Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz · 戈特弗里德·威廉·莱布尼茨
Logic and metaphysics · 逻辑与形而上学
24年对海德格尔的莱布尼茨解读的批评
Douban · Bidasari
Source revised / 来源修订: 26 June 2026
Reading / 研读:Martin Heidegger / 马丁·海德格尔 · The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic 逻辑学的形而上学基础
In this note / 篇目
海德格尔的莱布尼茨解释,I:
1. 海德格尔的洞察力是很惊人的,抓住了莱布尼茨的关窍:为了讨论逻辑与形而上学的问题,他抓住了「判断」形式的问题,并将判断的基本结构即主谓结构简化为「内蕴(inesse)」,或者说「包含(inclusion)」。海德格尔认为莱布尼茨的「判断」概念与笛卡尔式的「定位(positioning)」不同,并不仅仅是意志对被给予的诸多命题的肯定或者否定,换句话说,并不仅仅只是对诸多无差别被给予到眼前的命题的「看」或「不看」;相反,判断在莱布尼茨那里是一个知识的「追溯」活动,是对一个命题与另一个命题之间内容上的关系的澄清。然后,「包含」又被还原为「同一性(identity)」,并由此回到了中世纪「神圣知识(divine knowledge)」的问题上。
2. 神的知识可分为两大类,而后者又可以被分为两类。一种是不会被外在实现而只能内在于神的知识的「纯粹可能性(pure possibility)」,一种是会被外在实现并把握(visio)的「现实性」。「现实性」包含「实在」与「潜能」,前者当下即是,后者作为实在只有在未来或者过去才被实现。在神的眼中,任何事实都是同时呈现出其「实在」与「潜能」的样貌,也就是说,尽管这个存在者在永恒的当下一瞬被把握,但这个存在者依旧保留着它每一个瞬间之实在的特殊性,并把每一个实在相对于另一个实在把握为潜能。时间虽然被转化成了永恒而「接续(succession)」亦被取消,但这并不代表每一个瞬间失去了其相对于其它瞬间的独一性,而仅仅代表神对这些瞬间的把握是绝对的。神并不取消虚拟,而只是同样认知着虚拟的实在。
3. 从这里我们可以看出莱布尼茨哲学的主要问题域是如何被划出的了。尽管海德格尔确实抓住了中心问题,但他并没有准确地刻画它,也没找到真正适合刻画这一中心的领域。首先,尽管海德格尔意识到了「包含」的重要性,他却没有讨论同样重要的「排除(exclusion)」是如何发生又是如何在莱布尼茨的体系里被变更的。同样,他没有区分「原初理念(primitive notions)」和「原初真理(primary truths)」,也就是,莱布尼茨那里,尽管每个判断形式上可以被还原为原初真理或者同一性,但这并不意味着原初真理就是一切真理的「根」或「奠基」。在内容上,这些形式化的真理需要一些范例(prime examples),也就是「原初理念」,来给判断实在上的奠基。「狗咬人」可以被还原为「狗是狗」,并由此达到真理;但这一种还原依赖于原初理念在神的知识中的性质,是因为原初理念之间的「既不包含也不排除」的关系,同一性才能在根上被真正把握为「差异与同一之同一」,而由此神与世界的差异才能被真正理解。否则,莱布尼茨体系里真正的难点,也就是时-空与身体的生成论,就无法被把握。正是因为原初理念的持存,在理念A被理念B排除的情况下,理念A也并没有消失,而依然在神的知识中期待着实现。这才是「驱力(conatus)」真正的形式,源于一个本质对自身实现的等待和要求,而不仅仅局限于单子的活动。正是这最后一步,即对「排除」的保持与取消的中间态,奠定了世界相对于神(祂既不设定也不取消「排除」)的位置,世界其独立性在于其同样具有无限性(内在矛盾带来的辩证运动),其依赖性则在于其依旧维持着「一-多」之间的矛盾,尽管这是一个内生性的矛盾。简而言之,谢林比海德格尔更敏锐地注意到莱布尼茨和斯宾诺莎哲学的一贯性。而海德格尔这上面的主要疏漏在于他忽视了「普全数学(mathesis universalis)」对莱布尼茨的影响,甚至说他都没有意识到「普全数学」或者「形式本体论」本身是超出了所谓「存在问题」的范畴的。「形式本体论」并非是对存在问题的「抽象」,而是针对一与多之间不同关系的刻画。所以海德格尔只以为莱布尼茨关心的是「存在者的多怎么被还原成存在的一」,所以只讨论「容纳」,也就是一对多的统摄;却没有意识到「容纳」是必须相对于「排除」去讨论的,所以哪怕是容纳着的「一」本身也需要与其它的「一」处在关系中,而这种关系在不同的区域的不同层次也是不一样的:理念之间,没有容纳也没有排除;本质之间,要么容纳要么排除;存在之间,既有容纳,也有排除。想要偷懒跳过这些层次,直接去讨论所谓「存在问题」,那就只能陷入无谓的神秘化,仿佛这世上只有「存在」这一种「一」,或只有「存在者」这一种「多」。
海德格尔的莱布尼茨解释,II:
1. 首先,海德格尔明确了莱布尼茨处真理的涵义就是「同一性」。然后,他指出,在所有理性的规定中,真正起到一个中心的组织作用的是「奠基演示律(the principle of demonstrating ground)」,也就是,任何「理念」要被获得理解必须要求在自身内容的奠基中被澄清。这是一个动力化的定律(dynamic principle),因为它所规定的实际上是一个行动,即将一切理念还原为自我奠基的原初理念的寻根行动。根据莱布尼茨的说法,这要求一个理念首先变得「清晰(clear)」,即要被视作一个主题化的对象被认识;然后要「明确(distinct)」,即其作为主题所包含的诸多内容也要清晰地显示出来;接着要变得「合宜」,也就是这诸多内容也要变得明确,而其下的诸多内容亦要变得明确,直到最后的终点。想要获得这样「合宜」的知识,一种是通过对「规律(order)」的把握,这就涉及了「符号化」。「符号知识(symbolic knowledge)」是彻底明确的,只不过它没有也不需要被一步一步演示出来,而是可以作为一个「算法(algorithm)」被把握。与「符号知识」相对的就是「直观知识」了。有一点需要注意的是,也是海德格尔忽视了的地方,「符号知识」与「符号化」并不等同,因为哪怕「符号知识」作为知识确实一定得是「合宜」的,「符号化」本身作为一种主体的成就却是渗透在知识的各个区域的。一个「符号」可以让一个理念变得清晰,也可能让它变得明确,也可能产生完全相反的效果。
2. 与在I.中的诊断相同,海德格尔忽视了「普全数学」在莱布尼茨体系中的重要性。这让他靠忽视莱布尼茨体系中的其它要点直接抵达了他所认定的「形而上学基本问题」。他的做法是,首先通过「奠基演示律」揭露更原初的「自由」问题,再通过理念分析,即奠基演示,这一活动所隐含的「弥合差异」的程序揭露更原初的「差异与同一之同一」的问题。但这让他根本无法讨论为什么莱布尼茨会讨论形式化的同一性(A=A),为什么莱布尼茨会把这形式化的同一性等同于差异化的同一性。他也无法说明为什么在神那里形式化的同一性与差异化的同一性是等同的,又为什么要有这种区分。这也导致了他错误地将「原初理念(primitive notions)」等同于「原初真理(primary truths)」。在莱布尼茨那里,形式本身并非又是什么特殊的、原初的内容。形式并非是柏拉图的理念(eidos)或是亚里士多德的因(arche)。形式仅仅是规定内容的秩序,而它的规定是对「任意事物(anything whatsoever)」的规定。换句话说,形式只是代数符号,而并非形而上的生成原则。海德格尔这里一厢情愿地忽视了这一点,而将莱布尼茨一整个形式本体论的面向抹去,自然无法把握神与世界之间真正关键的张力:创世并非是因为阿奎那式的神就「是」形式与内容的同一,而是因为神在形式本体论所给予的无限的创世的可能性中「选择」了数学上最优的那个解法。仅仅只是前者,那神除了最单调的「是」以外将什么都不是,而世界也将丧失任何独立性,毕竟世界甚至单子哪个又不是「形式与内容的同一呢?」;只有通过后者,莱布尼茨才能真正地把握一个秩序,即从原初理念中组合出无限多的本质,又由这些本质组合成一个存在着的世界,每一个层次或者区域的「一-多结构」都有着不同的刻画,并真正凸显出神思与本质与存在与世界与单子之间各自细微的差异。实际上,「存在的多义性」无非就是将一切差异简化为存在论的差异,而「存在的单义性」则是通过取消存在论差异的独异性而将差异返还给诸种存在的集群。像胡赛尔的先验现象学还原则像是一种折中,不否认构造活动与被构造者之间的根本差异,但同时也不试图取消各区域的独立性与各区域对先验现象学的充实和保存。
海德格尔的莱布尼茨解释,III:
1. 海德格尔认为莱布尼茨将「单子」解释为「主体」:那能说出「我」的一个,于是将「单子」还原为「此在」。既然「单子」是最根本的「存在(existence)」,海德格尔就将蕴含在「单子」当中的「存在」的意义还原为「此在」在自身的超越中所通达的对存在的领会(ek-sistance)。所以,海德格尔的方法是,先追问「单子」的超越性结构,再通过这一结构通达对存在之领会,追问存在与诸存在者种类的关涉。
2. 「单子」的「驱力(drive)」就是此在的自身超越。「驱力」作为自我超越并非是亚里士多德处的entelechy,因为它并不是完满的实在,而是实在与潜能的永恒交涉;「驱力」同时也不是一个依赖于实在的去实现某事的力量,而是这一实在的自我实现本身。在这个意义上,驱力有多重结构。首先,驱力总是已经「预先」实现了它要实现的自我,这被「一」综合起来的「多」被预先给予,即「感知(perception)」;但被预先给予的「多」依然要作为「多」被「一」综合,这「再一次」的综合即「欲求(appetition)」;最后,这被综合的「多」可以完全显示为一个对立的「一」,且这个「一」无非是另一个「我」,这就是「自我认识(self-apperception)」。此外,内在于驱力的对驱力的阻力本身也有着不同的样态。如果是被驱力彻底辖制的、属于这个身体的阻力,那这阻力就呈现为「第一质料(primary matter)」,即F=ma当中质量m对加速度a的限制;如果是作为另一个有着驱力的身体对这个驱力的身体所产生的阻力,那就是通过碰撞发生的m1v1=m2v2,显示为物体A的质量作为障碍物对物体B运动的阻抗,这就是「第二质料(secondary matter)」。前者是被动的、被压制的阻力,前者则是主动的、两个物体平等施加的阻力。这样的驱力组成的网络就对应了有限此在作为驱力主体所设置出的诸多超越性的「视点」,以及根据这些「视点」组织出来的「世界观」。
3. 至于关键的「本质」与「存在」的关系海德格尔在这个讲座里略过不谈,并指示去参考27年的讲座。因此这里也不多谈。
海德格尔的莱布尼茨解释,IV:
1. 这里海德格尔就又开始他标准的六经注我了。第一步,他提出莱布尼茨的判断学说,也就是其「真理是主词与诸谓词之间的和谐」的论断可以被还原为形而上学论断:「单子的存在是其同一性与其统摄的世界之杂多的和谐」。这个意义上,逻辑并非是奠基性的,而需要形而上学的奠基。如果说逻辑学家认为自己提取出了「思」的根本规律并因此为如是科学提供了根本奠基,那她也需要承认这些根本规律以及逻辑作为一门科学本身亦需要在「思」与其最根本的内在可能性中获得奠基。这也是胡赛尔所强调的形式逻辑与先验逻辑之间的关系。但海德格尔这里尚没有清晰地理解形式化本身就是内在于主体的成就,并对主体本身亦有着奠基性的构成作用。如果说莱布尼茨试图为形而上学给出逻辑上的奠基,这不是因为莱布尼茨的“天真”,而是因为莱布尼茨更深切地意识到形式化或者普全数学恰恰是使得单子论这一形而上学学说成为可能的条件。若不是诸「原初真理」是同质化且可以互相添加混合直到无限的「记号(cipher)」,那像「单子」这种存在者形式(作为一个倾空了本质的「符号(symbol)」而存在)是不可能的;而也正是将一切理解成「符号」或「单子」,哪怕是「本质」与「存在」也不再有什么本质上的区别:「本质」之「本质」即是「存在」。换句话说,海德格尔认为自己对「存在」的理解比形式逻辑更“原初”,但却忽略了这种理解对形式逻辑这一成就的依赖性,忽视了莱布尼茨的动机恰恰是为了建立起形式逻辑与形而上学交互构成的本质可能。莱布尼茨并不“天真”,反而,他准确地看到了形式逻辑与单子论之间在内在本质上的不可分割性,因此他所完成的单子论恰恰是真正的形式本体论的雏形。这一点,海德格尔自认为看透彻了,将逻辑称作「真理的形而上学(metaphysics of truth)」,但一转却又忽略了真理的形而上学依赖于形式化,所以不能被简化或者还原为「此在」的生存论,毕竟生存论在它的直接性里恰恰是缺失「形式化之成就(the achievement of formalization)」这一环节的。由此,海德格尔完全错失了真正的问题。莱布尼茨真正的要点不在于「逻辑」与「普遍形而上学(general metaphysics)」之间的奠基关系,因为它们两者在莱布尼茨那里本就不是分离的。真正的要点是作为「形式本体论」的普遍单子论(普全数学)与作为「区域本体论」的本质关系论(对诸单子群落之间被本质所规定的时-空分布的秩序的归纳),以及更进一步的作为「质料本体论」的独一单子论(神正论)之间彼此奠基的关系。如果说海德格尔的「基础本体论(fundamental ontology)」是试图从「此在」的结构直接进入「质料本体论」的话,那就像是莱布尼茨直接从「我思」切入「单子论」,既没有诸客观科学的内容充实实在性,也没有普全数学去拓展可能性,那又怎么能真正领会普遍的存在呢?
2. 海德格尔为了完成他的「基础存在论」,从莱布尼茨的判断学说出发,分析了「充足根据律(principle of sufficient reason)」。「根据」在最根本的意义上是那「使得『存在存在,且使其作为此者存在,以此种方式存在』者」。换句话说,「充足根据律」的关键在「而非……」上:存在存在,而非不存在;这个东西存在,而非其它东西存在;这个东西这样存在,而非那样存在。「根据」因此本质上就包含选择,也就是「自由」。而「自由」就意味着「超越性」:「根据」是那潜藏着使某物开显为某物的东西。这并不是「主客」之间「上手」的那种联系,因为「上手之物」本质上是被理解为无需联系的;但因为「上手之物」的独立性恰恰依赖于这种「理解」,它依赖于「联系」本身。这一种「联系」正是那原初的超越性,使得物站出为物,在自由的联系中获得「真理」,这就是「根据」的原初意涵。但问题还是一致的:想要从这个形式直接得到对「存在」的根本领会,最后只能是半吊子的胡说。要么「基础存在论」因为缺少形式本体论而局限于「『此在』的某个结构到底是事实性的还是本质性的?」这种问题被搞成一门人类学,要么因为缺少诸区域本体论的充实而把存在过于泛化搞成某种神秘学。想要规避这「斯库拉还是卡律布狄斯?(Scylla or Charybdis?)」的窘境,要么走另一条路子,采用胡赛尔在「危机」后半部指出的彻底的「现象学-心理学还原」,要么脚踏实地地把经验科学和形式本体论纳入系统。可是海德格尔两条路一条都没有办法走。首先,他关注的「存在」是无可还原为「诸明见性(evidences)」之间互相构成的网络的,因为「存在」于他来说是允许「明见性」本身的显示的那隐没的根据,而「现象学-心理学还原」对「明见性」系统的描绘恰恰毁掉了他所关注的「存在-存在者」的关系本身;胡赛尔那将自然态度中碰上的存在个体还原为现象再通过主体活动将现象重构为现象学对象的方法,对他来说已远离了更原初自然的「在对存在者的『上手』中通达对存在本身的领会」的关系。
补充2. 换句话说,如果胡赛尔关注的是「明见性」如何指向其它「明见性」直到构成一个整体,他关注的就是「明见性」如何贬异自身而抛置出一个「作为『根据』的根据而非又一个『明见性』」。也是因此海德格尔不接受「现象学还原」那种将一切事实预先还原为主体之构造,也就是预先还原为「可明见之现象」的方法,并认为这种还原与重构错失了那预先被给予的、最为原初的「有什么绝对地隐藏着且绝对无法被重构甚至积极地阻抗着任何重构,但却同时与自身开显相关联」的预感。要谈论这一种绝对否定着的预感(而非那从完全的实现无限回撤但原则上已经被确证了的理念),只能通过「一瞬的暴力」或「长久的迂回」。他认为胡赛尔以自然态度为出发点就已经把「上手之物」与「存在之领会」分割开来了,而「存在」恰恰是这种领会在上手之物中滞留的游戏。这方面可以说自然态度恰恰是最不自然的,因为它只关注物的上手性,而选择性遗忘了存在。所以,胡赛尔的现象学最后只是试图通过主体的活动重构出这上手性是如何可能的。这已经预设了上手性本身是现象学的目的,即现象学的还原最后总要抵达对上手性的解释,而这意味着任何被现象学探问的东西在最后关头以及最根本上都是「可以上手」的。换句话说,任何东西最后都只是对可以全然在场的「现象」的综合,或对「明见性」的综合;也正是这样,胡赛尔才无法彻底克服「主客关系」的对立,因为哪怕主体的构成可以还原成「在场与缺场的游戏」,其指向的依旧是「彻底在场的无限明见性其本身作为理念的超越性」,而这种超越性就是所谓的「独立于主体的客观对象」,也就是一个「原则上可以被完全理解但又绝对超越了主体」的对象,或者说「在形式上无限独立于主体但在内容上无限依赖于主体」的对象,而这对象缺少了「此在」那在与存在者打交道的原初时间里「将『存在者』作为『存在』去领会,因此在内容上对这一存在者的认识超越了庸常已经内在于主体的认识,在形式上又能把握住它向主体开显的本质关联性」的结构。总之,对海德格尔来说,还原之路是走不通的。胡赛尔把光视作第一位,所以总用一点光指代无限可能的光(理念);海德格尔把影作第一位,光指代内在于光使光成为可能的影(存在)。既然还原之路走不通,那也就不需要那使还原这一方法成为可能的激进的对普遍可能性的探究(即「形式本体论」)了;而经验科学满打满算也无非只是对已经上手之物的研究而非对存在者和存在的原初交融的解释。
补充2. 最后总结胡赛尔和海德格尔的差别,那就是胡赛尔认为对一个明见性群落(manifold)的综合最后总会生成更高层次的一个明见性可以不完美地替代无限的明见性,比如对「这本书」的明见性替代了所有对「每页纸」的可能的明见性,而对「一页纸」的明见性替代了对「每个字」的可能的明见性,而这些明见性彼此支撑彼此构成,且其「不完美」恰恰就构成了这一被明见对象的对象性或超越性,因此每个明见性根本上都是一个超越的对象,因为每个明见性都是无限个其它明见性的替代物;那海德格尔就认为根本并不在在场的明见性与不在场的明见性的彼此交互构成上,而是在「在场」与「不在场」本身无法被分析的交融状态,所以关键不在于每一种「明见性」与其它「明见性」之间是什么构成结构,而在于任意一个「存在者」和「存在」本身的结构。如果说胡赛尔想要讨论的是每个「图像」相对于「原型」的具体意义(特殊实在性),并通过通达「符号」之普遍意义本身(普遍可能性)完成对一切「图像」的现象学还原,最后由此出发讨论哪些东西具有相当的符号上的普遍性和图像上的意义,处于两者之间(普遍存在);那海德格尔想要的就是不去分析任何具体图像的意义,也不去讨论「符号」不同于「图像」的性质从而取消「图像-原型」这一关系的直接性,而仅仅将每个具体的「图像」与抽象的「符号」搅在一起,并试图抹掉「图像」与「符号」的区分,显得好像每个「图像」都有一个普遍的没办法还原的「原型」,以这种方式「扩展」对存在或对世界的“理解”,直至回到某种原初的暧昧不分的状态,也就是回到宗教神秘学的世界,一种万物平等含混地彰显着存在之初有的类泛灵论的世界中去。这似乎与「快乐的科学」里的实验主义背道而驰。哪怕仅仅将其视作审美态度或实践态度,超人似乎也不会是「拥抱存在并与存在相守者」,而是要在将「存在」之原初性完全取消后转而加入生成之火流(显像的无限运动)的。并非将「图像」和「符号」糊成一团,仿佛每个存在者都是原则上平等的大写存在之彰显,都是某个普遍原型的图像,而是彻底地否定有这一个原型,转而分析每个显像与秩序并用复调的实践和解读去重估它、重构它。并不是让存在在直接性中去占有存在者,并不是一种带有阴影的重;而是正午一切阴影的消退,没有躲藏起来的「存在」,只有暴露一切的「权力意志们」轻盈无怯懦的运动。
海德格尔的莱布尼茨解释,V:
1. 从这里开始,海德格尔就已经脱离莱布尼茨开始讲「存在与时间」了。要理解SuZ势必要理解其基本问题的结构。SuZ的问题是存在问题,并以三个关系问题为导入,即「存在与此在」,「存在与时间」,和「此在与时间」。
2. 「存在」与「此在」之关联源于「此在」特殊的存在方式,即它的存在便是对存在的追问。这意味着此在在它的事实性存在中总是开显出存在本身的视域,而这一视域与事实性存在处于内在本质性的缠绕中。所以「此在」之本质即它在「存在」中的「被抛(thrownness)」,其存在之领会总是淹没在事实性的存在者之中。而反过来,要抵达对此在之结构的彻底领会,就要澄清此在的这一「有限性(finitude)」,并滞留于这种有限性。所以真切的思恰恰要求对事实性最深刻的关切。简言之,现象学还原是对存在问题的遮蔽,因为它取消了一切事实性之为事实性;存在问题不是将存在还原为诸明见性的综合后对明见性的分析,而是对明见性之呈现所仰赖的「根据」的关切。这个意义上,「基础存在论」无可避免地会被误解成私人化的世界观,因为它是最根本地切近于此在个体之思的;但因其同时关涉于普遍存在,此在于其自我设定的有限性中又要自我超越,于是将这一有限性回转为不断自由生发的起源,让问题真正成为「问题」,从而开显出存在。
3. 「存在」与「时间」之关联有三种显示。首先,对存在最根本的区分是根据时间模态来的,「有时的」「永恒的」「无时的」。然后,普遍被理解的存在者之在实际上是指「在每一个现在都在场着」,而存在之在则被理解成「在某一个现在预先给予了所有其它现在之在场」,所以此在对存在的领会本质上与对「现在」「当下」「在场」的领会密切联系。哪怕是日常上手之物也无非是那「随时或大部分时间都可以变得在场」之物。这里,海德格尔对胡赛尔的批评就是他继承了这传统形而上学的「在场主义」,将「存在」并非理解成「根据」,而是「诸缺席直观在在场直观的同一性之下获得的综合」。简言之,他首先认为胡赛尔将「不在场的东西」简化为「虽然不在场但可以被在场化的东西」,又将这些东西统摄于「在场的东西」,让缺席成为了对在场物的超越性的「构成」,而非缺席本身作为缺席即是一切在场的根据。最后,存在作为根据永远是「在先的」或者说「先验的」。「存在之先验性」依赖于时间但却又与客观时间无涉。如何去理解这个内在于任何存在任何时间点的「预先」便成了问题。这也不会是逻辑上的预先,因为存在并非是在思考中被预先清楚地设定出来的。相反,对存在之问预设了对存在者的基本了解,两者相互依存,处于动态关系中。
4. 最后则是「时间」与「此在」的关系。这需要回到柏拉图的「回忆说」与亚里士多德、奥古斯丁等人对时间与灵魂内在关系的洞见上。真正重要的是内在于此在构成的时间性,与时间性本身是如何允许了此在对存在的领会,与时间性如何构成了此在对存在的领会,这些关系最终获得了统一。存在问题最终就是此在在时之超越性如何展开存在的问题。这同时也直接导向了所谓的「元存在论(metontology)」。如果说「基础存在论」是对此在结构与其存在领会之可能性的分析,那「元存在论」就是这一「基础存在论」重新回归其有限性并再次出发的新存在论。基础存在论得到了此在与存在的根本关联与其根本问题,而元存在论则是对这一根本问题的坚持、追问与发展,并在对基础存在论其有限性和事实性的分析中发展出新的问题域,换句话说,就是不将基础存在论当成非历史的,也不将它提出的结构视作某种上手在场的僵化结构,而是为了坚持其结构之结构性,也就是时间、历史、自我超越的优先性,转而试图将这一结构再次不断地在不同有限性和事实性的语境中生成修改,类似于德里达的解构的「播撒(dissemination)」。
海德格尔的莱布尼茨解释,VI:
1. 海德格尔把重心放在「此在之超越性」上,这一超越性是让存在者进入世界的根本结构。但这里要注意,「进入世界(world-entry)」并不是让已经预先存在了的存在者变个样子,仿佛它本来在世界外,现在跑到世界内了。但更奇妙的是,这甚至也不是基督教造物的「无中生有」。对于海德格尔来说,进入世界的要点在于存在者要在世界中完整地将自己展现成超越或独立于世界的样子。所以存在者在存在或世界中开显出自己的根据。这也是说存在者打开的视域并非指向它未曾显示的侧面,而是直接地指向存在本身。
2. 这一超越性被分析为原初时间。原初时间即此在在自我超越中将自己朝向世界抛置成未来,并在对未来之否定性的自我否定中再次抛置成事实性的过去。因为自我超越总是朝向存在开放,而存在又是事实上的存在者的根据,那存在总是呈现为一个未来的「目的」。所以,原初时间的运动就是,此在在自身的事实性存在中领会存在本身,因此向世界打开,而世界因此呈现为未来的可能性;但是未来的可能性自我给予为实在的存在者,并由此此在再次被抛回过去。而这一运动就是真切的在有限性中持存的「自由」。
3. 我们需要仔细审视这些预设和决定带来的后果。「自由」可以被理解成多种形式。首先,在自然状态的事实性中,我们觉得不自由,因此我们上升到本质,即对所有可能事实进行统摄的规定,在这一规定与律法中,我们超越特殊的事实,由此感到自由。但是,律法本身将我们束缚在唯一的理念中,让我们丧失了将单调的可能性化为多样的现实的自由。因此,律法成为了强迫,而淡忘律法的事实性的自然状态又成为了自由。这就自然带来了第三种自由,即永远处在本质和事实的运动中;当律法过于强制时,便回归自然;当自然过于放纵时,便回归律法。这第三种自由实际上便是海德格尔要求的自由,也就是从事实性上升到可能性,再从可能性下降回事实性。这本身没有什么问题,任何哲学都必须满足这种运动。但有两点需要注意。首先,海德格尔并不是说从事实上升到本质,而是此在从与存在者打交道上升到存在之领会,存在直接地拥有着存在者。所以,这一运动最后会成为从绝对的捆绑上升到绝对的自由,又从绝对的自由掉落绝对的捆绑。这当中没有本质的中介与引渡。换句话说,没有「惯习」和「教育」,有的只有「决断」和「原初神话」。然后,正因如此,海德格尔强调未来的优先性,这是因为未来于他便是绝对开放着的可能性。可未来是要在当下被直观到,并为了充实全体而进入的。未来本身并无法展开全体,未来仅仅是又一个要被当下化从而去充实全体的时刻罢了。存在之为存在并不是直接地在实践中达到的,而是要通过长久的教育和训练去充实起来、去纯化的。所以柏拉图才会说「善超出存在」,而不是说「存在在存在者中拥有着」;并不是说那在此在超越视域中直接呈现为此在自我实现的绝对的可能性的东西就已经是善好了,那仅仅只是个目的。善好并不优先地在未来,也不优先地是可能性。善好在当下将自己分化,因善好是超出图像的原型,由此作为原型,它是过去,但又因它完全和图像同一,它又成为自己的未来。这一切都在活的当下获得统一,是活的当下不可或缺的共构成要素,也只有在作为整体把握而非部分(如未来)的时候,善好才完全在明见性中展开。或许,在生活的实践中,我总是为了自由本身而行动,又为了自由只能接受奴役;但当我们在教育中真正完成了现象学还原并形成一种习惯、一种态度,我们就不仅仅是在上升下降的运动中获得自由,而是在对这运动整体的沉思中获得自由。这种自由并不是盲目的,因为它有本质与事实之间互相充实规定的内容。那么,或许这种自由不够激进?可是还原恰恰是最激进的能将一切存在者甚至将整个世界的存在都抹除的自由。只是这种自由是需要依赖于长久的教育与对形式化的实践才能实现的。简而言之,海德格尔提出的「作为根据的自由」因其没有确凿的内容所以只能是泛泛之谈,又恰恰因其缺少内容,而只能将这形式本身视作内容,那就导致了神秘化。另一种自由则要求确切的理论教育,并通过对内容的刻画完成有序的全体,并在这一全体的呈现中真正直观到绝对中介的直接性,达成一种构成了全体的激进的自由。如果说前者容易将某些具体的可能性误解成绝对的自由,那后者就在对全体的沉思与永恒活动中成就了自由。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
In this note / 篇目
Heidegger’s Interpretation of Leibniz, I:
1. Heidegger’s insight is astonishing: he grasps Leibniz’s crucial point. To discuss the problem of logic and metaphysics, he seizes on the form of “judgment,” reducing its basic subject–predicate structure to “inesse,” or “inclusion.” Heidegger thinks Leibniz’s concept of “judgment” differs from Cartesian “positioning.” It is not merely the will’s affirmation or negation of given propositions; in other words, not merely “looking” or “not looking” at propositions indiscriminately presented before us. Rather, judgment in Leibniz is an epistemic activity of “tracing back,” clarifying the relation in content between one proposition and another. “Inclusion” is then reduced to “identity,” returning us to the medieval problem of “divine knowledge.”
2. God’s knowledge divides into two main kinds, the second of which subdivides into two. One is “pure possibility,” which will not be externally realized and can remain only within God’s knowledge; the other is “actuality,” which will be externally realized and grasped in visio. “Actuality” contains “reality” and “potentiality”: the former is now, while the latter is realized as reality only in the future or past. In God’s eyes, every fact simultaneously presents its “reality” and “potentiality.” Although this being is grasped in the eternal present instant, it retains the particularity of its reality at every instant, with each reality grasped as potentiality relative to another. Although time is transformed into eternity and “succession” canceled, this does not mean each instant loses its uniqueness relative to others; it merely means God’s grasp of these instants is absolute. God does not cancel the virtual, but likewise knows the reality of the virtual.
3. From here, we can see how Leibniz’s principal philosophical problem-field is demarcated. Although Heidegger does grasp the central problem, he neither characterizes it accurately nor finds the domain truly appropriate for doing so. First, although he recognizes the importance of “inclusion,” he does not discuss how the equally important “exclusion” arises or is modified within Leibniz’s system. Likewise, he fails to distinguish “primitive notions” from “primary truths.” In Leibniz, although every judgment can formally be reduced to primary truths or identity, this does not mean primary truths are all truths’ “root” or “ground.” In content, these formalized truths need “prime examples,” namely “primitive notions,” to give judgment a real grounding. “The dog bites a person” can be reduced to “the dog is the dog,” thereby attaining truth; but this reduction depends on the character of primitive notions within God’s knowledge. Only because primitive notions “neither include nor exclude” one another can identity be grasped at its root as “the identity of difference and identity,” allowing the difference between God and world to be genuinely understood. Otherwise, Leibniz’s real difficulty—the genesis of space–time and body—cannot be grasped. Precisely because primitive notions persist, notion A does not disappear when excluded by notion B, but remains within God’s knowledge awaiting realization. This is the genuine form of “conatus,” originating in an essence’s expectation and demand for its own realization, rather than being confined to the monad’s activity. This final step—the intermediate state between preserving and canceling “exclusion”—establishes the world’s position relative to God, who neither posits nor cancels “exclusion.” The world is independent insofar as it likewise possesses infinity, the dialectical movement brought by internal contradiction; it is dependent insofar as it still maintains the contradiction between “one” and “many,” albeit an internally generated contradiction. In brief, Schelling notices the continuity between Leibniz’s and Spinoza’s philosophies more acutely than Heidegger. Heidegger’s chief omission here is his neglect of the influence of “mathesis universalis” on Leibniz. Indeed, he does not even recognize that “mathesis universalis,” or “formal ontology,” itself exceeds the scope of the so-called “question of Being.” “Formal ontology” is not an “abstraction” from that question, but a characterization of different relations between one and many. Heidegger therefore thinks Leibniz is concerned only with “how the many of beings can be reduced to the one of Being,” and discusses only “inclusion,” the one’s encompassing of the many. He fails to recognize that “inclusion” must be discussed relative to “exclusion”: even the encompassing “one” itself must stand in relations to other “ones.” These relations differ at different levels of different regions: between notions, neither inclusion nor exclusion; between essences, either inclusion or exclusion; between existences, both inclusion and exclusion. Lazily skipping these levels to discuss the so-called “question of Being” directly can lead only to pointless mystification, as though “Being” were the world’s sole kind of “one,” or “beings” its sole kind of “many.”
Heidegger’s Interpretation of Leibniz, II:
1. First, Heidegger establishes that truth in Leibniz means “identity.” He then points out that, among all reason’s determinations, the “principle of demonstrating ground” performs the genuinely central organizing role: any “notion,” to be understood, requires clarification through the grounding of its own content. This is a “dynamic principle,” since what it determines is actually an act: the search for roots that reduces every notion to self-grounding primitive notions. According to Leibniz, this requires a notion first to become “clear”—known as a thematized object; then “distinct”—its many contents as a theme must also appear clearly; then “adequate”—these contents must themselves become distinct, and the contents beneath them distinct in turn, until the final endpoint. One way of obtaining such “adequate” knowledge is through grasping “order,” which involves “symbolization.” “Symbolic knowledge” is thoroughly distinct, except that it has not been, and need not be, demonstrated step by step: it can instead be grasped as an “algorithm.” Opposed to “symbolic knowledge” is “intuitive knowledge.” One point to note, also overlooked by Heidegger, is that “symbolic knowledge” and “symbolization” are not identical. Even though “symbolic knowledge,” as knowledge, must indeed be “adequate,” “symbolization” itself, as a subjective accomplishment, permeates every region of knowledge. A “symbol” can make a notion clear, make it distinct, or produce precisely the opposite effect.
2. As diagnosed in I, Heidegger neglects the importance of “mathesis universalis” in Leibniz’s system. By ignoring its other crucial points, he arrives directly at what he considers the “fundamental problem of metaphysics.” His method is first to reveal the more primordial problem of “freedom” through the “principle of demonstrating ground,” then to reveal the more primordial problem of “the identity of difference and identity” through the procedure of “bridging difference” implicit in conceptual analysis, or the demonstration of ground. But this leaves him fundamentally unable to discuss why Leibniz discusses formalized identity, A = A, or why Leibniz equates it with differentiated identity. He also cannot explain why formalized and differentiated identity are identical in God, or why this distinction is necessary. This also leads him mistakenly to equate “primitive notions” with “primary truths.” In Leibniz, form itself is not some particular, primordial content. Form is neither Plato’s eidos nor Aristotle’s arche. Form is merely the order determining content, and its determination applies to “anything whatsoever.” In other words, form is merely an algebraic symbol, not a metaphysical generative principle. Heidegger willfully ignores this, erasing Leibniz’s entire dimension of formal ontology. Naturally, he cannot grasp the genuinely crucial tension between God and world: creation occurs not because God, in Aquinas’ sense, simply “is” the identity of form and content, but because God “chooses” the mathematically optimal solution among the infinite possibilities of creation provided by formal ontology. With only the former, God would be nothing beyond the most monotonous “is,” and the world would lose all independence—after all, is the world, or even any monad, not also “the identity of form and content”? Only through the latter can Leibniz genuinely grasp an order: infinitely many essences combined from primitive notions, and an existing world combined from these essences. The “one–many structure” of each level or region receives a different characterization, genuinely highlighting the subtle differences among divine thought, essence, existence, world, and monad. In fact, the “equivocity of Being” merely simplifies every difference into ontological difference, whereas the “univocity of Being,” by canceling ontological difference’s singular status, returns difference to the groupings of various beings. Husserl’s transcendental phenomenological reduction resembles a compromise: it does not deny the fundamental difference between constitutive activity and the constituted, but neither does it seek to cancel regions’ independence or their enrichment and preservation of transcendental phenomenology.
Heidegger’s Interpretation of Leibniz, III:
1. Heidegger thinks Leibniz interprets the “monad” as a “subject”: the one capable of saying “I.” He thereby reduces the “monad” to “Dasein.” Since the “monad” is the most fundamental “existence,” Heidegger reduces the meaning of existence contained in the monad to the understanding of Being Dasein reaches through its own transcendence—ek-sistance. Heidegger’s method is therefore first to inquire into the monad’s structure of transcendence, then to reach an understanding of Being through this structure, asking how Being relates to the kinds of beings.
2. The monad’s “drive” is Dasein’s self-transcendence. As self-transcendence, “drive” is not Aristotle’s entelechy, since it is not complete actuality but the eternal interaction of actuality and potentiality. Nor is “drive” a power dependent on actuality to realize something: it is this actuality’s self-realization itself. In this sense, drive has a multiple structure. First, drive has always already realized “in advance” the self it is to realize. The “many” synthesized by the “one” are pregiven: this is “perception.” Yet the pregiven “many” still must, as “many,” be synthesized by the “one.” This synthesis “once again” is “appetition.” Finally, the synthesized “many” can appear wholly as an opposed “one,” and this “one” is nothing other than another “I”: this is “self-apperception.” Moreover, the resistance to drive immanent in drive itself has different modes. If it is a resistance wholly controlled by the drive and belonging to this body, it appears as “primary matter”: the limitation mass m imposes on acceleration a in F = ma. If it is the resistance another body possessing drive exerts on this driving body, it is m1v1 = m2v2 occurring through collision, appearing as body A’s mass resisting body B’s motion as an obstacle: this is “secondary matter.” The former is passive, suppressed resistance; the other is active resistance equally exerted by two bodies. The network of such drives corresponds to the many transcendent “viewpoints” established by finite Dasein as the subject of drive, and the “worldview” organized according to these viewpoints.
3. As for the crucial relation between “essence” and “existence,” Heidegger passes over it in this lecture, referring readers to the 1927 lectures. I therefore will not discuss it further here.
Heidegger’s Interpretation of Leibniz, IV:
1. Here Heidegger returns to his standard practice of making the classics comment on him. First, he proposes that Leibniz’s doctrine of judgment—his claim that “truth is harmony between the subject and its predicates”—can be reduced to a metaphysical claim: “the monad’s existence is the harmony between its identity and the manifold world it encompasses.” In this sense, logic is not foundational but requires metaphysical grounding. If a logician thinks she has extracted thought’s fundamental laws and thereby supplied a fundamental grounding for science as such, she must also acknowledge that those laws, and logic itself as a science, likewise require grounding in “thought” and its most fundamental intrinsic possibility. This is also the relation between formal and transcendental logic emphasized by Husserl. But Heidegger has not clearly understood that formalization itself is an accomplishment immanent to the subject and plays a foundational, constitutive role for the subject itself. If Leibniz seeks a logical grounding for metaphysics, this is not because he is “naive,” but because he understands more deeply that formalization, or mathesis universalis, is precisely the condition making the metaphysical doctrine of monadology possible. Unless “primary truths” were homogeneous “ciphers” capable of being added and mixed infinitely, a form of being such as the “monad”—existing as a “symbol” emptied of essence—would be impossible. And precisely because everything is understood as a “symbol” or “monad,” even “essence” and “existence” cease to differ essentially: the “essence” of “essence” is “existence.” In other words, Heidegger regards his understanding of “Being” as more “primordial” than formal logic, but overlooks this understanding’s dependence on the accomplishment of formal logic. He neglects that Leibniz’s motivation is precisely to establish the essential possibility of formal logic’s and metaphysics’ mutual constitution. Leibniz is not “naive”; rather, he accurately sees the intrinsic, essential inseparability of formal logic and monadology, and the monadology he accomplishes is therefore precisely the genuine outline of formal ontology. Heidegger thinks he has seen through this, calling logic a “metaphysics of truth,” only to overlook again that this metaphysics depends on formalization and thus cannot be simplified or reduced to the existential analysis of “Dasein.” After all, in its immediacy, existential analysis precisely lacks the moment of “the achievement of formalization.” Heidegger thus misses the real problem completely. Leibniz’s real point does not concern the grounding relation between “logic” and “general metaphysics,” since for him the two are not separate to begin with. The real point concerns the mutual grounding of general monadology as “formal ontology”—mathesis universalis—the theory of essential relations as “regional ontology”—the induction of the order of spatiotemporal distributions, determined by essences, among communities of monads—and, further, singular monadology as “material ontology”—theodicy. If Heidegger’s “fundamental ontology” seeks to move directly from Dasein’s structure into “material ontology,” this resembles Leibniz moving directly from the “cogito” into “monadology”: without the objective sciences’ content to enrich reality, or mathesis universalis to expand possibility, how could one genuinely comprehend universal Being?
2. To accomplish his “fundamental ontology,” Heidegger starts from Leibniz’s doctrine of judgment and analyzes the “principle of sufficient reason.” In its most fundamental sense, “ground” is what “makes being be, and makes it be as this, in this manner.” In other words, the key to the principle of sufficient reason lies in “rather than…”: being exists rather than not existing; this thing exists rather than another; this thing exists this way rather than that way. “Ground” therefore essentially contains choice, or “freedom.” And “freedom” means “transcendence”: “ground” is what remains concealed while allowing something to disclose itself as something. This is not the “ready-to-hand” connection between “subject and object,” because the “ready-to-hand” is essentially understood as needing no connection. Yet precisely because its independence depends on this “understanding,” it depends on “connection” itself. This connection is precisely primordial transcendence, allowing the thing to stand out as thing and obtain “truth” within a free connection: this is the primordial meaning of “ground.” But the problem remains the same: seeking to derive a fundamental understanding of “Being” directly from this form can ultimately yield only half-baked nonsense. Either “fundamental ontology,” lacking formal ontology, confines itself to questions such as “Is a particular structure of Dasein factual or essential?” and becomes anthropology; or, lacking enrichment by regional ontologies, it overgeneralizes Being into a kind of mysticism. To avoid this predicament of “Scylla or Charybdis,” one must either take another route, adopting the thoroughgoing “phenomenological-psychological reduction” indicated in the latter half of Husserl’s Crisis, or steadfastly incorporate empirical science and formal ontology into the system. Yet Heidegger can take neither route. First, the “Being” that concerns him cannot be reduced to a mutually constituting network of “evidences,” since for him Being is the concealed ground allowing “evidence” itself to appear. The “phenomenological-psychological reduction’s” depiction of the system of evidence precisely destroys the relation between “Being and beings” that concerns him. Husserl’s method of reducing existing individuals encountered in the natural attitude to phenomena, then reconstructing phenomena as phenomenological objects through subjective activity, has for him already departed from the more primordial, natural relation of “reaching an understanding of Being itself through beings’ readiness-to-hand.”
Supplement to 2: In other words, if Husserl concerns himself with how one “evidence” points toward other “evidences” until they constitute a whole, Heidegger concerns himself with how “evidence” differentiates and debases itself, positing “a ground as ‘ground,’ rather than another ‘evidence.’” This is also why Heidegger rejects “phenomenological reduction’s” method of reducing every fact in advance to subjective constitution, and thus to “a phenomenon capable of evidence.” He thinks such reduction and reconstruction miss the pregiven, most primordial anticipation that “something is absolutely concealed and absolutely incapable of reconstruction, even actively resisting every reconstruction, yet simultaneously related to its own disclosure.” To discuss this absolutely negating anticipation—rather than an idea infinitely retreating from complete realization but already verified in principle—one can proceed only through “an instant’s violence” or “a long detour.” He thinks Husserl’s starting from the natural attitude already separates the “ready-to-hand” from the “understanding of Being,” whereas “Being” is precisely the play of this understanding’s lingering within the ready-to-hand. In this respect, the natural attitude is precisely the least natural, since it attends only to things’ readiness-to-hand and selectively forgets Being. Husserl’s phenomenology thus ultimately seeks merely to reconstruct, through subjective activity, how this readiness-to-hand is possible. This already presupposes readiness-to-hand itself as phenomenology’s goal: phenomenological reduction must finally arrive at an explanation of readiness-to-hand, which means anything phenomenology questions is, ultimately and fundamentally, “capable of being ready-to-hand.” In other words, everything is finally merely a synthesis of “phenomena” capable of complete presence, or a synthesis of “evidence.” This is precisely why Husserl cannot completely overcome the opposition of the “subject–object relation”: even if subjective constitution can be reduced to the “play of presence and absence,” what it points toward remains “the transcendence, as an idea, of fully present infinite evidence itself.” This transcendence is the so-called “objective object independent of the subject”: an object “capable in principle of complete understanding, yet absolutely transcending the subject,” or “infinitely independent of the subject in form, yet infinitely dependent upon it in content.” This object lacks Dasein’s structure whereby, in the primordial time of dealing with beings, Dasein “understands ‘beings’ as ‘Being,’ so that its knowledge of this being in content exceeds the ordinary knowledge already immanent to the subject, while in form it grasps the essential relatedness through which the being discloses itself to the subject.” In short, for Heidegger, the route of reduction is impassable. Husserl gives light primacy, always using a little light to indicate infinitely possible light—the idea. Heidegger gives shadow primacy: light indicates the shadow immanent within light that makes light possible—Being. Since the route of reduction is impassable, there is no need for the radical investigation of universal possibility—“formal ontology”—that makes reduction possible as a method. And empirical science, at most, studies what is already ready-to-hand, rather than explaining the primordial intermingling of beings and Being.
Supplement to 2: To summarize finally the difference between Husserl and Heidegger: Husserl thinks synthesizing a “manifold” of evidences will ultimately generate a higher-level evidence capable of imperfectly substituting for infinitely many evidences. For example, evidence of “this book” substitutes for all possible evidences of “each page,” and evidence of “a page” substitutes for possible evidences of “each word.” These evidences support and constitute one another, and their “imperfection” precisely constitutes the objectivity or transcendence of the evident object. Each evidence is therefore fundamentally a transcendent object, since each substitutes for infinitely many others. Heidegger, however, thinks the fundamental point lies not in the mutual constitution and interaction of present and absent evidences, but in the unanalyzable intermingling of “presence” and “absence” themselves. The key is therefore not the constitutive structure between one “evidence” and others, but the structure between any “being” and “Being” itself. If Husserl wants to discuss each “image’s” concrete meaning relative to its “prototype”—particular reality—and accomplish phenomenological reduction of every “image” by reaching the universal meaning of “symbol” itself—universal possibility—then, starting from there, discuss what possesses sufficient symbolic universality and imagistic meaning, situated between the two—universal existence—Heidegger wants something different. He does not analyze any concrete image’s meaning, nor discuss the character distinguishing “symbol” from “image” so as to cancel the immediacy of the “image–prototype” relation. Instead, he merely mixes each concrete “image” with abstract “symbol,” trying to erase their distinction and make it seem that every “image” has a universal, irreducible “prototype.” In this way he “expands” the “understanding” of Being or world until it returns to a primordial, ambiguous indistinction: the world of religious mysticism, a quasi-animistic world in which everything equally and obscurely manifests Being’s primordial advent. This seems opposed to the experimentalism of The Gay Science. Even considered merely as an aesthetic or practical attitude, the overman would seemingly not be “one who embraces Being and abides with it,” but one who, after completely canceling Being’s primordial status, joins becoming’s stream of fire—the infinite movement of appearances. The point is not to muddle “image” and “symbol” together, as though every being were in principle an equal manifestation of capital-B Being, an image of some universal prototype. It is to deny this prototype thoroughly, then analyze each appearance and order and revalue and reconstruct it through polyphonic practice and interpretation. It is not to let Being possess beings in immediacy, not a shadow-laden weight, but the noon retreat of every shadow: no concealed “Being,” only the light, unafraid movement of “wills to power” exposing everything.
Heidegger’s Interpretation of Leibniz, V:
1. From here, Heidegger has already left Leibniz behind and begun discussing Being and Time. To understand SuZ, one must understand the structure of its basic question. SuZ asks the question of Being, introducing it through three relational questions: “Being and Dasein,” “Being and time,” and “Dasein and time.”
2. The connection between “Being” and “Dasein” originates in Dasein’s distinctive way of being: its being consists in questioning Being. This means Dasein always discloses the horizon of Being itself within its factical existence, and this horizon is intrinsically and essentially entangled with factical existence. Dasein’s essence is therefore its “thrownness” within “Being”; its understanding of Being is always submerged among factical beings. Conversely, to reach a thorough understanding of Dasein’s structure, we must clarify its “finitude” and remain within that finitude. Genuine thought thus requires the deepest concern for facticity. In brief, phenomenological reduction conceals the question of Being because it cancels every facticity as facticity. The question of Being is not an analysis of evidence after reducing Being to a synthesis of evidences, but a concern for the “ground” on which evidence’s presentation depends. In this sense, “fundamental ontology” will inevitably be mistaken for a private worldview, since it is most fundamentally close to the thought of individual Dasein. Yet because it simultaneously concerns universal Being, Dasein must also transcend itself within its self-posited finitude, turning this finitude into an origin of continually free generation, allowing the question genuinely to become a “question,” and thereby disclosing Being.
3. The connection between “Being” and “time” appears in three ways. First, the most fundamental distinctions of Being follow temporal modes: the “temporal,” the “eternal,” and the “timeless.” Second, beings’ being, as commonly understood, actually means “being present in every now,” while Being’s being is understood as “having pregiven, in a certain now, the presence of every other now.” Dasein’s understanding of Being is therefore essentially connected with its understanding of “now,” “present,” and “presence.” Even the everyday ready-to-hand is merely what “can become present at any time, or most times.” Here Heidegger criticizes Husserl for inheriting traditional metaphysics’ “presentism,” understanding “Being” not as “ground,” but as “the synthesis absent intuitions acquire under the identity of present intuition.” In brief, he first thinks Husserl simplifies “what is absent” into “what, although absent, can be made present,” then encompasses these things under “what is present.” Absence becomes a “constitution” of the present thing’s transcendence, rather than absence itself, as absence, being the ground of all presence. Finally, Being as ground is always “prior,” or “transcendental.” “Being’s transcendental character” depends on time yet has nothing to do with objective time. How to understand this “in advance,” immanent to any being at any temporal point, becomes the problem. Nor is it logical priority, since Being is not clearly posited in advance within thought. On the contrary, questioning Being presupposes a basic understanding of beings; the two are interdependent and dynamically related.
4. Finally comes the relation between “time” and “Dasein.” This requires returning to Plato’s doctrine of recollection and the insights of Aristotle, Augustine, and others into the internal relation between time and soul. What truly matters is the temporality immanent to Dasein’s constitution, how temporality itself permits Dasein’s understanding of Being, and how it constitutes that understanding; these relations ultimately acquire unity. The question of Being is finally how Dasein’s temporal transcendence unfolds Being. This also leads directly to so-called “metontology.” If “fundamental ontology” analyzes Dasein’s structure and the possibility of its understanding of Being, “metontology” is the new ontology in which “fundamental ontology” returns to its own finitude and sets out again. Fundamental ontology obtains the fundamental connection between Dasein and Being and its fundamental problem; metontology persists with, questions, and develops this problem, opening new problem-fields through analyzing fundamental ontology’s finitude and facticity. In other words, it does not treat fundamental ontology as ahistorical, or its proposed structures as rigid structures present and ready-to-hand. Rather, to preserve its structure’s structural character—the priority of time, history, and self-transcendence—it seeks continually to generate and modify this structure anew in different contexts of finitude and facticity, resembling the “dissemination” of Derrida’s deconstruction.
Heidegger’s Interpretation of Leibniz, VI:
1. Heidegger places the emphasis on “Dasein’s transcendence,” the fundamental structure allowing beings to enter the world. Here, however, “world-entry” does not mean changing the appearance of beings that already existed, as though they had previously been outside the world and now ran inside. More intriguingly, this is not even the Christian creation ex nihilo. For Heidegger, the point of world-entry is that beings must present themselves fully within the world as transcending or independent of it. Beings thus disclose their own ground within Being or world. This also means the horizon a being opens does not point toward its undisplayed sides, but directly toward Being itself.
2. This transcendence is analyzed as primordial time. Primordial time is Dasein, in self-transcendence, casting itself toward the world as future, then, through the self-negation of the future’s negativity, casting itself again as factical past. Because self-transcendence always opens toward Being, and Being is the ground of factical beings, Being always appears as a future “end.” The movement of primordial time is therefore this: Dasein understands Being itself within its own factical existence, thus opening toward the world, which accordingly appears as future possibility. Yet future possibility gives itself as real beings, thereby throwing Dasein back into the past. This movement is genuine “freedom” persisting within finitude.
3. We need to examine carefully the consequences of these presuppositions and decisions. “Freedom” can be understood in many forms. First, within the facticity of the natural state, we feel unfree, so we ascend to essence: the determination encompassing all possible facts. Within this determination and law, we transcend particular facts and thereby feel free. Yet law itself binds us to a single idea, depriving us of the freedom to turn monotonous possibility into diverse actuality. Law therefore becomes compulsion, while the factical natural state that forgets law becomes freedom again. This naturally brings a third freedom: always remaining within the movement between essence and fact. When law becomes too coercive, return to nature; when nature becomes too unrestrained, return to law. This third freedom is actually the freedom Heidegger demands: ascending from facticity to possibility, then descending from possibility to facticity again. There is nothing wrong with this itself; every philosophy must satisfy this movement. But two points require attention. First, Heidegger is not speaking of an ascent from fact to essence, but of Dasein’s ascent from dealing with beings to understanding Being, with Being directly possessing beings. This movement therefore ultimately becomes an ascent from absolute bondage to absolute freedom, then a fall from absolute freedom into absolute bondage. No essential mediation or passage intervenes. In other words, there is no “habit” or “education,” only “decision” and “primordial myth.” Second, precisely for this reason, Heidegger emphasizes the future’s priority, since for him the future is absolutely open possibility. Yet the future must be intuited in the present and entered to enrich the whole. The future itself cannot unfold the whole: it is merely another moment to be made present and thereby enrich the whole. Being as Being is not reached directly in practice; it must be enriched and purified through prolonged education and training. This is why Plato says “the Good is beyond Being,” rather than “Being possesses within beings.” What appears directly within Dasein’s transcendent horizon as the absolute possibility of Dasein’s self-realization is not already good; it is merely an end. The good does not primarily lie in the future, nor is it primarily possibility. The good differentiates itself in the present. Because the good is the prototype beyond the image, as prototype it is past; yet because it is wholly identical with the image, it becomes its own future. All this is unified within the living present, as its indispensable coconstitutive elements. Only when grasped as a whole rather than a part, such as the future, does the good unfold fully in evidence. Perhaps, in life’s practice, I always act for freedom itself, yet can only accept enslavement for freedom’s sake. But when through education we genuinely accomplish phenomenological reduction and form a habit, an attitude, we acquire freedom not merely within the movement of ascent and descent, but in contemplation of this movement as a whole. Such freedom is not blind, since it has the content of essence and fact mutually enriching and determining each other. Perhaps this freedom is insufficiently radical? Yet reduction is precisely the most radical freedom, capable of erasing every being, even the existence of the entire world. It is simply a freedom whose realization depends on prolonged education and the practice of formalization. In brief, Heidegger’s “freedom as ground,” lacking definite content, can only remain vague generality. Precisely because it lacks content, it can only treat this form itself as content, producing mystification. The other freedom requires definite theoretical education, accomplishing an ordered whole through the characterization of content, and genuinely intuiting the immediacy of absolute mediation within this whole’s presentation: a radical freedom constituting the whole. If the former readily mistakes particular concrete possibilities for absolute freedom, the latter accomplishes freedom in contemplation of the whole and eternal activity.