Edmund Husserl · 埃德蒙德·胡塞尔
The Crisis of European Sciences · 欧洲科学的危机
Undated 未注日期
The Crisis of European Sciences — Reading notes
Apple Notes
Revised 13 December 2024
1
1~7
The immanent contradiction (caused or sedimented by the naïveté of the first projectors of modern science) within philosophy acts together with the external pressures (as manifest in its apparent failure to “understand” the world and its laws as natural sciences do) to deaden the vivacity of truth inherent in this project. In this sense, the atrophy of philosophy deprives the multiplicity of sciences of their “root.”
Root has to be understood in its double meaning. First, formally, it is the center of meaning for multiple sciences, and is therefore analogous to the master signifier of an assemblage, and in this sense is not exempt from historicism. Simply to reorganize sciences according to some philosophy is not a genuine reactivation of the whole horizon of everything knowable, hence the whole existence of humanity, and is thus more of a symptom than a cure.
In its genuine content, therefore, the “rootedness” of philosophy is nothing short of its dedication to the discovery of ῥιζώματα πάντων (roots of all things). The falling away of sciences into their own limited regions purports to an atrophy of meaning in general. Truths become accumulated facts. Though sciences still retain their validity, yet these criteria of verification or inherited concepts are nothing but passive traditions. The givenness of facts simply stands opposed to the passive and paralyzed subject and its reasons. The sciences are waiting to be reappropriated: science detached from life is a priori a lie —— The 1844 Manuscripts. In its ultimate ground, all positive sciences lack meaning.
We need a philosophy that brings these sciences together. This means we have to reactivate the origins of modern science so as to bring them, as sediments, back to their origins when they still have genuine connections and are unified through this nexus. But this reactivation is itself an origination: it does not discover transcendent origins (as if these were just facts), but is itself the immanent origination of origins, for otherwise no origin can be truly active life. This means the philosophy thus discovered is already phenomenology. Reason self-realizes in our historical inquiry: yet this is not a self-enclosed retroactivity, but an opening up of unending horizons: Reason understands itself as the opening of infinite possibilities, as true infinity that goes beyond all limited infinities.
The new philosophy, comprehended as a simple object, is the infinite horizon of all horizons. Yet this diminishes it. Rather, the new philosophy is the infinitization or the horizonning of all horizons.
2
8~9d
First of all, what is to be investigated is the historical but also the ontological primacy of geometry. It is historically first precisely because it is ontologically the only possible scientific foundation for all other physical sciences. This is dependent on the primary constitution of all sensible objects. In one word, spatial-temporality is the only form of the perceptible, since shapes and motions are the only “common properties.” We can imagine an object without color, as an object is this for a blind person, or an object without hardness, as something intangible, yet it is impossible for an object to be possibly imagined without some shape, even a changing one. As a person deprived of all sense organs can still nonetheless imagine himself moving from place to place, delineating some shape, it is indubitable that space and time are the only forms of intuition, or forms of the world. This form has the absolute and ideal objectivity that makes it measurable. For measurement requires homogeneity of a unit, and such is not obtained without an ideal abstraction. Yet such an abstraction is not possible with plenums, since plenums, when idealized, lose their very sensible qualities; hence you could observe gradations in perceiving color, you might also have limit ideas of a color, yet no shade of color can become something homogeneous enough to measure another shade without destroying “the sense” of this very shade.
Thus the structure of the world is a geometrical structure. This science, however, is only attained to through practices with a guiding purpose: sharpness of an arrow requires acuteness of the angle, so is roundness, straightness, so on and so forth. By such continuous perfections, some limit shapes are thus acquired as ideal possessions, and qua ideal limits become objectivities communicable and transmissible intersubjectively.
These ideal shapes are nonetheless returned to the real world, which is structured through anexact and relatively unstable types, and guide the construction of more and more precisely measured instruments. This is a twofold process: on the one hand, the world becomes more and more geometrical and all shapes become gradually more approximate and potentially exact in relation to the actual exactness of ideality; on the other, through such progress in exactness, a relation between plenums (other sense-properties that are material of these shapes) and shapes become more pronounced.
At first, we only know that since the world is a world of shapes which factually have other properties, and these shapes as concrete objects are causally related to each other in the world horizon. That is, we know that concretely there is such a relation between, let’s say sharpness of the arrow and the acuteness of the angle, or weight and volume of the same material, or pitch and the length of a string. But at this point we can say nothing definitive about if such relation is a mathematical one, one that can be geometrically understood and measured.
Through the exactitude of geometry and the art of measurement, we obtain exact formulations of such relations between plenums indirectly in terms of the relation between shapes, such as temperature in terms of height of the mercury column, weight in terms of the counterweight on a balance or the shortening of a spring. And only now, through the method invented by Galileo, the method which we today call experiment, nature becomes thoroughly mathematized, or that, all properties can find its causal indices in the world of shapes: a thing of a certain generalized shape possesses a certain generalized property, and such property, while interacting with another generalized shape possessing some other property, changes that other shape in a determinate way. From now on, it is no longer for us to say subjectively what is “hot” as if it were a mere feeling, but rather we have a thermometer that displays objectively the change of temperature through its change of shape.
Science, though it achieves complete exactitude through this mathematization, nonetheless forgets its origin in this history of becoming science, that it is dependent on the concrete acts of perception, tool-making, measuring, writing and communicating, and finally experimenting with real objects, since it does not belong to the scientist’s attitude to inquire the origin of what is established to be apodictically true.
3
9e~9l
The movement of modern science proceeds in the following manner: it cherishes the hypothesis of the immediate relation between the ideal and natural as a relation of verification. That is, it starts with a hypothesis, and uses experience to verify such hypotheses. This leads to a number of consequences. First, the ideal of modern science is thus “the infinite verification”, which is tantamount to a “systematic eradication of errors and doubts”, and is hence presumed to infinitely and linearly make progress (at least according to its own ideal), as contrasting to the intermittent evolution of practical life.
Moreover, such an infinite progress of verification is different from the ideality of a straight line, since the ideality of geometrical figures are self-contained and self-sufficient: they have intrinsic meaning in geometric intuition. Yet the ideality of science is the ideality of the ultimate totality of “the real world”, which as is is the infinite horizon of verification and movement between experience and the ideal. It would lose its meaning once it becomes detached from the experienced world and the permanent inductivity of life.
Now, we understand the infinitization undergone by modern science is the infinitization through a thorough mathematization or symbolization. The mathematical formulae, though they might still have latent meanings and hence “orders of intuitions” or “harmonies of interconnected horizons”, their very existence obscures this orderedness. This is the problem of writing as formulated by Socrates is Phaedrus.
What matters for the modern scientists are not “orders of being”, nor the universal as opposed to the particular. Rather, the question of “methexis (participation)” is presupposed to be solved by the character or the symbol. The “general objects” are not of a different species that requires a different treatment (no ontological difference), but that all are but symbols that are homogeneous. A particular thing is not the instantiation of a higher universal (truth grounded in reality through a factuality that retroactively justifies), but the deciphering of a general object (truth to be grounded in originary evidence through a reduction of the fact to the active and normalizing constitution of its meaning). Hence the problem of how the universal is to arise out of the particular is forgotten, but only the “fact of symbols” is retained, and we treat all questions as technical problems of cryptology. Nothing has substantial being but all is symbolic.
This is the almost mysterious “emptying of meaning” of algebra or the arithmetization. Husserl, however, is not opposed to this institution. Rather, he believes a formal ontology consisting in the radical formalization of the world is necessary: the most general science of the world, wherein the world is generalized as any definite manifold (that is, an operable axiomatic system) following any rule whatsoever.
Modern science takes up the task of universal mathematization. This is due to its most origninary motivation. For mathematization achieves an unsurpassable exactness and precision of prediction, since it is absolutely ideal and a priori, and idealizes nature. Moreover, as modern science is this project of infinite verification of its ideality as a system, if its progress ever stops, it loses its vitality or impetus. Since it has forgotten its truth or is incapable of grounding itself by its own premises, it permanently needs a new utility to justify itself: even as how capitalism needs surplus value, it always verifies its hypothesis with more hypotheses to be verified. The analogy runs even deeper: just as exchange value becomes more prevalent alongside the progress of division of labor, as to produce one commodity more commodities are naturally generated in the market through the need of the finite producer, so to verify a mathematical formula belonging to a quantity, in the devising of its experiment a way to regulate other quantities or variables is to be devised, which more often than not involves another quantitative relation. For instance, in order to idealize Galileo’s gravity experiments, we have to overcome and control the problem of air resistance.
Material nature therefore is engulfed and is reduced to nothing but a verificatory function, a garment for ideality. Phenomenology effects a different verification: not the fulfillment of a prediction (truth as fulfilled by reality), but the fulfillment of meaning (truth as fulfilled by originary evidence) through connecting the ideal to its root in the life-world.
Modern science is impossible to progress if it is forever concerned with those fundamental problems. Its method of oblivion is both its strength and its foible: only through sedimentation or the suppression of questions such as the reactivation of origins can a method be used technically. Indeed, sedimentation and focus on technicality and a depletion of meaning is necessary to the scientist’s attitude, who is essentially finite and concerned with a practical purpose of making correct predictions. It is through the suppression of the ontological problem of participation and the effort to ground our conceptuality through natural intuition (an effort that only arises in ancient science that is still concerned with the life-world) that we arrive at a symbolism; and this symbolism is soon revealed to be fatal since through its suppression of the science—lifeworld problem it suppresses even its own origin within ancient science and, fundamentally, the lifeworld altogether. Yet it is precisely through this suppression symbolism reveals its technical nature. We use symbols and maintain traditions (traditionality almost necessarily involves a potential symbolism, since what objectivity is intended here is conveyed only through writing, which always could lose the distinct ideal objectivity and its related original lifeworld that the words are supposed to preserve, as ideality is nothing but omnitemporality in the related lifeworld, and deteriorates into mere “traces” or ciphers) for just this reason: technicality. But what is unreasonable is the attempt to totally suppress such reactivations such that the world of science becomes detached from the world of extra-scientific life, becomes depleted of all meaning.
The phenomenological historical inquiry is not simply to go back to retrospectively ground the present. Rather it is to genuinely move back and transform the present to a future: to see genuine potencies as potencies, so as to really understand the necessity of the telos, which is not extrinsic and imposed on the past, but intrinsic in its own motivation, and only so can the present be genuinely understood in its true beginnings. This is the same in Hegel: only when it is a genuine possibility that consciousness should fail to move to the next stage, that it is motivated in its freedom, that it is a true subject that is able to subjectify with inner and not imposed necessity; it is exactly the very experience of potential failure as negative content that nourishes the dialectic, but if such potential exists, it is actualizable as a positive state. It is only through the knowledge of genuine possibilities in the past that the meaning of the present is activated, and is originated. So it is not the modern scientific methodology of hypothesizing and verifying, for it is exactly concerned with the “truth” or “meaning” of such hypothesis and verification; not just how such a hypothesis is “reasonable” or “likely”, but how is a hypothesis constituted in its essential and concrete possibility through originary or mediated layers of evidence; verification is also not a factual fulfillment of the hypothesis, but a complex process of constituting the evidence that is required by the hypothesis. In other words, one can comprehend all the reasons in experience why a hypothesis is very “likely”, that is, it can be factually reflected in reality (which separates science and reality in an occasionalistic way), without comprehending what makes such a hypothesis “possible”, that is, how such a hypothesis is concretely generated or constituted in the first place. Also, verification is not this observation of a fact, but a concrete constitution of the evidenced factuality that is itself an achievement mediated by all the acts of interpretation, abstraction and theoretical practices.
4
10~17
The mathematization of nature achieves a self-enclosed sphere of bodies that is abstracted from the concrete life-world. But this permits a split to occur within the one and only world: a world of bodies, and a world of psychic beings. At first, this question of the connection between the mathematical world of bodies and the world of spirits is already a pressing one, since the objective and rational world is nonetheless an achievement of subjectivity.
Yet, the whole project of modern science hinges on the forgetting of these issues. The rationalization of the world occurs, in a certain sense, irrationally (though it is to be noted, such irrationality is not unconditional, but has a very limited sense: it only remains irrational insofar as it is not yet properly grounded in the self-constitution of teleological reason).
Psychology is, in this process, nonetheless framed on the model of physics, and thereby becomes the Hobbesian psychophysical anthropology. Empiricism is only rationalism’s manifestation: it presupposes the omnipresence of reason. Even the soul is now explained in physicalistic terms.
Metaphysics in that era is not exempt from the allure of objectivism. This is the thrust of Spinoza’s system: a geometrization of bodies and thoughts and affects under a rational determination of the fundamental substance. This is what is meant by “systemicity.” The spirit of modern science is captured best by Spinoza: the infinite progress and improvement of the intellect (through knowing and its inseparable doing), and the increasing “happiness” thereof, and the mutual substruction of the man-god image. This science, which is in the most genuine sense an all-encompassing totality, is a miraculous idea, which surpasses its mere manifestation in the abstract realm of the theoretical-technological.
The mathematization of the psychic, which is the ground of all knowledge, run into problems and incur the most fierce criticisms from a slew of skeptics. This skepticism has gone so far beyond the Greeks who oppose an episteme with the necessity of doxa, but since the psychic has shown itself to be unmathematizable, and the idea of modern science has reduced the life-world to an idealized mathematical world, the psychic itself is in jeopardy, hence the world grounded through the psychic. For Aristotle, though the soul’s experience is not mathematically determinable, it is nonetheless theorizable, since it is in the life-world and has substantial meaning. But for the moderns, this failure to get mathematized simply makes the soul and its experience suspicious: this is because the life-world is reduced to mere phenomena of the objectively true world, the world of idealized mathematics, and the psychic therefore loses all substantiality, hence the objective world itself related to the psychic.
The whole spirit of modern philosophy is therefore determined through the problem of objectivism versus transcendentalism. This is its historical task to achieve a final phenomenology, a transcendental idealism investigating things in themselves. This as the end of history is the final establishment via which “the unified directedness of all philosophies and philosophers can open up.” Hence it agrees with Hegel, the end of history is the complete form of freedom, where an opening is made, not a complete closure: the opening to the totality. Such an opening therefore is precisely carried out in practice through the historical investigation: this inquiry is itself the realization of the absolute. It reduces facts to norms where a personal responsibility of the historical subjectivity can spring forth: we criticize and reactivate the past and the historical unity immanently, neither as a closed factuality nor as a retroactive necessity, but as moments that contain in themselves fundamental potencies. Tacitus: let us and the future generations vie for friendly virtues!
Descartes is the one who both projects the ultimate form of modern science and the one who explodes it. He is the first that has gone as far as to doubt the existence of our pregiven world. And this radical skepticism gives him the cogito, which is however to be expanded into a concrete totality of congitationes related to their cogitata. This reduces the world to mere phenomena. Yet ego as the ground means necessarily that an apodeictic science should both be erected on this foundation but also be generated from this ground: that this ego must be able to let rest the building of knowledge statically, but also must generate such knowledge.
5
18~27
The operative concept here is intentionality or the cogitatio directed towards a cogitatum, and which constitutes or accomplishes this very objectivity onto which such directedness depends.
So there are two features of intentionality: first, it is immanent to consciousness or the subject; second, it is accomplishing and constituting objectivity. All Husserl’s critique of earlier philosophy revolves around this axis.
First, Descartes. Though Descartes discovers intentionality and its directedness, he fails to see this directedness to be the “accomplishment” immanent to the subject. Rather, he ignores this directedness, and the subject becomes a sterile thing rather than a generative principle. Ego becomes equated to “the soul” bestowed with innate faculties that are psychologically objectified (such as reason), and the problem is now how this isolated “inside” object is related to its “outside.” Descartes then moves to the idea of God as the guarantor, even though the “rational faculty” that helps him make that argument and the idea of God containing Being as a predicate as objectivities themselves must be first constituted (and not simply presupposed or inferred), whether it is a true argument or not. So, Descartes’ mistake is to objectify the ego into a soul, a residuum of worldly existence bestowed with properties, and how “this enclosed thing” is to relate to another self-enclosed thing, the world. He also thereby assumes that the rational self-evidences are independent self-evidences innate to the soul and are hence “objective self-evidences” without seeing that this apodicticity needs be constituted through the activity of the apodictic subjectivity, through the self-clarification of the truly apodictic self-evidence; otherwise these “self-evidences” would just be mystical constructions (Cartesian “natural light”) without a how or why, thus indefensible to a Humean skepticism.
This mistake is threefold, first, the world is not fully reduced but is still treated as an “outside”; second, the ego is objectified as a thing with innate ready-made properties, as an “inside”, whose properties however ought to be also reduced (the too quick dismissal of the evil genii); third, the inside and the outside are bridged by God, the argument of whose existence however presupposes the very thing questioned here, objectivity and rationality as such.
However the later history of development forgets about this fundamental problem. The subject is presupposed to be this other object with psychological faculties, proprietor of the immanent sense data; the world remains what it was. Which side has the ontological primacy determines whether the philosophy is empiricist or rationalist.
First, the empiricist position, as represented by Hume. Unlike Locke, he did not uncritically treat the ego as simply a natural-psychological being, but take up the fact that the ego is an accomplishing ego, an ego that generates (and is hence vivacious and for that matter an elusive subjectivity, not just another object). Yet, he still takes this ego to be regulated by “laws” of association and customs, which is self-contradictory. Moreover, he missed the crucial point of the “directedness” of intentionality: subjectivity is not simply a “bundling” of immanent data, but an accomplishment of “objectivity” as such. Hence, Hume is right insofar as he sees the generative aspect of the subject, but he misses what is generated is precisely objectivities, and not fictions immanent to the mind. There is no such thing as simple sense data: any datum is itself an object constituted by the subject.
Then, it is the rationalist position, as exemplified in Leibniz. For the rationalists, the metaphysical truth of rational thoughts immanent to the ego is simply presupposed as solved by Descartes and the positing of God: God as the guarantor of preestablished harmony. What is left, therefore, is simply the technique of making objective in thought what is merely subjective in experience: the clarification of metaphysics and a general ontology through logic as normative science and the reflection of pure reason.
Kant stands in this tradition. Therefore, he (unaware of the true Humean problem, i.e. the generation of “ideas” and “experiences” through subjectivity, since he has not the chance to read the Treatise), inspired by Hume, wishes to ground more thoroughly the truth of rational knowledge in experience, since prescientific man nonetheless knows “objects.” Experience is itself structured by logical categories, what is explicit in theory is already implicit in experience. But as all rationalists he presupposes the givenness of these categories, as if they simply belong to a faculty.
The key critical concept is therefore intentionality, which is used to reduce all “givenness” of the object to its constitutedness as objectivity. It is used against Descartes for he presupposes the givenness of psychological faculties of the ego and a worldly existence; against Hume for he presupposes the primary givenness of the ego and its propriety of “immanent” sense-data, thus reducing all objectivity to “mere” fictions; against Leibniz for he presupposes the givenness of the metaphysical truth of rational thinking and rational thinking itself; against Kant for precisely the same reason.
Husserl delegates praises by the same concept. He praises Descartes for he initiates the inquiry into subjectivity, though omitting the constitutive and generative role (not just foundational) it plays; he praises Hume for he precisely looks into the constitution problem, but has mistaken constitutedness to be immanence and/or non-existence; he praises Leibniz for first laying out the formulation of mathesis universalis, though he has completely missed the constitution problem of this task; finally, he praises Kant for redirecting the problem of knowledge back to the subject, and formulating it in terms of a problem of constitution, though such is only a constitution of “knowledge”, presupposing fixed faculties and properties of such faculties. In all of these, only Hume has the problem of “a history of the subject” in mind, though he thereby retreats to historicism.
6
28~32
The structure of intuition is much more complex than the Kantian model. A spatial unity is given through different perspectives and different appearances as a self-presence; and only a reflective attitude analyzes this unity into a manifold. So in the same way the self-presence shows in time. Moreover, kinestheses play a crucial role in constituting a unified realm of perception; the kinestheses in a living body of a perceived body unifies the perception. The realm of perceptions is in its way the ground for everything spiritual and is demanding an investigation. In such realm we constitute also other egos, even our own egos can be reflected upon and objectified, and all our acts and products are sedimented in us as habitualities. The new turn of science is to no longer take this pre-given lifeworld as presupposed to be valid as used for other horizons, but to unfold it in its own full horizonality. There are so many questions to ask about this world!
The task of philosophy also needs look into the anonymous subjectivity. Yet is this subjectivity possible for investigation? Would it not turn the subject into an object and lose that subjectivity? Only if one goes with a thorough epoché that no longer tries to find the absolute object, but only how all objectivities are constituted through the subject and how objectivities and the subject are intricately intermingled and unified in one history. The question of the “root.”
The problem with Kant is that he presupposes the subject to be transcending all intuition but not constituting intuitions through intuitions. This is because he is afraid all intuitions are a posteriori, and hence psychological. He does not think it possible to have historical a prioris. Subjectivity is only regressively to be inferred, not progressively to be described.
The world of depth is a world of roots. It is to bring it in unity with the surface that is the task of philosophy.
7
33~35
Lifeworld at first shows itself to be partial and ancillary to the objective and scientific world. Yet it turns out to be the true ground of objectivity. Exactly what is meant by “ground,” however, is ambivalent. At one point, it seems as if the lifeworld is correlational to the objective world, that is, since each has its own criterion for “truth” and each has its own self-evidence, their self-evidences are therefore only related to each other through a “founding” way or a “relating” way, that self-evidence in the world of the finite corresponds to a self-evidence in the world of the absolute. In between is the mediating term, the whole horizon of “reason” or “turning.” Through this interpretation, the lifeworld and the objective world are two manifolds that are related in the horizonal act of “turning.” This would harmonize to Klein’s project.
Yet, in a way the lifeworld is this very absolute or turns out to be this absolute. The objective world is but an achievement of the subject and is to be brought back to the concrete life of the subject. Before we are interested only in the lifeworld because the validity and self-evidence of science somehow rests or translates back to the layers of intuition (intuition of the self-presence of things themselves) we have in the lifeworld. Now we are interested in the lifeworld itself since it itself is an/the absolute, and itself needs a clarification of its original self-evidences. The question is eventually how the two worlds are unified in their horizons. As Hopkins interprets Husserl here missteps by positing a direct grounding as if science could really be made intuitable in terms of experience; yet it seems possible to suggest that Husserl is merely remarking on the necessary relation between the lifeworld and science, that the latter originates in the former and hence is laid the ground of by the former. The task of phenomenology therefore would be to make science intuitive in the sense of relating it back to its origin so as to witness the achievements of reason, and not directly fulfilling (“cashing out”) the concepts with intuitions. Depending on which is the case, Klein’s work would a critique of Husserl or a supplement to him. At least we can be sure that in the case of the absolute lifeworld, the absolute lifeworld denotes the world that belongs to the transcendental subjectivity that constitutes all objectivities, including those of science.
Therefore, we could conclude the following. First, science is grounded in the lifeworld, through its accumulation of significance as concrete and historical achievements, also as its self-evidence “depends”on the intuitive self-evidence. Moreover, this transcendental subjectivity primarily moves and acts in the concrete lifeworld, and science is one of its products, and the lifeworld is thereby more than the scientific world. Both worlds can thus be sublated from their mutual antagonism and be synthesized in the concrete mutual harmony of life, in which theoretical attitude is one attitude among many, though it might be a higher one.
The lifeworld is the world of doxa, from it grows the world of episteme which is continually renewed in the lifeworld. The world seems to be separate, that one is objective and absolute, while the other subjective and relative. Yet they are nonetheless in one world of conscious life. They are therefore to be united in one lifeworld. Doxa and episteme are one and mutually founding or experienceable in one world. This is the ultimate paradox: how can what is objective be constituted out of what is merely subjective? The key is an intentionality purified through epoché.
This brings us to the point of epoché, the suspension that sees a thing as it appears. The phenomenologist’s attitude is a habitual achievement: it can be suspended temporarily from its active achievement, yet its habitual potency still points to its goal and can be reactivated always.
8
36~44
Here Husserl has fully spelled out the task. First, we reduce the scientifically constructed objective world to the pre-scientific subjective and relative lifeworld. This reduction is effected through the first epoché that cancels out all objective sciences. What is retained is a science or a theoretical interest in the “structure” of the lifeworld. Different from logical or objective a prioris, the a prioris of lifeworld have a “structure” that is not independent from the essential relative givenness of the world but is only something these manifold givennesses refer to. In other words, a structure is always only descriptive, but not positive. Also, this structure contains or includes the very negativity of horizon: a purely ideal objectivity that is purely positive precludes such horizonality.
Next, we reduce this natural lifeworld in which all objectivities are held to be valid in one coherent whole despite the horizonal nature to its related transcendental subjectivity. This transcendental reduction can only be effected through a universal epoché that suspends all validities in one go. All of such ontic validities are reduced to phenomena.
The complete reduction has to be carried out in two steps since the first epoché provides a first field of theoretical interest, the science of doxa as the ground for all sciences; but it has not gone deep enough, since the root of both lies in the subjectivity. Moreover, though the first epoché has revealed the horizonal nature and has thus reduced a theoretical dogmatism, it has not reduced a practical dogmatism: though in the lifeworld a knowledge of the positively actual is no longer presumed, a belief in the actuality of the world nonetheless runs inveterate. This recapitulates the first delineation of historical skepticism: the Greeks counterpoised doxa to episteme, while Descartes suspended the world itself.
9
45~51
This is the clearest and the most important exposition of transcendental phenomenology. Through the absolute epoché every ontology or science, even an ontology of the lifeworld, is reduced from its objectivity. That is, even though the ontology of the lifeworld has nothing to do with idealities, it still is concerned with a “structure” that is taken to be granted or valid. But transcendental phenomenology should even reduce that very least residue of the factical.
A formal ontology liberates the subject from empirical sciences. But it again posits its own facts. A material ontology, ontology of the lifeworld, intends to take account of the eidetic structure of the world. But this ontology of the lifeworld nonetheless posits facts.
Facts are reduced to norms and constituted validities through the transcendental epoché. Through this we reduce all validities and evidences to their relative horizons that infinitely depend on each other. All evidences are unfolded and reactivated in their ultimate meanings rooted in the monad. This is not to simply provide an absolute evidence, but to provide self-evidence in terms of fundamental meaning and significance. To clarify the ultimate unity of every manifold (cogitatione) as constituted objectivity (cogitatum) in terms of the ego-pole’s unity (cogito) is the task of phenomenology. It is an absolute unfolding and the pursuit of adequate knowledge, or the infinite adequation of knowledge brought to full consciousness. Leibniz’s task undertaken after a thorough and critical reflection: the universal reason.
10
52~55
The four clarifications of the transcendental phenomenological method. First, phenomenology is not objective science and is concerned with how horizons mutually constitute each other through the mediation of subjectivity, how validities are constituted through other validities without ending at some obvious self-evidence; rather, it is the infinite task of absolute reactivation of all horizons.
Second, the teleology of phenomenology is not aiming for any end, but is open-ended. That is to say what it aims at is the totality. Nor does it cancel the end character of any particular end, but preserves it in the phenomenologist’s gaze.
Third, phenomenology is nonetheless an eidetic science that is interested in essences and structures, though these “factualities” are always warranted only by the constituted nature they have; that is, they as structures are nonetheless the immanent transcendence within the absolute flux of a concrete transcendental subjectivity. They as essences are not posited objects but rather open horizons and thus permeated by activity and subjectivity: first in terms of the constitution of their ideality, since these are produced through a transcendental method (eidetic variation); then in terms of the constitution of their content, since one region is bordering by other regions and encompassed in one unified subjectivity.
Finally, the subjectivity is self-constituting and thus constitutes itself in its otherness, and is intersubjectivity within the very primal subject. Thus the subject constitutes itself into an object and in relation to groups of objects, including humanity as a whole. More than this, not just humanity, but also other variations of subjectivity are included in the constitution. A transcendental nature: factualities reduced to the absolute activities.
There must be an irreducible factuality or self-evidence, that is the apodicticity of ego, or the apodictic fact of transcendental correlation. Yet this is not to ground objectivity or objective truths, but rather to connect and unify objects to subjects, and make their validities not only “obvious” and “grounded,” but also “meaningful” and “intelligible.” In other words, we not only see the fact of grounding between objects and the transcendental subjectivity and feel or know to be grounded, but also see how they are grounded. The ground is not a mythical or abstract one, but an actual, intelligible, unified and concrete manifold.
11
56~58
One of the most surprising readings. First, Husserl analyzed the current situation for philosophy. Philosophy has lost its guiding thread and has not unified all the techniques or arts of theories. Philosophy has failed to fully comprehend techné and could not account for its transcendental origin. Since the transcendental philosophy reacts against objectivism such dogmatic objectivism is distrusted, but the transcendental philosophers have not fully and properly begun their task. On the contrary, they are immersed still in their mythical constructs and are discredited for their obscurity and unintelligibility. If objectivism is unintelligible because it is dogmatic and has assumed the pregivenness of the world, transcendentalism is not less so for the same assumption, only here it is due to the pregivenness of subjectivity (i.e. those mythical constructions). Eventually, all of philosophy is discredited once and for all.
Husserl then makes a surprising turn. The reason why transcendental philosophy has so far failed is precisely because it has suppressed psychology for fear of psychologism. This fear is not illegitimate, yet once the transcendental insight is achieved, one has to go back to the lifeworld given to the concrete and functioning subject to actually “verify” it in experience. Mathematics and all such objectivistic and natural sciences require a deductive self-evidence. But transcendental philosophy needs a self-evidence that not only is universal and absolute, but is also always “repeatable” and “habitual.” What can this “habituality” mean other than that it has to be constantly verified in experience and can always be re-collected in our concrete experience? That is, even within our immersion in the natural attitude, we can and must always be able to again break loose from the natural attitude. This requires nothing other than a fully worked out psychology that mediates the transcendental: the transcendental must be grounded in the empirical and be self-constituting (in the same sense that in Hegel, Absolute Spirit must be thrown back to history; the dialectic of the Absolute). One must be able to understand the origin of transcendental philosophy and its variations and alienations, and hence the psychological, historical, political and every science thus transcendentally transformed must be studied for the complete exposition. Psychology is exemplary but by no means exclusively so.
Therefore every phenomenon studied under a discipline must be transformed by phenomenology in twofold ways. First, as a factical science it is to be reduced and understood as transcendental achievement. Second, once thus transformed, it is also to be understood that as a constitution how it in turn constitutes the self-constitution of the transcendental subjectivity, thus completing the teleology. Even in the second case, the science in question remains reduced and is no longer naïvely factical; it is dependent upon the factical, but its facts are understood to be self-objectifications that permit the dialectical self-understanding of the absolute subject. These facts are now, as a mere façon de parler, quasi-transcendental; they might still be irreducibly factical, yet not naïvely so, since they as facts are now habitualized indices of the transcendental. But one must remember these are not necessary conditions for the transcendental, as some Heideggerians might presume; self-constituting transcendental subjectivity is the absolute primary, and these quasi-transcendentals are not to be obtained without a prior transcendental reduction.
So, three levels after the transcendental reduction: the empirical sciences as quasi-transcendental quasi-factical indices for the properly transcendental, the transcendentally reduced manifolds that are constituted into those facts (cogitatum-cogitation), and the transcendental subjectivity that constitutes itself through these manifolds reduced from facts.
12
59~64
Psychology is to be transformed through transcendental phenomenology. Yet one must understand how the old psychology, a psychology modeled on physics, a psychophysical discipline, is instituted.
In the lifeworld, experiences of bodies are essentially distinct from experiences of souls. Souls are objects experienced to be “living” and “holding sway” but not objects of handled extension. Yet one must also say that all souls are embodied and thus related to bodies indirectly. Bodies are somehow still encapsulated in our subjective experience and immanent to our subjective experience. Then how are body and soul paralleled and put on equal footing, and why is psychology modeled on physics? Bodies and souls belong to different manifolds or regions, and in each region is to be understood differently. Their equality or parallelism of method is intrinsically impossible and absurd. Rather they must be treated as two qualitatively distinct manifolds unified in one universal science (or more narrowly, in one study of the lifeworld, the psychology transformed through transcendental phenomenology).
In sum, the current paradigm of psychology versus physics assumes two things, first, that they are two self-enclosed regions, second, that though they are self-enclosed regions they have the same overarching method. This is the running premise of objectivism, that all things are self-enclosed objects that only a method of idealization can access. To deconstruct the current paradigm, Husserl has two tasks ahead of him. First, to show that the physical and the psychological are distinct in experience in such a way that the same method is not applicable to the other, and this is done by clarifying the unique characteristics of the living soul and body.
But if the subjective is totally different from the objective, how come we end up objectifying it? This is the second task, to break the self-enclosure of the two regions. Much the same as souls are embodied, bodies are ensouled and perceived subjectively. They are still different regions of subjective experience, yet they nonetheless essentially belong together. These two aspects are to be unified under one science of transcendental phenomenology, and ideally, each region would entail a manifold different from the other but also not self-enclosed; they should be distinct manifolds co-constituting each other fully consciously.
Since Galileo, bodies are separated from subjective experience through idealization. Since Descartes, souls are idealized merely unclearly, due to vagueness and the essential impossibility of its thorough idealization in the same mathematical manner. This psychology is valuable, but only as a co-constituting region, not as a self-enclosed field of study that fully suppresses and is separate from the study of inner-experience. In the same way, the distinction between explanation and description is still valid, but must be understood differently for different manifolds.
The double objectivistic implication for psychology: 1. All objects are in their essence homogeneous in form but self-enclosed in content, i.e. they are homogeneous insofar as they are mathematically idealized and heterogeneous insofar as they are experienced. 2. Psychology is about such an object, soul, which is self-enclosed from body in content but only formally accessible to mathematical idealization. Against this misunderstanding, Husserl proposes a subversion and a mediation: 1. Soul, for instance, in our lifeworld is formally distinct from body (so it is not mathemtizable as physicalistic psychology believes) but continuous with its content since it constitutes bodies within itself (so it is not merely about “inner experience” as skeptical psychology or psychologism believes); it does not have one unified form separate from all differences, nor does it have their content totally self-enclosed and incommunicable; forms are like contents just as contents are like forms. 2. Science therefore also needs to include an investigation into the lifeworld of continuous variation of each region which proceeds until it reaches another region distinct from it, just as it ought to include objectivistic sciences which radically abstract from all differences of regions to attain the unified region of formal ontology. These regions co-constitute each other in transcendental subjectivity and is its self-constitution.
13
65~70
The origin of dualism is not a mere historical accident, though it originates through a historical achievement. It is motivated by the very structure of the world where two aspects can be abstractively obtained: the physical and the psychological. The mere formulation of inner psychological experience is not sufficient preventative to this dualism, since its enclosure turns it into a body-like thing. But, unlike bodies which are easier to comprehend abstractively from the mental since they are idealized objectivities, souls as experienced always posit the egoic and the correlation of intentionality. Under a pure psychology the full inner world is to be explicated in an interconnected totality of transmitted and sedimented validities and meanings. This is achieved through psychological epoché so as to arrive at the gateway to transcendental epoché. In psychological epoché what is taken to be the hidden validities are those ego acts and psychological experiences that are “real,” though their noema or content are suspended from their validities. Only through such a psychology can all other psychological investigations mixed in other regions be understood in its originary psychological meaning.
The roadmap of transcendental phenomenology: empirical sciences naturally accepted and governed by mathematics both as an ontology of ideal nature (what are the idealities all experiences posit beyond themselves that regulate experiences, i.e. suprasensible objectivities; pure geometry) and a methodology of natural experiences (what are the idealities actual experiences relate to that translate experiences, i.e. sensible objectivities; applied geometry), and a psychology (divided into the abstract descriptive natural sciences and the humanistic ones, plus a pure psychology), each being a region (objective world and the subjective lifeworld); formal ontology being the ontology of any world whatsoever; metaphysics or material ontology being the ontology of reality (the ultimate lifeworld), the one region encompassing all regions, mediated by the many regions of reality and the possible regionality as such; transcendental phenomenology below all regions as the active ground that constitutes their interplay and unity, and which performatively demonstrates this universality of constitution and the concreteness of all regions. The introduction of transcendental phenomenology depends on the achievement of a pure psychology and the reintroduction of the lifeworld because the absolute central region is only found through this re-subjectivization of the scientific world, this plus formal ontology gives us the formally completed metaphysics, where the transcendental activity is infinitely and absolutely at work.
The origin of geometry entails that even in perception there needs to exist a perceptive ideality that guarantees the identity of the perceived object, and not just a non-perceptive ideality, for otherwise how do we “experience” and “perceive” the same world? Only thing we can say is that we “think” the same world, not that we “experience” the same world. That is, not only must we have common notions, we must also have common perceptions. The same with arithmetics, since it provides an intuitive unit. Then, founded on these, we have algebra that not only provides pure intuitively perceived objects, but also general pure objects.
On the other hand, a concept such as redness is an essence, it being an ideal object can still be intuited categorially, though it is not to be originarily understood as a “one among many,” not a unit, not a general object; but rather it is the higher essence that is itself not a red, not even a general one. This symbolism gives rise to formal ontology, whose object is “anything whatsoever,” an ontology of the surface.
What is meant by abstract cannot be the Aristotelian one, that of “belonging to a substance but not itself substantial,” since if so we might say that colors are abstract because they do not exist on their own. Yet in that case we’d be making validity judgements, as if colors don’t have their own validity or their own way of “existing.” Indeed we can at best say that for the natural attitude or for the lifeworld nature and spirit are abstractions, but even this is not precise, since the lifeworld is thoroughly and essentially spiritual, yet it is not viewed as concrete but abstract. We cannot say that the lifeworld is by itself abstract. In other words, we cannot say that geometry is abstract because it does not exist really, since it fully exists for the geometrician; we can also not say that the lifeworld is fully concrete since it is thoroughly reducible to the psychological. Concrete and abstract are purely structural and technical concepts, i.e. the belonging together or complementarity of their essences, not substantial traits of “things.”
14
71~72
Psychology is abstract insofar as it is a positive science describing a region of things, i.e. souls, even when souls are not treated in a parallel manner as bodies. Like bodies, souls are treated by psychology as individuals: they are individuated through embodiment. Yet they are nonetheless emptied of corporeality and are merely “embodied” but not themselves “extensions.” Souls are thus seen to be individual non-extended abstractions in relation to bodies and are complementary to bodies. This is what psychology is believed to be as a complementary abstraction to physics, a region bordering physics. No body is unaccompanied by soul, therefore though the spiritual realm has very different empirical laws these are still laws between “psychic entities” no matter they are abstractions or not. This is psychology in its properly positive and natural sense. Though no psychological individual act is given any “natural” validity, a psychologically “real” validity is given.
The paradox, however, which for positive psychology is overlooked, is that this supposedly complementary abstraction retains meant objectivities or constituted meanings for the psychological self. That is, what is supposedly “abstract” somehow is also “concrete” and “universal.” Individual psychology does not see this since it does not see the universal horizon of constitution of world-consciousness and stops at a reduction of an individual that remains cut off from the network as if it were not constituted through and through. The individual reduction therefore always stops at a stage where representations are external to one another as if they were independent, so that when one sees the representation, that representation is abstractly present and real and totally immanent to the act that intends it, whereas when one misses the representation, it is abstractly absent and immaterial and totally transcendent to the act that it becomes a thing in itself for that intending act. This fails to grapple with the true nature of intentional object, which is precisely not unconstituted, but is always constituted to be horizonal or immanently transcendent. The first epoché, therefore, which consists in individual one by one reduction, presumes that one “encounters” every time a thing that is “out there” and then abstracts away whatever is supposedly “out there” to attain what is “really psychically real.” But this is just a return to data atomistic sensationalism. This missed precisely the truly radical aspect of the psychological reduction, which must suspend the stubborn “out there” and attain the truly psychic realm, which is progressively self-constituting.
In the genuine realm of psychology, objectivity is mixed in the subjective, and what is proper to the soul is not attained through a simple “abstraction” of bodies “out there” but rather consists in a complex reduction that traces all objectivities back to the originary constitutive activities. Every object “out there” is not reduced to “data,” but to self-constituting phenomenon that becomes the intentional object, a horizon. But this horizon, since it is a horizon that is constituted through and through, it must always implicate an infinite network of interrelated horizons: it must always be world-horizonal, and any consciousness has to be world-consciousness. The genuine reduction is therefore never “one by one” or “individualistic,” but as soon as it retains an intentional object in its true character of being a horizon, it must go on and see it as a meaning validity corroborated by infinitely many other meaning validities, that it is always in a world. Thus the reduction has to be done by one strike: once a genuine horizon is attained, an object is reduced to a meaning, everything objective is automatically and in principle reduced to meaning all at once, since everything can be progressively analyzed in their constitutive activities for that object. We no longer “run into” things independent from us and then abstract. Rather, everything is abstracted and reduced beforehand for us, since everything in the world is reduced to meaning in the world-horizon of one single reduced object. In this way, the soul proper or the purely psychic that is actively constitutive as world-consciousness turns out to be the source of every objectivity. Everything that is objective is in principle constituted through subjectivity, and the capacity to constitute one objectivity provides the same capacity of the soul to constitute the whole objective world. But then what is supposedly the “abstract” or the purely psychic turns out to be the universally concrete at the same time.
In summary, with individual psychology, an outside is necessarily retained, and the purely psychic remains abstract, so that the subject in its activity can only constitute what is abstractly psychic, as in Humean fictionalism; even a later generalization of this individual reduction only gives us a world of absolutely immanent sense material, not the world proper in its genuine objectivity. With the universal epoché, the whole world is suspended all at once as “phenomena,” including the objectivity of the world, so that everything becomes an intentional object and the whole world in its genuine objectivity can be constituted through the actively constituting subjectivity. But to achieve the universal epoché an analysis of the intentional object is enough. It can either be done formally or concretely. That is, either one can say, since any given objective thing can be constituted as an intentional object in its genuine objectivity, the whole pre-given objective world, insofar as it is likewise given to me as objective, is also constituted, in this way, the universal epoché is consciously done in one strike; or one could be more concrete by saying that since this object here when reduced to an intentional object in its content of validity implicates an infinite horizon of interrelated concrete validities, I can in principle analyze all infinitely many validities that in themselves constitute an absolute horizon, i.e. the world, and here the universal epoché is done in principle, only it remains an unexplicated achievement which grounds the conscious activity of horizon analysis, and we do not “run into” different things to reduce to meaning validities again and again, but only simply work with meaning validities after meaning validities and on the plane that consists solely in meaning validities.
Yet this is not to say that psychology is not an abstraction, since psychology, even when phenomenologically informed, falls back to the natural attitude and takes interest in the factical ego and its real experiences. That is, it takes itself back again as belonging to this world as a region among others, the region of pure souls, to which all are related yet all are irreducible. This region posits pure souls and what is or can be transcendentally elucidated (as absolute achieving historicity) to be passively received validities and sedimented meanings always capable of being reactivated.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
1
1~7
哲学内部的内在矛盾(由现代科学最初筹划者的天真所造成或沉淀),与外部压力(表现为它显然无法像自然科学那样“理解”世界及其法则)共同作用,使这一筹划内在的真理活力衰竭。在这个意义上,哲学的萎缩剥夺了诸科学的“根”。
根必须从双重意义来理解。首先,形式上,它是诸科学的意义中心,因此类似于一个组装体的主人能指,在这个意义上也不能免于历史主义。只是按照某种哲学重新组织科学,并非真正重新激活一切可知者的整个视域、因而也非重新激活人类的整个存在,所以这更像症候而非治疗。
因此,在真正的内容上,哲学的“扎根”正是致力于发现ῥιζώματα πάντων(万物之根)。科学散落到各自有限区域,意味着一般意义的萎缩。真理变成积累的事实。科学虽仍保有有效性,但这些验证标准或继承概念无非是被动传统。事实的给予性只是与被动瘫痪的主体及其理性相对立。科学等待被重新据有:与生活分离的科学先天地就是谎言——《1844年手稿》。在最终根据上,一切实证科学都缺乏意义。
我们需要把这些科学聚合起来的哲学。这意味着必须重新激活现代科学的起源,把它们作为沉淀带回尚有真正联系、通过这一关联而统一的起源。但这种重新激活本身就是起源化:它不发现超越的起源(仿佛这些只是事实),而自身是起源的内在起源化,否则任何起源都不能成为真正活动的生命。这意味着如此发现的哲学已经是现象学。理性在我们的历史探究中自我实现:但这不是封闭于自身的回溯性,而是开启无尽的视域;理性把自身理解为无限可能性的开启,理解为超出一切有限无限者的真正无限。
把新哲学理解为简单对象,它就是一切视域的无限视域。但这贬低了它。毋宁说,新哲学是一切视域的无限化或视域化。
2
8~9d
首先要研究的是几何学在历史上、也在本体论上的首要性。它在历史上首先出现,恰因为在本体论上,它是其他一切物理科学唯一可能的科学基础。这依赖一切可感对象的首要构成。一言以蔽之,时空性是可感者唯一的形式,因为形状与运动是仅有的“共同性质”。我们可以想象没有颜色的对象,正如对象对盲人而言那样,或没有硬度、不可触的对象;但不可能想象完全没有形状、哪怕变化的形状的对象。一个人即使被剥夺所有感觉器官,仍能想象自己从一处移到另一处、勾画某种形状,所以无可怀疑,空间与时间是直观的唯一形式,或世界的形式。这一形式具有使其可度量的绝对且理念的客观性。因为度量要求单位同质,而没有理念抽象就无法得到这种同质性。但充实内容无法进行这种抽象,因为充实内容一经理念化,就丧失了自身的感性性质;所以,你虽能在知觉颜色时观察到层次,也可能具有某种颜色的界限理念,却没有哪种色调能同质到足以度量另一色调,而不摧毁这一色调自身的“意义”。
所以,世界结构是几何结构。但这一科学只有通过有指导目的的实践才能达到:箭的锋利要求角度尖锐,圆、直等等也一样。通过如此持续的完善,某些界限形状作为理念财富被取得,并作为理念界限,成为可主体间交流与传递的对象性。
然而,这些理念形状又返回真实世界,这世界通过非精确、相对不稳定的类型组织起来;它们指导制造度量越来越精确的仪器。这是双重过程:一方面,世界越来越几何化,所有形状相对于理念的现实精确性,逐渐更加近似、潜在地精确;另一方面,通过精确性的进展,充实内容(作为这些形状之质料的其他感性性质)与形状之间的关系愈发突出。
起初我们只知道,世界是一个形状世界,这些形状在事实上具有其他性质,而这些形状作为具体对象,在世界视域中彼此因果关联。也就是说,我们知道具体存在这样的关系,比如箭的锋利与角的尖锐、同种材料的重量与体积、音高与弦长的关系。但此时,对于这种关系是否是数学关系、是否能在几何上理解并度量,我们还不能作确定断言。
通过几何学与度量技艺的精确性,我们借助形状间的关系,间接地获得充实内容之间关系的精确表述,比如用水银柱高度表述温度,用天平上的砝码或弹簧的缩短表述重量。只有到这时,通过伽利略发明的方法,即今天我们称为实验的方法,自然才被彻底数学化;也就是说,所有性质都能在形状世界中找到其因果指标:具有某种一般化形状的事物拥有某种一般化性质,而这种性质与拥有别的性质的另一一般化形状相互作用时,以确定方式改变后者的形状。从此,我们不再主观地说什么是“热”,仿佛那只是感受,而有了温度计,通过形状变化客观显示温度变化。
科学虽通过这种数学化达到完全精确,却遗忘了自身在成为科学的历史中的起源:它依赖知觉、制作工具、度量、书写与交流,最终对真实对象进行实验的具体行为;因为研究已被确认为无可置疑之真者的起源,并不属于科学家的态度。
3
9e~9l
现代科学这样推进:它珍视理念与自然之间直接关系的假说,把这种关系看作验证关系。也就是说,从假说出发,以经验验证这些假说。这带来一系列后果。首先,现代科学的理想因此是“无限验证”,相当于“系统地消除错误与怀疑”,所以被认为会无限且线性地进步(至少依其自身理想如此),与实践生活间歇性的演化相对。
而且,这种验证的无限进步不同于直线的理念性,因为几何图形的理念性封闭自足:它们在几何直观中有内在意义。但科学的理念性是“真实世界”之最终总体的理念性,而真实世界本身是验证以及经验与理念之间运动的无限视域。一旦脱离被经验的世界以及生活持续的归纳性,它就会失去意义。
现在,我们理解,现代科学经历的无限化,是通过彻底数学化或符号化实现的无限化。数学公式虽可能仍有潜在意义,因而有“直观秩序”或“相互联系的视域之和谐”,其存在本身却遮蔽了这种有序性。这就是苏格拉底在《斐德若》中提出的书写问题。
现代科学家关心的不是“存在秩序”,也不是与特殊者相对的普遍者。相反,“methexis(分有)”问题被预设为已由字符或符号解决。“一般对象”不属于需要不同处理的另一种类(没有本体论差异),而是一切都只是同质的符号。特殊事物不是更高普遍者的实例化(真理通过一种回溯性证成的事实性奠基于现实),而是一般对象的解码(真理通过把事实还原为其意义的主动、常模化构成,奠基于原初明见)。因此,普遍者如何从特殊者产生的问题被遗忘,只留下“符号的事实”,一切问题都被当成密码学的技术问题。没有什么具有本体性的存在,一切都是符号。
这就是代数或算术化几乎神秘的“意义空洞化”。但胡塞尔并不反对这一创制。相反,他认为有必要建立一种由世界彻底形式化构成的形式本体论:关于世界的最普遍科学,在其中,世界被一般化为依任意规则运行的任何确定杂多(即一个可操作的公理系统)。
现代科学承担普遍数学化的任务。这源于它最原初的动机。数学化达到不可超越的精确性与预测准确性,因为它绝对理念、先天,并把自然理念化。而且,现代科学既然是把自身作为系统的理念性无限验证的筹划,其进步一旦停止,就会丧失活力或动力。既然它遗忘了自身真理,或无法凭自身前提为自身奠基,就永远需要新用途来证成自身:正如资本主义需要剩余价值,它总以更多有待验证的假说来验证假说。这一类比还更深:正如交换价值随着劳动分工进展而更加普遍,因为有限生产者的需要,为生产一个商品,市场中自然产生更多商品;同样,为验证属于某一数量的数学公式,在设计实验时,需要设计调节其他数量或变量的方法,而这往往涉及另一个数量关系。比如,为了使伽利略重力实验理念化,我们必须克服并控制空气阻力问题。
物质自然因此被吞没,还原为纯粹验证功能,成为理念性的外衣。现象学进行另一种验证:通过把理念联系到它在生活世界中的根,完成的不是预测的充实(真理由现实充实),而是意义的充实(真理由原初明见充实)。
现代科学若永远关心这些根本问题,就无法进步。其遗忘方法既是力量也是弱点:只有通过沉淀,或压抑重新激活起源这类问题,方法才能被技术性地使用。确实,沉淀、专注技术及意义耗损,是科学家态度所必需的;科学家本质上有限,关心作出正确预测的实践目的。正是通过压抑分有的本体论问题,以及通过自然直观为我们的概念性奠基的努力(这努力只发生于仍关心生活世界的古代科学),我们达到一种符号主义;而这种符号主义很快显露为致命的,因为它压抑科学—生活世界问题时,甚至压抑了自身在古代科学中的起源,并根本地压抑整个生活世界。但符号主义恰通过这种压抑,显露其技术本性。我们使用符号并维持传统(传统性几乎必然包含潜在的符号主义,因为这里所意指的对象性只通过书写传达,而书写总可能失去词语本应保存的明确理念对象性及其相关的原初生活世界,因为理念性无非是相关生活世界中的全时间性,从而退化为纯粹“痕迹”或密码),正是为了这个理由:技术性。但不合理的是,试图彻底压抑这种重新激活,使科学世界脱离科学之外的生活世界,耗尽一切意义。
现象学的历史探究,不只是回去为当下作回溯奠基,而是真正回去,把当下转变为未来:把真正潜能看作潜能,从而真正理解目的的必然性;这目的并非外在并强加于过去,而内在于自身动机,唯有如此,当下才在真正开端中被理解。黑格尔也是如此:只有意识未能进入下一阶段是真正可能的,它才在自由中被动机化,才是能够以内在而非强加的必然性主体化的真正主体;恰是对潜在失败本身的经验,作为否定内容滋养辩证法,但如果这种潜能存在,它就能作为肯定状态现实化。只有通过认识过去的真正可能性,当下的意义才被激活、获得起源。因此,这不是假设与验证的现代科学方法论,因为它恰恰关心这种假设与验证的“真理”或“意义”;不仅问假说如何“合理”或“很可能”,而问假说的本质而具体的可能性如何通过原初或经中介的明见层次构成;验证也不是对假说的事实性充实,而是构成假说所要求之明见性的复杂过程。换言之,人可以理解经验中使一个假说非常“可能”的全部理由,即它能在事实层面映现于现实(这以偶因论方式把科学与现实分开),却不理解是什么使假说“可能”,即它最初如何具体生成或构成。同样,验证不是对事实的这种观察,而是对明见事实性的具体构成;这一事实性自身是一项成就,由一切诠释、抽象与理论实践行为所中介。
4
10~17
自然的数学化成就了一个从具体生活世界抽象出来、自我封闭的物体领域。但这使唯一的世界内部发生分裂:物体世界与心理存在者世界。起初,数学物体世界与精神世界如何联系的问题就已迫切,因为客观理性的世界毕竟是主体性的成就。
然而,现代科学的整个筹划都依赖遗忘这些问题。世界的理性化在某种意义上以非理性方式发生(但须注意,这种非理性并非无条件,而有极有限的意义:只要它尚未在目的论理性的自我构成中获得恰当奠基,它才仍是非理性的)。
然而,在这一过程中,心理学以物理学为模型建立,因而成为霍布斯式的心理—物理人类学。经验主义只是理性主义的表现:它预设理性无所不在。甚至灵魂现在也用物理主义术语解释。
那一时代的形而上学也无法抵御客观主义的诱惑。这就是斯宾诺莎系统的主旨:在对根本本体的理性规定下,把物体、思想与情动几何化。这就是“系统性”的含义。斯宾诺莎最准确地捕捉了现代科学精神:智性通过认识及与其不可分的行动无限进展与完善,“快乐”随之增长,以及人—神形象的相互构建。这种科学在最真实的意义上是包罗一切的总体,是一个奇迹般的理念,超越其在理论—技术抽象领域中的单纯表现。
作为一切知识之根据的心理者,其数学化遭遇问题,引来一系列怀疑论者最激烈的批评。这种怀疑论远超希腊人以意见(doxa)的必然性对抗知识(episteme)的做法;因为心理者已显露为不可数学化,而现代科学理念把生活世界还原为理念化的数学世界,所以心理者自身岌岌可危,通过心理者奠基的世界亦然。对亚里士多德,虽然灵魂经验不能在数学上规定,却仍能理论化,因为它在生活世界中,具有本体性的意义。但对现代人,这种数学化的失败直接使灵魂及其经验可疑:这是因为生活世界被还原为客观真实世界,即理念化数学世界的纯粹现象,所以心理者丧失一切本体性,与心理者相关的客观世界因而也丧失本体性。
因此,现代哲学的整个精神由客观主义与先验主义的问题规定。它的历史任务是达到最终的现象学,一种研究事物自身的先验观念论。这作为历史终结,是最终奠立,经由它,“一切哲学与哲学家的统一指向能够敞开”。因此,它与黑格尔一致:历史终结是自由的完整形式,在其中形成的是开启,而非完全封闭,是向总体开启。这种开启因此恰通过历史研究在实践中实行:这一探究自身就是绝对者的实现。它把事实还原为常模,使历史主体性的个人责任从中涌出:我们内在地批评并重新激活过去与历史统一,既不把它们当作封闭的事实性,也不当作回溯的必然性,而当作自身包含根本潜能的环节。塔西佗:让我们与后代在友爱的德性上竞相争先!
笛卡尔既筹划现代科学的最终形式,也炸开它。他是第一个走到怀疑我们预先给予的世界之存在的人。而这种彻底怀疑给了他我思(cogito),但它有待扩展为与其被思者(cogitata)相关的诸思维活动(congitationes)的具体总体。这把世界还原为纯粹现象。但自我作为根据,必然意味着:一门无可置疑的科学既应建立于这一基础,也应从这一根据生成;这个自我必须能静态地承托知识建筑,同时也必须生成这种知识。
5
18~27
这里发挥作用的概念是意向性,即指向被思者(cogitatum)的思维活动(cogitatio),它构成或成就这种指向性所依赖的对象性本身。
所以,意向性有两个特征:首先,它内在于意识或主体;其次,它成就并构成对象性。胡塞尔对先前哲学的全部批评围绕这条轴展开。
首先,笛卡尔。虽然笛卡尔发现意向性及其指向性,却没看到这种指向性是内在于主体的“成就”。相反,他忽略指向性,主体变成贫瘠的东西,而非生成原则。自我被等同于“灵魂”,被赋予在心理学上对象化的天赋能力(如理性),问题于是变成这个孤立的“内部”对象如何与其“外部”相关。笛卡尔随后诉诸神的理念作为担保,尽管帮助他作出这一论证的“理性能力”,以及把存在包含为谓词的神的理念,本身作为对象性,无论论证是否为真,都必须首先被构成(而非简单预设或推断)。所以,笛卡尔的错误是把自我对象化为灵魂、一个被赋予性质的世界性存在残余,并追问“这个封闭的东西”如何与另一个自我封闭的东西——世界——相关。他也因此假定,理性的自明性是灵魂天生的独立自明性,因而是“客观自明性”,却没看到这种无可置疑性需要通过无可置疑的主体性之活动、通过真正无可置疑的自明性之自我澄清来构成;否则这些“自明性”就只是没有如何、没有为何的神秘建构(笛卡尔的“自然之光”),因而无法抵御休谟式怀疑。
这一错误有三重:首先,世界未被充分还原,仍被当作“外部”;其次,自我被对象化为一个具有天生成品性质的东西,作为“内部”,然而其性质也应被还原(过快排除了恶魔);第三,内外由神连接,但论证神存在时却预设了这里正在质疑的东西,即对象性与理性本身。
然而,后来的发展史遗忘了这一根本问题。主体被预设为另一个具有心理能力的对象,是内在感觉材料的所有者;世界则依旧。哪一边具有本体论首要性,决定该哲学是经验主义还是理性主义。
首先,以休谟为代表的经验主义立场。不同于洛克,他没有不加批判地把自我只当作自然—心理存在者,而是抓住自我是进行成就的自我、生成的自我这一事实(所以它富于活力,并因而是难以捕捉的主体性,而非仅仅另一个对象)。但他仍把这个自我看成由联想与习惯的“法则”调节,这自相矛盾。而且,他错过意向性“指向性”的关键:主体性不只是内在材料的“成束”,而是“对象性”本身的成就。因此,休谟看到了主体的生成方面,在这一点上正确,却没看到所生成的恰是对象性,而非内在于心灵的虚构。没有简单感觉材料这种东西:任何材料自身都是由主体构成的对象。
其次,以莱布尼茨为例的理性主义立场。对理性主义者,内在于自我的理性思想之形而上学真理,被直接预设为已由笛卡尔与神的设定解决:神是前定和谐的担保。所以,剩下的只是把经验中仅仅主观者在思想中变为客观者的技术:通过作为常模科学的逻辑与纯粹理性的反思,澄清形而上学和一般本体论。
康德立于这一传统。因此,他受休谟启发,希望更彻底地把理性知识之真奠基于经验,因为前科学的人仍认识“对象”(他没有机会读《人性论》,所以不知道真正的休谟问题,即“观念”与“经验”通过主体性的生成)。经验本身由逻辑范畴组织;理论中明确者,在经验中已隐含。但与所有理性主义者一样,他预设这些范畴的给予性,仿佛它们只是属于某种能力。
所以,关键批评概念是意向性,用来把对象的一切“给予性”还原为其作为对象性的被构成性。它用来反对笛卡尔,因为他预设自我心理能力与世界性存在的给予性;反对休谟,因为他预设自我的首要给予性,以及自我对“内在”感觉材料的占有,从而把一切对象性还原为“纯粹”虚构;反对莱布尼茨,因为他预设理性思考的形而上学真理,以及理性思考自身的给予性;反对康德,理由完全相同。
胡塞尔也用同一个概念分配赞许。他赞许笛卡尔,因为他发起对主体性的探究,虽然遗漏主体性所起的构成、生成作用(而不仅是奠基作用);他赞许休谟,因为他恰研究了构成问题,却把被构成性误作内在性和/或不存在;他赞许莱布尼茨,因为他首先提出普全数学(mathesis universalis)的表述,虽然完全错过这一任务的构成问题;最后,他赞许康德,因为他把知识问题重新引向主体,并表述为构成问题,虽然这只是“知识”的构成,预设固定能力及其性质。在所有这些人中,只有休谟心中有“主体的历史”问题,虽然他由此退回历史主义。
6
28~32
直观结构比康德模型复杂得多。空间统一体通过不同视角、不同显象作为自身在场被给予;只有反思态度才把这一统一体分析为杂多。自身在场在时间中也如此显现。此外,动觉在构成统一知觉领域中起关键作用;被知觉身体之活身体中的动觉统一了知觉。知觉领域以其自身方式是一切精神之物的根据,要求得到研究。在这种领域中,我们也构成其他自我,甚至自身自我也可被反思、对象化,而我们所有行为与产物都作为习性沉淀在自身中。科学的新转向,是不再把这个预先给予的生活世界预设为有效、用来服务其他视域,而是在它自身完整的视域性中展开它。关于这个世界,有这么多问题可问!
哲学任务也需要研究匿名主体性。但这一主体性能被研究吗?这难道不会把主体变成对象,失去主体性吗?只有通过彻底的悬搁,不再试图寻找绝对对象,而只研究一切对象性如何通过主体构成、对象性与主体如何复杂地交织并统一于同一历史,才可能。“根”的问题。
康德的问题在于,他预设主体超越一切直观,而非通过直观构成直观。这是因为他害怕一切直观都是后天的,因而是心理的。他不认为历史的先天者可能存在。主体性只能通过回溯推断,而不能通过前进描述。
深度世界是根的世界。把它与表面统一起来,是哲学的任务。
7
33~35
生活世界起初显得局部、附属于客观科学世界。但它最终显露为对象性的真正根据。然而,“根据”究竟意味着什么,仍有歧义。一方面,生活世界似乎与客观世界是相关联的:两者各有“真”的标准,也各有自明性,因此,它们的自明性只是通过一种“奠基”或“关联”方式彼此联系,有限世界中的自明性对应于绝对世界中的自明性。中间有作为中介的项,即“理性”或“转向”的整个视域。依这一解释,生活世界与客观世界是两个杂多,通过“转向”的视域行为而关联。这与克莱因的筹划相协调。
但在某种意义上,生活世界就是这个绝对者,或最终显露为这个绝对者。客观世界只是主体的一项成就,应被带回主体的具体生活。此前,我们对生活世界感兴趣,只是因为科学的有效性与自明性以某种方式依赖或可译回我们在生活世界中的直观层次(事物自身之自身在场的直观)。现在,我们对生活世界自身感兴趣,因为它自身就是一个/那个绝对者,自身需要澄清其原初自明性。最终问题是两个世界如何在其视域中统一。按霍普金斯的解释,胡塞尔在这里失足了:他设定直接奠基,仿佛科学真的能以经验方式变得可直观。但也似乎可以认为,胡塞尔只是指出生活世界与科学的必然联系:后者起源于前者,因而由前者奠基。因此,现象学的任务是,在把科学重新联系到其起源、从而见证理性成就的意义上,使科学直观化,而非直接用直观充实(“兑现”)概念。取决于究竟是哪种情况,克莱因的工作将是对胡塞尔的批评或补充。至少可以确定,在绝对生活世界的情形中,它指的是属于构成一切对象性(包括科学对象性)的先验主体性的世界。
因此,可以得出以下结论。首先,科学通过作为具体历史成就而积累的意义奠基于生活世界,也因为其自明性“依赖”直观自明性。此外,这种先验主体性首先在具体生活世界中运动、行动,科学是它的一种产物,所以生活世界多于科学世界。两世界由此可以从相互敌对中被扬弃,综合于生活具体的相互和谐之中;理论态度是其中诸态度之一,尽管可能是较高者。
生活世界是意见的世界,知识的世界从中生长,并不断在生活世界中更新。世界似乎被分开:一个客观而绝对,另一个主观而相对。但它们仍在同一个意识生活的世界中。所以,它们应统一在同一个生活世界。意见与知识是一体,在同一个世界中相互奠基或可被经验。这是最终悖论:客观者如何能由仅仅主观者构成?关键是通过悬搁纯化的意向性。
这把我们带到悬搁,即如事物显现那样看待它的悬置。现象学家的态度是一项习性成就:其主动成就可以暂时悬置,但习性的潜能仍指向目标,总能被重新激活。
8
36~44
胡塞尔在这里充分阐明了任务。首先,把科学构建的客观世界还原为前科学的主观相对生活世界。这一还原通过第一次悬搁实行,取消所有客观科学。留下的是一种科学,或对生活世界“结构”的理论兴趣。不同于逻辑或客观的先天者,生活世界的先天者具有一种“结构”:它不独立于世界本质上相对的给予性,而只是这些多样给予性所指向者。换言之,结构总只是描述性的,而非实定的。而且,这一结构包含视域的否定性本身;纯粹肯定的纯理念对象性排除了这种视域性。
其次,我们把这一自然生活世界还原为与其相关的先验主体性;在该生活世界中,尽管有视域性,一切对象性仍被当作在同一个融贯整体中有效。这一先验还原只能通过一次悬置全部有效性的普遍悬搁实现。所有这类存在者层面的有效性都被还原为现象。
完整还原必须分两步,因为第一次悬搁提供了理论兴趣的第一个领域,即作为一切科学之根据的意见科学;但它还不够深,因为两者的根都在主体性。此外,第一次悬搁虽揭示视域本性、从而还原了理论教条主义,却未还原实践教条主义:虽然生活世界中不再预设对实定现实者的知识,对世界现实性的信念却仍根深蒂固。这概括了对历史怀疑论的最初刻画:希腊人以意见与知识对峙,笛卡尔却悬置了世界自身。
9
45~51
这是对先验现象学最清晰、最重要的阐述。通过绝对悬搁,每种本体论或科学,甚至生活世界本体论,都从其对象性被还原。也就是说,即使生活世界本体论与理念性无关,它仍关心被当作既定或有效的“结构”。但先验现象学应连这一最少的事实性残余也还原。
形式本体论使主体从经验科学中解放。但它又设定自身事实。质料本体论,即生活世界本体论,意在说明世界的理念结构。但生活世界本体论仍设定事实。
通过先验悬搁,事实被还原为常模与被构成的有效性。由此,把一切有效性与明见性还原到无限相互依赖的相对视域。所有明见性在扎根于单子的最终意义中展开、重新激活。这不只是提供绝对明见性,而是就根本意义与意蕴提供自明性。以自我极的统一(cogito)说明每个杂多(cogitatione)作为被构成对象性(cogitatum)的最终统一,是现象学的任务。这是一种绝对展开,是对恰切知识的追求,或把知识带到充分意识中的无限恰切化。经过彻底批判反思后重新承担莱布尼茨的任务:普遍理性。
10
52~55
对先验现象学方法的四项澄清。首先,现象学不是客观科学,它关心视域如何通过主体性中介相互构成,有效性如何通过其他有效性构成,而不停在某种显然的自明性;相反,它是绝对地重新激活一切视域的无限任务。
其次,现象学的目的论不以某个终点为目标,而是开放的。也就是说,它以总体为目标。它也不取消任何特殊目的的目的性质,而将其保留在现象学家的凝视中。
第三,现象学仍是关心本质与结构的理念科学,虽然这些“事实性”始终只由其被构成的本性保证;也就是说,它们作为结构,仍是具体先验主体性之绝对流内部的内在超越性。它们作为本质,不是被设定的对象,而是开放视域,因而被活动与主体性贯穿:首先,就理念性的构成而言,它们通过先验方法(理念变更)产生;其次,就内容的构成而言,一个区域与其他区域相邻,并被包含在统一主体性中。
最后,主体性自我构成,因而在他异性中构成自身,是原初主体自身内部的主体间性。因此,主体把自身构成为对象,并构成为与诸对象群体相关,其中包括人类整体。不仅人类,主体性的其他变式也包含在构成中。先验自然:事实性被还原为绝对活动。
必有一种不可还原的事实性或自明性,即自我的无可置疑性,或先验关联这一无可置疑的事实。但这不是为了给对象性或客观真理奠基,而是为了把对象与主体联系、统一,使其有效性不仅“显然”“有根据”,也“有意义”“可理解”。换言之,我们不仅看到对象与先验主体性之间奠基的事实,感觉或知道它们有根据,还看到它们如何被奠基。根据不是神话般或抽象的一,而是现实、可理解、统一、具体的杂多。
11
56~58
最令人惊讶的阅读之一。首先,胡塞尔分析哲学现状。哲学失去指导线索,未能统一所有理论的技术或技艺。哲学未能充分把握技艺(techné),不能说明其先验起源。先验哲学反对客观主义,所以这种教条客观主义不被信任,但先验哲学家尚未充分恰当地开始其任务。相反,他们仍沉浸于神话般建构,因晦涩难解而失信。如果客观主义不可理解,是因为它教条地假定世界的预先给予性,那么先验主义同样因这一假定而不可理解,只是这里预先给予的是主体性(即那些神话般建构)。最终,整个哲学一次而永远地失去信誉。
胡塞尔随后作出令人惊讶的转向。先验哲学至今失败的原因,恰是因害怕心理主义而压抑心理学。这一恐惧并非不正当,但一旦取得先验洞见,就必须回到给予具体而运作的主体的生活世界,在经验中实际“验证”它。数学及一切这类客观主义自然科学要求演绎的自明性。但先验哲学需要一种不仅普遍绝对,而且总是“可重复”“习性化”的自明性。这种“习性”还能意味着什么,除了它必须不断在经验中被验证,并总可在具体经验中被重新收集?也就是说,即便沉浸于自然态度,我们也能够、而且必须总能再次从自然态度挣脱。这无非要求一种充分展开、对先验者进行中介的心理学:先验者必须奠基于经验者并自我构成(正如黑格尔那里,绝对精神必须被抛回历史;绝对者的辩证法)。必须能理解先验哲学及其变式与异化的起源,所以,要完整阐述,就必须研究由此先验地转化了的心理学、历史学、政治学及每门科学。心理学是典范,却绝非唯一。
因此,每门学科研究的现象,都必须以双重方式由现象学转化。首先,作为事实科学,它要被还原并理解为先验成就。其次,一旦如此转化,就还需理解:它作为构成,如何反过来构成先验主体性的自我构成,从而完成目的论。即便在第二种情况下,相关科学仍处于还原中,不再天真地具有事实性;它依赖事实者,但其事实被理解为允许绝对主体辩证地自我理解的自我对象化。这些事实现在只是以一种说法(façon de parler)而言,是准先验的;它们仍可能不可还原地是事实性的,却不再天真,因为作为事实,它们现在是先验者的习性化指标。但必须记住,它们不像某些海德格尔主义者可能预设的那样,是先验者的必要条件;自我构成的先验主体性绝对首要,没有预先的先验还原,就不能得到这些准先验者。
所以,先验还原之后有三个层次:作为恰当先验者之准先验、准事实指标的经验科学;经过先验还原、被构成为那些事实的杂多(cogitatum-cogitation);以及通过这些从事实还原出来的杂多而构成自身的先验主体性。
12
59~64
心理学应通过先验现象学转化。但必须理解,旧心理学,即以物理学为模型的心理—物理学科,是如何被创立的。
在生活世界中,身体经验本质上不同于灵魂经验。灵魂是被经验为“活着”“支配着”的对象,而非可操弄的广延对象。但也必须说,所有灵魂都具身,因而间接关联于身体。身体以某种方式仍被包容在主观经验中,内在于主观经验。那么,身体与灵魂如何被平行化、置于同等地位,心理学又为何以物理学为模型?身体与灵魂属于不同杂多或区域,在各自区域中应以不同方式理解。它们在方法上的等同或平行,在内在上不可能且荒谬。相反,必须把它们视为两个性质不同的杂多,统一于一门普遍科学(或更窄地说,统一于对生活世界的一项研究,即经过先验现象学转化的心理学)。
总之,当前心理学与物理学对立的范式假定两点:首先,它们是两个自我封闭的区域;其次,虽然自我封闭,它们却有同一总括方法。这是客观主义贯穿始终的前提:一切事物都是自我封闭的对象,只有理念化方法能通达它们。要解构当前范式,胡塞尔有两个任务。首先,说明物理与心理在经验中以某种方式相区别,使同一方法不适用于另一者;这通过澄清活的灵魂与身体的独特特征来完成。
但如果主观者完全不同于客观者,为什么最终会把它对象化?这是第二个任务:打破两个区域的自我封闭。正如灵魂具身,身体也有灵,并被主观地知觉。它们仍是主观经验的不同区域,却在本质上共同归属。这两方面应统一于同一门先验现象学科学;理想上,每个区域包含一个不同于另一者、却也不自我封闭的杂多;它们应是充分自觉地相互构成的不同杂多。
自伽利略以来,物体通过理念化与主观经验分离。自笛卡尔以来,由于含混,以及在本质上不可能以同样数学方式彻底理念化,灵魂只被不清晰地理念化。这种心理学有价值,但只是作为共同构成的区域,而非作为完全压抑内在经验研究、与之分离的自我封闭研究领域。同样,解释与描述的区分仍有效,但必须针对不同杂多作不同理解。
客观主义对心理学的双重含义:1.一切对象本质上形式同质、内容自闭,即就被数学理念化而言同质,就被经验而言异质。2.心理学关乎这样的对象——灵魂,它在内容上与身体自我封闭,却只在形式上可由数学理念化通达。反对此误解,胡塞尔提出一种颠覆与中介:1.例如,灵魂在生活世界中形式上不同于身体(所以不能如物理主义心理学所信那样数学化),却与身体内容连续,因为它在自身中构成身体(所以并不像怀疑论心理学或心理主义所信那样,只关乎“内在经验”);它没有与一切差异分离的统一形式,其内容也非完全自闭、不可交流;形式如内容,内容亦如形式。2.因此,科学也需研究生活世界中每个区域的连续变更,一直进行到它抵达与自身不同的另一区域;同样,它也应包含客观主义科学,彻底抽离所有区域差异,以达到形式本体论的统一区域。这些区域在先验主体性中相互构成,是其自我构成。
13
65~70
二元论的起源不只是历史偶然,虽然它通过历史成就起源。它由世界自身结构所动机化,从中可以抽象地取得两个方面:物理与心理。仅仅提出内在心理经验,不足以防止二元论,因为其封闭把它变成类似物体的东西。但物体作为理念化对象性,较易被抽象地理解为与精神分离;与之不同,被经验的灵魂总设定自我性及意向性关联。在纯粹心理学下,完整的内在世界要作为被传递、沉淀的有效性与意义之相互联系的总体而阐明。这通过心理学悬搁实现,从而抵达先验悬搁的入口。在心理学悬搁中,被当作隐藏有效性者,是那些“实在”的自我行为与心理经验,虽然其意向相关项或内容的有效性被悬置。只有通过这种心理学,混杂于其他区域的一切心理学研究,才能在其原初心理学意义中被理解。
先验现象学的路线图:被自然地接受、由数学统辖的经验科学,其中数学既是理念自然的本体论(所有经验在自身之外设定、用来调节经验的理念性是什么,即超感性对象性;纯几何),也是自然经验的方法论(现实经验关联的、转译经验的理念性是什么,即感性对象性;应用几何);以及心理学(分为抽象描述的自然科学与人文科学,另加纯粹心理学),每个都是一个区域(客观世界与主观生活世界);形式本体论是关于任何世界的本体论;形而上学或质料本体论是关于实在(最终生活世界)的本体论,是包围一切区域的一个区域,由实在的多个区域以及可能的区域性自身所中介;先验现象学在一切区域之下,作为构成其交互与统一的活动根据,并通过实行展示构成的普遍性及一切区域的具体性。先验现象学的引入依赖纯粹心理学的成就与生活世界的重新引入,因为只有通过科学世界的这种重新主体化,才找到绝对中心区域;它加上形式本体论,给出形式上完成的形而上学,在其中先验活动无限且绝对地起作用。
几何学的起源意味着:即便在知觉中,也必须存在保证被知觉对象同一性的知觉理念性,而不只是非知觉的理念性,否则我们如何“经验”“知觉”同一个世界?我们只能说“思考”同一个世界,而不能说“经验”同一个世界。也就是说,不仅必须有共同概念,还必须有共同知觉。算术也一样,因为它提供直观单位。随后,奠基于这些,我们有代数,它不仅提供纯粹的直观知觉对象,也提供一般的纯粹对象。
另一方面,红性这样的概念是本质,它作为理念对象仍可在范畴上被直观,虽然原初地不应被理解为“多中之一”,不是单位,不是一般对象;相反,它是更高本质,自身不是一个红,甚至不是一般的红。这种符号主义产生形式本体论,其对象是“任意某物”,一种表面的本体论。
所谓抽象不能是亚里士多德式的“属于本体、却自身非本体的东西”,因为若如此,就可说颜色抽象,因为它们不独立存在。但那样我们就在作有效性判断,仿佛颜色没有自身有效性或“存在”方式。确实,至多可以说,对自然态度或生活世界而言,自然与精神是抽象;但即便这也不精确,因为生活世界彻底且本质上是精神的,却并未被看作具体,而是抽象。不能说生活世界自身抽象。换言之,不能因为几何学并不真实存在就说它抽象,因为它对几何学家而言充分存在;也不能说生活世界完全具体,因为它彻底可还原为心理者。具体与抽象纯粹是结构、技术概念,即其本质的共同归属或互补性,而非“事物”的本体特征。
14
71~72
心理学就其作为描述某个事物区域——灵魂——的实证科学而言是抽象的,即使灵魂并不以与身体平行的方式处理。像身体一样,灵魂被心理学当作个体:通过具身而个体化。但它们仍被抽空形体性,只是“具身”,自身却非“广延”。所以,灵魂被看作相对于身体的个别非广延抽象,并与身体互补。这就是心理学被认为是物理学之互补抽象的意义,一个与物理学接壤的区域。没有身体不伴随灵魂,所以精神领域虽有非常不同的经验法则,它们仍是“心理实体”之间的法则,无论那些实体是否抽象。这是心理学恰当的实证、自然意义。虽然没有心理学上的个别行为被赋予任何“自然”有效性,却被赋予了心理学上的“实在”有效性。
然而,实证心理学所忽略的悖论是:这个据说互补的抽象,为心理自我保留了被意指的对象性或被构成的意义。也就是说,据说“抽象”者不知如何又是“具体”“普遍”的。个体心理学没看到这一点,因为它没看到世界意识构成的普遍视域,而停在对个体的还原,这个体仍与网络切断,仿佛并非彻头彻尾被构成。因此,个体还原总停在某个阶段,在那里表象彼此外在,仿佛独立:看到表象时,表象就抽象地在场、实在,完全内在于意指它的行为;没有看到表象时,它就抽象地缺席、非物质,完全超越那个行为,以至于对该意指行为成为物自身。这未能把握意向对象的真正本性:它恰恰并非未被构成,而总被构成为视域性的,或内在地超越的。所以,第一次悬搁,即逐个进行的个体还原,预设每次“遇到”一个“在外面”的东西,然后把据说“在外面”的一切抽掉,以取得“真正心理实在”的东西。但这不过退回材料原子论式的感觉主义。它恰错过心理学还原真正彻底的一面:必须悬置顽固的“在外面”,达到逐步自我构成的真正心理领域。
在心理学的真正领域中,对象性混在主观者之中,灵魂自身的东西不是通过对“外面”物体的简单“抽象”得到,而在于一种把一切对象性追溯到原初构成活动的复杂还原。每个“在外面”的对象不是被还原为“材料”,而是被还原为自我构成的现象,成为意向对象、一个视域。但这一视域既然彻底被构成,就必然始终牵连相互关联视域的无限网络:它必然总是世界视域性的,任何意识都必须是世界意识。因此,真正还原从不“逐个”或“个体主义”地进行,而是一旦把意向对象保留为它真正的视域性质,就必须继续把它看作由无限多个其他意义有效性确证的意义有效性,它总在世界中。所以,还原必须一举完成:一旦取得真正视域,把对象还原为意义,一切客观者就自动、在原则上同时被还原为意义,因为一切都可在其对于该对象的构成活动中被逐步分析。我们不再“碰到”独立于我们的事物,然后抽象;相反,一切对我们而言预先已被抽象、还原,因为世界中的一切,都在一个单独被还原对象的世界视域中被还原为意义。如此,真正灵魂或纯粹心理者,作为世界意识而主动构成,最终显露为每种对象性的来源。一切客观者原则上都通过主体性构成,而构成一个对象性的能力,提供了灵魂构成整个客观世界的同一种能力。但如此,据说“抽象”者或纯粹心理者,同时显露为普遍具体者。
总之,在个体心理学中,外部必然被保留,纯粹心理者仍抽象,所以主体在其活动中只能构成抽象心理者,如休谟式虚构论;即使后来把这种个体还原一般化,也只给出绝对内在的感性材料世界,而非具有真正对象性的世界自身。通过普遍悬搁,整个世界包括其对象性,同时作为“现象”被悬置,使一切成为意向对象,具有真正对象性的整个世界便可通过主动构成的主体性而构成。但要达成普遍悬搁,分析意向对象已足够。这可以形式地,也可以具体地完成。也就是说,或者可以说:既然 任何给定客观事物,都可在其真正对象性中被构成为意向对象,那么整个预先给予的客观世界,就其同样作为客观者给予我而言,也是被构成的;如此,普遍悬搁自觉地一举完成。或者,可以更具体地说:既然这里这个对象被还原为意向对象时,其有效性内容牵连相互关联的具体有效性之无限视域,那么我原则上就能分析所有无限多个有效性,它们自身构成绝对视域,即世界;在这里,普遍悬搁原则上已完成,只是仍为未经阐明的成就,为视域分析的自觉活动奠基。我们并不一次又一次“碰到”不同事物再把它们还原为意义有效性,而只是处理一个又一个意义有效性,在完全由意义有效性构成的平面上工作。
但这不是说心理学并非抽象,因为心理学即使接受现象学启发,也会返回自然态度,关心事实自我及其实在经验。也就是说,它再次把自身当作属于这个世界、与其他区域并列的一个区域,即纯粹灵魂区域,一切都与之相关,却又都不可还原为它。这一区域设定纯粹灵魂,并把已经或能够被先验阐明者(作为绝对成就的历史性),设定为被动接受、总能重新激活的有效性与沉淀意义。