Edmund Husserl · 埃德蒙德·胡塞尔
Formal and Transcendental Logic · 形式逻辑与先验逻辑
Undated 未注日期
形式逻辑与先验逻辑——散记
Reflections · Pages
霍普金斯对胡赛尔「形式逻辑与先验逻辑」的批判,最后落脚于三个地方:1.胡赛尔对于普全数学的刻画没有解决为什么形式本体论与命题逻辑学可以形成一个整体,因为普全数学的构成动力,也就是批判态度的转换,朝向的是诸逻辑对象与其整体,而批判态度将如何处理数学对象,这一点并没有被明确;或者说,批判态度完成的是对判断本身的模态化,但此处的模态化似乎仅达成了对实在性与可能性的悬置,却并没有包括数学性的对多的判断,而对多的判断本身必须是与对一的判断区分开来的,因为将多视为一去对待这样的可能性尚未被讨论。2.胡赛尔对心理主义的克服来自于他在被给予的多重心理显像中发现了超越的对象性,可是他没有完全地利用这个发现去修改他从「算数哲学」继承来的隐藏的心理主义,因为如果超越性的对象性在多重心理显像中被给予,那这与“多/数”的理念结构不谋而合,可如果数只是通过“集合”这一心理行动获得正当性与客观性的,那他将依然无法摆脱心理主义。3.逻辑的正当性最后被认为来源于经验,而逻辑符号则被他还原为对根本判断的内容的意指替代,在这个意义上,符号本身是不重要的;他将自己判断的正当性建立在如下观察:从各自的命题语境中抽离,“A是b”与“A是c”在命题结构上等价,但是命题内容上,两个A并不是一样的,A与A之间可以有句法形式上的差异,也就是在判断中,第一个A可能意指红性,第二个A可能意指红的事物;而如果要建立起同一性,这个同一性必须是在符号表征之外的独立命题。霍普金斯认为,这里胡赛尔与其说通过这一观察建立了正当性,不如说根据他的哲学倾向预设了这一观察与其自然导向的结论的正当性。因为在实际运算时,A与A的形式差异是被逻辑学家所忽略的;更何况,A所意指的,在形式化逻辑中,其实是一个未确定的“任意事物”。未确定的任意事物,既然是任意的,也就是说它并不被逻辑链条所建立,因为任何部分都已经被包括在了它自身当中,如何在经验中找到其对应的直观对象?“任何事物”的形式差异因此是如何可能的?要解决这个问题,胡赛尔必须要对这个概念的起源进行更详尽的现象学分析。
用「经验与判断」的话说,第三点其实就是,胡叟最后还是把纯粹普遍可能性当成现实特殊可能性来处理了。
胡叟的基数理论可以看作一个例证,一方面基数似乎是完全同质的任意事物的重复,但另一方面基数又得保留最基本的确定性,因此不是“任意事物”,而是“某事物”。任意事物是必然从这个实在可能性链条中断出的纯粹可能性。
霍普金斯认为胡叟在「经验与判断」中所建立的特殊判断过渡到普遍判断的框架依然没有脱离「算数哲学」时期的预设;因为实际上普遍判断就是成了一个使用某个特殊判断的形式去表征一整个领域中的一切可能性,和将某一个特殊的多的显像拿来表征多本身没有区别;霍普金斯希望胡叟能要么兑现承诺突破这个表征去通达物本身,要么去建立象征化与普遍性之确立之间的谱系,而不是将象征化忽视。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
Hopkins’s criticism of Husserl’s Formal and Transcendental Logic ultimately centers on three points. 1. Husserl’s characterization of mathesis universalis does not resolve why formal ontology and propositional logic can form one whole. The constitutive impetus of mathesis universalis, the change of critical attitude, is directed toward logical objects and their totality; how this critical attitude handles mathematical objects remains unspecified. In other words, the critical attitude accomplishes a modalization of judgment itself, but this modalization seems only to suspend actuality and possibility, without encompassing mathematical judgments of multiplicity. Judgments of the many must themselves be distinguished from judgments of the one, since the possibility of treating the many as one has not yet been discussed. 2. Husserl overcomes psychologism by discovering transcendent objectivity within given multiple psychological appearances. Yet he does not fully use this discovery to revise the hidden psychologism inherited from the Philosophy of Arithmetic. If transcendent objectivity is given in multiple psychological appearances, this coincides with the eidetic structure of “multiplicity/number.” But if number gains validity and objectivity only through the psychological act of “collecting,” he still cannot escape psychologism. 3. Logic’s validity is ultimately taken to derive from experience, while logical symbols are reduced to signifying substitutes for the contents of fundamental judgments. In this sense, symbols themselves are unimportant. He grounds the validity of his judgment in this observation: abstracted from their respective propositional contexts, “A is b” and “A is c” are equivalent in propositional structure. Yet in propositional content the two As are not the same. A and A can differ in syntactic form: in a judgment, the first A may signify redness, the second a red thing. To establish their identity requires an independent proposition outside symbolic representation. Hopkins thinks that Husserl does not so much establish validity through this observation as presuppose, according to his philosophical inclinations, the validity of both the observation and the conclusion toward which it naturally leads. In actual calculation, logicians disregard the formal difference between A and A. Moreover, in formalized logic, what A signifies is actually an undetermined “anything whatever.” Since an undetermined anything is arbitrary, it is not established by a logical chain: every part is already included within it. How can its corresponding intuitive object be found in experience? How is a formal difference between instances of “anything whatever” possible? To resolve this, Husserl must undertake a more detailed phenomenological analysis of this concept’s origin.
In the language of Experience and Judgment, the third point really means that Husserl ultimately still treats pure universal possibility as actual particular possibility.
Husserl’s theory of cardinal number offers an example. On the one hand, cardinal number seems to be the repetition of wholly homogeneous instances of anything whatever. On the other, it must retain the most basic determinacy, and is therefore not “anything whatever,” but “something.” Anything whatever is pure possibility necessarily broken free from this chain of actual possibilities.
Hopkins thinks that the framework Husserl establishes in Experience and Judgment for passing from particular to universal judgment still does not escape the presuppositions of the Philosophy of Arithmetic. Universal judgment effectively becomes the use of one particular judgment’s form to represent every possibility within an entire domain. This is no different from using one particular appearance of multiplicity to represent multiplicity itself. Hopkins wants Husserl either to fulfill his promise of breaking through this representation to reach the things themselves, or to establish a genealogy connecting symbolization and the establishment of universality, rather than ignoring symbolization.