Martin Heidegger · 马丁·海德格尔
Being and time · 存在与时间
Undated 未注日期
存在与时间——散记
Reflections · Pages
其实地就是质料,或者说深渊性的质料,是切近的发生;天是这个发生的场所,在这个场所的敞开中地被空间化联结;这个联结就是神的指示意义,也就是一种遥远的无限性的指涉,或者说语词形式;而人则是意义回归有限性的统合场所。所以这个是有个内在顺序的轮转舞,地-天-神-人。但考虑到天地神人其实是一个对照关系而不是一个顺次连接关系,也无伤大雅。
海哥的石头,河流,植被与动物
在讨论问题之前,必须意识到问题在哪里。关于石头,河流,植被与动物的讨论,问题并不在于每个范畴或者实例自身,而在于这四种事物被聚集在一起的原因。一种狡猾的答复是,这种聚集是没有原因而完全偶然的:所谓玫瑰无意。可是思者的任务恰恰在于思考不可思考的,奠基不可奠基的;这样的答复并不能使我满意,因为我依然不理解。
为什么石头,河流,植被与动物成为了某种范式?显然,它们的共同点,对于海来说,就是可以作为一种存在之-间性的例证。但他显然不是仅仅将这四个种类视为例证的;这挑选的背后遵循着什么样的原则?
首先,我们可以举出在其它三者的参照下,每一者最显著的特征。石头,坚硬;河流,流淌;植物,生长;动物,运动。先从石头开始。海所分析的石头,具有坚硬的特质;但是这是一种特殊的坚硬。石头的坚硬是一种忍受,也就是其作为承载步履的表面构成了道路。它的坚硬因此是作为中介的坚硬,也是向外敞开的坚硬。坚硬意味着坚守,守护自身,意味着一种同一性;也就是说,石头在敞开的同时保持着自身。而这种中介作为中介的自身同一性使它守卫在一点,度过永恒。石头因此给予了一种特别的时空的发生:点与永恒。
河流的流淌同样充当了中介。但流淌相比起石头沉默的坚守要更加发散,只是堪堪地支撑住了同一性:在可能的无数支流当中。这里的中介其同一性被削减到了最低,而总是在不断地消逝当中。而消逝指示了方向;哪怕那个方向是一种回归,但到底是一种方向。流淌就是流逝。而另一种时空在这里被给出:方向与流。
植物,根据Theophrastus的描述,是一种涌出。这似乎与河流并没有什么不同。但是植物的涌出,其方向并不是随意的,而永远朝向天空与太阳的轨迹。植物因此总是指向了一种完成,一种至高点,而其蔓延则是对至高太一的摄取:也就是说,在植物的生长中,一多互摄的关系最先被勾勒出来。而植物的完成就是它的果实。植物因此给予了这样的时空:目的与成熟。
最后,动物。动物意味着运动,也就意味着脆弱性和保护自己的需要。动物需要扩张领土,需要栖息和游荡。动物的世界因此是未完成的,时刻与死相邻的。对于石头,河流和植物来说,死,或非存在,或无,都不是可以瞬间发生的事。石头遭受的是磨蚀,河流是干枯,而植物则是凋零。但动物时刻都暴露在湮灭的威胁下。因此,动物经受的时间是“每一刻”,或者说,“每一个活的当下”,而经受的空间则是“此处”和“彼处”。动物因此,相比其它三者,拥有着最彻底、每一个瞬间都发生着的自由。动物给出的时空因此是:此-在与向死而生。
海哥的时间问题
海哥处理时间问题的理由主要是出于对存在问题的思考,因为当奥古斯丁问时间“是”什么的时候,已经预设了存在=永恒当下了;所以要思考存在问题必须先行思考时间问题。而他对时间问题的思考发轫于此种解读:时间性=历史性。此在的历史性奠基于时间性,这是无从疑问的,而历史性与时间性的一致性也是自明的;然而对于海哥来说,除了历史性,时间性还有另一种可能的、甚至是必然的理解。历史性意味着此在总是接受先前的事物并将其向未来传递;这种传递首先意味着的是可能性与自由。在传递中,东西可能被散失,话语可能被扭曲,意义可能发生变化;这首先意味着一种开放性。而这种开放性是朝向什么的呢?是朝向事物本身,此在所接受的是事物本来所是的样貌,而传递的是事物现在所是,传递的朝向是事物的成为。因此在历史性中,此在呈现为对事物本身的敞开。此处必须重提奥古斯丁的疑问:“未来还不存在而过去已经不再存在,那现在也不能算作存在;那时间是否存在呢?”然而可以看到,时间并不消逝;相反的,在此在与事物的打交道中,时间始终持存着,始终被理解着、解读着;也就是说,时间性自身在时间中被保存。换句话说,在历史性-时间性向事物的敞开中,时间性也“同时”在诸事物中获得了荫庇与保存,这就是“关心的时间”;时间性总是向作为自身外部的自身敞开并被自身召唤。时间在事物中获得自身的拯救;这种拯救的、关心着的时间性差异于此在的时间性-历史性,它意味着此在时间性的向外敞开同时也是时间的自我保存;而进行这种保存的根本“事物”就是天空与太阳。在太阳行进于天空的轨迹中时,它环绕着大地并开显一切事物的运动、变化与时间,它作为尺度衡量时间的流动;它给予了时间的尺度,而这意味着它给予了时间,甚至可以说,太阳就是时间。因为太阳与天空的照耀,与黑夜的交替,此在的时间性-历史性的敞开并没有敞向虚无,而是在事物的时间中被存守;时间并没有遭遇根本的断裂,而是在历史的断裂处涌入了“另一种时间”,为这个此在的历史时间奠基的时间,不断回到自身、存守自身于事物的开显与荫庇中的行星运动的时间;也就是最为自然的“一天”“一夜”的时间。
sallis论海哥
此在“在此”生存的敞开中,可以得到以下诸元素;被给予的存在者、对存在者的无根的给予、接受存在者之被给予的场所和进行给予的无根性之场所。因为给予者在被给予者的开显中被隐匿着开显,给予者与被给予者有着共时性,它们同时发生着;同样的,接受存在者和接受给予性的场所也同时发生。正因为开显的同时有所隐匿,而隐匿同时也是一种开显,开显者与隐匿者被摆置在同一个被给予的场所中;对开显之追问将导向对隐匿之追问,而这样的循环恰恰勾勒出了存在之问的必然限度、也就是朝向之必然性。也就是,给予者与被给予者的循环将刻画出一个场所及其绝对的限度,也在同时通过这个限度刻画出另一个场所:无根之场所,而在当中站立的是绝对的给予者。此在的朝向因此总是在无根之根当中。也就是说,在这里,每个元素都将不可避免地向另一个元素转化,在对彼此共同的占有中成其本身。这就是 本有。而海哥后期的四合,就是对这诸元素的游戏的刻画:神是无限且无根的给予者,总在无根性当中舍离,也就是总是给予自身;大地接受给予并隐藏起给予者于自身,开显着给予者的自身隐匿;天空以其昼夜的光照、黑暗和透彻超越沉重大地的扎根性,却在这种超越中包裹起大地,托举起大地,容纳大地;而人则行走于大地之上,永远在大地的此岸此处接受着开显、隐匿、隐匿之开显、开显之隐匿、开显之开显、隐匿之隐匿等等,在无根性中行走扎根,朝向着。简单来说,如果这种简单具有合法性的话,神是给予者,大地是被给予者,天空是给予者的场所,而人(此在)则是被给予者的场所;这里都处在一种真理性的直接性当中被拥有,也就是本有,并在当中彼此渗透,因此刚刚粗暴的分类刚刚建立就会再次被推翻。尽管刚刚的分法最有意思的地方可能是并不是天空与大地相对应,而是天空与人对应,而神与大地对应……
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
Earth is really matter, or abyssal matter: a coming-to-be that is near at hand. Sky is the place of this coming-to-be; in the opening of this place, earth is spatialized and connected. This connection is the gods’ indicative meaning, a reference to a distant infinity, or a verbal form. Human beings are the gathering place where meaning returns to finitude. So this is a round dance with an internal sequence: earth–sky–gods–mortals. Still, considering that earth, sky, gods, and mortals actually stand in contrast rather than in a sequential connection, this does no harm.
Heidegger’s stones, rivers, vegetation, and animals
Before discussing a problem, one must recognize where the problem lies. In discussing stones, rivers, vegetation, and animals, the problem does not lie in each category or instance by itself, but in the reason these four kinds of things are gathered together. A cunning answer would say that this gathering has no reason and is wholly contingent: the rose is without why. Yet the thinker’s task is precisely to think the unthinkable and ground the ungroundable. Such an answer cannot satisfy me, because I still do not understand.
Why do stones, rivers, vegetation, and animals become a kind of paradigm? Clearly, for Heidegger, what they share is that they can exemplify the between-ness of Being. Yet he clearly does not regard these four kinds merely as examples. What principle governs this selection?
First, we can identify the most conspicuous trait of each in relation to the other three: stones are hard; rivers flow; plants grow; animals move. Begin with the stone. The stone Heidegger analyzes has the quality of hardness, but this is a particular hardness. The stone’s hardness is an endurance: as the surface that bears our footsteps, it constitutes a road. Its hardness is therefore the hardness of a medium, a hardness opened outward. Hardness means holding firm, guarding itself, an identity. In other words, the stone preserves itself while opening. This self-identity of a medium as medium makes it stand guard at a point through eternity. The stone thus gives a particular coming-to-be of space and time: point and eternity.
The river’s flowing likewise serves as a medium. Yet compared with the stone’s silent steadfastness, flowing is more dispersive and barely sustains identity amid countless possible tributaries. Here the medium’s identity is reduced to a minimum and is constantly passing away. Passing away indicates a direction: even if that direction is a return, it is a direction nonetheless. Flowing is passing. Another space-time is given here: direction and flow.
Plants, according to Theophrastus’ description, are an outpouring. This seems no different from rivers. Yet the direction of a plant’s outpouring is not arbitrary: it is always toward the sky and the sun’s course. A plant thus always points toward a completion, a highest point, and its spreading is a reception of the supreme One. In other words, the mutual inclusion of one and many is first outlined in a plant’s growth. Its completion is its fruit. Plants therefore give this space-time: purpose and ripening.
Finally, animals. Animals mean movement, and therefore vulnerability and the need to protect themselves. Animals need to expand their territory, dwell, and roam. Their world is therefore unfinished and always adjacent to death. For stones, rivers, and plants, death, nonbeing, or nothingness is not something that can occur in an instant. Stones undergo erosion, rivers drying up, and plants withering. But animals are always exposed to the threat of annihilation. The time animals undergo is therefore ‘each moment,’ or ‘each living present,’ while their space is ‘here’ and ‘there.’ Compared with the other three, animals thus possess the most thorough freedom, occurring at every instant. The space-time they give is therefore: being-here and living toward death.
Heidegger’s question of time
Heidegger’s reason for addressing time comes chiefly from his thinking of the question of Being. When Augustine asks what time ‘is,’ he has already presupposed Being = eternal present. To think the question of Being, one must therefore first think the question of time. His thinking of time begins from this interpretation: temporality = historicity. Dasein’s historicity is grounded in temporality; this is beyond question, and the agreement of historicity and temporality is self-evident. Yet for Heidegger, besides historicity there is another possible, even necessary, understanding of temporality. Historicity means that Dasein always receives what came before and transmits it toward the future. This transmission means, first of all, possibility and freedom. In transmission, things can be lost, words distorted, and meanings changed. This means, first of all, an openness. Toward what is this openness directed? Toward things themselves. What Dasein receives is what things originally were; what it transmits is what things now are; the direction of transmission is toward what things become. In historicity, Dasein thus appears as an opening toward things themselves. Here Augustine’s question must be recalled: ‘The future does not yet exist, and the past no longer exists, so neither can the present count as existent. Does time exist, then?’ Yet we can see that time does not pass away. On the contrary, in Dasein’s dealings with things, time always persists and is always understood and interpreted. Temporality itself, that is, is preserved in time. In other words, as historicity-temporality opens toward things, temporality ‘simultaneously’ finds shelter and preservation in things. This is ‘the time of concern.’ Temporality always opens toward itself as its own outside and is summoned by itself. Time finds its own salvation in things. This saving, concerned temporality differs from Dasein’s temporality-historicity. It means that the outward opening of Dasein’s temporality is simultaneously time’s self-preservation. The fundamental ‘things’ performing this preservation are the sky and the sun. As the sun travels its course across the sky, it circles the earth and discloses the movement, change, and time of all things. As a measure, it measures time’s flow. It gives time its measure, which means that it gives time; one could even say that the sun is time. Because of the shining of sun and sky and their alternation with night, the opening of Dasein’s temporality-historicity does not open into nothingness but is preserved in the time of things. Time does not suffer a fundamental rupture. Rather, ‘another time’ flows into the ruptures of history: the time grounding this Dasein’s historical time, the time of planetary movement that constantly returns to itself and preserves itself in the disclosure and shelter of things. This is the most natural time of ‘a day’ and ‘a night.’
Sallis on Heidegger
Within the opening of Dasein’s existence ‘here,’ we obtain the following elements: given beings; the groundless giving of beings; the place receiving the givenness of beings; and the place of the groundlessness that gives. Because the giver is disclosed in concealment within the disclosure of the given, giver and given are simultaneous: they occur together. Likewise, the places receiving beings and receiving givenness occur together. Precisely because something is concealed in disclosure, and concealment is simultaneously a disclosure, the disclosed and the concealed are placed within the same given place. Questioning disclosure leads to questioning concealment. This circle outlines the necessary limit of the question of Being, the necessity of its direction. That is, the circle of giver and given delineates a place and its absolute limit, and through this limit simultaneously delineates another place: the place of groundlessness, where the absolute giver stands. Dasein’s orientation is thus always within the ground of groundlessness. Here, in other words, each element inevitably turns toward another and becomes itself through their shared appropriation of one another. This is Ereignis. Heidegger’s later fourfold characterizes the play of these elements. The gods are infinite and groundless givers, always relinquishing themselves in groundlessness, always giving themselves. Earth receives the giving and conceals the giver within itself, disclosing the giver’s self-concealment. Sky, through the light, darkness, and transparency of day and night, transcends the rootedness of heavy earth; yet in this transcendence it envelops, upholds, and accommodates earth. Mortals walk upon earth, always receiving disclosure, concealment, the disclosure of concealment, the concealment of disclosure, the disclosure of disclosure, the concealment of concealment, and so on, here on this side of earth. They walk and take root in groundlessness, oriented toward something. Simply put, if such simplicity is legitimate: the gods are the givers, earth is the given, sky is the place of the givers, and mortals—Dasein—are the place of the given. All are appropriated within an immediacy of truth, namely Ereignis, and interpenetrate there. Thus this crude classification is overturned as soon as it is established. Perhaps its most interesting feature, though, is that sky corresponds not to earth but to mortals, while the gods correspond to earth…