Edmund Husserl · 埃德蒙德·胡塞尔
Cartesian Meditations · 笛卡尔式的沉思
2024年重读留记
Douban · Bidasari
Source revised / 来源修订: 3 July 2026
胡赛尔第一沉思:
1. 笛卡尔的失败在于他虽然达到了「先验我思」,却没有注意「先验」与「经验」之间的本体论差异。这最大的问题其实就是笛卡尔将一切真理念理解为「清楚明白的(clear and distinct)」,而「我思」具有这样的性质,因此一定为真。胡赛尔这里继承了后笛卡尔哲学对笛卡尔的批评:除了「清晰(clarity)」和「明白(distinctiveness)」以外,还有一个「恰切(adequacy)」。先验我思的确是清楚的,但它不是恰切的,因为它不完整,所以必然内在地包含了对自身的超越性。
2. 这一个区分也是胡赛尔的「现象学还原(epoché)」这一方法所要强调的:任何「清晰性(apodicticity/clarity)」都有其范围,科学的驱力是不断去完善(adequate)知识,直到属于「先验我思」的清晰性覆盖一切活动。而「现象学还原」之所以如此强调对「存在论断」的悬置,就是因为它要允许存在的有限性,或者说,存在与非存在的混合状态。因此,现象学不应该是对「真理」的设定,而是对「真理」之显现的构成的分析。先验主体本身就是这一真理的构成活动。因此,现象学并不是笛卡尔意义上的以几何数学为模型的推导性科学,而是对自由与构成可能性互相联系的先验科学。
胡赛尔第二沉思:
1. 由于「先验我思」的结构已经澄清,其是具有「清晰性」却不「完善」的永恒分裂的无限自我,「一-多综合」的问题从开始就摆到台面上了。「现象学还原」实际上就是对这一结构的澄清,也就是同一个自我是如何分裂并且进入「在」与「非在」的综合构成之活动中的;同一个自我同时可以进入自然态度和先验态度,或者说,先验态度所描述的正是那一个统摄了自然态度与其潜能的主体。而这一个主体就是对如是科学的奠基。这个并不是笛卡尔意义上的奠基,反而是康德或莱布尼茨意义上的奠基,也就是可能性与自由的无根性。
2. 这样的现象学将永远以对客观科学的批评的样式存在。在这个意义上,胡赛尔才表示,现象学心理学与先验现象学互为表里:前者描述一种「在」着的现象,而后者将前者「还原」为被构成的现象。就像费希特将教条主义和先验哲学视作表里,而后者是对前者的永恒批判一样。
3. 正是因为有这样的「分裂」,「被思者」的超越性才得以澄清。在现象学之外,「我思」和「被思者」之间的关系表现为一种直接性。只有通过现象学还原,「我思」才得以被重新刻画为分裂自我的综合活动,而「被思者」也得以作为构成活动的成就而被保留。「我思-思者-被思者(cogito-cogitation-cogitatum)」因此就是绝对内在的活性(我思)自我构成为有限活动(思者),而这一活动的超越性呈现为被动对象(被思者)。现象学科学就是对任何「思者」作为构成过程的分析,并在这一分析中分别刻画出其作为对象和主体的超越性和内在性,并将任何对象的超越性还原为绝对主体(我思)的内在构成(思者)的成就。换句话说,现象学作为科学,就是朝向绝对活性(太一)的驱力,而这一驱力通过对诸有限活性(大全)的分析成功激活让诸孤立对象(杂多)联系成诸个视域(一-多综合)。
胡赛尔第三沉思:
1. 这一沉思主要处理的问题是「真」与「明见性」在现象学系统中的地位。因为现象学还原达成了对「在」与「非在」的悬置,因此任何对象都在构成的角度上被理解。这就意味着「真」或「假」只能是构成的结果,而不能是构成的前提。作为结果,「真」就是符合意向性之规定的明见性互相完善交织所搭建的网络。
2. 明见性在这个意义上就是构成之实现,而非明见性则是构成之潜能。尽管明见性有多有少,但无论是否明见,任何意识活动都依然是先验主体的构成活动,而这一构成活动总是得以明见的,因为这构成活动始终处在活的当下。这也就意味现象学描述的可能性:现象学不仅可以描述现实性,同样也可以描述现实性的缺失,也就是对潜能与超越性的描述。这些超越性可以被不断激活实现,向无限的科学理念前进。「假」在这个意义上因此就是意向性的不完善(inadequacy),尽管「假」中定然已经包含了某种基本的明见性(clarity)。
准确一点说,「假」是对视域或潜能的压制或沉淀;现象学还原则重新激活了这些潜能作为潜能,并为这些潜能的实现(彻底激活)给予了通路。所以只有在这个意义上,现象学才是一种科学。
胡赛尔第四沉思:
1. 「我思」的系统性在现象学还原中被无限展开,这些视域的系统是先验论的,因为对我思的现象学分析是实在和潜能之间交互的结构分析。
2. 但是一个重要的问题是,「潜能」到底是一种什么样的可能性?尤其是,当主体生成性的自由与客体化理念之结构都表示「可能性」的时候?这里可以引入莱布尼茨。单子的潜能是与实在相映照的,而对任何单子的生成论分析实际上都是对潜能与实在之交互的分析,或者说,潜能如何是实在的驱力,而实在又是如何向潜能延伸。理念则是对具体实在与其潜能之关系的抽象和平面化,这种可能性因此不是生成的动机化的可能性,而是包含了所有可能性的纯粹普遍性;主体并不从某个实在前往某个潜在,而是将实在与潜在的结构把握为稳定的、理念化的。
3. 但是这个区分自然只会是抽象的。因为实际上,任何现象学分析都需要一定程度的抽象,因此理念化是必不可少的。理念化是现象学的根本形式,而诸具体活动则是现象学的根本内容。这里是两极的关系,单子并不是抽象的一,而是具体的全;理念则相反。因此现象学要处理四个方面:一和多(综合的问题),抽象和具体(理念的问题),先验和经验(还原的问题),潜能和实在(分析的问题)。
4. 只有在这个意义上,胡赛尔才得以区分事实上的先验主体和理念上的先验主体。先验主体的统一性来源于对先验综合的明见性:只有在潜能与实在的通路是连续的情况下,「我思」的这种统一性才得以保障。这也是笛卡尔或其它前先验理念论者的问题,因为他们没有意识到潜能与实在的连续性,所以他们无法讨论构成的问题,而没有构成,就没有明见性的传递,知识也就丧失了可能性。知识就是诸明见性在诸活动中的无限奠基(无限,因为在先验态度下,任何活动依然保留着潜能与自由;而先验态度下的必然性也只是动机或者法的必然性,而非因果决定的必然性,除非这一因果决定是在这一本体论区域内的基本事态并且对象仅在这一区域内作为实体而非先验主体的产物被考虑)。
5. 还有一点需要注意的是,现象学作为一种理念科学并不意味着它直接地就是形式本体论。形式本体论仅仅是讨论一个主体是如何构成概念之普遍性的,但这并不意味着这一构成之成就就是抽象的。恰恰相反,形式概念本身是先验主体具体的成就;而对这一成就再进行抽象只不过是让形式本体论获得科学性的主体自反的活动。在这个意义上,可以说现象学作为理念科学是对形式本体论的奠基,因为形式本体论需要作为先验主体的成就;但同时形式本体论给予了现象学的科学性和普遍性。在这个意义上,形式本体论与现象学作为理念科学是必须互相成就的,也就是理念化方法和先验论方法的互相成就。
胡赛尔第五沉思:
1. 第五沉思需要解决的问题是科学客观性的问题。简单来说,如果一切都是先验主体的成就,那这些成就如何可以脱离一边倒的主观性呢?这里尤其要注意的是,胡赛尔在第五沉思中所关注的这一「客观性」并非仅仅是相对于主体的对象的超越性或潜能,而是这一对象如何可以呈现给另一个与构造它的主体同等地位的差异主体。
2. 正是为此,胡赛尔首先抽象出了一个「属于我」的世界,也就是一个以「我」为中心构建出的视点的世界。在这个世界中,「我的身体」与「我」有着密切的交互与构造关系。而这一个展开的「我的有灵的身体进行构造的场域」在我与他人身体相遇时,无须反思或推断,就“直接地”以他人的身体为中心被唤起。同时,这一经验本质上属于他人,因为虽然经验来源于我,却被锚定在他人身体的「彼处」上。换句话说,当我看到一个人,我被唤起的是“如果我现在处于「彼处」,我能看到、触碰到……”的经验。这一经验在我的经验之内被表达,其表达的意义却是绝对地超出于「我」的中心的。
3. 由此,以「我」为源头被构造的「绝对他者」就成为了可能,而同时,这一「他者」的视线同样也构造出了我对我的身体的反思意识,也让我的身体与心理经验成为了客观科学的对象。这一建立于我的经验中的我与他者的差异平等就成为了「社群」或「文化」。「我」的自然作为奠基在文化中被构成为一个新的中心与他者差异开,但同时又与他者属于同一个社群,正如一个文化共同体将另一个文化共同体视作同等去奠基在自身的理解中。
4. 对「客观精神」之现象的澄清是建立在对先验主体间性的现象学澄清之上的。但是在这一个先验主体间性的底部,我们还需要澄清更为本源的「我的自然」的内在超越性的构成,这包括了对「物」、「时间」、「空间」等现象构成的研究。这一方面,先验观念论需要与意向性心理学结合,将意向性心理学的客观因果描述转化为非实在的自由且必然的主体成就。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
In this note / 篇目
Husserl’s First Meditation
1. Descartes’ failure is that, although he reaches the ‘transcendental cogito,’ he does not notice the ontological difference between the ‘transcendental’ and the ‘empirical.’ The chief problem is that Descartes understands all true ideas as ‘clear and distinct’; since the cogito has these qualities, it must be true. Here Husserl inherits the post-Cartesian critique of Descartes: besides clarity and distinctiveness, there is also adequacy. The transcendental cogito is indeed clear, but it is not adequate. Because it is incomplete, it necessarily includes within itself a transcendence of itself.
2. This distinction is also what Husserl’s method of ‘phenomenological reduction (epoché)’ emphasizes. All ‘apodicticity/clarity’ has its scope; the scientific drive is continually to adequate knowledge until the clarity belonging to the transcendental cogito covers every activity. The phenomenological reduction places such emphasis on suspending ‘existential assertions’ precisely because it must allow the finitude of existence, or the mixed state of existence and nonexistence. Phenomenology should therefore not posit ‘truth’ but analyze the constitution of truth’s appearing. The transcendental subject itself is this constitutive activity of truth. Phenomenology is thus not a deductive science modeled on geometry and mathematics in the Cartesian sense, but a transcendental science of the interrelation between freedom and the possibility of constitution.
Husserl’s Second Meditation
1. Once the structure of the transcendental cogito is clarified as an infinite self, eternally divided, possessing clarity but lacking adequacy, the problem of the one–many synthesis is on the table from the outset. The phenomenological reduction is really a clarification of this structure: how the same self divides and enters the activity of synthetically constituting being and nonbeing. The same self can enter both the natural and transcendental attitudes; or rather, what the transcendental attitude describes is precisely the subject encompassing the natural attitude and its potentialities. This subject grounds such science. This is not grounding in the Cartesian sense, but in the Kantian or Leibnizian sense: the groundlessness of possibility and freedom.
2. Such phenomenology will always exist as a critique of objective science. It is in this sense that Husserl says phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology are two sides of the same thing. The former describes a phenomenon that ‘is’; the latter ‘reduces’ it to a constituted phenomenon. Similarly, Fichte treats dogmatism and transcendental philosophy as two sides, with the latter an eternal critique of the former.
3. It is precisely because of this division that the transcendence of ‘what is thought’ can be clarified. Outside phenomenology, the relation between the cogito and what is thought appears immediate. Only through phenomenological reduction can the cogito be recharacterized as the divided self’s synthetic activity, and what is thought be preserved as the accomplishment of constitution. ‘Cogito–cogitation–cogitatum’ thus means that absolutely immanent activity—the cogito—constitutes itself as finite activity—cogitation—whose transcendence appears as a passive object—the cogitatum. Phenomenological science analyzes every cogitation as a constitutive process, characterizing its transcendence and immanence as object and subject, respectively, and reducing every object’s transcendence to the accomplishment of the absolute subject’s immanent constitution: cogitation as the accomplishment of the cogito. In other words, phenomenology as science is a drive toward absolute activity, the One. Through analyzing finite activities, the All, this drive successfully activates them, connecting isolated objects, the manifold, into horizons, the one–many synthesis.
Husserl’s Third Meditation
1. This meditation chiefly addresses the status of truth and evidence in the phenomenological system. Because phenomenological reduction suspends being and nonbeing, every object is understood from the standpoint of constitution. Truth or falsity can therefore only be the result of constitution, not its premise. As a result, truth is the network constructed by mutually adequating and interweaving evidences in conformity with the determinations of intentionality.
2. Evidence in this sense is the realization of constitution, while nonevidence is its potentiality. Although evidence varies in degree, every act of consciousness, evident or otherwise, remains an act of constitution by the transcendental subject. This constitutive activity can always become evident because it is always in the living present. This also means the possibility of phenomenological description: phenomenology can describe not only actuality but also its absence, namely potentiality and transcendence. These transcendences can continually be activated and realized, advancing toward the infinite Idea of science. Falsity in this sense is therefore intentional inadequacy, although some basic evidence, or clarity, is necessarily already contained in falsity.
More precisely, falsity is the suppression or sedimentation of horizons or potentialities. Phenomenological reduction reactivates these potentialities as potentialities and gives them a passage toward realization, or complete activation. Only in this sense, therefore, is phenomenology a science.
Husserl’s Fourth Meditation
1. The systematicity of the cogito is infinitely unfolded in phenomenological reduction. This system of horizons is transcendental because phenomenological analysis of the cogito is a structural analysis of the interaction between actuality and potentiality.
2. Yet an important question is: what kind of possibility is ‘potentiality’? Especially when the subject’s genetic freedom and the structure of objectifying Ideas both signify ‘possibility’? Leibniz can be introduced here. The monad’s potentiality stands in contrast with actuality, and a genetic analysis of any monad is really an analysis of the interaction between potentiality and actuality: how potentiality drives actuality, and how actuality extends toward potentiality. An Idea, by contrast, abstracts and flattens the relation between concrete actuality and its potentiality. This possibility is therefore not a genetic, motivated possibility, but pure universality containing all possibilities. The subject does not move from one actuality toward one potentiality, but grasps the structure of the actual and the potential as stable and idealized.
3. Naturally, however, this distinction can only be abstract. In practice, every phenomenological analysis requires some degree of abstraction, so idealization is indispensable. Idealization is phenomenology’s fundamental form, while concrete activities are its fundamental content. This is a relation between two poles. The monad is not an abstract one but a concrete all; the Idea is the reverse. Phenomenology must therefore address four aspects: one and many, the problem of synthesis; abstract and concrete, the problem of the Idea; transcendental and empirical, the problem of reduction; potentiality and actuality, the problem of analysis.
4. Only in this sense can Husserl distinguish the factual transcendental subject from the ideal transcendental subject. The unity of the transcendental subject comes from the evidence of transcendental synthesis: only when the passage between potentiality and actuality is continuous can this unity of the cogito be secured. This is also the problem with Descartes and other pretranscendental idealists. Because they do not recognize the continuity between potentiality and actuality, they cannot discuss constitution. Without constitution, evidence cannot be transmitted, and knowledge loses its possibility. Knowledge is the infinite grounding of evidences in activities—infinite because, in the transcendental attitude, every activity retains potentiality and freedom. Necessity in the transcendental attitude is only the necessity of motivation or law, not that of causal determination, unless causal determination is a basic state of affairs within this ontological region and the object is considered only within that region as an entity rather than as a product of the transcendental subject.
5. Another point to note is that phenomenology’s being an eidetic science does not mean it is immediately formal ontology. Formal ontology discusses only how a subject constitutes the universality of concepts, but this does not mean that this constitutive accomplishment is abstract. On the contrary, formal concepts themselves are concrete accomplishments of the transcendental subject. Further abstraction from this accomplishment is simply the subject’s self-reflexive activity that gives formal ontology its scientific character. In this sense, phenomenology as eidetic science can be said to ground formal ontology, because formal ontology must be an accomplishment of the transcendental subject. At the same time, formal ontology gives phenomenology its scientific character and universality. Formal ontology and phenomenology as eidetic science must therefore accomplish one another: the method of idealization and the transcendental method mutually accomplish one another.
Husserl’s Fifth Meditation
1. The Fifth Meditation must resolve the problem of scientific objectivity. Simply put, if everything is an accomplishment of the transcendental subject, how can these accomplishments escape one-sided subjectivity? It is especially important to note that the ‘objectivity’ concerning Husserl here is not merely an object’s transcendence or potentiality relative to a subject, but how this object can appear to another, different subject of equal standing with the subject that constitutes it.
2. For this reason, Husserl first abstracts a world ‘belonging to me,’ a perspectival world constituted around ‘me’ as its center. In this world, ‘my body’ and ‘I’ stand in a close relation of interaction and constitution. When I encounter another person’s body, this unfolded ‘field of constitution by my ensouled body’ is ‘directly’ evoked around that other body as its center, without reflection or inference. At the same time, this experience essentially belongs to the other person. Although it originates in me, it is anchored to the ‘there’ of their body. In other words, when I see someone, what is evoked in me is the experience: ‘If I were now over there, I could see, touch…’ This experience is expressed within my experience, yet the meaning it expresses absolutely exceeds the center of ‘me.’
3. An ‘absolute other’ constituted with ‘me’ as its origin thereby becomes possible. At the same time, this other’s gaze also constitutes my reflective consciousness of my body and makes my body and psychic experience into objects of objective science. This differentiated equality of myself and the other, established within my experience, becomes ‘community’ or ‘culture.’ ‘My’ nature is constituted as a new center grounded in culture, differentiated from the other yet belonging to the same community, just as one cultural community grounds another within its own understanding by regarding it as equal.
4. The clarification of the phenomena of ‘objective spirit’ rests on the phenomenological clarification of transcendental intersubjectivity. Yet beneath this transcendental intersubjectivity, we still need to clarify the more originary constitution of the immanent transcendence of ‘my nature.’ This includes investigating the constitution of phenomena such as ‘thing,’ ‘time,’ and ‘space.’ Here transcendental idealism needs to join with intentional psychology, transforming intentional psychology’s objective causal descriptions into nonreal, free yet necessary accomplishments of the subject.