Thomas Hobbes · 托马斯·霍布斯
Leviathan · 利维坦
Undated 未注日期
利维坦——散记
Reflections · Pages
自然法是1.具体的;2.无条件的;这本身就是一组矛盾。这个矛盾的化解要求一个外部的解决。霍布斯的解决方式是引入一个自然状态,用自我保存的冲动来奠基自然法。自我保存的冲动对自然法的奠基被视作解决矛盾的手段,因为1.自我保存的冲动是可以被把握的、实在的,具体的;2.自我保存的冲动被认为是绝对的、普遍的。
洛克的几个批评分别是,1.自我保存的冲动并不是普遍的,因为我们有自杀者,而自然法仍然谴责自杀的行为,因此自然法的覆盖范围比自我保存的冲动的范围要大,如果是自我保存奠基了自然法,那我们将批评不了自杀者;而我们批评自杀者的事实说明自然法比自我保存更普遍。
但我个人认为洛克更重要的批评在下面,这样的批评是辩证法式的,而且有超出政治哲学领域的洞见:2.如果自我保存普遍地为自然法奠基,那一切美德,包括无私、奉献、爱,都要被理解为自我保存的形式;然而,常理上这些美德不能被理解为自我保存的形式还保持为美德(多数情况下会被认为是伪善),因此是与自我保存冲突的;因此,自我保存与自我保存的显示形式相冲突;自我保存的内容是因为与无私等美德的差异而被确定的,但自我保存又是这些美德的本质;因此,自我保存的冲动会自我差异化;那它就不会是自我保存,而是不断地自身他者化;自我保存因此本质上是无私。所以为自然法奠定基础的也可以被认为是无私。
3.假设所有人对所有人战争的自然状态是完全的自我保存状态,那它就是无条件的自我保存。但当自然法被奠基时,它就停止作为无条件的自我保存了;此时不可以随时随地进行资源的掠夺。而自然法必须被无条件的自我保存奠基;那就意味着,当自然法被设立的一刻,它就无法被奠基。霍布斯会辩解:“自然法的无条件原则并没有被违反;因为对自然法的设立是为了更好地自我保存。”他是为了说明,在自然法状态下,自我保存仍然是无条件的。可是当我们一旦认为有“更好”的自我保存,那自我保存就不是绝对无条件的了;我们意识到,有两种可能的自我保存,一种是自然状态下即时的、危险的自我保存,一种是公民社会中长期的、安全的自我保存;我们偏爱后一种,拒绝前一种,恰恰是因为它们各自具体的情境的限制。我们还可以进行更多的计算;在意大利南部生活的自我保存,在黑死病时期的欧洲的自我保存……自我保存成为了具体的行为决定;那它就不会再有自然法的普遍性、无条件性;正相反,每个人的自我保存的计算和判断都不一样,不可通约,每个人都因此被孤立开来;任何他人为了自我保存都可能做出任何ta们认为合适的行动,包括甚至要求了行使抽象的无差别暴力(对对方行为的无知意味着危险,在首要的目标是自我保存的情况下,危险意味着要先发制人);而无差别暴力的行使再次使无知和恐惧升级;直到再次回到自然状态,具体的自我保存要求回到抽象的自我保存行动。我们因此会得到一个循环:自然状态→自然法→自然状态。自然法因此只是一个阶段,它并不具有无条件的有效性,也就不会是自然法;它也并不具体,因为自然状态决定了自然法的内容,而自然状态下只有抽象的“自我保存”。这个问题和2里描述的是一样的;自然状态规定的自我保存是自然法的本质,但是自然状态的自我保存却与自然法的自我保存差异开了;这样一个自我差异、自我冲突会导致一个结果,就是自我保存并不是自我保存,自然状态也并不是自然状态,自然法也并不是自然法;这个矛盾在霍布斯处并没有得到明确的解决,甚至遗留在了他对主权正当性的分析中。这是洛克对霍布斯提出的批评。
施论霍布斯
霍布斯的矛盾点:1.完全的自然主义(只有自然物体是存在的,其它的信念、思想都是幻象)是如何和近似于存在主义的自由哲学(自然状态的混乱,以及政治现象)共存的?施的想法是,霍布斯的观念整体上是自然主义的,利维坦等政治著作则是这样的自然主义被书写进常识和传统上对人总体理解的后果:因为没有神或信仰只有物理规律、自然现象,人因此不受保护;人巧合地拥有特殊的“言说的能力”,可以给自己塑造形象、信念,便使用这种能力去遏制恐惧、创制荣誉;因此自然得以过渡到反对自然的理性,却还是自然的一部分。因此,人在根本上是自然的,而因为这样的自然人理解超出了过去对人的总体的理解,所以反而显得仿佛是一种自由哲学了。
2.所以自然状态向主权的过渡也是一样;那么在自然状态中就已经有了主权或者公民社会的种子了。霍布斯要宣扬对主权的遵从,就得让主权正当化;他正当化的方式就是发现自然状态向主权过渡的必然性。这种必然性为主权提供支撑,是合理的,也是好的;那这里就有了一种目的论;可是自然状态,以霍布斯的理论,是不能是目的论的,那它就得是随机的。自然状态如果是随机的,那就说明自然状态下,不仅有主权建立后被回溯性标记为好的条件,也必须有不好的条件;那就是,除了有自然法,也有对自然法的反对。因此主权者不可能是无条件的好,而必须是遵守自然法的才是好,不遵守的是不好,反而正当化了无政府主义;因此,为了正当化主权,霍布斯反而消解了主权的正当性:我们必须从以自然法为权威的角度去判断主权是否正当;这与他的前提,“主权就是正当的”,矛盾了。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
Natural law is 1. concrete and 2. unconditional. This is itself a contradiction requiring an external resolution. Hobbes resolves it by introducing a state of nature and grounding natural law in the impulse of self-preservation. This grounding is treated as the means of resolving the contradiction because 1. the impulse of self-preservation is graspable, actual, and concrete; 2. it is considered absolute and universal.
Locke’s criticisms are as follows. 1. The impulse of self-preservation is not universal, because there are people who kill themselves, while natural law still condemns suicide. Natural law therefore extends farther than the impulse of self-preservation. If self-preservation grounded natural law, we could not criticize those who kill themselves. The fact that we criticize them shows that natural law is more universal than self-preservation.
Personally, however, I think Locke’s more important criticism is the following, which is dialectical and offers insight beyond political philosophy. 2. If self-preservation universally grounds natural law, every virtue, including selflessness, devotion, and love, must be understood as a form of self-preservation. Yet ordinarily these virtues cannot be understood as forms of self-preservation while remaining virtues; they would usually be considered hypocrisy. They therefore conflict with self-preservation. Self-preservation thus conflicts with its own forms of manifestation. Its content is determined through its difference from virtues such as selflessness, yet it is also the essence of these virtues. The impulse of self-preservation therefore differentiates itself. It would then no longer be self-preservation, but a continual becoming-other of itself. Self-preservation is therefore essentially selflessness. What grounds natural law can thus also be considered selflessness.
3. Suppose the state of nature, the war of everyone against everyone, is a state of complete self-preservation. It is then unconditional self-preservation. But when natural law is grounded, self-preservation ceases to be unconditional: one can no longer plunder resources anytime and anywhere. Yet natural law must be grounded in unconditional self-preservation. This means that the moment natural law is established, it can no longer be grounded. Hobbes would object: “The unconditional principle of natural law has not been violated, because natural law is established for better self-preservation.” He wants to show that self-preservation remains unconditional under natural law. But once we acknowledge “better” self-preservation, self-preservation is no longer absolutely unconditional. We recognize two possible kinds: immediate, dangerous self-preservation in the state of nature, and long-term, secure self-preservation in civil society. We prefer the latter and reject the former precisely because of their respective concrete circumstances and limitations. We can make further calculations: self-preservation while living in southern Italy, self-preservation in Europe during the Black Death… Self-preservation becomes a concrete practical decision, losing natural law’s universality and unconditionality. On the contrary, each person’s calculations and judgments of self-preservation differ and are incommensurable, isolating everyone. For self-preservation, any other person may take any action they consider suitable, even demanding the exercise of abstract, indiscriminate violence. Ignorance of the other’s behavior means danger, and when self-preservation is the primary aim, danger means striking preemptively. The exercise of indiscriminate violence escalates ignorance and fear again, until we return to the state of nature: concrete self-preservation demands a return to abstract acts of self-preservation. We therefore obtain a cycle: state of nature → natural law → state of nature. Natural law is thus merely a phase, lacking unconditional validity and therefore not natural law. Nor is it concrete, because the state of nature determines its content, while the state of nature contains only abstract “self-preservation.” This is the same problem as in 2. Self-preservation determined by the state of nature is natural law’s essence, yet self-preservation in the state of nature differs from self-preservation under natural law. Such self-difference and self-conflict produce the result that self-preservation is not self-preservation, the state of nature is not the state of nature, and natural law is not natural law. Hobbes does not clearly resolve this contradiction; it even remains in his analysis of sovereignty’s legitimacy. This is Locke’s criticism of Hobbes.
Strauss on Hobbes
Hobbes’ contradictions: 1. How can complete naturalism—only natural bodies exist, while beliefs and thoughts are illusions—coexist with an almost existentialist philosophy of freedom, the chaos of the state of nature and political phenomena? Strauss’s thought is that Hobbes’ outlook is naturalistic as a whole. Political works such as Leviathan result from inscribing this naturalism into common sense and the traditional understanding of humanity as a whole. Because there is no God or faith, only physical laws and natural phenomena, human beings are unprotected. By chance, they possess the special “capacity for speech,” enabling them to fashion images and beliefs for themselves. They use this capacity to contain fear and create honor. Nature thus passes into reason that opposes nature, while remaining part of nature. Human beings are therefore fundamentally natural. Because this understanding of natural humanity exceeds earlier comprehensive understandings of humanity, it instead seems like a philosophy of freedom.
2. The same holds for the passage from the state of nature to sovereignty. Seeds of sovereignty or civil society must therefore already exist in the state of nature. To advocate obedience to sovereignty, Hobbes must justify it. His method of justification is to discover the necessity of passing from the state of nature to sovereignty. This necessity supports sovereignty, and is reasonable and good. A teleology therefore appears here. Yet according to Hobbes’ theory, the state of nature cannot be teleological: it must be random. If it is random, then besides the conditions retrospectively marked as good after sovereignty’s establishment, it must also contain bad conditions. Alongside natural law, there must be opposition to natural law. The sovereign therefore cannot be unconditionally good: only one who follows natural law is good; one who does not is bad. This instead legitimizes anarchism. To justify sovereignty, Hobbes thus dissolves its legitimacy: we must judge whether sovereignty is legitimate from a perspective that takes natural law as authoritative. This contradicts his premise that “sovereignty is legitimate.”