Thomas Hobbes · 托马斯·霍布斯
Leviathan · 利维坦
Undated 未注日期
利维坦——读书笔记
Reflections · Pages
It is easy for one to lose oneself in the labyrinthine construction of Leviathan. Yet as long as one keeps in mind that Hobbes tries to solve a human predicament through political reflections, in other words, he is not writing merely because of idle curiosity, one finds Ariadne’s thread.
What is the predicament Hobbes tries to solve? The problem is not the fabled condition of war: it is only a manifestation of a deeper trouble. The trouble lies in human nature: men are passionate beings. Hobbes also does not believe in the ancient medication of reason: reasoning is yet but an expression of passional interpretation. While on the other hand, reason itself comes wide of the mark when without the deliverance from some passions.
Men strive to achieve felicity, but they fall short. The two passions most destructive to this endeavor are pride and dejection of mind. Pride comes from a misassumption of the power one has. But more than this. In the passage where he talks about vain glory, Hobbes says that “they are vain even when they know they don’t have the power but still assume so”. What is laid out here is not just that they do not know their real power, but rather a supposition despite the knowledge. One attempts still when one knows one lacks such power: this is due to honor and a sense of right. The same is applicable to dejection of mind: the opinion of lack of power despite the knowledge of entertaining such power. These two passions come about through a mismatch between his sense of right and his power. One is vain when one couples his sense of unconditional right to his finite power, and is deject when he couples his power to a sense of no right at all. These two are the main culprits to an obstacle to the pursuit of felicity.
Because men are vain, they strive against each other, judging they all have equal power, for that to which each has an unconditional right. Condition of war. Then they modulate their sense of right, saying there are things I cannot reasonably claim to have, for otherwise I will never achieve felicity. Yet they might deceive themselves even in this respect, that they do not believe they can resist harmful exigencies rightfully even when they have that power. Here our natural reason fails on two ends and deceives us twice. First, we are deceived that simply by nature we can attain felicity: but our nature is not reasonable. Then, we are deceived that simply by reasoning along, like Socrates did in Crito, we can attain felicity: but our reason is not natural. Hence we need to deflect from both ends, and say we combat our nature through reason, and vice versa. Yet this deflected mean cannot be established until we have something other than natural reason: to harmonize nature and reason, we need to find the missing link. And this is our artifice. Leviathan is such artificial intermediary between nature and reason that harmonizes both.
To combat our natural sense of unconditional right, it employs reason to design a way out of the quagmire. To combat the unnatural Socratic reason which reigns absolute, it again conjures that ghost of natural right. To guarantee this reconciliation between nature and reason is successful, ‘felicitous’, Hobbes makes such arrangements and maneuvers so as to first reconcile the ruler with the ruled. First, he explains how it would be unreasonable to let our natural passions go unchecked against this artifice, and therefore assigns reasoning to people over their own natural passions. But a reasoning or deliberation without its natural impulse is void, he therefore assigns will to the sovereign so that the sovereign expresses the natural will of the people. The reasoning kept by the people helps instruct them to harmonize with the sovereign, but they lack the vital impulse of attaining anything. This impulse is only inherent in the will of their sovereign. Yet this assignment needs further qualification, for as the rationality assigned to people helps avert the predicament caused by nature qua nature (discord), and the will helps avert the trouble caused by reason qua reason (impotence), there is yet the reconciliation between the personal and the common. The personal good is to achieve felicity. The common good is peace. If people only have reasoning, they might not be able to achieve felicity. Thus they need their own will and liberty within the framework of this artifice, they need to realize their vital impulse inside the city. And this is only guaranteed through general peace, and when peace and felicity come in conflict, it is time for the individual to employ the natural will against the rational. But it is also the case that the will to peace has to accommodate its own reasoning process regarding the individual wills to felicity: a tyrannical will shall be overthrown, hence this will needs its own prudence. That is, to those inside the city, the will to peace has to employ its reasoning, its work of conscience, to maintain this artifice.
Hence we see there are multiple limits imposed upon this artificial man as an intermediary: men of the condition of war and Socratic rationalizers compose the first limits between nature and reason. The second pair of bounds are iniquity and insecurity, regarding the sovereign, the former being lack of reason, the latter being lack of will. The third pair of bounds being injustice and stupidity, regarding the citizen, the former being lack of reason, the latter lack of will. Right ordains that which one feels bound to will. The Leviathan floats in such boundaries, and is thus maintained.
利维坦中的道德问题:
1. 道德问题在利维坦中获得了政治决定,也因此需要根据政治的范畴进行讨论。因此要讨论的是被分进两个对子的道德:自然-共和国,君主-臣民。
2. 首先,在自然状态里,道德是无法被讨论的。显然,每个人可以通过理性抵达对自然法「己所不欲,勿施于人」的认识,但自然法在自然状态中仅仅只是一个审慎的建议,而没有达到法的要求。这不仅仅是因为随时对自身安全的追求都会破坏自然”法”的实现,更是因为自身安全是自然权利,所以自然法本身在内容上就必须包括对自我的保存。
3. 只有在安全得到保障的情况下,对自然法的遵守才是有意义的。因为这个时候,所有人都放弃了自己决定自然法的适用范围和解读自然法的实际运用的权利,为了避免无休止的战争,并将裁夺的力量交给了主权者。当这个自然法获得了统一的解读和决定并成为了公法后,任何试图破坏或不遵守公法的行为才是不义的,因为首先,衡量正义与不义有了建立在主权者意志上的统一的标准,然后,有了主权者的力量可以保证安全与和平的自然权利的实现。只有在这两个条件下,讨论正义或不义才有意义,否则要么各人有各人自己的正义标准,要么在生命安全受到威胁时,正义与否都不再成为问题。
4. 由此可以得到,在共和国建立之后,正义才有意义。而臣民的正义就是不阻碍共和国的和平,而不阻碍的方式就是遵纪守法,服从君主的命令。但对君主是否有任何道德要求呢?首先,霍布斯明确指出,尽管君主是共和国中唯一保留了完整自然权利的个体,但有某些行为依然可以被判断为对和错。当然,一个问题是,这样的对和错有什么意义呢?在霍布斯那里,「天子犯法与庶民同罪」这个立场是荒谬的。君主本来就是定义正义者,是不可能有「罪」或能被「惩罚」的。既然不能被惩罚,那讨论这个行为正义不正义还有意义吗?这个对错的意义哪怕在臣民的层面上也是个疑问,既然当我“感觉”生命受到威胁时,我总是可以无限制反抗,那么讨论正义和不正义还有什么意义呢?既然我只要碰到惩罚就可以去用尽方式避免,那这种不愿接受惩罚的态度和实际反抗惩罚的行动能称为正义吗?
5. 首先解决臣民层面上的这个疑问。作为共和国的臣民,这意味着臣民接受了共和国的保护,也意味臣民接受了主权者的统治。如果不接受保护,就意味着臣民是主权者的敌人。接受惩罚和反抗惩罚因此都不是不正义,前者表示自己依然遵从主权者的正义,后者表示不再接受主权者的正义。那在这里不正义是什么呢?不正义与惩罚的接受与否无关,而仅仅与是否遵守法律有关。在安全受到主权者保障的情况下,臣民理应遵守和平的要求,并维持这一唯一善好的秩序,任何对此进行破坏的行为都是不义的,也理当被主权者划定为有罪,并由主权者施以惩罚。但主权者理当施以惩罚并不意味着臣民理当接受惩罚,仅仅意味着臣民理当遵守法律。
6. 在主权者的层面上,主权者理当将自己对自然法的解读作为主权者公布出来,并运用暴力维持自己这一解读的正统性。因此霍布斯真正讨论的并非是主权者的解读内容上的对错,而是主权者作为主权者在传播解读方法上的对错。解读的内容完全取决于主权者的意志,但是主权者的意志本身要有一些决定。比如,主权者的意志不能自相矛盾。比如,主权者不能惩罚臣民在法未立时做出的相关行为,像在x还没被认定为罪时,A做了x,那A将不能被后来的法律惩罚。这是因为那时主权者的意志还没有被知晓,而在这个特定情境下,让自己的意志被知晓是主权者的责任。在主权者没有被知晓的情况下,臣民明显并未进入共和国的契约里,因此也没有什么正义和不正义的区分。如果A一定要因为x被惩罚,那就不是作为主权者合理运用法律,而仅仅是君主运用暴力的敌对行为罢了。君主有权使用任何暴力进行敌对行为,但很多情况下,这是“错”的,因为他没有正确扮演主权者这个角色。这个“错”在法律层面是没有后果的,而仅仅在上帝建立的道德层面有后果。可是仅仅是道德层面的后果对君主真的有足够的约束力吗?显然,在有些方面,这不是霍布斯在「利维坦」里要考虑的问题,比如君主对好名声的追求,君主的骄傲,君主对上帝的虔敬,以及一切对公正精神有益的激情。但是,有一点是确定的,一旦君主无力扮演主权者的角色,主权者的力量就会衰退。尽管任何被主权者惩罚的人都可能认为主权者不公正,但真正的不公是在旁观者角度可以被确定的;因此,在君主不公正地审判并惩罚了A之后,其它旁观的臣民也就意识到了主权者的失职。对主权者的失职,臣民显然没有正当理由去主动反对,但是无论是因此产生的消极的对抗,或是因为主权者的敌意而切实发生了的叛乱以及对叛乱者的同情,还是对主权者的不信任,还是因为对某方的偏向导致某方逐渐成长起来的力量,都会导致主权者力量的消减。而一旦主权者的力量被削弱到无法保护臣民的地步,他就丧失了主权者的资格。这一危险要求主权者保证基本的公义。
7. 简而言之,「利维坦」中的道德只在共和国内发生。对臣民来说,正义意味着不主动破坏和平以及持久和平的机制,任何相反的举动都是不正义,其后果就是会被主权者以及给主权者提供力量并被主权者代表的其它臣民惩罚;但是在接受惩罚的这一阶段,正义就不再作为问题,因此霍布斯不接受所谓的「苏格拉底问题」。正义仅仅意味着「犯法会导致来自主权者的制裁」,不代表一定要接受制裁。而主权者的公正则仅仅来自于他扮演主权者这一角色的成效。如果他扮演失败,这也损害了和平的机制,尽管这一损害并不是直接的冲突。因为主权者保有完整的自然权利,他做任何事都不会与共和国直接冲突,哪怕这些事做出来是不利于扮演主权者这一角色的。但是损害依然会发生,直到他的力量被自己的不公消磨殆尽,而不再具有主权者的效力。
对利维坦的批评绝对不能仅仅停留在一种道德情操上,尽管这种批评或许是高尚且有效的,但并不能持续,也不能进入一种理论对话。
几个比较基础广泛的道德情操上的厌弃如果真正进入霍布斯的论证就会发现其实要么是误解,要么是无力的,因为霍布斯的论证恰恰是不违背他设定的道德(法义)的。因此必须要求一种完全不同的前设,否则利维坦就将是唯一可以选择的道路。
霍布斯的前设有这么几个:1.一个行动是道德的,当且仅当它跟从于个人的意志的时候;2.因为个人的意志要求个人的生命的保存,因此一个行动是道德的,当且仅当它不损害个人生命的时候。
从这两个前设出发,最根本的自然法(这里暂且不引入上帝的担保)就是:在保存自己生命的情况下,完成自己的意志。一个行动只有符合这两个标准,才能称作道德行动。
把这一点澄清了,很多利维坦的问题都可以迎刃而解。
比如,首先,利维坦之所以有这么大权利(right)和权力(might)并且总是正义的,是因为利维坦不仅代表了一个公民的意志,而且在最开始的时候就是其意志的造物,“我授权给利维坦,此后它的行动就是我的行动”,而反悔就是意志的自我矛盾,因此是不公义的。
再比如,关于为什么利维坦有权利除掉我,而我也有权利反抗,则类似于,在安全得到保证的情况下,我的意志可以做任何事,包括清除隐患,而在我意志的代表那里,它所做的不过是替“我”清除隐患罢了,但当安全不再有保障,我就不能再如此授权,而必须反抗。而为什么利维坦的法律永远是需要执行的,因为你只是在服从你自己的意志。
至于为什么我不能直接继续自己做自己所意志的,而需要一个代表来替我意志,则是因为如果每个人都同样意志,而不愿放弃无条件的权利,那人将永远处于战争状态,但这并不是利维坦诞生的直接契机;对和平的渴望只能使人暂时放弃无条件的意志。但是当他们不仅暂时放弃无条件的意志,还将自己的力量“借”给利维坦的时候,利维坦才真正无中生有了。
因此,利维坦的诞生可以做如下描述:战争状态下的某一个瞬间,人们暂时建立了和平的契约;但同时,他们说,我们需要一个有绝对力量的裁判去阻止人们违反契约,因为如果没有绝对力量,任何有一定力量的人都会想要当这个裁判,那我们又会陷入战争状态;因此,这个裁判的力量必须是绝对的。所以,我们都得将这个力量交给某一个(群)人。尽管这个人可能最开始有自己的野心,但当他已经拥有了绝对的力量的时候,他还需要去对我们这些没有竞争威胁的人做什么呢?他需要故意去伤害我们吗?如果他伤害我们,那肯定是为了让我们更强大且富有,因为作为他的所有物,我们是他力量和财富的直接体现。你说他可能不够聪明,没有办法想到治理的最好方式:但这不代表你能代替他治理。如果你有更好的主意,你只能对他建言。但你要知道,人和人的差距没有那么大,并且,真正具有危害性的是对权威的损害:如果所有人都认为自己比主权者更擅长治理,并挑战主权者的权威,那内乱将是更严重的后果。我们建立利维坦恰恰是为了杜绝这件事的发生,因此利维坦将必须确保自己拥有绝对的力量。这甚至可以说是主权者的最大责任。至于主权者根本不治理?那如果他不主动退位,说明“无为”就是他的治理方式,你同样不能挑战他的权威。在这种情况下,利维坦的意志就是法律,哪怕它违反了任何自然法的条款。
但是如果说霍布斯是彻底的绝对主义者也是有失偏颇的。因为这套哲学明白地展示给主权者看了如下两个事实:1.如果你危害到了个人的生命,个人必然会反抗,因为这种反抗是全然道德的,也就意味着,这种反抗是遵循着利维坦建立的内在原则且不可避免的,你不可能诉诸任何理性去解决这个矛盾;2.而当足够多的人因你造成的危害而正当地反抗的时候,你的力量就会因此削弱;3.当你的力量被削弱到一定程度,你的力量就不再是绝对的,而你也就失去了作为利维坦的权利,这一时刻就是战争状态的复归。因此,任何有基本审慎的主权者都不可能做出极端的举动。因此霍布斯只是威权主义,而不是绝对主义。
最后一个问题则是,在霍布斯的政治架构当中,讨论“道德”真的有意义吗?如果我们把道德理解为一种内心的良知秩序,那霍布斯会认为这是没有直接意义的。对于霍布斯来说,他在意的是道德与力量的关系,而非某种超脱于现实力量的道德。这对于他来说仅有上帝可以裁夺。但是道德显示了一种必然性:即,因为这样做是对的,所以人可以这样做,而这个可能性就是他感兴趣的动因。出于上述的两个道德原则,脱离战争状态的可能性被给出了,而这一可能性建立了利维坦。同样的,因为道德原则,主权者需要考虑叛乱的可能性,因此一种审慎的威权政治与自由和统治的解决方案才可以被提出。在这个意义上,霍布斯是关乎一种可能性的政治的哲学家,与柏拉图是同一路人。
所以其实“道德地”或者“有权利地”可以被视作一种“能”:遭遇利维坦的压迫,人可能不反抗,但重要的是人能反抗,而且不仅能反抗,仔细思考还会意识到自己在良知的敦促下应该反抗;同样,人可能不真地去遵从法律,但重要的是人能遵从法律,而且良知会敦促他去遵从法律,而那些试图用理性说明人其实不应该遵从法律的人才是犯了自相矛盾的谬误。
任何一种对霍布斯的严肃解读都不应该回避下面几个问题:1.序言的地位,尤其是当序言似乎使用了一种隐喻的手法,而隐喻对霍布斯来说却是对科学的背离的时候。
2.第一卷前几章与后几章的联系:在何种意义上对人作为一种存在本身的讨论必然奠基一种政治哲学?与序言联系起来,这是一种直接的模仿关系,即个人的理性对应于利维坦的理性,个人的激情对应利维坦的激情;还是一种部分与整体的关系,即人作为政治的匠人与质料必须被如此理解?这种必要性来自哪里?
3.第一卷与第二卷的衔接关系:似乎author这个概念在第一卷的末尾与在第二卷的开篇相对于person获得了不同的位置。第一卷的末尾,person与author的行动、责任与内容都是截然分开的,但在第二卷当霍布斯论证道“主权者不应被附属侵害因为附属和主权者同是一人”时,这一个差异被抹掉了。为什么?
4.我们也不能假装没看到他对利维坦的开端的描述是彻底地自身设定的。利维坦的诞生需要契约,但如果先没有利维坦契约就无法保障;没有利维坦一切人会自然地进入战争状态,但脱离战争状态才可以使利维坦奠基;这个自我设定的循环霍布斯肯定不会注意不到。为什么这么做?
5.最后的一个问题就是战争状态的存在论地位。在和平状态下,主权者之间处于战争,但这不是一切人反对一切人;在战争状态下,一切人反对一切人,但结盟(confederation)却又是可能的。历史上从来没有总体地出现过战争状态,但蛮人的各个家庭部族之间的战争近似于这种状态。战争状态似乎应该是先于利维坦的导致利维坦的原因,但从4.我们已经知道这问题很大。
对于我来说,任何一个对「利维坦」的解读如果不能全面融贯地处理这五个问题,那就不会使我信服。
另外,其实现在我对好哲学与坏哲学的标准已经被彻底地颠倒了:过去我觉得只有严密、准确的哲学是好的哲学,但我现在反而觉得,如果一种哲学有很多错漏,那或许更说明提出这种哲学的人对它充满激情的意志,那可能这种哲学反而是更好的哲学。
AI translated the non-English passages; original English passages are preserved. The mixed-language original is available under Original.
It is easy for one to lose oneself in the labyrinthine construction of Leviathan. Yet as long as one keeps in mind that Hobbes tries to solve a human predicament through political reflections, in other words, he is not writing merely because of idle curiosity, one finds Ariadne’s thread.
What is the predicament Hobbes tries to solve? The problem is not the fabled condition of war: it is only a manifestation of a deeper trouble. The trouble lies in human nature: men are passionate beings. Hobbes also does not believe in the ancient medication of reason: reasoning is yet but an expression of passional interpretation. While on the other hand, reason itself comes wide of the mark when without the deliverance from some passions.
Men strive to achieve felicity, but they fall short. The two passions most destructive to this endeavor are pride and dejection of mind. Pride comes from a misassumption of the power one has. But more than this. In the passage where he talks about vain glory, Hobbes says that “they are vain even when they know they don’t have the power but still assume so”. What is laid out here is not just that they do not know their real power, but rather a supposition despite the knowledge. One attempts still when one knows one lacks such power: this is due to honor and a sense of right. The same is applicable to dejection of mind: the opinion of lack of power despite the knowledge of entertaining such power. These two passions come about through a mismatch between his sense of right and his power. One is vain when one couples his sense of unconditional right to his finite power, and is deject when he couples his power to a sense of no right at all. These two are the main culprits to an obstacle to the pursuit of felicity.
Because men are vain, they strive against each other, judging they all have equal power, for that to which each has an unconditional right. Condition of war. Then they modulate their sense of right, saying there are things I cannot reasonably claim to have, for otherwise I will never achieve felicity. Yet they might deceive themselves even in this respect, that they do not believe they can resist harmful exigencies rightfully even when they have that power. Here our natural reason fails on two ends and deceives us twice. First, we are deceived that simply by nature we can attain felicity: but our nature is not reasonable. Then, we are deceived that simply by reasoning along, like Socrates did in Crito, we can attain felicity: but our reason is not natural. Hence we need to deflect from both ends, and say we combat our nature through reason, and vice versa. Yet this deflected mean cannot be established until we have something other than natural reason: to harmonize nature and reason, we need to find the missing link. And this is our artifice. Leviathan is such artificial intermediary between nature and reason that harmonizes both.
To combat our natural sense of unconditional right, it employs reason to design a way out of the quagmire. To combat the unnatural Socratic reason which reigns absolute, it again conjures that ghost of natural right. To guarantee this reconciliation between nature and reason is successful, ‘felicitous’, Hobbes makes such arrangements and maneuvers so as to first reconcile the ruler with the ruled. First, he explains how it would be unreasonable to let our natural passions go unchecked against this artifice, and therefore assigns reasoning to people over their own natural passions. But a reasoning or deliberation without its natural impulse is void, he therefore assigns will to the sovereign so that the sovereign expresses the natural will of the people. The reasoning kept by the people helps instruct them to harmonize with the sovereign, but they lack the vital impulse of attaining anything. This impulse is only inherent in the will of their sovereign. Yet this assignment needs further qualification, for as the rationality assigned to people helps avert the predicament caused by nature qua nature (discord), and the will helps avert the trouble caused by reason qua reason (impotence), there is yet the reconciliation between the personal and the common. The personal good is to achieve felicity. The common good is peace. If people only have reasoning, they might not be able to achieve felicity. Thus they need their own will and liberty within the framework of this artifice, they need to realize their vital impulse inside the city. And this is only guaranteed through general peace, and when peace and felicity come in conflict, it is time for the individual to employ the natural will against the rational. But it is also the case that the will to peace has to accommodate its own reasoning process regarding the individual wills to felicity: a tyrannical will shall be overthrown, hence this will needs its own prudence. That is, to those inside the city, the will to peace has to employ its reasoning, its work of conscience, to maintain this artifice.
Hence we see there are multiple limits imposed upon this artificial man as an intermediary: men of the condition of war and Socratic rationalizers compose the first limits between nature and reason. The second pair of bounds are iniquity and insecurity, regarding the sovereign, the former being lack of reason, the latter being lack of will. The third pair of bounds being injustice and stupidity, regarding the citizen, the former being lack of reason, the latter lack of will. Right ordains that which one feels bound to will. The Leviathan floats in such boundaries, and is thus maintained.
The Moral Problem in Leviathan:
1. In Leviathan, the moral problem receives a political determination and therefore must be discussed through political categories. What must be discussed is morality divided into two pairs: nature–commonwealth, sovereign–subject.
2. First, morality cannot be discussed in the state of nature. Clearly, everyone can reach through reason an understanding of the natural law, “Do not do to others what you would not wish done to yourself.” Yet in the state of nature, natural law is merely prudent advice and has not attained the requirements of law. This is not merely because the pursuit of personal safety can at any moment disrupt the realization of natural “law,” but because personal safety is a natural right: natural law itself must therefore include self-preservation in its content.
3. Observing natural law becomes meaningful only when safety is guaranteed. At that point, to avoid endless war, everyone has relinquished the right to determine natural law’s scope and interpret its practical application, handing the power of decision to the sovereign. Only after natural law receives a unified interpretation and determination, becoming public law, is any attempt to undermine or disobey public law unjust. First, there is now a unified standard of justice and injustice founded on the sovereign’s will; second, the sovereign’s power can guarantee the realization of the natural right to safety and peace. Only under these two conditions does discussing justice or injustice make sense. Otherwise, either everyone has their own standard of justice, or, when life and safety are threatened, justice ceases to be the question.
4. It follows that justice becomes meaningful only after the commonwealth is established. Subjects’ justice consists in not obstructing the commonwealth’s peace; the way not to obstruct it is to observe the law and obey the sovereign’s commands. But are there any moral requirements for the sovereign? First, Hobbes explicitly states that, although the sovereign is the only individual in the commonwealth retaining complete natural right, certain acts can still be judged right or wrong. Of course, the question is what such right and wrong mean. For Hobbes, the position that “a ruler who breaks the law is guilty on the same terms as a commoner” is absurd. The sovereign defines justice and cannot be “guilty” or “punished.” If he cannot be punished, does it still make sense to discuss whether an act is just? Even at the level of subjects, the meaning of right and wrong is questionable: if I can always resist without limit when I “feel” my life threatened, what meaning remains in discussing justice and injustice? If I can use every means to avoid punishment whenever I encounter it, can this unwillingness to accept punishment and this actual resistance to it be called just?
5. First, let us resolve the question at the level of subjects. Being a subject of the commonwealth means accepting its protection, and also accepting the sovereign’s rule. Refusing protection means being the sovereign’s enemy. Neither accepting nor resisting punishment is therefore unjust: the former indicates continued compliance with the sovereign’s justice; the latter indicates that one no longer accepts it. What, then, is injustice here? Injustice has nothing to do with whether punishment is accepted; it concerns only whether the law is obeyed. When safety is guaranteed by the sovereign, subjects ought to obey the demands of peace and maintain this uniquely good order. Any act undermining it is unjust and ought to be designated criminal and punished by the sovereign. Yet the sovereign’s obligation to punish does not mean subjects ought to accept punishment; it means only that subjects ought to obey the law.
6. At the sovereign’s level, the sovereign ought to proclaim his interpretation of natural law as sovereign and use violence to maintain its authority. What Hobbes actually discusses, therefore, is not the rightness or wrongness of the content of the sovereign’s interpretation, but of the method by which the sovereign, as sovereign, communicates it. The interpretation’s content depends entirely on the sovereign’s will, but this will itself must possess certain determinations. For instance, it cannot contradict itself. The sovereign cannot punish subjects for relevant acts performed before a law was established: if A did x before x was designated a crime, A cannot be punished by the subsequent law. This is because the sovereign’s will was not yet known, and in this particular context, making his will known is his responsibility. Where the sovereign is unknown, subjects have clearly not entered the commonwealth’s covenant, and there is therefore no distinction between justice and injustice. If A must nevertheless be punished for x, this is not the sovereign’s proper exercise of law, but merely the ruler’s hostile use of violence. The ruler has the right to use any violence in hostility, but in many cases this is “wrong,” because he has not properly played the sovereign’s role. This “wrong” has no legal consequences, only consequences at the moral level established by God. Yet can merely moral consequences sufficiently restrain the ruler? Clearly, certain aspects are not what Hobbes seeks to consider in Leviathan: the ruler’s pursuit of a good reputation, his pride, his piety toward God, and all passions beneficial to a spirit of equity. But one point is certain: once the ruler cannot perform the sovereign’s role, sovereign power declines. Although anyone punished by the sovereign may consider him inequitable, genuine inequity can be established from an observer’s standpoint. Thus, after the ruler inequitably judges and punishes A, other observing subjects recognize the sovereign’s failure. Subjects clearly have no legitimate reason actively to oppose this failure. Yet whether through consequent passive resistance, actual rebellion caused by the sovereign’s hostility and sympathy for rebels, distrust of the sovereign, or one party’s growing strength through his favoritism, sovereign power will diminish. Once that power weakens to the point where he cannot protect his subjects, he loses his standing as sovereign. This danger requires the sovereign to guarantee basic equity.
7. In brief, morality in Leviathan occurs only within the commonwealth. For subjects, justice means not actively undermining peace or the mechanisms of lasting peace. Any contrary act is unjust, with the consequence of punishment by the sovereign and the other subjects who supply his power and whom he represents. But at the stage of accepting punishment, justice ceases to be the question; Hobbes therefore does not accept the so-called “Socratic problem.” Justice means merely that “breaking the law brings sanctions from the sovereign,” not that those sanctions must be accepted. The sovereign’s equity, meanwhile, derives solely from how successfully he performs the sovereign’s role. Failure damages the mechanisms of peace, even if that damage is not direct conflict. Because the sovereign retains complete natural right, nothing he does directly conflicts with the commonwealth, even when his actions impair his performance as sovereign. Yet damage still occurs, until his inequity exhausts his power and he no longer has sovereign efficacy.
Criticism of Leviathan absolutely cannot remain merely at the level of moral sentiment. Although such criticism may be noble and effective, it cannot endure or enter into theoretical dialogue.
Once several basic and widespread moral aversions genuinely enter Hobbes’ argument, they prove either misunderstandings or powerless, since his argument precisely does not violate the morality—legal justice—he establishes. Entirely different presuppositions are therefore required; otherwise, Leviathan will be the only available path.
Hobbes’ presuppositions include the following: 1. An act is moral if and only if it follows the individual’s will; 2. Because the individual’s will demands the preservation of the individual’s life, an act is moral if and only if it does not harm that life.
From these two presuppositions, the most fundamental natural law—temporarily leaving aside God’s guarantee—is to fulfill one’s will while preserving one’s life. Only an act satisfying both standards can be called moral.
Once this is clarified, many problems in Leviathan are readily resolved.
For example, Leviathan possesses such immense right and might, and is always just, because it not only represents a citizen’s will but is, from the beginning, that will’s creation: “I authorize Leviathan; henceforth its acts are my acts.” Reneging is the will’s self-contradiction and therefore inequitable.
Likewise, why does Leviathan have the right to eliminate me while I have the right to resist? The situation is approximately this: when safety is guaranteed, my will may do anything, including eliminating potential dangers. My will’s representative does nothing more than eliminate dangers on “my” behalf. But when safety is no longer guaranteed, I can no longer authorize it in this way and must resist. Why must Leviathan’s laws always be carried out? Because you are merely obeying your own will.
As for why I cannot simply continue doing what I will myself, but need a representative to will for me: if everyone equally wills without relinquishing unconditional right, humanity will remain forever in the state of war. Yet this is not the immediate occasion for Leviathan’s birth. The desire for peace can make people only temporarily relinquish unconditional will. Leviathan truly comes into being from nothing only when, besides temporarily relinquishing unconditional will, they also “lend” it their power.
Leviathan’s birth can therefore be described as follows: at a certain moment within the state of war, people temporarily establish a covenant of peace. At the same time, they say: we need an arbiter with absolute power to prevent people from breaking the covenant. Without absolute power, anyone possessing a certain amount of power will want to be this arbiter, and we will fall into war again. The arbiter’s power must therefore be absolute. Accordingly, we must all hand this power to a particular person or group. Although this person may initially have ambitions of his own, once he possesses absolute power, what more need he do to us, who pose no competitive threat? Need he deliberately hurt us? If he hurts us, it must be to make us stronger and wealthier, since as his possessions, we directly embody his power and wealth. You say he may not be intelligent enough to devise the best means of governing: this does not mean you can govern in his place. If you have better ideas, you can only advise him. But you must recognize that differences between people are not so great, and that the real danger lies in damage to authority. If everyone considers themselves better at governing than the sovereign and challenges his authority, civil disorder will be the graver consequence. We establish Leviathan precisely to prevent this, so Leviathan must ensure its absolute power. This can even be called the sovereign’s greatest responsibility. What if the sovereign does not govern at all? Unless he voluntarily abdicates, “inaction” is his manner of governing, and you still cannot challenge his authority. Under these conditions, Leviathan’s will is law, even if it violates any provision of natural law.
Yet calling Hobbes a thoroughgoing absolutist is also one-sided. His philosophy plainly displays the following two facts to the sovereign: 1. If you endanger an individual’s life, that individual will necessarily resist, because such resistance is entirely moral. This means resistance follows the immanent principles of Leviathan’s establishment and is inevitable; no appeal to reason can resolve this contradiction. 2. When sufficiently many people legitimately resist because of the harm you cause, your power weakens. 3. Once weakened to a certain point, your power ceases to be absolute, and you lose the right to be Leviathan: this moment is the return of the state of war. Thus, no sovereign possessing basic prudence could act in extreme ways. Hobbes is therefore authoritarian, not absolutist.
The final question is whether discussing “morality” genuinely makes sense within Hobbes’ political framework. If morality means an inner order of conscience, Hobbes would regard it as having no direct significance. What concerns him is morality’s relation to power, rather than some morality detached from actual power. Only God can judge the latter. But morality displays a necessity: because an act is right, people may perform it, and this possibility is the motive force that interests him. The two moral principles above provide the possibility of leaving the state of war, and this possibility establishes Leviathan. Likewise, because of moral principles, the sovereign must consider the possibility of rebellion, allowing a prudent authoritarian politics and a solution to freedom and rule to be proposed. In this sense, Hobbes is a philosopher concerned with a politics of possibility, of the same kind as Plato.
Thus, “morally” or “rightfully” can actually be regarded as a kind of “can.” Faced with Leviathan’s oppression, people may not resist, but what matters is that they can resist—and not only can resist: careful reflection will show that conscience urges them to do so. Likewise, people may not actually obey the law, but what matters is that they can obey it, and conscience urges them to obey. Those who try to show through reason that people ought not obey the law are the ones committing the fallacy of self-contradiction.
No serious interpretation of Hobbes should evade the following questions: 1. The status of the introduction, especially when it seems to employ metaphor, while for Hobbes metaphor is a departure from science.
2. The connection between the early and later chapters of Part I: in what sense must a discussion of humanity as a being in itself ground a political philosophy? In connection with the introduction, is this a direct relation of imitation—individual reason corresponding to Leviathan’s reason, individual passions to Leviathan’s passions—or a relation of parts and whole, in which humanity as politics’ artificer and material must be understood this way? Where does this necessity come from?
3. The transition between Parts I and II: the concept of author seems to acquire different positions relative to person at the end of Part I and the beginning of Part II. At the end of Part I, the acts, responsibilities, and contents of person and author are clearly separated. Yet in Part II, when Hobbes argues that “the sovereign ought not be injured by subjects because subject and sovereign are the same person,” this difference is erased. Why?
4. Nor can we pretend not to notice that his description of Leviathan’s beginning is thoroughly self-positing. Leviathan’s birth requires a covenant, but without Leviathan already existing, the covenant cannot be guaranteed. Without Leviathan, everyone naturally enters the state of war, but only leaving that state permits Leviathan’s foundation. Hobbes certainly cannot have failed to notice this self-positing circle. Why proceed this way?
5. The final question concerns the ontological status of the state of war. In peace, sovereigns are at war with one another, but this is not everyone against everyone. In the state of war, everyone opposes everyone, yet confederation is possible. Historically, the state of war has never occurred universally, but war between separate families and tribes of savages approximates it. The state of war seemingly ought to precede Leviathan as the cause leading to it, but point 4 has already shown how problematic this is.
For me, any interpretation of Leviathan that cannot address these five questions comprehensively and coherently will not be convincing.
Moreover, my standard for good and bad philosophy has actually been completely reversed: previously, I thought only rigorous, precise philosophy was good philosophy. Now, on the contrary, I think that if a philosophy contains many mistakes and omissions, this may further indicate its author’s passionate will toward it—and perhaps that philosophy is better for it.
非中文段落由 AI 翻译,中文原文保持不变。中英混合原稿可通过“原文”按钮查看。
人在《利维坦》迷宫般的构造中很容易迷失自己。但只要记得霍布斯是在试图通过政治反思解决一个人的困境,换句话说,他并非仅仅出于闲散的好奇而写作,我们就找到了阿里阿德涅的线。
霍布斯试图解决的困境是什么?问题并非那广为传说的战争状态:它只是更深层困扰的表现。这一困扰在于人的自然:人是充满激情的存在者。霍布斯也不相信古代理性这剂药方:推理本身也不过是激情性诠释的一种表达。而另一方面,理性如果没有从某些激情中获得解救,自身也会偏离目标。
人努力获得幸福,却总是未能如愿。对这一努力最具破坏性的两种激情,是骄傲与心灵的沮丧。骄傲来自对自己所拥有力量的错误假定。但不仅如此。在谈论虚荣的段落中,霍布斯说,“即便他们知道自己没有那种力量,却仍然如此假定,他们依旧是虚荣的。”这里呈现的并不仅是他们不知道自己的真实力量,而是一种明知如此却依然坚持的假定。人明知自己缺乏那种力量,却仍然尝试:这是由于荣誉与权利意识。同样的道理也适用于心灵的沮丧:明知自己拥有力量,却仍然认为自己缺乏力量。这两种激情产生于一个人的权利意识与力量之间的不相称。当他把自己无条件的权利意识与有限的力量相结合时,他便虚荣;当他把自己的力量与全无权利的意识相结合时,他便沮丧。这两者是阻碍幸福追求的主要罪魁。
由于人是虚荣的,他们彼此争斗,认为自己都拥有平等的力量,去争取每个人都对之拥有无条件权利的东西。这就是战争状态。然后,他们调整自己的权利意识,说,有些东西我不能合理地宣称拥有,否则我就永远无法获得幸福。但即便在这一点上,他们也可能自欺:即便拥有力量,也不相信自己能够正当地抵抗有害的迫切情势。在这里,我们的自然理性在两端都失效了,欺骗了我们两次。首先,我们误以为仅凭自然就能获得幸福:但我们的自然并不合乎理性。然后,我们误以为仅凭一路推理,就像苏格拉底在《克力同》中所做的那样,就能获得幸福:但我们的理性并不自然。因此,我们需要从两端各自偏转,说,我们通过理性对抗自然,反之亦然。但在拥有某种自然理性之外的东西之前,这个偏转而来的中间位置就无法建立:为了调和自然与理性,我们需要找到缺失的环节。而这就是我们的人为造物。利维坦就是这样一个介于自然与理性之间、调和两者的人为中介。
为了对抗我们自然的无条件权利意识,它运用理性设计一条走出泥潭的道路。为了对抗那至高无上的、非自然的苏格拉底式理性,它又唤起自然权利的幽灵。为了保证自然与理性的这一和解成功而“幸福”,霍布斯作出种种安排和运筹,首先调和统治者与被统治者。他先解释,任由我们的自然激情不受约束地对抗这一人为造物,是多么不合理,因此把推理分配给民众,让他们以此约束自身的自然激情。但没有自然冲动的推理或审议是空洞的,因此他把意志分配给主权者,让主权者表达民众的自然意志。民众保有的推理帮助教导他们与主权者协调,却缺乏获得任何东西的生命冲动。这一冲动只内在于他们主权者的意志之中。但这一分配还需要进一步限定,因为,尽管分配给民众的理性有助于避免自然之为自然所造成的困境(不和),而意志有助于避免理性之为理性所造成的困扰(无力),个人与共同体之间仍需和解。个人善在于获得幸福。共同善则是和平。如果民众只有推理,他们可能无法获得幸福。因此,他们需要在这一人为造物的框架之内拥有自己的意志与自由,需要在城邦内部实现自己的生命冲动。而这只有通过普遍和平才能得到保障;当和平与幸福发生冲突时,就到了个体运用自然意志对抗理性的时候。但与此同时,和平意志也必须容纳自身针对个人幸福意志的推理过程:暴虐的意志将被推翻,因此这一意志需要自己的审慎。也就是说,面对城邦内部的人们,和平意志必须运用其推理、其良心的工作,来维持这一人为造物。
由此可见,作为中介的这一人造之人承受着多重限制:战争状态中的人和苏格拉底式的理性推论者,构成了自然与理性之间的第一重界限。第二对界限是就主权者而言的不公与不安全,前者是理性的缺失,后者是意志的缺失。第三对界限是就公民而言的不义与愚钝,前者是理性的缺失,后者是意志的缺失。权利规定了一个人感到自己有义务去意愿的东西。利维坦漂浮在这样的边界之中,并由此得以维持。
利维坦中的道德问题:
1. 道德问题在利维坦中获得了政治决定,也因此需要根据政治的范畴进行讨论。因此要讨论的是被分进两个对子的道德:自然-共和国,君主-臣民。
2. 首先,在自然状态里,道德是无法被讨论的。显然,每个人可以通过理性抵达对自然法「己所不欲,勿施于人」的认识,但自然法在自然状态中仅仅只是一个审慎的建议,而没有达到法的要求。这不仅仅是因为随时对自身安全的追求都会破坏自然”法”的实现,更是因为自身安全是自然权利,所以自然法本身在内容上就必须包括对自我的保存。
3. 只有在安全得到保障的情况下,对自然法的遵守才是有意义的。因为这个时候,所有人都放弃了自己决定自然法的适用范围和解读自然法的实际运用的权利,为了避免无休止的战争,并将裁夺的力量交给了主权者。当这个自然法获得了统一的解读和决定并成为了公法后,任何试图破坏或不遵守公法的行为才是不义的,因为首先,衡量正义与不义有了建立在主权者意志上的统一的标准,然后,有了主权者的力量可以保证安全与和平的自然权利的实现。只有在这两个条件下,讨论正义或不义才有意义,否则要么各人有各人自己的正义标准,要么在生命安全受到威胁时,正义与否都不再成为问题。
4. 由此可以得到,在共和国建立之后,正义才有意义。而臣民的正义就是不阻碍共和国的和平,而不阻碍的方式就是遵纪守法,服从君主的命令。但对君主是否有任何道德要求呢?首先,霍布斯明确指出,尽管君主是共和国中唯一保留了完整自然权利的个体,但有某些行为依然可以被判断为对和错。当然,一个问题是,这样的对和错有什么意义呢?在霍布斯那里,「天子犯法与庶民同罪」这个立场是荒谬的。君主本来就是定义正义者,是不可能有「罪」或能被「惩罚」的。既然不能被惩罚,那讨论这个行为正义不正义还有意义吗?这个对错的意义哪怕在臣民的层面上也是个疑问,既然当我“感觉”生命受到威胁时,我总是可以无限制反抗,那么讨论正义和不正义还有什么意义呢?既然我只要碰到惩罚就可以去用尽方式避免,那这种不愿接受惩罚的态度和实际反抗惩罚的行动能称为正义吗?
5. 首先解决臣民层面上的这个疑问。作为共和国的臣民,这意味着臣民接受了共和国的保护,也意味臣民接受了主权者的统治。如果不接受保护,就意味着臣民是主权者的敌人。接受惩罚和反抗惩罚因此都不是不正义,前者表示自己依然遵从主权者的正义,后者表示不再接受主权者的正义。那在这里不正义是什么呢?不正义与惩罚的接受与否无关,而仅仅与是否遵守法律有关。在安全受到主权者保障的情况下,臣民理应遵守和平的要求,并维持这一唯一善好的秩序,任何对此进行破坏的行为都是不义的,也理当被主权者划定为有罪,并由主权者施以惩罚。但主权者理当施以惩罚并不意味着臣民理当接受惩罚,仅仅意味着臣民理当遵守法律。
6. 在主权者的层面上,主权者理当将自己对自然法的解读作为主权者公布出来,并运用暴力维持自己这一解读的正统性。因此霍布斯真正讨论的并非是主权者的解读内容上的对错,而是主权者作为主权者在传播解读方法上的对错。解读的内容完全取决于主权者的意志,但是主权者的意志本身要有一些决定。比如,主权者的意志不能自相矛盾。比如,主权者不能惩罚臣民在法未立时做出的相关行为,像在x还没被认定为罪时,A做了x,那A将不能被后来的法律惩罚。这是因为那时主权者的意志还没有被知晓,而在这个特定情境下,让自己的意志被知晓是主权者的责任。在主权者没有被知晓的情况下,臣民明显并未进入共和国的契约里,因此也没有什么正义和不正义的区分。如果A一定要因为x被惩罚,那就不是作为主权者合理运用法律,而仅仅是君主运用暴力的敌对行为罢了。君主有权使用任何暴力进行敌对行为,但很多情况下,这是“错”的,因为他没有正确扮演主权者这个角色。这个“错”在法律层面是没有后果的,而仅仅在上帝建立的道德层面有后果。可是仅仅是道德层面的后果对君主真的有足够的约束力吗?显然,在有些方面,这不是霍布斯在「利维坦」里要考虑的问题,比如君主对好名声的追求,君主的骄傲,君主对上帝的虔敬,以及一切对公正精神有益的激情。但是,有一点是确定的,一旦君主无力扮演主权者的角色,主权者的力量就会衰退。尽管任何被主权者惩罚的人都可能认为主权者不公正,但真正的不公是在旁观者角度可以被确定的;因此,在君主不公正地审判并惩罚了A之后,其它旁观的臣民也就意识到了主权者的失职。对主权者的失职,臣民显然没有正当理由去主动反对,但是无论是因此产生的消极的对抗,或是因为主权者的敌意而切实发生了的叛乱以及对叛乱者的同情,还是对主权者的不信任,还是因为对某方的偏向导致某方逐渐成长起来的力量,都会导致主权者力量的消减。而一旦主权者的力量被削弱到无法保护臣民的地步,他就丧失了主权者的资格。这一危险要求主权者保证基本的公义。
7. 简而言之,「利维坦」中的道德只在共和国内发生。对臣民来说,正义意味着不主动破坏和平以及持久和平的机制,任何相反的举动都是不正义,其后果就是会被主权者以及给主权者提供力量并被主权者代表的其它臣民惩罚;但是在接受惩罚的这一阶段,正义就不再作为问题,因此霍布斯不接受所谓的「苏格拉底问题」。正义仅仅意味着「犯法会导致来自主权者的制裁」,不代表一定要接受制裁。而主权者的公正则仅仅来自于他扮演主权者这一角色的成效。如果他扮演失败,这也损害了和平的机制,尽管这一损害并不是直接的冲突。因为主权者保有完整的自然权利,他做任何事都不会与共和国直接冲突,哪怕这些事做出来是不利于扮演主权者这一角色的。但是损害依然会发生,直到他的力量被自己的不公消磨殆尽,而不再具有主权者的效力。
对利维坦的批评绝对不能仅仅停留在一种道德情操上,尽管这种批评或许是高尚且有效的,但并不能持续,也不能进入一种理论对话。
几个比较基础广泛的道德情操上的厌弃如果真正进入霍布斯的论证就会发现其实要么是误解,要么是无力的,因为霍布斯的论证恰恰是不违背他设定的道德(法义)的。因此必须要求一种完全不同的前设,否则利维坦就将是唯一可以选择的道路。
霍布斯的前设有这么几个:1.一个行动是道德的,当且仅当它跟从于个人的意志的时候;2.因为个人的意志要求个人的生命的保存,因此一个行动是道德的,当且仅当它不损害个人生命的时候。
从这两个前设出发,最根本的自然法(这里暂且不引入上帝的担保)就是:在保存自己生命的情况下,完成自己的意志。一个行动只有符合这两个标准,才能称作道德行动。
把这一点澄清了,很多利维坦的问题都可以迎刃而解。
比如,首先,利维坦之所以有这么大权利(right)和权力(might)并且总是正义的,是因为利维坦不仅代表了一个公民的意志,而且在最开始的时候就是其意志的造物,“我授权给利维坦,此后它的行动就是我的行动”,而反悔就是意志的自我矛盾,因此是不公义的。
再比如,关于为什么利维坦有权利除掉我,而我也有权利反抗,则类似于,在安全得到保证的情况下,我的意志可以做任何事,包括清除隐患,而在我意志的代表那里,它所做的不过是替“我”清除隐患罢了,但当安全不再有保障,我就不能再如此授权,而必须反抗。而为什么利维坦的法律永远是需要执行的,因为你只是在服从你自己的意志。
至于为什么我不能直接继续自己做自己所意志的,而需要一个代表来替我意志,则是因为如果每个人都同样意志,而不愿放弃无条件的权利,那人将永远处于战争状态,但这并不是利维坦诞生的直接契机;对和平的渴望只能使人暂时放弃无条件的意志。但是当他们不仅暂时放弃无条件的意志,还将自己的力量“借”给利维坦的时候,利维坦才真正无中生有了。
因此,利维坦的诞生可以做如下描述:战争状态下的某一个瞬间,人们暂时建立了和平的契约;但同时,他们说,我们需要一个有绝对力量的裁判去阻止人们违反契约,因为如果没有绝对力量,任何有一定力量的人都会想要当这个裁判,那我们又会陷入战争状态;因此,这个裁判的力量必须是绝对的。所以,我们都得将这个力量交给某一个(群)人。尽管这个人可能最开始有自己的野心,但当他已经拥有了绝对的力量的时候,他还需要去对我们这些没有竞争威胁的人做什么呢?他需要故意去伤害我们吗?如果他伤害我们,那肯定是为了让我们更强大且富有,因为作为他的所有物,我们是他力量和财富的直接体现。你说他可能不够聪明,没有办法想到治理的最好方式:但这不代表你能代替他治理。如果你有更好的主意,你只能对他建言。但你要知道,人和人的差距没有那么大,并且,真正具有危害性的是对权威的损害:如果所有人都认为自己比主权者更擅长治理,并挑战主权者的权威,那内乱将是更严重的后果。我们建立利维坦恰恰是为了杜绝这件事的发生,因此利维坦将必须确保自己拥有绝对的力量。这甚至可以说是主权者的最大责任。至于主权者根本不治理?那如果他不主动退位,说明“无为”就是他的治理方式,你同样不能挑战他的权威。在这种情况下,利维坦的意志就是法律,哪怕它违反了任何自然法的条款。
但是如果说霍布斯是彻底的绝对主义者也是有失偏颇的。因为这套哲学明白地展示给主权者看了如下两个事实:1.如果你危害到了个人的生命,个人必然会反抗,因为这种反抗是全然道德的,也就意味着,这种反抗是遵循着利维坦建立的内在原则且不可避免的,你不可能诉诸任何理性去解决这个矛盾;2.而当足够多的人因你造成的危害而正当地反抗的时候,你的力量就会因此削弱;3.当你的力量被削弱到一定程度,你的力量就不再是绝对的,而你也就失去了作为利维坦的权利,这一时刻就是战争状态的复归。因此,任何有基本审慎的主权者都不可能做出极端的举动。因此霍布斯只是威权主义,而不是绝对主义。
最后一个问题则是,在霍布斯的政治架构当中,讨论“道德”真的有意义吗?如果我们把道德理解为一种内心的良知秩序,那霍布斯会认为这是没有直接意义的。对于霍布斯来说,他在意的是道德与力量的关系,而非某种超脱于现实力量的道德。这对于他来说仅有上帝可以裁夺。但是道德显示了一种必然性:即,因为这样做是对的,所以人可以这样做,而这个可能性就是他感兴趣的动因。出于上述的两个道德原则,脱离战争状态的可能性被给出了,而这一可能性建立了利维坦。同样的,因为道德原则,主权者需要考虑叛乱的可能性,因此一种审慎的威权政治与自由和统治的解决方案才可以被提出。在这个意义上,霍布斯是关乎一种可能性的政治的哲学家,与柏拉图是同一路人。
所以其实“道德地”或者“有权利地”可以被视作一种“能”:遭遇利维坦的压迫,人可能不反抗,但重要的是人能反抗,而且不仅能反抗,仔细思考还会意识到自己在良知的敦促下应该反抗;同样,人可能不真地去遵从法律,但重要的是人能遵从法律,而且良知会敦促他去遵从法律,而那些试图用理性说明人其实不应该遵从法律的人才是犯了自相矛盾的谬误。
任何一种对霍布斯的严肃解读都不应该回避下面几个问题:1.序言的地位,尤其是当序言似乎使用了一种隐喻的手法,而隐喻对霍布斯来说却是对科学的背离的时候。
2.第一卷前几章与后几章的联系:在何种意义上对人作为一种存在本身的讨论必然奠基一种政治哲学?与序言联系起来,这是一种直接的模仿关系,即个人的理性对应于利维坦的理性,个人的激情对应利维坦的激情;还是一种部分与整体的关系,即人作为政治的匠人与质料必须被如此理解?这种必要性来自哪里?
3.第一卷与第二卷的衔接关系:似乎author这个概念在第一卷的末尾与在第二卷的开篇相对于person获得了不同的位置。第一卷的末尾,person与author的行动、责任与内容都是截然分开的,但在第二卷当霍布斯论证道“主权者不应被附属侵害因为附属和主权者同是一人”时,这一个差异被抹掉了。为什么?
4.我们也不能假装没看到他对利维坦的开端的描述是彻底地自身设定的。利维坦的诞生需要契约,但如果先没有利维坦契约就无法保障;没有利维坦一切人会自然地进入战争状态,但脱离战争状态才可以使利维坦奠基;这个自我设定的循环霍布斯肯定不会注意不到。为什么这么做?
5.最后的一个问题就是战争状态的存在论地位。在和平状态下,主权者之间处于战争,但这不是一切人反对一切人;在战争状态下,一切人反对一切人,但结盟(confederation)却又是可能的。历史上从来没有总体地出现过战争状态,但蛮人的各个家庭部族之间的战争近似于这种状态。战争状态似乎应该是先于利维坦的导致利维坦的原因,但从4.我们已经知道这问题很大。
对于我来说,任何一个对「利维坦」的解读如果不能全面融贯地处理这五个问题,那就不会使我信服。
另外,其实现在我对好哲学与坏哲学的标准已经被彻底地颠倒了:过去我觉得只有严密、准确的哲学是好的哲学,但我现在反而觉得,如果一种哲学有很多错漏,那或许更说明提出这种哲学的人对它充满激情的意志,那可能这种哲学反而是更好的哲学。