Edmund Husserl · 埃德蒙德·胡塞尔
Drives and time-consciousness · 驱力与时间意识
Undated 未注日期
驱力与时间意识——散记
Reflections · Pages
胡叟的驱力论
驱力首先对胡叟来说是无意识的身体运动,一般具有重复性、强制性,根据一定韵律行动。但这并不代表胡叟脱离了第一人称意识的视角;他的驱力理论永远是与自我意识双重刻画的。驱力的刺激是可以来自于内在和外在,但外在只是为身体的刺激提供条件。
驱力不同于愿望和欲望;愿望是对具体事态和对象的渴望,因此无法脱离表征,从现在当下被隔离开,导向未来与想象;欲望则是对带来快乐(pleasure)的对象的占有,因此处在驱力和愿望之间。
驱力快乐附属于感知快乐(sensible pleasure),是前反思的、情动的、未被表征对感知的感受,可以是被动的感知也可以是主动的感知,可以是对外在对象(尽管仍未被对象化)的感知也可以是对运动的感知,而驱力快乐则是对驱力的压力释放的感知;感知快乐与意识快乐有所区别,意识快乐是对图像的生成或是价值事态被实现时产生的快乐,但这种快乐仍然是内在的。当快乐进入反思关系时,也就是“感到快乐”这一事态本身带来快乐时,就成为了“享受”(enjoyment)。在这样的事态下,人不仅仅是直接感受到了快乐,而是快乐本身成为了一个具有时-空延拓的视域。
与快乐相区别的范畴有欣赏(appreciation)和欢愉(joy)。欣赏来自于对客观价值对象的情动式位置择定,是对价值对象的动态经验,因此区别于未进入表征的快乐;但两者并不互相排斥。欢愉则是对价值对象的反思性关联,因此同样是构成了一个视域。欢愉并不一定依赖于欣赏,欣赏也不一定带来欢愉;欢愉是对“值得欣赏的对象”的反应,因此并不要求欣赏的实在发生。
胡叟对布伦塔诺的批评主要集中在两个方面:1.布伦塔诺认为瞬时过去(或未来)作为次生对象是无真实性的、未被实现的潜在,而不能被称作是现实的,然而时间之流却确确实实具有现实性并恰恰是次生对象构成了现时之原生对象的现实性,用奥古斯丁的问法就是:“如果你说过去是不存在的,那现在如何存在呢?”;2.正因为次生对象的非现实性,次生对象与原生对象的共构成整体必须是被一个瞬时行为构造出来的,而这个瞬时行为是不能有时间上的延拓的、否则它自身也会被过去的非真实性污染,但是这样的话,次生对象的非真实性是从何而来呢?此外,没有时间延拓的瞬时行为自身又如何被转换为次生对象的活动潜能呢?这就不仅仅是次生对象的真实性问题,更是次生对象自身(不管真实非真实)如何可能的问题。胡叟此处的诊断观察因此其实是一个整体,就是如何在一个统一且内在的意识整体中划分出差异化的、超越性的时间秩序。真实性与非真实性并不是这里的重点,正如在场和缺席也不是问题,这是布伦塔诺的误解与误造;真正重要的问题在于内在性与超越性的互动关系。
换句话说就是布伦塔诺把潜在当作非现实,但是对胡叟来说这并不是非现实,而是现实的给予方式之一种
所以他选择用内在性-超越性,而不是现实-潜在(或者更有问题的真实-非真实)
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
Husserl’s Theory of Drives
For Husserl, a drive is first an unconscious bodily movement, generally repetitive and compulsive, proceeding according to a certain rhythm. But this does not mean he abandons the perspective of first-person consciousness. His theory of drives is always articulated together with self-consciousness. The stimulus of a drive can come from within or without, but the external provides only conditions for bodily stimulation.
Drives differ from wishes and desires. A wish longs for a concrete state of affairs or object and therefore cannot be separated from representation. It is detached from the living present and directed toward the future and imagination. Desire, by contrast, concerns possession of an object that brings pleasure, and thus stands between drive and wish.
Drive-pleasure belongs under sensible pleasure: a prereflective, affective, unrepresented feeling of sensing. This sensing can be passive or active, directed toward an external object, though not yet objectified, or toward movement. Drive-pleasure is the sensing of the release of a drive’s pressure. Sensible pleasure differs from conscious pleasure, which arises from the generation of an image or the realization of a valuable state of affairs. This pleasure, however, remains immanent. When pleasure enters a reflective relation, when the state of affairs of “feeling pleasure” itself brings pleasure, it becomes “enjoyment.” In this situation, one does not merely feel pleasure directly: pleasure itself becomes a temporally and spatially extended horizon.
Categories distinct from pleasure include appreciation and joy. Appreciation arises from an affective position-taking toward an objective value-object. It is a dynamic experience of a value-object, and thus differs from pleasure that has not entered representation, although the two are not mutually exclusive. Joy is a reflective relation to a value-object and therefore likewise constitutes a horizon. Joy does not necessarily depend on appreciation, nor does appreciation necessarily bring joy. Joy is a response to an “object worthy of appreciation,” and therefore does not require appreciation actually to occur.
Husserl’s criticism of Brentano chiefly concerns two points. 1. Brentano holds that the immediate past, or future, as a secondary object lacks reality, being an unactualized potentiality, and cannot be called actual. Yet the flow of time undoubtedly has actuality, and secondary objects precisely constitute the actuality of the present primary object. In Augustine’s phrasing: “If you say the past does not exist, how does the present exist?” 2. Precisely because secondary objects are nonactual, the whole jointly constituted by secondary and primary objects must be constructed through an instantaneous act. This instantaneous act cannot have temporal extension, or it would itself be contaminated by the past’s unreality. But then where does the secondary object’s unreality come from? Moreover, how can an instantaneous act without temporal extension itself be transformed into the secondary object’s potentiality for activity? This is no longer merely a question of the secondary object’s reality, but of how the secondary object itself, real or unreal, is possible. Husserl’s diagnostic observation here thus forms a single whole: how can a differentiated, transcendent temporal order be distinguished within a unified, immanent whole of consciousness? Reality and unreality are not the central issue, just as presence and absence are not the problem. These are Brentano’s misunderstanding and misconstruction. What really matters is the interactive relation between immanence and transcendence.
In other words, Brentano treats potentiality as nonactuality. For Husserl, however, it is not nonactuality, but one way in which actuality is given.
He therefore chooses immanence–transcendence rather than actuality–potentiality, or the still more problematic reality–unreality.