David Hume · 大卫·休谟
A Treatise of Human Nature · 人性论
Undated 未注日期
人性论——读书笔记
Reflections · Pages
休谟相对于霍布斯更丰富深化了对自然状态的描述。如果人仅仅只有自私的激情,那无论如何都不可能停止自然状态的无限战争,也不可能“正确”运用理性,因为印象主导着理性的内容,而激情是一种强烈的印象。正是因为人有着自私和包容两种激情,才能在家庭这样的有限社会单位中不断经验社会关系带来的好处,而因为同情,才可以将心比心,从而相信对方与自己一样意识到社会化的好处;并在不断加强这样的联系后,社会契约才正式成型,「正义」作为道德情感之一才得以奠基。这里有意思的几个点是,一,休谟的「共情」并不只是同甘共苦,活性达到一定程度就会变成将心比心,也就是不仅感受对方的痛苦,还感受到与痛苦伴随的其它观念或印象,比如恐惧、希望等等;二,休谟这里的激情和理性是平行对应关系,只有激情可以对抗激情,传统认为的对抗激情的理性不过只是另一种与理性之运用相似的激情的模式罢了,每一种激情都伴随着自己的理性内容,而有一种激情更加柔和舒缓,也更平常,其理性内容也就最自然;三,「同情」是因为与「我」相关联的观念都有着更高的活性,这样的观念被对他人当前状态的印象激发后,从对他人的印象转化为我自己所拥有的激情;四,理性分析只能观测各个观念之间的关系,但这样的关系并不具备道德内涵(内涵不能只是「责任感」,而要说清楚是什么责任感,以及这种责任是哪里来的),而同时,道德必须跨越内在和外在,因为纯粹内在的道德是不以世界为对象且完全不存在的,没有行动的,而纯粹外在又是不可能的,因为并找不到任何事物的道德因素,因此,道德必须是作为对外在印象反应的行为之动机,像「正义」就是「自私/包容的激情面对物资匮乏逐渐达成的社会感」。
休谟论同一性:
1. 休谟论证最开始的进路是通过因果性来进行的。我看见风扇在吹,当我移开眼,我依然感觉到风,因此我断言风扇还保持在原处运作着,因为我通过惯习总结出在这类情况下还吹的风肯定来自于风扇。但这个论证的问题是,这只意味着「有风扇」,却不代表现在吹着我的风扇和之前我看见的风扇是同一个。因此通过因果性建立同一性的尝试是失败的。
2. 同一性来自于想象力通过相似性建立联系的顺遂。因为心灵在通过几个极度相似且被多次重复后联系被加强为「惯习」的感知时几乎受不到任何阻力,也感受不到区别,仿佛不是在经过几个不同的感知,而是只进入了同一个感知似的,这让它将一个特殊的感知视作全体感知集合的代表,而那「相似观念连接的自然感与顺遂感」就成为了「同一性」这一观念的对应印象,其内容不过是「仿佛是只有一个对象一样」;类比于「因果」的观念所对应的印象无非是「经验惯习所连接的观念联系式自然与顺遂的感觉」,「符号」的观念所对应的印象是「惯习通过语音相关联的观念连接的自然与顺遂感」。
3. 由于几个感知通过相似性产生了过于紧密的联系,当其中缺失了一部分时,产生的「顺遂感」依然足够让我们联系到「同一性」,但缺失的部分也不能被完全忽视。因此为了化解这一矛盾(矛盾感是一种印象,是直接被给予的,而不是一个单纯理性的操作),心灵首先通过想象自动补上了缺失的部分,这样心灵就可以维持那种「顺遂感」带来的「同一性」。然后,「同一性」被制造出来,接下来就是在场与不在场的问题了。既然有很多观念都从我整个心灵的观念的自然集合里分离出来了,那这些观念只是不在「我」这个集合里面,但依然存在着;这一部分缺失的感知只是从印象的整体里被抽掉了。而当我重新看到风扇时,这并不是一个新的风扇,而不过是之前的观念被重新放置回我观念的总集合里面。想象力因此在这里起到了搬运工的作用,将一个观念集合从整体这个集合里搬出去再搬回来,就是为了保证其整体性。而这一「同一性」集合被联系起来后,又在当下印象的活性影响下被不断地因为相似性的通路而传递,直到最后成为「惯习」。
4. 「整体-部分」的区分也是来自于此:心灵运动的顺遂带来了同一性,但首尾两端的感知之间的差异又带来了区分,为了化解这一矛盾,心灵制造了「整体」和「部分」的区分,并把连接起来的集合视作「一个」整体,而其它的集合成员被视作部分。
5. 印象的活性最终传递到了这个「整体」的观念上,并让它看起来有了内容和客观性。这就是这一观念的力量来源。
当然这里的「整体」其实只是「符号」的意思。
还有需要澄清的是,应该是相似性带来的「顺遂感」和「一个」感知的顺遂感太相似,所以相似的感知才被当成了「一个个体」被把握;「一个」的观念总是被联系向相似的感知集合,因此印象的活性也就流入了「一个」这个观念,使「同一性」成为了一个客观观念。
而语言符号所带来的特殊观念旁边就像是暗暗地簇拥着一整个观念群落,就像光圈一样;而这个群落仿佛被把握成「一」,但这只是错觉,实际上还不过是群落,只不过没有清晰地显示出自己罢了;但这种暧昧带来的不是不确定性,因为每个观念自己都是绝对确定的,而不过是没完全显示出来罢了。换句话说,休谟根本不相信「抽象」这回事儿。
休谟论因果关系:
1. 休谟真正认为重要的本体论区域一共只有两个,一,具有更高活性且不易变更的印象层面,二,低活性且容易变更的想象层面。
2. 想象的区域是印象区域的投射。从想象的区域,我们可以得到这样的印象,也就是,有些观念之间的关系是无法变更的、直接的。不能变更的关系如相似性、比例等,可以变更的关系如时空、因果关系等。在想象的区域可以通过「比较/哲学态度」完成这样的印象的获取,因为「哲学态度」就是将观念从印象带来的整体秩序中分解出来,将它们打散了放置到一起,再观察彼此的关系。但是在进行「哲学反思」之前,想象的区域还给出了一个直接的印象,也就是,每个观念都被按照原印象所给予的秩序被组织起来。观念与观念间通过相似性、时空性、因果性等自然排布。这就是「自然态度」。
3. 任何观念都必须有其对应的印象。观念自己无法生成观念,而只能通过产生印象的方式二次生成观念。这是因为任何一个观念都有其与其它观念之间的相似关系或比例关系,也就是说,观念作为观念,必然要具有一定客观性和活性,也就一定要有其对应的印象。
4. 因此,「因果」或「必然性」这个观念也必须要求一个对应的印象。时空关系的印象直接在经验直观中就给出了。「因果」的特殊性在于,它在经验直观中是隐藏的。由此,「因果」的观念所要对应的印象不能在纯粹经验中获取。
5. 对「因果」的印象因此只能在想象区域里找到。这个印象只能在观念和观念的联系中被获取。但如果我们仅仅用「哲学态度」去探查每一个观念和每一个观念的因果联系,我们只能知道「因果」是完全随机的,没有一个稳定的相似印象的集合能让我们获得「因果」的观念集合。与「时空」不同,「时空」的印象直接来自于经验,但「因果」却不是。
6. 休谟接下来观察到,「因果」不是简单的观念和观念之间的关系,而是观念群落和观念群落之间的关系群落。只有被多次重复过的观念对子之间才能有「因果」关系。可是光是多次重复本身,如果仅仅放置在「哲学态度」下,并不会带来任何不同的印象。因为在哲学反思下,与A相似的观念总是在经验印象中与与B相似的观念同时出现是一个无意义的事实,因为这一事实总是可以变更,其事实性总是可以被消解。
7. 但是在「哲学态度」的映照下,「自然态度」获得了澄清。我们看到观念A的群落「自然地」与观念B的群落有力地联系在一起。而我们的「哲学态度」需要更多的力量才能将两者分开。这一自然态度对哲学反思的阻力正是「因果」印象的原初形态。这一种阻力就是「惯习」,也就是心灵在不断接收印象的同时,其观念联系的通路也在同时被加强,直到这一阻力突破了界限,达到了带来深刻印象的程度。因此,「因果」横跨印象与想象两个区域,是「在想象区域阻滞了哲学反思的自然联系」,既不像直接在外在经验中被给出的时空关系,也不是完全脱离外在经验的哲学反思,而是心灵的经验。
8. 休谟的哲学体系很可能会有自反问题,比如,印象-想象的划分本身就是一个因果关系的划分,但这可以直接从经验所感受到的活性来解决,也就是,我确实觉得我认为被重复多次了的观念其活性变强了。或者,自然态度或者哲学态度本身似乎都要求一个「这样去做」的意志,但意志是一个不清晰的「力量」,因此根据休谟的标准,意志不应该是原因,且我们所拥有的只不过是每个心理状态的接续,但如果这样,就谈不上什么「变更」「阻力」了,或者,「认识到因和果」本身作为一个心理现象也预设了自身的因,而假如我们说因果是来自于心灵对两个观念的重复,那么「因果认识」的因就是「对惯习的印象」,但根据休谟的逻辑,我们之所以能确定这点,也无非是因为这两个认识总是一起出现罢了;正因为这两个现象总是同时出现,休谟才说A导致了B,可这已经预设了一个「对『惯习的印象』的惯习的印象」了。这里的解决方法似乎可以是进行层次的划分,即我开始的时候只因为惯习认为A导致B,但后来我意识到这个「因为惯习」本身也是因为惯习。经验允许并包括了这样的无限层次的综合,并通过经验的直接性消解其复杂性。
9. 休谟的哲学要达成的是对培根的经验主义的先验奠基。也就是说,经验先验地占据优先地位。尽管这一「先验经验主义」同样允许一种别的描述,即,根据经验,经验应该需要占据优先地位。
当然,因为休谟并没有详细地分析「惯习」,「惯习」也可以被简单视作空能指,最后得到的就是普通的无限套娃,「A导致B是因为惯习是因为惯习是因为惯习……」
加上经验的有限性和情动的直接性,任何哲学态度都没有自然态度与接近自然态度的层次所带来的情动强,而这些才是真正决定行动的动机。
正是因为分出了不同的惯习的层次,才可以反驳「不可决断性」;我们习惯根据直觉判断(A是B)和次生判断(我可能出错)做决定,因此哪怕我们也有更多层次的惯习的判断(但我认为自己出错可能才是错的),它们要么单独来说活性没有直接经验所带来的印象和引起的感情强,比如一只老虎出现在面前所带来的情动和你对「自己的判断是不是错误」的判断再套娃八次带来的情动是完全不一样的;要么它们在有限的经验中被重复得不够多,毕竟我们不是所有人每时每刻都要清晰地过一遍每个层次的判断才做决定的,也就没有产生强大的惯习。
休谟哲学的基本框架:
1. 「感知印象」与「知性观念」之间的关系不是一个「普遍-特殊」的双边收束的关系,就是说,感觉质料并不是普遍理念在有限理智中的重叠与模糊化,而是平行镜像。在每个平行的平面里,有聚合物和简单物,聚合印象-简单印象,聚合观念-简单观念。类比莱布尼茨和斯宾诺莎对身-心问题的不同处理。
2. 「感知印象」与「知性观念」之间的差别在于「活性」或「强度」,而不在于任何其它方面。但「活性」不仅差别开「印象」与「观念」,还差别开了「记忆」和「想象」。「强度」保持了每一个观念聚合的秩序。「记忆」作为一个官能在聚合中保持事情发生的顺序和关系,而想象则可以聚合任意不同的观念。但哪怕在想象中,观念之间依然保持某种关系。
3. 大多数情况下,印象生成观念,但观念可以生成新的观念,甚至可以生成新的印象。比如战争的观念引发恐惧的印象。但这不变更印象和观念之间的差异。
4. 「本体」和「模态」之间的差异在于,本体是几个观念之间的有机统一,它们彼此之间的联系更紧密,更难被分开,同时这一微观的聚合是更大聚合的中心。其余的观念的组织都是围绕这一中心建立起来的。因此任何新的观念一旦被发现为处于这一整体中,这一添加是自然服从于这一中心的,因此不改变其内容。但如果聚合仅仅有松散的形式,那任何新内容的添加都会本质性地改变整个集合。
5. 语言起着引渡的功能。语言是一种特殊的观念/印象集合,它与其它事物的联系来自于传统。一个个体被牵引入代表它的语词/声响的集合,并通过这一集合被引渡到相应的其它观念中去。任何观念都是绝对个体化的。符号表征或者“抽象观念”的可能性就来自于这样的引渡过程,而不是共相与殊相的垂直联系。
6. 存在不是谓词,因为任何步骤都无法从存在者身上还原或剥离出存在本身。但其它的任意观念都可以进行一种剥离,尤其是通过将同一个观念放置在两个不同的集合中,通过这一观念与其它观念的关系的不同可以得到两个看似不同的观念,虽然实际上只是所处集合的不同罢了。比如“白球”与“白砖”放置在一起,其关系就显示为“白”的观念,尽管“白”仅仅只是一个描述这种引渡的集合关系的符号罢了。
「关系」自己不能是观念的,像说「相似」其实指的就是可以允许如此引渡的观念集合。
7. 确定科学的步骤如数学推导实际上只是同样的相似性引渡罢了。比如,平行线内部切线的两个角相加得180°,指的是这个命题里所包含的诸个观念集合中的观念,如每一对平行线,都包含着相似的关系。而经验科学所被奠基的唯一关系则是因果关系,因为无论是时空关系还是同一关系都是在经验中直接给出了,任何对这两个关系的怀疑和解释都只能来自于对因果关系的确定。
8. 不同的观念集合之间的关系不同,所建立的回路也就不同。假如一个观念A和另一个观念B之间是相似的关系,那当我有一个印象A*,我通过观念A会回想起相似的观念B。印象A*在活的当下重新激活了观念A,而观念A则传导了这一活性向观念B。同样的,假如印象A*与观念B空间或时间上接近,那A*会激活周边的观念B,直到新的印象C产生,而这一新的印象C可能会相似于B。对因果关系的处理则更加困难,因为因果关系不仅仅是将一个印象A*与过去所经历的观念A通过相似关联起来,也不是激活与观念A有因果关系的观念B,而是要让观念B*被投射到A*并与A*保持相似的因果关系。这不是通过理性分析,因为A*会和B*有因果关系并不是必然发生的,甚至其发生的可能性本身就是一个对因果关系的预设了。这也不能通过「激活」来解释,因为只有观念A和观念B被激活,但观念B*尚未被联系到印象A*上,更遑论被激活了。这里,休谟的解决方案是拿上面5.所说的语言的符号进程作为模板,印象A*被归纳于A「那一类」,直接引渡到因果关系沟通起来的B「那一类」。这一符号化进程休谟认为是一种惯习,其不需反思的特质似乎默认了一种「重复强化」的机制,即,某个观念回路重复越多,其组成部分联系就越紧密,而这个回路也就越自然;这一自然性只影响观念的联系,而不影响观念本身清晰与否,因此不能被「激活」解释。当然,通过不断的重复,这一观念聚集本身不断地被激活,因此具有相当高的清晰度和活性;而自然的回路也保持了活性传递的通畅,也因此「推断」可以成为「信念」。
9. 「印象」本身似乎可以被化作一种「观念」,当休谟将「印象」视作「观念」的原因时。问题是印象本身可以是一种什么观念呢?休谟这点也没讲明白。
10. 活性的传递网络决定了哪些观念是可信的,哪些观念是不可信的,而可信在这个意义上就是可理解。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
Compared with Hobbes, Hume enriches and deepens the description of the state of nature. If people possessed only selfish passions, they could never end the state of nature’s unlimited warfare or use reason ‘correctly,’ because impressions govern the content of reason, and passion is an intense impression. Precisely because people have both selfish and generous passions, they can continually experience the benefits of social relations within limited social units such as the family. Sympathy allows them to put themselves in another’s place and believe that the other recognizes the benefits of socialization just as they do. Only after such connections are continually strengthened does the social contract formally take shape, grounding ‘justice’ as a moral sentiment. Several points are interesting here. First, Hume’s ‘empathy’ is not merely sharing joy and suffering: when its vivacity reaches a certain degree, it becomes putting oneself in another’s place. One feels not only the other’s pain but also other ideas or impressions accompanying that pain, such as fear and hope. Second, passion and reason stand in a parallel correspondence here. Only passion can oppose passion. What tradition regards as reason opposing passion is merely another pattern of passion resembling the exercise of reason. Each passion is accompanied by its own rational content, while one kind of passion is gentler, calmer, and more ordinary, and its rational content is therefore the most natural. Third, ‘sympathy’ occurs because ideas associated with ‘me’ have greater vivacity. When activated by impressions of another’s present condition, these ideas are transformed from impressions of the other into passions I myself possess. Fourth, rational analysis can observe only relations among ideas, and such relations contain no moral content. This content cannot merely be a ‘sense of duty’: one must explain what duty it is and where it comes from. Morality must also cross the internal and the external. A purely internal morality has no world as its object, does not act, and is entirely nonexistent; a purely external morality is impossible because no moral factor can be found in any thing. Morality must therefore be a motive of action responding to external impressions. ‘Justice,’ for example, is ‘the social sense gradually achieved by selfish/generous passions confronting material scarcity.’
Hume on identity:
1. Hume’s initial argumentative approach proceeds through causality. I see a fan blowing; when I look away, I still feel the wind. I therefore assert that the fan continues operating in the same place, because habit has led me to conclude that in such circumstances the continuing wind must come from the fan. The problem with this argument is that it means only ‘there is a fan,’ not that the fan now blowing on me is the same one I saw before. The attempt to establish identity through causality therefore fails.
2. Identity comes from the ease with which imagination establishes connections through resemblance. When the mind passes through several extremely similar perceptions whose connections have been strengthened into ‘habit’ by repeated occurrence, it encounters almost no resistance and feels no difference, as though it were entering a single perception rather than passing through several distinct ones. This leads it to treat one particular perception as representative of the entire collection. The ‘feeling of naturalness and ease in the connection of resembling ideas’ becomes the impression corresponding to the idea of identity, whose content is merely ‘as though there were only one object.’ By analogy, the impression corresponding to causality is simply ‘the natural and easy feeling of associated ideas connected by experiential habit’; the impression corresponding to the idea of a sign is ‘the natural and easy feeling of connections among ideas habitually associated through vocal sounds.’
3. Because several perceptions have become too closely connected through resemblance, when a part is missing, the feeling of ease remains sufficient to suggest identity. Yet the missing part cannot be entirely ignored. To resolve this contradiction—the feeling of contradiction is an impression, directly given, not merely a rational operation—the mind first automatically supplies the missing part through imagination, thereby preserving the identity brought by that feeling of ease. Once identity is produced, the next problem is presence and absence. Since many ideas have separated from the natural collection of ideas comprising my entire mind, they are merely absent from the collection called ‘me’ but still exist. This missing portion of perception has simply been removed from the whole of impressions. When I see the fan again, it is not a new fan: the previous idea has merely been placed back into the total collection of my ideas. Imagination thus acts as a mover, carrying a collection of ideas out of the collection constituting the whole and back again, precisely to preserve its wholeness. Once this collection of ‘identity’ is connected, the vivacity of present impressions continues to be transmitted through paths of resemblance until it finally becomes habit.
4. The distinction between whole and part also comes from this. The ease of the mind’s movement brings identity, yet the difference between perceptions at the two ends brings distinction. To resolve this contradiction, the mind produces the distinction between whole and part, treating the connected collection as ‘one’ whole and its other members as parts.
5. The vivacity of impressions is finally transmitted to the idea of this whole, making it appear to have content and objectivity. This is the source of the idea’s force.
Of course, ‘whole’ here really means only ‘sign.’
Another clarification is needed. It should be that the feeling of ease brought by resemblance is too similar to the ease of ‘one’ perception, so resembling perceptions are grasped as ‘one individual.’ The idea of ‘one’ is always associated with a collection of resembling perceptions. The vivacity of impressions therefore flows into the idea of ‘one,’ making identity an objective idea.
The particular idea brought by a linguistic sign is as though secretly surrounded by an entire community of ideas, like a halo. This community appears to be grasped as ‘one,’ but this is an illusion: it remains a community, merely one that has not clearly exhibited itself. The ambiguity does not bring indeterminacy, however, because each idea is absolutely determinate in itself and is merely not fully exhibited. In other words, Hume fundamentally does not believe in ‘abstraction.’
Hume on causality:
1. There are only two ontological regions Hume regards as truly important: the level of impressions, with greater vivacity and less susceptibility to change, and the level of imagination, with lower vivacity and greater susceptibility to change.
2. The region of imagination is a projection of the region of impressions. From imagination we can obtain the impression that certain relations among ideas are unalterable and immediate. Unalterable relations include resemblance and proportion; alterable relations include spatiotemporal and causal relations. Within imagination, such impressions can be acquired through a ‘comparative/philosophical attitude,’ because the philosophical attitude decomposes ideas out of the overall order brought by impressions, disperses them and places them together, then observes their relations. Before philosophical reflection, however, imagination also gives an immediate impression: every idea is organized according to the order given by its original impressions. Ideas are naturally arranged through resemblance, spatiotemporality, causality, and so on. This is the ‘natural attitude.’
3. Every idea must have its corresponding impression. Ideas cannot generate ideas by themselves; they can generate further ideas only by producing impressions. This is because every idea stands in relations of resemblance or proportion to other ideas. As an idea, it must therefore possess a certain objectivity and vivacity, and must have its corresponding impression.
4. The idea of causality or necessity must therefore also require a corresponding impression. Impressions of spatiotemporal relations are directly given in empirical intuition. Causality is distinctive because it is hidden in empirical intuition. The impression corresponding to the idea of causality therefore cannot be obtained from pure experience.
5. The impression of causality can consequently be found only in imagination, through connections among ideas. Yet if we merely examine the causal connections between individual ideas in the philosophical attitude, we can know only that causality is entirely random. No stable collection of resembling impressions enables us to obtain the collection of ideas called causality. Unlike causality, impressions of space and time come directly from experience.
6. Hume next observes that causality is not a simple relation between ideas, but a community of relations between communities of ideas. Only repeatedly occurring pairs of ideas can have a causal relation. Yet repetition alone, considered only in the philosophical attitude, brings no different impression. Under philosophical reflection, the fact that ideas resembling A always appear together in empirical impressions with ideas resembling B is meaningless, because this fact can always be altered and its factuality dissolved.
7. In contrast with the philosophical attitude, however, the natural attitude becomes clear. We see the community of idea A ‘naturally’ and powerfully connected with that of idea B. Our philosophical attitude needs greater force to separate them. This resistance of the natural attitude to philosophical reflection is precisely the originary form of the impression of causality. Such resistance is habit: as the mind continually receives impressions, the pathways connecting its ideas are simultaneously strengthened until this resistance crosses a threshold and becomes strong enough to make a deep impression. Causality thus spans impressions and imagination. It is ‘a natural connection within imagination that impedes philosophical reflection.’ It is neither like spatiotemporal relations directly given in external experience, nor philosophical reflection wholly detached from external experience, but an experience of the mind.
8. Hume’s philosophical system may well have problems of self-reference. The division between impression and imagination, for example, is itself a causal division. This can be resolved directly through the vivacity felt in experience: I do indeed feel that ideas I believe have been repeated many times acquire greater vivacity. Or both the natural and philosophical attitudes seem to require a will to ‘do this.’ Yet will is an unclear ‘force’ and should therefore not count as a cause by Hume’s standards. All we possess would be the succession of psychic states, but then there could be no talk of ‘alteration’ or ‘resistance.’ Or again, ‘recognizing cause and effect,’ itself a psychic phenomenon, presupposes its own cause. If we say that causality comes from the mind’s repetition of two ideas, the cause of causal knowledge is the impression of habit. Yet by Hume’s logic, our certainty of this merely comes from the fact that these two cognitions always appear together. Precisely because these phenomena always appear together, Hume says A causes B; but this already presupposes an ‘impression of the habit of the impression of habit.’ A possible solution seems to be to distinguish levels: initially I believe A causes B only because of habit, but later I recognize that this ‘because of habit’ is itself because of habit. Experience allows and includes such a synthesis of infinite levels and dissolves its complexity through its immediacy.
9. Hume’s philosophy aims to provide a transcendental grounding of Baconian empiricism. Experience, that is, occupies a transcendental priority. Yet this ‘transcendental empiricism’ also allows another description: according to experience, experience should occupy priority.
Of course, because Hume does not analyze habit in detail, habit can also be treated simply as an empty signifier, leaving only ordinary infinite nesting: ‘A causes B because of habit because of habit because of habit…’
Given the finitude of experience and the immediacy of affect, no philosophical attitude generates affects as strong as those of the natural attitude and the levels close to it. These are the motives that truly determine action.
It is precisely by distinguishing levels of habit that we can refute ‘undecidability.’ We habitually make decisions according to intuitive judgments—‘A is B’—and secondary judgments—‘I may be mistaken.’ Even if we possess further levels of habitual judgment—‘but perhaps thinking I am mistaken is itself the mistake’—either they individually lack the vivacity of impressions and emotions brought by direct experience, or they have not been repeated sufficiently within finite experience to produce a powerful habit. The affect brought by a tiger appearing before you differs entirely from the affect brought by nesting the judgment ‘is my judgment mistaken?’ another eight times. After all, not everyone explicitly runs through every level of judgment at every moment before deciding.
The basic framework of Hume’s philosophy:
1. The relation between perceptual impressions and intellectual ideas is not a relation of bilateral convergence between universal and particular. Sensory matter, that is, is not the overlap and blurring of universal Ideas in a finite intellect; the two are parallel mirrors. On each parallel plane there are complexes and simples: complex impressions–simple impressions, complex ideas–simple ideas. Compare Leibniz’s and Spinoza’s different treatments of the mind–body problem.
2. Perceptual impressions and intellectual ideas differ in vivacity or intensity, and in no other respect. Yet vivacity distinguishes not only impressions from ideas but also memory from imagination. Intensity preserves the order of every combination of ideas. Memory as a faculty preserves the sequence and relations of events within combinations, whereas imagination can combine any different ideas. Even in imagination, however, ideas retain certain relations.
3. In most cases impressions generate ideas, but ideas can generate new ideas and even new impressions. The idea of war, for example, evokes the impression of fear. This does not alter the difference between impressions and ideas.
4. Substance differs from mode in being an organic unity of several ideas, whose connections are closer and harder to separate. This microscopic combination is also the center of a larger combination, with the remaining ideas organized around it. Whenever a new idea is discovered to belong to this whole, its addition naturally submits to this center and does not alter its content. If a combination has only a loose form, however, adding any new content essentially changes the entire collection.
5. Language performs a function of transfer. Language is a special collection of ideas/impressions whose connections with other things come from tradition. An individual is drawn into the collection of words/sounds representing it and transferred through this collection to corresponding other ideas. Every idea is absolutely individuated. The possibility of symbolic representation or ‘abstract ideas’ comes from this process of transfer, not from a vertical relation between universal and particular.
6. Existence is not a predicate, because no procedure can reduce or detach existence itself from beings. Any other idea, however, can undergo a kind of detachment, especially by placing the same idea within two different collections. Differences in its relations to other ideas can yield two apparently different ideas, although in fact only the collections differ. For example, placing a ‘white ball’ beside a ‘white brick’ exhibits their relation as the idea of ‘white,’ although ‘white’ is merely a sign describing the relation of transfer between these collections.
A relation cannot itself be an idea. Saying ‘resemblance,’ for example, really refers to a collection of ideas that permits such transfer.
7. The procedures of certain sciences, such as mathematical deduction, are really the same transfer through resemblance. For example, saying that two interior angles made by a transversal between parallel lines add to 180° means that ideas in the collections contained in this proposition, such as each pair of parallel lines, contain resembling relations. The only relation grounding empirical science, however, is causality, because both spatiotemporal relations and relations of identity are directly given in experience. Any doubt or explanation concerning those two relations can come only from certainty about causality.
8. Different relations among collections of ideas establish different circuits. If idea A resembles idea B, then when I have impression A*, I recall the resembling idea B through idea A. Impression A* reactivates idea A in the living present, and A transmits this vivacity to B. Likewise, if impression A* is close to idea B in space or time, A* activates the neighboring idea B until a new impression C arises, and C may resemble B. Causality is harder to address. It does not merely associate impression A* through resemblance with the previously experienced idea A, nor activate idea B causally related to A. Rather, idea B* must be projected onto A* and stand in a similar causal relation to A*. This does not occur through rational analysis, because a causal relation between A* and B* is not necessary; even its possibility already presupposes causality. Nor can ‘activation’ explain it: only ideas A and B are activated, while B* has not yet been connected to impression A*, let alone activated. Hume’s solution here uses the symbolic process of language described in 5 as its model. Impression A* is subsumed under ‘the kind’ A and directly transferred to ‘the kind’ B connected with it through causality. Hume regards this symbolizing process as a habit. Its unreflective character seems to presuppose a mechanism of reinforcement through repetition: the more an ideational circuit is repeated, the closer the connections among its components and the more natural the circuit. This naturalness affects only the connections among ideas, not the clarity of ideas themselves, and therefore cannot be explained by activation. Through constant repetition, of course, the collection of ideas itself is repeatedly activated and thus acquires considerable clarity and vivacity. The natural circuit also preserves the unobstructed transmission of vivacity, allowing ‘inference’ to become ‘belief.’
9. Impression itself seems capable of becoming a kind of idea when Hume treats impressions as the causes of ideas. The question is: what kind of idea can an impression itself be? Hume does not make this clear either.
10. The network transmitting vivacity determines which ideas are credible and which are not. Credibility in this sense is intelligibility.