G. W. F. Hegel · 格奥尔格·威廉·弗里德里希·黑格尔
Science of Logic · 逻辑学
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逻辑学——散记
Reflections · Pages
对黑狗逻辑学的一个初步的、粗糙的把握:存在的逻辑类似于阳性逻辑,即从一个存在者转换为下一个存在者,上一个存在者在下一个存在者中以缺席的状态被保持,也就是其观念性在于对外部的指示;本质的逻辑则处在阳性逻辑向阴性逻辑的过渡之间,此时的缺席状态被反过来视作肯定性而出于存在者内部,作为本质的肯定性,而本质的肯定性来自于对非本质部分的否定,也就是在本质逻辑中,有规定者-被规定者的区分,而观念性对他者性的克服在于规定者和被规定者都是在规定的同时生成的,也就是规定者自身也被自己的规定所规定。然而,在本质的逻辑中,我们仍然还有着规定-被规定的区分,哪怕我们可以说进行规定的总同时是被规定的,但是这里我们能得到的只会是被动的、双重原则的总已经在被给予性中被综合了的、无法言说的基质;基质总是自我规定,并同时逃逸出了规定。概念的逻辑则同时超越并持守住了这两种逻辑;它并没有强加任何逻辑,而是将存在和本质逻辑的真理开显出来;总是逃逸出规定的自我规定性并不是一个不可探究的源头,并非一个原因,因为原因之所以成为原因要求了结果的显现,结果反而成为原因的原因;因此,这个逃逸出规定的自我规定性本身并没有逃逸到规定的外部,而恰恰是在与被规定的诸有限者中得到了规定,而成为了有限的无限性得到开示,其无限性由此作为了一个有限部分参与构成了概念的真实无限性。所以概念的逻辑并不在于概念是一个不断生成的动力源,而在于这个动力源本身亦是被它所生成的诸物体反过来生成而获得特殊性的;这就达到了阴性逻辑,一个空洞堆叠空洞的、筛子状的世界观。
所以在概念的逻辑中,本质成为了诸存在中的一个,而诸存在也正皆是本质;整体成为了一个部分在整体之中得到确证,一种分形论式的逻辑构成
而诸范畴的意义也可以由此得到彰显:真理来自于概念的自我差异化,显现为概念与自身的差异与同一;概念的真实无限性在有限性之中被实在化获得确定性而与其真实无限性相对应;在存在的逻辑中,真理是不存在的,因为没有差异于被给予者的对象;本质的逻辑中,真理也是不可能的,因为无限性无法与依托于它的诸有限对象呼应;当且仅当在概念逻辑中的无限性被限制而特殊化时,概念才可能呼应于差异于自身的自身。
用判断类型举例子的话,可以说,在存在逻辑中,我们只能说“动物是动物”“鸟类是鸟类”,因为动物与鸟是相互分离的范畴,而这不会是真理;在本质逻辑中,我们只可以说“鸟类不是动物,但是动物的一种”,而这明显是悖谬的,鸟类作为动物演化的结果却并非动物本身;只有在概念逻辑中,我们才可以说“鸟类是动物”,因为在此处鸟类差异于动物作为动物演化的结果,却又反过来规定了动物性的显现而指示了动物自身的实现,所以“鸟类是动物”这个判断之真同时是建立在“动物亦是鸟类”这个判断之上的
在判断的范畴获得阐明的同时,客观性也要获得阐明。主观判断到客观性的过渡就在于概念的自我差异化运动,概念将自身的普遍性放置在特殊性之中而获得客观性;而这客观性本身也是可显现为不同的模式的。一种是,概念的普遍性在特殊性之中显现为同样特殊的,这就是实证式的客观性,物与物之间没有关联的直接给予(可能有点类似于静态现象学?);一种是,概念的普遍性在特殊性之中显现为纯粹的普遍性,这就是否定式的客观性,经验对象之间呈现为因果性的关联,也就是牛顿物理世界观,对象只在与对象的关联中获得确定性,而被关联的对象又要再关联于其它对象,任何对象都关联于无限的对象而成为了无质的中介,对象性被消解为了中介性;最后,真正的对象性来自对中介性之直接性的认识,也就是在对象的弥散中对象性仍然被持守,中介性自身也是被中介为了直接的
Constituted—>Constituting in the constituted—>Constituting as the constituted per se
Constituting—>Constituted within the constituting—>Constituted as the constituting per se
黑格尔的纯粹理性批判在于他接受了康德的结论:绝对者是不能被知性的有限概念达到的;但他不像康德因此把绝对者放到了超出知性或知识之外的位置上,而是要求对绝对者进行另一种思考,也就是辩证法式的思考,而这种思考又回过来改变了对一切层次的存在者的全体的认识;被有限概念限定的经验知识因此成为了无限概念的诸化身而同样被“无限化”了。
稍稍總結黑格爾對康德先天範疇的駁論(我盡力了,見笑)
當範疇作為差異化的對象被指出的時候,其差異本身就與必然性產生矛盾了:這裡沒有一個總與全的絕對者,當你說“必然,一件事不是有便是無”時,必然性本身就被割裂成差異化的兩部分而喪失了;而這些範疇本身又是歷史地被提出的,只有在歷史的運動中它們得到了必然性,如果沒有歷史之前的運動設定好作為對象的本質以及主體對這個本質的篡奪,範疇的必然性就是不完整的
AI translated the non-English passages; original English passages are preserved. The mixed-language original is available under Original.
A preliminary, rough grasp of Hegel’s Logic: the logic of being resembles masculine logic, passing from one being to the next, with the previous being preserved in the next in the state of absence. Its ideality thus lies in indicating the outside. The logic of essence stands in the transition from masculine to feminine logic. Absence is now conversely treated as positivity arising from within the being, the positivity of essence. Essence’s positivity comes from negating the nonessential part. The logic of essence therefore distinguishes the determining from the determined. Ideality overcomes otherness insofar as both the determining and the determined are generated in the act of determining: the determining is itself determined by its own determination. Yet in the logic of essence, the distinction between determining and being determined remains. Even if we say that what determines is always simultaneously determined, what we obtain here can only be a passive, unsayable substrate of dual principles, always already synthesized within givenness. The substrate always determines itself and simultaneously escapes determination. The logic of the concept both transcends and preserves these two logics. It imposes no logic, but discloses the truth of the logics of being and essence. The self-determination that always escapes determination is not an inscrutable source or a cause. A cause becomes a cause only through the appearance of its effect; the effect conversely becomes the cause of the cause. Thus this self-determination escaping determination does not itself escape outside determination. Rather, it receives determination among the determined finite things and is disclosed as a finite infinity. Its infinity thus participates, as one finite part, in constituting the concept’s true infinity. The logic of the concept therefore does not mean that the concept is a continuously generative motive source, but that this source is itself generated in return by the bodies it generates, thereby acquiring particularity. This reaches feminine logic, a sieve-like worldview of voids piled upon voids.
In the logic of the concept, then, essence becomes one being among beings, while all beings are themselves essences. The whole becomes a part and is confirmed within the whole: a fractal kind of logical constitution.
The meaning of the categories can also be disclosed through this. Truth arises from the concept’s self-differentiation, appearing as its difference from and identity with itself. The concept’s true infinity is actualized within finitude, acquiring determinacy and thereby corresponding to its true infinity. In the logic of being, truth does not exist, because there is no object distinct from what is given. In the logic of essence, truth is also impossible, because infinity cannot correspond to the finite objects that depend on it. Only when infinity is limited and particularized in the logic of the concept can the concept correspond to itself as different from itself.
Using types of judgment as examples: in the logic of being, we can say only “Animals are animals” and “Birds are birds,” because animals and birds are mutually separate categories. This cannot be truth. In the logic of essence, we can say only “Birds are not animals, but a kind of animal,” which is plainly paradoxical: birds, as the result of animals’ evolution, are nevertheless not animals themselves. Only in the logic of the concept can we say “Birds are animals.” Here birds differ from animals as the result of animals’ evolution, yet conversely determine the manifestation of animality and indicate animals’ own actualization. The truth of the judgment “Birds are animals” therefore simultaneously rests on the judgment “Animals are also birds.”
As the categories of judgment are clarified, objectivity must be clarified as well. The passage from subjective judgment to objectivity lies in the concept’s movement of self-differentiation. The concept places its own universality within particularity and thereby acquires objectivity. This objectivity can itself appear in different modes. In one, the concept’s universality appears within particularity as equally particular: this is positive objectivity, the immediate givenness of things unrelated to one another, perhaps somewhat like static phenomenology? In another, the concept’s universality appears within particularity as pure universality: this is negative objectivity, where empirical objects appear in causal connections, the Newtonian physical worldview. An object acquires determinacy only in relation to another object, while the related object must again relate to further objects. Every object relates to infinitely many objects and becomes a qualityless mediator; objectivity dissolves into mediation. Finally, true objectivity comes from recognizing mediation’s immediacy: objectivity remains preserved in the dispersion of objects, and mediation itself is mediated into immediacy.
Constituted—>Constituting in the constituted—>Constituting as the constituted per se
Constituting—>Constituted within the constituting—>Constituted as the constituting per se
Hegel’s critique of pure reason consists in accepting Kant’s conclusion: the Absolute cannot be reached by the understanding’s finite concepts. But unlike Kant, he does not consequently place the Absolute beyond understanding or knowledge. Instead, he demands another way of thinking the Absolute, dialectical thinking, which in turn changes the cognition of beings at every level as a whole. Empirical knowledge delimited by finite concepts thus becomes the many embodiments of the infinite concept and is likewise “infinitized.”
A brief summary of Hegel’s objection to Kant’s a priori categories—I have done my best; bear with me.
When categories are indicated as differentiated objects, their difference itself conflicts with necessity. There is no Absolute that is a total whole here. When you say, “Necessarily, something either is or is not,” necessity itself is split into two differentiated parts and lost. These categories are themselves also historically proposed; only within history’s movement do they acquire necessity. Without the preceding historical movement that establishes essence as object and the subject’s appropriation of that essence, the necessity of the categories is incomplete.
非中文段落由 AI 翻译,中文原文保持不变。中英混合原稿可通过“原文”按钮查看。
对黑狗逻辑学的一个初步的、粗糙的把握:存在的逻辑类似于阳性逻辑,即从一个存在者转换为下一个存在者,上一个存在者在下一个存在者中以缺席的状态被保持,也就是其观念性在于对外部的指示;本质的逻辑则处在阳性逻辑向阴性逻辑的过渡之间,此时的缺席状态被反过来视作肯定性而出于存在者内部,作为本质的肯定性,而本质的肯定性来自于对非本质部分的否定,也就是在本质逻辑中,有规定者-被规定者的区分,而观念性对他者性的克服在于规定者和被规定者都是在规定的同时生成的,也就是规定者自身也被自己的规定所规定。然而,在本质的逻辑中,我们仍然还有着规定-被规定的区分,哪怕我们可以说进行规定的总同时是被规定的,但是这里我们能得到的只会是被动的、双重原则的总已经在被给予性中被综合了的、无法言说的基质;基质总是自我规定,并同时逃逸出了规定。概念的逻辑则同时超越并持守住了这两种逻辑;它并没有强加任何逻辑,而是将存在和本质逻辑的真理开显出来;总是逃逸出规定的自我规定性并不是一个不可探究的源头,并非一个原因,因为原因之所以成为原因要求了结果的显现,结果反而成为原因的原因;因此,这个逃逸出规定的自我规定性本身并没有逃逸到规定的外部,而恰恰是在与被规定的诸有限者中得到了规定,而成为了有限的无限性得到开示,其无限性由此作为了一个有限部分参与构成了概念的真实无限性。所以概念的逻辑并不在于概念是一个不断生成的动力源,而在于这个动力源本身亦是被它所生成的诸物体反过来生成而获得特殊性的;这就达到了阴性逻辑,一个空洞堆叠空洞的、筛子状的世界观。
所以在概念的逻辑中,本质成为了诸存在中的一个,而诸存在也正皆是本质;整体成为了一个部分在整体之中得到确证,一种分形论式的逻辑构成
而诸范畴的意义也可以由此得到彰显:真理来自于概念的自我差异化,显现为概念与自身的差异与同一;概念的真实无限性在有限性之中被实在化获得确定性而与其真实无限性相对应;在存在的逻辑中,真理是不存在的,因为没有差异于被给予者的对象;本质的逻辑中,真理也是不可能的,因为无限性无法与依托于它的诸有限对象呼应;当且仅当在概念逻辑中的无限性被限制而特殊化时,概念才可能呼应于差异于自身的自身。
用判断类型举例子的话,可以说,在存在逻辑中,我们只能说“动物是动物”“鸟类是鸟类”,因为动物与鸟是相互分离的范畴,而这不会是真理;在本质逻辑中,我们只可以说“鸟类不是动物,但是动物的一种”,而这明显是悖谬的,鸟类作为动物演化的结果却并非动物本身;只有在概念逻辑中,我们才可以说“鸟类是动物”,因为在此处鸟类差异于动物作为动物演化的结果,却又反过来规定了动物性的显现而指示了动物自身的实现,所以“鸟类是动物”这个判断之真同时是建立在“动物亦是鸟类”这个判断之上的
在判断的范畴获得阐明的同时,客观性也要获得阐明。主观判断到客观性的过渡就在于概念的自我差异化运动,概念将自身的普遍性放置在特殊性之中而获得客观性;而这客观性本身也是可显现为不同的模式的。一种是,概念的普遍性在特殊性之中显现为同样特殊的,这就是实证式的客观性,物与物之间没有关联的直接给予(可能有点类似于静态现象学?);一种是,概念的普遍性在特殊性之中显现为纯粹的普遍性,这就是否定式的客观性,经验对象之间呈现为因果性的关联,也就是牛顿物理世界观,对象只在与对象的关联中获得确定性,而被关联的对象又要再关联于其它对象,任何对象都关联于无限的对象而成为了无质的中介,对象性被消解为了中介性;最后,真正的对象性来自对中介性之直接性的认识,也就是在对象的弥散中对象性仍然被持守,中介性自身也是被中介为了直接的
被构成者——>被构成者之中的构成者——>作为被构成者本身的构成者
构成者——>构成者之内的被构成者——>作为构成者本身的被构成者
黑格尔的纯粹理性批判在于他接受了康德的结论:绝对者是不能被知性的有限概念达到的;但他不像康德因此把绝对者放到了超出知性或知识之外的位置上,而是要求对绝对者进行另一种思考,也就是辩证法式的思考,而这种思考又回过来改变了对一切层次的存在者的全体的认识;被有限概念限定的经验知识因此成为了无限概念的诸化身而同样被“无限化”了。
稍稍總結黑格爾對康德先天範疇的駁論(我盡力了,見笑)
當範疇作為差異化的對象被指出的時候,其差異本身就與必然性產生矛盾了:這裡沒有一個總與全的絕對者,當你說“必然,一件事不是有便是無”時,必然性本身就被割裂成差異化的兩部分而喪失了;而這些範疇本身又是歷史地被提出的,只有在歷史的運動中它們得到了必然性,如果沒有歷史之前的運動設定好作為對象的本質以及主體對這個本質的篡奪,範疇的必然性就是不完整的