Gui Ruiyan

Edmund Husserl · 埃德蒙德·胡塞尔
The Crisis of European Sciences · 欧洲科学的危机

The Galilean Project of Science

Paper / 论文

In the beginning sections of Part II, Husserl has to fulfill a twofold task. First, he has to fully clarify what is the content of Galileo’s project of mathematical physics and its inner evidence or validity. On the other hand, he needs to demonstrate why it is crucial to construe the form Galileo’s reflections take to be a ‘project’ or a ‘task.’ These two aspects mutually imply each other. If according to Husserl, the fully-fledged ideal of universal science proclaims ‘a superior survey of the world […] unfettered by myth and the whole tradition: universal knowledge, absolutely free from prejudice, of the world and man, ultimately recognizing in the world its inherent reason and teleology and its highest principle, God,’1 it should not be surprising that in the very germination of the content of the Galilean science it takes up the form of a task, implying in its very formation a teleological horizon of past possibilities that it is actualizing and of future possibilities to be actualized. The Galilean science is not a heap of doctrines and formulas such as have authority solely due to the weight of ‘myth and the whole tradition,’ nor is it a collection of verifiable facts indifferent among themselves and indifferent to Nature, i.e. their source of verification, but a living vision encompassing past and future significations and conceptualities grounded in the achievements of ‘fellow scientists,’ each responsible for his or her own intellectual pursuit, in one unified history till infinity.

Therefore, we expect Husserl’s critical reflections on Galileo to uncover precisely this horizon of history, the form of a task embedded in the very execution of this task in its worked-out content. We now move to consider this very content. The fruit that we call the Galilean science is none other than mathematical physics. There are, for Galileo, two roots to cultivate in order to grow this fruit. One is the pre-given lifeworld, the other the already cultivated plurality of sciences passed down from the Greeks, the most prominent among which is geometry. We need to ponder the intimate connection between these two roots.

The pre-given lifeworld is teeming with life-formative activities. Some of these particularly have to do with the shaping of physical bodies in service of practical interests: these we call ‘crafts.’ As an ironsmith, I know, for instance, that the sharper the arrowhead, the more piercing it is. As a wheel-maker, I start shaping my wheel rounder and rounder, for I know the rounder the wheels are, the less effort the cart moves with. Thus, the lifeworld for the craftsman is primarily a world where physical shapes and other qualities are intricately articulated. Here, three points come to our notice. First, we can reasonably replace comparatives with superlatives: the sharpest arrowhead is the most piercing, the roundest wheel moves with the least effort. Such maxima are absent from physical realities, yet they are not inconceivable. Thus, in our intellectual vision, new shapes are produced that are posited as limits toward which our crafts progress infinitely. Husserl calls these ‘limit-shapes.’2 Second, through the positing of both comparatives and superlatives, scales can be constructed: each gradation of the physical shape in the direction of its limit-shape corresponds to one gradation of its accompanying qualities in the direction of their limit-qualities. Finally, we suspect perhaps ‘crafts’ is too general a term for these practices that have to do specifically with the relation between shapes and other qualities. In the art of dyeing, for instance, the interest is not only in the relation between quantities of dyes (that is, the respective size of the vessel we use to contain each mixing agent) that we mix and the shade of color we yield at the end of the process, but also in the kinds of dyes that can yield certain colors. A craftsman’s know-how consists not only in his knowledge of the scale relating shapes to qualities, but also in a simply qualitative knowledge.

In the lifeworld of a craftsman, therefore, the physical shape is merely one ‘being-so (Sosein)’ among many others. It might be a useful one, but certainly claims no primacy. It is only through geometry that the significance of shapes is fully revealed. The world open to geometrical reflections has two peculiarities: first, though detached from it, our geometrical intuition is nonetheless in close proximity to our perception in the lifeworld; second, because of such proximity, it is a world receptive of measures and ratios. To explicate this uniqueness of geometry, we can freely play with our imagination to see if other qualities are capable of holding the same peculiarities.

First, is it possible to imagine a limit-color, analogous to limit-shapes, such as straight lines, circles and triangles? It is certainly possible to conceive the color red in gradation, and sentences such as ‘this apple is redder than that one’ or ‘this is the reddest color’ make intuitive sense. We can say, therefore, there are limit-colors, and scales of gradation can be constructed in reference to such limit-colors. Next, we examine if these scales are analogous to those of shapes. Husserl answers in the negative: ‘These qualities, too, appear in gradations, and in a certain way measurement applies to them as to all gradations […] Today, when we speak of measuring, of units of measure, methods of measure, or simply of magnitudes, we mean as a rule those that are already related to idealities and are “exact”; so it is difficult for us to carry out the abstract isolation of the plena which is so necessary here.’3 Plena or sense-qualities are not receptive of exact measurements, and that has to do with their unrelatedness to idealities. This needs further clarification. Plena, as sense-qualities, are always immediately dependent on sense-organs. This dependency entails 1. no ratio or unit of measurement come up by any subject can receive ideal objectivity and 2. conversely, any ideal objectivity regarding sense-qualities has to be unmeasurable. I might be convinced that the apple is twice redder than the flag, yet a blind person or a person with a slightly different disposition can easily disagree, the former for the lack of any intuition at all, the latter for the variation of sense-organs. More importantly, I always disagree with myself, since any ideal objectivity I produce as comprising of units of measurement ought to be homogenous to the unit given in my intuition, yet no abstraction of colors can eradicate the heterogeneity without abolishing all intuition as such. In other words, a color is necessarily perceived through the eye, and even an imagined red relies on the memory of ‘having seen’ such red. This perception is absolutely singular, to abstract from it is to destroy it. A unit of red, suppose such unit is possible, is necessarily a color perceived through the eye, a sensation. Yet to posit a unit is to abstract a pure intuition from its physical reality, i.e. its perceived-ness, and to abstract pure intuitions from all other things to be measured against this unit that is homogeneous to them. But precisely this is impossible, since a shade of red abstracted from all actual perceptions is not a color intuited, but rather the essence of that particular redness as such. Such abstractions should obtain no intuitions, but only concepts, and concepts are unmeasurable thoughts. Geometrical units, however, transcend sensations: they are not visual, acoustical or tactile. I fully know that no ‘meter’ as such exists in my sense-reality, yet these units are intuitively given through idealities; whereas a unit of red, if such a thing exists, must remain a sensation perceived visually, thus contradicting itself, and conversely, an ideal redness is deprived of all intuition, hence unmeasurable.

Therefore we can see that the world given to the craftsmen and the world given to the geometricians are mutually independent. The geometricians confront a self-enclosed world of idealities, of pure intuitions of shapes, whereas the craftsmen deal with shapes not insofar as they are forms of physical bodies, but as they are merely materials to work with. Sure, applied geometry exists, yet it remains in a relatedness between ideal shapes and physical shapes, not in a relatedness between the world of craft and the world of shapes in general. Each world thus stands on its own. Yet, in their mutual indifference, Galileo perceives a common horizon: if the world of geometry first originates from the pre-given lifeworld, then shapes, as they are representative of bodies in the formal realm of geometry, are equally representative of the qualities of these bodies in the physical realm. Since scales can be constructed connecting shapes to qualities, each gradation of quality can be assigned to its corresponding gradation of shape. Next, we only need to see if such gradations of shapes, as tentatively representing some qualities, consistently effect changes in the gradation of other shapes, as representing other qualities. For instance, we assign to each degree of warmth its corresponding height of the mercury column. Then we see if the warmth as represented by the height of the column consistently causes proportionate changes in other qualities as represented by other such measurable gradations of shapes. This is Galileo’s greatest contribution, which Husserl calls the ‘indirect mathematization of nature.’4

We shall now assess the success of Husserl’s investigations. Has he fulfilled the promise to explicate the form of a ‘task’ in the very becoming of the idea of science and to unfold the inherent teleology of reason? From Husserl’s investigations into the formation of the Galilean science, we see that Galileo’s achievement, whether he is fully conscious of it or not, consists precisely in that reactivation of the lifeworld in his reflection on geometry. In receiving the handed-down geometry, Galileo relates this self-enclosed world back to its root, i.e. the lifeworld given to the craftsmen, and ventures with a ‘hypothesis’ based on general intuitions obtained in this lifeworld that the ‘indirect mathematization of nature’ is indeed possible, that these two horizons mutually determine each other. The world of the craftsman is now recapitulated into the new idea of science as that of experiment, whereas the world of mathematics as that of theory. A new horizon is thus created precisely through the reactivation of a past, i.e. the pre-given lifeworld, inside a present, i.e. the geometry inherited. The Galilean science is created fundamentally as a realization of past possibilities, as a completion of task, i.e. the respective completion of the idea of τέχνη and μάθησις, as the latter now really guides the former and the former substantially expands the latter. Galileo thus not only comes up with a ‘scientific method,’ but also grounds the very significance of science in relation to the pre-scientific world. For now, what we still leave unexamined is that horizon of future possibilities thus opened in Galileo’s primal establishment. We have reasons to suspect, since Husserl calls Galileo ‘a concealing genius,’5 that this new horizon contains its own obscurities.

Notes

  1. Crisis, p. 8

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  2. Ibid, p. 26

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  3. Ibid, p. 34

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  4. Ibid, p. 35

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  5. Ibid, p. 52

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