Gui Ruiyan

G. W. F. Hegel · 格奥尔格·威廉·弗里德里希·黑格尔
Phenomenology of Spirit · 精神现象学

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Phenomenology of Spirit — Reading notes

Apple Notes

Revised 19 September 2024

In this note / 篇目

1

1.
Philosophy is in the execution (as if anatomy), and not in the “end” misplaced to the beginning. This is important for philosophy needs to reveal truth, and truth misplaced is no truth at all, and should not claim to be the most essential element.

2.
Philosophical work demands a presupposition-less system which in itself for itself is again a self-differentiating movement. This requires not opposition but dialectical movement.

3.
Knowing is a tarrying with and a surrendering to the real issue. To comprehend positively and to judge negatively is to understand the issue in itself and for itself.

4.
Culture and education is a dialectical process that begins with generalities and gradually enriches itself within itself.

5.
Truth is only truth as a whole, as a system. Philosophy strives for Science. Science is actualized Philosophy. Such inner necessity for Science has to be accompanied by outer necessity in actual history, which nevertheless is independent from all specifics: an actual but nonetheless transcendental history. See Jacob Klein.

6.
The Absolute is not bare intuition or assertion. It is not simply positivity. Rather, it has to take the form of the Notion and be discursive.

7.
Spirit desires intuition or feeling because it has done away with the rudimentary being but cannot gather itself in its new content; thus casting away its original content, it desires the return of some pure content or material.

8.
The New Science has abandoned the old content but is enfeebled to provide new content. Thus Spirit only sees the here and now and experience; which is but the supplement to the other extreme, the “feeling” of Romanticism. It only desires feeling because it knows no better remedy and has lost all power to “think” and “conceptualize” a new content. So this is twofold: first, it resorts to crude feeling because the new science itself has torn concepts asunder and relegated thought to experience (from Being to Subject), and is thus habituated to feeling and experience; on the other hand, being too much astray from the true path, it has forgotten all its previous efforts and can grope along only as it remembers most lately.

10.
“The power of Spirit is only as great as its expression, its depth only as deep as it dares to spread out and lose itself in its exposition.”

11.
The New contra The Old. The new science, a science of the subject, of the negative, against the science of being, of the posited absolute. Modern science vs philosophy. Against Aristotelianism that presupposes substantial forms and beings.

13.
Science in its incipience is universal, abstract and esoteric. Only in its full development it is enriched and fulfilled and becomes concrete and fully intelligible. It is only fully intelligible if it is intelligible to everyone. That is, if anyone can grasp its content. This is not possible with the empty formula. Rather Science has to reach out of itself and provide a concrete ladder for any consciousness.

14.~16.
The dynamic between the two sciences. The New Science is not forceful enough because it lacks its immanent force. Rather, it has assumed a formalism that is empty, the same it assumes an empty sentimentalism, and its endeavor an empty repetition.

17.
Spinoza. The realization that Substance qua God reduces the complexity of self-consciousness in Being to pure simplicity of Being, or on the other hand Thought becomes itself undifferentiated (the Idea of God), or finally is expounded the inert simplicity of Thought united to Being.

18.~22.
Substance is Subject. Being is Becoming. The simplicity of immediacy is the immediacy of mediation.

23.
“God” is Subject incomplete. For it anticipates the Subject by positing a meaningless negativity: God is the naming name. But God as such is only an inert principle, just as dialectics (the self-differentiating differentiation) not carried out is but an abstraction. God as a name is even worse, for its senselessness makes it a fixed point to which no predicate actually refers. Therefore it always remains indifferent to the whole process and content. Either way, the anticipated subject remains inert, and has to be destroyed and dissolved before it can be reconstituted. Absolute Freedom needs to be destroyed in order to become actual.

25.
Subjective Spirit and Objective Spirit. Subjective Spirit is when Spirit is thus for us, as it develops in us. Objective Spirit is when itself develops out of itself and reaches us and involves us. Zigzag motion: subject-object-subject; object-subject-object.

26.
The dialectical principle is the element. Yet it is nonetheless an abstraction. But it still requires actual labor to arrive at such abstraction. It marks the divide between two phases: pre-science natural consciousness and science proper. Yet one also has to notice that the two phases form a circle: Spirit in its self-development needs to involve the unspiritual. Spirit is a bone. The initiation of the natural consciousness into science therefore is, from the spiritual perspective, the actualization of Science.

27.~29.
It is therefore crucial to understand the twofold character of this [Phenomenology]. First, it is Hegel the wise man actualizing himself and his Spirit (recollecting his wisdom). Second, it is educational for others. It is not merely that which leads you to the system, but it itself is part of the system. The ladder is a necessary moment in the system, mediating the natural with the spiritual. In a way, one can say this book starts from us and shows the development for us, but not the development for itself. So it is necessary for Spirit to go through the same process spiritually.

30.~37.
The methodology and structure of [Phenomenology]. Spirit takes up the sedimented forms in its natural consciousness. It then thinks and dissolves these sediments and reactivates them in their originality. It loosens up those fixed thoughts and drives thinking onward.

38.~41.
A reconsideration of truth and falsity. The ultimate unity is neither truth nor falsity. It is the true shining forth in its falsity as falsity.

2

42.~46.
Mathematical truths are inert. Its matter is only existence, and its development of essence and life is only external to it, i.e. in a consciousness imposing measures and propositions and constructions unto it, the symptom being the lack of necessity of such constructions. Its truth resides only in the result and its motion disappears as soon as the subjective consciousness reaches an end. Also no theorem naturally “necessitates” the other theorem and drives to actualize itself in the other; that is, mathematical truth is always only retrospective, and even worse, it is retrospective without prospect. That is to say, it retrospectively constructs a ground, but not a source. Then, it concerns itself with dead Space in which Notion is supposed to inscribe its immanent differentiation; it grasps Time as a dead unit, which is supposed to be Notion itself.

58.
Treat something alien and unfamiliar as a new authority, thus opposing it or congratulating it, is due to the shame incurred by actually learning something.

59.~60.
The ratiocinative or argumentative attitude first negates all content, and even when it affirms content it affirms it as its own accidents and predicates. The abyss of absolute freedom.

63.
Because philosophy compels the subject and predicate to be unified in a transitive and reciprocal relationship, it has a different syntax that eludes most consciousnesses. It’s thereby difficult to comprehend for others, since such transitive language is the only language expressing the “essence” of a thing.

65.
The sublation of the form of proposition has to be not anchored in its immediate content, but also progress by itself in its own self-consciousness. Hence not only is “God is being” one such sublation, the sublation has to progress beyond itself and be carried out fully consciously until it traces the whole system.

66.
Here it is evident that the dialectical method is exclusive. It involves risks and therefore cannot start with a fixed point like the name “God”, lest it beaches before it sails. Rather it has to start from a Notion. It is therefore noteworthy that the Hegelian system is a “systemic perspective”, and such perspective has to be carefully constructed.

67.
There’s no such thing as self-evident notions. Philosophy requires training and labor. The shoe analogy is hilarious.

76.
The difficulty that involves Science in its relationship to the natural attitude is one of education. Science appears to natural consciousness as just another mode of knowledge. It has to convince the natural consciousness of its superiority without appealing merely to authority, and it has to explicate why its origination from the natural attitude is an elevation of consciousness.

78.
This explication of the origination of Science within natural consciousness has to be practically carried out: it is education not in the sense of cramming information, but instead a ritual of purification. It is “the path of despair”. This path is a path actually trodden. This first means that it has to be resolved upon and this resolution has to be fulfilled. But this also means that the way to fulfill such resolution is to carry this resolution to its bitter end, through all the “truths” encountered on the path: one has to totally lose oneself in the totality of all such “truths” in order to salvage it. In other words, this skepticism is neither merely personal nor attitudinal: it is an actualized skepticism, a fully confirmed despair that sees the desert of the phenomenal world in its whole expanse.

79.
The natural skepticism is one-sided and only sees pure nothingness in negation. This, however, is an entrapped consciousness that remains incomplete; it must be superseded in accordance to the spiritual methodology.

80.
The goal is set for such journey. Yet the goal is not the drive. The drive for natural life is its death as external transcendence; the drive for consciousness, however, is internal, for consciousness is the Notion of itself, and is hence the subject that goes beyond every limit it sets for itself. It is possible, however, that such infinitude is restrained in one station and dares not to go beyond, i.e. bad infinity, but it cannot be satiated by such infinity, and one way or another there will be some consciousness courageous and clever enough to traverse the whole journey, thus incorporating all other forms as its constituent parts.

3

82.
The paradigm where being in itself and being for another is distinguished is the traditional paradigm for phenomenal knowledge and shall be transformed by this very process of knowing.

83.
The distinction between for us and in itself is itself carried out through our consciousness as two moments within knowledge. That is to say transcendence is always an immanent transcendence, otherwise there always exists a transcendent standard for knowledge ad infinitum. And hence the standard is never external but always immanent, and has to be viewed immanently. This is to say that, if someone in perception denies understanding to be true because it is also “abstractly” not adequate, he is jumping ahead himself and missing the natural progression of consciousness; every standard must not be viewed in abstraction as if unordered, but must be understood as naturally connected. This implies the act of comparison is always a movement of consciousness and qua movement the criterion for such comparison is capable of change. The existence modifies the essence, and as its inner truth thus changed essence again modifies the existence.

85.
Therefore the truth of knowledge is not its object, but rather a different kind of knowledge. It is not a different piece of knowledge, but rather a different station, a different consciousness once and for all.

87.
An example of the scientific progression: it moves by logical necessity, the first in itself is by such necessity transformed into the second in itself for a consciousness. This is actually the first transition from consciousness to self-consciousness. Moreover, what for the consciousness is an experience (an encounter with a new object) is for the observer of this consciousness a necessary becoming; we see the development of this consciousness with formal clarity whereas the consciousness itself only is submerged in the content with an unreflective stance. This position of the observer is provided by the inculcating Spirit.

88.
“The way to Science is itself already Science.” But it is not the Science complete and adequate in itself, but only one part of Science, i.e. the science of experience of consciousness.

90.~92.
An external examination of sense-certainty. Sense-certainty is immediate knowing, yet it as a this (“I”) knows only a this. The point here being that it is merely a certainty and not yet a perception that grasps and orders all the sense data.

93.
Only now do we delve into this form of consciousness.

96.
The Truth of the particular of sense-certainty cannot be preserved and is negated by other such particulars. Some mediation is required to order these contradictory statements and all these truths provided by sense-certainty cannot be absolute truths. This new Truth is that these particulars are the most universal.

97.
Language is the more truthful as it expresses not what we mean but what is the truth of what we mean.

103.
Since all such particulars of sense-certainty are universals none of them have intrinsic truths. They have to be ordered. But this ordering can only be done in the following way. One “this” has to be differentiated from another “this”. Such differences are actualized by the distinction between consciousness and its object. That is, one “I” is different from another “I” because they have different objects; but they have different objects because they are different “I”s. Before the establishment of this one-one correspondence two objects can be for one “I” and are confused for this “I” that lies concealed from the consciousness’s gaze as inessential, as if it were not because they took the “I” to be a singular and particularly unchanging “I” that a contradiction arises; and when the consciousness becomes aware of the plurality of particular “I”s, it’s “forgotten” again about the objects being a plurality of particulars but assume that the different sensings are all pointing towards the same singular object, so that it wonders why the same thing should turn into a different thing.

105.
The observer is exhorted to put himself into this new form of sense-certainty (one-one correspondence). Now we are the “this I” that points to a “this object”.

106.
Correspondence is an act of pointing to. But in the pointing to the evanescent particular vanishes and becomes its own non-being. There is a delay or difference between “I” and the object and any pointing out always misses the mark. Or a better way to conceive of it is that both consciousnesses and objects are indenumerable. The differentiation between I and object creates the plurality of inhering heres and nows.

107.~109.
These paragraphs fully explicate the indenumerability of sense-certainty. By pointing out the particular, one misses the particular; yet the particular vanishes if missed, while the pointing itself is preserved and is to point out a being, hence the pointing again returns to the particular to which it is directed. Such back and forth movement delineates the manifold in unity of sense-certainty as mediated universal.

110.
“The sensuous This that is meant cannot be reached by language, which belongs to consciousness, i.e. to that which is inherently universal…… Consequently, what is called the unutterable is nothing else than the untrue, the irrational, what is merely meant [but is not actually expressed].”

111.
A setting up of the new stage. Perception is by principle universal and involves two moments of the same movement: the act and object of perception. But the object of perception is itself this movement (as in apperception or the perception of perception). Object and act are therefore merely formal distinctions.

112.
Perception is the truth for sense-certainty for it is the source of sensations being its instances.

113.~115.
All the particulars are exclusive of other particulars. Yet as universals they should interpenetrate. Thus they are kept apart as many separate properties yet united in one medium. Many-in-one. But this is also one-above-many which is not indifferent; rather a property always claims the oneness to itself (as the “thinghood” of the thing), and in this claiming oneness to itself actualizes Oneness as such, viz. an exclusion. The thing thus always changes its face as a plurality or as a unity, and through this movement eventually an interior where all permitted properties penetrate and an exterior where all other properties are excluded should be created, though this is yet only clear to us the onlookers.

116.
The danger of untruth and deception is introduced into perception because any perceived object is a unified universality, a Thing that is at once exclusive and encompassing, thus always involving in its self-identity an otherness. But since self-identity as the truth of perception is put onto the Thing, any falsity stems from the percipient.

117.
My experience with perception is therefore this: I encounter a contradiction between unity and plurality. Because properties are universals, they need to interpenetrate and be indifferent to each other; yet they must exclude others and be determinate and hence must usurp the One. In breaking up One into a plurality of properties properties become indifferent to others and stop being properties; properties have to be able to unite others to themselves in order to oppose them and hence have to be of one unity. Also it is worth noting that a regression is possible: that perception could potentially regress back to sense-certainty, or that one of its moments takes the same form as sense-certainty; the indifference of properties as simply singular self-relations that remain fundamentally indeterminate.

118.
Since consciousness runs into a cycle of turning its truth into untruth, it recognizes itself as the source of this untruth to be essential to perception as such. That is, since contradiction seems to be inevitable, consciousness recognizes itself, qua the root of such untruth, to be also inevitable and hence an element of it. Yet it tries to correct perceptions by eliminating its own effect paradoxically out of its own doing.

119.
Thus when the Thing is in truth One, consciousness is the medium that separates out a plurality of properties. And when the Thing is in truth Many, consciousness is the unifying faculty to organize all properties into one thing (one-above-many).

120.
Our perception changes in the following way. We trust that it is only in our consciousness things stand aloof to one another. We see them as determinate things, but they don’t oppose each other in our consciousness and there’s no determination coming from our consciousness in our consciousness, since all things are alike Ones in the medium of our consciousness (Humean empiricism, many-in-one). But exclusion such as makes Ones stems from determinateness. Exclusion such as in consciousness therefore has to come from determination intrinsic to things and not to consciousness. But this intrinsic determination means that the self-relation is intrinsic to things. Thus the Thing is in itself a “many-in-one”. To recap: first, things in us are determinate, and only things that can oppose one another are determinate; things cannot be determinate because of us, for in us they do not oppose one another; therefore, things are determinate in and for themselves; but this also means that things have intrinsic differences regardless of others and have self-differentiating properties, hence are in themselves self-relating, that they by themselves bring others in a unity in order to oppose them and are thus self-relating things. This argument is necessary because what we have to prove is “things are in themselves many-in-one without us”, hence one has to remove from the conception all elements in us. The first part of the argument effects such removal, the second part is an ontological argument. Many-in-one or self-relation is not the cause of determination, hence such self-relation in consciousness has nothing to do with the thing itself; but since it is an effect of determination it necessarily occurs in things themselves.

It is to be noted that throughout there is an asymmetry. Many-in-one or the Also is an element inherited from sense-certainty after its sublation. One-above-many or the One is the new element introduced to overcome the original contradiction. The new contradiction occurs when this newly introduced One necessarily produces Also; but if Also produces One that is the old contradiction. One produces Also naturally, but Also behooves consciousness to invent One to overcome its own contradictions.

4

121.
If the Thing in itself is in truth a medium then all properties are “free matters”. It is then decided that consciousness is the power that unifies. But this power that unifies always descends to a plurality, only this time it happens primarily in consciousness and not in the Thing.

122.
Just as the Thing in itself reflects out of itself (as the One) into its opposite truth, our consciousness also reflects out of itself. This cycle is asymmetrical and convoluted: One is naturally mediated to Also; and the power of One resides either in the Thing or in consciousness, so when the Thing becomes an Also, consciousness becomes a One, which again becomes an Also, making the Thing back to a One. This is a fourfold ring-dance.

123.~128.
A new phase of perception. The Thing is no longer a simple self-identity, but rather a self-differentiation. But such self-differentiation is divided into two moments: firstly and essentially, it is a self differentiated from others; secondly, it is in itself a different thing and such difference is immanent. This is a critique of the Aristotelian definition of essence qua difference. The contradiction here is: difference is essential and immanent, yet such difference is not an actual or immanent difference; such a difference that is essential but not immanent is always a contradiction in terms. The Thing is both for itself and for another; the truth of one resides in the other, this is the true import of definitional difference. It is to be noted that again there is an asymmetry in such relation: it is for itself that it becomes another, and it becomes another for itself; itself is the end it strives for in such becoming. If it is purely for itself as something indeterminate, it destroys itself. In other words, a thing can either simply annihilate itself, or destroy itself in order to save itself. This is a choice asymmetrical.

129.~131.
With perception, everything is but abstraction of oneness in manyness through manyness. It grasps these individualities as essences which however always run into contradictions, since these essences are dependent upon others. Such universality is therefore conditioned universality. But once Understanding comes to the scene, universality becomes unconditioned and absolute, for Understanding grasps the unity of one and many and defines not individuals but conceptual universality as rules and laws of individuation.

132.
A characterization of Understanding. Understanding emerges out of the contradiction for perception, and now grasps things not as individuals but as laws of individuation; not as essences opposed to other essences in order to be determinate, but as generative principles of all such essences. In a sense they are like the Spinozist common notions. Just like essences are abstractions of the common notions, perceptions are abstractions from Understanding. And these common notions are present for Understanding as its objects.

134.~135.
The two moments of perception, the “being-for-itself” and “being-for-another” are united in Understanding, and become the content for Understanding. Though sensual data still separates the content of Understanding from its form, the formal consciousness only contemplates the movement of the two moments. That is, even though the law or common notion is abstracted from sensuality, what is contemplated is only the concept itself: this posits what Klein calls the “secondary intentionality”, instead of contemplating the relation between object and concept, it contemplates conceptuality itself. Previously, perception imposes essence and relation onto objects and dictates its moment, but now all moments are united and the object is transformed into concept as such.

136.
Force is the expression of itself in its self-impression. Expression is the dispersal of unity into a plurality of matters, impression the re-submergence of matters into itself. It is to be noted that this universal is not limited in scope: rather, its dispersal of matters is always infinite and it is all-encompassing. And Force proper as impression and Force as expression are again two moments that become independent and submerged alternately, and are differences in thought; expression is itself expressed and then impressed. If expression is in thought, the expressibility nonetheless resides in Force proper, and the distinction come up by thought is generated by Force proper, since Force is transitive and generative of its other. So this distinction of expression and impression is immanent to Force, and is itself expressed or impressed alternately as a distinction. And objectivity and subjectivity are but two extremes generated by “objective” Force. It is to be noted that here Hegel is employing the same contradiction that perception is unable to resolve because perception is one-sided, i.e. the contradiction of one and many separately distributed to consciousness and being, but since Force in itself permits this movement of differentiation, it easily resolves the contradiction by generating its own opposite.

137.
Solicitation is that which makes Force express itself. Yet this solicitation is but the impression of the expressibility of Force. Hence solicitation of another is but the expression of Force in itself. Solicitation therefore is but a product of Force in its own medium. Force is essentially a field. But a field nonetheless is excluded from others and remains one field (here again is an asymmetry between field and determinate one), and opposes itself to one. One thereby becomes an other that solicits the field, and is again submerged. But this gives a constant reappearing of the other, and the other is therefore an enduring Force. From one force we thereby see two forces; and the soliciting force is nonetheless solicited; and we now have two forces in a reciprocal relation.

139.
Content of the force is that it is either a medium or a one, and this distinction is not a real distinction, as is established, but only a distinction for us to better observe this consciousness; form of the force, however, is posited to be real since it arises with the new emergence of two forces and their mutual relation, which is more of a real distinction since it is a distinction between two forces at a higher ontological level, and not an inner distinction within one unified force. But again we see that the form is not different from its content since passivity or activity means nothing but if a force includes another generated by itself as an opposite or not, it is active if it opposes the other, and is passive if it simply includes the other; but this correspondence again can be subverted, since passive as a medium means active as a source.

141.
The realization of Force is to be substantially unrealized: Force is in its substance without substance, and is essentially nothing but its expression. That is, Force is in its essence nothing other than Thought.

143.
Consciousness therefore sees in Force proper its notional content and recognizes it as the notion. It sees the play of Forces and grasps it in its totality (since all forces are all-encompassing) as appearance. The play of appearance is the negative at work, the persistent negation. Notion therefore sees the negativity as its truth, but has not yet grasped this negativity in itself through the mediation of Forces, since it encounters it only through the mediation of this play of appearance. It is again to be stressed that, at this stage, the mediation is not external to the essence, but the essence is mediation: “This totality, as totality or as a universal, is what constitutes the inner, the play of Forces as a reflection of the inner into itself.” The play is mediation, and the play qua play is the totality is the negative and is the essence. The essence of truth is to grasp the play as a play. The asymmetry here is that play is itself to be grasped as a determining one.

146.
The nothingness of appearance is in itself the pure beyond. It is definitional that it should be unknowable, since it is void par excellence: it is the transitory effect of negation, or in Lacan’s term, it is the jouissance of signifier.

147.
The supersensible is the ground of the sensible. This is to say it is the horizon through which appearance is recognized as appearance. It is the ground where appearance shines forth in its own truth as a vanishing. The ground of appearance is itself not an appearance, just as primal light is not a color and blind darkness not black; asymmetry must be preserved.

148.
“What there is in this absolute flux is only difference as a universal difference, or as a difference into which the many antitheses have been resolved. This difference, as a universal difference, is consequently the simple element in the play of Force itself and what is true in it. It is the law of Force.”

149.~151.
Since laws express the vanishing of appearances as appearances, and appearances are many, there must be a plurality of laws. That is, since laws register the vanishing of appearances and thus make appearances into appearances, it must also make a plurality of such vanishings and pluralities. The one Law for the totality of all appearances therefore must be capable of division and modification by circumstances: “A must by necessity change into B, so as to make sure both are appearances qua appearances; but such necessity is a determinate necessity (A to B) and must be provided by a determinate law.” The pure Notion of law runs up against laws as such, for the pure notion of law is utterly indeterminate and incapable of generating real differences; and determinateness becomes a vanishing moment merely implicit in the law, which nonetheless must be expressed in its content. The determinate differences must be absorbed into the unity of the law as consequents of its inner necessity, which nonetheless are determinate sides of the law.

152.
What we want is a universal difference that generates specific differences. We want such differentiation, but seem not able to encounter it in laws, for laws have their twofoldness: in one way they are supposed to unite in their necessity all generated differences, in the other they are indifferent to what differences they generate. This is a very profound insight into the nature of mathematical physics: for in mathematical formulas we see no essential necessity why some factors are united in one formula and not others.

154.~155.
Because the laws and their Notion are in conflict, it is resolved that the Notion is in itself united to those differences, but loses such necessity in consciousness, or that what Understanding does is to dissolve the original unity of Notion and its laws in being: so that in one singular lightening Understanding perceives two different electricities, which are united in the original lightening. But this is only regression back to the play of Forces, so that laws are nothing but evanescent expressions, and Notions are Forces. The play of Forces is thereby introduced to the supersensible.

156.~158.
The asymmetry here is that though the content of change is the same, this change is nonetheless situated at a higher ontological level than appearances. Supersensible laws are not appearances even if they change as appearances do, and they become appearances only in respect to the second supersensible world. And Understanding learns something new: the law of appearance itself is that what is not self-same is self-attractive. That unlike becomes like and like becomes unlike; which is a law that is both self-same and self-differentiating; that ensures change since change is deep rooted in the foundation of things. And once the supersensible is changing, the law that dictates the appearances to change might also change, so as to clog the change of appearances. And because of the asymmetry a bad infinity is averted; the first supersensible world is not simply and equally reverted to appearances so as to constitute another beyond ad infinitum, but constitutes one world of changing principles. In other words, what emerges is not another higher world, but the inversion of all worlds.

159.~160.
This inverted world is not a higher world, nor is it a different world, but intrinsic to our world. It is intrinsic in our world first as imaginary and potential, then as actual. It is the worlding of worlds, and is the dialectical as such. Here finally Hegel has fleshed out the notion of dialectics: everything changes into its opposite. Method is explained in unity with content. These opposites are not Aristotelian categories such as hot and cold, for those are abstractions; rather, opposites are organic and asymmetrical, and are thereby concrete, so as to contain immanent drive to overcome themselves. Note the example of crime: the antithesis of crime is not good deed, but unfulfilled intention. Difference as an infinity.

162.
To ask about the split of Identity is already to abstract Identity and to oppose it to Difference. The differentiation always already happens. The unity is a unity of unity and difference.

163.
It is only in the “explanation” of forces or the absolute difference of all differences that the universal law of self-differentiating differentiation is clearly stated. Therefore it is only at this stage that consciousness becomes self-consciousness and recognizes itself as its own object.

164.
Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness. Consciousness without self-consciousness is trapped in a bad infinity of always moving on to know of something different without recognizing that all it knows is nothing but itself. Transcendence is always immanent. This self-consciousness is still only for itself and not for all consciousness.

5

166.
Truth and certainty become identical. Certainty of oneself is the truth of oneself.

167.
The movement is that the first moment is consciousness of being or existence; this moment is immediately superseded by consciousness of self as essence; but self in the second moment is without existence, and is dependent on the first moment.

168.
Desire is the unity of self-consciousness, the unity for self; Life is the unity of objective differentiation, the unity in itself (and not yet for itself).

169.
“Independence itself, in which the differences of the movement are resolved, the simple essence of Time which, in this equality with itself, has the stable shape of Space.”

171.
Life is on the one hand a passive medium that consumes all differences, and on the other a pure movement that disperses itself; the two moments are united in one process, but this process is precisely the death of its own process; death is a constituent of life. “Life is a living thing.”

172.
Death is nonetheless the Other to Life, and is nothing but consciousness. Life overreaches to its own death in consciousness.

174.
The same way the death of consciousness is none other than life as its desire.

175.
Therefore the desire of consciousness is life qua independent self-consciousness. For though Life is equally a ceaseless motion it nonetheless is object for another; the source of its motion or negation could possibly still reside in another and itself still a movement subjected to another. Only when it overreaches into consciousness as its own death does it overturn the hierarchy; Life now generates consciousness. And this overturning must be marked and actualized in consciousness itself as the birth of an objective living consciousness on equal terms with it.

177.
“What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is —— this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousness which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’.”

178.
Recognition.

184.
What we used to observe as the process of the play of Forces as a mediation between self-consciousnesses is now a truth recognized by the consciousnesses we are observing and are immanent to them. This is because previously the play of forces was yet an object for consciousness and hence mediated in the element of consciousness; only now it has become fully liberated as a self-sufficient subject and stands immediate to another subject. So now the process resides the in the immediacy, i.e. the extremes.

186.
It has become obvious in these paragraphs how the new shape of consciousness is an elevated recapitulation of previous shapes. That the new level is a new perspective to reconceive the prior moment. So is play of Forces now understood differently as the self-movement of an independent consciousness; and Life as yet an objective movement without subjectivity.

187.
The affirmation of consciousness is the death of life. This death is both an uprooting of oneself from life and a destruction of life for oneself. The former entails staking out one’s life, the latter entails killing. And the one also implies the other: through uprooting of oneself, one sees its own death reflected as the death of another; through killing, one sees the death of the other as death of oneself.

188.
But death as such must be preserved in life and in the movement. That is, the dead are to be reincorporated into the living. Survival is the truth of death. Unsurviving deaths are merely deaths falling away into indifference and thus unopposed become absolute freedoms that have no independent significance or enduring being. Natural Men according to Rousseau.

189.
Lords and slaves come to the scene as opposed extremes mediated by recognition. One is the essential consciousness for itself, the other a consciousness merely for another.

190.
The Lord wants the slave to be a reified consciousness, a consciousness independent but ready at hand, negated by him easily but also self-negative. So the Lord wants a Slave who is but a thing, and is made into a thing by his chains. Chains thereby mediate the Lord with the Slave. But he also wants his slaves to be self-consciousnesses and express themselves, so they must continue to negate: but such negation has to be shown as independent. Therefore, those negations have to be congealed in works. Chains subject negativity, and Works express it; Works are independent as they are things belonging to lords and by this power relation alone resist the negation of slaves, and thereby signify nothing but chains; whereas chains subject slaves and withstand their negation, and signify nothing but works. Lords, on the other hand, desire nothing but to negate the reified negations of the slaves, and achieves it through negating their works for their own enjoyment (which enjoyment is in the meantime to liberate them from their chains).

191.~193.
A lopsided recognition: lords see slaves as inessential but ipso facto see not truly independent consciousness but only dependent ones. Such consciousness is always entangled in ambiguities of the two moments: slaves as things but also as liberated equals. But also are slaves turning out to be things actually opposite to themselves, viz. they are nothing but liberated existences.

194.
Slaves are liberated by their absolute dread and because they are terrorized by the Absolute Lord. But they are thus seeing themselves in the lord qua their essential nature. They see lords to be their own essence, and thus incorporate the lord into themselves and their true being. But so far the lord is only standing opposite as a separate essence. Through the terror, however, such truth becomes immanent; by the negation of works, the lords actually negate the chains. The slave therefore recognizes both implicitly in himself and explicitly in his lord the negativity, and carries it out through labor: he negates as his lord commands and in such way eventually becomes his lord.

195.
In enjoyment negativity is only fleeting negation. It needs the permanence of work. Thus the slave as indicated by his work becomes the essential moment. He has a more genuine consciousness than his lord, since his lord, defined only by unreflective enjoyment, does not see himself in the work, since he sees his slaves as only things or automatons, and work remains essentially unintelligible to him as work (the classic fetishism of production: “is not the product self-sprung?”), and in this way he regresses back to the moment where he sees nothing but himself and sees himself as pure negativity (like a tyrant who inherits a kingdom and has to destroy it and reinstates the state of war); and once he sees himself in the work of slave, he is redefined as a slave, for now his slaves are his work of management. Therefore the asymmetry here is: either the master sees himself as nothing but a slave, or he reinstates war and fights for life and death and thus falls back to the cycle, where he came from. So either enjoyment remains pure enjoyment and regresses, or enjoyment develops into work of maintenance and is synthesized with work.

196.
Without the absolute terror, the formative activity (i.e. work) cannot actualize absolute freedom, but only relative freedom; without the formative activity, the freedom cannot be actualized but slips back to the state of war with the lords. Works are made to appease the lords, but in so doing, the slaves check the lords as subjects with particular desires. Yet such check is universalized by the absolute terror (slaves desperately come up with ever new ways and all ways to please the lord) and now, all things are workable, and enjoyable, and desirable, and checkable. Work is enjoyment is desire is freedom and is chain. “Man is born free but is everywhere in chains.”

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197.
The independent self-consciousness only interprets itself as an abstraction. It does not see itself as self-differentiating. Only when it is forced back into itself, it gains a new potential. In servile consciousness, this potential remains nevertheless unfulfilled, for it still sees itself as separated between the lordly being-for-self and the reified objective consciousness and sinks to a bad infinity of “knowledge accumulation” or development of arts. Only we the observer can take on a new shape of consciousness, viz. the consciousness of a thinker. Through thinking consciousness becomes immediately its own object and is grounded in self-knowledge. Though so far the concrete development is only initiated.

199.
“What alone has importance is the difference posited by thought, or the difference which from the very first is not distinct from myself.” The truth of universal freedom is universal bondage.

200.
Stoicism is the universality of freedom of thought. Yet such freedom can easily fall back to the abstract since it sees itself unchained by reality or natural existence. Either way it can regress to contentless thought, where the determinateness itself qua reasonableness is but another abstract determination alien to consciousness and has to be negated in turn, and become either a tyrant or a slave, and this way thinking becomes tedium, boredom and drudgery.

201.
The abstract determination of determinateness is itself negated; so abstraction is itself abstracted. In this way, the abstract thought becomes a concrete thinking; the passive receptacle for stale categories becomes an active force.

202.
When this abstract passive thought of stoicism is fully carried out and actualized, it becomes the skeptic’s active thought of abstraction, and is concrete since it opposes itself against every real difference and therefore takes on as many attitudes and bears as many differences as life can have. And in this way it is universal and complete.

203.
A recapitulation of what has happened, though here it is pointed out that ethics might be immanently generated in the command of the master, and behind any thinking there is an ethicality.

204.~206.
Since skepticism always is the concrete negation of its contents, it is dependent on its own content. It negates every form only to relapse into the same form. It is disorderly and full of contradictions because it realizes its truth only in these inherent contradictions. But skepticism only realizes its truth in holding these contradictions separate, and seeing itself as simply divided between empiricism and nihilism in a bad infinity, without uniting them. The new shape of consciousness unites both ends. It is to be asked how Hegel’s own method leaves skepticism. I believe it is concerned with “shapes of consciousness” and thus grasps them in an ordered way.

207.
The unhappy consciousness is skepticism in its movement of bad infinity. Yet it has its essential nature already in potency.

208.
The unhappy consciousness grasps the unchangeable and the changeable as two opposites, one moment being more essential than the other. It is to be noted that opposition seems to only take the form of essential-inessential; for otherwise if both are inessential they are merely indifferent since neither constitutes the other, and if both are essential they are of one unity since they constitute each other.

209.
Again the asymmetry between absolute nothingness as the absolute unchangeable, and the act of negation as the solid feeling of unchangeable which nevertheless is only evanescence.

210.~212.
Either fall back to opposition, or reconcile with both ends. Consciousness knows itself to be the individually unchangeable individuality, thus knows itself as Spirit. The reconciliation takes on three steps. The first is immediate opposition. The second is confrontation with the individuated universality. The third is reabsorption of the individuality of consciousness to the universality. In the second moment, consciousness still regards itself to be inessential and the unchangeable individuated only for this consciousness, but not in itself. Only in the third moment it recognizes itself as produced by the unchangeable, so its representation of the unchangeable necessarily coincides with the unchangeable itself. Or rather, it requires this representation to indicate the beyond: by bringing it closer, it pushes it away. At the second stage, consciousness attributes this individuation (hence division between particular and universal) of the Unchangeable to itself and not to the Unchangeable.

213.
Either one loses oneself in chasing the formless universality, or one encounters and relates to universality incarnate.

214.
The dialectic now has progressed beyond the unreflective opposition between universality as the unchangeable and individuality as the changeable. It recognizes the necessity of an individuated universality. Yet this necessity still preserves the former opposition; previously this opposition is unmarked, that one does not see the necessity to relate them; now this relation has been manifested as necessary, but the what-ness of the relation becomes the question.

215.~217.
The first mode this consciousness takes inevitably regresses to the unreflective opposition between universality and individuality, and therefore to self-certainty. It tries to grasp the individuated universal, but the universal only always flees. It can only appeal to a feeling of the vanishing of the individual. It seeks only the grave of the universal which however is itself fleeting. Consciousness sees the universal as is presented immediately to consciousness, but this presentation is really a representation and is hence imperfect, for the universal, though is known incarnate, is still known as the Other and different from consciousness. That is, though the “universal content” is supposedly reconciled with the “particular form”, this is still seen as an object out there, hence the universal is still not the absolute universal that transitively relates back to consciousness, which relation is itself consciousness (pure thinking), but an immediate relation of devotion.

218.~221.
This fleetingness of the feeling heart is nonetheless fixed into constancy by work and desire. For the feeling heart perceives in its own feeling the auto-affected eternality. The unchangeable as an object is none other than the auto-affection of the feeling heart. This heart therefore is constant and has actual existence in the world. Thus the world becomes this feeling heart and vibrates with it in its sanctity; consciousness is always busy at particular works and desires, thus in any definite activity it is “continuously confirming its own certainty”, yet this confirmation, though more continuous and sustained than devotion, is yet incomplete, just as “all of time/enduring” is different from “outside of time/eternal.” Work and desire within the world is this other moment, which is again but a regression to the servile consciousness: it locates the essential and unchanging qualities of the world to be consciousness’s faculties and powers to command. Such powers belong to consciousness but their right is renounced to nature, for it is dependent on nature as the Unchangeable.

222.
The servile consciousness gratifies the unchangeable consciousness and renounces its own essential being (feeling for self). But this renunciation is nothing but its own act to put on a show of sacrifice, which is in every way an action. Renunciation of self is but self affirmation. In such a way, man and world again stand opposed as independent beings.

223.~226.
The bad infinity of pain and pleasure. As consciousness works and enjoys, it affirms itself; yet it knows such actions are inessential, thus feels wretched and is in haste to renounce these powers, for it sees these powers as petty and eclipsed by nature; yet even its renunciation is vain and boastful. It cannot but feel always impoverished. This however signifies to the consciousness its constant relation to the unchangeable, in this knowledge it is unified with the unchangeable.

227.
Priest or mediator is not a figure, but a figuration. He is ongoing and incessant mediation, as he brings the nothingness of consciousness and the being of Unchangeable together in one, as obviously consciousness itself as the particular individual cannot “do” since it has to be annulled; as consciousness qua individual “is not”, relation is the only thing that subsists for consciousness.

228.~300.
Instead of a direct correspondence of pleasure and pain between the two extremes, according to which one gains as the other loses essence, the third term of pure relation is introduced. Now, instead of granting essence directly to the absolute, consciousness only grants it to the mediator who interprets the absolute; renunciation is only before the mediator, and not directly over the absolute. This way, even when it grants being to things, it does not explicitly grant being to everything, and still holds its humility as the inessential moment. And when it renounces itself, its positivity does not directly accumulate to the other extreme, but passes through the interpretation of the mediator; and since it does not comprehend directly the absolute, the absolute remains a genuine and essential beyond for it. So its action of renunciation, though in principle posits the absolute, in reality or as taken by the consciousness could still content itself with its own humility. And even the renunciation as an action is carried out by an alien will; though this will does concur, it concurs with a mediating will, not the universal will, and is only carrying out an incomplete action. So now all speech and action and enjoyment become meaningless, for they do not directly relate to the world and hence have no content other than the mediator, the pure relation. When I give up my willing to another will, I do not admit into the willing a positive will that has any content (worldliness), but is purely negative. This pure relation is logos, Reason.

231.~233.
Reason is pure relation. Here there is no longer destruction nor negation of the world: for it is no longer a relation of more or less, of opposition, or of pain and pleasure. Rather, in this simple relation both extremes endure as mediated: mediation is not an absorption, but a letting free. This letting free has undergone two phases before it is actualized: first, consciousness sees all truths dependent on itself, that all truths are immanent to consciousness; second, consciousness sees the other (consciousness) simply as the self, as the self let free yet possessed.

234.~235.
Reason not comprehending its own path and recollecting in itself all its moments easily falls back to where it came from. Reason is a perspective on the whole and thus the sole truth of all “truths”. Reason in its pure immediacy is without truth and no reason at all. Without the whole progress comprehended in itself, by simply regarding itself as an abstraction, it cannot substantiate its own truth of simplicity; much less can it assert its own differences immanent to itself. Reason is the pure essentiality only when it is comprehended, and it is not comprehended unless it is grasped as an absolute negative essence established through and through in its negation.

236.
The two moments of Reason. Each moment on its own falls back to previous contradictions: Reason as a pure simplicity, or Reason comprehending differences unreflectively. Reason has to be a synthesis of both moments and reflects its own differences in itself, as a negative unity related to its own differences, hence as a singular individual from which a schema is projected. Unity of Apperception.

238.~239.
The idealism of simplicity always fails because it regards everything as belonging to consciousness, yet only in their simplicity: any difference therefore is extraneous to Reason, since Reason is always in itself simple. It has to revert to an exclusion so as to maintain its simplicity, thus creating noumena, and regresses to skepticism, only with skepticism it is to seek the negative Unchangeable as its object, with simple idealism it is to purify negatives (differences) from its positivity, only to reincorporate them, reverting to the second moment of unreflective empiricism.

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240.
What in perception is a thing is now a notion for reason to consciously interpret itself as itself.

241.
Reason starts as a pure “I”. But a pure I (Cartesian ego) cannot fully see the rational immanently. It must bring out the differences in itself before it can fully enjoy itself.

242.
Reason therefore regresses to the immediacy of being. It sees sensuous things and is certain that they belong to it. So it observes beings. Yet it does not see these differences as immanent, so it sees them as immediate and opposite, viz. things are now enduring screens of my gaze and are to be interpreted. Prior to reason, things are annihilated and negated; now with reason, things are interpreted as beings and as rational.

244.
What pique the interest of reason are interpretables, so that they are actually universal.

245.
The first element of universalization is remembrance of the same, i.e. description. But descriptions are also a movement between the universal and the particular, the wholes versus details, and in this consciousness is involved as an infinite taxonomy. It also loses itself in this infinite process and forgets any necessity or order of nature, and loses all precision in description.

246.
For reason its object is itself in an alike movement of consciousness. Hence the marked differences (as essential differences, not simply perceived ones) are not merely for consciousness, but also inherent in Nature. Natural things are in themselves more or less for themselves. Animals distinguish themselves, so do plants in their limited way, but ores and what are lower are more difficult, since their differences are more indifferent to each other, hence the taxonomy more arbitrary; for now the differences descend to only perceived marks, but not essential and rational divisions, which only occur in real and actual nature. And in being contrasted or put together in a rational and essential way, the thing does not maintain itself in this relation, then the thing in its transmutation disturbs the taxonomy. This bespeaks the trouble about chemistry nomenclature that concerns Lavoisier, where every property of matter seems accidental and non-essential and changeable, hence no essential difference remains for the thing: gold can be fluid and change its color.

247.
But even in those stable systems always there are exceptional cases that disturb reason. This is inevitable because differences are themselves in antithesis to universality. Differences limit universality, which nonetheless transcends those limits qua universality. Hence observing reason from time to time has to fall back to mere iteration of perception marks.

248.
Now instead of indifferent taxonomical categories, observation concerns itself with dynamical laws that regulate the movements of these evolving categories. Also, it is worth noting that Hegel is recapitulating here all the stations traversed earlier with understanding, since these are movements preserved in reason. It is crucial to ask what changes and what is kept and what seeps into other stations. It is a general tendency that the deeper into the book the longer it gets.

249.
The maxim for reason: “what ought to be, in fact also is, and what only ought to be without actually being, has no truth.” Laws belong to Reason as Notion. Notions possess appearance and are true for observation.

250.
Reason at first took its truth to be alien to its Notion. Yet this is contradicted by its accepting laws that are imperfectly grounded in sensuous experience and are spoken of only in terms of analogy and probability. Hence laws must have an origin in consciousness and in their Notion, as dictated by Notion. But it nonetheless regards itself as imperfect, for it still retains the imagination of a simple immediate universality. Because the universality is not yet an immanently developing universality, consciousness strives to map what is stale in the notion to what is changing in sensuous reality as extrinsic to it, and deems itself imperfect when it does not see this universality in appearance in one swoop.

251.
Experiments are efforts to refine universalities. These universalities are predicates liberated from their actual substances and elevated off of them. They are therefore called, not bodies, but matters. It is to be noted here the refinement is not a simple abstraction of universalities, but a substantiation and differentiation of the self-developing Notion enshrouded in sensuous material, which is to be lifted off in its free movement: the Notion is law as how things behave differently and develop in their environments.

252.
Reason still instinctive is not aware of its own achievement of generating “a non-sensuous thing of sense, an incorporeal and yet objective being.”

254.~255.
Such universal object is now a self-moving object (instead of a universal imposed onto appearance in the form of probability, and this object is extracted from sensuous material through reflective experiments), and all other determinate objects at rest are dissolved in these self-moving organisms and are centered around them. This creates the division between inorganic and organic nature. It is to be noted that Hegel here is talking about animals not merely in the superficial sense, but also as animate beings, including the Leibnizian spermatic animals. The division of inorganic and organic natures is coincidental since the two natures are indifferent to each other, and hence has to be established in an external relationship of teleology.

256.
But the telos of an organism is not just external to its environing nature, but is also itself the circling flow.

257.
The organism is related to another as indifferent to it. Yet this indifference is superseded by its seeking and inclusion of the other. This seeking of a center only rediscovers what is already there from the beginning, for what is included is none other than the End itself in its reaching out. The other is not a mere means to the end, but is a means produced by the end itself as its necessary complement, and is end itself.

258.
For consciousness, the End seems to be posited both external to the actuality as its means and to the consciousness, as an object for consciousness.

260.
The two moments are for the organism first an external end to which any action of the organism is contingently related and is therefore petty and indifferent; but it is also dissolved in the universal End as a necessary moment and hence providential.

261.
To a Reason still enchained in its instinct for simple immediate universality of being these processes are only ambiguous and potential and not fully developed for it. Once End is regarded as transcendent, transcendence starts constitute its two aspects of being an end for consciousness and being an end for a thing, for these two are really identical, thinghood is for a thing its end as much as it is an end for consciousness. Thinghood is nothing but this doubling, and doubling is nothing but transcendence.

262.~266.
A depiction of this doubling: in form it is a doubling of thing versus consciousness, in content it is a doubling of thing versus thinghood. Transcendence thus regresses to picture thinking of inner and outer. The inner and outer are united in one substance by expressiveness. Inner is soul, outer is actual being. But some animals do not fully develop the inner-outer relationship, like vegetal life, and are therefore more indifferent moments. The Leibnizian world full of life and full of zombies.

269.
Souls are posited to be the inner that has their outer aspect expressed. These expressions are directly related to the inner and are thus distinguished from the general outer. And the relation between these terms must be observed to be without truth, for soul is a fluid and always changing its determination and aspect and permeates all shapes. Soul cannot be totally deciphered, nor its properties as expressed in the outer. This is because these properties are always reactive and reflective, and reflections are fluidity par excellence.

274.~275.
These properties can be considered either as quantitatively related or qualitatively. But quantitative relations are not essential and do not clarify the significance; and qualitative relations are not explicated by their outer manifestations but only their inner development, and as outer manifestations they are indifferent to one another as sensuous materials are indifferent to one another, and just as haphazard and coincidental, varying by every varying circumstance.

276.
Therefore anatomical parts must not be considered as staid external manifestations, but rather fluid processes of such externalization. That is, it must be comprehended as living. The outer has to be immanent to the inner.

279.
What is for understanding merely transition is here an object in its universal individuation. This is not to say that individuality is not present to understanding as oneness, but that individuality as oneness is still one-sided, and the individuality is not elevated and sublated to its proper form, but only dissolves in the flux and transition, and is not grasped as enduring through the transition. If one considers this objectification or elevation as a thematization one is not mistaken: before every object is dissolved in transition, but now this transition is itself the thematized object.

In every station, the clarification and the fulfillment of that station requires a recapitulation of everything that has happened earlier in its development in the perspective of this very station. So in the section of Reason every previous station is recomprehended in it as a preserved moment. Consciousness first sees only Being; then it sees the other consciousness; then it sees itself. It first sees itself pitted against being; then it sees itself embattled beside the other; then it sees itself confronting itself.

8

283.~287.
Outer is in itself the for another: it is the element of being for the organic nature. Outer contains an inner for it, as actual life is contained in inorganic life, and simple subsistence in actual life. For the outer, its inner is posited as a simple and universal inner that is indifferent to it, but is only expressed by the outer in numerical terms. Expressiveness entails an asymmetrical form of power, the expressed being more essential than its expression, and in terms of mirror reflection, the relation is not transitive. Therefore what happens is merely an imposition of the outer unto the inner in terms of number. The inner is combined with the outer into one unity; yet this unity is an indifferent unity, so that its two aspects are related in the dead tranquility of numbers, and not in the living process of development.

290.
It is intriguing how Hegel views quantitative relations. For him it seems mathematical relations, as he remarked in the preface, are indifferent relations in which two entities, though related, stand only aloof to each other as corresponding ends, and not as essentially constituting for the other. Since they are in one unity, they determine each other, and in this sense represent each other; yet because they stand aloof and indifferent, they determine each other only quantitatively and not essentially. This suggests that at least the opposition between indifference and determination is overcome, unlike in understanding; even in indifference, properties can now determine each other indifferently. Only this indifferent determination treats only what is inessential, or that the relation and determination qua quantitative is for it only an inessential aspect of the already synthesized content (One-Also). Further reference to 152.

291.
The organic inner and outer, comprising the inner proper, are laws and their outward manifestations; the inorganic inner and outer, comprising the outer proper, are staid properties and their outward relata. And the inorganic is subsumed under the organic as its outer proper, so that the organic universal destroys the staid inner being of the inorganic, and overstretches every magnitude.

292.
Genus is a living individual, yet it is not known as such a universal consciousness, but only a universal falling outside of the determinateness of number or numerical difference, as an abstract universal. The first is the soul of the individual, the second the species. And these two terms are opposite yet equivalent: the soul of a man is opposite to yet is nothing but his humanity.

294.
The systemicity of general universality as numerical series is always disrupted by the individuated universality of Earth and the dynamic differences it embraces in itself.

295.
World-history as the Spirit in its middling mediation and transitive movement is the self-systemization of the general universality and the individual universality. But organic Nature in itself is only the center of this self-development, and cannot be considered the whole, and therefore has no history in itself. It is ahistorical because its development is deemed inessential to itself: inorganicity is deemed inferior as a means to organism. This is a refutation of vitalism. Soul is ahistorical if it is not entangled in its skeleton and is thus transformed into Spirit. And in such a case, soul is always contemplated in its generality.

296.~297.
As organic nature is in its universality the individual Earth, and all the developed differences are inessential to Earth, we see nothing of necessity between Earth and its differences. But if instead of Earth one sees only the inorganic system, without mediation of the Spirit as world-history, all differences are but indifferent measurements and calculations. The two poles have to be mediated through world history to gain both necessity and intelligibility.

298.
Notion is realized both in organic and inorganic nature and holds them together in self-movement. It as essence and self-consciousness is not the genus that is divided between the self-sundering of a universal and the undifferentiated simplicity of an individual. Notion is Spirit as world history. Organic principle of movement is to be synthesized with inorganic rest and antipathy.

300.
The problem resides more in the attitude consciousness or reason takes: reason merely observes the movement and is scared of participating in it. Thus it sees laws as immediate beings and thus as merely indifferent parts and undeveloped in movement. Unlike us, who are both onlookers and occasionally actors.

302.
Laws now stand against Soul; laws are both the manifestations of individuality (which is the form all these laws take up) and the opponents against individuality (as itself a self-determining law). This opposition is only in the observing attitude of reason, which sees all beings, including individual souls, as an immediate being and ready at hand. We are no longer interested in the opposition between organism and inorganic nature, since this is recapitulated in the mediation of Spirit; now what reason observes is immediate Spirit (homo sacer!) as it relates to its own actual existence (custom). Further reference to Giorgio Agamben.

303.
Laws are living but ready at hand. So is active consciousness as such. It is an opposition between soul and its faculties, including of course its properties and its body as inorganic nature activated as universal inorganicity.

306.
Monadology. External circumstances are but the preordained destiny of the monad, as decorations inscribed on the inner surface of each monad. Each is a world unto itself. It is not to be neglected the overpowering presence of Leibniz in this stretch.

307.
The world takes on individual form as it takes on a viewpoint of the monad; but it is transformed by the monad insofar as it belongs to the singular monad as its own world.

309.
The superseded opposition between individuality and his world turns the object of observation into individuality as such a unified whole of him and his world.

310.
Now the soul and its activity is no longer indifferent to its body, and does not treat its body as a mere property. Rather, body is the product of the individual and his immediately given world.

311.
Body and its world is immanent to the soul.

312.
Body is the membrane between active consciousness and its reflected activity. Lacan, mirror-identification. In order to examine the activity itself, consciousness mistrusts the externalized activity, which is constantly changing and negative, and tries to look at a stable and enduring thing: a passivity to which activity is infused.

315.
Instead of observing the whole life, one sees and interprets the whole (which ipso facto is activity) in and through its rejected part, to which the whole is infused and transforming the part into a sign.

316.
This is how organs come to be taken as signs. For organs are things whence actions proceed. They are not actions and are hence stable, but they are also not deeds or products and are hence more infused and immanent to the source. Again this is a commentary on Leibniz, since organs are fundamental to his thought, as generative series closer to the unity. One is expected to notice here that once again world and consciousness regress to a quantitative relationship, where one end is more activity, and the other it is less activity.

317.
These organ expressions are not only manifestations of mediated activity, but also manifestations of reflections on these mediated activities. That is, as a mediation, organs are not only the channel through which activities are externalized, but also bridges with these externalizations as received back into oneself. They express how individuals view their own deeds.

318.
This inner expression however is just as contingent, and might require another inner expression, ad infinitum. Face is only but a mask.
**
319.~320.
Physiognomy only means the inner activity but is unable to locate this within the body, but constantly moves back and forth between the body and the deed, involving both extremes as antithetical in a bad infinity. Eventually what it can say is both insubstantial and unsubstantiated. The reason is because it sees the individual as but fixed by categories and does not see that activity and body are not involved in a static correspondence as two indifferent and contingent poles, but a transitive development as a whole. See Nietzsche on body and its habitual thought for comparison, for Nietzsche of course moves in a different direction.

9

322.
The passive being of organs therefore has to be dissolved in the actual carrying out of the individuality; that is, in the deed, the deed as it involves and develops the intention of the organ. Though externalized and variable, we must find a way to see how such a deed could obtain permanence, and not trying to regress back to physiognomy. Funniest paragraph.

323.
A different relation is that Spirit in its action reflects into itself and is the ultimate movement of individuality, yet this individuality is again indifferent to its outermost sphere. That is, Spirit has its own inner body as opposed to its outer body, and its expression is active within this organ as inner and acting causally on the other.

325.
This is to say, an organ of reflection is necessary in order to subsume an organ of objective production back into itself, for the organ is in itself only an actual existence indifferent to Spirit, and it must be related to Spirit through mediation of another organ that is itself the self-reflectedness and self-movement.

327.
Brain is this organ of self-reflection and being-within-itself-for-itself.

328.
If brain is the organ of self-consciousness, then the skull is its expression and the Thing it works on.

329.~330.
Brain is both the organic source for actualizing the skull and the mechanical cause acting on the actualized skull. The brain is itself again one organ and many organs in organic development. As a cause the brain is always self-determining and infinite, plus the indeterminateness of its relation to the skull, so the skull is nothing signitive of the spirit at all.

331.
“The actuality and existence of man is his skull-bone. This is how the relationship and the two sides of this relation are understood by the consciousness observing them.”

340.
The worst of Spirit is when it has fully alienated itself and stopped recognizing itself as Spirit, but rather as a bone. Because it has reached the peak of opposition and regarded itself as a dead corpse, and is therefore the most dejected, that it can reverse this recognition and see itself precisely as itself of a higher existence.

341.~343.
A very helpful and smooth recapitulation of what went before in this section.

344.
The twofold significance of “the being of spirit is a bone.” The first significance is reflective. First, spirit is possessed by a thing; reason is not itself without its object, and reason is possessed by its object. Consciousness defined by this attitude is the observing consciousness. But it also recognizes the negative truth, that the thing in being is necessarily mediated by the infinite judgement equating thing and self. This way the thing as reason stands over against reason as counter-reason, and the consciousness is but self-consciousness or being-for-self.

345.
The second significance, which is unreflective and sinks to a bad infinity of gibberish about signs.

346.
If reason only apprehends itself as an other, that is, if it observes itself as a thing unreflectively, it is the lowest and most dejected; yet if it again comprehends itself in its infinite judgement, then it is the highest.

347.
Reason recognizes itself in the other as all reality, and its object as its superseded and enduring self. It does not blindly sees itself as a pure object, but sees itself as the self-developing movement. But so far this is only in principle, and we need to recapitulate all previous moments to fulfill this newly emerging realization.

349.
What is newly constituted is the ethical world, or the life-world, in which all previous moments are united in their universal individuality.

350.
Such an ethical life presupposes a political life in a nation state as unified citizens. And the moments of such a life are fully explicit for consciousness.

354.~356.
Yet this ethical life is so far only instituted in principle and not yet in full actuality (for it is undeveloped in all its moments), for the ethical order is so far only standing over against the individual as a specific and limited being. And though the individual has already attained to his trust or belief in happiness (i.e. unity with the universal spirit), this happiness is not yet developed in all its recapitulated moments.

357.~359.
An introduction to what follows in order. What are given later appear first as individual and isolated moments of natural impulses, which pushes forward to ethical life as such; but these natural impulses are also self-contained, and ethical life has to recapitulate them in itself by a higher form and ascertain itself to be their essential truth. So in developing as these impulses do, they eventually recognize a higher truth, but there’s not yet explicit necessity to reach for that truth; it is only immanent to the ethical consciousness as such that such necessity explicitly holds. That is, consciousness, after attaining the recognition of ethical life, has to recapitulate all its moments to fulfill and substantiate its truthfulness; otherwise the ethical order will be lost to these moments as isolated satisfactions. The former leads up to unreflective ethical life, the latter as a reflection leads up to morality. In following sections, the latter viewpoint from morality where ethics is lost and has to be reconstituted is emphasized, and these forms are viewed in congruence to morality, because we are more familiar with this viewpoint; though it is not less necessary that how morality itself develops out of ethical substance and is first recognized as truth should be explicated. What one is expected to see, therefore, is how the moral self-consciousness tries to actualize itself in its other moments for itself. Why does Hegel decide to skip his step here?

10

360.~362.
A life in pursuit of happiness. Happiness, nevertheless, is but the self-enjoyment of self-consciousness. It enjoys itself immediately, and sees itself as transcending laws, customs and theories, entertaining a full moment of actuality of pure individuality, as unbounded by any universal mediation. Yet as soon as it enjoys itself, it sees itself subsisting in the other, and the other is therefore unified with it as a universal.

363.
As consciousness sees itself and relates to itself, it also sees that it sees itself not as gratifying, but its pleasure always dispatched by its own emptiness. This emptiness is no longer that of the unreflective simple being qua thinghood. On the contrary, this emptiness is the pure movement of abstraction and reduction. This pure movement, however, is only viewed in its abstract sense, not Notion as Notion itself in its concrete self-development, but Notion as a being, which is nothing but a circle. This circle is fate or necessity.

364.
The reason for this dilemma is that individuality sees itself as pure and absolute, standing over against the community and all universality; it therefore must transition to an equally absolute abstraction of the universal moment.

365.
This transition is unmediated. Two shapes are indifferent and their contents are opposite. One is the absolute negation of the other. What for consciousness is its deed or its actualization of essence turns out to be really that of an absolute other. Oedipus. For the feeling of pleasure is fleeting, as soon as the negation occurs it is subverted into pain, it never beholds itself in full contentment.

366.
To sum up the development. First, an individual sets itself as an immediate other aside from the ethical substance it belongs to. This individual has no conformation to rules or laws. Then, this individual has to be recognized as oneself and be negated. In such negation, it enjoys itself in pleasure. But this pleasure is fleeting, for as it negates itself, itself is lost, and has become only a moment. The pleasure is then lost to pain. But the being-for-self is negated not as a thing is negated by desire, but rather being-for-self is negated by the movement or thought or category, by self-contemplation and the shape it takes. That is, the enduring object of being-for-self in abstraction is negated by the being-in-itself of Notion which is equally abstract, viz. freedom negated by necessity. Because the individuality is unmediated, so is its negation also unmediated. Machiavelli, without virtue and order, one is easy prey to Fortuna.

367.
But the necessity of fate is but the necessity within consciousness, and is nothing but the law of heart.

368.~369.
The new form recognizes necessity immediately in its own freedom of heart. It therefore sees the ethical substance from which it steps aside as oppressing the true law and true necessity. It does not, however, recognize that this opposition of the real world is its necessary moment, and must be reproduced in itself, because it does not comprehend its own origin and has not yet recapitulated its previous development, but only takes the oppression as a given being. If it does, it will comprehend that it, as the mediated product of this oppression, must in itself always reproduce the same oppression, and such oppression can never be effaced in itself. That is why it unreflectively strives to abolish this opposition and annihilate reality.

370.~374.
This consciousness sees that its law of heart is really only a particular inclination and not a universal law. Its “universal law” really confronts it as a product that is itself oppression. It no longer recognizes itself either in its law nor in its action. It sees itself as a free universal that negates all such laws of heart, but in this way embraces all reality. No law stemming from the heart works as a universal law. It therefore realizes how the reality which it used to despise really contains the universal it aspires to, since these are laws which implicitly embrace the consciousness of all individuals.

376.~378.
What consciousness experiences in its twofoldness is even worse than madness. Madness is holding one essential and its contradiction implicit in fixed relation. This however is wandering reason, since it views both as essential and is fully aware of the duplicity of truth. This is the heart-throb of self-pity in self-conceit. But this raving of self-pity is not wrong either.

379.
What is this public order of all hearts is really the loss of all hearts. Such a reconciliation is really a slaughter of all. Perpetual peace is war perpetrated. The problem of Hobbes.

381.
Recognizing its mistake in the previous two shapes, consciousness now does not take itself aside from the ethical substance, but is intent on nullifying it. By nullifying individuality, the individual is resubsumed under the absolute order, which is but the whole recapitulation of previous movements, under the heading of “the way of the world.”

382.~383.
Virtue sees itself as the resolution of the dilemma, thus puts itself as opposite to the dilemma. It sacrifices individuality in the face of the way of the world, so as to give actuality to it and show its essence. That is to say, it tries to overcome the world by actualizing its absolute universality and order and purifying the world from its perversions, instead of an empty necessity in the case of pleasure, or a self-contradictory and disturbed order in the case of heart. It tries to achieve this through sacrificing individuality, which it deems to be the source of the problem and the premise of all later mistakes

384.~385.
At first, virtue signifies only gifts and powers. For virtues are here only directed at a remote purpose in faith and are therefore still dependent upon the world. This way they do not have their independent status but are abstract and are in relation to the world. They are virtues only wielded by individuals against individuals (for being against individuals is just to become an individual).

386.
But these virtues are not the good itself, therefore the truth of virtue is essentially a posturing. For what are sacrificed are inessential for the good itself, and the good “triumphs” no matter what. But what are sacrificed, being those individuated virtues, are nonetheless the first universals to nullify individuals; hence these universals sacrificed for an “other”, for an individual, are again in turn worthy and virtuous. In combatting evil, good becomes actual. Virtuous consciousness therefore tries to attack every actualized good and disentangle it from its perversion in the world. It seeks good only in combatting evil, and therefore actualizes good only in evil. By annihilating evil, virtue resurrects it, and must preserve itself in sacrificing itself. 圣人不死,大盗不止。

387.~389.
The world can also essentially sacrifice everything, including the good or the universal, for it sees the good as an indifferent object. If it sees it not as a dead object but as something that has intrinsic being, it regards it only as for itself and a passive instrument. Therefore, either vice is as equally virtuous as the virtuous consciousness (for it is as willing to sacrifice), or it is as invulnerable and unchangeable. The latter is because the vicious is either indifferent to what is pointed out as the good, or it is only concerned with the good so that it can make use of it and pervert it. The world perverts the good, but its perversion is only to realize the good. Virtue distinguishes the good in itself and the good for another, without realizing that what it deems to be the good in itself is only but what is good for itself, and is therefore “real” and “worldly”.

390.
The problem of virtue is not that virtue is inferior to vice, but rather that the content of virtue is not well-defined. If it is merely the sacrifice of individuality, it lacks all content.

391.~393.
A world of virtue. Theodicy.

394.
“Action is in its own self its truth and reality, and individuality in its setting-forth or expression is, in relation to action, the End in and for itself.”

395.
All the previous moments are now developed and recapitulated in Reason as its content, though still opposed to Reason itself as their form, or their genus.

The Hegelian method is the natural movement of: first, enumerating opposing moments (e.g. one vs also); second, developing a sublation, thus superseding the opposition in a new form (e.g. understanding); third, recapitulating previous moments under this new form (recapitulating the full process of development under this new perspective) so as to generate its new content, which is also the preservation of what went before (e.g. force); fourth, opposing this new content to the new form as is clarified by the content, thus going back to the first step (e.g. force vs law).

11

397.
Again a recapitulation is needed to fulfill the new form or category.

399.
Consciousness of an individual knows itself to have determinate being as the reality wherein it acts in its own element.

401.
There are no longer two realities. The intrinsic reality is now for consciousness only a show of reality, whereas the essence of the show stems from reality explicit within consciousness. The first unity of being and action is immediate; by the mere interest one has of the thing, one immediately begins to act, which already presupposes all circumstances of ends and means, and actualizing one’s individuality thereof.

402.
Yet the actualized work in its specificity corresponding to action seems to stand opposed to the universal individuality.

403.
Since the end of the action and the work done is a self-expression, there is no measure of good and bad. Every work expresses individuality equally.

404.
There is no regret, no comparison with what is “possible”, no reflection in work qua self-expression. Rather, one finds immediate joy in one’s work.

405.
Work is the particular actualization of a universal consciousness. Work is therefore for consciousness the sublation of its own work. Work is always reinterpreted and thus dissolved and reproduced.

406.
Consciousness learns of the antithesis between doing and being as a result in its confronting its work. In this learning, it knows this antithesis to be insurmountable, both as a beginning and as an end. For in its doing, it presupposes a specific being, yet this specific being is without content (since it is in itself nothing but absolute transition) but its pure doing.

407.
Doing and being fall apart into indifference and are only mutually related through accidents, which are passive means to the purpose.

408.
Contingency is itself contingent. Necessity is still implied in the notion of action, though they seem indifferent. Though the work seems to be indifferent to action, yet its negation is itself a work and a real doing to be negated, and shows itself to be really a necessary moment in the actualization of individuality. This is because at this stage the whole reality is already superseded by self-consciousness, so that any doing or negating is itself negated. Otherwise, without this truth having been grasped, consciousness will fall back to a bad infinity of working and negating.

409.
The true work is thereby produced as “the heart of the matter”.

411.
The matter in hand (is it important to distinguish matter in hand and heart of the matter?) has the form of an abstract universal, a genus of which all previous moments are its species.

412.
The consciousness busied by the matter in hand is the honest consciousness.

413.
This consciousness always consoles itself with the feeling of “done matter”. That is, it always says to itself: at least I got something done. In fact the honest conscience is but a busybody.

415.
The honest conscience is actually not honest at all, for it cannot simply abstract from the reality with its empty and abstract “matter” while it wishes to; it sees itself doing this while essentially it is also doing that; it does a specific thing while it means to do a general thing, and it seems to be doing a general thing while it essentially is only trivializing the matter. This is what “business” is. What it wants is to always busy itself and be occupied by “what is at hand”, so as to avert seeing its own truth. Nietzsche’s scholar. When things go poorly, it consoles itself with “at least it’s done” (generalization), and when things are done, it agitates itself with “why am I wasting my time?”

416.
The bad infinity of “the chase”. Since consciousness only sees an abstract unity of the moments, all moments fall outside this unity and take up their own forms as independent. They infinitely deceive themselves.

418.
The simple category has gained its content and is no longer a mere thought. Rather, it is objective and actual work, as a work (or a subject matter) for one and all, changeable yet enduring, and becomes thereby subject proper. Husserl: the intersubjective task of science as an ethical pursuit.

420.
The reconstitution of the ethical substance as was noted in advance, which substance is absolute, free, and authoritative.

422.
The determinate masses of laws are for consciousness its pregiven and hence immediate content of ethicality, which express directly the ethical substance.

424.
The form of declaration and proposition ethicality takes up immediately runs counter to its contingent content. What seems to be true and good immediately is really full of mediations or requires them.

425.
“In other words, such laws stop short at Ought, they have no actuality; they are not laws, but merely commandments.”

426.~428.
There is no such absolute or universal content. For such content is really no content at all, and its truth is an empty form. Hegel’s first critique of Kantian ethics, which he develops further in the next section. And reason as the dictator of laws is really only an examiner of them, to see if these laws are self-contradictory.

429.
The ethical substance is no longer standing over against the determinate laws as a separate being, but is itself the form under which these laws show themselves and are to be considered or tested as themselves. The laws are not given by reason, but given to reason.

430.
But if reason is only an examiner of laws, it is utterly impotent, and ethicality itself is devoid of content.

431.
Any self-contradiction in any ethical law stems not from the form but from the determination of its content. So the examination requires a first delineation of the ethical content, and is such development of content itself.

433.
If the content of laws and the form of laws are held separate, consciousness merely busies itself in trying to determine laws and making laws which again are no laws. It then regresses to business, i.e. shystery. See Montaigne and Rousseau on the multiplication of laws as the evil of society. Multiplication of laws hurts their authority.

434.
Honesty believes that such determinations of laws always already possess an authority, which is not true. But without this belief, these moments in isolation would only fall apart, and now examiners of laws would take all given laws as capricious, while lawgivers would dictate all kinds of laws without true ethical authority and are merely tyrannical.

435.
It is to be noted that there are three basic results of a development. Either one regresses, or one stays in the station, or one moves beyond and overcomes the current station. If one stays in the station, one either falls to one end and remains dead there, and is negated as a nothingness, or one starts to chase one end and the other and thus gets oneself caught in a bad infinity. In this example, if one does not overcome the present situation, one either becomes a tyrant and is killed, or one becomes an enemy of the state that has no law and is killed (absolute negation), or one becomes a shyster that naively deceives himself and others about the authority of laws (bad infinity).

437.
The absolute ethical substance is here fully instated in its form on its foundation. It is regarded as the institution of laws. Yet this institution has to recapitulate all earlier moments to fulfill its content, which in fulfilling must shake the foundation.

12

438.
“Reason is Spirit when its certainty of being all reality has been raised to truth, and it is conscious of itself as its own world, and of the world as itself.” Certainty is the form, truth is the developed content. “But [spiritual] essence that is in and for itself, and which is at the same time actual as consciousness and aware of itself, this is Spirit.”

440.
“Spirit is thus self-supporting, absolute, real being. All previous shapes of consciousness are abstract forms of it. They result from Spirit analyzing itself, distinguishing its moments, and dwelling for a while with each. This isolating of those moments presupposes Spirit itself and subsists therein; in other words, the isolation exists only in Spirit which is a concrete existence.” This is so crucial. The next part is also essential for understanding the stages Spirit undergoes: first, for and as the abstract in-itself, Spirit is Sense-certainty, Perception and Understanding; second, as it emphasizes the moment of for-itself, Spirit is self-consciousness; but when both moments are synthesized as the in-and-for-itself, consciousness qua self-consciousness is the consciousness that has Reason; but only when this Reason is not merely possessed but itself actualized is Spirit formed.

442.
The living ethical world needs to recapitulate all its moments and develop them. In its first recapitulation, it see its immediacy given in the world of laws as opposed to itself; the division is the traced to the divide between culture and faith; then, when these moments are brought back together, it is the Enlightenment.

444.
The two sides of Spirit, the ethical substance and the individuated consciousness of action, is mediated by self-consciousness and brought into mutual actualization.

445.
As the mediating self-consciousness, the mediation takes on either more of the side of immediate substance, i.e. a divine law, or of the side of substantial consciousness, i.e. a human law.

446.~450.
If self-consciousness takes on the form of human law, it is the form of a self-moving and self-comprehending and mediated ethical substance, i.e. the state. Yet it has to confront the uncomprehending, immediate and implicit essence of Divine Law, i.e. the family. The state is therefore here only a form, which is unfulfilled by the content of the development of family.

451.
The End of Family is always the immediate relation between the individual and the family. This is to say, the individual here is not a citizen for the universal, but an individual qua universal. Its object is not the citizen mediated by power and wealth, but an individual as such. It therefore sees the pure individuality: just as one sees a pure abstraction, such individuality is a dead individuality. Family is the shrine of the dead.

452.
Because of this immediacy to the pure individuated universal, family relates to its members as what they are, not as how they do. But because family is raised above the immediate nature and is itself ethical, it transfers their pure being to a pure doing: a conscious action of commemoration is imposed unto the dead. Funeral rituals are to preserve the dead individuals as elevated in their ethicality and preserved from the danger of falling back into Nature, the regression to non-self-conscious being.

453.
The burial of the dead is therefore the divine law par excellence. The Hegelian reading of Antigone. Here Antigone’s potential incestuousness is interpreted in the light of an intimated tension: Antigone is driven precisely by duty and not love. And this divinity of the individual is itself the all-powerful ground and earth on which the state is founded.

455.
The developed government diversifies into civil associations (if powerful families are these associations, they are not literal families, but familial-civil associations, such as mafias). But the state has to be drawn back to its beginnings from time to time and civil strife is absolutely necessary to renew the strength and unity of a state. Through these revolutions, the corruption of dependence and partisanship is eliminated, and the universal consciousness of freedom is reawakened; the unfree are killed and “freed” from the state as mere natural existences, the civil associations are submerged. This is Machiavelli’s “always bringing the state back to its beginnings.” And this is the sovereignty of the divine law: a purified family and a state funeral.

456.~459.
The development of the moments within family and an analysis of the family. Man and wife are attached by feeling, and see their relationship objectified in the child. The child grows independent and becomes separate from the immediate source, and only in the passing away of the parents can the child fully achieve its own being-for-self. Therefore, only as brothers and sisters are family members most simply and equally related. Apart from the age difference, there’s also sexual difference. Family for women is the universal element in which they live; they therefore see family as particularly ethical; but this ethicality is only purely substantiated in their brother, for as a mother or a wife there’s always non-ethical and contingent factor playing into the relationship: she is related to her husband by love, and related to her child by ownership. Men, however, see family simply as particular, since they possess their own universal element outside the family. Ethical life is therefore actualized in its universality in the sister-brother relationship. The sister becomes the guardian of divine law, and the brother becomes the citizen of the state. And they show themselves in their immediate relationship as two natural or immediate poles of universal determination, which is sexual difference.

461.
The fourfold: Nation, Family; Man, Woman. Nation is mediated with Family as the mediated substance, so are man and woman mediated as self-consciousnesses. Moreover, just as man is the mediator more on the side of nation, so is woman the mediator more on the side of family; they are mediated by child, but parents are mediated with their children through sisterhood and brotherhood, which fulfills the universal mediation of the nation and is again reflected back into family. And all previous moments are in equilibrium in this new whole.

462.
Vengeance is therefore brought into the city in its ethical form of Justice. The individual who suffers wrong in the city is reawakened in its power as a pure individual, a haunting ghost; but what it seeks is not simple retribution of blood (or it will not be “justice” proper), but rather the bringing to light and reason of his death. What the ghost seeks is “the reason why he has to die”. What the ghost seeks is that its death is not accidental to its being, but self-conscious. Therefore, the triumph of Athene and the transformation of Erinys in Aeschylus.

463.
Man is a downward movement, and woman is upward.

464.
Man and woman stands immediately to each other as opponents. They wage a perpetual war of universality against individuality; or the world against the holy, and the self-consciousness is entrapped in this perpetuation of strife.

465.
Tragedy is the collision between the essential and the inessential moments, resulting in a sacrifice of the inessential, rescuing the essential sublimity; comedy is the collision between the essential and the other essential moments, resulting in an absolute nihilism of all essences.

466.
The first stage for ethical consciousness is tragic, for it sees one side as inessential reality and tries to negate and sacrifice this reality in saving the essence.

467.
For the ethical consciousness, it has forgotten (or rather “repressed in memory”) all the one-sidedness it used to have. It sees itself as essentially the individuality of reality of the world; the world of fixed essence and its own fixity is superseding itself and superseded in the individual by the individuality. Ethical consciousness is not an essential consciousness, but a consciousness united with the movement of the world. It therefore believes that the world and its action shall fulfill its own law, that its right is guaranteed by reality itself, and the law is nothing more than what it knows as its own truth.

468.
For the individual consciousness, its knowledge nevertheless contradicts its own law. It knows its active self only as guilty of transgressing and criminal, for the world is divided between two laws. It either regresses into inaction and recollects all its repressed content, or it has to acknowledge its own guilt as a universally mediated individual, or it persists in its one-sidedness and pretends it has forgotten this prejudice. If it opts for the last, it will suffer revenge from the other law, which is also its own conscience. Hegelian interpretation of Oedipus as the unknowing knower.

470.
But the mere lack of knowledge is insufficient for ethical consciousness. Ethical consciousness has to eventually acknowledge its own guilt before it even acts, for it needs to recognize its truth only in actuality, which is its own opposite. It has to be tragic, that it sacrifices itself to save the actuality of its own essence.

471.
But the actuality itself, being the opposite to the essential law, must negate the significance of that law. What the ethical consciousness has done, therefore, becomes meaningless as an ethical action. It merely means a disposition, an inclination, or a nature (e.g. the feminine nature) in its fixity, without the self-moving reality backing it up.

472.
But the other law is no less destroyed. The vanishing of the vanishing. Characters (that is, fixed natures) and ethical powers alike contain the other in themselves, for they are actualized as much as in the other. In this mutual destruction, they see the omnipotent Destiny.

473.
The earlier strife is recapitulated here as a strife between Nature and State in the form of fratricide.

475.
War and Love are the principles of youth to attract Women, who are representatives of the individualities. War is the negative power that dissolves separation and renews freedom, that creates authentic individualities standing together (Heidegger), guarded and preserved as natural powers by their womenfolk. The warrior-lover, however, stands alone alongside his woman, and is soulless and dead to the nation.

479.
This new community of soulless spirits is a community of legal personalities. They are the realized form of the stoic consciousness, which is restricted to simple thought.

480.
The abstraction of legality is opposed to the unorganized content. See Evgeny Pashukanis. This empty category is nevertheless positive and recognized.

481.
Against the forms of individualities deprived of content there stands a singular individuality that is all essence and all content, which has absolute but arbitrary power, and is nothing but chaos. Hobbes’ Leviathan.

482.
On the side of the leviathan, consciousness is a mere madness. On the side of the subjects, consciousness is not only without content, but also losing its very form, for form is nothing but the self-generation of content.

483.
The truth of self-consciousness is now set before itself as an omnipotent and alienated self-consciousness, which is as much itself as its own content; all its content is thereby concentrated in its opposite.

13

484.
The world is not in itself or in its being an alien element to the spirit; rather, it is the negative element of the spirit as itself. Only in such externalization is the spirit gaining a substance.

485.
This suggests the antithesis between two consciousnesses: an actual consciousness and an essential consciousness.

486.
A preface to what follows. Mutual alienation gives forth the intellectual insight of the beyond. Enlightenment “contaminates” the beyond and brings it back to this world, which originates morality.

487.
The flight from this world to the beyond of pure consciousness is not religion but faith. Faith nevertheless is dependent on this world and hence is always also a notion.

488.
The alienation is at once a possession of the world as the content of self-consciousness. Instead of the immediacy in which two empty legal persons stand opposed, the raging elements are again reconstituted as one’s own culture.

489.
The dignity of a legal status is most contemptible, and is only specific as a “kind”.

490.
Culture is at once a conformation of the individual consciousness to its own world and an externalization of itself in the shape of its world.

491.
The alienated shall alienate itself. The fixed category of good and bad in culture shall redetermine themselves and turn into their opposites, in which consciousness shall eventually recognize itself and those moments shall be regarded as recapitulated moments.

492.
A Hegelian doctrine of four elements.

493.~495.
Good is the being-in-itself for Spirit. Bad is the being-for-another for Spirit that is to be sacrificed. State power is the good, wealth is the bad. But in relating to both, consciousness has to turn them inside out as their negative unity.

496.
Good and bad have the only criterion of like or unlike Spirit. In its relation to Spirit, the good or the bad itself takes on a spiritual nature and loses its initial fixity as an object.

497.~499.
Two judgements that subvert each other and are therefore spiritual. And consciousness itself contains such duality of good and bad, and this hinges on its essential relation to the actual.

500.~501.
The consciousness that sees its own like sees good and accord and is therefore noble. The opposite consciousness is ignoble.

502.
The double consciousness is related to its object (state or wealth) in various relations superseding each other, thus sees its own object as its self-consciousness.

503.~507.
The noble consciousness is related to the state in its heroism of service, and in its heroism actualizes itself in actualizing the state. The state then possesses its essential being from the alienated subject. But this alienation is only that of being and not that of being-for-self. The state yet has no will. And the being-for-self or self-consciousness is still on the side of the individual and opposes the state power in its reserve for its counseling. The state at this point is just an apparatus that has no will of its own and is not alive, but is haphazardly seized for any partisanship. Therefore, what the state needs is not simply the renunciation of individual lives, which would be simply inertia and death, but rather individual wills, so as to constitute a general will.

508.~510.
This is very unexpected and interesting. Language is the mediation between individual and the state; or rather, the essence of language implicit for consciousness is state power. In this is seen Rousseau’s influence on Hegel. Language here is considered in its formal aspect, or as a function. It is not the form of a content, but by itself expresses the content of a speaker, or the spirit as capable of speech. Lacan, subject of enunciation. This is not the same signification as that of an abstract individuality, which is only the legal status. For here the subject of enunciation is a form of self-differentiating content, hence capable of bestowing its own self-consciousness to its own essential being. It is the source of significance, and the source of building its own world for itself. Plato’s Republic: the city in speech is the city of speech, is speech itself. Yet this language is still divided between the speaker and the spoken of/to, and is not yet the language of Spirit speaking of itself to itself.

511.
The silent heroism becomes the heroism of flattery that is related to the absolute monarch in speech. The absolute monarch is the pivot of speech, the name of absolute individuality that is more essential than other individualities who sing its praise.

512.
Yet this more essential self-consciousness is again reflected back to the noble consciousness as what authorizes the thought and action of the nobility. Nobility is the concrete actualization of the universal will; the monarch is a will to be superseded and sacrificed, and it is therefore only wealth. Once sacrificed, what is left of it is simply a name.

513.
Therefore, what is noble consciousness is in fact the splitting of the accord, and in its service to the state its truth is only its wealth. In this consists its ignobility.

514.
Now we turn to observe how noble consciousness reacts to wealth, which it deems to be an inessential universality and is in relation to it merely gratitude.

515.
What wealth needs is therefore the contrary movement: instead of being liquidated, what it requires is the fixity of essential being, so as to stay a stable and uncanceled self-consciousness.

516.~518.
The gratitude is nonetheless a disgust. For it demonstrates to self-consciousness how what it deems to be inessential is really independent to it and contingent on another personality. A noble consciousness wouldn’t like to be grateful. It is therefore always verging towards ingratitude. By that it is ignoble.

519.
As well as the recipient or perhaps even more so, the benefactor gives away its self-consciousness. But in sacrificing itself it becomes more universal and claims ownership of the other’s soul, for it has alienated its own soul in order to subject itself as another to the give-away. In this consists the arrogance of the giver. In sacrificing, the self-consciousness has actually sacrificed nothing, but only wishes to see its own in the other.

520.
Just as there is a city in speech, and there is a justice in the city, there is justice in speech: this is the distribution of wealth in speech, or the property talk, and the way language relates to wealth. This language of base flattery, however, always involves the other side of language; the identical judgement is the infinite judgement; the diremption of subject and predicate is the identity of both. The kingdom of flattery therefore is the kingdom of letters: it is authentic and genuine culture. Culture is flattery, and vice versa.

521.
The kingdom of letters is the kingdom of flattery. It is that which is conscious of this absolute perversion. As such a consciousness, it regards itself as the absolutely transitory play of all perversions, and is therefore glibness or cleverness.

523.
Honesty has no place in culture and can say nothing new about the sophisticated, educated, ironical mind that has not been already known to it. The mind of irony is bulletproof. This is also how the Lesser Speech is to triumph over the Greater Speech.

524.
This is a commentary on misanthropy. See Molière and Swift: the universal disgust of all humanity, the ideal of an impossible escape, the utter impossibility of simplicity.

525.~526.
This ironic consciousness is only the negative shape of spirit and knows itself only as the universal contradiction, but has not yet achieved the vanishing of all vanishings beyond the bad infinity, neither has it developed the new positive content it contains in principle: the positivity of the beyond for faith.

14

527.
At first, faith is just picture-thought and is therefore only negative, and has not unchained itself into its positivity. This is to say, here thought has gained its actuality and content, though such content is still undeveloped and implicit in it. This is because pure thought is construed to be all reality and self-consciousness and consciousness itself, and not just a negative beyond.

528.
Religion in faith is a substantial belief: it has substance, but is yet not actualized.

529.
The opposition between pure insight and pure thought (faith): one is the negating self-consciousness, the other is the positing consciousness of an essence.

530.~534.
An analysis of the structure of faith. Faith is at once a positing of the distinctive beings of spirits (they are distinctive because they have content and are generative of the actual world of culture as a transcendent source) and a striving for union with those beings. It is also important to note that this believing consciousness is not a condemning consciousness, for it already sees everything as intrinsically vain and does not mean to criticize any brilliance of irony or perversion in order to save it.

536.
“Pure insight is not only the certainty of self-conscious Reason that it is all truth: it knows that it is.”

537.
An analysis of the structure of pure insight. Pure insight is the very negative movement of the notion. It abolishes all essential differences (since nothing stays constant) only to return to an absolute qualitative difference (each “other” is equally a self that is immanent self-differentiation). This is to say, all the beings possessed by the power of a self are to be compared only quantitatively to that of other selves, only because they are the same selves; but they are the same in that they are all absolutely different and differentiating.

539.
The pure insight is a general apprehension of all special insights.

540.
The pure insight then knows itself to be dependent on the vanity of its content and is its own vanity; in that the whole is preserved as a whole, and witty judgements are synthesized into wit in general. This general wit is opposite to the essential faith.

541.
In the immediate opposition, pure insight sees in its opposite, that is, faith, its own negative content.

542.
For Enlightenment, the structure of superstition lies in this: the masses are held in essences, while the self-consciousness (since this element is not to be lacking in the actual world or beyond) and evil intention is all reserved to the separate class of priests and the ultimate absolute being. That is, it sees its own opposition to the essences and ill intention in the reflected image of priesthood. Philosophers are the new priests (philosophy the civil religion), only these priests are not independent from the masses, only disseminate their “true” teachings to the masses.

543.
The evil intention and the despot are individuality standing aloof from the masses they deceive. This individuality is invulnerable since it is already cut off and dead, and is immediate to the universal, and is therefore only a sworn enemy to the Enlightenment: a direct confrontation with priesthood means a fight to life or death, and pitted in this fight the Enlightenment philosophers would be no better than the priests, only they serve a different lord. Enlightenment, to avoid such regression, has to therefore operate on the undeveloped masses and develop them into the true universal that itself is, and in the mediation of the populace brings out the absolute mediation.

544.
Faith is the self-consciousness of insight as in-itself, while Enlightenment is the for-itself.

545.
Every infection starts unnoticed. Machiavelli: corruption and conspiracy have to be long-term; Nietzsche: corruption is the autumn of a people. This is a beautiful passage.

548.
The suspicion of Enlightenment is immanent to Enlightenment. Once something happens there’s no turning back. Strauss, Rousseau. The first stage of Enlightenment for Enlightenment is a regression to deadly antagonism.

549.~550.
Both Enlightenment and Faith are the same production and intuition of the pure insight into themselves as absolute self-consciousness. Enlightenment is about the absolute trust of self-consciousness, which, however, is nonetheless a faith. It sees religion as a fiction produced by consciousness, but it itself is just this too. Thus religion never deceives people; rather, the populace themselves require religion; religion is already the mediated reality, just as much as Enlightenment sees itself to be. One has to ask, however, if this “mediation” is not retrospectively conceived: it is only through the mediation of Enlightenment that Religion now is the mediated spirit. Enlightenment is only naively the enemy to religion; rather, it’s the self-development of religion.

552.~556.
The initial criticisms Enlightenment lays onto Religion are all misunderstandings. Since in truth Religion is the self-conscious and immanent self-movement of Spirit, it is in the mediation and truth to itself; but for its other moment, Enlightenment, that sees the mediating movement rather as an immediacy or external opposition between being and self-consciousness, this requires the additional mediations of history (as events), substance (as objects) or action (as renunciations). Enlightenment therefore exhibits itself as equally a lie.

557.
In this antithesis between the same others, each presents itself to the other as a deception. Both are sublated, and religion sees its own truth in the popular religious enlightenment (Reformation) and enlightenment its own truth in the establishment of a cultivated civil religion (Science/New Philosophy), each in reaction and mediation to the other.

558.~560.
The positive content of Enlightenment is therefore nothing but nihilism. Everything (every here and now, hence sense-certainty) belongs to the absolute void of self-consciousness, but each thing itself stands opposed to the void as a self-opposing void; everything is negative and negating; everything is useful and using. The point here is that everything is an absolute singularity (Deleuze, the black hole of subjectivity). This is how it appears to Religion, but also how it corrupts Religion into becoming the same. Here Spirit is at the risk of again regressing to sense-certainty and an absolute nihilism; such however is averted by the introduction of a new content, that of use and being used, or utility, since it already knows its truth in the identity of self and other, and being-for-self and being-for-another. Because it is already Spirit in form, it has the same absolute opposition in its spiritual form of a self used for another self. Contrast this universal usage to the universal war as the manifestation of a conflict and opposition, and see how this recapitulation of the same content shows itself already as a reconciliation.

It is again to be noted that so far the Spirit is only recapitulating its prior moments. The Spirit is still in opposition and antagonism, for it has alienated itself. In Reason, self-consciousness is in an immediate relationship to another self-consciousness; though it knows the other as itself, its knowledge is still only a certainty, but not truth; that is, it only knows the other self immediately as an object, but not yet mediated to it. And so far the Spirit has only recapitulated such immediacies as its own alienated self; and it knows such alienation essentially and in truth belongs to itself. In other words, all the antagonisms between Woman and Man, Family and State, Honesty and Flattery, Enlightenment and Religion, are but how the Spirit comprehends the earlier oppositions between Individual and Custom, etc. What is changed is that what before appears to be a certain and immediate opposition is now developed in their more concrete and mediated content (e.g. the abstract and formal opposition between Individual and Custom is now embodied in the sexual difference and mediated by the sexual union). That is, what was understood as the objective self opposed to a subjective self is now reinterpreted in the perspective of a Whole Spirit: what was taken to be simply “I” against the “World” is now comprehended as development in a concrete and real association, like man and woman, or community and its godhead. Though such mediation within Spirit might regress to its unmediated form, yet it always is capable of a new development towards further mediation that eventually ends up in the self-comprehension of the Spirit; consciousness therefore proceeds from objective subjectivities to intersubjectivities, in which even opposition or objectivity is merely alienation.

15

561.
Religion is for Enlightenment the ultimate utility.

562.~564.
For Faith, such truth is detestable. This, however, also suggests how Religion is to be “corrupted” by Enlightenment and starts to know its own truth, which resides not in self-identity, but in being perverted. Enlightenment is Religion in truth.

565.~573.
Faith finds its own truth in Enlightenment and through Enlightenment: 1. it knows itself to be an action via being reminded by Enlightenment, and not a picture thought, for faith always finds itself in the absolute being; 2. it knows the object of its veneration is both an actual existence and a beyond; 3. it knows that it is disingenuous of it to both see the ground of its knowledge be contingent to any knowledge and yet claim immediate and absolute knowledge, for Enlightenment in counteracting this immediate self-assurance is all mediation; 4. it knows its own renunciation is really hypocritical, and the real sacrifice resides not in any particular action, but in the inwardness of the will, whose inwardness echoes the absolute.

575.
“So that the schism that arises in one of the parties and seems to be a misfortune, demonstrates rather that party’s good fortune.”

578.
The two parties of Enlightenment purport to the same identical truth: “Absolute” is the immediate absolute thought, the intellectual intuition which nonetheless relates to consciousness; “Pure Matter” is the mediated abstraction that nonetheless remains purely inward and absolute. Abstraction is intellectual intuition, one presupposing the other.

579.
The two parties coexist and constitute the immanent differentiation or alternation inside the absolute. The absolute is immediately pure being and pure negativity (one is therefore for the other in the form of an object), and is therefore pure utility: the pure being-for-self that immediately oscillates to pure being-for-another.

580.
The two moments of the Useful are pure and absolute and are in a bad infinity of alternation. Here, being and notion are not yet one and the same, because the for-self is still only a flickering result and not the overarching unity, and it stands opposed as an abstraction against other moments. Because the Useful still takes on the form of an object, it has a world.

581.
By having an object of the Useful, pure insight is content with itself. It has its own object to negate and affirm, and could tarry with it. This is the bad infinity of its actual certainty of self meeting the substantial existence of thinghood. “The two worlds are reconciled and heaven is transplanted to earth below.”

582.~585.
The Useful as an object or as an end of pursuit, however, is just as fictional. For such alternation soon finds in principle an equilibrium. It is certain that all objects can be abolished. It takes up the form of absolute freedom. In absolute freedom, each self-consciousness is a multitude of all consciousnesses, and each individual is an absolute universal. And such a power is now unstoppable, for consciousness is all reality; and now consciousness being certain of the possession of itself as pure self-consciousness or absolute Notion must be capable of abolishing all restricted spheres.

588.
Nothing positive stays for everything is negated by the individuated universal will. This is a regression. There is no free object. For everything that is enduring or particular is nonetheless always negated as a universal work. Back to a bad infinity of culture. For no longer can the universal be an inert genus to the particular in which both abide unnegated; rather, everything is absolute negation. In other words, there is no possible representative or proxy for the individual per universal.

589.
Absolute freedom is absolute destruction.

590.
The abstraction of absolute freedom is the worst death: not only is it death, it is not death enshrined or glorious; rather, it is utterly meaningless.

593.
Again one needs to survive this absolute terror. In surviving it, one becomes the positive negativity and takes on the form of truth, instead of mere certainty.

594.
The escape from absolute terror is a regression to the starting point, whose end would be stuck at a common interpenetration of Spirit and Substance. But it is possible to overcome this absolute terror: absolute freedom in ridding itself of the real existence is then no longer restricted by real existence anyhow; it is now absolute positivity, and its own self as knowing is its own existence. Spirit is now fully in its own element as a pure knowing and willing, and it knows itself to be the Universal Subject, and that the Object is immediately one with the Subject as Subjectivity Itself. Every Object is a Free Object, i.e. a Subject. In this Spirit has become moral, in-itself-for-itself.

597.
The absolute immediacy of Spirit is its own absolute mediation. It is no longer an immediacy of being or existence, as that of an ethical character, but a spiritual immediacy, the immediacy of spirit knowing and willing itself.

598.
Reason is certain of itself being all reality. Spirit knows itself being all reality and possesses it as developed truth and knowledge. The form it possesses this truth is through morality.

16

599.
Nature and the natural world is born inside the moral consciousness because the moral consciousness is Notion and has to include otherness; and since its primary substance is duty, which dissolves all alien objects, moral consciousness is indifferent to the actual world, and sets the other world free from itself. This actual world let free is the natural world.

600.
The mutual indifference posits a mutual absolute exclusion.

601.~602.
Yet Nature and Morality have to be in harmony, for duty is to be fulfilled and individuated. It is therefore a postulate that happiness and duty should harmonize, for so far this remains a postulate and is not developed in the notion.

603.
Duty has to be fulfilled, yet it also has to remain absolutely transcendent. Therefore, the consummation of the unity between Nature and Morality has to be carried out yet infinitely postponed. It is a task that is no task.

604.
The implicit harmony is the harmony between morality and nature. Or the being natural of morality. This still sees the two ends as two extremities staying in themselves forced to correspond. The explicit harmony is the harmony between the moral self and the sensuous self; this is the being-for-self that locates this unity not in the forced correspondence between two worlds but in one single consciousness’s development. And here we have the actual doing as the mediation between the unity in itself (a dead unity) and the unity for itself (a unity in flux). The former is an objective unity (independently it is the necessity without actualization), the latter a subjective one (independently it is a contingent actuality). The former is the fulfillment, the latter the task. Each end is united to the other through “actual doing”.

606.
The inner and sacred moral consciousness appears to consciousness as another consciousness.

608.
This split of the consciousness creates for consciousness in turn a disharmony, and it does not trust the unity between happiness and duty is achievable by itself, but only as a gift of Grace, according to its own imperfection.

612.
Instead of unreflectively falling into a bad infinity, a careful reflection or recapitulation of the previous moments signifies a new shape: it is only because the actual moral consciousness takes itself as its own immediate object that it sees itself as an end unfulfilled; but this object originates from itself. Therefore the moral consciousness is a consciousness of imagination or duplicity: it takes the truth of its own morality as what is non-moral, and the essence of what is non-moral to be morality. It makes do with the actual world.

616.
This is crucial and often misleading: this is not to only say that moral consciousness does not yet know its own truth, that is it produces itself as an object; but that in order to fully acquire this truth, it must recapitulate itself as if it has only simply originated.

617.~627.
The universal morality turns out to be universal duplicity. What it claims to want to achieve abolishes itself. It demands a unity between nature and morality; it demands the mediation of moral action, that the implicit unity be brought out explicitly for consciousness; yet the in-itself is opposed to the for-itself for a moral action is merely an individual action that is opposed to the universality of absolute duty, and therefore is merely contingent, and achieves nothing in-itself, nor therefore is it truly for-itself without the in-itself, but falls away from itself, and really the moral action is immoral, and the moral perfection is in truth imperfection. Therefore there is no sense in asking why some worthy of happiness suffer in this world, since morality is really immorality and null. The sanctifying other pure consciousness or the holy consciousness is itself dismantled as contingent on reality.

628.
The moral consciousness flees this universal hypocrisy and falls entirely within itself, thus negating all the natural world and withdraws its own moral “view” of the world.

631.
Morality turns out to be universal hypocrisy. By rejecting any positive relation between nature and duty, the beautiful conscience comprises the first moment of hypocrisy, and is therefore a recapitulation. It is not a regression for this conscience upholds only the truth it has obtained of the universality of hypocrisy. This raises a very important question: how is a recapitulation different from a regression? I venture to say, a recapitulation occurs when we bear in mind the truth, viz. the new form, just obtained and goes back to rethink the previous moments, and a regression occurs when consciousness forgets this retrospect. Here conscience does not simply regress, because it remembers the universal hypocrisy, and is conscious of the other world and its choice to flee. It regresses only when it fully forgets the other world and takes itself to be a simple positive Spirit. The same holds for any recapitulation: what is a recapitulation for us, can be a progress for that consciousness, and can also become a regress for that consciousness as well.

633.
The new shape of consciousness in the form of conscience recapitulates the previous moments of legal persons and absolute freedoms. Legal persons are pure forms deprived of content; absolute freedoms possess content; and this conscience possesses its own content in the form of a world. That is, it does not need to actualize itself in the world as an object divided from and striving for subjectivity, unlike absolute freedom. Rather, since it is already its own subject, this conscience is already worldly and intersubjective.

634.~640.
Conscience renounces all dissemblances because it does not need to depend on reality or the actual world. Rather, it directly and immediately is certain of possessing a moral kingdom of ends recognized by other subjects. It believes itself to be not in need of Nature or objectivity: it is immediately intersubjective.

17

641.
“The ‘thing itself’ has substantiality in general in the ethical sphere, external existence in culture, the self-knowing essentiality of thought in morality; and in conscience it is the subject that knows these moments within it.”

642.~645.
Conscience sees actions as known and weighed by judgement; even if such knowledge is incomplete and one cannot possibly know everything about an action, but such incompleteness is permissible for the completeness of knowledge is already reserved for other subjects as a show of the subject’s inwardness and intersubjectively recognized. Also, an action only accords to pure duty as an intersubjective deed. On the end of subjectivity, this is a pure conviction, a sense of certainty, that an action is not to fulfill any end, but to show other subjects the complete freedom of conscience. Therefore this conviction is without content, and only contains content as a necessary moment, but the content itself is without significance. Spinoza’s ethical view of the world: the intertwining of intersubjective essences into a common destiny. Regarding its form and content, no utilitarianism can hold water against conscience, since utilitarianism is itself dependent upon particular insight and calculation, and all such calculations are external to conscience, and the universal is itself as determinate as the individual.

648.~651.
A recapitulation of the battle over life and death. Conscience must preserve itself by negating the reality possessed by others as an expression of the other’s conscience. Reality has become the medium in which consciences communicate, or rather, the battlefield on which consciences kill each other. What matters here is not any determinate reality, but the reality known to be self-expression of a conscience as such.

652.~653.
Language is this reality. And as the reality of selves relating only to selves and relating to them as others, it is elevated out of simple command or imperative to speak or die, but now is a free expression. Speech is now no longer a commanded necessity, but a duty or a conviction declared.

654.
“It is this form which is to be established as actual: it is the self which as such is actual in language, which declares itself to be the truth, and just by so doing acknowledges all other selves and is acknowledged by them.”

656.~658.
In a way this is Spinozist. Consciousness knows itself to be God in actualized Religion. But so far, conscience still sees the universal and omnipotent consciousness as immediately present to it. In this collapsing into the abstract extremes and knowing them to be abstractions, Spirit risks regressing to prior death, for all abstractions vanish into this self-contemplation. It sees only itself and is in immediate unity with itself (to note, here mediation means to differ and separate), for the abstract absolute is immediately present for it as its own self. Speech is merely a dying echo. It has forgotten its own existence and has become “the beautiful soul”. As unhappy consciousness does not comprehend itself as an explicit Notion but only an implicit certainty, the beautiful soul sees and comprehends itself positively as a Notion that denies itself, and is therefore “submerged” in the Notion and not simply “actively negating” others; moreover, it knows itself to be the source of laws, and is hence not striving to fulfill some one duty or another and struggling to reconcile them, but is striving to declare adequately its own self as the source of all duties and laws. The inner truth of the moral view of the world is therefore not what kind of duty is to be fulfilled, but what action is to be justified and expressed; or rather, previously, an action is always guilty of breaching the law or doing the wrong thing, but now an action is always inherently justified but only guilty of besmirching the soul, and not expressing how righteous and beautiful the soul really is.

659.
The return of the repressed antithesis between individual and universal duty, or content and form. It sees itself to be conscientious, to act purely, but it also sees that it can be interpreted by others to be specific and not universal and for some ulterior purpose. What really matters here, as we shall soon see, is this matter of “interpretation.” Here, if consciousness falls back to a contradiction between the individual and the universal, it merely regresses to the moral view of the world.

660.~661.
The way to annihilate the other conscience to assure oneself is to reinterpret the other’s action into hypocrisy: to expose the other conscience. This is because the particular conscience (the individual) claims to be the universal, whereas the universal disbelieves such claim and has to unmask the disguise. One cannot simply say that because hypocrisy acknowledges virtue that it knows itself to be evil, for it is only an insubstantial mask of virtue that it acknowledges; moreover, it is believed that by acknowledging virtue it to some degree is virtuous and fails to see its hypocrisy.

662.~663.
Yet this exposure cannot result from any one-sided persistence. For if the evil conscience persists, it simply confesses itself to be evil and is not regretful, nor does it appear to itself as truly contradictory; that is, it still fails to see its hypocrisy. Nor can the one-sided universal conscience achieve this exposure, for it in persisting only exposes itself as what it is not, i.e. evil. This is such a great turn, for now we see that the “universal consciousness” is in fact nothing but another individual consciousness that is hypocritical, who achieves nothing but judge, for it sees all actions to be capable of being misunderstood, and is actively misunderstanding all those actions, and takes itself to be a pure and beautiful soul!

664.~665.
In the entanglement of the two consciences, the first evil conscience sees its own likeness in the second universal conscience. And the universal conscience in this attempt at exposing others only exposes its own hypocrisy, for it only criticizes those actual consciences as evil, without itself actualizing itself, and realizing that such passivity is itself a particular deed that contradicts its own conscience. “No man is a hero to his valet; not, however, because the man is not a hero, but because the valet—is a valet…Thus, for the judging consciousness, there is no action in which it could not oppose to the universal aspect of the action, the personal aspect of the individuality, and play the part of the moral valet towards the agent.”

666.~667.
The critical and judging conscience sees itself as superior, whilst its truth is recognized by the evil conscience. The evil conscience identifies with the judge and tries to persuade him. But this judge must have the hardness of heart and is not easily persuaded: it still holds itself to be superior and there is no necessity for him to give that up. But in this denial of the sinner’s confession, the hardened heart of the judge denies the flow of Spirit, and is involved in its own contradiction: it refuses to accept the doer’s confession or genuine speech, via which the actuality of the deed is itself given up to the spiritual speech, even if its own whole existence hinges on speech. The mute and silent doer is willing to open his mouth to the judge, whilst the judge refuses to hear.

669.
The ultimate reconciliation between doing and speaking, action and speech. The unacknowledged act is only declared in speech, but not explained through speech; in its persistence, it becomes stubborn in sinning; so is the other empty speech of the judge, which is hypocritical in condemning the particular. It is only by both giving up their persistence, so that the sinner breaks the silence to confess, and the judge softens his own heart to listen, true speech can once again be established, incorporating the actual doing and the universal speaking. In this mutual recognition, they forgive each other’s evil, and genuinely see each as a self.

671.
The moment of universal pure knowledge and individual conscious duty, are absolutely different, and in this absolute opposition comprise the absolute Notion of God: the self absolutely identical with the self absolutely different. A new certainty as the certainty of God: the expansion and splitting of the I into two that nevertheless are united in one.

672.~677.
These passages are crucial. From now on, Spirit is certain that it is not simply a thing, nor a negativity, nor an immediate presence of the other self-consciousness as an object, nor an immediate presence of itself as an object, nor the self-consciousness as an absolute negativity, but a positive intersubjectivity communing with itself in itself.

678.
What is required of religion is a new recapitulation that truly substantiates itself as a free actuality of itself.

679.
Another crucial passage. This gives us a clue to the relation between Time and Hegel’s philosophy. Spirit in its development unfolds in time as dispersed and separate shapes; but these shapes preserve previous shapes as moments in themselves, and such moments become therefore atemporal parts of the whole. That echoes what was said in the preface: Spirit has to labor first to attain to its shape; but in its newly obtained shape it has to recollect and reflect upon all the earlier shapes and preserve them as conscious moments, thus seeing itself fulfilled in content and becomes a conscious whole of Spirit as such. Otherwise, the Spirit would simply forget itself in time and remain mundane. The labor of the concept does not take time; it is Spirit thinking itself. It is ahistorical in the sense that it is only a recapitulation, or a reactivation of its own source; it is historical in the sense that it is wisdom first actuated and permitted by world history. It is not genuine Time because it is only a reactivation; and it is the end of history because it has attained to its full potential. What can be done is simply recollection of what is forgotten, but there can be no new breakthrough of history. In other words, the abolishment of Time is not to say that differentiation is canceled, only that differentiation is grasped as a whole and as itself: there is nothing genuinely new, and there never was such a thing. And what appears is really a tension between history and thought, which however is dissolved in the end as the convergence of two movements, the one going forward, the other retracing its steps. Time is really no Time, but so is no Time really absolute Time: shapes merge into moments, but so are moments themselves capable of regressing back to shapes.

680.
The specific actual shapes are then preserved as moments in an actual religion, and are taken up to form this religion into specific shapes. That is, as spirit that has attained to the form but forgets its own fulfilled content, and is therefore yet undeveloped, it assumes different shapes as religion. A religion not yet capable of recapitulating other shapes into its own moments is incomplete and is itself a specific shape. There is therefore a temporal genesis of Religion, wherein the shapes are not yet converted into moments.

681.
The metaphor is utterly unhelpful. But what is clear is that, with shapes, it’s always discrete and always returns to a new “node”; but once unified together as moments, they become continuous and are thus one atemporal whole. Or rather what once was a singular line of temporal progression and return, now becomes an atemporal sprawl of a structure. In actual spirit, some are moments while one shape is taken to be the substance; but for us, all are moments, and there is no substance that is not a subject.

682.
Shapes are forms which stand separate from other forms and also from the content. The content in conflict with the shape produces a new shape, in which the old shape is taken up as a moment of the content. The immediate shape of religion is thereby split into multiple shapes that are taken up finally into the ultimate shape as only moments.

18

684.
Religions are to be placed in a hierarchical order. Lower religions though they contain higher elements those elements are merely alongside the lower and are appropriated only by those lower elements as shapes in their own unities. It is the structure that matters.

686.
The first diremption of the notion of religion generates its own object as an immediate presence, as a sense-certainty. But this is also a sense-certainty of the Spirit, therefore a certainty of self-consciousness as master or slave. This is the first shape of “shapeless” light generating darkness and dissolving it. See Heidegger and Fink on Heraclitus.

688.
The unitary light has to be dispersed again into many self-subsisting forms that give light its enduring content.

689.
The multiplicity of in-itself flower religions transform to the active and warring for-itself tribalism of animal spirits.

690.
The moment of in-itself is united to the other moment of for-itself and they coalesce into the relation between work and its artificer. See Timaeus.

692.
The first artificer god is an architect: the building offers dead and indifferent architectural intelligibility only to be immersed in the living light and give light a subtle reflectiveness.

694.
The work is dead, however, and its inner life is not yet brought out, until it is immersed not in pure light as an abstract life but in actual life of vegetation as its ornament.

695.
Animals shapes and human shapes are brought into the temple. But they are still speechless.

696.
Against this outer shape of spirit is the equally mute and indifferent stone of darkness.

698.
Spirit as an artificer has now become an artist that fashions self-consciousness striving against unconscious.

700.
The religion of art is one spirit in which spirit is reconciled to itself as an other. Therefore such religion has its proper place only in the ethical realm and is itself spiritual work.

702.~704.
At first, such art is only subjected to customs and the ethical realm. But with the disintegration of the ethical world, spirit has fled into itself and recognizes now only itself. It sees itself as the unrestrained negative power and its universal and concrete world as the imposed pathos. It then works its pathos.

706.
Incommensurability is the essence of organic life. Through these ratios life is present in art first as an immediacy.

707.
The unethical nature as a universal is later overcome by the ethical realm of national spirits. And both the natural and the spiritual in this strife have attained to universality.

708.
In the work one at first sees the universality present as an uninspired work in contrast and antithesis to the absolute unrest of a self or an individual spirit.

710.
This antithesis between work and self, between universality and individuality is overcome in the medium of language. One form godhead takes itself present in language is the hymn, in which godhead dwells in universal communication with the self.

711.
Oracle is the first linguistic form of religion. In it godhead appears as an alien self-consciousness, and appears as a contingent abstraction of universality.

712.
In the self-developing spirit of the community, the universality is particularized and becomes pervasive in language. Speech expresses universal truths, while contingent facts are settled by contingent Oracles. Such oracles are subsumed in the universality of language, however, even if it pertains only to particular incidents; for it in being merged with the universal becomes the ultimate truth that all necessities are equally contingents, that those who deny particularities or are indifferent to them are nonetheless involved in the absolute fate. The testers of oracles are themselves tested; oracles become self-fulfilling prophesies.

713.~715.
This universal language is then to be united with its dead statue in the cult. The abstract cult is only an imaginary union with substance and an imaginary ritual of purification.

716.
The actual cult has to realize its own pure spirit through individuation.

717.~718.
The actual cult achieves this reconciliation through the deed of sacrifice. It sacrifices its own self and its work to the universal; but the universal also is sacrificed for the self as actual existences and as things later consumed by the individual in the prepared feast. The first rites are sacrifices to the underworld, which is unrequited in principle; the second rites, however, are preparations for a feast, through which the universal and the self are mediated in positivity. The self sacrifices only a little portion to the underworld, but everything else reserved for a feast; in this he cheats divine being into a union with himself, viz. into a circuit of ritual economy.

719.
Through the adornment of a temple as a communal practice, the negativity expressed in sacrifice and devotion is mediated in the positivity of the temple as such.

19

720.~721.
The inert substance people revere is transformed into a self-conscious otherness that has recapitulated in itself the substantial and the spiritual aspects, in expression of the feminine contra the masculine.

722.~724.
Hegel’s interpretation of the Bacchae. The feminine power still confronts the masculine power and devours the spirit in pure frenzied enjoyment and desire, since the feminine power is self-consciousness immediately related to the substance, hence is immediately a principle of desire.

725.~726.
This unrestrained power of revelry is then to be worked into a stable shape. Such shape or corporeality is fixed in the human priest of the procession. In this hero of the procession are united the bacchic frenzy and the lucid speech; he is the ultimate expression of the national spirit as self-conscious substance in its ultimate universality.

727.~729.
The universal self-consciousness of the hero expresses the national spirit, which however is in immediate relation to its yet unrecapitulated content. The national spirit needs to subsume the world of all spirits in its own openness. This gives birth to the Homeric Epic, in which the world itself is produced through the individual voice, and which immerses various spirits (heroes) in one overarching spirit of Muse or Mnemosyne. Instead of the opposition between unconscious and conscious self-consciousnesses as femininity versus masculinity, this now is one spirit versus many spirits. To see this worldliness, one must look into Homer’s verses on Achilles’ shield.

730.~731.
Now the divine and the human are related explicitly as self-conscious on two ends, instead of one end being simply consciousness of substance, the other end a desiring self, or one end being the desiring self, the other end a withdrawal of Spirit. They are in the confrontation between a divine self-consciousness and a mortal self-consciousness. Yet such relations are still involved in picture-thinking; that is, it is involved in a bad infinity of moving between the particularity and the universality of the divine and the mortal; the divine are dependent upon the mortal, yet they must also transcend them; they are thereby both universal and subject to a blind Necessity.

732.
Necessity binds the divine to the heroic. See Fink’s interpretation of Heraclitus’ fragment on immortals gazing towards mortals. But this means that necessity cannot be some abstract form, but must itself immerse itself in its content; so is the Minstrel, who is only an indifferent medium wherein necessity is weaved, going to participate. In other words, the abstract necessity of the speech has to be actualized in and by the speaker, and becomes thus a concrete necessity. It is quite remarkable that Hegel even here has not forgotten the importance of medium and meta-textuality.

733.
Tragedy is the higher form where unity between interiority and exteriority is brought about. The Minstrel is an Actor, and he speaks in the Character’s language. Actor is essential to the mask; but the converse is not less true. Mask is essential to the actor.

734.
The chorus is just material as the common people, who are passive and negated. They lack the negative power of a united self and constitute only the dispersed content as such. That is why they are impotent.

735.
The chorus is the indifferent and spectator consciousness that does not participate in the drama. This is not like us, the observers of the development of consciousness, for we occasionally act out our roles; or rather, we constantly act out our roles.

735.
In tragedy many characters are borne out because of the dissolution and abstraction of the subject, making these characters externalities.

737.
Hegel is a Hamlet fan, because Hamlet tarries with the negative and is therefore conscious of the self-consciousness and the deceptive nature of truth and knowledge. The actor eventually has to comprehend its own subjectivity and obscurity. Or otherwise it has to remain at this stage of bad infinity between knowledge and ignorance of oneself.

738.~741.
An analysis of the dramatic structure. Substance is opposed to self-consciousness, so that a god and their knowledge as essence is first posited. Self-consciousness of the hero accepts its one-sided truth and through his action destroys it, thus annihilating the particularity in the inert and indifferent universality of death, the darkness of subjectivity. Thus, unlike the chorus, who are swayed one way or another in a bad infinity, the hero is a consciousness of this bad infinity and comprehends this as a whole is absolute nihilism. This is the same attitude the educated consciousness takes towards culture: that all things are equally vain, there is no substance: whence comes the positivity of Subject. Heroes actualize the Necessity which to the chorus is only a beyond.

742.~743.
This universality of Fate, however, is only produced as a result. And as a result, it is an end still split up between its actuality in the hero and its transcendence in the spectator (chorus). One still feels this nihilism to be distant, since these other moments are nonetheless present as distinct abstractions. The subject is still only present as an object, and is not taken as omnipresent as a self.

744.
Comedy is this new form of subjectivity that takes the subject not as an end result or an object, but as a premise from the start. It is already fully itself and not present as an immediate otherness. Here, the mask is not the actor, but the mask is precisely the revealed distance between the mask and the actor: the actor has no substance and has no mask.

746.
Hegel’s interpretation of Clouds. The elevation of the ideals away from the specificity of laws and maxims: the liberating power of Reason and Speech, the opposition between the Greater and Lesser Speech. Hegel thus seems to differ from Strauss who claims that comedy is essentially conservative; rather, he sees comedy as a symptom of an event in history that has already taken place.

747.
A crucial paragraph. Comedy is the ultimate power of certainty. In comedy all fixity is purified into self-consciousness. From now on the comedic consciousness has fully recapitulated up to the station of absolute freedom; it then needs to advance beyond to the point of morality, as from subjectivity to intersubjectivity.

748.~752.
The Subject is Substance. But in such an alienation, the subject is yet only so far immediate. But as an immediate subject it is only pure form, which has let go its content, and is first a regression to legal person, and unhappy consciousness is really the truth of the comedic consciousness. “The loss of substance as well as of the Self, it is the grief which expresses itself in the hard saying that ‘God is dead.’”

753.~755.
A beautiful passage retelling the story of Christ’s birth. Christ is the rebirth and externalization of the in-itself and the for-itself. The implicitness of the mystery is the father, whereas the maternal power of self-consciousness is its actuality. Compare this to Anselm’s Christology. And also note the strange subversion here between femininity and masculinity: femininity, in keeping with its substantiality, has become a representative of the actual for-itself; whereas masculinity now becomes the mysterious in-itself. This might have to do with the different nature of substance: before substance is simple Being, which is posited to be abject and alien for self-consciousness; now substance is the Self, which is a Self posited to be in community to self-consciousness, and is therefore not the dangerous and tumultuous feminine.

756.
Hegelian methodology for hermeneutics as opposed to the Straussian one: esoteric reading is just imaginary.

757.~759.
The negativity of an esoteric and imaginary beyond is mediated by the immediacy of an actual positivity of God, the incarnation of Christ as the self-developing and developed Notion, the immediacy of the absolute mediation. Thus, the absolute religion has to be revelatory: all knowledge is simply given as immediacy in its absolute mediation.

760.
The last and also the biggest circle is now closed, in whose enclosure the absolute is opened up: the ultimate shape now is comprehended as its own moment, and the end of time is eternity, which is Time in its absolute and unstoppable circling stream. The absolute abstraction is the absolute concrete and enriched being. And unlike where we start with the oscillation between sense-certainty and its absolute universal, here the moments are unified in their absolutely developed and enriched moments. They are not two poles opposed to each other and excluding each other; rather, they are reconciled in the Absolute Notion. Something more needs to be said about the circling.

The absolute circling is a circling of all circles. The movement is like the following. All the previous shapes are to be comprehended and recapitulated in the new shape as preserved moments. The moments unified as a whole stand opposed to the shape and generate thus a new shape. The end of the smaller circle is the beginning of the encompassing circle, which recapitulates the older shapes in itself, those old shapes eventually dissolved in the new circle as preserved moments, which nonetheless suffers the risk of fixity, either getting stuck in one of its recapitulated shape and incapable of turning it into a moment, eventually regressing, or those moments qua moments as one whole content are in opposition to the shape. In the ultimate circling, however, the shape is the moment, so the ultimate absolute knowledge is the first and most immediate moment grasped as a moment. In a way, one could think of it as epicycles, only that the largest circle is in its own turn chained down to the smallest circle.

20

761.
“Only when absolute Being is beheld as an immediate self-consciousness is it known as Spirit.”

762.
A recapitulation of prior moments in this new shape of absolute Spirit, so as for us to witness the dissolution of the shape into its own developed content.

766.
Originary recollection or spiritual recapitulation is not historical in the sense of registering facts; that would only be extraneous. Rather, what one needs is a transcendental history, where the ahistorical is interweaved into the history.

767.~770.
The famous tripartition of thesis-antithesis-synthesis is formulated in a totally different way here. For Hegel, synthesis is still only picture-thinking, as if two terms are to be linked externally. What is at stake here is not a dead formula, but the spiritual movement immanent to the content.

776.
Hegel, though resorting to the arithmetic paradigm of metaphysics, refuses eidetic number. Of course, Hegel’s system is not simply arithmetical.

779.
Crucial. Logos is here no longer a ratio of mixture; not even qualitative ways to organize mixings; rather, it is the immanent generation of Notion into the other Notion.

786.
The final stage: the content of absolute spirit is comprehended as picture-thought as such. That is, abstraction is itself the content for the shape, which shape, however, is content itself. This will be the ultimate recapitulation: the content of the ultimate and absolute shape is fully developed so that the absolute shape is to be dissolved in its absolute content, i.e. the journey the spirit itself takes as externalized abstraction. The end of the largest circle is one with the start of the smallest epicycle; and here it is not immediately one, but is in truth one, for it is fully developed now in its content of the immolation and resurrection of Christ. Now the development of the content is done at this stage, what remains for Absolute Knowing is to dissolve the shape in the content, and to bring the content in one with the shape, for here content is still the negative to the shape, and vice versa, and Spirit only possesses its content of abstraction as an abstraction. In other words, what is needed now is to recapitulate all content as developed content, not abstract content; in such recapitulation, shape itself is reconciled to the content and absolute knowing is achieved. In other words, Spirit knows its shape to be absolute immediate unity (revealed religion), and its content to be absolute difference to be mediated (the death and resurrection of God); the ultimate unity of identity and difference is to be achieved in absolute knowing qua absolute knowing. Right now this unity is only implicit and is not self-conscious.

788.~805.
The ultimate circling of all circles is here complete. The two extremities of the last circle, one extremity touching the beginning of all circles (the smallest epicycle), the other touching the end (the second largest epicycle), have to now be united in the ultimate circle. The resolution for the ultimate contradiction between absolute form and absolute content is for the form to be dissolved in the content, so that the shape is itself at once the giving up of shape and taking up of the beginning; Eternity becomes Time. This is what Zizek calls the ultimate letting-go and setting-free. Here, moments take shape, and in their taking shape are moments. In kissing both the beginning and the end, the ultimate totality knows itself as the ultimate shape dissolved in its taking up the first shape: in transporting itself to finitude, it knows its infinity as its truth. Consciousness believes the immolation of Christ to be only an object or a content, that self-alienation is distant from its shape of self-unification; but the ultimate unity recognizes that the shape really is the content, thus the shape gives up its shape and rejoins Time, its journey, whilst doing this holds onto Eternity by taking up the shape it starts with.

806.
In Science, there is no more antithesis between consciousness and self-consciousness. What is known simply is. All in Science are self-grounding and developing Notions. All are equally moments of a system and shapes of systems. Systemicity is now fully comprehended in its ultimate power: immanence is transcendence. And it passes from the Absolute Notion to Sense-Certainty.

807.
Yet this cannot be a half-hearted sacrifice. Rather, the externalization has to be absolutely free and contingent. That is, the Absolute has to be what it absolutely is not: the letting go that gives forth the abyss of the subject. The absolute contingency here simply means: the movement of the circles always points to an absolute lack of ground. A circle that only stresses its void in the middle. The absolute contingency is nothing but the happening of time and space, i.e. Nature.

808.
Yet there is always mediation with the void: the necessity of the contingent, the law of freedom. That which relates natural time and space to the Absolute is (comprehended) History. But just as the Notion is externalized as sense-certainty to develop into progression of shapes with the final goal of self-comprehension, so is the final end, i.e. the final comprehension of this externalization itself, to be externalized as an “inwardness of the Notion”, as jettisoned into Time, thus perpetuating the movement towards Absolute Knowledge as an eternal yet historical act of comprehension. That is, the comprehended history, as Hegel’s Phenomenology, is achieved through the labor of history as the end result of its self-comprehension, which is itself thrown back into the absolute flow of history.

In revealed religion, the content (absolute difference) is still negatively opposite the shape (absolute unity). The reconciliation is that the absolute shape is the giving up of its own shape and passing into the first shape. Or rather, the shape of Eternity is its own dissolution in Time. It is because of this the last recapitulation of the whole journey as the absolute content is fully reconciled to the absolute shape. All those shapes become moments for Absolute Knowing, which however is itself the setting free of all these moments into their own independent shapes. The Absolute Knowing is the setting free of All Notions as All Times. The implosion of Time.

Consciousness starts with its negating objects continuously, thus posits a subject as its object, and is self-consciousness in truth.

Self-consciousness negates other subjects continuously, thus posits its very self as an other out there, and is reason in truth.

Reason negates its own selves continuously, thus posits itself as a community of subjects, or an intersubjectivity, and is spirit in truth.

Spirit negates its reified intersubjectivities continuously, thus posits itself as the absolute intersubjectivity, and is religion in truth.

Religion negates all its shapes of consciousness, or all its history of mediations, continuously, thus posits itself as the absolute immediacy, and is sense-certainty or consciousness in truth.

If religion does not pass back into immediacy and the circle is not closed, there is no reason why there is no other divide that can still posit something even higher in principle, or why it must end at this point without contingency or arbitrariness. In other words, the representation of Jesus Christ as the mediator between consciousness and the Absolute is actually an obstacle, and once this obstacle of picture-thought is removed and one sees “death in immediacy” to be a product immanent to the Absolute, one puts Jesus Christ transformed into a here and now stripped of its coat of allegory not between the consciousness and the Absolute, but as a projective development in the other direction of the immediacy of God who is dead: and this immediacy is none other but our sense-certainty, the beginning of our consciousness, not in between the consciousness and its end, but as a result projected out of its ultimate end. This cannot be more emphasized: Jesus Christ is a screen representation between consciousness and the Absolute, but sense certainty is beyond the representation of the Absolute, as something projected from the Absolute.