Gui Ruiyan

Edmund Husserl · 埃德蒙德·胡塞尔
Ideas I · 观念 I

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Ideas I — Reading notes

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Revised 12 March 2025

In this note / 篇目

1~17

1.
Knowledge starts with experience. Experience is directed towards the world. Originary intuition.

2.
Facts are experienced. All facts contain a kernel of essence and their essence can always be idealized into eidos. Facts and factual regularities such as laws of nature deal with what exists, while essences deal with what could possibly exist. Therefore, essences are immediately posited and are hence not generated. In this sense, all essences are universal, as they express a totality of possibilities.

3.
Ideation transforms a fact into an essence. Yet this essence is intuited clearly, or distinctly, or even adequately, depending on one’s knowledge of it. Some essences are necessarily incomplete and inadequate, so that they by necessity refer to other essences to complete their form. This inadequacy later will be considered abstractness. The intuition of a universal essence as such and that of its factual exemplary is to be distinguished.

4.
Through phantasy one can freely discern an essence as such without positing any matter-of-fact existence. The positing of an essence is different from the positing of an existence. Phenomenological attitude is precisely one that suspends any positing of existence.

5.
A universal essence as such is different from a general horizon created by this essence for its possible instantiations. One can either objectify an essence as such or not so as to keep it as a horizon wherein factual instances appear.

6.
Eidetic judging and judgement correspond to what is eidetically meant, hence a mere objectivity. Eidetic truth of the judgement corresponds to what is eidetically obtaining as an established object.
An eidetic necessity follows, as a particularized and instantiated consequence, the eidetic universality of a judgement. A fact, since it always is an instantiation of an essence, is therefore always also an eidetic necessity of sorts. What an eidetic science is interested in is precisely this essential necessity a priori.

7.
Sciences of facts and sciences of essences are parallel to each other.

8.
Eidetic sciences are, through their very essence, independent from factual sciences since they do not need to refer to empirical facts qua eidetic sciences, while factual sciences must be dependent on eidetic sciences, since sciences must refer to universal knowledge of all possibilities, so that first all factual sciences have to obey formal logic, and also have to conform to the material essence of its study. Foreshadowing of 15~17 already at work here.

9.
Now we move from contemplating the relation between facts and essences to contemplating essences alone. All regions are defined through some material essence as their organizing center.

10.
Now we need to clarify a few notions. Object, category, and region. Objects have various meanings, of which the originary paradigm is the thing in itself. We start with formal ontology to better understand these notions. Regions are collectivities of units regulated and organized through categories, each positing their axioms. Now we just need to understand what are the units (objects), collected through what (categories), and formed into what (regions).
Meanings parallel objects, and it is not to be forgotten that meaning is just objectivity unfulfilled and unverified, and we study meaning when we are not interested if these meanings are actually fulfilled or not.

11.
Syntactic categories are relations between units that unify them into a manifold, without thus submerging them in undifferentiated homogeneity. If these manifolds are seen then as further units, these units or substrates are syntactic objects. Ultimate substrates are those units deprived of any syntactic configuration meaningful (within the limits of a given region?: an ultimate “this thing,” such as “this red,” “this color,” even “this essence”).

12.
All essences form into genera and species. This is a vertical structure. These genera and species are unified through the mereological category of “wholes and parts.” As wholes and parts are dependent on each other, as we later will see, they cannot be concrete by themselves, but only a complete vertical series of all genera with their subordinate species can be a candidate for “concretum.”

13.
A generalization ascends from species to genus, and through the determination in a genus the species is accordingly determined. In short, this is a vertical movement. This is different from universalization or formalization, which depends on symbolism. Formalization is not achieved through ascending to a higher genus, not even to the genus of Being, for it concerns all things equally as it concerns an indifferent “anything whatsoever,” hence it has none of the vertical movement, but the highest genus is for it only one other object to be syntactically related to its many species. But even more importantly, the universal object cannot be the highest genus, for it would not be “empty” but would be a material essence, thus related to factuality through abstraction ad infinitum, while the highest genus itself is only possible in the first place through a universalization that radically overcomes the method of abstraction.
For better articulation of this matter, consult my paper on Leibniz.

14.
The lowest species itself in question can still be particularized into a “this one.” This “this one” is not a factual existence! But it is only a possible existence. To be exact, this possible existence. “This one” is therefore also an essence!

15.—17.
A “this one” is not yet an individual. An individual is a “this one” whose essence does not by necessity refer to some other essence. By this definition, we can see genera and species must not be concrete, for all genera by necessity refer to their species. All genera qua genera are therefore abstract, and only complete vertical series are possible candidates for concreta. But some vertical series , such as from “this-red” to “color” to something even higher, its individual “this-red” implies some “this-shape” intrinsically, and is therefore not complete horizontally. Only a series whose individuals are thus completed in their essence can be called properly a region. A region is therefore always a complex of mutually corroborating, vertically and non-vertically, series of significances. Though each region studies complete individuals, so each region involves every other and there is in principle no clear boundary between essences included or excluded (for each regional ontology is the study of substances as infinite monads) it does not mean it is not particularly framed in perspective through some particular complex of essences. Regional ontology therefore always is “weighted” differentially into biologism, psychologism, anthropologism, physicalism, etc. These regional ontologies are to be unified into one universal science only through, first, a formal ontology (a region “beyond” regions) unweighted by any material essence, not even Being itself, but moreover, a science, i.e. phenomenology, that unites formal ontology and material ontology into one genuine metaphysics.
On this, consult my earlier paper on Husserl’s Crisis.

18~32

18.
Eidetics are not products of prejudices inherited from traditions, but precisely consequences of a return to “things themselves.”

19.
Empiricist’s starting point is the destruction of all idols obstructing thought. Yet it has itself become an idol of prejudices, insofar as it identifies experience with experience of natural and actual things. But it has to justify its own thesis with eidetics, which is self-defeating. Intuition is broader than mere perception. Intuition of the thing itself is the originary justifier in that it even is the first that lays down the ways to justifiably justify.

20.
Phenomenology is positivism in the sense that it entrusts its truths to what positively affords itself in intuition.

21.
Idealism is in the danger of degenerating into psychologism, for it, instead of seeking the “natural light” in the thing itself and the structure it affords for its own intuitive fulfillment of meaning, seeks it in an “affective feeling,” which can only be a very particular source of evidence specific to a particular region.

22.
Essences are not “actual” though they are “objective.”

23.
Ideation, compared to perception, is spontaneous. Like perception, its meaning can be relatively fulfilled or emptied. So is imagining, while imagining however is a region dependent on the originary givenness of perception, hence is abstract in itself. So essences are not fictions in the sense of being imagined, but they are as fictional as perceptions are fictional: that is, they are phenomenal.

24.
The principle of all principles is that whatever affords in intuition is to be taken as what it affords itself to be in the limits it sets itself. Is this principle itself not self-referential? But at least it closes itself off through intuition, and is thereby not self-inconsistent, since this principle is itself intuitive. Despite being circular in form, it first is “consistent,” and in addition “intuitive.” But the empiricist thesis that every truth is only particular and through custom is inconsistent with itself as it either presupposes a universal truth that contradicts its own claim or it defeats its own truth by declaring itself also only particular, thus degenerates into nonsense or an empty statement.
The same way a natural scientist conducts experiments on facts because the essence of natural science dictates thus.

25.
The double consciousness of a scientist: they in their dogmatic practice use eidetics such as mathematics without qualms, while in philosophical practice they become skeptics. In no way are instincts and historical unconscious capable of generating something exact like the sciences. Hence no way empiricist standpoint on science is legitimate.

26.
Two strands of skepticism: of the outside world and of the eidetics. Both need not trouble the scientists as they progress in accord with the first principle of intuition or self-evidence. But such a critique of knowledge should be effected through reflections immanent to philosophy itself before it is applied to sciences in general.

27.—30.
Here we turn from the negative to the positive establishment of phenomenology. We start with the natural attitude and its environing world to other attitudes in coherence with it. We are also to be clear that phenomenology is precisely the instituting of an eidetic science of the spirit: like mathematics is the eidetic science of the natural; moreover, it has to be transcendental so that it is not only restricted in the region of spirit, but is communicating all regions in one universal genesis.
I have talked about this in my paper: phenomenology is an ontology of the lifeworld, completing the unification between formal and material ontology through an ontology of the scientific praxis; it at the same time is an eidetic science of psychology, but insofar as it is not just one region or perspective among many, rather that it by essential necessity leads to a transcendental articulation of every noematic region, as it affords itself to the transcendental subject, and the transcendental subject is to be witnessed in-between every eidetic and its factual, including even that of psychology itself, between the eidetic subject and the empirical subject, as the absolute subject.

31.—32.
The phenomenological epoché is not doubting, nor an attempt to doubt. Rather, it is only one constitutive element of doubt or attempt to doubt. It, though negative, does not negate the world nor put the world in question. Rather, it remains convinced of the world while seeing its conviction as itself an attitude. “Bracketing,” so it is called. This is the most authentic form of freedom as it does not take any position and does not attempt to transform, hence be objectively related, to anything. It “makes of no use” and is hence free from the world.

33~46

33.
The project here is to gain not merely the region of eidetics of nature or ontology, which is already instituted through mathematical sciences, but rather a new region, the region of pure experiences. I shall provide a preliminary account of this necessity. As was clear from earlier, a region is an eidetic system based on a perspective in view of a totality which essentially does not refer to another perspective by necessity. In other words, a region is an independent and self-sufficient monad. We can find pairs of region that are parallel and though complementary do not refer to each other by necessity, among which the most prominent are: formal ontological vs material ontological, factic vs eidetic, and natural vs spiritual. These regions together comprise the totality of all regions, yet they do not essentially need each other. They rather are only pros hen. One could be thoroughly spiritual or material or factical… These regions are thereby only unified analogically through freedom.
Freedom is the freedom of a subject. This subject qua the ultimate unity has to unify all perspectives. This means, superficially, it has to generate all regions from each its other. For instance, it has to constitute facts through ideas ethically, and ideas through facts historically; it has to constitute the formal through the material intuitively, material through formal universally; finally, it has to constitute the spiritual through the natural and vice versa. But principally Husserl has to establish the spiritual as a region. Psychology has to be independent. This is his project in this section: to show the spiritual is independent from the natural.
Only when all these regions are established can Husserl finally achieve an introduction to transcendental phenomenology, which involves all these regions in its constitution, though it by necessity has to begin with the spiritual, as the spiritual is, as will be shown, the indubitable and primordial region. But it shall also become clear that the eidetic region of the spirit itself, being self-enclosed, would be reduced to mere material psychology without a universalization of its method in communication with formal ontology, or to death without history and genesis of facts, or to subjectivism without natural sciences. So he starts in this section with instituting the eidetic region of subjectivity, then will move on to a transcendental overcoming of the merely eidetic, to the properly phenomenological: through the instituting of an ontology of the lifeworld (metaphysics) between formal and material ontologies, a universal transcendental history between facts and ideas, and a constitutive phenomenology between nature and spirit.

34.—38.
The essential structure of consciousness is it is always consciousness of something. There is always transcendence of the thing and immanence of the content of consciousness qua experience. Moreover, there is always a center of focus and a horizon gradually out of focus. This must have something to do with transcendence and immanence.

39.—41.
A thing is most primarily transcendent not as a scientific object but as a perceived thing. As such it stands opposite to experience. An easy way to grasp the essential difference between an experience and a thing is that an experience, though always another experience “transcends” it, its transcendence is not construed in a way that necessitates a harmonizing function. Experiences are always harmonized in an absolute flow: that is, it is immaterial if experiences might contradict each other. A thing is a pre-unified center of harmony or coherence, and it has a rigid form. Experiences are fluid and have no form: their reality depends only on the amount of content. See my Leibniz paper, the discussion on substance vs form.

42.—46.
All the consequences follow from this essential difference: the manifold of experiences is therefore absolutely certain and indubitable, as it is always there, whereas thinghood qua the center of organized experiences might not be there all the time, hence is dubitable. But what is even more important is that thinghood here is entirely emergent as an effect of experiences, i.e. how much a manifold of experiences harmonize. This way, one can say that the independent region of experiences is finally instituted as it now incorporates its own “opposite” under its perspective, that transcendence is now its accessory. Things are still essentially different from experiences, which, for instance, are not spatially extended. Thus the transcendence of things is irreducible to what is immanent, yet they are irreducible merely as effects are irreducible to causes, so that they are still dependent on experiences. Fundamentally, things are transcendent only due to what is immanent, i.e. experiences. That is why in 43. Husserl criticizes the “thing in itself” or the “symbolic view of thinghood,” as if a thing is merely something “out there” that has not shown up as itself in its appearances. That might very well be a reasonable theory, but not how the sense of thinghood is understood properly. In other words, even God cannot intuit a thing not as a thing (e.g. as experiences), but He only intuits a thing infinitely. Our finitude has nothing to do with the essential structure of a thing, and in this matter Heidegger is gravely mistaken. Husserl has here accomplished what he sets out to do, namely, to attain an independent region for subjectivity.
One must also realize that the region of natural bodies also is independent and essentially indubitable in its own perspective, as a thing is there construed as the ultimate objectivity guaranteed eidetically through mathematics, hence absolutely certain. What Husserl has achieved here is therefore an initial counterpoint to the rationalistic perspective, which would eventually be expanded to incorporate all regions and their mutual geneses.

47~62

47.
All “things” through the phenomenological reduction are reduced to unities of sense, or simply manifolds of experiences. Some manifolds don’t need to constitute coherent “things.” These manifolds of experiences are unified through motivations, which are all teleological actions, and they are not causal since they are not unified as transcendent things are unified through their mutual eidetic necessities (horizontally between two distinct units) but are unified as immanent experiences are through the absolute ego into a more intensive experience.

48.
Something can be logically possible without making sense materially, namely, in relation to all the “facts” and their material essences. The imperceptible world is one such example, as it cannot make sense materially and does not harmonize with other experiences.

49.—50.
Destruction of the world that retains the region of absolute consciousness. See Majolino.

51.
If transcendental reduction starts out as an abstraction, it has now retained the fully concrete substance of an independent perspective, hence an ontological region. Yet in order to become the absolute region, though no region should by necessity refers to it, it must by necessity incorporates all regions, i.e. nature and spirit, formal and material ontologies, essences and facts, in itself. The self-overcoming of phenomenology starts here with the Remark, with the positing of an immanent teleological and theological principle: the absolute ordering is different from the ordering that gives rise to a “thing.”

52.
The mistake of naive realism is twofold. First it mistakes experiences with “appearances,” thus calling appearances merely subjective, without noticing how appearances such as colors are altogether transcendent. Then it mistakes appearances with physical things, so as to believe there are some “things in themselves” not completely perceived hidden inside appearances, without realizing that these so-called “things in themselves” are nothing but rational kernels of laws and rules regulating experiences of “appearances.” In other words, physical things are but higher unities of experience founded on lower unities.

53.—54.
Another overcoming comes in here with the incorporation of the physicalistic and naturalistic attitude inside the phenomenological one: the physical-psychological perspective is nothing other than an apperceptive unity of experiences of bodies founded on the absolute flow of experiences.

55.
Phenomenology affords a different stipulation of “reality.”

56.—62.
Here we are to fully comprehend the metamorphosis of phenomenology. All “suspensions” here are not to be understood as negations but as reductions, i.e. as constituted through the absolute consciousness. These reductions are of the independent regions: nature vs spirit, facts vs essences, and formal vs material ontologies.
With nature and spirit it is obvious. Nature and the naturalistic attitude are still legitimate in themselves, as they have their own eidetic region and perspective. But it is also overcome as it is incorporated in the absolute genesis of absolute consciousness. Moreover, this region of absolute consciousness is not simply the region of psychology or spirit, as it transcends all spiritual unities as such. Rather, qua transcendental subjectivity, it also points to a transcendental nature.
It then overcomes the gulf between facts and essences. This is achieved in three ways. First, as each fact is a unity of sense, it is no longer a given fact but a fact constituted through a horizon of possibility, i.e. a fact construed eidetically. A phenomenology of facts means nothing other than an eidetic phenomenology of facts, reducing these facts to their material essences, qua immanent essences of experiences that constitute a certain experienced objectivity. Therefore, there is no purely factual experience, but every experience is essentially both: phenomenology is always material in its practice. Second, it also becomes clear that phenomenology, as a science, cannot dispense with essences, and though it is not inconceivable for a pure consciousness to be purely factual, that is, purely concerned with actuality and overlooking the essential motivational possibility behind this “fact,” it would not be a scientific consciousness. Phenomenology therefore has to stay with essences, if only with immanent essences such as “the experience A is not possible without…” Finally, phenomenology has to take its bearing with facts too, for it must posit a teleology that leads from possibility to fact (for otherwise no fact is fundamentally “possible,” in the sense of lacking a sufficient reason), and also its own immanent essences (including the ontological essence of a general consciousness) are themselves objectivities constituted through the flux of absolute consciousness, the absolute consciousness therefore must be a teleological self-explication of its own essence as a material fact to itself: the self-constituting constitution.
The last transformation is already underway, for though a formal ontology is absolutely empty and hence “applicable” also to pure consciousness, and phenomenology must use formal logic, it explicates itself through its achievement of the region of formal logic: formal logic is an independent region, yet phenomenology must exceed formal logic and its emptiness. For phenomenology is ultimately material and is nothing other than a universal genesis of everything, including formal logic as the self-explication of this very universality. Hence, transcendental logic is the fulfilling of a genuine material ontology: metaphysics.
Therefore, we witness the multiple cloaks phenomenology wears. As pure psychology, it is at the same time a transcendental naturalism; as an eidetics, it is at the same time a rational theology; as a transcendental logic, it is at the same time the genuine universal metaphysics.

63~79

63.—65.
Phenomenology has to be the first philosophy. As first philosophy that is forever self-critical, hence self-generative, it is by necessity self-referential. Self-reference is only a problem when all things derived utterly depend on the first principle and hence have no self-validity. That is, in the way all logical arguments are thoroughly dependent on the premises, the premises cannot be proved through these derivative arguments, yet can be enriched or further differentiated through them.

66.
The ideal for phenomenology as a science is therefore this self-fulfilling of sense through self-determined intuitions and self-appropriated methods.

67.
This is very important. The three different designations for givenness. First, givenness or givenness of self, in the sense of a manifold giving itself as it is in its essential and normative structure of clarity and obscurity, presence and absence; e.g. a thing giving itself in its manifold of profiles. Second, originary givenness as the source of maximal and absolute (apodeictic) intuition or vivacity; e.g. original impression. Third, givenness as a readiness for affording intuition; e.g. the potency of a horizon.

68.
Another important distinction. Givenness can be intensive or extensive. Either an intuition is clear as a unity, or it is clear as a manifold; and clarification can proceed inside the unified intuition or from it to other intuitions. All these manifolds have essential restrictions or limits on their structure of givenness.

69.—70.
Perception and free phantasy are both privileged ways of gaining intuitions. But essentially what is required is to maximize the intensity and scope of one’s mental gaze to determine the essence of the experience; if such an essence is only “limited” it is nonetheless an essence.

71.—75.
Phenomenology is itself a self-contained region of study. The question now is if it is like mathematics. It is obviously material and concrete. But its domain is not definitively of an exhaustive and definite manifold. That is, a phenomenologist does not start with a limited set of axiomatic experiences to deduce every possible experience (though it is not yet proved in principle impossible) in the domain but only describes morphological essences as they are. Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem has no effect on this matter since the impossibility to prove the self-consistency of a system through this system alone does not negate the motivation that institutes the system in the first place. That is, though an axiomatic system depends on other related systems, its axiomacity is not denied, nor its basic structure of founding derivatives on primitive axioms. Moreover, precisely because phenomenology is indifferent to deductions, though it always has to employ logic, it obeys intuition primarily, so that it does not have to follow one step from the other in some fixed order, but is generally free in its motivations and its descriptiveness, which freedom is prescribed by intuition.

76.
The clearest statement of what was established earlier about the scope of phenomenology as a first philosophy: it is the root region of every region and every discipline, i.e. it is the pre-established harmony of all monads.

77.—79.
Reflections are key to phenomenology for phenomenology is first of all an eidetic science, and all essences are about possibilities, hence always reflective. Reflection is here the synthesis of self-alienation and is structural: originary givenness is always a structurally modified moment within the harmony of the givenness of itself. In this sense, though retention is less originary than impression, it is equally essential to constituting impression. The same way imagination, though (in its essence) less originary than perception, must (also in its essence) presuppose perception. What has absolute legitimacy is what is essential to the most originary, including retention, protention and impression. What has relative legitimacy is what is inessential to the most originary, such as recollection and perception might play against each other, though perception, since it is more originary, weighs more than recollection.
Reflection always retains the act in relation to its correlate, thus modifying it. But is reflection then always missing the “actual thing” through modifying it? No, for several reasons. First, Husserl uses the term “modification” for a reason, as “modification” does not suggest a total transformation, but rather it (in a Spinozist way) always expresses the original and as such is a structural moment that can immediately comprehend the original through this structure. Its “ideation” or “making essence” is not itself outside the prescription of the givenness. Second, to say we always miss the original is only a verbal game, for such is not afforded in intuition, and nothing would make sense, including this statement, “we always miss the original,” itself. Finally, to be thus skeptical is making a false assumption, namely, the thing is an “intrinsically perceivable reality” that is not yet perceived, that is, the thing is fully transcendent beyond what is “subjectively immanent,” but this is the same mistake as before. For we suppose “a past time” is like a real thing we can access, only that we are trapped in our “present time;” yet intuition affords us a different insight, that “a past time” is an immanently constituted transcendence that gives itself in the living present. Such is the essence of time, and psychology has to follow phenomenology’s determination of essence instead of wallowing in its own naturalistic prejudices.

80~96

80.—83.
Inner-time consciousness is the absolute foundation for consciousness. Through its three dimensions intentionality gathers its essential threefold structure: depth, expanse, and altitude. So is an impression at once a noesis—that is, the activity of synthesizing what is other and obscure from what is clearly intuited, or an activity in depth, a noema—that is, the achievement of an expanding structure of the unified manifold of sense, a noesis-noema compound, and an absolute ideal—that is, the highest limit of originary intuition. Noesis and noema can be glossed in a different way, as noesis is the unity of what becomes clear, noema is the unity of what stays obscure and recalcitrant; and these are proximate to the former sense, as “activity” is precisely what is most proximate to the unity of clarity or illumination. But either way, it cannot be denied that there is an ideal limit of the absolute unity of consciousness.

84.—86.
Hyletic phenomenology is concerned with what is purely or abstractly immanent to consciousness as material for intentional functions to objectify. These are “sensory” data not in the sense of secondary qualities but as drives and inner feelings. These are then implemented in intentional acts, clear or unclear, as material for objectivities. The phenomenology concerned with the noetic aspect, or what is beyond the hyletic, is properly called transcendental phenomenology.

87.—91.
Noema is what transcends the really obtaining noetic function as its intended sense. The noetic function reaches out over itself into another noesis and only in such overreaching synthesizes this other potential noesis into a noematic unity. The noematic unity stresses the intended or unfulfilled kernel about which the sense is organized, while the noetic unity stresses the intending or the fulfillment about which the sense is construed. In this relation, noetic unity is more vital and proximate, while the noematic less so.

92.—96.
But the noematic and the noetic are also one unity with different focal points. The structure of a horizon or “attention” is absolutely crucial to this unity, as is witnessed through the syntheses of multiple horizons of attention affording sense. Logical judgement is always twofold as the noematic, the “judged as such,” and as the noetic, the “general judging.” One cannot be without the other without thereby being an abstraction. Logicians are right insofar as they emphasize the objectivity of judgements, but they omit the equally “objective” (essential and universal) noetic unity of a general judgement. So is axiology or ethics concerned with noetic essences of valuation as much as with the noematic essences of what is valuable. These different essences are founded on each other or correlated to each other, vertically as valuation is on perception, horizontally as valuation is to what is valuable.

97~117

97.—101.
The hyletic and noetic aspects are really obtaining, while the noematic are constituted as transcendent. But it also seems that noema is constituted as a unity, while noeses are always the constituting manifold. We must therefore be careful about our analyses. First, we cannot ignore that a noema is in turn a unity of manifold noemata, while noeses themselves are organized by a dominating noesis. The distinction between noema and noesis does not reside in that simply of one and many. Rather, it is clear that noema is the structure where a manifold of immanences and transcendences of noeses are constituted into an “overly transcendent” unity, which in turn is composed of other such noemata, mediated through these noeses. Noesis is immanent mediation. Any phenomenological explication therefore must follow a zigzag pattern: noesis-noema-noesis-noema… Noeses and noemata reflect into each other.

102.—108.
All acts in the natural attitude are thetic. That is, they, either actually or potentially (meaning actual to the attention focus of consciousness or only latent for it), all posit being. This is not only meant in a foundational sense, that all doxic modifications of being rely on some primary being, which does constitute part of the problematic; but also that all modifications in themselves can potentially be construed as thetic. For instance, it is true that in order to doubt something, you need something posited so that you can doubt it; but even when you doubt it, it is now a “dubious being.” These modifications, because of this thetic nature, are themselves modifiable ad infinitum. That is, one can doubt a doubt, can confirm a doubt, can reject a doubt, etc.
One has to be clear, however, that the noema corresponding to a noesis is immediate. That is, it is not because I unite the doubting I reflect upon with the thing I doubt that I see the thing as doubtful; but I first immediately see the thing as doubtful so that on later reflection I can analyze my doubt. One must not substitute an experience reflected upon with an immediate experience, for in that immediate experience no such analysis is carried out, and if it is carried out it would not be the same experience. One might be tempted to ask again how is phenomenological analysis capable of explicating the experience if the immediate experience is not identical to the reflected experience. It is to be understood that they are not identical, but equivalent: through reflections and analyses, one clarifies what was not clear, including how it was not clear, thus preserving the experience with its corresponding unclarity and immediacy within the content of its reflection; but in the immediacy of experience it cannot comprehend its own reflection, for that contradicts the very definition of immediacy.

109.—117.
Phenomenological reflection, however, is a very unique kind of reflection. It is non-positional, hence is a neutral modification. Unlike doxic modifications that all depend on what is thetic, each expounding only on the theses through reason (even dialectic proceeds in this manner: perhaps not beyond it until the final moment of comprehending the totality in its immediacy), this neutral modification only posit things as if they are: neither ascertained nor negated. They are only expressions of the expressed, not the generated out of an origin. That is, neutrality is a symbolic attribute, as through symbols a totality of actualities and potentialities are posited indifferently. This neutrality expresses a different kind of potency than a potency that is related to actuality and in urge to become actualized: it is the potency to leave this network altogether, it is the potential surface of universality.
But a non-absolute surface can always become stratified. That is, some phantasy, though neutral in itself, for instance, can always be tapped back to reality as its foundation. Normal acts of reflections all have this characteristic, that they can always be iterated, for they always point to their originals to be further reflected upon. A phantasy can contain a further phantasy, etc. To achieve the phenomenological reduction, however, the act has to be absolute to “produce” a universal surface of reflection. The world must be “destroyed” in this process. That is, since all reflections bracket some theses, what is needed is therefore a universalization of these reflections that destroy the original once and for all. For instance, my memory points to another memory points to another memory, and each memory is itself taken as immediately remembered, so memories all indicate some original presentation, and each memory is itself such a presentation “as a memory.” But since the ideal possibility is always essentially there that something originally remembered is itself but a remembrance of something else, ad infinitum, and each remembrance, as an original being, is but itself something remembered, that ultimately everything is but a memory deprived of any actual being. This is the significance of Plato’s doctrine of recollection. The thing recollected is itself a recollection, and recollection itself is nothing but the recollected of another recollection. Every original being is therefore dissolved into the immanent surface of universal recollection: each recollection is equally original and equally a derivative image, equally an as if. Everything therefore consists in these equally expressive “mere appearances.” The univocity of being. All things are in the totality of expressions, equally as expressions, and qua expressions are ordered into different manifolds, each manifold with its own respective center of unity, hence “origin” or “originary givenness.” But no such originary givenness marks an absolute genesis, only a normative structure of expression. Just as we need to explain why there are simulations of origins if all are equally expressions.
This does not merely apply to the world of being, but also the world of values and the world of practices. As acts can be founded on other acts, they can even be founded on such neutral acts: the valorization of a phantasy, or the life as a phenomenologist. But the phenomenologist’s attitude does not allow for iterated acts: it has to be once and for all, though phenomenological attitude itself can become thetic in reflection, it is a self-instantiation, not an iteration. A phenomenology of phenomenology is an Absolute Science differentiating itself into different levels, not a bundle of fundamentally different phenomenologies.
Finally, as everything can be turned into the thetic, the thetic attitude is also essentially universal. Since anything axiological or practical is founded on the thetic, and can itself be turned into the thetic, a formal axiology and a formal theory of praxis both depend on a formal logic. Moreover, as formal logic is essentially universal, it correlates to the universal material ontology: metaphysics, the ontology of the lifeworld. But that in turn depends on phenomenology as the universal science. Why? Because formal logic is in principle neutral. It presupposes the neutrality of a phenomenologist so as to become truly universal as a thetic science. Otherwise it would be entangled in the practice of specific logical practices in determining what is thetic and what is not without attaining the universal view of all that is thetic, the universal surface of being, so to speak.

118~135

118.—123.
Each thetic can be related syntactically to other thetics to be synthesized. This synthetic, however, can be also transformed in consciousness into a simple thetic.

124.—127.
The problem of meaning and expression is related to the problem of sense. While sense is not necessarily linguistic, hence universal, meaning and expression are linguistic categories. The difficulty is how language mirrors sense unities and its basic motivations. More importantly, one might be tempted to ask if the mirroring of language is not an archaic preparation of phenomenological attitude: through language, each sense is represented and captured. Perhaps the difference is that language, though potentially universal, never incorporates this universality as a positive aim, like phenomenology does. That is, it mostly only expresses confusedly, unreflectively, and incompletely, while also taking itself again as some entity. Phenomenological attitude, however, is a conscious universalization that aims to fully explicate every meaning and its expressed sense. Moreover, as language is not always doxic, it sometimes is rather a speech act, which requires again a bracketing.

128.—135.
Not only is there a noetic intending to sense, there is also a noematic sense. An object itself intends another object as its constituting horizon. Moreover, all objects contain in themselves the bearers of sense, the transcendental Xs, around which senses are centered in fleshing out the fullness of these noematic cores. Phenomenology provides the access to a theoretical comprehensive study of all the systems of these cores and their coinciding identities as a genuine metaphysics of general and concrete objectivity, in relation to the universal psychology of general and concrete noetic subjectivity. Such is the universal science that unites formal logic with material sciences (including objective formal and material ethics) and an equally universal psychology. But with all these systematic interconnections, another crucial aspect is yet lacking, that is the problem of facticity or actuality. In what ways are these essences prescribing horizons of possibility considered actualized? In what ways do essences pass into facts? What is the essence of a fact? These questions concern phenomenology in a new way: a phenomenology qua rational theology and teleology is thereby outlined. Not the essence of a “this,” which is merely the singular, in relation to the universal; but the essence of “this as a fact,” which might even include essences, for essences could themselves be simply reduced to the factual existences in natural attitude. That is, phenomenology also needs to account for the essence of a thesis and the natural attitude in its relation to the transcendental attitude together with the constitution of a this in order to fully explicate the factical.

136~153

136.—153.
So, what is facticity? Before we even proceed to consider this, we need to understand what is actuality. Actuality’s first component is vivacity in the Humean sense, or the Cartesian natural light. This, one can say, amounts to evidence in general, and in the particular realm of judgment or logic, insight. But it is crucial to note that this natural light would simply be mysterious without its second component, rationality. Rationality is the co-articulation of all evidences into a reciprocally corroborating network of illumination.
We need to understand more carefully how evidences present themselves in different regions. First, all essences qua essences give adequate, apodeictic, immanent insights. They give themselves perfectly and fully in intuition as essences. They are purely the horizons of all immediate possibilities as such. In the same sense “1+1=2” is certain, so is “a centaur is a horse-man combination,” or “a material thing is essentially inadequately given in perception.” They completely give forth their constitution content as essence.
Does this mean, however, that essences are purely self-sufficient? In a way, yes; for all essences are independent insofar as they are completed and totalizing horizons. Yet, they also, not by essential necessity, but by transcendental necessity (i.e. freedom), intend factual instantiations. Are essences essentially essences of facts? Not necessarily, for we can imagine a world where all are essences, where no fact obtains, which indeed is the region of constitutive phenomenology with its comprehended individual senses; nor is a world only of facts incomprehensible, as a world in our empirical and natural attitude. Essences and facts are rather related through, not the essence of essences, but the essence of transcendental consciousness. For transcendental consciousness precisely is the self-transcending absolute flux of consciousness that, though an essence in it completely retains its veracity as itself, nonetheless freely expounds the sense of this essence through the sense of another essence, and intends with one independent region another region. Why? Because though the region is self-enclosed and does not intend “itself” in another, consciousness nonetheless intends itself as the Absolute Totality through it, enriching itself in this intending. In other words, though a mathematical axiom is self-evident, it nonetheless “intends” its derived propositions, not because it is incomplete without those propositions, but because it makes consciousness unfree without the totality of its posits.
Therefore, all essences are to be understood, not as mysterious posits, but also norms regulating facts, which are nonetheless intended through the self-differentiating act of absolute consciousness. Essences intend facts, not essentially, but transcendentally.
Yet we still have not clarified the sense of “facticity.” It is now evident, however, that though it is necessarily an actuality, i.e. evidence, coarticulated and verified by other evidences in harmony inherent to absolute consciousness, it lacks a third component to set it apart from essence. An essence also is actual and co-intends other evidences. What kind of evidence do facts possess?
Not particularity, for “this horse” is also an essence. Rather, the distinguishing mark is inadequacy. That is, though the essence of a thing entails “inadequacy,” yet this is nonetheless adequately comprehended as a universal horizon, a norm. “Inadequacy” is contained in the essence merely as an adequate essence itself. However, if an essence dictates inadequacy as a norm, the essence has to transcend itself and become incarnate in a fact. A fact is therefore understood as an “evidence essentially inadequately given, i.e. necessitated by the very essence itself, to intend other actualities, including other essences.” That is, a fact is the necessary supplement to an essence that dictates its own inadequacy to be fully given as itself, while itself can only be given as an idea. Every essence, therefore, is constituted as a fact, through the essence of transcendental consciousness. For the essence of consciousness is “that which intends absolutely but always inadequately,” and through its own essence, though its essence is adequately given as an essence, this adequacy itself entails the (infinite) inadequacy inherent to its very content, thus overcoming its own essence, it intends other evidences as facts. Simply put, a fact belongs to an essence that negates its own adequacy, such that it adds in its essential content the operation sign: “…but I, the essence, am not it.” A factual essence is, unlike essences that cointend only transcendentally, what cointends infinitely by essential necessity. An essence that prescribes only a limited amount of essences in making it up is a pure essence; its contrary is the essence of a fact. And facticity, therefore, is just this effect of condensed or confused totality intended by an essence: the infinite transcendence of a concrete noema.