Gui Ruiyan

Edmund Husserl · 埃德蒙德·胡塞尔
The Crisis of European Sciences · 欧洲科学的危机

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The Crisis of European Sciences — Reading notes

Apple Notes

Revised 13 December 2024

In this note / 篇目

1

1~7

The immanent contradiction (caused or sedimented by the naïveté of the first projectors of modern science) within philosophy acts together with the external pressures (as manifest in its apparent failure to “understand” the world and its laws as natural sciences do) to deaden the vivacity of truth inherent in this project. In this sense, the atrophy of philosophy deprives the multiplicity of sciences of their “root.”

Root has to be understood in its double meaning. First, formally, it is the center of meaning for multiple sciences, and is therefore analogous to the master signifier of an assemblage, and in this sense is not exempt from historicism. Simply to reorganize sciences according to some philosophy is not a genuine reactivation of the whole horizon of everything knowable, hence the whole existence of humanity, and is thus more of a symptom than a cure.

In its genuine content, therefore, the “rootedness” of philosophy is nothing short of its dedication to the discovery of ῥιζώματα πάντων (roots of all things). The falling away of sciences into their own limited regions purports to an atrophy of meaning in general. Truths become accumulated facts. Though sciences still retain their validity, yet these criteria of verification or inherited concepts are nothing but passive traditions. The givenness of facts simply stands opposed to the passive and paralyzed subject and its reasons. The sciences are waiting to be reappropriated: science detached from life is a priori a lie —— The 1844 Manuscripts. In its ultimate ground, all positive sciences lack meaning.

We need a philosophy that brings these sciences together. This means we have to reactivate the origins of modern science so as to bring them, as sediments, back to their origins when they still have genuine connections and are unified through this nexus. But this reactivation is itself an origination: it does not discover transcendent origins (as if these were just facts), but is itself the immanent origination of origins, for otherwise no origin can be truly active life. This means the philosophy thus discovered is already phenomenology. Reason self-realizes in our historical inquiry: yet this is not a self-enclosed retroactivity, but an opening up of unending horizons: Reason understands itself as the opening of infinite possibilities, as true infinity that goes beyond all limited infinities.

The new philosophy, comprehended as a simple object, is the infinite horizon of all horizons. Yet this diminishes it. Rather, the new philosophy is the infinitization or the horizonning of all horizons.

2

8~9d

First of all, what is to be investigated is the historical but also the ontological primacy of geometry. It is historically first precisely because it is ontologically the only possible scientific foundation for all other physical sciences. This is dependent on the primary constitution of all sensible objects. In one word, spatial-temporality is the only form of the perceptible, since shapes and motions are the only “common properties.” We can imagine an object without color, as an object is this for a blind person, or an object without hardness, as something intangible, yet it is impossible for an object to be possibly imagined without some shape, even a changing one. As a person deprived of all sense organs can still nonetheless imagine himself moving from place to place, delineating some shape, it is indubitable that space and time are the only forms of intuition, or forms of the world. This form has the absolute and ideal objectivity that makes it measurable. For measurement requires homogeneity of a unit, and such is not obtained without an ideal abstraction. Yet such an abstraction is not possible with plenums, since plenums, when idealized, lose their very sensible qualities; hence you could observe gradations in perceiving color, you might also have limit ideas of a color, yet no shade of color can become something homogeneous enough to measure another shade without destroying “the sense” of this very shade.

Thus the structure of the world is a geometrical structure. This science, however, is only attained to through practices with a guiding purpose: sharpness of an arrow requires acuteness of the angle, so is roundness, straightness, so on and so forth. By such continuous perfections, some limit shapes are thus acquired as ideal possessions, and qua ideal limits become objectivities communicable and transmissible intersubjectively.

These ideal shapes are nonetheless returned to the real world, which is structured through anexact and relatively unstable types, and guide the construction of more and more precisely measured instruments. This is a twofold process: on the one hand, the world becomes more and more geometrical and all shapes become gradually more approximate and potentially exact in relation to the actual exactness of ideality; on the other, through such progress in exactness, a relation between plenums (other sense-properties that are material of these shapes) and shapes become more pronounced.

At first, we only know that since the world is a world of shapes which factually have other properties, and these shapes as concrete objects are causally related to each other in the world horizon. That is, we know that concretely there is such a relation between, let’s say sharpness of the arrow and the acuteness of the angle, or weight and volume of the same material, or pitch and the length of a string. But at this point we can say nothing definitive about if such relation is a mathematical one, one that can be geometrically understood and measured.

Through the exactitude of geometry and the art of measurement, we obtain exact formulations of such relations between plenums indirectly in terms of the relation between shapes, such as temperature in terms of height of the mercury column, weight in terms of the counterweight on a balance or the shortening of a spring. And only now, through the method invented by Galileo, the method which we today call experiment, nature becomes thoroughly mathematized, or that, all properties can find its causal indices in the world of shapes: a thing of a certain generalized shape possesses a certain generalized property, and such property, while interacting with another generalized shape possessing some other property, changes that other shape in a determinate way. From now on, it is no longer for us to say subjectively what is “hot” as if it were a mere feeling, but rather we have a thermometer that displays objectively the change of temperature through its change of shape.

Science, though it achieves complete exactitude through this mathematization, nonetheless forgets its origin in this history of becoming science, that it is dependent on the concrete acts of perception, tool-making, measuring, writing and communicating, and finally experimenting with real objects, since it does not belong to the scientist’s attitude to inquire the origin of what is established to be apodictically true.

3

9e~9l

The movement of modern science proceeds in the following manner: it cherishes the hypothesis of the immediate relation between the ideal and natural as a relation of verification. That is, it starts with a hypothesis, and uses experience to verify such hypotheses. This leads to a number of consequences. First, the ideal of modern science is thus “the infinite verification”, which is tantamount to a “systematic eradication of errors and doubts”, and is hence presumed to infinitely and linearly make progress (at least according to its own ideal), as contrasting to the intermittent evolution of practical life.

Moreover, such an infinite progress of verification is different from the ideality of a straight line, since the ideality of geometrical figures are self-contained and self-sufficient: they have intrinsic meaning in geometric intuition. Yet the ideality of science is the ideality of the ultimate totality of “the real world”, which as is is the infinite horizon of verification and movement between experience and the ideal. It would lose its meaning once it becomes detached from the experienced world and the permanent inductivity of life.

Now, we understand the infinitization undergone by modern science is the infinitization through a thorough mathematization or symbolization. The mathematical formulae, though they might still have latent meanings and hence “orders of intuitions” or “harmonies of interconnected horizons”, their very existence obscures this orderedness. This is the problem of writing as formulated by Socrates is Phaedrus.

What matters for the modern scientists are not “orders of being”, nor the universal as opposed to the particular. Rather, the question of “methexis (participation)” is presupposed to be solved by the character or the symbol. The “general objects” are not of a different species that requires a different treatment (no ontological difference), but that all are but symbols that are homogeneous. A particular thing is not the instantiation of a higher universal (truth grounded in reality through a factuality that retroactively justifies), but the deciphering of a general object (truth to be grounded in originary evidence through a reduction of the fact to the active and normalizing constitution of its meaning). Hence the problem of how the universal is to arise out of the particular is forgotten, but only the “fact of symbols” is retained, and we treat all questions as technical problems of cryptology. Nothing has substantial being but all is symbolic.

This is the almost mysterious “emptying of meaning” of algebra or the arithmetization. Husserl, however, is not opposed to this institution. Rather, he believes a formal ontology consisting in the radical formalization of the world is necessary: the most general science of the world, wherein the world is generalized as any definite manifold (that is, an operable axiomatic system) following any rule whatsoever.

Modern science takes up the task of universal mathematization. This is due to its most origninary motivation. For mathematization achieves an unsurpassable exactness and precision of prediction, since it is absolutely ideal and a priori, and idealizes nature. Moreover, as modern science is this project of infinite verification of its ideality as a system, if its progress ever stops, it loses its vitality or impetus. Since it has forgotten its truth or is incapable of grounding itself by its own premises, it permanently needs a new utility to justify itself: even as how capitalism needs surplus value, it always verifies its hypothesis with more hypotheses to be verified. The analogy runs even deeper: just as exchange value becomes more prevalent alongside the progress of division of labor, as to produce one commodity more commodities are naturally generated in the market through the need of the finite producer, so to verify a mathematical formula belonging to a quantity, in the devising of its experiment a way to regulate other quantities or variables is to be devised, which more often than not involves another quantitative relation. For instance, in order to idealize Galileo’s gravity experiments, we have to overcome and control the problem of air resistance.

Material nature therefore is engulfed and is reduced to nothing but a verificatory function, a garment for ideality. Phenomenology effects a different verification: not the fulfillment of a prediction (truth as fulfilled by reality), but the fulfillment of meaning (truth as fulfilled by originary evidence) through connecting the ideal to its root in the life-world.

Modern science is impossible to progress if it is forever concerned with those fundamental problems. Its method of oblivion is both its strength and its foible: only through sedimentation or the suppression of questions such as the reactivation of origins can a method be used technically. Indeed, sedimentation and focus on technicality and a depletion of meaning is necessary to the scientist’s attitude, who is essentially finite and concerned with a practical purpose of making correct predictions. It is through the suppression of the ontological problem of participation and the effort to ground our conceptuality through natural intuition (an effort that only arises in ancient science that is still concerned with the life-world) that we arrive at a symbolism; and this symbolism is soon revealed to be fatal since through its suppression of the science—lifeworld problem it suppresses even its own origin within ancient science and, fundamentally, the lifeworld altogether. Yet it is precisely through this suppression symbolism reveals its technical nature. We use symbols and maintain traditions (traditionality almost necessarily involves a potential symbolism, since what objectivity is intended here is conveyed only through writing, which always could lose the distinct ideal objectivity and its related original lifeworld that the words are supposed to preserve, as ideality is nothing but omnitemporality in the related lifeworld, and deteriorates into mere “traces” or ciphers) for just this reason: technicality. But what is unreasonable is the attempt to totally suppress such reactivations such that the world of science becomes detached from the world of extra-scientific life, becomes depleted of all meaning.

The phenomenological historical inquiry is not simply to go back to retrospectively ground the present. Rather it is to genuinely move back and transform the present to a future: to see genuine potencies as potencies, so as to really understand the necessity of the telos, which is not extrinsic and imposed on the past, but intrinsic in its own motivation, and only so can the present be genuinely understood in its true beginnings. This is the same in Hegel: only when it is a genuine possibility that consciousness should fail to move to the next stage, that it is motivated in its freedom, that it is a true subject that is able to subjectify with inner and not imposed necessity; it is exactly the very experience of potential failure as negative content that nourishes the dialectic, but if such potential exists, it is actualizable as a positive state. It is only through the knowledge of genuine possibilities in the past that the meaning of the present is activated, and is originated. So it is not the modern scientific methodology of hypothesizing and verifying, for it is exactly concerned with the “truth” or “meaning” of such hypothesis and verification; not just how such a hypothesis is “reasonable” or “likely”, but how is a hypothesis constituted in its essential and concrete possibility through originary or mediated layers of evidence; verification is also not a factual fulfillment of the hypothesis, but a complex process of constituting the evidence that is required by the hypothesis. In other words, one can comprehend all the reasons in experience why a hypothesis is very “likely”, that is, it can be factually reflected in reality (which separates science and reality in an occasionalistic way), without comprehending what makes such a hypothesis “possible”, that is, how such a hypothesis is concretely generated or constituted in the first place. Also, verification is not this observation of a fact, but a concrete constitution of the evidenced factuality that is itself an achievement mediated by all the acts of interpretation, abstraction and theoretical practices.

4

10~17

The mathematization of nature achieves a self-enclosed sphere of bodies that is abstracted from the concrete life-world. But this permits a split to occur within the one and only world: a world of bodies, and a world of psychic beings. At first, this question of the connection between the mathematical world of bodies and the world of spirits is already a pressing one, since the objective and rational world is nonetheless an achievement of subjectivity.

Yet, the whole project of modern science hinges on the forgetting of these issues. The rationalization of the world occurs, in a certain sense, irrationally (though it is to be noted, such irrationality is not unconditional, but has a very limited sense: it only remains irrational insofar as it is not yet properly grounded in the self-constitution of teleological reason).

Psychology is, in this process, nonetheless framed on the model of physics, and thereby becomes the Hobbesian psychophysical anthropology. Empiricism is only rationalism’s manifestation: it presupposes the omnipresence of reason. Even the soul is now explained in physicalistic terms.

Metaphysics in that era is not exempt from the allure of objectivism. This is the thrust of Spinoza’s system: a geometrization of bodies and thoughts and affects under a rational determination of the fundamental substance. This is what is meant by “systemicity.” The spirit of modern science is captured best by Spinoza: the infinite progress and improvement of the intellect (through knowing and its inseparable doing), and the increasing “happiness” thereof, and the mutual substruction of the man-god image. This science, which is in the most genuine sense an all-encompassing totality, is a miraculous idea, which surpasses its mere manifestation in the abstract realm of the theoretical-technological.

The mathematization of the psychic, which is the ground of all knowledge, run into problems and incur the most fierce criticisms from a slew of skeptics. This skepticism has gone so far beyond the Greeks who oppose an episteme with the necessity of doxa, but since the psychic has shown itself to be unmathematizable, and the idea of modern science has reduced the life-world to an idealized mathematical world, the psychic itself is in jeopardy, hence the world grounded through the psychic. For Aristotle, though the soul’s experience is not mathematically determinable, it is nonetheless theorizable, since it is in the life-world and has substantial meaning. But for the moderns, this failure to get mathematized simply makes the soul and its experience suspicious: this is because the life-world is reduced to mere phenomena of the objectively true world, the world of idealized mathematics, and the psychic therefore loses all substantiality, hence the objective world itself related to the psychic.

The whole spirit of modern philosophy is therefore determined through the problem of objectivism versus transcendentalism. This is its historical task to achieve a final phenomenology, a transcendental idealism investigating things in themselves. This as the end of history is the final establishment via which “the unified directedness of all philosophies and philosophers can open up.” Hence it agrees with Hegel, the end of history is the complete form of freedom, where an opening is made, not a complete closure: the opening to the totality. Such an opening therefore is precisely carried out in practice through the historical investigation: this inquiry is itself the realization of the absolute. It reduces facts to norms where a personal responsibility of the historical subjectivity can spring forth: we criticize and reactivate the past and the historical unity immanently, neither as a closed factuality nor as a retroactive necessity, but as moments that contain in themselves fundamental potencies. Tacitus: let us and the future generations vie for friendly virtues!

Descartes is the one who both projects the ultimate form of modern science and the one who explodes it. He is the first that has gone as far as to doubt the existence of our pregiven world. And this radical skepticism gives him the cogito, which is however to be expanded into a concrete totality of congitationes related to their cogitata. This reduces the world to mere phenomena. Yet ego as the ground means necessarily that an apodeictic science should both be erected on this foundation but also be generated from this ground: that this ego must be able to let rest the building of knowledge statically, but also must generate such knowledge.

5

18~27

The operative concept here is intentionality or the cogitatio directed towards a cogitatum, and which constitutes or accomplishes this very objectivity onto which such directedness depends.

So there are two features of intentionality: first, it is immanent to consciousness or the subject; second, it is accomplishing and constituting objectivity. All Husserl’s critique of earlier philosophy revolves around this axis.

First, Descartes. Though Descartes discovers intentionality and its directedness, he fails to see this directedness to be the “accomplishment” immanent to the subject. Rather, he ignores this directedness, and the subject becomes a sterile thing rather than a generative principle. Ego becomes equated to “the soul” bestowed with innate faculties that are psychologically objectified (such as reason), and the problem is now how this isolated “inside” object is related to its “outside.” Descartes then moves to the idea of God as the guarantor, even though the “rational faculty” that helps him make that argument and the idea of God containing Being as a predicate as objectivities themselves must be first constituted (and not simply presupposed or inferred), whether it is a true argument or not. So, Descartes’ mistake is to objectify the ego into a soul, a residuum of worldly existence bestowed with properties, and how “this enclosed thing” is to relate to another self-enclosed thing, the world. He also thereby assumes that the rational self-evidences are independent self-evidences innate to the soul and are hence “objective self-evidences” without seeing that this apodicticity needs be constituted through the activity of the apodictic subjectivity, through the self-clarification of the truly apodictic self-evidence; otherwise these “self-evidences” would just be mystical constructions (Cartesian “natural light”) without a how or why, thus indefensible to a Humean skepticism.

This mistake is threefold, first, the world is not fully reduced but is still treated as an “outside”; second, the ego is objectified as a thing with innate ready-made properties, as an “inside”, whose properties however ought to be also reduced (the too quick dismissal of the evil genii); third, the inside and the outside are bridged by God, the argument of whose existence however presupposes the very thing questioned here, objectivity and rationality as such.

However the later history of development forgets about this fundamental problem. The subject is presupposed to be this other object with psychological faculties, proprietor of the immanent sense data; the world remains what it was. Which side has the ontological primacy determines whether the philosophy is empiricist or rationalist.

First, the empiricist position, as represented by Hume. Unlike Locke, he did not uncritically treat the ego as simply a natural-psychological being, but take up the fact that the ego is an accomplishing ego, an ego that generates (and is hence vivacious and for that matter an elusive subjectivity, not just another object). Yet, he still takes this ego to be regulated by “laws” of association and customs, which is self-contradictory. Moreover, he missed the crucial point of the “directedness” of intentionality: subjectivity is not simply a “bundling” of immanent data, but an accomplishment of “objectivity” as such. Hence, Hume is right insofar as he sees the generative aspect of the subject, but he misses what is generated is precisely objectivities, and not fictions immanent to the mind. There is no such thing as simple sense data: any datum is itself an object constituted by the subject.

Then, it is the rationalist position, as exemplified in Leibniz. For the rationalists, the metaphysical truth of rational thoughts immanent to the ego is simply presupposed as solved by Descartes and the positing of God: God as the guarantor of preestablished harmony. What is left, therefore, is simply the technique of making objective in thought what is merely subjective in experience: the clarification of metaphysics and a general ontology through logic as normative science and the reflection of pure reason.

Kant stands in this tradition. Therefore, he (unaware of the true Humean problem, i.e. the generation of “ideas” and “experiences” through subjectivity, since he has not the chance to read the Treatise), inspired by Hume, wishes to ground more thoroughly the truth of rational knowledge in experience, since prescientific man nonetheless knows “objects.” Experience is itself structured by logical categories, what is explicit in theory is already implicit in experience. But as all rationalists he presupposes the givenness of these categories, as if they simply belong to a faculty.

The key critical concept is therefore intentionality, which is used to reduce all “givenness” of the object to its constitutedness as objectivity. It is used against Descartes for he presupposes the givenness of psychological faculties of the ego and a worldly existence; against Hume for he presupposes the primary givenness of the ego and its propriety of “immanent” sense-data, thus reducing all objectivity to “mere” fictions; against Leibniz for he presupposes the givenness of the metaphysical truth of rational thinking and rational thinking itself; against Kant for precisely the same reason.

Husserl delegates praises by the same concept. He praises Descartes for he initiates the inquiry into subjectivity, though omitting the constitutive and generative role (not just foundational) it plays; he praises Hume for he precisely looks into the constitution problem, but has mistaken constitutedness to be immanence and/or non-existence; he praises Leibniz for first laying out the formulation of mathesis universalis, though he has completely missed the constitution problem of this task; finally, he praises Kant for redirecting the problem of knowledge back to the subject, and formulating it in terms of a problem of constitution, though such is only a constitution of “knowledge”, presupposing fixed faculties and properties of such faculties. In all of these, only Hume has the problem of “a history of the subject” in mind, though he thereby retreats to historicism.

6

28~32

The structure of intuition is much more complex than the Kantian model. A spatial unity is given through different perspectives and different appearances as a self-presence; and only a reflective attitude analyzes this unity into a manifold. So in the same way the self-presence shows in time. Moreover, kinestheses play a crucial role in constituting a unified realm of perception; the kinestheses in a living body of a perceived body unifies the perception. The realm of perceptions is in its way the ground for everything spiritual and is demanding an investigation. In such realm we constitute also other egos, even our own egos can be reflected upon and objectified, and all our acts and products are sedimented in us as habitualities. The new turn of science is to no longer take this pre-given lifeworld as presupposed to be valid as used for other horizons, but to unfold it in its own full horizonality. There are so many questions to ask about this world!

The task of philosophy also needs look into the anonymous subjectivity. Yet is this subjectivity possible for investigation? Would it not turn the subject into an object and lose that subjectivity? Only if one goes with a thorough epoché that no longer tries to find the absolute object, but only how all objectivities are constituted through the subject and how objectivities and the subject are intricately intermingled and unified in one history. The question of the “root.”

The problem with Kant is that he presupposes the subject to be transcending all intuition but not constituting intuitions through intuitions. This is because he is afraid all intuitions are a posteriori, and hence psychological. He does not think it possible to have historical a prioris. Subjectivity is only regressively to be inferred, not progressively to be described.

The world of depth is a world of roots. It is to bring it in unity with the surface that is the task of philosophy.

7

33~35

Lifeworld at first shows itself to be partial and ancillary to the objective and scientific world. Yet it turns out to be the true ground of objectivity. Exactly what is meant by “ground,” however, is ambivalent. At one point, it seems as if the lifeworld is correlational to the objective world, that is, since each has its own criterion for “truth” and each has its own self-evidence, their self-evidences are therefore only related to each other through a “founding” way or a “relating” way, that self-evidence in the world of the finite corresponds to a self-evidence in the world of the absolute. In between is the mediating term, the whole horizon of “reason” or “turning.” Through this interpretation, the lifeworld and the objective world are two manifolds that are related in the horizonal act of “turning.” This would harmonize to Klein’s project.

Yet, in a way the lifeworld is this very absolute or turns out to be this absolute. The objective world is but an achievement of the subject and is to be brought back to the concrete life of the subject. Before we are interested only in the lifeworld because the validity and self-evidence of science somehow rests or translates back to the layers of intuition (intuition of the self-presence of things themselves) we have in the lifeworld. Now we are interested in the lifeworld itself since it itself is an/the absolute, and itself needs a clarification of its original self-evidences. The question is eventually how the two worlds are unified in their horizons. As Hopkins interprets Husserl here missteps by positing a direct grounding as if science could really be made intuitable in terms of experience; yet it seems possible to suggest that Husserl is merely remarking on the necessary relation between the lifeworld and science, that the latter originates in the former and hence is laid the ground of by the former. The task of phenomenology therefore would be to make science intuitive in the sense of relating it back to its origin so as to witness the achievements of reason, and not directly fulfilling (“cashing out”) the concepts with intuitions. Depending on which is the case, Klein’s work would a critique of Husserl or a supplement to him. At least we can be sure that in the case of the absolute lifeworld, the absolute lifeworld denotes the world that belongs to the transcendental subjectivity that constitutes all objectivities, including those of science.

Therefore, we could conclude the following. First, science is grounded in the lifeworld, through its accumulation of significance as concrete and historical achievements, also as its self-evidence “depends”on the intuitive self-evidence. Moreover, this transcendental subjectivity primarily moves and acts in the concrete lifeworld, and science is one of its products, and the lifeworld is thereby more than the scientific world. Both worlds can thus be sublated from their mutual antagonism and be synthesized in the concrete mutual harmony of life, in which theoretical attitude is one attitude among many, though it might be a higher one.

The lifeworld is the world of doxa, from it grows the world of episteme which is continually renewed in the lifeworld. The world seems to be separate, that one is objective and absolute, while the other subjective and relative. Yet they are nonetheless in one world of conscious life. They are therefore to be united in one lifeworld. Doxa and episteme are one and mutually founding or experienceable in one world. This is the ultimate paradox: how can what is objective be constituted out of what is merely subjective? The key is an intentionality purified through epoché.

This brings us to the point of epoché, the suspension that sees a thing as it appears. The phenomenologist’s attitude is a habitual achievement: it can be suspended temporarily from its active achievement, yet its habitual potency still points to its goal and can be reactivated always.

8

36~44

Here Husserl has fully spelled out the task. First, we reduce the scientifically constructed objective world to the pre-scientific subjective and relative lifeworld. This reduction is effected through the first epoché that cancels out all objective sciences. What is retained is a science or a theoretical interest in the “structure” of the lifeworld. Different from logical or objective a prioris, the a prioris of lifeworld have a “structure” that is not independent from the essential relative givenness of the world but is only something these manifold givennesses refer to. In other words, a structure is always only descriptive, but not positive. Also, this structure contains or includes the very negativity of horizon: a purely ideal objectivity that is purely positive precludes such horizonality.

Next, we reduce this natural lifeworld in which all objectivities are held to be valid in one coherent whole despite the horizonal nature to its related transcendental subjectivity. This transcendental reduction can only be effected through a universal epoché that suspends all validities in one go. All of such ontic validities are reduced to phenomena.

The complete reduction has to be carried out in two steps since the first epoché provides a first field of theoretical interest, the science of doxa as the ground for all sciences; but it has not gone deep enough, since the root of both lies in the subjectivity. Moreover, though the first epoché has revealed the horizonal nature and has thus reduced a theoretical dogmatism, it has not reduced a practical dogmatism: though in the lifeworld a knowledge of the positively actual is no longer presumed, a belief in the actuality of the world nonetheless runs inveterate. This recapitulates the first delineation of historical skepticism: the Greeks counterpoised doxa to episteme, while Descartes suspended the world itself.

9

45~51

This is the clearest and the most important exposition of transcendental phenomenology. Through the absolute epoché every ontology or science, even an ontology of the lifeworld, is reduced from its objectivity. That is, even though the ontology of the lifeworld has nothing to do with idealities, it still is concerned with a “structure” that is taken to be granted or valid. But transcendental phenomenology should even reduce that very least residue of the factical.

A formal ontology liberates the subject from empirical sciences. But it again posits its own facts. A material ontology, ontology of the lifeworld, intends to take account of the eidetic structure of the world. But this ontology of the lifeworld nonetheless posits facts.

Facts are reduced to norms and constituted validities through the transcendental epoché. Through this we reduce all validities and evidences to their relative horizons that infinitely depend on each other. All evidences are unfolded and reactivated in their ultimate meanings rooted in the monad. This is not to simply provide an absolute evidence, but to provide self-evidence in terms of fundamental meaning and significance. To clarify the ultimate unity of every manifold (cogitatione) as constituted objectivity (cogitatum) in terms of the ego-pole’s unity (cogito) is the task of phenomenology. It is an absolute unfolding and the pursuit of adequate knowledge, or the infinite adequation of knowledge brought to full consciousness. Leibniz’s task undertaken after a thorough and critical reflection: the universal reason.

10

52~55

The four clarifications of the transcendental phenomenological method. First, phenomenology is not objective science and is concerned with how horizons mutually constitute each other through the mediation of subjectivity, how validities are constituted through other validities without ending at some obvious self-evidence; rather, it is the infinite task of absolute reactivation of all horizons.

Second, the teleology of phenomenology is not aiming for any end, but is open-ended. That is to say what it aims at is the totality. Nor does it cancel the end character of any particular end, but preserves it in the phenomenologist’s gaze.

Third, phenomenology is nonetheless an eidetic science that is interested in essences and structures, though these “factualities” are always warranted only by the constituted nature they have; that is, they as structures are nonetheless the immanent transcendence within the absolute flux of a concrete transcendental subjectivity. They as essences are not posited objects but rather open horizons and thus permeated by activity and subjectivity: first in terms of the constitution of their ideality, since these are produced through a transcendental method (eidetic variation); then in terms of the constitution of their content, since one region is bordering by other regions and encompassed in one unified subjectivity.

Finally, the subjectivity is self-constituting and thus constitutes itself in its otherness, and is intersubjectivity within the very primal subject. Thus the subject constitutes itself into an object and in relation to groups of objects, including humanity as a whole. More than this, not just humanity, but also other variations of subjectivity are included in the constitution. A transcendental nature: factualities reduced to the absolute activities.

There must be an irreducible factuality or self-evidence, that is the apodicticity of ego, or the apodictic fact of transcendental correlation. Yet this is not to ground objectivity or objective truths, but rather to connect and unify objects to subjects, and make their validities not only “obvious” and “grounded,” but also “meaningful” and “intelligible.” In other words, we not only see the fact of grounding between objects and the transcendental subjectivity and feel or know to be grounded, but also see how they are grounded. The ground is not a mythical or abstract one, but an actual, intelligible, unified and concrete manifold.

11

56~58

One of the most surprising readings. First, Husserl analyzed the current situation for philosophy. Philosophy has lost its guiding thread and has not unified all the techniques or arts of theories. Philosophy has failed to fully comprehend techné and could not account for its transcendental origin. Since the transcendental philosophy reacts against objectivism such dogmatic objectivism is distrusted, but the transcendental philosophers have not fully and properly begun their task. On the contrary, they are immersed still in their mythical constructs and are discredited for their obscurity and unintelligibility. If objectivism is unintelligible because it is dogmatic and has assumed the pregivenness of the world, transcendentalism is not less so for the same assumption, only here it is due to the pregivenness of subjectivity (i.e. those mythical constructions). Eventually, all of philosophy is discredited once and for all.

Husserl then makes a surprising turn. The reason why transcendental philosophy has so far failed is precisely because it has suppressed psychology for fear of psychologism. This fear is not illegitimate, yet once the transcendental insight is achieved, one has to go back to the lifeworld given to the concrete and functioning subject to actually “verify” it in experience. Mathematics and all such objectivistic and natural sciences require a deductive self-evidence. But transcendental philosophy needs a self-evidence that not only is universal and absolute, but is also always “repeatable” and “habitual.” What can this “habituality” mean other than that it has to be constantly verified in experience and can always be re-collected in our concrete experience? That is, even within our immersion in the natural attitude, we can and must always be able to again break loose from the natural attitude. This requires nothing other than a fully worked out psychology that mediates the transcendental: the transcendental must be grounded in the empirical and be self-constituting (in the same sense that in Hegel, Absolute Spirit must be thrown back to history; the dialectic of the Absolute). One must be able to understand the origin of transcendental philosophy and its variations and alienations, and hence the psychological, historical, political and every science thus transcendentally transformed must be studied for the complete exposition. Psychology is exemplary but by no means exclusively so.

Therefore every phenomenon studied under a discipline must be transformed by phenomenology in twofold ways. First, as a factical science it is to be reduced and understood as transcendental achievement. Second, once thus transformed, it is also to be understood that as a constitution how it in turn constitutes the self-constitution of the transcendental subjectivity, thus completing the teleology. Even in the second case, the science in question remains reduced and is no longer naïvely factical; it is dependent upon the factical, but its facts are understood to be self-objectifications that permit the dialectical self-understanding of the absolute subject. These facts are now, as a mere façon de parler, quasi-transcendental; they might still be irreducibly factical, yet not naïvely so, since they as facts are now habitualized indices of the transcendental. But one must remember these are not necessary conditions for the transcendental, as some Heideggerians might presume; self-constituting transcendental subjectivity is the absolute primary, and these quasi-transcendentals are not to be obtained without a prior transcendental reduction.

So, three levels after the transcendental reduction: the empirical sciences as quasi-transcendental quasi-factical indices for the properly transcendental, the transcendentally reduced manifolds that are constituted into those facts (cogitatum-cogitation), and the transcendental subjectivity that constitutes itself through these manifolds reduced from facts.

12

59~64

Psychology is to be transformed through transcendental phenomenology. Yet one must understand how the old psychology, a psychology modeled on physics, a psychophysical discipline, is instituted.

In the lifeworld, experiences of bodies are essentially distinct from experiences of souls. Souls are objects experienced to be “living” and “holding sway” but not objects of handled extension. Yet one must also say that all souls are embodied and thus related to bodies indirectly. Bodies are somehow still encapsulated in our subjective experience and immanent to our subjective experience. Then how are body and soul paralleled and put on equal footing, and why is psychology modeled on physics? Bodies and souls belong to different manifolds or regions, and in each region is to be understood differently. Their equality or parallelism of method is intrinsically impossible and absurd. Rather they must be treated as two qualitatively distinct manifolds unified in one universal science (or more narrowly, in one study of the lifeworld, the psychology transformed through transcendental phenomenology).

In sum, the current paradigm of psychology versus physics assumes two things, first, that they are two self-enclosed regions, second, that though they are self-enclosed regions they have the same overarching method. This is the running premise of objectivism, that all things are self-enclosed objects that only a method of idealization can access. To deconstruct the current paradigm, Husserl has two tasks ahead of him. First, to show that the physical and the psychological are distinct in experience in such a way that the same method is not applicable to the other, and this is done by clarifying the unique characteristics of the living soul and body.

But if the subjective is totally different from the objective, how come we end up objectifying it? This is the second task, to break the self-enclosure of the two regions. Much the same as souls are embodied, bodies are ensouled and perceived subjectively. They are still different regions of subjective experience, yet they nonetheless essentially belong together. These two aspects are to be unified under one science of transcendental phenomenology, and ideally, each region would entail a manifold different from the other but also not self-enclosed; they should be distinct manifolds co-constituting each other fully consciously.

Since Galileo, bodies are separated from subjective experience through idealization. Since Descartes, souls are idealized merely unclearly, due to vagueness and the essential impossibility of its thorough idealization in the same mathematical manner. This psychology is valuable, but only as a co-constituting region, not as a self-enclosed field of study that fully suppresses and is separate from the study of inner-experience. In the same way, the distinction between explanation and description is still valid, but must be understood differently for different manifolds.

The double objectivistic implication for psychology: 1. All objects are in their essence homogeneous in form but self-enclosed in content, i.e. they are homogeneous insofar as they are mathematically idealized and heterogeneous insofar as they are experienced. 2. Psychology is about such an object, soul, which is self-enclosed from body in content but only formally accessible to mathematical idealization. Against this misunderstanding, Husserl proposes a subversion and a mediation: 1. Soul, for instance, in our lifeworld is formally distinct from body (so it is not mathemtizable as physicalistic psychology believes) but continuous with its content since it constitutes bodies within itself (so it is not merely about “inner experience” as skeptical psychology or psychologism believes); it does not have one unified form separate from all differences, nor does it have their content totally self-enclosed and incommunicable; forms are like contents just as contents are like forms. 2. Science therefore also needs to include an investigation into the lifeworld of continuous variation of each region which proceeds until it reaches another region distinct from it, just as it ought to include objectivistic sciences which radically abstract from all differences of regions to attain the unified region of formal ontology. These regions co-constitute each other in transcendental subjectivity and is its self-constitution.

13

65~70

The origin of dualism is not a mere historical accident, though it originates through a historical achievement. It is motivated by the very structure of the world where two aspects can be abstractively obtained: the physical and the psychological. The mere formulation of inner psychological experience is not sufficient preventative to this dualism, since its enclosure turns it into a body-like thing. But, unlike bodies which are easier to comprehend abstractively from the mental since they are idealized objectivities, souls as experienced always posit the egoic and the correlation of intentionality. Under a pure psychology the full inner world is to be explicated in an interconnected totality of transmitted and sedimented validities and meanings. This is achieved through psychological epoché so as to arrive at the gateway to transcendental epoché. In psychological epoché what is taken to be the hidden validities are those ego acts and psychological experiences that are “real,” though their noema or content are suspended from their validities. Only through such a psychology can all other psychological investigations mixed in other regions be understood in its originary psychological meaning.

The roadmap of transcendental phenomenology: empirical sciences naturally accepted and governed by mathematics both as an ontology of ideal nature (what are the idealities all experiences posit beyond themselves that regulate experiences, i.e. suprasensible objectivities; pure geometry) and a methodology of natural experiences (what are the idealities actual experiences relate to that translate experiences, i.e. sensible objectivities; applied geometry), and a psychology (divided into the abstract descriptive natural sciences and the humanistic ones, plus a pure psychology), each being a region (objective world and the subjective lifeworld); formal ontology being the ontology of any world whatsoever; metaphysics or material ontology being the ontology of reality (the ultimate lifeworld), the one region encompassing all regions, mediated by the many regions of reality and the possible regionality as such; transcendental phenomenology below all regions as the active ground that constitutes their interplay and unity, and which performatively demonstrates this universality of constitution and the concreteness of all regions. The introduction of transcendental phenomenology depends on the achievement of a pure psychology and the reintroduction of the lifeworld because the absolute central region is only found through this re-subjectivization of the scientific world, this plus formal ontology gives us the formally completed metaphysics, where the transcendental activity is infinitely and absolutely at work.

The origin of geometry entails that even in perception there needs to exist a perceptive ideality that guarantees the identity of the perceived object, and not just a non-perceptive ideality, for otherwise how do we “experience” and “perceive” the same world? Only thing we can say is that we “think” the same world, not that we “experience” the same world. That is, not only must we have common notions, we must also have common perceptions. The same with arithmetics, since it provides an intuitive unit. Then, founded on these, we have algebra that not only provides pure intuitively perceived objects, but also general pure objects.

On the other hand, a concept such as redness is an essence, it being an ideal object can still be intuited categorially, though it is not to be originarily understood as a “one among many,” not a unit, not a general object; but rather it is the higher essence that is itself not a red, not even a general one. This symbolism gives rise to formal ontology, whose object is “anything whatsoever,” an ontology of the surface.

What is meant by abstract cannot be the Aristotelian one, that of “belonging to a substance but not itself substantial,” since if so we might say that colors are abstract because they do not exist on their own. Yet in that case we’d be making validity judgements, as if colors don’t have their own validity or their own way of “existing.” Indeed we can at best say that for the natural attitude or for the lifeworld nature and spirit are abstractions, but even this is not precise, since the lifeworld is thoroughly and essentially spiritual, yet it is not viewed as concrete but abstract. We cannot say that the lifeworld is by itself abstract. In other words, we cannot say that geometry is abstract because it does not exist really, since it fully exists for the geometrician; we can also not say that the lifeworld is fully concrete since it is thoroughly reducible to the psychological. Concrete and abstract are purely structural and technical concepts, i.e. the belonging together or complementarity of their essences, not substantial traits of “things.”

14

71~72

Psychology is abstract insofar as it is a positive science describing a region of things, i.e. souls, even when souls are not treated in a parallel manner as bodies. Like bodies, souls are treated by psychology as individuals: they are individuated through embodiment. Yet they are nonetheless emptied of corporeality and are merely “embodied” but not themselves “extensions.” Souls are thus seen to be individual non-extended abstractions in relation to bodies and are complementary to bodies. This is what psychology is believed to be as a complementary abstraction to physics, a region bordering physics. No body is unaccompanied by soul, therefore though the spiritual realm has very different empirical laws these are still laws between “psychic entities” no matter they are abstractions or not. This is psychology in its properly positive and natural sense. Though no psychological individual act is given any “natural” validity, a psychologically “real” validity is given.

The paradox, however, which for positive psychology is overlooked, is that this supposedly complementary abstraction retains meant objectivities or constituted meanings for the psychological self. That is, what is supposedly “abstract” somehow is also “concrete” and “universal.” Individual psychology does not see this since it does not see the universal horizon of constitution of world-consciousness and stops at a reduction of an individual that remains cut off from the network as if it were not constituted through and through. The individual reduction therefore always stops at a stage where representations are external to one another as if they were independent, so that when one sees the representation, that representation is abstractly present and real and totally immanent to the act that intends it, whereas when one misses the representation, it is abstractly absent and immaterial and totally transcendent to the act that it becomes a thing in itself for that intending act. This fails to grapple with the true nature of intentional object, which is precisely not unconstituted, but is always constituted to be horizonal or immanently transcendent. The first epoché, therefore, which consists in individual one by one reduction, presumes that one “encounters” every time a thing that is “out there” and then abstracts away whatever is supposedly “out there” to attain what is “really psychically real.” But this is just a return to data atomistic sensationalism. This missed precisely the truly radical aspect of the psychological reduction, which must suspend the stubborn “out there” and attain the truly psychic realm, which is progressively self-constituting.

In the genuine realm of psychology, objectivity is mixed in the subjective, and what is proper to the soul is not attained through a simple “abstraction” of bodies “out there” but rather consists in a complex reduction that traces all objectivities back to the originary constitutive activities. Every object “out there” is not reduced to “data,” but to self-constituting phenomenon that becomes the intentional object, a horizon. But this horizon, since it is a horizon that is constituted through and through, it must always implicate an infinite network of interrelated horizons: it must always be world-horizonal, and any consciousness has to be world-consciousness. The genuine reduction is therefore never “one by one” or “individualistic,” but as soon as it retains an intentional object in its true character of being a horizon, it must go on and see it as a meaning validity corroborated by infinitely many other meaning validities, that it is always in a world. Thus the reduction has to be done by one strike: once a genuine horizon is attained, an object is reduced to a meaning, everything objective is automatically and in principle reduced to meaning all at once, since everything can be progressively analyzed in their constitutive activities for that object. We no longer “run into” things independent from us and then abstract. Rather, everything is abstracted and reduced beforehand for us, since everything in the world is reduced to meaning in the world-horizon of one single reduced object. In this way, the soul proper or the purely psychic that is actively constitutive as world-consciousness turns out to be the source of every objectivity. Everything that is objective is in principle constituted through subjectivity, and the capacity to constitute one objectivity provides the same capacity of the soul to constitute the whole objective world. But then what is supposedly the “abstract” or the purely psychic turns out to be the universally concrete at the same time.

In summary, with individual psychology, an outside is necessarily retained, and the purely psychic remains abstract, so that the subject in its activity can only constitute what is abstractly psychic, as in Humean fictionalism; even a later generalization of this individual reduction only gives us a world of absolutely immanent sense material, not the world proper in its genuine objectivity. With the universal epoché, the whole world is suspended all at once as “phenomena,” including the objectivity of the world, so that everything becomes an intentional object and the whole world in its genuine objectivity can be constituted through the actively constituting subjectivity. But to achieve the universal epoché an analysis of the intentional object is enough. It can either be done formally or concretely. That is, either one can say, since any given objective thing can be constituted as an intentional object in its genuine objectivity, the whole pre-given objective world, insofar as it is likewise given to me as objective, is also constituted, in this way, the universal epoché is consciously done in one strike; or one could be more concrete by saying that since this object here when reduced to an intentional object in its content of validity implicates an infinite horizon of interrelated concrete validities, I can in principle analyze all infinitely many validities that in themselves constitute an absolute horizon, i.e. the world, and here the universal epoché is done in principle, only it remains an unexplicated achievement which grounds the conscious activity of horizon analysis, and we do not “run into” different things to reduce to meaning validities again and again, but only simply work with meaning validities after meaning validities and on the plane that consists solely in meaning validities.

Yet this is not to say that psychology is not an abstraction, since psychology, even when phenomenologically informed, falls back to the natural attitude and takes interest in the factical ego and its real experiences. That is, it takes itself back again as belonging to this world as a region among others, the region of pure souls, to which all are related yet all are irreducible. This region posits pure souls and what is or can be transcendentally elucidated (as absolute achieving historicity) to be passively received validities and sedimented meanings always capable of being reactivated.