Edmund Husserl · 埃德蒙德·胡塞尔
The Crisis of European Sciences · 欧洲科学的危机
The Galilean Project of Science
Paper / 论文
In the beginning sections of Part II, Husserl has to fulfill a twofold task. First, he has to fully clarify what is the content of Galileo’s project of mathematical physics and its inner evidence or validity. On the other hand, he needs to demonstrate why it is crucial to construe the form Galileo’s reflections take to be a ‘project’ or a ‘task.’ These two aspects mutually imply each other. If according to Husserl, the fully-fledged ideal of universal science proclaims ‘a superior survey of the world […] unfettered by myth and the whole tradition: universal knowledge, absolutely free from prejudice, of the world and man, ultimately recognizing in the world its inherent reason and teleology and its highest principle, God,’1 it should not be surprising that in the very germination of the content of the Galilean science it takes up the form of a task, implying in its very formation a teleological horizon of past possibilities that it is actualizing and of future possibilities to be actualized. The Galilean science is not a heap of doctrines and formulas such as have authority solely due to the weight of ‘myth and the whole tradition,’ nor is it a collection of verifiable facts indifferent among themselves and indifferent to Nature, i.e. their source of verification, but a living vision encompassing past and future significations and conceptualities grounded in the achievements of ‘fellow scientists,’ each responsible for his or her own intellectual pursuit, in one unified history till infinity.
Therefore, we expect Husserl’s critical reflections on Galileo to uncover precisely this horizon of history, the form of a task embedded in the very execution of this task in its worked-out content. We now move to consider this very content. The fruit that we call the Galilean science is none other than mathematical physics. There are, for Galileo, two roots to cultivate in order to grow this fruit. One is the pre-given lifeworld, the other the already cultivated plurality of sciences passed down from the Greeks, the most prominent among which is geometry. We need to ponder the intimate connection between these two roots.
The pre-given lifeworld is teeming with life-formative activities. Some of these particularly have to do with the shaping of physical bodies in service of practical interests: these we call ‘crafts.’ As an ironsmith, I know, for instance, that the sharper the arrowhead, the more piercing it is. As a wheel-maker, I start shaping my wheel rounder and rounder, for I know the rounder the wheels are, the less effort the cart moves with. Thus, the lifeworld for the craftsman is primarily a world where physical shapes and other qualities are intricately articulated. Here, three points come to our notice. First, we can reasonably replace comparatives with superlatives: the sharpest arrowhead is the most piercing, the roundest wheel moves with the least effort. Such maxima are absent from physical realities, yet they are not inconceivable. Thus, in our intellectual vision, new shapes are produced that are posited as limits toward which our crafts progress infinitely. Husserl calls these ‘limit-shapes.’2 Second, through the positing of both comparatives and superlatives, scales can be constructed: each gradation of the physical shape in the direction of its limit-shape corresponds to one gradation of its accompanying qualities in the direction of their limit-qualities. Finally, we suspect perhaps ‘crafts’ is too general a term for these practices that have to do specifically with the relation between shapes and other qualities. In the art of dyeing, for instance, the interest is not only in the relation between quantities of dyes (that is, the respective size of the vessel we use to contain each mixing agent) that we mix and the shade of color we yield at the end of the process, but also in the kinds of dyes that can yield certain colors. A craftsman’s know-how consists not only in his knowledge of the scale relating shapes to qualities, but also in a simply qualitative knowledge.
In the lifeworld of a craftsman, therefore, the physical shape is merely one ‘being-so (Sosein)’ among many others. It might be a useful one, but certainly claims no primacy. It is only through geometry that the significance of shapes is fully revealed. The world open to geometrical reflections has two peculiarities: first, though detached from it, our geometrical intuition is nonetheless in close proximity to our perception in the lifeworld; second, because of such proximity, it is a world receptive of measures and ratios. To explicate this uniqueness of geometry, we can freely play with our imagination to see if other qualities are capable of holding the same peculiarities.
First, is it possible to imagine a limit-color, analogous to limit-shapes, such as straight lines, circles and triangles? It is certainly possible to conceive the color red in gradation, and sentences such as ‘this apple is redder than that one’ or ‘this is the reddest color’ make intuitive sense. We can say, therefore, there are limit-colors, and scales of gradation can be constructed in reference to such limit-colors. Next, we examine if these scales are analogous to those of shapes. Husserl answers in the negative: ‘These qualities, too, appear in gradations, and in a certain way measurement applies to them as to all gradations […] Today, when we speak of measuring, of units of measure, methods of measure, or simply of magnitudes, we mean as a rule those that are already related to idealities and are “exact”; so it is difficult for us to carry out the abstract isolation of the plena which is so necessary here.’3 Plena or sense-qualities are not receptive of exact measurements, and that has to do with their unrelatedness to idealities. This needs further clarification. Plena, as sense-qualities, are always immediately dependent on sense-organs. This dependency entails 1. no ratio or unit of measurement come up by any subject can receive ideal objectivity and 2. conversely, any ideal objectivity regarding sense-qualities has to be unmeasurable. I might be convinced that the apple is twice redder than the flag, yet a blind person or a person with a slightly different disposition can easily disagree, the former for the lack of any intuition at all, the latter for the variation of sense-organs. More importantly, I always disagree with myself, since any ideal objectivity I produce as comprising of units of measurement ought to be homogenous to the unit given in my intuition, yet no abstraction of colors can eradicate the heterogeneity without abolishing all intuition as such. In other words, a color is necessarily perceived through the eye, and even an imagined red relies on the memory of ‘having seen’ such red. This perception is absolutely singular, to abstract from it is to destroy it. A unit of red, suppose such unit is possible, is necessarily a color perceived through the eye, a sensation. Yet to posit a unit is to abstract a pure intuition from its physical reality, i.e. its perceived-ness, and to abstract pure intuitions from all other things to be measured against this unit that is homogeneous to them. But precisely this is impossible, since a shade of red abstracted from all actual perceptions is not a color intuited, but rather the essence of that particular redness as such. Such abstractions should obtain no intuitions, but only concepts, and concepts are unmeasurable thoughts. Geometrical units, however, transcend sensations: they are not visual, acoustical or tactile. I fully know that no ‘meter’ as such exists in my sense-reality, yet these units are intuitively given through idealities; whereas a unit of red, if such a thing exists, must remain a sensation perceived visually, thus contradicting itself, and conversely, an ideal redness is deprived of all intuition, hence unmeasurable.
Therefore we can see that the world given to the craftsmen and the world given to the geometricians are mutually independent. The geometricians confront a self-enclosed world of idealities, of pure intuitions of shapes, whereas the craftsmen deal with shapes not insofar as they are forms of physical bodies, but as they are merely materials to work with. Sure, applied geometry exists, yet it remains in a relatedness between ideal shapes and physical shapes, not in a relatedness between the world of craft and the world of shapes in general. Each world thus stands on its own. Yet, in their mutual indifference, Galileo perceives a common horizon: if the world of geometry first originates from the pre-given lifeworld, then shapes, as they are representative of bodies in the formal realm of geometry, are equally representative of the qualities of these bodies in the physical realm. Since scales can be constructed connecting shapes to qualities, each gradation of quality can be assigned to its corresponding gradation of shape. Next, we only need to see if such gradations of shapes, as tentatively representing some qualities, consistently effect changes in the gradation of other shapes, as representing other qualities. For instance, we assign to each degree of warmth its corresponding height of the mercury column. Then we see if the warmth as represented by the height of the column consistently causes proportionate changes in other qualities as represented by other such measurable gradations of shapes. This is Galileo’s greatest contribution, which Husserl calls the ‘indirect mathematization of nature.’4
We shall now assess the success of Husserl’s investigations. Has he fulfilled the promise to explicate the form of a ‘task’ in the very becoming of the idea of science and to unfold the inherent teleology of reason? From Husserl’s investigations into the formation of the Galilean science, we see that Galileo’s achievement, whether he is fully conscious of it or not, consists precisely in that reactivation of the lifeworld in his reflection on geometry. In receiving the handed-down geometry, Galileo relates this self-enclosed world back to its root, i.e. the lifeworld given to the craftsmen, and ventures with a ‘hypothesis’ based on general intuitions obtained in this lifeworld that the ‘indirect mathematization of nature’ is indeed possible, that these two horizons mutually determine each other. The world of the craftsman is now recapitulated into the new idea of science as that of experiment, whereas the world of mathematics as that of theory. A new horizon is thus created precisely through the reactivation of a past, i.e. the pre-given lifeworld, inside a present, i.e. the geometry inherited. The Galilean science is created fundamentally as a realization of past possibilities, as a completion of task, i.e. the respective completion of the idea of τέχνη and μάθησις, as the latter now really guides the former and the former substantially expands the latter. Galileo thus not only comes up with a ‘scientific method,’ but also grounds the very significance of science in relation to the pre-scientific world. For now, what we still leave unexamined is that horizon of future possibilities thus opened in Galileo’s primal establishment. We have reasons to suspect, since Husserl calls Galileo ‘a concealing genius,’5 that this new horizon contains its own obscurities.
Notes
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
在第二部分的开头几节,胡塞尔必须完成双重任务。首先,他必须充分澄清,伽利略的数学物理学方案究竟包含什么内容,以及它内在的明见性或有效性是什么。另一方面,他需要表明,为什么把伽利略的思考所采取的形式理解为一个“方案”或一项“任务”,是如此关键。这两个方面彼此蕴含。按照胡塞尔的说法,充分发展的普遍科学理念宣告了“一种对世界的更高审视……摆脱神话与整个传统的束缚:关于世界与人的、绝对不受偏见约束的普遍知识,最终在世界中认识到它的内在理性与目的论,以及它的最高原则,上帝”。1既然如此,伽利略科学的内容在萌生之初便采取任务的形式,就不应令人惊讶:它在自身的形成中,就已经蕴含着一个目的论视域,包含它正在实现的过去可能性,以及有待实现的未来可能性。伽利略科学既不是一堆仅仅由于“神话与整个传统”的分量而具有权威的学说与公式,也不是一组彼此漠不相关、同时也与自然——即它们的验证源泉——漠不相关的可验证事实。相反,它是一幅活的图景,把过去与未来的意指和概念性包含在一部统一而延伸至无限的历史之中;这部历史奠基于“科学同道”的成就,而每个人都对自己的智性追求负责。
因此,我们期待胡塞尔对于伽利略的批判性反思,恰恰揭示这个历史视域,揭示那嵌入任务之实际执行及其展开内容中的任务形式。现在,我们转而考察这一内容本身。我们称作伽利略科学的果实,无非是数学物理学。对于伽利略而言,为了长出这枚果实,需要培育两条根:一条是预先给予的生活世界,另一条是从希腊人传承下来的、已经培育起来的多种科学,其中最突出的是几何学。我们需要思考这两条根之间的紧密联系。
预先给予的生活世界充满了塑造生活的活动。其中一些活动,尤其涉及为实践利益服务而塑造物体:我们称它们为“技艺”。例如,作为铁匠,我知道,箭头越尖,便越有穿透力。作为车轮匠,我开始把车轮做得越来越圆,因为我知道,车轮越圆,车子移动时便越省力。因此,对工匠而言,生活世界首先是一个物理形状与其它性质复杂交织的世界。这里有三点引起我们的注意。首先,我们可以合理地用最高级替换比较级:最尖的箭头最有穿透力,最圆的车轮运动时最省力。这样的极值并不存在于物理现实中,却并非不可思议。因此,在我们的智性视野中,新的形状被生产出来,并被设定为我们的技艺无限趋近的极限。胡塞尔称它们为“极限形状”。2其次,通过同时设定比较级与最高级,可以构造出尺度:物理形状朝向其极限形状的每一个级差,都对应着其伴随性质朝向各自极限性质的一个级差。最后,我们怀疑,对于那些专门涉及形状与其它性质之关系的实践,“技艺”这个词或许太宽泛。例如,在染色技艺中,人们关心的不只是混合的染料数量——也就是用来盛放每种混合剂的容器各自的大小——与过程结束时得到的色调之间的关系,还关心能够产生某些颜色的染料种类。工匠的实践知识,不仅包含把形状与性质联系起来的尺度知识,也包含单纯关于性质的知识。
因此,在工匠的生活世界中,物理形状只是众多“如此存在(Sosein)”之一。它或许有用,却当然并不享有首要地位。只有通过几何学,形状的意义才得到充分揭示。向几何反思敞开的世界,有两项特殊之处:首先,尽管与生活世界中的知觉相分离,我们的几何直观却仍然与它密切邻近;其次,由于这种邻近,它是一个能够接受尺度与比例的世界。为了阐明几何学的这一独特性,我们可以自由运用想象,看看其它性质是否能够具有相同的特殊之处。
首先,是否可能想象一种极限颜色,类似于直线、圆和三角形这样的极限形状?把红色理解为具有级差,当然是可能的;“这个苹果比那个更红”或“这是最红的颜色”这样的句子,在直观上也是有意义的。因此,我们可以说,存在极限颜色,而且可以参照这样的极限颜色来构造级差尺度。接下来,我们考察这些尺度是否与形状的尺度相类似。胡塞尔给出否定的答案:“这些性质也表现出级差,而且,在某种意义上,测量也像适用于一切级差那样适用于它们……今天,当我们谈论测量、测量单位、测量方法,或仅仅谈论量时,我们通常所指的,已经是那些与理念性相关、因而‘精确’的东西;所以,我们很难实行这里如此必要的、对充实内容的抽象分离。”3充实内容(plena),或者感性性质,不能接受精确的测量,而这与它们不关联于理念性有关。这还需要进一步澄清。充实内容作为感性性质,始终直接依赖感觉器官。这一依赖关系意味着:一,任何主体提出的比例或测量单位,都无法获得理念的客观性;二,反过来,关于感性性质的任何理念客观性,都必然是不可测量的。我或许确信,这个苹果比那面旗子红两倍,但一个盲人,或者一个禀赋稍有不同的人,都很容易不同意;前者因为完全缺乏相应的直观,后者因为感觉器官的差异。更重要的是,我总是会与自己产生分歧,因为,我所生产的任何由测量单位构成的理念客观性,都应当与我直观中给予的单位同质;然而,任何对颜色的抽象,都不可能在不取消直观本身的情况下,消除这种异质性。换句话说,颜色必然通过眼睛被知觉,即使是想象中的红色,也依赖于“曾经见过”那种红色的记忆。这一知觉是绝对独异的,从中进行抽象,就意味着摧毁它。假定红色的单位是可能的,那么这一单位必然仍是通过眼睛知觉的颜色,是一种感觉。然而,设定一个单位,意味着从其物理现实,也就是其被知觉性中,抽象出一个纯粹直观,并从所有其它有待依据这一与之同质的单位来测量的事物中,抽象出纯粹直观。但这恰恰是不可能的,因为,从所有实际知觉中抽象出来的一种红色,不是被直观的颜色,而是那种特定红色本身的本质。这样的抽象不应得到任何直观,而只能得到概念;概念则是不可测量的思想。然而,几何单位超越感觉:它们既非视觉的,也非听觉的或触觉的。我完全知道,在我的感觉现实中,不存在“一米”本身;但这些单位却通过理念性在直观中被给予。相反,一个红色单位,如果这种东西存在,就必须始终是一种通过视觉被知觉的感觉,从而陷入自相矛盾;反过来,理念的红色则失去了所有直观,因此不可测量。
因此,我们可以看到,给予工匠的世界与给予几何学家的世界,是相互独立的。几何学家面对的是一个自我封闭的理念性世界,一个关于形状的纯粹直观的世界;工匠则处理形状,却并不把它们当作物体的形式,而只是当作可供加工的材料。诚然,应用几何学是存在的,但它所处的,是理念形状与物理形状之间的关系,而不是技艺世界与一般的形状世界之间的关系。因此,每个世界都独立站立。然而,在它们相互漠然的关系中,伽利略察觉到了一个共同视域:如果几何世界最初起源于预先给予的生活世界,那么,形状既然在几何学的形式领域中表征着物体,它们在物理领域中也同样表征着这些物体的性质。既然可以构造尺度,把形状与性质联系起来,那么,性质的每一个级差,都可以被指派给与之对应的形状级差。接下来,我们只需要考察:这些暂时代表某些性质的形状级差,是否持续地引起代表其它性质的其它形状级差发生变化。例如,我们把每一温度指派给与之对应的水银柱高度,然后考察,由水银柱高度所代表的温度,是否持续地导致由其它类似的可测量形状级差所代表的其它性质发生相应比例的变化。这是伽利略最大的贡献,胡塞尔称之为“自然的间接数学化”。4
现在,我们应当评估胡塞尔的探究是否成功。他是否兑现了承诺,在科学理念自身的生成中阐明“任务”的形式,并展开理性内在的目的论?从胡塞尔对于伽利略科学之形成的探究中,我们看到,伽利略的成就,无论他本人是否完全意识到,恰恰在于他在对几何学的反思中重新激活了生活世界。在接收传承下来的几何学时,伽利略把这个自我封闭的世界重新联系到它的根,也就是给予工匠的生活世界,并且依据从这一生活世界中得到的一般直观,冒险提出一个“假设”:自然的间接数学化确实可能,这两个视域相互规定。工匠的世界现在作为实验的世界,被重新统摄到新的科学理念中;数学的世界则作为理论的世界被纳入其中。因此,一个新的视域恰恰通过在当下,也就是继承而来的几何学内部,重新激活过去,也就是预先给予的生活世界,而被创造出来。伽利略科学在根本上,作为过去可能性的实现、作为任务的完成而被创造出来,也就是作为τέχνη与μάθησις之理念各自的完成:后者如今真正指导前者,而前者则实质性地扩展后者。因此,伽利略不仅提出了一种“科学方法”,也为科学相对于前科学世界的意义本身奠定了基础。到目前为止,我们仍未考察的,是伽利略的原初创立由此打开的未来可能性视域。既然胡塞尔称伽利略为“一位遮蔽着的天才”,5我们便有理由怀疑,这个新视域包含着它自己的晦暗。