form, for form is nothing but the self-generation of content.
483.
The truth of self-consciousness is now set before itself as an omnipotent and alienated self-consciousness, which is as much itself as its own content; all its content is thereby concentrated in its opposite.
13
484.
The world is not in itself or in its being an alien element to the spirit; rather, it is the negative element of the spirit as itself. Only in such externalization is the spirit gaining a substance.
485.
This suggests the antithesis between two consciousnesses: an actual consciousness and an essential consciousness.
486.
A preface to what follows. Mutual alienation gives forth the intellectual insight of the beyond. Enlightenment “contaminates” the beyond and brings it back to this world, which originates morality.
487.
The flight from this world to the beyond of pure consciousness is not religion but faith. Faith nevertheless is dependent on this world and hence is always also a notion.
488.
The alienation is at once a possession of the world as the content of self-consciousness. Instead of the immediacy in which two empty legal persons stand opposed, the raging elements are again reconstituted as one’s own culture.
489.
The dignity of a legal status is most contemptible, and is only specific as a “kind”.
490.
Culture is at once a conformation of the individual consciousness to its own world and an externalization of itself in the shape of its world.
491.
The alienated shall alienate itself. The fixed category of good and bad in culture shall redetermine themselves and turn into their opposites, in which consciousness shall eventually recognize itself and those moments shall be regarded as recapitulated moments.
492.
A Hegelian doctrine of four elements.
493.~495.
Good is the being-in-itself for Spirit. Bad is the being-for-another for Spirit that is to be sacrificed. State power is the good, wealth is the bad. But in relating to both, consciousness has to turn them inside out as their negative unity.
496.
Good and bad have the only criterion of like or unlike Spirit. In its relation to Spirit, the good or the bad itself takes on a spiritual nature and loses its initial fixity as an object.
497.~499.
Two judgements that subvert each other and are therefore spiritual. And consciousness itself contains such duality of good and bad, and this hinges on its essential relation to the actual.
500.~501.
The consciousness that sees its own like sees good and accord and is therefore noble. The opposite consciousness is ignoble.
502.
The double consciousness is related to its object (state or wealth) in various relations superseding each other, thus sees its own object as its self-consciousness.
503.~507.
The noble consciousness is related to the state in its heroism of service, and in its heroism actualizes itself in actualizing the state. The state then possesses its essential being from the alienated subject. But this alienation is only that of being and not that of being-for-self. The state yet has no will. And the being-for-self or self-consciousness is still on the side of the individual and opposes the state power in its reserve for its counseling. The state at this point is just an apparatus that has no will of its own and is not alive, but is haphazardly seized for any partisanship. Therefore, what the state needs is not simply the renunciation of individual lives, which would be simply inertia and death, but rather individual wills, so as to constitute a general will.
508.~510.
This is very unexpected and interesting. Language is the mediation between individual and the state; or rather, the essence of language implicit for consciousness is state power. In this is seen Rousseau’s influence on Hegel. Language here is considered in its formal aspect, or as a function. It is not the form of a content, but by itself expresses the content of a speaker, or the spirit as capable of speech. Lacan, subject of enunciation. This is not the same signification as that of an abstract individuality, which is only the legal status. For here the subject of enunciation is a form of self-differentiating content, hence capable of bestowing its own self-consciousness to its own essential being. It is the source of significance, and the source of building its own world for itself. Plato’s Republic: the city in speech is the city of speech, is speech itself. Yet this language is still divided between the speaker and the spoken of/to, and is not yet the language of Spirit speaking of itself to itself.
511.
The silent heroism becomes the heroism of flattery that is related to the absolute monarch in speech. The absolute monarch is the pivot of speech, the name of absolute individuality that is more essential than other individualities who sing its praise.
512.
Yet this more essential self-consciousness is again reflected back to the noble consciousness as what authorizes the thought and action of the nobility. Nobility is the concrete actualization of the universal will; the monarch is a will to be superseded and sacrificed, and it is therefore only wealth. Once sacrificed, what is left of it is simply a name.
513.
Therefore, what is noble consciousness is in fact the splitting of the accord, and in its service to the state its truth is only its wealth. In this consists its ignobility.
514.
Now we turn to observe how noble consciousness reacts to wealth, which it deems to be an inessential universality and is in relation to it merely gratitude.
515.
What wealth needs is therefore the contrary movement: instead of being liquidated, what it requires is the fixity of essential being, so as to stay a stable and uncanceled self-consciousness.
516.~518.
The gratitude is nonetheless a disgust. For it demonstrates to self-consciousness how what it deems to be inessential is really independent to it and contingent on another personality. A noble consciousness wouldn’t like to be grateful. It is therefore always verging towards ingratitude. By that it is ignoble.
519.
As well as the recipient or perhaps even more so, the benefactor gives away its self-consciousness. But in sacrificing itself it becomes more universal and claims ownership of the other’s soul, for it has alienated its own soul in order to subject itself as another to the give-away. In this consists the arrogance of the giver. In sacrificing, the self-consciousness has actually sacrificed nothing, but only wishes to see its own in the other.
520.
Just as there is a city in speech, and there is a justice in the city, there is justice in speech: this is the distribution of wealth in speech, or the property talk, and the way language relates to wealth. This language of base flattery, however, always involves the other side of language; the identical judgement is the infinite judgement; the diremption of subject and predicate is the identity of both. The kingdom of flattery therefore is the kingdom of letters: it is authentic and genuine culture. Culture is flattery, and vice versa.
521.
The kingdom of letters is the kingdom of flattery. It is that which is conscious of this absolute perversion. As such a consciousness, it regards itself as the absolutely transitory play of all perversions, and is therefore glibness or cleverness.
523.
Honesty has no place in culture and can say nothing new about the sophisticated, educated, ironical mind that has not been already known to it. The mind of irony is bulletproof. This is also how the Lesser Speech is to triumph over the Greater Speech.
524.
This is a commentary on misanthropy. See Molière and Swift: the universal disgust of all humanity, the ideal of an impossible escape, the utter impossibility of simplicity.
525.~526.
This ironic consciousness is only the negative shape of spirit and knows itself only as the universal contradiction, but has not yet achieved the vanishing of all vanishings beyond the bad infinity, neither has it developed the new positive content it contains in principle: the positivity of the beyond for faith.
14
527.
At first, faith is just picture-thought and is therefore only negative, and has not unchained itself into its positivity. This is to say, here thought has gained its actuality and content, though such content is still undeveloped and implicit in it. This is because pure thought is construed to be all reality and self-consciousness and consciousness itself, and not just a negative beyond.
528.
Religion in faith is a substantial belief: it has substance, but is yet not actualized.
529.
The opposition between pure insight and pure thought (faith): one is the negating self-consciousness, the other is the positing consciousness of an essence.
530.~534.
An analysis of the structure of faith. Faith is at once a positing of the distinctive beings of spirits (they are distinctive because they have content and are generative of the actual world of culture as a transcendent source) and a striving for union with those beings. It is also important to note that this believing consciousness is not a condemning consciousness, for it already sees everything as intrinsically vain and does not mean to criticize any brilliance of irony or perversion in order to save it.
536.
“Pure insight is not only the certainty of self-conscious Reason that it is all truth: it knows that it is.”
537.
An analysis of the structure of pure insight. Pure insight is the very negative movement of the notion. It abolishes all essential differences (since nothing stays constant) only to return to an absolute qualitative difference (each “other” is equally a self that is immanent self-differentiation). This is to say, all the beings possessed by the power of a self are to be compared only quantitatively to that of other selves, only because they are the same selves; but they are the same in that they are all absolutely different and differentiating.
539.
The pure insight is a general apprehension of all special insights.
540.
The pure insight then knows itself to be dependent on the vanity of its content and is its own vanity; in that the whole is preserved as a whole, and witty judgements are synthesized into wit in general. This general wit is opposite to the essential faith.
541.
In the immediate opposition, pure insight sees in its opposite, that is, faith, its own negative content.
542.
For Enlightenment, the structure of superstition lies in this: the masses are held in essences, while the self-consciousness (since this element is not to be lacking in the actual world or beyond) and evil intention is all reserved to the separate class of priests and the ultimate absolute being. That is, it sees its own opposition to the essences and ill intention in the reflected image of priesthood. Philosophers are the new priests (philosophy the civil religion), only these priests are not independent from the masses, only disseminate their “true” teachings to the masses.
543.
The evil intention and the despot are individuality standing aloof from the masses they deceive. This individuality is invulnerable since it is already cut off and dead, and is immediate to the universal, and is therefore only a sworn enemy to the Enlightenment: a direct confrontation with priesthood means a fight to life or death, and pitted in this fight the Enlightenment philosophers would be no better than the priests, only they serve a different lord. Enlightenment, to avoid such regression, has to therefore operate on the undeveloped masses and develop them into the true universal that itself is, and in the mediation of the populace brings out the absolute mediation.
544.
Faith is the self-consciousness of insight as in-itself, while Enlightenment is the for-itself.
545.
Every infection starts unnoticed. Machiavelli: corruption and conspiracy have to be long-term; Nietzsche: corruption is the autumn of a people. This is a beautiful passage.
548.
The suspicion of Enlightenment is immanent to Enlightenment. Once something happens there’s no turning back. Strauss, Rousseau. The first stage of Enlightenment for Enlightenment is a regression to deadly antagonism.
549.~550.
Both Enlightenment and Faith are the same production and intuition of the pure insight into themselves as absolute self-consciousness. Enlightenment is about the absolute trust of self-consciousness, which, however, is nonetheless a faith. It sees religion as a fiction produced by consciousness, but it itself is just this too. Thus religion never deceives people; rather, the populace themselves require religion; religion is already the mediated reality, just as much as Enlightenment sees itself to be. One has to ask, however, if this “mediation” is not retrospectively conceived: it is only through the mediation of Enlightenment that Religion now is the mediated spirit. Enlightenment is only naively the enemy to religion; rather, it’s the self-development of religion.
552.~556.
The initial criticisms Enlightenment lays onto Religion are all misunderstandings. Since in truth Religion is the self-conscious and immanent self-movement of Spirit, it is in the mediation and truth to itself; but for its other moment, Enlightenment, that sees the mediating movement rather as an immediacy or external opposition between being and self-consciousness, this requires the additional mediations of history (as events), substance (as objects) or action (as renunciations). Enlightenment therefore exhibits itself as equally a lie.
557.
In this antithesis between the same others, each presents itself to the other as a deception. Both are sublated, and religion sees its own truth in the popular religious enlightenment (Reformation) and enlightenment its own truth in the establishment of a cultivated civil religion (Science/New Philosophy), each in reaction and mediation to the other.
558.~560.
The positive content of Enlightenment is therefore nothing but nihilism. Everything (every here and now, hence sense-certainty) belongs to the absolute void of self-consciousness, but each thing itself stands opposed to the void as a self-opposing void; everything is negative and negating; everything is useful and using. The point here is that everything is an absolute singularity (Deleuze, the black hole of subjectivity). This is how it appears to Religion, but also how it corrupts Religion into becoming the same. Here Spirit is at the risk of again regressing to sense-certainty and an absolute nihilism; such however is averted by the introduction of a new content, that of use and being used, or utility, since it already knows its truth in the identity of self and other, and being-for-self and being-for-another. Because it is already Spirit in form, it has the same absolute opposition in its spiritual form of a self used for another self. Contrast this universal usage to the universal war as the manifestation of a conflict and opposition, and see how this recapitulation of the same content shows itself already as a reconciliation.
It is again to be noted that so far the Spirit is only recapitulating its prior moments. The Spirit is still in opposition and antagonism, for it has alienated itself. In Reason, self-consciousness is in an immediate relationship to another self-consciousness; though it knows the other as itself, its knowledge is still only a certainty, but not truth; that is, it only knows the other self immediately as an object, but not yet mediated to it. And so far the Spirit has only recapitulated such immediacies as its own alienated self; and it knows such alienation essentially and in truth belongs to itself. In other words, all the antagonisms between Woman and Man, Family and State, Honesty and Flattery, Enlightenment and Religion, are but how the Spirit comprehends the earlier oppositions between Individual and Custom, etc. What is changed is that what before appears to be a certain and immediate opposition is now developed in their more concrete and mediated content (e.g. the abstract and formal opposition between Individual and Custom is now embodied in the sexual difference and mediated by the sexual union). That is, what was understood as the objective self opposed to a subjective self is now reinterpreted in the perspective of a Whole Spirit: what was taken to be simply “I” against the “World” is now comprehended as development in a concrete and real association, like man and woman, or community and its godhead. Though such mediation within Spirit might regress to its unmediated form, yet it always is capable of a new development towards further mediation that eventually ends up in the self-comprehension of the Spirit; consciousness therefore proceeds from objective subjectivities to intersubjectivities, in which even opposition or objectivity is merely alienation.
15
561.
Religion is for Enlightenment the ultimate utility.
562.~564.
For Faith, such truth is detestable. This, however, also suggests how Religion is to be “corrupted” by Enlightenment and starts to know its own truth, which resides not in self-identity, but in being perverted. Enlightenment is Religion in truth.
565.~573.
Faith finds its own truth in Enlightenment and through Enlightenment: 1. it knows itself to be an action via being reminded by Enlightenment, and not a picture thought, for faith always finds itself in the absolute being; 2. it knows the object of its veneration is both an actual existence and a beyond; 3. it knows that it is disingenuous of it to both see the ground of its knowledge be contingent to any knowledge and yet claim immediate and absolute knowledge, for Enlightenment in counteracting this immediate self-assurance is all mediation; 4. it knows its own renunciation is really hypocritical, and the real sacrifice resides not in any particular action, but in the inwardness of the will, whose inwardness echoes the absolute.
575.
“So that the schism that arises in one of the parties and seems to be a misfortune, demonstrates rather that party’s good fortune.”
578.
The two parties of Enlightenment purport to the same identical truth: “Absolute” is the immediate absolute thought, the intellectual intuition which nonetheless relates to consciousness; “Pure Matter” is the mediated abstraction that nonetheless remains purely inward and absolute. Abstraction is intellectual intuition, one presupposing the other.
579.
The two parties coexist and constitute the immanent differentiation or alternation inside the absolute. The absolute is immediately pure being and pure negativity (one is therefore for the other in the form of an object), and is therefore pure utility: the pure being-for-self that immediately oscillates to pure being-for-another.
580.
The two moments of the Useful are pure and absolute and are in a bad infinity of alternation. Here, being and notion are not yet one and the same, because the for-self is still only a flickering result and not the overarching unity, and it stands opposed as an abstraction against other moments. Because the Useful still takes on the form of an object, it has a world.
581.
By having an object of the Useful, pure insight is content with itself. It has its own object to negate and affirm, and could tarry with it. This is the bad infinity of its actual certainty of self meeting the substantial existence of thinghood. “The two worlds are reconciled and heaven is transplanted to earth below.”
582.~585.
The Useful as an object or as an end of pursuit, however, is just as fictional. For such alternation soon finds in principle an equilibrium. It is certain that all objects can be abolished. It takes up the form of absolute freedom. In absolute freedom, each self-consciousness is a multitude of all consciousnesses, and each individual is an absolute universal. And such a power is now unstoppable, for consciousness is all reality; and now consciousness being certain of the possession of itself as pure self-consciousness or absolute Notion must be capable of abolishing all restricted spheres.
588.
Nothing positive stays for everything is negated by the individuated universal will. This is a regression. There is no free object. For everything that is enduring or particular is nonetheless always negated as a universal work. Back to a bad infinity of culture. For no longer can the universal be an inert genus to the particular in which both abide unnegated; rather, everything is absolute negation. In other words, there is no possible representative or proxy for the individual per universal.
589.
Absolute freedom is absolute destruction.
590.
The abstraction of absolute freedom is the worst death: not only is it death, it is not death enshrined or glorious; rather, it is utterly meaningless.
593.
Again one needs to survive this absolute terror. In surviving it, one becomes the positive negativity and takes on the form of truth, instead of mere certainty.
594.
The escape from absolute terror is a regression to the starting point, whose end would be stuck at a common interpenetration of Spirit and Substance. But it is possible to overcome this absolute terror: absolute freedom in ridding itself of the real existence is then no longer restricted by real existence anyhow; it is now absolute positivity, and its own self as knowing is its own existence. Spirit is now fully in its own element as a pure knowing and willing, and it knows itself to be the Universal Subject, and that the Object is immediately one with the Subject as Subjectivity Itself. Every Object is a Free Object, i.e. a Subject. In this Spirit has become moral, in-itself-for-itself.
597.
The absolute immediacy of Spirit is its own absolute mediation. It is no longer an immediacy of being or existence, as that of an ethical character, but a spiritual immediacy, the immediacy of spirit knowing and willing itself.
598.
Reason is certain of itself being all reality. Spirit knows itself being all reality and possesses it as developed truth and knowledge. The form it possesses this truth is through morality.
16
599.
Nature and the natural world is born inside the moral consciousness because the moral consciousness is Notion and has to include otherness; and since its primary substance is duty, which dissolves all alien objects, moral consciousness is indifferent to the actual world, and sets the other world free from itself. This actual world let free is the natural world.
600.
The mutual indifference posits a mutual absolute exclusion.
601.~602.
Yet Nature and Morality have to be in harmony, for duty is to be fulfilled and individuated. It is therefore a postulate that happiness and duty should harmonize, for so far this remains a postulate and is not developed in the notion.
603.
Duty has to be fulfilled, yet it also has to remain absolutely transcendent. Therefore, the consummation of the unity between Nature and Morality has to be carried out yet infinitely postponed. It is a task that is no task.
604.
The implicit harmony is the harmony between morality and nature. Or the being natural of morality. This still sees the two ends as two extremities staying in themselves forced to correspond. The explicit harmony is the harmony between the moral self and the sensuous self; this is the being-for-self that locates this unity not in the forced correspondence between two worlds but in one single consciousness’s development. And here we have the actual doing as the mediation between the unity in itself (a dead unity) and the unity for itself (a unity in flux). The former is an objective unity (independently it is the necessity without actualization), the latter a subjective one (independently it is a contingent actuality). The former is the fulfillment, the latter the task. Each end is united to the other through “actual doing”.
606.
The inner and sacred moral consciousness appears to consciousness as another consciousness.
608.
This split of the consciousness creates for consciousness in turn a disharmony, and it does not trust the unity between happiness and duty is achievable by itself, but only as a gift of Grace, according to its own imperfection.
612.
Instead of unreflectively falling into a bad infinity, a careful reflection or recapitulation of the previous moments signifies a new shape: it is only because the actual moral consciousness takes itself as its own immediate object that it sees itself as an end unfulfilled; but this object originates from itself. Therefore the moral consciousness is a consciousness of imagination or duplicity: it takes the truth of its own morality as what is non-moral, and the essence of what is non-moral to be morality. It makes do with the actual world.
616.
This is crucial and often misleading: this is not to only say that moral consciousness does not yet know its own truth, that is it produces itself as an object; but that in order to fully acquire this truth, it must recapitulate itself as if it has only simply originated.
617.~627.
The universal morality turns out to be universal duplicity. What it claims to want to achieve abolishes itself. It demands a unity between nature and morality; it demands the mediation of moral action, that the implicit unity be brought out explicitly for consciousness; yet the in-itself is opposed to the for-itself for a moral action is merely an individual action that is opposed to the universality of absolute duty, and therefore is merely contingent, and achieves nothing in-itself, nor therefore is it truly for-itself without the in-itself, but falls away from itself, and really the moral action is immoral, and the moral perfection is in truth imperfection. Therefore there is no sense in asking why some worthy of happiness suffer in this world, since morality is really immorality and null. The sanctifying other pure consciousness or the holy consciousness is itself dismantled as contingent on reality.
628.
The moral consciousness flees this universal hypocrisy and falls entirely within itself, thus negating all the natural world and withdraws its own moral “view” of the world.
631.
Morality turns out to be universal hypocrisy. By rejecting any positive relation between nature and duty, the beautiful conscience comprises the first moment of hypocrisy, and is therefore a recapitulation. It is not a regression for this conscience upholds only the truth it has obtained of the universality of hypocrisy. This raises a very important question: how is a recapitulation different from a regression? I venture to say, a recapitulation occurs when we bear in mind the truth, viz. the new form, just obtained and goes back to rethink the previous moments, and a regression occurs when consciousness forgets this retrospect. Here conscience does not simply regress, because it remembers the universal hypocrisy, and is conscious of the other world and its choice to flee. It regresses only when it fully forgets the other world and takes itself to be a simple positive Spirit. The same holds for any recapitulation: what is a recapitulation for us, can be a progress for that consciousness, and can also become a regress for that consciousness as well.
633.
The new shape of consciousness in the form of conscience recapitulates the previous moments of legal persons and absolute freedoms. Legal persons are pure forms deprived of content; absolute freedoms possess content; and this conscience possesses its own content in the form of a world. That is, it does not need to actualize itself in the world as an object divided from and striving for subjectivity, unlike absolute freedom. Rather, since it is already its own subject, this conscience is already worldly and intersubjective.
634.~640.
Conscience renounces all dissemblances because it does not need to depend on reality or the actual world. Rather, it directly and immediately is certain of possessing a moral kingdom of ends recognized by other subjects. It believes itself to be not in need of Nature or objectivity: it is immediately intersubjective.
17
641.
“The ‘thing itself’ has substantiality in general in the ethical sphere, external existence in culture, the self-knowing essentiality of thought in morality; and in conscience it is the subject that knows these moments within it.”
642.~645.
Conscience sees actions as known and weighed by judgement; even if such knowledge is incomplete and one cannot possibly know everything about an action, but such incompleteness is permissible for the completeness of knowledge is already reserved for other subjects as a show of the subject’s inwardness and intersubjectively recognized. Also, an action only accords to pure duty as an intersubjective deed. On the end of subjectivity, this is a pure conviction, a sense of certainty, that an action is not to fulfill any end, but to show other subjects the complete freedom of conscience. Therefore this conviction is without content, and only contains content as a necessary moment, but the content itself is without significance. Spinoza’s ethical view of the world: the intertwining of intersubjective essences into a common destiny. Regarding its form and content, no utilitarianism can hold water against conscience, since utilitarianism is itself dependent upon particular insight and calculation, and all such calculations are external to conscience, and the universal is itself as determinate as the individual.
648.~651.
A recapitulation of the battle over life and death. Conscience must preserve itself by negating the reality possessed by others as an expression of the other’s conscience. Reality has become the medium in which consciences communicate, or rather, the battlefield on which consciences kill each other. What matters here is not any determinate reality, but the reality known to be self-expression of a conscience as such.
652.~653.
Language is this reality. And as the reality of selves relating only to selves and relating to them as others, it is elevated out of simple command or imperative to speak or die, but now is a free expression. Speech is now no longer a commanded necessity, but a duty or a conviction declared.
654.
“It is this form which is to be established as actual: it is the self which as such is actual in language, which declares itself to be the truth, and just by so doing acknowledges all other selves and is acknowledged by them.”
656.~658.
In a way this is Spinozist. Consciousness knows itself to be God in actualized Religion. But so far, conscience still sees the universal and omnipotent consciousness as immediately present to it. In this collapsing into the abstract extremes and knowing them to be abstractions, Spirit risks regressing to prior death, for all abstractions vanish into this self-contemplation. It sees only itself and is in immediate unity with itself (to note, here mediation means to differ and separate), for the abstract absolute is immediately present for it as its own self. Speech is merely a dying echo. It has forgotten its own existence and has become “the beautiful soul”. As unhappy consciousness does not comprehend itself as an explicit Notion but only an implicit certainty, the beautiful soul sees and comprehends itself positively as a Notion that denies itself, and is therefore “submerged” in the Notion and not simply “actively negating” others; moreover, it knows itself to be the source of laws, and is hence not striving to fulfill some one duty or another and struggling to reconcile them, but is striving to declare adequately its own self as the source of all duties and laws. The inner truth of the moral view of the world is therefore not what kind of duty is to be fulfilled, but what action is to be justified and expressed; or rather, previously, an action is always guilty of breaching the law or doing the wrong thing, but now an action is always inherently justified but only guilty of besmirching the soul, and not expressing how righteous and beautiful the soul really is.
659.
The return of the repressed antithesis between individual and universal duty, or content and form. It sees itself to be conscientious, to act purely, but it also sees that it can be interpreted by others to be specific and not universal and for some ulterior purpose. What really matters here, as we shall soon see, is this matter of “interpretation.” Here, if consciousness falls back to a contradiction between the individual and the universal, it merely regresses to the moral view of the world.
660.~661.
The way to annihilate the other conscience to assure oneself is to reinterpret the other’s action into hypocrisy: to expose the other conscience. This is because the particular conscience (the individual) claims to be the universal, whereas the universal disbelieves such claim and has to unmask the disguise. One cannot simply say that because hypocrisy acknowledges virtue that it knows itself to be evil, for it is only an insubstantial mask of virtue that it acknowledges; moreover, it is believed that by acknowledging virtue it to some degree is virtuous and fails to see its hypocrisy.
662.~663.
Yet this exposure cannot result from any one-sided persistence. For if the evil conscience persists, it simply confesses itself to be evil and is not regretful, nor does it appear to itself as truly contradictory; that is, it still fails to see its hypocrisy. Nor can the one-sided universal conscience achieve this exposure, for it in persisting only exposes itself as what it is not, i.e. evil. This is such a great turn, for now we see that the “universal consciousness” is in fact nothing but another individual consciousness that is hypocritical, who achieves nothing but judge, for it sees all actions to be capable of being misunderstood, and is actively misunderstanding all those actions, and takes itself to be a pure and beautiful soul!
664.~665.
In the entanglement of the two consciences, the first evil conscience sees its own likeness in the second universal conscience. And the universal conscience in this attempt at exposing others only exposes its own hypocrisy, for it only criticizes those actual consciences as evil, without itself actualizing itself, and realizing that such passivity is itself a particular deed that contradicts its own conscience. “No man is a hero to his valet; not, however, because the man is not a hero, but because the valet—is a valet…Thus, for the judging consciousness, there is no action in which it could not oppose to the universal aspect of the action, the personal aspect of the individuality, and play the part of the moral valet towards the agent.”
666.~667.
The critical and judging conscience sees itself as superior, whilst its truth is recognized by the evil conscience. The evil conscience identifies with the judge and tries to persuade him. But this judge must have the hardness of heart and is not easily persuaded: it still holds itself to be superior and there is no necessity for him to give that up. But in this denial of the sinner’s confession, the hardened heart of the judge denies the flow of Spirit, and is involved in its own contradiction: it refuses to accept the doer’s confession or genuine speech, via which the actuality of the deed is itself given up to the spiritual speech, even if its own whole existence hinges on speech. The mute and silent doer is willing to open his mouth to the judge, whilst the judge refuses to hear.
669.
The ultimate reconciliation between doing and speaking, action and speech. The unacknowledged act is only declared in speech, but not explained through speech; in its persistence, it becomes stubborn in sinning; so is the other empty speech of the judge, which is hypocritical in condemning the particular. It is only by both giving up their persistence, so that the sinner breaks the silence to confess, and the judge softens his own heart to listen, true speech can once again be established, incorporating the actual doing and the universal speaking. In this mutual recognition, they forgive each other’s evil, and genuinely see each as a self.
671.
The moment of universal pure knowledge and individual conscious duty, are absolutely different, and in this absolute opposition comprise the absolute Notion of God: the self absolutely identical with the self absolutely different. A new certainty as the certainty of God: the expansion and splitting of the I into two that nevertheless are united in one.
672.~677.
These passages are crucial. From now on, Spirit is certain that it is not simply a thing, nor a negativity, nor an immediate presence of the other self-consciousness as an object, nor an immediate presence of itself as an object, nor the self-consciousness as an absolute negativity, but a positive intersubjectivity communing with itself in itself.
678.
What is required of religion is a new recapitulation that truly substantiates itself as a free actuality of itself.
679.
Another crucial passage. This gives us a clue to the relation between Time and Hegel’s philosophy. Spirit in its development unfolds in time as dispersed and separate shapes; but these shapes preserve previous shapes as moments in themselves, and such moments become therefore atemporal parts of the whole. That echoes what was said in the preface: Spirit has to labor first to attain to its shape; but in its newly obtained shape it has to recollect and reflect upon all the earlier shapes and preserve them as conscious moments, thus seeing itself fulfilled in content and becomes a conscious whole of Spirit as such. Otherwise, the Spirit would simply forget itself in time and remain mundane. The labor of the concept does not take time; it is Spirit thinking itself. It is ahistorical in the sense that it is only a recapitulation, or a reactivation of its own source; it is historical in the sense that it is wisdom first actuated and permitted by world history. It is not genuine Time because it is only a reactivation; and it is the end of history because it has attained to its full potential. What can be done is simply recollection of what is forgotten, but there can be no new breakthrough of history. In other words, the abolishment of Time is not to say that differentiation is canceled, only that differentiation is grasped as a whole and as itself: there is nothing genuinely new, and there never was such a thing. And what appears is really a tension between history and thought, which however is dissolved in the end as the convergence of two movements, the one going forward, the other retracing its steps. Time is really no Time, but so is no Time really absolute Time: shapes merge into moments, but so are moments themselves capable of regressing back to shapes.
680.
The specific actual shapes are then preserved as moments in an actual religion, and are taken up to form this religion into specific shapes. That is, as spirit that has attained to the form but forgets its own fulfilled content, and is therefore yet undeveloped, it assumes different shapes as religion. A religion not yet capable of recapitulating other shapes into its own moments is incomplete and is itself a specific shape. There is therefore a temporal genesis of Religion, wherein the shapes are not yet converted into moments.
681.
The metaphor is utterly unhelpful. But what is clear is that, with shapes, it’s always discrete and always returns to a new “node”; but once unified together as moments, they become continuous and are thus one atemporal whole. Or rather what once was a singular line of temporal progression and return, now becomes an atemporal sprawl of a structure. In actual spirit, some are moments while one shape is taken to be the substance; but for us, all are moments, and there is no substance that is not a subject.
682.
Shapes are forms which stand separate from other forms and also from the content. The content in conflict with the shape produces a new shape, in which the old shape is taken up as a moment of the content. The immediate shape of religion is thereby split into multiple shapes that are taken up finally into the ultimate shape as only moments.
18
684.
Religions are to be placed in a hierarchical order. Lower religions though they contain higher elements those elements are merely alongside the lower and are appropriated only by those lower elements as shapes in their own unities. It is the structure that matters.
686.
The first diremption of the notion of religion generates its own object as an immediate presence, as a sense-certainty. But this is also a sense-certainty of the Spirit, therefore a certainty of self-consciousness as master or slave. This is the first shape of “shapeless” light generating darkness and dissolving it. See Heidegger and Fink on Heraclitus.
688.
The unitary light has to be dispersed again into many self-subsisting forms that give light its enduring content.
689.
The multiplicity of in-itself flower religions transform to the active and warring for-itself tribalism of animal spirits.
690.
The moment of in-itself is united to the other moment of for-itself and they coalesce into the relation between work and its artificer. See Timaeus.
692.
The first artificer god is an architect: the building offers dead and indifferent architectural intelligibility only to be immersed in the living light and give light a subtle reflectiveness.
694.
The work is dead, however, and its inner life is not yet brought out, until it is immersed not in pure light as an abstract life but in actual life of vegetation as its ornament.
695.
Animals shapes and human shapes are brought into the temple. But they are still speechless.
696.
Against this outer shape of spirit is the equally mute and indifferent stone of darkness.
698.
Spirit as an artificer has now become an artist that fashions self-consciousness striving against unconscious.
700.
The religion of art is one spirit in which spirit is reconciled to itself as an other. Therefore such religion has its proper place only in the ethical realm and is itself spiritual work.
702.~704.
At first, such art is only subjected to customs and the ethical realm. But with the disintegration of the ethical world, spirit has fled into itself and recognizes now only itself. It sees itself as the unrestrained negative power and its universal and concrete world as the imposed pathos. It then works its pathos.
706.
Incommensurability is the essence of organic life. Through these ratios life is present in art first as an immediacy.
707.
The unethical nature as a universal is later overcome by the ethical realm of national spirits. And both the natural and the spiritual in this strife have attained to universality.
708.
In the work one at first sees the universality present as an uninspired work in contrast and antithesis to the absolute unrest of a self or an individual spirit.
710.
This antithesis between work and self, between universality and individuality is overcome in the medium of language. One form godhead takes itself present in language is the hymn, in which godhead dwells in universal communication with the self.
711.
Oracle is the first linguistic form of religion. In it godhead appears as an alien self-consciousness, and appears as a contingent abstraction of universality.
712.
In the self-developing spirit of the community, the universality is particularized and becomes pervasive in language. Speech expresses universal truths, while contingent facts are settled by contingent Oracles. Such oracles are subsumed in the universality of language, however, even if it pertains only to particular incidents; for it in being merged with the universal becomes the ultimate truth that all necessities are equally contingents, that those who deny particularities or are indifferent to them are nonetheless involved in the absolute fate. The testers of oracles are themselves tested; oracles become self-fulfilling prophesies.
713.~715.
This universal language is then to be united with its dead statue in the cult. The abstract cult is only an imaginary union with substance and an imaginary ritual of purification.
716.
The actual cult has to realize its own pure spirit through individuation.
717.~718.
The actual cult achieves this reconciliation through the deed of sacrifice. It sacrifices its own self and its work to the universal; but the universal also is sacrificed for the self as actual existences and as things later consumed by the individual in the prepared feast. The first rites are sacrifices to the underworld, which is unrequited in principle; the second rites, however, are preparations for a feast, through which the universal and the self are mediated in positivity. The self sacrifices only a little portion to the underworld, but everything else reserved for a feast; in this he cheats divine being into a union with himself, viz. into a circuit of ritual economy.
719.
Through the adornment of a temple as a communal practice, the negativity expressed in sacrifice and devotion is mediated in the positivity of the temple as such.
19
720.~721.
The inert substance people revere is transformed into a self-conscious otherness that has recapitulated in itself the substantial and the spiritual aspects, in expression of the feminine contra the masculine.
722.~724.
Hegel’s interpretation of the Bacchae. The feminine power still confronts the masculine power and devours the spirit in pure frenzied enjoyment and desire, since the feminine power is self-consciousness immediately related to the substance, hence is immediately a principle of desire.
725.~726.
This unrestrained power of revelry is then to be worked into a stable shape. Such shape or corporeality is fixed in the human priest of the procession. In this hero of the procession are united the bacchic frenzy and the lucid speech; he is the ultimate expression of the national spirit as self-conscious substance in its ultimate universality.
727.~729.
The universal self-consciousness of the hero expresses the national spirit, which however is in immediate relation to its yet unrecapitulated content. The national spirit needs to subsume the world of all spirits in its own openness. This gives birth to the Homeric Epic, in which the world itself is produced through the individual voice, and which immerses various spirits (heroes) in one overarching spirit of Muse or Mnemosyne. Instead of the opposition between unconscious and conscious self-consciousnesses as femininity versus masculinity, this now is one spirit versus many spirits. To see this worldliness, one must look into Homer’s verses on Achilles’ shield.
730.~731.
Now the divine and the human are related explicitly as self-conscious on two ends, instead of one end being simply consciousness of substance, the other end a desiring self, or one end being the desiring self, the other end a withdrawal of Spirit. They are in the confrontation between a divine self-consciousness and a mortal self-consciousness. Yet such relations are still involved in picture-thinking; that is, it is involved in a bad infinity of moving between the particularity and the universality of the divine and the mortal; the divine are dependent upon the mortal, yet they must also transcend them; they are thereby both universal and subject to a blind Necessity.
732.
Necessity binds the divine to the heroic. See Fink’s interpretation of Heraclitus’ fragment on immortals gazing towards mortals. But this means that necessity cannot be some abstract form, but must itself immerse itself in its content; so is the Minstrel, who is only an indifferent medium wherein necessity is weaved, going to participate. In other words, the abstract necessity of the speech has to be actualized in and by the speaker, and becomes thus a concrete necessity. It is quite remarkable that Hegel even here has not forgotten the importance of medium and meta-textuality.
733.
Tragedy is the higher form where unity between interiority and exteriority is brought about. The Minstrel is an Actor, and he speaks in the Character’s language. Actor is essential to the mask; but the converse is not less true. Mask is essential to the actor.
734.
The chorus is just material as the common people, who are passive and negated. They lack the negative power of a united self and constitute only the dispersed content as such. That is why they are impotent.
735.
The chorus is the indifferent and spectator consciousness that does not participate in the drama. This is not like us, the observers of the development of consciousness, for we occasionally act out our roles; or rather, we constantly act out our roles.
735.
In tragedy many characters are borne out because of the dissolution and abstraction of the subject, making these characters externalities.
737.
Hegel is a Hamlet fan, because Hamlet tarries with the negative and is therefore conscious of the self-consciousness and the deceptive nature of truth and knowledge. The actor eventually has to comprehend its own subjectivity and obscurity. Or otherwise it has to remain at this stage of bad infinity between knowledge and ignorance of oneself.
738.~741.
An analysis of the dramatic structure. Substance is opposed to self-consciousness, so that a god and their knowledge as essence is first posited. Self-consciousness of the hero accepts its one-sided truth and through his action destroys it, thus annihilating the particularity in the inert and indifferent universality of death, the darkness of subjectivity. Thus, unlike the chorus, who are swayed one way or another in a bad infinity, the hero is a consciousness of this bad infinity and comprehends this as a whole is absolute nihilism. This is the same attitude the educated consciousness takes towards culture: that all things are equally vain, there is no substance: whence comes the positivity of Subject. Heroes actualize the Necessity which to the chorus is only a beyond.
742.~743.
This universality of Fate, however, is only produced as a result. And as a result, it is an end still split up between its actuality in the hero and its transcendence in the spectator (chorus). One still feels this nihilism to be distant, since these other moments are nonetheless present as distinct abstractions. The subject is still only present as an object, and is not taken as omnipresent as a self.
744.
Comedy is this new form of subjectivity that takes the subject not as an end result or an object, but as a premise from the start. It is already fully itself and not present as an immediate otherness. Here, the mask is not the actor, but the mask is precisely the revealed distance between the mask and the actor: the actor has no substance and has no mask.
746.
Hegel’s interpretation of Clouds. The elevation of the ideals away from the specificity of laws and maxims: the liberating power of Reason and Speech, the opposition between the Greater and Lesser Speech. Hegel thus seems to differ from Strauss who claims that comedy is essentially conservative; rather, he sees comedy as a symptom of an event in history that has already taken place.
747.
A crucial paragraph. Comedy is the ultimate power of certainty. In comedy all fixity is purified into self-consciousness. From now on the comedic consciousness has fully recapitulated up to the station of absolute freedom; it then needs to advance beyond to the point of morality, as from subjectivity to intersubjectivity.
748.~752.
The Subject is Substance. But in such an alienation, the subject is yet only so far immediate. But as an immediate subject it is only pure form, which has let go its content, and is first a regression to legal person, and unhappy consciousness is really the truth of the comedic consciousness. “The loss of substance as well as of the Self, it is the grief which expresses itself in the hard saying that ‘God is dead.’”
753.~755.
A beautiful passage retelling the story of Christ’s birth. Christ is the rebirth and externalization of the in-itself and the for-itself. The implicitness of the mystery is the father, whereas the maternal power of self-consciousness is its actuality. Compare this to Anselm’s Christology. And also note the strange subversion here between femininity and masculinity: femininity, in keeping with its substantiality, has become a representative of the actual for-itself; whereas masculinity now becomes the mysterious in-itself. This might have to do with the different nature of substance: before substance is simple Being, which is posited to be abject and alien for self-consciousness; now substance is the Self, which is a Self posited to be in community to self-consciousness, and is therefore not the dangerous and tumultuous feminine.
756.
Hegelian methodology for hermeneutics as opposed to the Straussian one: esoteric reading is just imaginary.
757.~759.
The negativity of an esoteric and imaginary beyond is mediated by the immediacy of an actual positivity of God, the incarnation of Christ as the self-developing and developed Notion, the immediacy of the absolute mediation. Thus, the absolute religion has to be revelatory: all knowledge is simply given as immediacy in its absolute mediation.
760.
The last and also the biggest circle is now closed, in whose enclosure the absolute is opened up: the ultimate shape now is comprehended as its own moment, and the end of time is eternity, which is Time in its absolute and unstoppable circling stream. The absolute abstraction is the absolute concrete and enriched being. And unlike where we start with the oscillation between sense-certainty and its absolute universal, here the moments are unified in their absolutely developed and enriched moments. They are not two poles opposed to each other and excluding each other; rather, they are reconciled in the Absolute Notion. Something more needs to be said about the circling.
The absolute circling is a circling of all circles. The movement is like the following. All the previous shapes are to be comprehended and recapitulated in the new shape as preserved moments. The moments unified as a whole stand opposed to the shape and generate thus a new shape. The end of the smaller circle is the beginning of the encompassing circle, which recapitulates the older shapes in itself, those old shapes eventually dissolved in the new circle as preserved moments, which nonetheless suffers the risk of fixity, either getting stuck in one of its recapitulated shape and incapable of turning it into a moment, eventually regressing, or those moments qua moments as one whole content are in opposition to the shape. In the ultimate circling, however, the shape is the moment, so the ultimate absolute knowledge is the first and most immediate moment grasped as a moment. In a way, one could think of it as epicycles, only that the largest circle is in its own turn chained down to the smallest circle.
20
761.
“Only when absolute Being is beheld as an immediate self-consciousness is it known as Spirit.”
762.
A recapitulation of prior moments in this new shape of absolute Spirit, so as for us to witness the dissolution of the shape into its own developed content.
766.
Originary recollection or spiritual recapitulation is not historical in the sense of registering facts; that would only be extraneous. Rather, what one needs is a transcendental history, where the ahistorical is interweaved into the history.
767.~770.
The famous tripartition of thesis-antithesis-synthesis is formulated in a totally different way here. For Hegel, synthesis is still only picture-thinking, as if two terms are to be linked externally. What is at stake here is not a dead formula, but the spiritual movement immanent to the content.
776.
Hegel, though resorting to the arithmetic paradigm of metaphysics, refuses eidetic number. Of course, Hegel’s system is not simply arithmetical.
779.
Crucial. Logos is here no longer a ratio of mixture; not even qualitative ways to organize mixings; rather, it is the immanent generation of Notion into the other Notion.
786.
The final stage: the content of absolute spirit is comprehended as picture-thought as such. That is, abstraction is itself the content for the shape, which shape, however, is content itself. This will be the ultimate recapitulation: the content of the ultimate and absolute shape is fully developed so that the absolute shape is to be dissolved in its absolute content, i.e. the journey the spirit itself takes as externalized abstraction. The end of the largest circle is one with the start of the smallest epicycle; and here it is not immediately one, but is in truth one, for it is fully developed now in its content of the immolation and resurrection of Christ. Now the development of the content is done at this stage, what remains for Absolute Knowing is to dissolve the shape in the content, and to bring the content in one with the shape, for here content is still the negative to the shape, and vice versa, and Spirit only possesses its content of abstraction as an abstraction. In other words, what is needed now is to recapitulate all content as developed content, not abstract content; in such recapitulation, shape itself is reconciled to the content and absolute knowing is achieved. In other words, Spirit knows its shape to be absolute immediate unity (revealed religion), and its content to be absolute difference to be mediated (the death and resurrection of God); the ultimate unity of identity and difference is to be achieved in absolute knowing qua absolute knowing. Right now this unity is only implicit and is not self-conscious.
788.~805.
The ultimate circling of all circles is here complete. The two extremities of the last circle, one extremity touching the beginning of all circles (the smallest epicycle), the other touching the end (the second largest epicycle), have to now be united in the ultimate circle. The resolution for the ultimate contradiction between absolute form and absolute content is for the form to be dissolved in the content, so that the shape is itself at once the giving up of shape and taking up of the beginning; Eternity becomes Time. This is what Zizek calls the ultimate letting-go and setting-free. Here, moments take shape, and in their taking shape are moments. In kissing both the beginning and the end, the ultimate totality knows itself as the ultimate shape dissolved in its taking up the first shape: in transporting itself to finitude, it knows its infinity as its truth. Consciousness believes the immolation of Christ to be only an object or a content, that self-alienation is distant from its shape of self-unification; but the ultimate unity recognizes that the shape really is the content, thus the shape gives up its shape and rejoins Time, its journey, whilst doing this holds onto Eternity by taking up the shape it starts with.
806.
In Science, there is no more antithesis between consciousness and self-consciousness. What is known simply is. All in Science are self-grounding and developing Notions. All are equally moments of a system and shapes of systems. Systemicity is now fully comprehended in its ultimate power: immanence is transcendence. And it passes from the Absolute Notion to Sense-Certainty.
807.
Yet this cannot be a half-hearted sacrifice. Rather, the externalization has to be absolutely free and contingent. That is, the Absolute has to be what it absolutely is not: the letting go that gives forth the abyss of the subject. The absolute contingency here simply means: the movement of the circles always points to an absolute lack of ground. A circle that only stresses its void in the middle. The absolute contingency is nothing but the happening of time and space, i.e. Nature.
808.
Yet there is always mediation with the void: the necessity of the contingent, the law of freedom. That which relates natural time and space to the Absolute is (comprehended) History. But just as the Notion is externalized as sense-certainty to develop into progression of shapes with the final goal of self-comprehension, so is the final end, i.e. the final comprehension of this externalization itself, to be externalized as an “inwardness of the Notion”, as jettisoned into Time, thus perpetuating the movement towards Absolute Knowledge as an eternal yet historical act of comprehension. That is, the comprehended history, as Hegel’s Phenomenology, is achieved through the labor of history as the end result of its self-comprehension, which is itself thrown back into the absolute flow of history.
In revealed religion, the content (absolute difference) is still negatively opposite the shape (absolute unity). The reconciliation is that the absolute shape is the giving up of its own shape and passing into the first shape. Or rather, the shape of Eternity is its own dissolution in Time. It is because of this the last recapitulation of the whole journey as the absolute content is fully reconciled to the absolute shape. All those shapes become moments for Absolute Knowing, which however is itself the setting free of all these moments into their own independent shapes. The Absolute Knowing is the setting free of All Notions as All Times. The implosion of Time.
Consciousness starts with its negating objects continuously, thus posits a subject as its object, and is self-consciousness in truth.
Self-consciousness negates other subjects continuously, thus posits its very self as an other out there, and is reason in truth.
Reason negates its own selves continuously, thus posits itself as a community of subjects, or an intersubjectivity, and is spirit in truth.
Spirit negates its reified intersubjectivities continuously, thus posits itself as the absolute intersubjectivity, and is religion in truth.
Religion negates all its shapes of consciousness, or all its history of mediations, continuously, thus posits itself as the absolute immediacy, and is sense-certainty or consciousness in truth.
If religion does not pass back into immediacy and the circle is not closed, there is no reason why there is no other divide that can still posit something even higher in principle, or why it must end at this point without contingency or arbitrariness. In other words, the representation of Jesus Christ as the mediator between consciousness and the Absolute is actually an obstacle, and once this obstacle of picture-thought is removed and one sees “death in immediacy” to be a product immanent to the Absolute, one puts Jesus Christ transformed into a here and now stripped of its coat of allegory not between the consciousness and the Absolute, but as a projective development in the other direction of the immediacy of God who is dead: and this immediacy is none other but our sense-certainty, the beginning of our consciousness, not in between the consciousness and its end, but as a result projected out of its ultimate end. This cannot be more emphasized: Jesus Christ is a screen representation between consciousness and the Absolute, but sense certainty is beyond the representation of the Absolute, as something projected from the Absolute.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
1
1.
哲学在实行中(仿佛解剖学),而不在错置于开端的“目的”中。这重要,因为哲学须揭示真理,错置的真理根本不是真理,不应自称最本质要素。
2.
哲学工作要求无预设的系统,系统自在自为地又是自我差异化运动。这要求辩证运动,而非对立。
3.
知是在实事处逗留并交付自身。肯定地把握、否定地判断,就是自在自为地理解问题。
4.
文化与教养是辩证过程,从一般性开始,在自身内部逐渐丰富自身。
5.
真理只有作为整体、系统才真。哲学追求科学。科学是现实化的哲学。科学的这种内在必然性,须伴随实际历史中的外在必然性,但后者又独立于一切具体细节:实际却先验的历史。见雅各布·克莱因。
6.
绝对者不是裸直观或断言,不是单纯肯定性。它必须采取概念形式,是推论展开的。
7.
精神欲求直观或感受,因为已摆脱粗浅存在,却不能在新内容中聚集自身;因此抛弃原有内容后,它欲求某种纯内容或材料的回归。
8.
新科学抛弃旧内容,却无力提供新内容。所以精神只见此时此地与经验;这只是另一极端、浪漫主义“感受”的补充。它欲求感受,只因不知更好疗法,失去“思”“概念化”新内容的一切力量。所以有两面:首先,求助粗糙感受,是因新科学自身撕裂概念,把思想降为经验(从存在到主体),因此习惯感受与经验;另一方面,偏离正途太远,忘掉此前全部努力,只能沿最近记忆摸索。
10.
“精神的力量只如其表达那样强大,其深度只如它在阐述中敢于展开并丧失自身的程度那样深。”
11.
新与旧。新科学是主体、否定者的科学,对抗存在、被设定绝对者的科学。现代科学与哲学。反对预设本体形式与存在者的亚里士多德主义。
13.
科学初起普遍、抽象、隐秘。唯在充分发展中,才丰富、充实,变得具体、完全可理解。唯有人人可理解,才完全可理解,即任何人皆可把握其内容。空公式做不到。科学须伸出自身,为任一意识提供具体阶梯。
14.~16.
两种科学的动态关系。新科学不够有力,因为缺少内在力量。它反取空形式主义,如同采取空感伤主义,其努力是空重复。
17.
斯宾诺莎。认识到本体作为神,把存在中自我意识的复杂性还原为存在的纯简单性;或另一方面,思想自身变成无差别者(神观念);或最终,阐述与存在统一的思想之惰性简单性。
18.~22.
本体是主体。存在是生成。直接性的简单,是中介的直接性。
23.
“神”是不完整主体。它通过设定无意义的否定性预示主体:神是命名之名。但神自身只是惰性原则,如未实行的辩证法(自我差异化的差异化)只是抽象。神作为名称更糟,因为无意义使之成为固定点,没有谓词实际指向它。因此它总与全过程及内容无涉。两种情况下,预示的主体仍惰性,须先毁灭消解,才能重构。绝对自由须毁灭,才能现实。
25.
主观精神与客观精神。精神在我们中发展、因而对我们如此,是主观精神。精神自身从自身发展、达到并包含我们,是客观精神。之字运动:主体—对象—主体;对象—主体—对象。
26.
辩证原则是元素,但仍是抽象。抵达这种抽象仍需实际劳动。它标示两阶段界线:科学前的自然意识与科学本身。但须注意两阶段成圆:精神自我发展须包含非精神者。精神是一块骨头。因此,自然意识进入科学,从精神视角看就是科学现实化。
27.~29.
因此,理解这部《现象学》的双重性至关重要。第一,是智者黑格尔现实化自身与其精神(回忆智慧)。第二,是教育他人。它不只是通向系统者,自身也是系统部分。阶梯是系统必然环节,中介自然与精神。某方式上可说,本书从我们开始,展示为我们的发展,而非为自身的发展。所以精神须精神性地经历同一过程。
30.~37.
《现象学》的方法与结构。精神接过自然意识中沉淀的形式,思考并消解这些沉淀,在其原初性中重新激活。它松动固定思想,推动思继续。
38.~41.
重新思考真假。最终统一既非真也非假,而是真在其作为假的假中闪现。
2
42.~46.
数学真理惰性。其材料只是存在,本质与生命的发展仅外在于它,即在一个把尺度、命题、构造施加于它的意识中,症候是这些构造缺乏必然性。真理只在结果中,主体意识一抵达终点,运动便消失。没有定理自然“必然要求”另一定理,驱动自身在其中现实化;即数学真理总仅回溯,更糟的是无前瞻的回溯。它回溯构造根据,却非本原。它也处理死空间,概念本应在其中铭刻内在差异化;把时间把握为死单位,而时间本应是概念自身。
58.
把陌生不熟悉者当作新权威,继而反对或恭贺,是因实际学习某物所引发的羞耻。
59.~60.
推论或争辩态度先否定一切内容,甚至肯定内容时,也只肯定为自身偶性与谓词。绝对自由的深渊。
63.
哲学迫使主词谓词统一于可传递且相互的关系,所以有不同句法,逃逸大多数意识。因此他人难理解,因为这种可传递语言是表达事物“本质”的唯一语言。
65.
对命题形式的扬弃不能停在直接内容,还须在自身自我意识中自行前进。因此不只“神是存在”是这种扬弃,扬弃还须超出自身,完全自觉地贯彻,直至遍历整个系统。
66.
这里可见辩证方法具有排他性。它涉及风险,不能从“神”这类固定名称开始,否则未启航已搁浅。必须从概念出发。因此须注意,黑格尔系统是“系统视角”,这视角须细致建构。
67.
没有不证自明的概念。哲学要求训练与劳动。鞋子的类比太好笑了。
76.
科学与自然态度关系中的困难是教养问题。科学在自然意识看来只是另一知识方式。它须使自然意识信服其优越,不能仅诉诸权威,且须阐明为何从自然态度起源是意识的提升。
78.
科学在自然意识中起源的阐明,须在实践中实行:教养不是灌输信息,而是净化仪式。它是“绝望之路”,实际走过的路。首先意味着须下决心,且须履行决心;也意味着履行方式是带着此决心,穿过沿路遇到的一切“真理”,走到苦尽:人须在全部“真理”的全体中彻底失去自身,才能拯救自身。换言之,这怀疑论既非仅个人,也非仅态度:它是现实化的怀疑论、完全确证的绝望,看见现象世界沙漠的全部延展。
79.
自然怀疑论片面,只在否定中见纯无。但这是被困而不完整的意识;须依精神方法超越它。
80.
此旅程有设定的目标,但目标不是驱力。自然生命的驱力是作为外部超越的死亡;意识驱力却内在,因为意识是自身概念,因而是超越自设每个界限的主体。但无限性可能受限于一站而不敢超越,即坏无限;它却不能满足于此无限,终会有某意识足够勇敢聪明,走完整条旅程,把其它一切形式纳为构成部分。
3
82.
将自在存在与为他者存在区分开的范式,是现象知识的传统范式,并且将被这一认识过程本身所转化。
83.
为我们与自在之间的区分,本身就是通过我们的意识,作为知识内部的两个环节而完成的。这就是说,超越性始终是一种内在的超越性,否则就总会存在一个超越于知识的标准,以至无穷。因此,标准从来不是外在的,而始终是内在的,也必须从内在来观看。这就是说,假如某个处于知觉阶段的人,因为知性同样在“抽象地”看来并不恰切,就否认知性为真,那么他就是超前于自身,错过了意识的自然进展;不能将每个标准都抽象地视为仿佛没有次序的东西,而必须将它们理解为自然地联系在一起。这意味着,比较的活动始终是意识的一种运动,而作为运动,这种比较的准则是能够改变的。存在改变本质,而这样改变了的本质,作为存在的内在真理,又再次改变存在。
85.
因此,知识的真理并非它的对象,而是另一种知识。它并非另一条知识,而是一个不同的阶段,一种彻底不同的意识。
87.
科学进展的一个例子:它依照逻辑必然性运动,第一个自在通过这一必然性转化为第二个对某个意识而言的自在。这实际上就是从意识向自我意识的第一次过渡。此外,对这一意识来说是一种经验的东西,即与一个新对象的相遇,对这一意识的观察者来说却是一种必然的生成;我们以形式上的清晰性看到这一意识的发展,而意识自身却只是以一种未经反思的姿态沉浸在内容中。观察者的这一位置,是由施行教化的精神所提供的。
88.
“通向科学的道路本身就已经是科学。”但它并非自在地完整且恰切的科学,而只是科学的一部分,即意识经验的科学。
90.~92.
对感性确定性的一种外部考察。感性确定性是直接的认识,但它作为一个这个(“我”),所认识的也只是一个这个。这里的要点在于,它仅仅是一种确定性,尚不是把握并整理所有感性材料的知觉。
93.
到这里,我们才进入这一意识形式之中。
96.
感性确定性中个别者的真理无法被保存,而被其它这样的个别者否定。需要某种中介来整理这些相互矛盾的陈述,感性确定性所提供的这一切真理都不可能是绝对真理。这一新的真理就是:这些个别者乃是最普遍的。
97.
语言更为真实,因为它所表达的并非我们所意谓的东西,而是我们所意谓之物的真理。
103.
既然感性确定性中所有这样的个别者都是普遍者,它们就没有任何一个具有内在的真理。它们必须被整理。但这一整理只能以如下方式完成。一个“这个”必须与另一个“这个”区分开来。这些差异通过意识与其对象之间的区分而现实化。也就是说,一个“我”不同于另一个“我”,是因为它们拥有不同的对象;但它们拥有不同的对象,又是因为它们是不同的“我”。在这一一一对应关系确立之前,两个对象可以属于同一个“我”,并且对这个“我”来说是混淆的;这个“我”作为非本质的东西,隐匿于意识的目光之外,仿佛矛盾的产生并不是因为他们将“我”视作一个单一而个别地不变的“我”;而当意识察觉到个别的“我”的多样性时,它又再次“忘记”了对象也是诸个别者的多样性,却假定不同的感觉都指向同一个单一对象,于是它疑惑:为什么同一个东西竟然会变成不同的东西。
105.
观察者被要求将自己置入感性确定性的这一新形式(一一对应)中。现在,我们就是那个指向一个“这个对象”的“这个我”。
106.
对应是一种指示活动。但在指示之中,那转瞬即逝的个别者消失了,成为它自身的非存在。“我”与对象之间存在一个延迟或差异,任何指示总是无法命中目标。或者,一种更好的理解方式是:意识与对象都是不可数的。我与对象之间的分化,创造出了内在的诸此处与诸现在的多样性。
107.~109.
这些段落充分阐明了感性确定性的不可数性。通过指出个别者,人错过了个别者;然而,个别者一旦被错过便消失了,指示本身却得以保存,并且要指出一个存在,因此,指示又再次回到它所指向的个别者。这种往复运动,将感性确定性的统一中的杂多刻画为经中介的普遍者。
110.
“所意谓的感性的这个,是语言所无法企及的;语言属于意识,也就是属于内在地普遍的东西……因此,所谓不可言说者,无非就是不真的、不合理的、仅仅被意谓的东西[却没有被实际表达]。”
111.
新阶段的设立。知觉在原则上是普遍的,并且包含同一运动的两个环节:知觉的活动与知觉的对象。但知觉的对象本身就是这一运动(如在统觉或对知觉的知觉中)。因此,对象与活动仅仅是形式上的区分。
112.
知觉是感性确定性的真理,因为它是感觉的来源,而诸感觉则是它的实例。
113.~115.
一切个别者都排斥其它个别者。然而,作为普遍者,它们又应当相互渗透。因此,它们作为诸多分离的性质而彼此分开,却又统一在一个媒介中。一中之多。但这同时也是多上之一,而它并非漠然无差别的;相反,一个性质总是将一性据为己有(作为物的“物性”),并且在将一性据为己有的过程中,使一性本身,即排斥,现实化。因此,物总是在多样性与统一性之间改变自己的面貌;通过这一运动,最终应当产生一个内部,其中所有被允许的性质相互渗透,以及一个外部,其中所有其它性质都被排除,尽管这一点尚且只对我们这些旁观者才是清楚的。
116.
不真与欺骗的危险被引入知觉,是因为任何被知觉的对象都是一种统一的普遍性,一个既排斥又包容的物,因此它总是在其自身同一性中包含他异性。但既然自身同一性作为知觉的真理被放置在物上,任何虚假就都来自知觉者。
117.
因此,我对知觉的经验是这样的:我遇到了统一性与多样性之间的矛盾。因为诸性质是普遍者,它们需要相互渗透,对彼此漠然无差别;但它们又必须排斥其它性质,成为有规定的,因而必须夺取“一”。在将“一”拆解为诸性质的多样性时,诸性质变得对其它性质漠然无差别,不再是性质;性质必须能够将其它性质统一于自身,以便与它们对立,因此必须属于同一个统一体。同样需要注意的是,一种倒退也是可能的:知觉可能退回感性确定性,或者说,它的一个环节采取了与感性确定性相同的形式;诸性质仅仅作为单一的自身关系而漠然无差别,在根本上仍然是无规定的。
118.
既然意识陷入一个将自身真理转化为不真的循环,它就认识到,自己作为这一不真的来源,对于知觉本身是本质性的。也就是说,既然矛盾似乎不可避免,意识就认识到,自身作为这一不真的根源,同样不可避免,因此也是其中的一个要素。然而,它又试图通过排除自身的影响来纠正知觉,悖论在于,这一排除仍然出自它自己的作为。
119.
因此,当物在真理上是一时,意识就是将诸性质的多样性分离出来的媒介。而当物在真理上是多时,意识就是将一切性质组织为一个物的统一能力(多上之一)。
120.
我们的知觉以下述方式改变。我们相信,只有在我们的意识中,事物才彼此分立。我们将它们看作有规定的物,但它们在我们的意识中并不相互对立,在我们的意识中也不存在来自我们意识的规定,因为所有物都同样是在我们意识这一媒介中的诸一(休谟式经验论,一中之多)。但那造成诸一的排斥,来自规定性。因此,意识中的这种排斥必须来自内在于物、而非内在于意识的规定。但这一内在的规定,意味着自身关系内在于物。因此,物自在地就是一个“一中之多”。回顾一下:首先,物在我们之中是有规定的,而只有能够相互对立的物才是有规定的;物不可能因为我们才有规定,因为它们在我们之中并不相互对立;因此,物自在自为地是有规定的;但这也意味着,物不依赖其它物就具有内在差异,并且拥有自我分化的性质,因而自在地与自身相关,即它们自行将其它物带入一个统一中,以便与之对立,因此是与自身相关的物。这个论证是必要的,因为我们必须证明的是“物不依赖我们,自在地就是一中之多”,因此必须从这一构想中排除一切在我们之中的要素。论证的第一部分完成这种排除,第二部分则是一个本体论论证。一中之多或自身关系并非规定的原因,因此意识中的这种自身关系与物本身无关;但既然它是规定的结果,它就必然发生在物本身之中。
需要注意的是,这里始终存在一种不对称。一中之多,或者说“亦”,是从被扬弃的感性确定性那里继承来的要素。多上之一,或者说“一”,则是为克服最初矛盾而引入的新要素。当这一新引入的“一”必然地产生“亦”时,新的矛盾就发生了;但如果“亦”产生“一”,那就是旧的矛盾。“一”自然地产生“亦”,而“亦”则迫使意识发明“一”,以克服它自身的矛盾。
4
121.
如果物自在地在真理上是一个媒介,那么一切性质都是“自由的质料”。于是,意识被认定为进行统一的力量。但这一进行统一的力量总是降落为多样性,只是这一次主要发生在意识中,而非物之中。
122.
正如物自在地从自身(作为“一”)反思出去,进入其相反的真理,我们的意识也同样从自身反思出去。这个循环是不对称而曲折的:“一”自然地被中介为“亦”;而“一”的力量或者存在于物中,或者存在于意识中,所以当物成为“亦”时,意识就成为“一”,而意识又再次成为“亦”,使物重新成为“一”。这是一场四重的环舞。
123.~128.
知觉的一个新阶段。物不再是简单的自身同一性,而是自我分化。但这一自我分化被分为两个环节:首先且本质上,它是一个与其它东西区分开的自身;其次,它自在地是一个不同的东西,而这一差异是内在的。这是对亚里士多德将本质定义为差异的批评,即本质作为差异。这里的矛盾是:差异是本质性的、内在的,但这一差异又不是一个现实的或内在的差异;这种本质性却非内在的差异,始终是一个词义上的自相矛盾。物既是自为的,又是为他者的;一方的真理存在于另一方之中,这就是定义上的差异的真正意义。需要注意的是,这一关系同样具有不对称性:它是为了自身而成为他者,也为自身而成为他者;自身是它在这一生成中追求的目的。假如它作为某种无规定的东西而纯粹自为,它就会毁灭自身。换句话说,一个东西或者可以单纯地消灭自身,或者可以为了拯救自身而毁灭自身。这是一个不对称的选择。
129.~131.
对知觉来说,一切都只是通过多性,在多性中对一性的抽象。它将这些个体性把握为本质,但这些本质总是陷入矛盾,因为它们依赖于其它本质。因此,这样的普遍性是有条件的普遍性。但一旦知性登场,普遍性就成为无条件且绝对的,因为知性把握一与多的统一,所定义的也不再是个体,而是作为个体化之规则与法则的概念普遍性。
132.
对知性的刻画。知性从知觉的矛盾中产生,现在将事物把握为个体化的法则,而非个体;它们不再是为了获得规定而与其它本质相对立的本质,而是所有这些本质的生成原则。在某种意义上,它们类似斯宾诺莎的共同概念。正如本质是共同概念的抽象,诸知觉也是从知性中抽象出来的。而这些共同概念作为知性的对象,对知性呈现出来。
134.~135.
知觉的两个环节,“自为存在”与“为他者存在”,在知性中统一起来,成为知性的内容。尽管感性材料仍然将知性的内容与其形式分离,形式上的意识却只观照这两个环节的运动。也就是说,尽管法则或共同概念是从感性中抽象出来的,所观照的却只是概念本身:这设立了克莱因所谓的“第二意向性”,它不再观照对象与概念之间的关系,而是观照概念性本身。此前,知觉将本质与关系施加于对象,并规定其环节,但现在,一切环节都统一起来,对象也被转化为概念本身。
136.
力是在自身的内收中对自身的外显(expression);内收(impression)与外显相对。外显是统一向诸质料的多样性的散布,内收则是诸质料重新沉没于自身之中。需要注意的是,这一普遍者的范围并非有限:相反,它对诸质料的散布始终是无限的,而且包容一切。而作为内收的本来的力,与作为外显的力,又是交替地独立并沉没的两个环节,是思想中的差异;外显本身被外显,然后又被内收。如果外显在思想之中,可外显性却仍然存在于本来的力之中,思想所提出的区分也是由本来的力生成的,因为力能够传递,并生成其自身的他者。因此,外显与内收的这一区分内在于力,而且这一区分本身也作为区分而交替地被外显或内收。客观性与主观性不过是“客观的”力所生成的两个极端。需要注意的是,黑格尔在这里所使用的,正是知觉因其片面性而无法解决的同一个矛盾,即分别分配给意识与存在的一与多的矛盾;但既然力自在地允许这一分化运动,它就通过生成自身的对立面而轻易地解决了这一矛盾。
137.
激发是使力外显自身的东西。但这一激发不过是力的可外显性的内收。因此,另一个东西的激发,不过是力自在的外显。所以,激发不过是力在其自身媒介中的产物。力本质上是一个场。但一个场仍然排斥其它场,并且保持为一个场(这里,场与有规定的一之间同样存在不对称性),并且使自身与一相对立。一由此成为激发这个场的他者,并且再次沉没。但这使他者不断重新出现,所以他者就是一个持存的力。由一个力,我们由此看到两个力;而激发的力仍然是被激发的;现在,我们就有了处于相互关系中的两个力。
139.
力的内容在于,它或者是一个媒介,或者是一个一;如已确立的,这一区分不是实在区分,而只是为了让我们更好地观察这一意识而做出的区分;但力的形式却被设定为实在的,因为它伴随两个力及其相互关系的新出现而产生,这更接近一个实在区分,因为它是在一个更高的本体论层次上,两个力之间的区分,而不是一个统一的力内部的区分。但我们再次看到,形式并不不同于其内容,因为被动性或主动性所指的,无非是一个力是否将自身生成的另一个力作为对立面包含进来;如果它与他者对立,它就是主动的,如果它仅仅包含他者,它就是被动的;但这种对应又可以被颠倒,因为作为媒介的被动,意味着作为来源的主动。
141.
力的实在化,就是在本体上不被实在化:力在其本体中没有本体,本质上无非就是其外显。这就是说,力在其本质中无非就是思想。
143.
因此,意识在本来的力中看到其概念内容,并将其认作概念。它看到诸力的游戏,并将其作为整体(因为所有力都包容一切)把握为显现。显现的游戏是在活动中的否定者,是持续的否定。因此,概念将否定性视为自身的真理,但尚未通过诸力的中介而自在地把握这否定性,因为它只是通过这一显现游戏的中介才遇到否定性。必须再次强调,在这一阶段,中介并不外在于本质,而是本质就是中介:“这一总体,作为总体或普遍者,构成了内在者,构成了作为内在者向自身反思的诸力的游戏。”游戏就是中介,而游戏作为游戏,就是总体,就是否定者,也就是本质。真理的本质,就是将游戏作为游戏来把握。这里的不对称性在于,游戏本身要被把握为一个进行规定的一。
146.
显现的无,自在地就是纯粹的彼岸。它应当不可知,这是由定义决定的,因为它是最纯粹的空无:它是否定的转瞬即逝的效果,或者用拉康的术语说,它是能指的享受。
147.
超感性是感性的根据。这就是说,它是显现通过其而被认作显现的视域。它是显现作为消逝、在自身真理中闪现出来的根据。显现的根据本身并非显现,正如原初的光并非一种颜色,盲目的黑暗也并非黑色;不对称性必须被保存。
148.
“在这一绝对流变中存在的,只有作为普遍差异的差异,或者说,诸多对立在其中被消解的差异。因此,这一差异作为普遍差异,就是力的游戏本身中的简单要素,也是其中真实的东西。它就是力的法则。”
149.~151.
既然诸法则表达显现作为显现的消逝,而显现是众多的,那么诸法则也必须是多样的。也就是说,既然法则记录显现的消逝,并由此使显现成为显现,它也必须造就这些消逝与多样性的多样性。因此,针对一切显现之总体的那一个法则,必须能够依情境而划分和变更:“A必须必然地变成B,以确保两者都是作为显现的显现;但这一必然性是一个有规定的必然性(A到B),必须由一个有规定的法则提供。”法则的纯粹概念与诸法则本身相冲突,因为法则的纯粹概念完全无规定,无法生成实在的差异;规定性成为一个消逝的环节,仅仅隐含于法则之中,却又必须在法则的内容中被表达。有规定的差异必须被吸收到法则的统一性之中,作为其内在必然性的后果,而它们仍然是法则有规定的诸方面。
152.
我们所要的是一种生成特定差异的普遍差异。我们想要这样的分化,但似乎无法在法则中遇见它,因为法则具有双重性:一方面,它们应当在自身的必然性中统一一切生成的差异,另一方面,它们对自己生成何种差异又漠然无差别。这是对数学物理学本质的一个非常深刻的洞见:因为在数学公式中,我们看不到任何本质的必然性,来说明为什么某些因素而非其它因素被统一在同一个公式中。
154.~155.
因为诸法则与其概念处于冲突之中,于是得到这样的解决:概念自在地与那些差异统一,却在意识中丧失了这种必然性;或者说,知性所做的,是将存在中概念与其诸法则的原初统一溶解开来:因此,在一道单独的闪电中,知性知觉到两种不同的电,而它们在原初的闪电中是统一的。但这只是退回到诸力的游戏,于是法则无非是转瞬即逝的外显,而诸概念就是诸力。诸力的游戏由此被引入超感性之中。
156.~158.
这里的不对称性在于,虽然变化的内容相同,这一变化仍然处在一个高于显现的本体论层次上。超感性的诸法则即便像显现一样变化,也并非显现;它们只有相对于第二个超感性世界,才成为显现。而知性学到了一些新的东西:显现本身的法则就是,非自身相同者会自身相吸。不相同者变得相同,相同者变得不相同;这是一条既自身相同、又自我分化的法则;它保障变化,因为变化深深扎根于事物的基础之中。而一旦超感性处于变化之中,规定诸显现变化的法则本身也可能改变,从而阻塞诸显现的变化。由于这种不对称性,恶无限得以避免;第一个超感性世界并非简单地、同等地被还原为诸显现,再构成一个彼岸,以至无穷,而是构成了一个变化的诸原则的世界。换句话说,产生的不是另一个更高的世界,而是一切世界的颠倒。
159.~160.
这个颠倒的世界并非一个更高的世界,也不是一个不同的世界,而是内在于我们的世界。它首先作为想象的和潜在的而内在于我们的世界,随后则作为现实的而内在。这是诸世界的世界化,是辩证法本身。到这里,黑格尔终于充实了辩证法的概念:一切都变成自身的对立面。方法在与内容的统一中得到解释。这些对立面并非热与冷之类的亚里士多德式范畴,因为后者是抽象的;相反,对立面是有机的、不对称的,因此是具体的,从而包含着克服自身的内在驱力。注意犯罪的例子:犯罪的对立面并非善行,而是未实现的意图。差异作为一种无限。
162.
追问同一性的分裂,就已经是在抽象同一性,并将其与差异对立起来。分化总是已经发生了。统一是统一与差异的统一。
163.
只有在诸力的“解释”,或者说一切差异的绝对差异中,自我分化的分化这一普遍法则才被清晰地陈述出来。因此,只有在这一阶段,意识才成为自我意识,并将自身认作自己的对象。
164.
自我意识是意识的真理。没有自我意识的意识,被困在一种不断前行、认识不同东西的恶无限之中,却没有认识到,它所认识的一切无非就是它自身。超越性始终是内在的。这一自我意识尚且只是自为的,而非对一切意识而言的。
5
166.
真理与确定性成为同一的。自身的确定性就是自身的真理。
167.
这一运动是:第一个环节是对存在或实存的意识;这一环节立即被对作为本质的自身的意识所扬弃;但第二个环节中的自身没有实存,并且依赖第一个环节。
168.
欲望是自我意识的统一,是为自身的统一;生命是客观分化的统一,是自在的统一(尚且不是自为的)。
169.
“独立性本身,运动的诸差异在其中消解,时间的简单本质,在这一与自身的相等中,具有空间的稳定形态。”
171.
生命一方面是吞噬一切差异的被动媒介,另一方面是散布自身的纯粹运动;这两个环节统一在同一个过程中,但这一过程恰恰就是其自身过程的死亡;死亡是生命的一个构成部分。“生命是一个活着的东西。”
172.
死亡仍然是生命的他者,而且无非就是意识。生命在意识中超出自身,达到它自己的死亡。
174.
同样,意识的死亡无非就是作为其欲望的生命。
175.
因此,意识的欲望就是作为独立自我意识的生命。因为生命虽然同样是一种不息的运动,它仍然是为他者的对象;它的运动或否定的来源,仍然可能存在于他者之中,而它自身仍然是一种隶属于他者的运动。只有当它超出自身,进入作为自身死亡的意识时,它才颠倒了这一等级秩序;现在,生命生成意识。而这一颠倒必须在意识自身中被标记并现实化,表现为一个与它地位平等的客观的活的意识的诞生。
177.
“意识前面尚待经历的,是精神是什么的经验——这一绝对本体,是诸不同的独立自我意识的统一;它们在其对立中享有完全的自由与独立:是‘我们’的‘我’,与是‘我’的‘我们’。”
178.
承认。
184.
我们此前作为诸自我意识之间的中介所观察到的诸力游戏的过程,现在成为我们正在观察的那些意识所认识到的真理,并且内在于它们。这是因为,此前诸力的游戏仍然是意识的一个对象,因此在意识的要素中受到中介;只有现在,它才作为自足的主体得到完全解放,直接地面对另一个主体。因此,现在这一过程存在于直接性,也就是诸极端之中。
186.
在这些段落中,新的意识形态如何是对先前诸形态的提升式重述,已经变得明显。新的层次是重新理解先前环节的新视角。因此,诸力的游戏现在被以不同方式理解为一个独立意识的自身运动;而生命则仍然是没有主体性的客观运动。
187.
意识的肯定就是生命的死亡。这一死亡既是自身从生命中的拔根,又是为自身而对生命的毁灭。前者意味着冒自己生命的危险,后者意味着杀戮。而一方也蕴涵另一方:通过将自身拔根,人看到自身的死亡映照为他者的死亡;通过杀戮,人看到他者的死亡就是自身的死亡。
188.
但死亡本身必须被保存在生命与运动中。也就是说,死者要被重新纳入生者之中。幸存是死亡的真理。没有幸存的死亡,只是坠入漠然无差别的死亡,因而不再受到对立,成为没有独立意义或持存存在的绝对自由。卢梭所谓的自然人。
189.
主人与奴隶作为由承认所中介的对立极端登场。一方是自为的本质性意识,另一方则是仅仅为他者的意识。
190.
主人希望奴隶成为物化的意识,一种独立却又随手可用的意识,既能被他轻易否定,又能够自我否定。因此,主人想要一个仅仅是物的奴隶,并且通过其锁链将他变为物。锁链由此中介主人与奴隶。但他又希望奴隶们是自我意识,并且表达他们自己,所以他们必须继续否定;但这样的否定又必须表现为独立的。因此,这些否定必须凝结在作品中。锁链使否定性隶属,作品则表达否定性;作品是独立的,因为它们是属于主人的物,仅凭这一权力关系就抵抗奴隶们的否定,因此所意指的无非就是锁链;而锁链使奴隶隶属,抵挡他们的否定,所意指的也无非就是作品。另一方面,主人们所欲望的,无非是否定奴隶们被物化的否定,并通过否定他们的作品、供自身享乐来达成这一点(而这一享乐同时也是将他们从其锁链中解放出来)。
191.~193.
一种偏斜的承认:主人将奴隶视为非本质的,但也由此只看到依赖性的意识,而非真正独立的意识。这样的意识始终纠缠于两个环节的含混之中:奴隶既是物,又是被解放的平等者。但奴隶也显现为实际上与自身相反的东西,即他们无非就是被解放的存在。
194.
奴隶因其绝对的畏惧而得到解放,因为他们受到绝对主人的恐吓。但他们由此在主人中看到作为其本质性自然的自身,即主人作为其本质性自然。他们将主人看作自己的本质,由此将主人纳入自身及其真实存在之中。但到目前为止,主人仍然只是作为一个分离的本质站在对面。然而,通过恐怖,这一真理变得内在;通过对作品的否定,主人们实际上否定了锁链。因此,奴隶既隐含地在自身之中,又明确地在其主人之中,认识到否定性,并通过劳动来实行它:他依主人之命进行否定,并且以这种方式最终成为自己的主人。
195.
在享乐中,否定性只是转瞬即逝的否定。它需要作品的持久性。因此,奴隶如其作品所表明的,成为本质性的环节。他拥有比其主人更为真实的意识,因为他的主人仅仅由未经反思的享乐所定义,并不在作品中看到自身,因为他将奴隶视为仅仅是物或自动机,作品作为作品对他来说仍然根本不可理解(典型的生产拜物教:“难道产品不是自发出现的吗?”);由此,他退回到一个只看到自身、并将自身视为纯粹否定性的环节(就像一个继承了王国的暴君,必须摧毁它,并重新建立战争状态);而一旦他在奴隶的作品中看到自身,他就被重新定义为奴隶,因为现在,他的奴隶们就是他管理的作品。因此,这里的不对称性是:主人或者将自身视为无非是奴隶,或者重新建立战争,进行生死搏斗,因而跌回他所来自的循环。因此,享乐或者保持为纯粹享乐而倒退,或者发展为维护的工作,并与工作综合起来。
196.
没有绝对的恐怖,塑形的活动(即工作)就无法使绝对自由现实化,而只能使相对自由现实化;没有塑形的活动,自由就无法现实化,而是滑回与主人的战争状态。作品被制作出来以取悦主人,但在这样做时,奴隶们也将主人限定为具有特定欲望的主体。然而,这种限定通过绝对的恐怖而被普遍化(奴隶们拼命想出不断更新的方式,以及一切方式,来取悦主人);现在,一切事物都成为可工作的、可享乐的、可欲望的、可限定的。工作是享乐,是欲望,是自由,也是锁链。“人生而自由,却无往不在枷锁之中。”
6
197.
独立的自我意识仅仅将自身解释为一种抽象。它并未将自身看作自我分化的。只有当它被迫返回自身时,它才获得一种新的潜能。然而,在奴役意识中,这一潜能仍然未被实现,因为它依旧将自身看作分裂于主人的自为存在与被物化的客观意识之间,并沉入“知识积累”或技艺发展的恶无限。只有我们这些观察者能够采取一种新的意识形态,即一个思想者的意识。通过思,意识直接成为其自身的对象,并奠基于自我认识之中。尽管到目前为止,具体的发展才刚刚开始。
199.
“唯一重要的,是由思想所设定的差异,或者说,从最初就不与我自身相分离的差异。”普遍自由的真理就是普遍的束缚。
200.
斯多亚主义是思想自由的普遍性。然而,这样的自由很容易退回抽象,因为它将自身视为不受现实或自然存在束缚的。无论哪种方式,它都可能退回没有内容的思想,其中,规定性本身作为合理性,不过是另一个异于意识的抽象规定,也必须反过来被否定;它由此成为暴君或奴隶,而思想也以这种方式变得单调、无聊、苦役般繁重。
201.
对规定性的抽象规定本身被否定了;于是,抽象本身被抽象。以这种方式,抽象的思想成为具体的思;容纳陈旧范畴的被动容器,成为一种主动的力量。
202.
当斯多亚主义的这种抽象的被动思想被充分实行并现实化时,它就成为怀疑论者的抽象的主动思想;它是具体的,因为它使自身与每一个实在的差异相对立,因此采取与生命所能拥有的一样多的态度,承载与生命所能拥有的一样多的差异。它以这种方式成为普遍而完整的。
203.
对已经发生之事的重述,不过这里指出,伦理可能在主人的命令中内在地生成,而任何思想背后都存在一种伦理性。
204.~206.
既然怀疑论始终是对其内容的具体否定,它就依赖自身的内容。它否定每一种形式,却只是重新落入同一种形式。它是无序而充满矛盾的,因为它只有在这些内在矛盾中才实现其真理。但怀疑论只有将这些矛盾保持为分离的,才实现自身的真理;它将自身视为在经验论与虚无主义之间单纯地分裂,陷入恶无限,而不将二者统一起来。新的意识形态将两端统一起来。需要追问的是,黑格尔自己的方法如何离开怀疑论。我相信,它关注的是“意识形态”,因而以有序的方式把握它们。
207.
苦恼意识就是处于恶无限运动中的怀疑论。然而,它已经潜在地拥有了自身的本质性自然。
208.
苦恼意识将不变者与可变者把握为两个对立面,其中一个环节比另一个更为本质。需要注意的是,对立似乎只能采取本质与非本质的形式;否则,如果两者都是非本质的,它们就只是彼此漠然无差别,因为没有一方构成另一方;而如果两者都是本质性的,它们就属于同一个统一体,因为它们相互构成。
209.
又是作为绝对不变者的绝对的无,与作为对不变者的坚实感受、却仍然只是消逝的否定活动之间的不对称。
210.~212.
或者退回对立,或者与两端和解。意识知道自身是个别地不变的个体性,因此知道自身是精神。和解分为三个步骤。第一是直接的对立。第二是与个体化的普遍性的对峙。第三是意识的个体性被重新吸收进普遍性。在第二个环节中,意识仍然认为自身是非本质的,不变者只是为这一意识而个体化,而非自在地个体化。只有在第三个环节中,它才认识到自身是由不变者产生的,所以它对不变者的表征必然与不变者本身重合。或者毋宁说,它要求这一表征指向彼岸:通过使它靠近,它将它推远。在第二阶段,意识将不变者的这个体化(因而也是特殊与普遍之间的分裂)归于自身,而非归于不变者。
213.
人或者在追逐无形式的普遍性时丧失自身,或者遇见化身的普遍性,并与之发生关系。
214.
辩证法现在已经超出了作为不变者的普遍性与作为可变者的个体性之间未经反思的对立。它认识到个体化的普遍性的必然性。然而,这一必然性仍然保存着先前的对立;此前,这一对立未被标记,人没有看到将它们联系起来的必要性;现在,这一关系被显明为必然,但关系的是什么却成为问题。
215.~217.
这一意识所采取的第一种样式,不可避免地退回普遍性与个体性之间未经反思的对立,因此退回自身确定性。它试图把握个体化的普遍者,但普遍者总是在逃逸。它只能诉诸对个体消逝的一种感受。它只寻求普遍者的坟墓,而这坟墓本身却也转瞬即逝。意识看到的是直接呈现给意识的普遍者,但这一呈现实际上是一种表征,因此是不完善的,因为普遍者虽然被认识为化身的,却仍然被认识为他者,作为与意识不同的东西。这就是说,虽然“普遍的内容”据说已经与“特殊的形式”和解,这仍然被视为一个在那里的对象,因此普遍者仍然不是通过传递而返回并关联于意识的绝对普遍者——这一关系本身就是意识(纯粹的思)——而是一种虔敬的直接关系。
218.~221.
然而,感受之心的这种转瞬即逝,通过工作与欲望而被固定为持恒。因为感受之心在自身的感受中知觉到自身感发的永恒性。不变者作为对象,无非就是感受之心的自身感发。因此,这颗心是持恒的,并在世界中具有现实存在。由此,世界成为这颗感受之心,并在其神圣性中与之共振;意识总是忙于特殊的工作与欲望,因此,在任何确定的活动中,它都在“持续地确认自身的确定性”;但这一确认虽然比虔敬更为连续、持久,却仍然不完整,正如“全部时间/持存”不同于“时间之外/永恒”。世界中的工作与欲望就是这另一个环节,而它又只是退回奴役意识:它将世界本质的、不变的性质定位为意识用来支配的能力与力量。这些力量属于意识,但它们的权利被放弃给自然,因为意识依赖作为不变者的自然。
222.
奴役意识取悦不变的意识,并放弃自身的本质性存在(对自身的感受)。但这一放弃无非是它自己摆出牺牲姿态的行动,而这在一切方面都是一种行动。对自身的放弃不过是自我肯定。以这种方式,人与世界再次作为独立的存在相对而立。
223.~226.
痛苦与快乐的恶无限。当意识工作并享乐时,它肯定自身;但它知道这些行动是非本质的,因此感到悲惨,急于放弃这些力量,因为它将这些力量视为渺小的、被自然遮蔽的;但甚至它的放弃也是徒劳而自夸的。它无法不始终感到贫乏。然而,这向意识表明了它与不变者的持恒关系;在这一认识中,它与不变者统一起来。
227.
祭司或中介者并非一个形象,而是一种塑形。他是持续而不息的中介,因为他将意识的无与不变者的存在结合为一;显然,意识自身作为特殊个体无法“做”到这一点,因为它必须被取消;既然作为个体的意识“不存在”,关系就是为意识而存续的唯一东西。
228.~300.
两个极端之间,不再是快乐与痛苦的直接对应,即一方获得本质时另一方就丧失本质;第三项,即纯粹关系,被引入进来。现在,意识不再直接将本质给予绝对者,而只是将它给予解释绝对者的中介者;放弃只在中介者面前发生,而非直接面对绝对者。以这种方式,即便它将存在给予诸物,它也并未明确地将存在给予一切,仍然将自身的谦卑保持为非本质的环节。而当它放弃自身时,它的肯定性并不直接积累到另一个极端,而是经过中介者的解释;由于它不直接理解绝对者,绝对者对它来说就仍然是一个真正而本质性的彼岸。因此,它放弃自身的行动,虽然在原则上设定了绝对者,在现实中,或者说在意识的理解中,却仍然可以满足于自身的谦卑。甚至作为行动的放弃,也由一个异己的意志来实行;虽然这一意志确实赞同,但它赞同的是一个中介的意志,而非普遍意志,并且只是实行一个不完整的行动。因此,现在一切言说、行动与享乐都变得没有意义,因为它们不直接与世界发生关系,因而除了中介者,即纯粹关系之外,没有任何内容。当我将自身的意愿交给另一个意志时,我并未在意愿中接纳一个具有任何内容(世界性)的肯定意志,而是纯粹否定的。这一纯粹关系就是逻各斯,理性。
231.~233.
理性是纯粹关系。在这里,不再有对世界的毁灭或否定:因为这不再是多与少的关系、对立的关系,或痛苦与快乐的关系。相反,在这一简单关系中,两个极端都作为被中介的而持存:中介并非一种吸收,而是一种让其自由。这一让其自由,在现实化之前经历了两个阶段:首先,意识看到一切真理都依赖自身,一切真理都内在于意识;其次,意识将他者(意识)单纯地视为自身,视为被放任自由却仍被持有的自身。
234.~235.
理性若不理解自身的道路,不在自身中回忆其一切环节,就很容易退回它所来自的地方。理性是对整体的一种视角,因此是一切“真理”的唯一真理。理性在其纯粹的直接性中没有真理,根本不是理性。如果它未将整个进程理解于自身之中,只是将自身视为一种抽象,它就无法证实其自身简单性的真理;更无法主张内在于自身的诸差异。理性只有被理解时,才是纯粹的本质性;而除非它被把握为一个通过其否定而彻底确立的绝对否定本质,它就没有被理解。
236.
理性的两个环节。每一个环节单独来看,都退回先前的矛盾:作为纯粹简单性的理性,或者未经反思地包含诸差异的理性。理性必须是两个环节的综合,并在自身之中反思其自身的差异,作为一个与自身差异相关的否定统一体,因此作为一个单一的个体,一个图式由它投射出来。统觉的统一。
238.~239.
简单性的观念论总是失败,因为它将一切都视为属于意识,却只在它们的简单性中如此看待:因此,任何差异都外在于理性,因为理性自在地始终是简单的。它必须诉诸排除,以维持自身的简单性,由此创造出本体,并退回怀疑论;只不过,怀疑论寻求作为其对象的否定的不变者,而简单的观念论则要从其肯定性中清除否定者(差异),结果却只是重新纳入它们,退回未经反思的经验论这一第二环节。
7
240.
在知觉中是物的东西,现在成为理性的一个概念,理性借此自觉地将自身解释为自身。
241.
理性开始于一个纯粹的“我”。但纯粹的我(笛卡尔式自我)无法从内在充分看到理性的东西。它必须先将自身中的差异带出来,才能充分地享有自身。
242.
因此,理性退回存在的直接性。它看到感性的事物,并确定它们属于自身。所以它观察诸存在。但它并未将这些差异看作内在的,因此将它们看作直接而对立的,即诸物现在成为承接我凝视的持存屏幕,有待解释。在理性之前,诸物被消灭、被否定;现在,在理性中,诸物被解释为存在着的、理性的。
244.
引起理性兴趣的是可解释者,所以它们实际上是普遍的。
245.
普遍化的第一个要素,是对相同者的记忆,即描述。但诸描述也是普遍与特殊、整体与细节之间的一种运动,意识在其中作为无限的分类学而介入。它也在这一无限过程中迷失自身,遗忘自然的任何必然性或秩序,并在描述中丧失一切精确性。
246.
对理性来说,它的对象是在相似的意识运动中的自身。因此,被标记的差异(作为本质差异,而非仅仅被知觉的差异)不仅是为意识的,也内在于自然。自然物自在地或多或少是自为的。动物区分自身,植物也以其有限的方式如此,但矿石及更低的东西则更困难,因为它们的差异彼此更为漠然无差别,因而分类学也更为任意;因为现在,差异降为仅仅被知觉的标记,而非本质而理性的划分,后者只发生于实在而现实的自然中。而当物以一种理性而本质的方式被对照或组合起来时,它并不在这一关系中保持自身,那么物在其转化中就扰乱了分类学。这道出了拉瓦锡所关注的化学命名问题:物质的每一个性质似乎都是偶然的、非本质的、可变的,因此物不再保留任何本质差异:金可以是流动的,也可以改变颜色。
247.
但即使在那些稳定的系统中,也总存在扰乱理性的例外。这是不可避免的,因为差异本身与普遍性相对立。差异限制普遍性,而普遍性仍然作为普遍性超出这些限制。因此,观察的理性不时必须退回对知觉标记的单纯列举。
248.
现在,观察所关心的,不再是彼此漠然无差别的分类范畴,而是调节这些演化中的范畴之运动的动态法则。此外,需要注意的是,黑格尔在这里重述了此前知性所经历的一切阶段,因为这些都是保存在理性中的运动。关键是追问什么改变了,什么被保留,什么渗入了其它阶段。总体趋势是,越深入这本书,篇幅就越长。
249.
理性的格言:“应当存在的,事实上也存在;而仅仅应当存在、却不实际存在的,没有真理。”诸法则作为概念属于理性。诸概念拥有显现,并且对观察来说是真实的。
250.
理性起初将其真理视为异于自身概念的。但它接受那些在感性经验中奠基得并不完善、只以类比与概率来谈论的法则,这就与前者相矛盾。因此,诸法则必须在意识及其概念中有一个来源,由概念所规定。但理性仍然认为自身不完善,因为它还保留着对一种简单直接的普遍性的想象。由于这一普遍性尚且不是内在地发展的普遍性,意识力图将概念中固定不变的东西,与外在于它的感性现实中变化的东西对应起来;当它无法一举在显现中看到这一普遍性时,就认为自身不完善。
251.
实验是提炼诸普遍性的努力。这些普遍性是从其现实的本体中解放出来、从其上提升出来的谓词。因此,它们不被称作物体,而被称作质料。这里需要注意,提炼并非对诸普遍性的简单抽象,而是对包裹在感性材料中、自我发展的概念的充实与分化;这一概念要在其自由运动中被提升出来:概念就是事物如何在其环境中表现不同、并有所发展的法则。
252.
尚且本能地活动着的理性,没有意识到自身已经生成了“一个非感性的感性之物,一个无形体却又客观的存在”。
254.~255.
这样的普遍对象,现在是一个自身运动的对象(而非以概率形式施加于显现的普遍者,这一对象通过反思的实验从感性材料中提取出来),一切其它静止的有规定的对象都在这些自身运动的有机体中消解,并以它们为中心。这创造了无机自然与有机自然的划分。需要注意的是,黑格尔在这里谈论的动物,并非仅仅是表面意义上的动物,也是有生命的存在,包括莱布尼茨的种子动物。无机自然与有机自然的划分是偶合的,因为这两种自然对彼此漠然无差别,因此必须在目的论的外部关系中被确立。
256.
但有机体的目的,不仅仅外在于它周围的自然,它自身也是环流。
257.
有机体作为对他者漠然无差别的而与他者相关。然而,这种漠然无差别被它对他者的寻求与纳入所扬弃。这一对中心的寻求,只是重新发现了从最初就已经在那里的东西,因为被纳入的无非就是目的本身向外伸展的活动。他者并非仅仅是目的的手段,而是目的自身所产生的、作为其必然补足的手段,并且就是目的自身。
258.
对意识来说,目的似乎既被设定为外在于作为其手段的现实性,又作为意识的对象而外在于意识。
260.
对有机体来说,两个环节首先是一个外在目的,有机体的任何行动都偶然地与之相关,因此是渺小而无关紧要的;但它也在普遍的目的中消解,成为一个必然的环节,因此是天意性的。
261.
对仍然被其追求存在之简单直接普遍性的本能束缚着的理性来说,这些过程只是含混而潜在的,尚未对它充分发展出来。一旦目的被视为超越的,超越性就开始构成其两个方面:作为意识的目的,以及作为物的目的,因为这两者实际上是同一的;物性对于物是它的目的,正如它对于意识也是目的。物性无非就是这一加倍,而加倍无非就是超越性。
262.~266.
对这一加倍的描绘:在形式上,它是物与意识的加倍,在内容上,它是物与物性的加倍。超越性由此退回内与外的表象思维。内与外通过表达性而统一于同一本体之中。内是灵魂,外是现实存在。但有些动物并未充分发展内外关系,例如植物性生命,因此是更为漠然无差别的环节。莱布尼茨的世界,充满生命,也充满僵尸。
269.
灵魂被设定为内在者,其外在方面得到表达。这些表达直接关联于内在者,因此区别于一般的外在者。而这些项之间的关系,必须在观察中显出其没有真理,因为灵魂是流动的,始终改变自身的规定与面貌,并渗透一切形态。灵魂无法被彻底解读,它在外部表达出来的性质也同样如此。这是因为,这些性质始终是反应性的、反思性的,而反思是最纯粹的流动性。
274.~275.
这些性质可以被看作在量上相关,也可以被看作在质上相关。但量的关系并非本质性的,无法澄清其意义;而质的关系并非通过其外部表现而得到阐明,而只通过其内部发展得到阐明;作为外部表现,它们彼此漠然无差别,正如感性材料彼此漠然无差别,并且同样偶然、同样碰巧,随着每一种情境的变化而变化。
276.
因此,解剖学的诸部分不能被视为固定的外部表现,而必须被视为这种外化的流动过程。也就是说,必须将它理解为活的。外在者必须内在于内在者。
279.
对知性来说仅仅是过渡的东西,在这里是一个处于其普遍个体化中的对象。这不是说个体性没有作为一性对知性呈现,而是说,作为一性的个体性仍然是片面的,个体性并未被提升、扬弃到其恰当的形式,而只是消解于流变与过渡之中,并未被把握为贯穿过渡而持存的。如果将这种对象化或提升视为主题化,并没有错:此前,每一个对象都在过渡中消解,但现在,这一过渡本身就是被主题化的对象。
在每一个阶段,对这一阶段的澄清与充实,都要求从这一阶段本身的视角,重述此前发展中已经发生的一切。因此,在理性这一部分中,每一个先前阶段都被重新理解为保存在其中的环节。意识最初只看到存在;随后,它看到另一个意识;最后,它看到自身。它最初看到自身与存在对立;随后,它看到自身与他者并肩作战;最后,它看到自身面对自身。
8
283.~287.
外在者自在地就是为他者者:它是有机自然之存在的要素。外在者包含一个为它的内在者,正如现实的生命包含于无机生命中,简单的存续包含于现实生命中。对外在者来说,其内在者被设定为一个简单而普遍的内在者,对它漠然无差别,却只由外在者以数字形式表达。表达性蕴涵一种不对称的力量形式,被表达者比其表达更为本质;而就镜面映照而言,这一关系并不具有传递性。因此,所发生的仅仅是以数字形式将外在者施加于内在者。内在者与外在者结合为一个统一体;但这一统一体是漠然无差别的统一体,因此,它的两个方面在数字的死寂中相关,而非在发展的活的过程中相关。
290.
黑格尔如何看待数量关系,是值得玩味的。对他来说,数学关系似乎如他在序言中所说,是漠然无差别的关系;其中,两个实体虽然相关,却仅仅作为相互对应的两端彼此分立,而非本质地为另一方进行构成。既然它们处于同一个统一体中,它们就相互规定,并在这一意义上相互表征;但因为它们彼此分立、漠然无差别,它们就只在量上、而非本质上相互规定。这意味着,至少漠然无差别与规定之间的对立已经被克服,这与知性中的情况不同;即便在漠然无差别中,诸性质现在也能够漠然无差别地相互规定。只是,这种漠然无差别的规定所处理的只是非本质者,或者说,关系与规定作为量的东西,对它来说仅仅是已经综合起来的内容(一—亦)的一个非本质方面。进一步参见152。
291.
有机的内与外,共同构成本来的内在者,是诸法则及其外部表现;无机的内与外,共同构成本来的外在者,是固定的性质及其外部关系项。而无机者作为有机者本来的外在者,被归摄于有机者之下,因此,有机的普遍者摧毁无机者固定的内在存在,并超出每一种量值。
292.
属是一个活的个体,但它并未被认识为这样的普遍意识,而只是被认识为一个落在数字规定性或数字差异之外的普遍者,一个抽象的普遍者。前者是个体的灵魂,后者是种。而这两项既对立又等价:一个人的灵魂与其人性相对立,却又无非就是其人性。
294.
一般普遍性作为数字系列的系统性,始终被地球的个体化普遍性,以及地球自身所包含的动态差异所扰乱。
295.
世界历史,作为处于居间中介及传递运动中的精神,是一般普遍性与个体普遍性的自我系统化。但有机自然自在地只是这一自我发展的中心,不能被视为整体,因此自在地没有历史。它是非历史的,因为它的发展被认为对自身并非本质:无机性作为有机体的手段,被认为是低等的。这是对活力论的反驳。灵魂如果不纠缠于其骨架之中、并由此转化为精神,就是非历史的。而在这样的情况下,灵魂始终在其一般性中被观照。
296.~297.
由于有机自然在其普遍性中就是个体的地球,而一切发展出来的差异对地球来说都是非本质的,我们就看不到地球与其诸差异之间的任何必然性。但如果一个人所看到的不是地球,而仅仅是无机的系统,没有作为世界历史的精神的中介,一切差异就都只是漠然无差别的测量与计算。两极必须通过世界历史而得到中介,才能同时获得必然性与可理解性。
298.
概念既在有机自然中、又在无机自然中实在化,并在自身运动中将它们结合起来。它作为本质与自我意识,并非那个分裂于普遍者的自我分裂与个体的未分化简单性之间的属。概念就是作为世界历史的精神。运动的有机原则,要与无机的静止及排斥综合起来。
300.
问题更多在于意识或理性所采取的态度:理性只是观察运动,害怕参与其中。因此,它将诸法则视为直接的存在,因而仅仅视为彼此漠然无差别的部分,并未在运动中展开。这不同于我们,我们既是旁观者,偶尔也是行动者。
302.
诸法则现在与灵魂对立;诸法则既是个体性的表现(个体性是所有这些法则所采取的形式),又是个体性的对手(个体性自身是一个自我规定的法则)。这一对立只存在于理性的观察态度中,它将一切存在,包括个体的灵魂,都视为一个直接的、随手可用的存在。我们不再关心有机体与无机自然之间的对立,因为这已在精神的中介中被重述;现在,理性所观察的是直接的精神(神圣人!),以及它如何与其自身的现实存在(习俗)相关。进一步参见乔治·阿甘本。
303.
诸法则是活的,却又是随手可用的。主动的意识本身也同样如此。这是灵魂与其诸能力之间的对立,当然也包括其诸性质,以及它那作为被激活为普遍无机性的无机自然的身体。
306.
单子论。外部情境不过是单子预定的命运,仿佛铭刻在每个单子内表面的装饰。每一个都是自成一体的世界。不能忽视莱布尼茨在这一段落中压倒性的在场。
307.
世界在采取单子的视点时,获得个体形式;但只要它作为独异单子自己的世界而属于该单子,它就被这个单子所转化。
309.
个体性与其世界之间被扬弃的对立,使观察的对象转变为作为他自身与其世界之统一整体的个体性。
310.
现在,灵魂及其活动不再对其身体漠然无差别,也不再将身体视为单纯的性质。相反,身体是个体与其直接被给予的世界的产物。
311.
身体及其世界内在于灵魂。
312.
身体是主动意识与其被反映的活动之间的膜。拉康,镜像认同。为了考察活动本身,意识不信任那不断变化、不断否定的外化活动,而试图观看一个稳定而持存的东西:一种被灌注了活动的被动性。
315.
人不再观察整个生命,而是在整体所拒斥的部分之中、并通过这一部分,观看并解释整体(整体由此就是活动);整体被灌注于这一部分之中,将这一部分转化为符号。
316.
器官就是这样被当作符号的。因为器官是行动由之发生的东西。它们不是行动,因此是稳定的;但它们也不是行为或产物,因此被来源灌注得更多,也更内在于来源。这同样是对莱布尼茨的评论,因为器官作为更接近统一性的生成系列,在他的思想中具有根本性。这里应当注意,世界与意识再次退回一种数量关系,其中一端是更多的活动,另一端则是更少的活动。
317.
这些器官的表达,不仅是被中介的活动的表现,也是对这些被中介的活动的反思的表现。这就是说,作为中介,器官不仅是活动外化所通过的通道,也是与这些外化之物在被重新接纳回自身时相联结的桥梁。它们表达个体如何看待自己的行为。
318.
然而,这种内在表达同样是偶然的,可能需要另一个内在表达,以至无穷。面孔不过是一个面具。
**
319.~320.
面相学只是意谓内在的活动,却无法将它定位于身体之中,而是在身体与行为之间不断往返,将两个极端作为对立面卷入恶无限。最终,它所能说出的,既没有实质,也没有根据。原因在于,它将个体视为仅仅被范畴固定的东西,没有看到活动与身体并非作为两个彼此漠然无差别、偶然的极点,参与一种静态的对应关系,而是作为整体参与一种传递的发展。可对照尼采关于身体及其习惯性思想的论述,当然,尼采走向了不同的方向。
9
322.
因此,器官的被动存在必须消解于个体性的实际实行之中;也就是说,消解于行为之中,消解于包含并发展器官之意图的行为之中。尽管行为被外化并且可变,我们仍然必须找到一种方式,看到这样的行为如何能够获得持久性,而不是试图退回面相学。最滑稽的一段。
323.
另一种关系是,精神在其行动中反思进入自身,是个体性的终极运动,然而这一个体性又对其最外层领域漠然无差别。这就是说,精神拥有自身的内在身体,与其外在身体相对立,而它的表达在这一作为内在者的器官中是主动的,并在因果上作用于另一个身体。
325.
这就是说,为了将客观生产的器官重新归摄于自身之中,一个反思的器官是必要的,因为器官自在地只是一个对精神漠然无差别的现实存在,它必须通过另一个器官的中介而与精神相关,而这另一个器官本身就是自身反思与自身运动。
327.
大脑就是这一自身反思与在自身之内的自为存在的器官。
328.
如果大脑是自我意识的器官,那么颅骨就是它的表达,也是它所加工的物。
329.~330.
大脑既是使颅骨现实化的有机来源,又是作用于已经现实化的颅骨的机械原因。大脑自身又是在有机发展中的一个器官与诸多器官。作为原因,大脑始终是自我规定且无限的,再加上它与颅骨之间关系的无规定性,所以颅骨根本不能指示精神。
331.
“人的现实性与存在就是他的颅骨。观察着它们的意识,就是这样理解这一关系及其两端的。”
340.
精神最糟糕的状态,是它已经完全异化自身,不再将自身认作精神,而是认作一块骨头。正因为它已经达到对立的顶峰,将自身视为一具死尸,因此最为沮丧,它才得以颠倒这一认识,并将自身恰恰视为处于更高存在中的自身。
341.~343.
对本节此前内容的一次非常有帮助而流畅的重述。
344.
“精神的存在是一块骨头”的双重意义。第一种意义是反思性的。首先,精神被一个物所持有;没有其对象,理性就不是自身,而理性被其对象所持有。由这一态度定义的意识,是观察的意识。但它也认识到否定的真理,即存在着的物必然受到将物与自身等同起来的无限判断的中介。以这种方式,作为理性的物,作为反理性而与理性相对而立,而意识不过就是自我意识或自为存在。
345.
第二种意义是未经反思的,沉入关于符号的胡言乱语的恶无限。
346.
如果理性只是将自身作为他者来领会,也就是说,如果它未经反思地将自身作为物来观察,它就是最低、最沮丧的;但如果它又在其无限判断中理解自身,它就是最高的。
347.
理性在他者中将自身认作一切实在性,将其对象认作被扬弃而持存的自身。它并非盲目地将自身视为纯粹对象,而是将自身视为自我发展的运动。但到目前为止,这还只是原则上如此,我们需要重述一切先前环节,来充实这一新出现的认识。
349.
新构成的是伦理世界,或者说生活世界,一切先前环节都在其中,以其普遍的个体性而统一起来。
350.
这样的伦理生活,预设了在一个民族国家中作为统一的公民的政治生活。而这种生活的诸环节,对意识来说是完全明确的。
354.~356.
然而,这一伦理生活到目前为止只是原则上确立,尚未处于完全的现实性中(因为它尚未在其一切环节中展开),因为伦理秩序到目前为止只是作为一个特定而有限的存在,与个体相对而立。而虽然个体已经达到了对幸福的信赖或信仰(即与普遍精神的统一),这一幸福却尚未在其一切被重述的环节中展开。
357.~359.
对接下来依次展开之内容的介绍。随后给出的东西,首先作为自然冲动的个别而孤立的环节出现,这些冲动推动着伦理生活本身的形成;但这些自然冲动也各自自足,伦理生活必须以一种更高的形式,在自身中重述它们,并确定自身是它们的本质真理。因此,当这些冲动如此发展时,它们最终认识到一种更高的真理,但尚未具有追求这一真理的明确必然性;只有内在于伦理意识本身,这样的必然性才明确成立。这就是说,意识在达到对伦理生活的认识之后,必须重述其一切环节,以充实并证实其真实性;否则,伦理秩序就会被这些作为孤立满足的环节所吞没。前者导向未经反思的伦理生活,后者作为反思则导向道德。在接下来的诸节中,后一种来自道德的视角,即伦理已经丧失、必须被重新构成的视角,受到强调,而这些形式也被视为与道德相一致,因为我们更熟悉这一视角;尽管同样有必要阐明,道德自身如何从伦理本体中发展出来,并最初被认作真理。因此,读者应当看到的是,道德的自我意识如何试图在其其它环节中,为自身使自身现实化。为什么黑格尔在这里决定跳过这一步?
10
360.~362.
追求幸福的生活。然而,幸福不过是自我意识对自身的享有。它直接享有自身,并将自身视为超越诸法则、习俗与理论的,享受着纯粹个体性之现实性的完整环节,不受任何普遍中介的约束。但它一旦享有自身,就看到自身存续于他者之中,而他者因此作为普遍者与它统一起来。
363.
当意识看到自身并与自身相关时,它也看到,自己并未将自身看作令人满足的,而是其快乐总被自身的空虚所驱散。这一空虚不再是未经反思的简单存在作为物性的空虚。相反,这一空虚是抽象与还原的纯粹运动。然而,这一纯粹运动只在其抽象意义上被看待,并非概念作为概念本身在其具体的自我发展中被看待,而是概念作为一个存在被看待,而这无非就是一个圆圈。这个圆圈就是命运或必然性。
364.
这一困境的原因在于,个体性将自身视为纯粹而绝对的,与共同体及一切普遍性相对而立;因此,它必须过渡到一个同样绝对的、对普遍环节的抽象。
365.
这一过渡是未经中介的。两种形态彼此漠然无差别,其内容相对立。一方是另一方的绝对否定。对意识来说是其行为或其本质之现实化的东西,结果实际上却属于一个绝对他者。俄狄浦斯。因为快乐的感受转瞬即逝,否定一发生,它就被颠倒为痛苦,它从未在充分的满足中看见自身。
366.
概括这一发展。首先,一个个体将自身设定为其所属于的伦理本体之外的直接他者。这个个体不符合任何规则或法则。随后,这个个体必须被认作自身,并被否定。在这一否定中,它在快乐中享有自身。但这一快乐转瞬即逝,因为当它否定自身时,自身就丧失了,成为仅仅一个环节。快乐于是丧失于痛苦之中。但自为存在并非像物被欲望否定那样被否定,而是被运动、思想或范畴,被自身观照及其所采取的形态所否定。这就是说,自为存在在抽象中的持存对象,被同样抽象的概念的自在存在所否定,即自由被必然性否定。因为个体性未经中介,其否定也同样未经中介。马基雅维利:没有德性与秩序,人就很容易成为机运的猎物。
367.
但命运的必然性不过是意识内部的必然性,无非就是心之法则。
368.~369.
新的形式直接在自身内心的自由中认识到必然性。因此,它将自己所脱离的伦理本体视为压迫着真正的法则与真正的必然性。然而,它没有认识到,实在世界的这一对立是其必然环节,必须在自身中被重新产生,因为它不理解自身的起源,尚未重述自身先前的发展,而只是将压迫视为一个被给予的存在。如果它认识到这一点,就会理解,自己作为这一压迫的被中介的产物,必然在自身中始终重新产生同样的压迫,而这样的压迫自在地永远无法被抹除。这就是它未经反思地力图取消这一对立、消灭现实的原因。
370.~374.
这一意识看到,其心之法则实际上只是某种特殊倾向,而非普遍法则。它的“普遍法则”实际上作为一个本身就是压迫的产物,与它对立。它不再在其法则或其行动中认识到自身。它将自身视为否定所有这些心之法则的自由普遍者,却以这种方式包含了一切现实。没有一条出自内心的法则能够作为普遍法则起作用。因此,它认识到,自己曾经鄙视的现实如何实际上包含着它所渴求的普遍者,因为这些法则隐含地包含着所有个体的意识。
376.~378.
意识在其双重性中所经历的,比疯狂还糟。疯狂是在固定关系中,坚持一方为本质,并隐含着其矛盾。但这里却是迷乱的理性,因为它将两者都视为本质,并且充分意识到真理的两面性。这是自负之中的自怜的心悸。但这一自怜的狂言也并非错误。
379.
这一所有心灵的公共秩序,实际上就是所有心灵的丧失。这样的和解实际上是一场对所有人的屠杀。永久和平就是被实施的战争。霍布斯的问题。
381.
意识认识到自身在前两种形态中的错误,现在不再将自身置于伦理本体之外,而是决意将其取消。通过取消个体性,个体被重新归摄于绝对秩序之下,而这一秩序无非就是以“世道”为名,对先前诸运动的完整重述。
382.~383.
德性将自身视为困境的解决,因此将自身放在困境的对面。它在世道面前牺牲个体性,以赋予世道现实性,并显示其本质。这就是说,它试图通过使世界的绝对普遍性与秩序现实化、并净化世界的诸颠倒来克服世界,而非像快乐的情形那样诉诸空洞的必然性,也非像内心的情形那样诉诸自相矛盾而混乱的秩序。它试图通过牺牲个体性来达成这一点,因为它将个体性视为问题的来源,以及此后一切错误的前提。
384.~385.
最初,德性只意味着天赋与力量。因为这里的诸德性只是在信仰中指向一个遥远的目的,因此仍然依赖世界。由此,它们没有独立的地位,而是抽象的,并且处于与世界的关系中。它们只是由个体运用来反对个体的德性(因为反对个体,就恰恰是成为一个个体)。
386.
但这些德性并非善本身,因此德性的真理本质上是一种姿态。因为被牺牲的东西对善本身来说是非本质的,而善无论如何都“获胜”。但被牺牲的东西,作为那些个体化的德性,仍然是最先取消个体的普遍者;因此,这些为了一个“他者”、为了一个个体而被牺牲的普遍者,反过来又是有价值、有德性的。在与恶斗争时,善成为现实。因此,有德性的意识试图攻击每一个已经现实化的善,将它从世界中的颠倒里解脱出来。它只在与恶斗争中寻求善,因此也只在恶中使善现实化。通过消灭恶,德性使恶复活,并且必须在牺牲自身中保存自身。圣人不死,大盗不止。
387.~389.
世界本质上也可以牺牲一切,包括善或普遍者,因为它将善视为一个漠然无差别的对象。如果它不将善视为一个死的对象,而视为具有内在存在的东西,它也只是将其视为为自身的、被动的工具。因此,恶德或者与有德性的意识同样有德性(因为它同样愿意牺牲),或者同样不可伤害、不可改变。后者是因为,邪恶者或者对被指出为善的东西漠然无差别,或者只是为了利用并颠倒善而关心善。世界颠倒善,但其颠倒只是使善实在化。德性区分自在的善与为他者的善,却没有意识到,它所认为的自在的善,无非就是为自身的善,因此是“实在的”和“世俗的”。
390.
德性的问题不在于德性不如恶德,而在于德性的内容未被良好定义。如果它仅仅是对个体性的牺牲,它就缺乏一切内容。
391.~393.
德性的世界。神义论。
394.
“行动在其自身中就是其真理与现实性,而个体性在其展现或表达中,相对于行动,就是自在自为的目的。”
395.
一切先前环节现在都在理性中展开并被重述,成为理性的内容,尽管它们仍然与作为其形式、或其属的理性本身相对立。
黑格尔的方法,是如下自然运动:首先,列举对立的环节(例如一与亦);其次,发展一种扬弃,由此在一种新形式中克服对立(例如知性);第三,在这一新形式之下重述先前环节(在这一新视角下重述发展的完整过程),以生成其新的内容,同时保存此前的东西(例如力);第四,将这一新内容与由内容澄清的新形式相对立,从而回到第一步(例如力与法则)。
11
397.
又一次需要重述,以充实新的形式或范畴。
399.
个体的意识知道自身具有有规定的存在,作为它在自身要素中行动于其中的现实。
401.
不再有两种现实。内在的现实,现在对意识来说只是现实的一种表象,而这一表象的本质则来自意识内部明确呈现的现实。存在与行动的第一次统一是直接的;仅凭人对事物的兴趣,人就立即开始行动,这已经预设了目的与手段的一切情境,并由此使自身的个体性现实化。
402.
然而,已经现实化的作品,在其与行动相对应的特殊性中,似乎与普遍的个体性相对立。
403.
既然行动的目的与完成的作品都是自我表达,就没有好与坏的尺度。每一件作品都同等地表达个体性。
404.
在作为自我表达的工作中,没有后悔,没有与“可能之物”的比较,也没有反思。相反,人直接在自己的工作中找到快乐。
405.
作品是普遍意识的特殊现实化。因此,作品对意识来说,就是对其自身作品的扬弃。作品始终被重新解释,由此被消解并重新产生。
406.
意识在面对其作品时,认识到作为结果的做与存在之间的对立。在这一认识中,它知道,这一对立作为开端、也作为终点,都是不可逾越的。因为在其做之中,它预设了一个特定的存在,但这一特定的存在除了其纯粹的做之外,没有任何内容(因为它自在地无非就是绝对的过渡)。
407.
做与存在分离开来,彼此漠然无差别,只通过诸偶然事件而相互关联,而这些偶然事件是目的的被动手段。
408.
偶然性本身是偶然的。必然性仍然隐含在行动的概念中,尽管它们看似彼此漠然无差别。虽然作品似乎对行动漠然无差别,但对作品的否定本身也是一个作品,是一个有待被否定的实在的做,并表明自身实际上是个体性现实化中的一个必然环节。这是因为,在这一阶段,整个现实已经被自我意识所扬弃,因此任何做或否定本身都被否定。否则,如果这一真理尚未被把握,意识就会退回工作与否定的恶无限。
409.
真正的作品由此作为“事情的核心”产生出来。
411.
手头的事情(区分手头的事情与事情的核心是否重要?)具有抽象普遍者的形式,是一个属,先前一切环节都是它的种。
412.
忙于手头事情的意识,就是诚实的意识。
413.
这一意识总是以“事情做完了”的感觉安慰自身。这就是说,它总是对自己说:至少我做成了点什么。事实上,诚实的良心不过是个忙人。
415.
诚实的良心实际上根本不诚实,因为它虽然希望如此,却无法仅凭自身空洞而抽象的“事情”,就从现实中抽离出来;它看到自己在做这个,而本质上也在做那个;它做着一件具体的事,却意谓着在做一件一般的事,而它看似在做一件一般的事,本质上却只是在使事情琐碎化。这就是“忙碌”。它想要的是始终让自己忙碌,被“手头的事”占据,从而避免看到自身的真理。尼采笔下的学者。当事情进展不佳时,它以“至少做完了”来安慰自己(一般化);而当事情完成时,它又以“我为什么在浪费时间?”来使自己焦躁。
416.
“追逐”的恶无限。既然意识只看到诸环节的抽象统一,一切环节就都落在这一统一之外,采取各自的形式而独立存在。它们无限地欺骗自身。
418.
简单的范畴已经获得其内容,不再仅仅是一个思想。相反,它是客观而现实的作品,是为每一个人、也为所有人的作品(或主题),可变却又持存,并由此成为真正的主体。胡塞尔:科学作为伦理追求的主体间任务。
420.
如此前预告的,伦理本体的重新构成;这一本体是绝对的、自由的、具有权威的。
422.
有规定的诸法则群,对意识来说,是其预先被给予、因而直接的伦理性内容,它们直接表达伦理本体。
424.
伦理性所采取的宣告与命题的形式,立即与其偶然的内容相冲突。看似直接地真而善的东西,实际上充满中介,或者需要中介。
425.
“换句话说,这样的法则停留于应当,它们没有现实性;它们不是法则,而仅仅是诫命。”
426.~428.
不存在这样的绝对或普遍内容。因为这样的内容实际上根本没有内容,其真理是一个空洞的形式。黑格尔对康德伦理学的第一次批评,他在下一节进一步展开这一批评。而作为诸法则之命令者的理性,实际上只是它们的检验者,考察这些法则是否自相矛盾。
429.
伦理本体不再作为一个分离的存在,与有规定的诸法则相对而立,而本身就是这些法则在其下显示自身、并被作为自身来考虑或检验的形式。诸法则并非由理性给予,而是被给予理性。
430.
但如果理性只是诸法则的检验者,它就完全无能为力,而伦理性本身也没有内容。
431.
任何伦理法则中的任何自相矛盾,都不是来自形式,而是来自其内容的规定。因此,检验要求首先刻画伦理内容,而检验本身就是这种内容的发展。
433.
如果诸法则的内容与形式被保持为分离的,意识就只是忙于试图规定法则、制定法则,而这些又不是法则。它于是退回忙碌,即讼棍式的狡诈。参见蒙田与卢梭关于法律繁殖作为社会之恶的论述。法律的繁殖损害其权威。
434.
诚实相信,这些对法则的规定总是已经拥有权威,而这并不真实。但没有这一信念,这些孤立的环节就只会分崩离析;现在,法则的检验者会将一切既定法则视为任性的,而立法者则会命令各种法则,却没有真正的伦理权威,仅仅是暴虐的。
435.
需要注意,发展有三种基本结果。或者退步,或者停留在当前阶段,或者超出并克服当前阶段。如果停留在当前阶段,就或者落向一端,死在那里,作为无而被否定,或者开始追逐一端又追逐另一端,由此使自身陷入恶无限。在这个例子中,如果一个人不克服当前处境,他就或者成为暴君而被杀,或者成为没有法则的国家之敌而被杀(绝对否定),或者成为一个天真地就法则权威欺骗自身与他人的讼棍(恶无限)。
437.
绝对的伦理本体,在这里以其形式,在其基础上被充分确立。它被视为诸法则的建制。然而,这一建制必须重述所有早先环节,以充实其内容,而这一充实必定会动摇其基础。
12
438.
“当理性关于自身是一切实在性的确定性被提升为真理,并且它意识到自身就是自己的世界、世界就是自身时,理性就是精神。”确定性是形式,真理是展开了的内容。“但自在自为的[精神性]本质,同时又现实地作为意识存在,并且意识到自身,这就是精神。”
440.
“因此,精神是自立的、绝对的、实在的存在。一切先前的意识形态都是它的抽象形式。它们产生于精神对自身的分析、对其诸环节的区分,以及在每个环节中的暂时停留。对这些环节的孤立,预设了精神自身,并在精神中存续;换句话说,这种孤立只存在于作为具体存在的精神中。”这一点极为关键。接下来的部分,对于理解精神所经历的阶段同样至关重要:首先,为抽象的自在、并作为抽象的自在,精神是感性确定性、知觉与知性;其次,当它强调自为的环节时,精神就是自我意识;但当两个环节综合为自在自为时,作为自我意识的意识,就是拥有理性的意识;然而,只有当这一理性不再仅仅被拥有,而自身现实化时,精神才形成。
442.
活的伦理世界需要重述并发展其一切环节。在其第一次重述中,它看到自身的直接性,在与自身相对立的法则世界中被给予;这一分裂随后被追溯到教化与信仰之间的分裂;然后,当这些环节被重新结合起来时,就是启蒙。
444.
精神的两面,即伦理本体与行动的个体化意识,通过自我意识而被中介,并进入相互的现实化。
445.
作为进行中介的自我意识,这一中介或者更多采取直接本体的一面,即神的法,或者更多采取本体性意识的一面,即人的法。
446.~450.
如果自我意识采取人的法的形式,它就是自身运动、自身理解并经过中介的伦理本体的形式,即国家。然而,它必须面对神的法那不理解的、直接而隐含的本质,即家庭。因此,国家在这里还只是一个形式,尚未由家庭发展的内容所充实。
451.
家庭的目的始终是个体与家庭之间的直接关系。这就是说,这里的个体并非为了普遍者的公民,而是作为普遍者的个体。它的对象并非由权力与财富所中介的公民,而是个体本身。因此,它看到纯粹的个体性:正如人看到一个纯粹的抽象,这样的个体性是死的个体性。家庭是死者的神龛。
452.
由于与纯粹的个体化普遍者具有这种直接性,家庭依据其成员是什么而与之相关,而非依据他们如何作为。但因为家庭被提升到直接自然之上,并且自身是伦理性的,它就将他们纯粹的存在转变为纯粹的做:一个自觉的纪念行动被施加于死者。葬礼是为了将死去的个体保存在其被提升的伦理性中,使他们免于重新坠入自然、退回非自我意识存在的危险。
453.
因此,埋葬死者是最典型的神的法。黑格尔对《安提戈涅》的解读。在这里,安提戈涅潜在的乱伦倾向,在一个隐约提示的张力中被解释:驱动安提戈涅的恰恰是义务,而非爱。而个体的这一神圣性,本身就是国家建立其上的全能根据与大地。
455.
发展了的政府分化为民间团体(如果强大的家族就是这些团体,它们就不是字面上的家庭,而是家族—公民团体,例如黑手党)。但国家必须不时被拉回其开端,内争对于更新国家的力量与统一是绝对必要的。通过这些革命,依赖与结党的腐败被消除,自由的普遍意识重新苏醒;不自由者被杀,作为单纯的自然存在被从国家中“解放”出来,民间团体则被淹没。这就是马基雅维利所谓“总是将国家带回其开端”。而这就是神的法的主权:一个被净化的家庭,一场国葬。
456.~459.
家庭内部诸环节的发展,以及对家庭的分析。丈夫与妻子通过感情相联结,并看到他们的关系在孩子身上被对象化。孩子逐渐独立,与其直接来源分离,而只有在父母逝去之后,孩子才能充分实现其自身的自为存在。因此,只有作为兄弟姐妹,家庭成员才以最简单、最平等的方式相关。除了年龄差异,还有性别差异。对女性来说,家庭是她们生活于其中的普遍要素;因此,她们将家庭视为特别具有伦理性的;但这一伦理性只在她们的兄弟身上得到纯粹的充实,因为作为母亲或妻子,总有非伦理的、偶然的因素介入关系:她通过爱与丈夫相关,通过所有权与孩子相关。然而,男性只是将家庭视为特殊者,因为他们在家庭之外拥有自己的普遍要素。因此,伦理生活在其普遍性中,通过姐妹—兄弟关系而现实化。姐妹成为神的法的守护者,兄弟成为国家的公民。而他们在其直接关系中,将自身显示为普遍规定的两个自然的或直接的极点,这就是性别差异。
461.
四重结构:民族、家庭;男人、女人。民族与家庭作为被中介的本体而相互中介,男人与女人也作为自我意识而相互中介。此外,正如男人是更偏向民族一方的中介者,女人则是更偏向家庭一方的中介者;他们通过孩子被中介,但父母与孩子之间又通过姐妹关系与兄弟关系被中介,这充实了民族的普遍中介,并再次反映回家庭中。一切先前环节在这一新的整体中处于平衡。
462.
因此,复仇以正义这一伦理形式被带入城邦。在城邦中蒙受不义的个体,在其作为纯粹个体的力量中重新苏醒,成为萦绕不散的幽灵;但它所寻求的并非简单的血债血偿(否则就不是真正的“正义”),而是使其死亡被揭示并获得理由。幽灵寻求的是“他为什么必须死的理由”。幽灵寻求的是,其死亡对于其存在并非偶然,而是自我意识的。因此,埃斯库罗斯笔下有雅典娜的胜利,以及复仇女神的转化。
463.
男人是向下的运动,女人则是向上的。
464.
男人与女人作为对手直接地彼此面对。他们进行一场普遍性反对个体性的永久战争,或者说世界反对神圣者的战争,而自我意识被困在这一斗争的延续中。
465.
悲剧是本质环节与非本质环节之间的碰撞,结果是牺牲非本质者,拯救本质的崇高;喜剧则是本质环节与另一个本质环节之间的碰撞,结果是一切本质的绝对虚无主义。
466.
伦理意识的第一阶段是悲剧性的,因为它将一方视为非本质的现实,并试图通过否定、牺牲这一现实来拯救本质。
467.
对伦理意识来说,它已经遗忘了(或者毋宁说“压抑在记忆中”)自己曾有的一切片面性。它将自身视为本质上就是世界现实的个体性;固定本质的世界及其自身的固定性正在扬弃自身,并在个体中被个体性所扬弃。伦理意识并非一种本质意识,而是与世界运动统一的意识。因此,它相信,世界及其行动将充实它自己的法则,其权利由现实本身保障,而法则无非就是它作为自身真理所知道的东西。
468.
然而,对个体意识来说,其知识与其自身的法则相矛盾。它只将其主动的自身认识为有过犯、有罪的,因为世界分裂于两种法之间。它或者退回不行动,回忆一切被压抑的内容,或者必须作为一个普遍地被中介的个体,承认自身的罪责,或者坚持其片面性,假装已经遗忘这一偏见。如果它选择最后一种,就会遭受另一种法的复仇,而这另一种法也是它自己的良心。黑格尔将俄狄浦斯解释为不知的知者。
470.
但单纯缺乏知识,对伦理意识来说是不够的。伦理意识最终必须在尚未行动之前,就承认自身的罪责,因为它需要只在现实性中认识自身的真理,而现实性正是它自身的对立面。它必须是悲剧性的,即牺牲自身,以拯救其自身本质的现实性。
471.
但现实性自身,作为本质法则的对立面,必须否定这一法则的意义。因此,伦理意识所做的,作为伦理行动变得没有意义。它仅仅意味着一个固定的性情、倾向或自然(例如女性的自然),却没有自身运动的现实来支撑。
472.
但另一种法同样被摧毁。消逝的消逝。性格(即固定的自然)与伦理力量一样,都在自身中包含他者,因为它们同样在他者中现实化。在这一相互毁灭中,它们看到全能的命运。
473.
先前的斗争在这里被重述为自然与国家之间、以兄弟相残为形式的斗争。
475.
战争与爱,是青年吸引女性的原则,而女性是诸个体性的代表。战争是否定的力量,消解分离、更新自由,创造共同站立的本真个体性(海德格尔),而这些个体性作为自然力量,由他们的女性守护并保存。然而,战士—爱人与其女人并肩独立,对民族来说是无灵魂的、死的。
479.
这一无灵魂精神的新共同体,是法律人格的共同体。它们是斯多亚意识的实在化形式,而斯多亚意识局限于简单的思想。
480.
法律性的抽象与未经组织的内容相对立。参见叶夫根尼·帕舒卡尼斯。然而,这一空洞的范畴是肯定的,并受到承认。
481.
与被剥夺了内容的诸个体性形式相对而立的,是一个独异的个体性,它是一切本质、一切内容,具有绝对却任意的权力,无非就是混沌。霍布斯的利维坦。
482.
在利维坦一方,意识只是疯狂。在臣民一方,意识不仅没有内容,而且正在丧失其形式本身,因为形式无非就是内容的自我生成。
483.
自我意识的真理,现在作为一个全能而异化的自我意识,被摆在它自己面前;这一自我意识既是它自身,也是它自身的内容;它的一切内容由此集中于其对立面之中。
13
484.
世界自在地、或在其存在中,并非一个异于精神的要素;相反,它是精神作为自身的否定要素。只有在这样的外化中,精神才获得本体。
485.
这提示了两种意识之间的对立:一种现实的意识,一种本质的意识。
486.
对下文的序言。相互异化产生了对彼岸的知性洞见。启蒙“污染”彼岸,将它带回此世,由此产生道德。
487.
从此世逃向纯粹意识的彼岸,并非宗教,而是信仰。然而,信仰依赖于此世,因此始终也是一个概念。
488.
异化同时就是将世界作为自我意识的内容来占有。两个空洞的法律人格直接相对而立的状态,被取代了;那些狂暴的要素再次被重新构成为一个人自己的教化。
489.
法律地位的尊严最为可鄙,并且只作为一种“类型”才是特定的。
490.
教化既是个体意识对其自身世界的符合,又是自身以其世界之形态而进行的外化。
491.
异化者将异化自身。教化中善与恶的固定范畴,将重新规定自身,并转变为其对立面,意识最终将在其中认识到自身,而那些环节将被视为被重述的环节。
492.
黑格尔式的四元素学说。
493.~495.
善是精神的自在存在。恶是精神的为他者存在,是要被牺牲的。国家权力是善,财富是恶。但在与二者的关系中,意识必须作为它们的否定统一体,将它们内外翻转。
496.
善与恶的唯一准则,是与精神相似或不相似。在其与精神的关系中,善或恶本身获得精神的自然,丧失作为对象的最初固定性。
497.~499.
两个相互颠覆、因而具有精神性的判断。而意识自身包含着善与恶的这一双重性,这取决于它与现实者的本质关系。
500.~501.
看到与自身相似者的意识,看到善与和谐,因此是高贵的。相反的意识则是卑贱的。
502.
双重的意识在各种相互扬弃的关系中,与其对象(国家或财富)相关,由此将其自身的对象视为其自我意识。
503.~507.
高贵意识在其服务的英雄主义中与国家相关,并在其英雄主义中,通过使国家现实化而使自身现实化。国家于是从异化的主体那里获得其本质存在。但这一异化只是存在的异化,而非自为存在的异化。国家尚未拥有意志。而自为存在或自我意识仍然在个体一方,并在个体为自身进谏所保留的余地中,与国家权力相对立。此时的国家只是一个装置,没有自己的意志,也没有生命,而是被任意攫取来服务于任何党派。因此,国家所需要的,不仅是对个体生命的放弃——这只会是惰性与死亡——而是个体的意志,以构成一个普遍意志。
508.~510.
这一点非常出人意料,也很有意思。语言是个体与国家之间的中介;或者毋宁说,语言对意识而言隐含的本质,就是国家权力。这里可以看到卢梭对黑格尔的影响。语言在这里从其形式方面,或者作为一种功能来考虑。它并非某个内容的形式,而是自身表达言说者的内容,或者说表达能够言说的精神。拉康,言说行为的主体。这不同于抽象个体性的意义,后者只是法律地位。因为在这里,言说行为的主体是自我分化的内容的形式,因此能够将自身的自我意识给予自身的本质存在。它是意义的来源,也是为自身建造其自身世界的来源。柏拉图的《理想国》:言说中的城邦就是言说的城邦,就是言说本身。然而,这一语言仍然分裂于言说者与被谈论/被言说所指向者之间,尚未成为精神向自身言说自身的语言。
511.
沉默的英雄主义成为谄媚的英雄主义,在言说中与绝对君主相关。绝对君主是言说的枢轴,是绝对个体性的名字,它比那些歌颂它的其它个体性更为本质。
512.
然而,这一更为本质的自我意识,又反映回高贵意识,作为授权贵族之思想与行动的东西。贵族是普遍意志的具体现实化;君主则是一个有待被扬弃、被牺牲的意志,因此它只是财富。一旦被牺牲,它所留下的就只是一个名字。
513.
因此,所谓高贵意识实际上是和谐的分裂,而在其对国家的服务中,它的真理只是其财富。它的卑贱就在于此。
514.
现在,我们转而观察高贵意识如何回应财富;它将财富视为非本质的普遍性,与财富的关系仅仅是感激。
515.
因此,财富需要的是相反的运动:它所要求的,不是被清算,而是本质存在的固定性,以保持为一个稳定而未被取消的自我意识。
516.~518.
然而,感激是一种厌恶。因为它向自我意识表明,它所认为非本质的东西,实际上独立于它,并且取决于另一个人格。高贵意识不愿感激。因此,它总是趋向忘恩负义。它由此是卑贱的。
519.
与接受者一样,或许甚至更甚,施惠者也将其自我意识赠送出去。但在牺牲自身时,它变得更为普遍,并声称拥有他者的灵魂,因为它已经异化自己的灵魂,以便将作为他者的自身置于赠与之下。给予者的傲慢就在于此。在牺牲中,自我意识实际上什么也没有牺牲,只是希望在他者中看到属于自己的东西。
520.
正如言说中有一个城邦,城邦中有正义,言说中也有正义:这就是财富在言说中的分配,或者说关于财产的言谈,以及语言与财富发生关系的方式。然而,这种卑下谄媚的语言,总是包含语言的另一面;同一判断就是无限判断;主语与谓语的分裂,就是二者的同一。因此,谄媚的王国就是文人的王国:它是本真而真实的文化。文化就是谄媚,反之亦然。
521.
文人的王国就是谄媚的王国。它意识到这一绝对的颠倒。作为这样的意识,它将自身视为一切颠倒的绝对流转的游戏,因此就是油嘴滑舌或机巧。
523.
诚实在文化中没有位置;对于复杂、受过教养、充满反讽的心灵,它说不出任何后者尚未知晓的新东西。反讽的心灵刀枪不入。这也是弱辞如何战胜强辞的方式。
524.
这是对厌世的评论。参见莫里哀与斯威夫特:对全体人类的普遍厌恶,不可能逃离的理想,简单性的彻底不可能。
525.~526.
这一反讽的意识只是精神的否定形态,只将自身认识为普遍的矛盾,却尚未达到超出恶无限的一切消逝的消逝,也尚未发展出它在原则上包含的新的肯定内容:信仰之彼岸的肯定性。
14
527.
最初,信仰只是表象思维,因此只是肯定性尚未被释放出来的否定者。这就是说,在这里,思想已经获得其现实性与内容,尽管这一内容尚未展开,仍然隐含于其中。这是因为,纯粹思想被理解为一切实在性、自我意识与意识本身,而非仅仅一个否定的彼岸。
528.
信仰中的宗教,是一种具有本体的信念:它拥有本体,却尚未现实化。
529.
纯粹洞见与纯粹思想(信仰)之间的对立:一方是否定的自我意识,另一方则是设定某一本质的意识。
530.~534.
对信仰结构的分析。信仰既是对诸精神之独特存在的设定(它们之所以独特,是因为它们拥有内容,并且作为超越的来源,生成教化的现实世界),又是追求与这些存在统一的努力。同样需要注意,这一信仰的意识并非谴责的意识,因为它已经看到一切在内在上都是徒然的,并不打算为了拯救什么而批评任何反讽或颠倒的才华。
536.
“纯粹洞见不仅是自我意识的理性关于自身是一切真理的确定性:它知道自身就是如此。”
537.
对纯粹洞见结构的分析。纯粹洞见就是概念的否定运动本身。它取消一切本质差异(因为没有什么保持恒定),却只是返回一个绝对的质的差异(每一个“他者”都同等地是一个自身,即内在的自我分化)。这就是说,所有被某个自身的力量所持有的存在,只有在量上才能与其它自身所持有的存在相比较,仅仅因为它们是同样的自身;但它们之所以相同,在于它们都是绝对不同、并进行分化的。
539.
纯粹洞见是对一切特殊洞见的一般领会。
540.
纯粹洞见于是知道,自身依赖于其内容的徒然,并且就是自身的徒然;整体由此作为整体被保存,机智的诸判断被综合为一般的机智。这一一般的机智与本质性的信仰相对立。
541.
在直接的对立中,纯粹洞见在其对立面,即信仰中,看到自身的否定内容。
542.
对启蒙来说,迷信的结构在于:群众被束缚于诸本质之中,而自我意识(因为现实世界或彼岸中不能缺少这一要素)与恶意,则全部被保留给祭司这一独立阶层,以及终极的绝对存在。这就是说,它在祭司阶层的反射形象中,看到自身对诸本质的反对,以及自身的恶意。哲人是新的祭司(哲学是公民宗教),只不过这些祭司并不独立于群众,而只是将他们“真实的”教诲传播给群众。
543.
恶意与暴君,是与其所欺骗的群众分立的个体性。这一个体性不可伤害,因为它已经被切断、已经死亡,并且直接地与普遍者相关,因此它对启蒙来说只是一个不共戴天的敌人:与祭司阶层直接对抗,意味着生死搏斗,而被置于这一搏斗中的启蒙哲人,并不比祭司更好,只不过侍奉不同的主人。为了避免这样的倒退,启蒙因此必须作用于尚未发展的群众,将他们发展为它自身所是的真正普遍者,并在民众的中介中带出绝对的中介。
544.
信仰是作为自在的洞见的自我意识,而启蒙则是自为。
545.
每一种感染都始于无人察觉。马基雅维利:腐化与阴谋必须是长期的;尼采:腐化是一个民族的秋天。这是一段优美的文字。
548.
对启蒙的怀疑内在于启蒙。一旦某件事发生,就再也无法回头。施特劳斯,卢梭。对启蒙来说,启蒙的第一阶段,是退回致命的敌对。
549.~550.
启蒙与信仰,都是纯粹洞见将自身作为绝对自我意识来生产和直观的同一个过程。启蒙关乎自我意识的绝对信赖,然而,这仍然是一种信仰。它将宗教视为意识所产生的虚构,但它自身也恰恰如此。因此,宗教从未欺骗人;相反,是民众自身要求宗教;宗教已经是被中介的现实,正如启蒙也将自身视为如此。然而,必须追问,这种“中介”是否是回溯性地构想出来的:只有通过启蒙的中介,宗教现在才成为被中介的精神。启蒙只有在天真时才是宗教的敌人;相反,它是宗教的自我发展。
552.~556.
启蒙最初对宗教提出的批评,全部都是误解。因为在真理上,宗教是精神自觉而内在的自身运动,它在中介中、也在对自身的真理中;但对于它的另一个环节,即启蒙来说,情况不同:启蒙将这一中介运动视为存在与自我意识之间的直接性或外部对立,因此,它要求历史(作为诸事件)、本体(作为诸对象)或行动(作为诸放弃)的额外中介。启蒙由此显出自身同样是一个谎言。
557.
在相同的他者之间的这一对立中,每一方都向另一方呈现为欺骗。两者都被扬弃,宗教在大众的宗教启蒙(宗教改革)中看到自身的真理,启蒙则在有教养的公民宗教(科学/新哲学)的建立中看到自身的真理;每一方都在对另一方的反应与中介中如此。
558.~560.
因此,启蒙的肯定内容无非就是虚无主义。一切(每一个此处与现在,因而是感性确定性)都属于自我意识的绝对空无,但每一个东西自身又作为与自身对立的空无,与空无相对立;一切都是否定的、进行否定的;一切都是有用的、进行使用的。这里的要点在于,一切都是绝对的独异性(德勒兹,主体性的黑洞)。这是它对宗教呈现的样子,也是它如何腐化宗教、使宗教成为同样东西的方式。在这里,精神面临再次退回感性确定性与绝对虚无主义的风险;但通过引入一种新内容,即使用与被使用,或者说效用,这一风险得以避免,因为它已经知道,其真理在于自身与他者、自为存在与为他者存在的同一。因为它在形式上已经是精神,它就以一个自身被另一个自身使用的精神形式,拥有同样的绝对对立。将这种普遍使用,与作为冲突和对立之表现的普遍战争对照,就能看到,对同一内容的这一重述,如何已经将自身显示为一种和解。
还需要再次注意,到目前为止,精神只是在重述其先前的环节。精神仍然处于对立与敌对中,因为它已经异化自身。在理性中,自我意识与另一个自我意识处于直接关系;虽然它将他者知道为自身,但其知识仍然只是确定性,而非真理;也就是说,它只是直接地将另一个自身知道为对象,却尚未与之中介。到目前为止,精神也只是将这些直接性,作为其自身被异化的自身来重述;它知道,这样的异化在本质上、在真理上属于自身。换句话说,女人与男人、家庭与国家、诚实与谄媚、启蒙与宗教之间的一切敌对,无非是精神理解此前个体与习俗等等之间对立的方式。改变的是,此前显得确定而直接的对立,现在在其更具体、被中介的内容中展开了(例如,个体与习俗之间抽象而形式的对立,现在体现于性别差异中,并由两性的结合所中介)。这就是说,此前被理解为与主观自身相对立的客观自身,现在从整体精神的视角被重新解释:此前被视为简单的“我”与“世界”的对立,现在被理解为一个具体而实在的联合中的发展,例如男人与女人,或共同体与其神明。虽然精神内部的这一中介可能退回其未经中介的形式,它却始终能够向进一步的中介作出新的发展,最终达到精神的自我理解;因此,意识从客观的诸主体性走向诸主体间性,其中,即便对立或客观性也只是异化。
15
561.
对启蒙来说,宗教是终极的效用。
562.~564.
对信仰来说,这样的真理令人厌恶。然而,这也表明,宗教如何将被启蒙“腐化”,并开始认识其自身的真理,而这一真理不在于自身同一性,而在于被颠倒。启蒙就是宗教的真理。
565.~573.
信仰在启蒙中、并通过启蒙找到自身的真理:1. 经启蒙提醒,它知道自身是一种行动,而非表象思维,因为信仰总是在绝对存在中找到自身;2. 它知道,其崇敬的对象既是现实存在,又是彼岸;3. 它知道,既将其知识的根据视为对任何知识而言都是偶然的,又声称拥有直接而绝对的知识,是不诚实的,因为启蒙在反对这一直接的自我确信时,全然是中介;4. 它知道,其自身的放弃实际上是虚伪的,真正的牺牲不在于任何特殊行动,而在于意志的内在性,这一内在性与绝对者相呼应。
575.
“因此,一方内部发生的分裂,看似不幸,却反而表明了这一方的幸运。”
578.
启蒙的两个党派,意图表达同一个同一的真理:“绝对者”是直接的绝对思想,是知性直观,却仍然与意识相关;“纯粹物质”是经过中介的抽象,却仍然保持为纯粹内在而绝对的。抽象就是知性直观,一方预设另一方。
579.
两个党派共存,构成绝对者内部的内在分化或交替。绝对者直接地是纯粹存在与纯粹否定性(因此,一方以对象的形式为另一方存在),所以是纯粹效用:纯粹的自为存在直接摆动为纯粹的为他者存在。
580.
有用者的两个环节是纯粹而绝对的,并处于交替的恶无限中。在这里,存在与概念尚未成为同一个东西,因为自为仍然只是一个闪烁的结果,而非统摄的统一,它作为抽象与其它环节相对立。因为有用者仍然采取对象的形式,它就拥有一个世界。
581.
通过拥有有用者这一对象,纯粹洞见满足于自身。它有自己的对象可以否定、可以肯定,并能与之逗留。这是其现实的自身确定性与物性的本体性存在相遇的恶无限。“两个世界和解了,天国被移植到下方的大地。”
582.~585.
然而,有用者作为对象,或者作为追求的目的,同样是虚构的。因为这样的交替很快在原则上找到一种平衡。它确定,一切对象都可以被取消。它采取绝对自由的形式。在绝对自由中,每一个自我意识都是一切意识的众多体,每一个个体都是绝对普遍者。而这样的力量现在势不可挡,因为意识就是一切现实;现在,意识确定自己拥有作为纯粹自我意识或绝对概念的自身,因此必定能够取消一切受限的领域。
588.
没有任何肯定的东西保留下来,因为一切都被个体化的普遍意志否定。这是一种倒退。没有自由的对象。因为一切持存的或特殊的东西,仍然总是作为普遍作品而被否定。退回教化的恶无限。因为普遍者不再能够成为特殊者的惰性之属,让两者都在其中保持不被否定;相反,一切都是绝对否定。换句话说,对于作为普遍者的个体,不可能有任何代表或代理。
589.
绝对自由就是绝对毁灭。
590.
绝对自由的抽象,是最糟糕的死亡:它不仅是死亡,而且不是被供奉或光荣的死亡;相反,它彻底没有意义。
593.
人再次需要从这一绝对恐怖中幸存。通过幸存,人就成为肯定的否定性,并采取真理的形式,而非仅仅确定性的形式。
594.
逃离绝对恐怖,是退回起点,其终点将困在精神与本体的一般相互渗透中。但克服这一绝对恐怖是可能的:绝对自由在摆脱实在存在之后,就不再受到实在存在的任何限制;它现在是绝对的肯定性,而它自身作为认识,就是它自身的存在。精神现在作为纯粹的认识与意愿,完全处于自身的要素中,它知道自身是普遍主体,而对象则作为主体性本身,直接与主体合一。每一个对象都是自由的对象,即主体。在这里,精神成为道德的,成为自在地自为的。
597.
精神的绝对直接性,就是其自身的绝对中介。它不再是存在或实存的直接性,如伦理性格的直接性,而是精神的直接性,是精神认识并意愿自身的直接性。
598.
理性确定自身是一切现实。精神知道自身是一切现实,并将其作为展开了的真理与知识而持有。它通过道德来持有这一真理。
16
599.
自然与自然世界诞生于道德意识内部,因为道德意识是概念,必须包含他异性;而既然它的首要本体是义务,义务消解一切异己的对象,道德意识就对现实世界漠然无差别,并将另一个世界从自身中释放出去。这个被释放的现实世界,就是自然世界。
600.
相互的漠然无差别,设定了相互的绝对排斥。
601.~602.
然而,自然与道德必须和谐,因为义务必须被完成并个体化。因此,幸福与义务应当和谐,是一个公设,因为到目前为止,这仍然只是一个公设,尚未在概念中展开。
603.
义务必须被完成,但它也必须保持绝对超越。因此,自然与道德之统一的圆满必须被实行,却又被无限推迟。这是一项并非任务的任务。
604.
隐含的和谐,是道德与自然之间的和谐,或者说道德之为自然。这仍然将两端视为各自停留于自身、被迫对应的两个极端。明确的和谐,则是道德的自身与感性的自身之间的和谐;这是自为存在,它将这一统一定位于一个单一意识的发展之中,而非两个世界之间被迫的对应。这里,我们就有了现实的做,作为自在的统一(死的统一)与自为的统一(流动中的统一)之间的中介。前者是客观统一(单独来看,它是没有现实化的必然性),后者是主观统一(单独来看,它是偶然的现实性)。前者是完成,后者是任务。每一端都通过“现实的做”与另一端统一。
606.
内在而神圣的道德意识,作为另一个意识对意识显现。
608.
意识的这一分裂,反过来又为意识创造了不和谐;它不相信幸福与义务的统一能够由自身达成,而认为根据其自身的不完善,这一统一只能作为恩典的赠予而获得。
612.
对先前诸环节的仔细反思或重述,指示了一种新的形态,而非未经反思地落入恶无限:只是因为现实的道德意识将自身作为自己的直接对象,它才将自身视为尚未完成的目的;但这一对象源自自身。因此,道德意识是想象或两面性的意识:它将其自身道德性的真理视为非道德者,将非道德者的本质视为道德。它与现实世界将就着相处。
616.
这一点至关重要,也常常容易误导:这并非仅仅是说,道德意识尚未知道自身的真理,即它将自身生产为对象;而是说,为了充分获得这一真理,它必须仿佛自己只是刚刚起源那样,重述自身。
617.~627.
普遍的道德结果成为普遍的两面性。它所声称想要达成的东西,取消了它自身。它要求自然与道德之间的统一;它要求道德行动的中介,要求将隐含的统一明确地为意识带出;但自在与自为相对立,因为一个道德行动仅仅是个体行动,与绝对义务的普遍性相对立,因此只是偶然的,自在地什么也没有达成,也因此在没有自在的情况下不真正是自为的,而是从自身脱落;道德行动实际上是不道德的,道德的完善在真理上是不完善。因此,追问为什么那些配得幸福的人在此世受苦,没有意义,因为道德实际上是不道德,是无效的。那个施予神圣性的另一个纯粹意识,或者说神圣意识,自身也被拆解为取决于现实的东西。
628.
道德意识逃离这一普遍的虚伪,完全落回自身之内,从而否定整个自然世界,撤回自身对世界的道德“观看”。
631.
道德结果成为普遍的虚伪。通过拒绝自然与义务之间的任何肯定关系,美的良心构成了虚伪的第一个环节,因此是一种重述。这不是倒退,因为这一良心只坚持它已经获得的、关于虚伪之普遍性的真理。这提出了一个非常重要的问题:重述与倒退有何不同?我试着说,重述发生于我们记住刚刚获得的真理,即新的形式,并回头重新思考先前诸环节之时;倒退则发生于意识遗忘了这一回顾之时。这里,良心并非简单地倒退,因为它记得普遍的虚伪,意识到另一个世界,以及自身逃离的选择。只有当它完全遗忘另一个世界,并将自身视为一个简单的肯定精神时,它才倒退。任何重述都同样如此:对我们来说是重述的东西,对那一意识来说可以是进步,也同样可以成为倒退。
633.
以良心为形式的新意识形态,重述了法律人格与绝对自由的先前环节。法律人格是被剥夺内容的纯粹形式;绝对自由拥有内容;而这一良心以世界的形式拥有其自身的内容。这就是说,不同于绝对自由,它不需要作为一个与主体性分离、并追求主体性的对象,在世界中使自身现实化。相反,因为它已经是自身的主体,这一良心就已经是属于世界的、主体间的。
634.~640.
良心放弃一切伪装,因为它不需要依赖现实或现实世界。相反,它直接而立即地确定自己拥有一个被其它主体承认的、道德的目的王国。它相信自己不需要自然或客观性:它直接就是主体间的。
17
641.
“‘事情本身’在伦理领域中具有一般的本体性,在教化中具有外部存在,在道德中具有思想的自我认识的本质性;而在良心中,它就是知道这些环节存在于自身之内的主体。”
642.~645.
良心将行动视为由判断所认识并衡量的;即便这样的知识不完整,人不可能知道关于一个行动的一切,这样的不完整也是被允许的,因为知识的完整性已经被留给其它主体,作为主体内在性的展现,并在主体间受到承认。此外,一个行动只有作为主体间的行为,才符合纯粹义务。在主体性一端,这是一种纯粹的确信,一种确定感:一个行动并非为了完成任何目的,而是为了向其它主体展示良心的完全自由。因此,这一确信没有内容,只将内容包含为一个必然环节,而内容本身没有意义。斯宾诺莎的伦理世界观:诸主体间的本质交织成共同的命运。就其形式与内容而言,没有任何功利主义能够抵挡良心,因为功利主义本身依赖于特殊的洞见与计算,而一切这样的计算都外在于良心,普遍者本身也与个体一样,是有规定的。
648.~651.
对生死斗争的重述。良心必须通过否定他者所持有、并作为他者良心之表达的现实,来保存自身。现实已经成为诸良心相互交流的媒介,或者毋宁说,成为诸良心相互杀戮的战场。这里重要的并非任何有规定的现实,而是被认识为良心本身之自我表达的现实。
652.~653.
语言就是这一现实。而作为诸自身只与诸自身相关、并将它们作为他者来相关的现实,它被提升出简单的命令,或“言说,否则就死”的命令式,现在成为自由的表达。言说现在不再是被命令的必然性,而是被宣告的义务或确信。
654.
“正是这一形式要被确立为现实的:是自身本身在语言中现实地存在,宣告自身是真理,并且正是通过这样做,承认一切其它自身,也被它们承认。”
656.~658.
在某种程度上,这是斯宾诺莎式的。意识在现实化的宗教中知道自身是神。但到目前为止,良心仍然将普遍而全能的意识视为直接对它在场的。在这一坍缩到抽象的极端、并知道它们是抽象的过程中,精神冒着退回先前死亡的风险,因为一切抽象都在这一自身观照中消失。它只看到自身,并且直接与自身统一(注意,在这里,中介意味着区别与分离),因为抽象的绝对者作为它自身的自身,直接对它在场。言说只是逐渐消逝的回声。它遗忘了自身的存在,成为“美的灵魂”。苦恼意识并不将自身理解为明确的概念,而只是隐含的确定性;美的灵魂则肯定地将自身看到并理解为一个否定自身的概念,因此“沉没”于概念中,而非仅仅“主动否定”他者;此外,它知道自身是诸法则的来源,因此并非努力完成某个或另一个义务,并挣扎着调和它们,而是努力将其自身作为一切义务与法则的来源,恰切地宣告出来。因此,道德世界观的内在真理,并非要完成何种义务,而是何种行动要被辩护并表达;或者毋宁说,此前,一个行动总是因违反法则或做错事而有罪,但现在,一个行动始终在内在上获得辩护,只因玷污灵魂、未能表达灵魂究竟多么正义而美丽,才是有罪的。
659.
个体义务与普遍义务,或者内容与形式之间,被压抑的对立回归了。它将自身视为有良心的、纯粹地行动的,但它也看到,他者可以将它解释为特殊的、非普遍的、为了某种隐秘目的的。正如我们很快将看到的,这里真正重要的,是这一“解释”的问题。在这里,如果意识退回个体与普遍者之间的矛盾,它就只是退回道德世界观。
660.~661.
为了确信自身而消灭他者良心的方式,是将他者的行动重新解释为虚伪:揭露他者的良心。这是因为,特殊的良心(个体)声称自己是普遍者,而普遍者不相信这一声称,必须揭开伪装。不能简单地说,因为虚伪承认德性,它就知道自身是恶的,因为它所承认的,只是一个没有实质的德性面具;此外,它相信,通过承认德性,自己就在某种程度上是有德性的,因此未能看到自身的虚伪。
662.~663.
然而,这一揭露不能来自任何片面的坚持。因为如果邪恶的良心坚持下去,它就只是承认自身是邪恶的,并不后悔,也不对自身显得真正矛盾;也就是说,它仍然未能看到自身的虚伪。片面的普遍良心也无法完成这一揭露,因为它在坚持中,只揭露出自身就是它所不是的东西,即恶。这是多么精彩的转折,因为现在我们看到,“普遍意识”实际上无非就是另一个虚伪的个体意识,它除了评判之外什么也没有完成,因为它看到一切行动都可能被误解,并且正在主动误解所有这些行动,却将自身视为一个纯洁而美丽的灵魂!
664.~665.
在两种良心的纠缠中,第一个邪恶的良心,在第二个普遍的良心中看到与自身相似的东西。而普遍的良心,在这一揭露他者的尝试中,只揭露了自身的虚伪,因为它只将那些现实的良心批评为邪恶,却不使自身现实化,也没有认识到,这样的被动性本身就是一个与其自身良心相矛盾的特殊行为。“在贴身男仆眼里,没有人是英雄;然而,这并不是因为那个人不是英雄,而是因为男仆——是男仆……因此,对评判的意识来说,没有任何行动不能被它用个体性的个人方面,与行动的普遍方面相对立,并对行动者扮演道德男仆的角色。”
666.~667.
批评并评判的良心将自身视为优越的,而它的真理却被邪恶的良心认识到。邪恶的良心认同评判者,并试图说服他。但这一评判者必定心硬,并不容易被说服:它仍然认为自身优越,没有任何必然性迫使它放弃这一点。但在拒绝罪人的忏悔时,评判者坚硬的心否定了精神的流动,并卷入自身的矛盾:它拒绝接受行动者的忏悔或真实的言说,尽管通过这一言说,行为的现实性本身已被交付给精神的言说,而它自身的全部存在恰恰依赖言说。缄默而沉默的行动者愿意向评判者开口,评判者却拒绝倾听。
669.
做与说、行动与言说之间的终极和解。未被承认的行动,只是在言说中被宣告,却未通过言说得到解释;在其坚持中,它变得顽固地犯罪;评判者另一方空洞的言说也同样如此,它在谴责特殊者时是虚伪的。只有双方都放弃坚持,罪人打破沉默去忏悔,评判者软化自身的心去倾听,真正的言说才能再次被确立,将现实的做与普遍的说结合起来。在这一相互承认中,它们宽恕彼此的恶,并真正将彼此视为一个自身。
671.
普遍的纯粹知识与个体的自觉义务这两个环节,绝对不同,并在这一绝对对立中构成神的绝对概念:与自身绝对同一的自身,与绝对不同的自身。一种新的确定性,作为神的确定性:我的扩展与分裂为二,而这二者仍然统一为一。
672.~677.
这些段落至关重要。从现在开始,精神确定,自身并非仅仅是物,并非否定性,并非另一个自我意识作为对象的直接在场,并非自身作为对象的直接在场,并非作为绝对否定性的自我意识,而是在自身之内与自身相交通的肯定的主体间性。
678.
宗教所需要的是一次新的重述,真正将自身充实为自身的自由现实性。
679.
又一段至关重要的文字。这为我们提供了时间与黑格尔哲学之间关系的一条线索。精神在其发展中,作为散布而分离的诸形态,在时间中展开;但这些形态将先前形态作为自身内部的环节保存下来,这些环节因此成为整体的非时间性部分。这呼应了序言中所说的:精神必须先劳动,才能达到其形态;但在新获得的形态中,它必须回忆并反思一切早先形态,将它们作为自觉的环节保存,由此看到自身在内容上获得充实,并成为精神本身的自觉整体。否则,精神就只会在时间中遗忘自身,停留于世俗。概念的劳动不占用时间;它是精神思考自身。它是非历史的,因为它只是一种重述,或者对自身来源的重新激活;它又是历史的,因为它是首先由世界历史促成并允许的智慧。它并非真正的时间,因为它只是一种重新激活;它又是历史的终结,因为它已经达到其全部潜能。能够做的,只是回忆被遗忘的东西,却不可能再有历史的新突破。换句话说,时间的取消并不是说分化被取消,而只是说,分化被作为整体、作为其自身来把握:没有任何真正新的东西,从来就没有过这样的东西。而显现出来的,实际上是历史与思想之间的张力,不过这一张力最终消解于两种运动的汇合,一种向前,一种沿自己的足迹回溯。时间实际上不是时间,而非时间也确实就是绝对时间:诸形态融为诸环节,但诸环节自身也能够退回诸形态。
680.
特定的现实形态,随后作为环节被保存在一个现实的宗教中,并被采用,使这一宗教形成特定的形态。这就是说,作为已经达到形式、却遗忘自身充实内容、因此尚未发展的精神,它作为宗教采取不同的形态。一个尚不能将其它形态重述为自身环节的宗教,是不完整的,它自身就是一个特定形态。因此,宗教有一种时间性的发生,其中诸形态尚未转化为诸环节。
681.
这一比喻完全没有帮助。但清楚的是,对于诸形态,总是离散的,总是回到一个新的“节点”;但一旦作为诸环节统一起来,它们就成为连续的,因此是一个非时间性的整体。或者毋宁说,曾经是时间性进展与返回的单一线条,现在成为一个结构的非时间性铺展。在现实的精神中,一些是环节,而一个形态被视为本体;但对我们来说,一切都是环节,没有任何本体不是主体。
682.
诸形态是与其它形式、也与内容分立的形式。与形态冲突的内容产生一个新形态,旧形态在其中被作为内容的一个环节吸收进来。宗教的直接形态由此分裂为多种形态,它们最终在终极形态中被吸收为仅仅是环节。
18
684.
诸宗教要被置于一个等级秩序中。较低的宗教虽然包含较高的要素,但这些要素只是与较低的要素并列,并且只被那些较低的要素作为其自身统一体中的形态所占用。重要的是结构。
686.
宗教概念的第一次分裂,将其自身的对象生成为直接的在场,生成为感性确定性。但这也是精神的感性确定性,因此是自我意识作为主人或奴隶的确定性。这是“无形态”的光生成黑暗并将其消解的第一种形态。参见海德格尔与芬克关于赫拉克利特的讨论。
688.
统一的光必须再次散布为诸多自立的形式,它们赋予光以持存的内容。
689.
自在的花卉宗教的多样性,转化为动物精神主动而好战的自为部落主义。
690.
自在的环节与另一个自为的环节统一,二者融合为作品与其工匠之间的关系。参见《蒂迈欧》。
692.
第一个工匠神是一位建筑师:建筑提供死的、漠然无差别的建筑可理解性,只是为了浸入活的光中,并赋予光一种微妙的反射性。
694.
然而,作品是死的,其内在生命尚未被带出,直到它不再浸入作为抽象生命的纯粹光中,而是浸入作为其装饰的植物之现实生命中。
695.
动物的形态与人的形态被带入神庙。但它们仍然无言。
696.
与精神的这一外在形态相对的,是同样沉默而漠然无差别的黑暗之石。
698.
作为工匠的精神,现在成为一个艺术家,塑造着与无意识斗争的自我意识。
700.
艺术宗教是一个精神,其中精神将自身作为他者而与自身和解。因此,这样的宗教只有在伦理领域中才有其恰当位置,并且自身就是精神的作品。
702.~704.
最初,这样的艺术只是从属于习俗与伦理领域。但随着伦理世界的瓦解,精神逃入自身,现在只认识到自身。它将自身视为不受约束的否定力量,将其普遍而具体的世界视为被施加的激情。它于是加工其激情。
706.
不可公度性是有机生命的本质。通过这些比率,生命最初作为直接性而在艺术中在场。
707.
作为普遍者的非伦理自然,随后被民族精神的伦理领域所克服。而在这一斗争中,自然者与精神者都达到了普遍性。
708.
在作品中,人最初看到普遍性作为一个没有灵感的作品而在场,与一个自身或个体精神的绝对不安相对照、相对立。
710.
作品与自身、普遍性与个体性之间的这一对立,在语言的媒介中被克服。神性使自身在语言中在场的一种形式,是颂歌;神性在其中与自身普遍地交流。
711.
神谕是宗教的第一种语言形式。神性在其中显现为异己的自我意识,显现为普遍性的偶然抽象。
712.
在共同体自我发展的精神中,普遍性被特殊化,并弥漫于语言之中。言说表达普遍真理,而偶然事实则由偶然的神谕裁定。然而,即使这些神谕只涉及特殊事件,它们也被归摄于语言的普遍性中;因为在与普遍者融合时,它成为终极真理:一切必然性都同样是偶然性,那些否认诸特殊性、或对它们漠然无差别的人,仍然卷入绝对的命运中。检验神谕者自身受到检验;神谕成为自我实现的预言。
713.~715.
这一普遍语言,随后要在祭祀中与其死的雕像统一。抽象的祭祀只是与本体的想象性统一,以及想象性的净化仪式。
716.
现实的祭祀必须通过个体化,使其自身的纯粹精神实在化。
717.~718.
现实的祭祀通过献祭行为达成这一和解。它将其自身与作品牺牲给普遍者;但普遍者也作为现实存在、作为随后在备好的宴席中被个体消费的诸物,而为自身被牺牲。第一种仪式是献给冥界的祭祀,在原则上没有回报;然而,第二种仪式是为宴席所作的准备,通过它,普遍者与自身在肯定性中被中介。自身只将很少一部分献祭给冥界,其余一切都留作宴席;它由此哄骗神圣存在与自身统一,即进入仪式经济的循环。
719.
通过作为共同体实践的神庙装饰,献祭与虔敬所表达的否定性,在神庙本身的肯定性中被中介。
19
720.~721.
人们崇敬的惰性本体,转化为一个具有自我意识的他异性,它已在自身中重述本体性与精神性的方面,表现为女性与男性的对立。
722.~724.
黑格尔对《酒神的女信徒》的解读。女性力量仍然与男性力量相对峙,并在纯粹狂乱的享乐与欲望中吞噬精神,因为女性力量是直接与本体相关的自我意识,因此直接就是欲望的原则。
725.~726.
这一不受约束的狂欢力量,随后要被加工为稳定的形态。这样的形态或身体性,固定在行列中的人类祭司身上。在这一行列的英雄身上,酒神的狂乱与清晰的言说统一起来;他是民族精神作为具有自我意识的本体,在其终极普遍性中的最终表达。
727.~729.
英雄的普遍自我意识表达民族精神,然而,民族精神与其尚未被重述的内容处于直接关系。民族精神需要在其自身的开放性中,归摄一切精神的世界。这产生了荷马史诗,其中世界自身通过个体的声音被生产出来,各种精神(英雄)沉浸于缪斯或谟涅摩绪涅这一统摄的精神之中。不再是作为女性与男性的、无意识与有意识的自我意识之间的对立,现在是一个精神与诸多精神的对立。要看到这一世界性,必须看荷马关于阿喀琉斯之盾的诗句。
730.~731.
现在,神与人明确地作为自我意识,在两端相互关联,而非一端仅仅是对本体的意识、另一端是欲望的自身,或者一端是欲望的自身、另一端是精神的撤退。它们处于神的自我意识与凡人的自我意识之间的对峙中。然而,这样的关系仍然卷入表象思维;也就是说,它卷入在神与凡人的特殊性和普遍性之间移动的恶无限;神依赖于凡人,却又必须超越凡人;因此,神既是普遍的,又受制于盲目的必然性。
732.
必然性将神与英雄结合起来。参见芬克对赫拉克利特关于不朽者凝望凡人之残篇的解释。但这意味着,必然性不能是某种抽象形式,而必须自身沉浸于其内容之中;因此,原本只是一个漠然无差别的媒介、必然性在其中被编织的吟游诗人,也将参与进来。换句话说,言说的抽象必然性必须在言说者中、并由言说者现实化,从而成为具体的必然性。黑格尔甚至在这里也没有忘记媒介与元文本性的重要,这一点相当值得注意。
733.
悲剧是内在性与外在性的统一得以产生的更高形式。吟游诗人是演员,他以角色的语言言说。演员对面具是本质性的;但反过来也同样真实。面具对演员是本质性的。
734.
合唱队作为普通民众,只是材料,是被动的、被否定的。他们缺乏统一自身的否定力量,只构成散布的内容本身。这就是他们无能为力的原因。
735.
合唱队是漠然无差别的、作为观众的意识,不参与戏剧。这不同于我们这些意识发展的观察者,因为我们偶尔会扮演自己的角色;或者毋宁说,我们不断地扮演自己的角色。
735.
在悲剧中,许多角色由于主体的消解与抽象而产生,使这些角色成为外在者。
737.
黑格尔是《哈姆雷特》的爱好者,因为哈姆雷特与否定者逗留,因此意识到自我意识,以及真理与知识的欺骗性自然。演员最终必须理解其自身的主体性与晦暗性。否则,它就必须停留在关于自身的知识与无知之间的恶无限这一阶段。
738.~741.
对戏剧结构的分析。本体与自我意识相对立,因此,首先设定一个神及其作为本质的知识。英雄的自我意识接受其片面的真理,并通过其行动摧毁它,由此在死亡的惰性而漠然无差别的普遍性中,在主体性的黑暗中,消灭特殊性。因此,不同于在恶无限中向这边或那边摇摆的合唱队,英雄是对这一恶无限的意识,并将其作为整体理解为绝对虚无主义。这与受过教养的意识对文化所采取的态度相同:一切都同样徒然,没有本体;主体的肯定性由此而来。英雄使必然性现实化,而对合唱队来说,必然性只是彼岸。
742.~743.
然而,命运的这一普遍性,只是作为结果产生出来。而作为结果,它是一个目的,仍然分裂于其在英雄中的现实性与其在观众(合唱队)中的超越性之间。人仍然感到这一虚无主义是遥远的,因为这些其它环节仍然作为彼此区分的抽象而在场。主体仍然只是作为对象在场,尚未作为自身被视为无所不在。
744.
喜剧是这一新的主体性形式,它不将主体视为最终结果或对象,而是从一开始就将其视为前提。它已经完全是其自身,并非作为直接的他异性而在场。在这里,面具不是演员,而是恰恰作为面具与演员之间被揭示的距离而存在:演员没有本体,也没有面具。
746.
黑格尔对《云》的解读。诸理想被从法则与格言的特殊性中提升出来:理性与言说的解放力量,强辞与弱辞之间的对立。因此,黑格尔似乎不同于声称喜剧本质上是保守的施特劳斯;相反,他将喜剧视为一个已经发生的历史事件的症候。
747.
至关重要的一段。喜剧是确定性的终极力量。在喜剧中,一切固定性都被净化为自我意识。从现在起,喜剧意识已经充分重述到绝对自由这一阶段;随后,它需要超出这一阶段,前进到道德,也就是从主体性走向主体间性。
748.~752.
主体就是本体。但在这样的异化中,主体到目前为止仍然只是直接的。而作为直接主体,它只是纯粹形式,已经放开其内容,首先退回法律人格,而苦恼意识实际上就是喜剧意识的真理。“本体与自身的共同丧失,是在‘神死了’这一严酷的话语中表达自身的悲痛。”
753.~755.
重述基督诞生故事的一段优美文字。基督是自在与自为的重生与外化。奥秘的隐含性是父,而自我意识的母性力量则是其现实性。将此与安瑟尔谟的基督论对照。还要注意这里女性与男性之间奇特的颠倒:女性在保持其本体性的同时,成为现实的自为的代表;而男性现在成为神秘的自在。这可能与本体的不同自然有关:此前,本体是简单的存在,被设定为对自我意识来说卑下而异己的;现在,本体是自身,是被设定为与自我意识处于共同体中的自身,因此不再是危险而骚动的女性。
756.
黑格尔的诠释学方法与施特劳斯的方法相对立:隐微解读只是想象性的。
757.~759.
隐微而想象性的彼岸的否定性,由神的现实肯定性的直接性所中介,即基督的化身,作为自我发展并已发展的概念,作为绝对中介的直接性。因此,绝对宗教必须是启示性的:一切知识都在其绝对中介中,作为直接性而被简单地给予。
760.
最后也是最大的圆圈现在闭合了,绝对者在其闭合中被打开:终极形态现在被理解为其自身的环节,时间的终结就是永恒,而永恒就是时间在其绝对而不可阻挡的循环流动中。绝对的抽象就是绝对具体而充实的存在。不同于我们开始时在感性确定性与其绝对普遍者之间的摆动,在这里,诸环节在其绝对展开并充实的环节中统一起来。它们不是两个相互对立、相互排斥的极点;相反,它们在绝对概念中和解。关于这一循环,还需要多说一些。
绝对的循环是一切圆圈的循环。其运动如下。所有先前形态都要在新形态中被理解、被重述为保存下来的环节。诸环节作为整体统一起来,与形态相对立,从而生成一个新形态。较小圆圈的终点,是包容它的圆圈的起点,后者在自身中重述较早的诸形态,那些旧形态最终在新圆圈中消解为保存下来的环节,然而它仍然面临固定化的风险:或者卡在一个被重述的形态中,无法将其转化为环节,最终倒退;或者那些环节作为环节、作为一个完整内容,与形态相对立。但在终极的循环中,形态就是环节,因此,终极的绝对知识,就是作为环节被把握的最初而最直接的环节。在某种意义上,可以将其想象为本轮,只不过最大的圆圈反过来又被锁在最小的圆圈上。
20
761.
“只有当绝对存在被看作直接的自我意识时,它才被认识为精神。”
762.
在绝对精神的这一新形态中,对先前诸环节的重述,以便让我们见证形态消解于其自身展开了的内容之中。
766.
原初的回忆或精神的重述,并非记录事实意义上的历史性;那只会是外在的。相反,人所需要的是先验的历史,其中非历史者被编织进历史之中。
767.~770.
著名的正题—反题—合题三分法,在这里以完全不同的方式被表述。对黑格尔来说,综合仍然只是表象思维,仿佛两个项要从外部被连接起来。这里关键的并非一个死的公式,而是内在于内容的精神运动。
776.
黑格尔虽然诉诸形而上学的算术范式,却拒绝理念数。当然,黑格尔的系统并非简单地是算术的。
779.
至关重要。逻各斯在这里不再是混合的比率;甚至不再是组织诸混合的质的方式;相反,它是概念内在地生成为另一个概念的活动。
786.
最终阶段:绝对精神的内容,被理解为表象思维本身。这就是说,抽象自身就是形态的内容,而这一形态却就是内容本身。这将是终极的重述:终极而绝对的形态的内容被充分展开,以使绝对形态消解于其绝对内容,即精神自身作为外化的抽象所走过的旅程之中。最大圆圈的终点与最小本轮的起点合一;这里并非直接地合一,而是在真理上合一,因为它现在已经在基督的献祭与复活这一内容中充分展开。现在,内容的发展在这一阶段已经完成,绝对知所剩的工作,是使形态消解于内容中,并使内容与形态合一,因为在这里,内容仍然是形态的否定者,反之亦然,而精神只是作为抽象来持有其抽象的内容。换句话说,现在需要的是将一切内容重述为已经展开的内容,而非抽象内容;在这一重述中,形态自身与内容和解,绝对知得以达成。换句话说,精神知道,其形态是绝对的直接统一(启示宗教),其内容是有待中介的绝对差异(神的死亡与复活);同一与差异的终极统一,要在作为绝对知的绝对知中达成。目前,这一统一还只是隐含的,尚未具有自我意识。
788.~805.
一切圆圈的终极循环在这里完成。最后一个圆圈的两个极端,一端触及一切圆圈的开端(最小的本轮),另一端触及终点(第二大的本轮),现在必须在终极圆圈中统一。绝对形式与绝对内容之间终极矛盾的解决,在于形式消解于内容之中,因此,形态自身同时就是放弃形态与重新采取开端;永恒成为时间。这就是齐泽克所谓终极的放下与释放。在这里,诸环节形成形态,并在其形成形态中成为诸环节。在同时亲吻开端与终点时,终极总体将自身认识为一个终极形态,它在重新采取第一个形态的过程中消解自身:在将自身转入有限性时,它知道其无限性就是其真理。意识相信,基督的献祭只是一个对象或内容,自我异化与其自我统一的形态相距遥远;但终极统一认识到,形态实际上就是内容,因此,形态放弃自身的形态,重新进入时间,进入其旅程,同时在这样做时,通过重新采取它起初的形态而持守永恒。
806.
在科学中,不再有意识与自我意识之间的对立。所知者就简单地存在。科学中的一切都是自我奠基并发展的概念。一切都同等地是一个系统的环节,也是诸系统的形态。系统性现在在其终极力量中被充分理解:内在性就是超越性。它从绝对概念过渡到感性确定性。
807.
然而,这不能是一场半心半意的牺牲。相反,外化必须是绝对自由而偶然的。这就是说,绝对者必须成为它绝对不是的东西:产生主体深渊的放手。这里的绝对偶然性简单地意味着:诸圆圈的运动始终指向绝对的无根据。一个只强调其中间空无的圆圈。绝对偶然性无非就是时间与空间的发生,即自然。
808.
然而,始终存在与空无的中介:偶然者的必然性,自由的法则。将自然的时间与空间关联于绝对者的,是(被理解的)历史。但正如概念被外化为感性确定性,发展为诸形态的进程,以自我理解为最终目标,最终目的,即对这一外化本身的最终理解,也要被外化为“概念的内在性”,被抛入时间之中,由此使走向绝对知识的运动,作为一个永恒却又历史性的理解活动而持续。这就是说,被理解的历史,作为黑格尔的《精神现象学》,通过历史的劳动,作为其自我理解的最终结果而达成,而这一结果自身又被抛回历史的绝对流动中。
在启示宗教中,内容(绝对差异)仍然否定地与形态(绝对统一)相对立。和解在于,绝对形态就是放弃自身的形态,并过渡到第一个形态。或者毋宁说,永恒的形态就是其自身在时间中的消解。正因为如此,对整个旅程作为绝对内容的最后重述,才与绝对形态完全和解。所有这些形态都成为绝对知的环节,而绝对知自身却是将所有这些环节释放为其自身独立的形态。绝对知就是将一切概念释放为一切时间。时间的内爆。
意识开始于不断否定其对象,由此将一个主体设定为其对象,并在真理上是自我意识。
自我意识不断否定其它主体,由此将其自身设定为一个在那里的他者,并在真理上是理性。
理性不断否定其自身的诸自身,由此将自身设定为诸主体的共同体,或者主体间性,并在真理上是精神。
精神不断否定其被物化的诸主体间性,由此将自身设定为绝对的主体间性,并在真理上是宗教。
宗教不断否定其一切意识形态,或其全部中介历史,由此将自身设定为绝对直接性,并在真理上是感性确定性或意识。
如果宗教不重新过渡到直接性,圆圈不闭合,就没有理由说明,为什么不存在另一种分裂、仍能在原则上设定某种更高的东西,或者为什么它必须在此处结束,而不带有偶然性或任意性。换句话说,将耶稣基督表征为意识与绝对者之间的中介,实际上是一个障碍;一旦这一表象思维的障碍被移除,人看到“直接性中的死亡”是一个内在于绝对者的产物,就会将耶稣基督转化为一个此时此地,剥去其寓言外衣,将其放置为已死之神的直接性在另一方向上的投射性发展,而非放置在意识与绝对者之间:而这一直接性无非就是我们的感性确定性,我们意识的开端,它不在意识与其终点之间,而是作为一个从其终极终点投射出来的结果。这一点无论如何强调都不为过:耶稣基督是意识与绝对者之间的屏幕表征,而感性确定性则在绝对者的表征之外,是从绝对者投射出来的东西。