Edmund Husserl · 埃德蒙德·胡塞尔
Ideas I · 观念 I
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Ideas I — Reading notes
Apple Notes
Revised 12 March 2025
1~17
1.
Knowledge starts with experience. Experience is directed towards the world. Originary intuition.
2.
Facts are experienced. All facts contain a kernel of essence and their essence can always be idealized into eidos. Facts and factual regularities such as laws of nature deal with what exists, while essences deal with what could possibly exist. Therefore, essences are immediately posited and are hence not generated. In this sense, all essences are universal, as they express a totality of possibilities.
3.
Ideation transforms a fact into an essence. Yet this essence is intuited clearly, or distinctly, or even adequately, depending on one’s knowledge of it. Some essences are necessarily incomplete and inadequate, so that they by necessity refer to other essences to complete their form. This inadequacy later will be considered abstractness. The intuition of a universal essence as such and that of its factual exemplary is to be distinguished.
4.
Through phantasy one can freely discern an essence as such without positing any matter-of-fact existence. The positing of an essence is different from the positing of an existence. Phenomenological attitude is precisely one that suspends any positing of existence.
5.
A universal essence as such is different from a general horizon created by this essence for its possible instantiations. One can either objectify an essence as such or not so as to keep it as a horizon wherein factual instances appear.
6.
Eidetic judging and judgement correspond to what is eidetically meant, hence a mere objectivity. Eidetic truth of the judgement corresponds to what is eidetically obtaining as an established object.
An eidetic necessity follows, as a particularized and instantiated consequence, the eidetic universality of a judgement. A fact, since it always is an instantiation of an essence, is therefore always also an eidetic necessity of sorts. What an eidetic science is interested in is precisely this essential necessity a priori.
7.
Sciences of facts and sciences of essences are parallel to each other.
8.
Eidetic sciences are, through their very essence, independent from factual sciences since they do not need to refer to empirical facts qua eidetic sciences, while factual sciences must be dependent on eidetic sciences, since sciences must refer to universal knowledge of all possibilities, so that first all factual sciences have to obey formal logic, and also have to conform to the material essence of its study. Foreshadowing of 15~17 already at work here.
9.
Now we move from contemplating the relation between facts and essences to contemplating essences alone. All regions are defined through some material essence as their organizing center.
10.
Now we need to clarify a few notions. Object, category, and region. Objects have various meanings, of which the originary paradigm is the thing in itself. We start with formal ontology to better understand these notions. Regions are collectivities of units regulated and organized through categories, each positing their axioms. Now we just need to understand what are the units (objects), collected through what (categories), and formed into what (regions).
Meanings parallel objects, and it is not to be forgotten that meaning is just objectivity unfulfilled and unverified, and we study meaning when we are not interested if these meanings are actually fulfilled or not.
11.
Syntactic categories are relations between units that unify them into a manifold, without thus submerging them in undifferentiated homogeneity. If these manifolds are seen then as further units, these units or substrates are syntactic objects. Ultimate substrates are those units deprived of any syntactic configuration meaningful (within the limits of a given region?: an ultimate “this thing,” such as “this red,” “this color,” even “this essence”).
12.
All essences form into genera and species. This is a vertical structure. These genera and species are unified through the mereological category of “wholes and parts.” As wholes and parts are dependent on each other, as we later will see, they cannot be concrete by themselves, but only a complete vertical series of all genera with their subordinate species can be a candidate for “concretum.”
13.
A generalization ascends from species to genus, and through the determination in a genus the species is accordingly determined. In short, this is a vertical movement. This is different from universalization or formalization, which depends on symbolism. Formalization is not achieved through ascending to a higher genus, not even to the genus of Being, for it concerns all things equally as it concerns an indifferent “anything whatsoever,” hence it has none of the vertical movement, but the highest genus is for it only one other object to be syntactically related to its many species. But even more importantly, the universal object cannot be the highest genus, for it would not be “empty” but would be a material essence, thus related to factuality through abstraction ad infinitum, while the highest genus itself is only possible in the first place through a universalization that radically overcomes the method of abstraction.
For better articulation of this matter, consult my paper on Leibniz.
14.
The lowest species itself in question can still be particularized into a “this one.” This “this one” is not a factual existence! But it is only a possible existence. To be exact, this possible existence. “This one” is therefore also an essence!
15.—17.
A “this one” is not yet an individual. An individual is a “this one” whose essence does not by necessity refer to some other essence. By this definition, we can see genera and species must not be concrete, for all genera by necessity refer to their species. All genera qua genera are therefore abstract, and only complete vertical series are possible candidates for concreta. But some vertical series , such as from “this-red” to “color” to something even higher, its individual “this-red” implies some “this-shape” intrinsically, and is therefore not complete horizontally. Only a series whose individuals are thus completed in their essence can be called properly a region. A region is therefore always a complex of mutually corroborating, vertically and non-vertically, series of significances. Though each region studies complete individuals, so each region involves every other and there is in principle no clear boundary between essences included or excluded (for each regional ontology is the study of substances as infinite monads) it does not mean it is not particularly framed in perspective through some particular complex of essences. Regional ontology therefore always is “weighted” differentially into biologism, psychologism, anthropologism, physicalism, etc. These regional ontologies are to be unified into one universal science only through, first, a formal ontology (a region “beyond” regions) unweighted by any material essence, not even Being itself, but moreover, a science, i.e. phenomenology, that unites formal ontology and material ontology into one genuine metaphysics.
On this, consult my earlier paper on Husserl’s Crisis.
18~32
18.
Eidetics are not products of prejudices inherited from traditions, but precisely consequences of a return to “things themselves.”
19.
Empiricist’s starting point is the destruction of all idols obstructing thought. Yet it has itself become an idol of prejudices, insofar as it identifies experience with experience of natural and actual things. But it has to justify its own thesis with eidetics, which is self-defeating. Intuition is broader than mere perception. Intuition of the thing itself is the originary justifier in that it even is the first that lays down the ways to justifiably justify.
20.
Phenomenology is positivism in the sense that it entrusts its truths to what positively affords itself in intuition.
21.
Idealism is in the danger of degenerating into psychologism, for it, instead of seeking the “natural light” in the thing itself and the structure it affords for its own intuitive fulfillment of meaning, seeks it in an “affective feeling,” which can only be a very particular source of evidence specific to a particular region.
22.
Essences are not “actual” though they are “objective.”
23.
Ideation, compared to perception, is spontaneous. Like perception, its meaning can be relatively fulfilled or emptied. So is imagining, while imagining however is a region dependent on the originary givenness of perception, hence is abstract in itself. So essences are not fictions in the sense of being imagined, but they are as fictional as perceptions are fictional: that is, they are phenomenal.
24.
The principle of all principles is that whatever affords in intuition is to be taken as what it affords itself to be in the limits it sets itself. Is this principle itself not self-referential? But at least it closes itself off through intuition, and is thereby not self-inconsistent, since this principle is itself intuitive. Despite being circular in form, it first is “consistent,” and in addition “intuitive.” But the empiricist thesis that every truth is only particular and through custom is inconsistent with itself as it either presupposes a universal truth that contradicts its own claim or it defeats its own truth by declaring itself also only particular, thus degenerates into nonsense or an empty statement.
The same way a natural scientist conducts experiments on facts because the essence of natural science dictates thus.
25.
The double consciousness of a scientist: they in their dogmatic practice use eidetics such as mathematics without qualms, while in philosophical practice they become skeptics. In no way are instincts and historical unconscious capable of generating something exact like the sciences. Hence no way empiricist standpoint on science is legitimate.
26.
Two strands of skepticism: of the outside world and of the eidetics. Both need not trouble the scientists as they progress in accord with the first principle of intuition or self-evidence. But such a critique of knowledge should be effected through reflections immanent to philosophy itself before it is applied to sciences in general.
27.—30.
Here we turn from the negative to the positive establishment of phenomenology. We start with the natural attitude and its environing world to other attitudes in coherence with it. We are also to be clear that phenomenology is precisely the instituting of an eidetic science of the spirit: like mathematics is the eidetic science of the natural; moreover, it has to be transcendental so that it is not only restricted in the region of spirit, but is communicating all regions in one universal genesis.
I have talked about this in my paper: phenomenology is an ontology of the lifeworld, completing the unification between formal and material ontology through an ontology of the scientific praxis; it at the same time is an eidetic science of psychology, but insofar as it is not just one region or perspective among many, rather that it by essential necessity leads to a transcendental articulation of every noematic region, as it affords itself to the transcendental subject, and the transcendental subject is to be witnessed in-between every eidetic and its factual, including even that of psychology itself, between the eidetic subject and the empirical subject, as the absolute subject.
31.—32.
The phenomenological epoché is not doubting, nor an attempt to doubt. Rather, it is only one constitutive element of doubt or attempt to doubt. It, though negative, does not negate the world nor put the world in question. Rather, it remains convinced of the world while seeing its conviction as itself an attitude. “Bracketing,” so it is called. This is the most authentic form of freedom as it does not take any position and does not attempt to transform, hence be objectively related, to anything. It “makes of no use” and is hence free from the world.
33~46
33.
The project here is to gain not merely the region of eidetics of nature or ontology, which is already instituted through mathematical sciences, but rather a new region, the region of pure experiences. I shall provide a preliminary account of this necessity. As was clear from earlier, a region is an eidetic system based on a perspective in view of a totality which essentially does not refer to another perspective by necessity. In other words, a region is an independent and self-sufficient monad. We can find pairs of region that are parallel and though complementary do not refer to each other by necessity, among which the most prominent are: formal ontological vs material ontological, factic vs eidetic, and natural vs spiritual. These regions together comprise the totality of all regions, yet they do not essentially need each other. They rather are only pros hen. One could be thoroughly spiritual or material or factical… These regions are thereby only unified analogically through freedom.
Freedom is the freedom of a subject. This subject qua the ultimate unity has to unify all perspectives. This means, superficially, it has to generate all regions from each its other. For instance, it has to constitute facts through ideas ethically, and ideas through facts historically; it has to constitute the formal through the material intuitively, material through formal universally; finally, it has to constitute the spiritual through the natural and vice versa. But principally Husserl has to establish the spiritual as a region. Psychology has to be independent. This is his project in this section: to show the spiritual is independent from the natural.
Only when all these regions are established can Husserl finally achieve an introduction to transcendental phenomenology, which involves all these regions in its constitution, though it by necessity has to begin with the spiritual, as the spiritual is, as will be shown, the indubitable and primordial region. But it shall also become clear that the eidetic region of the spirit itself, being self-enclosed, would be reduced to mere material psychology without a universalization of its method in communication with formal ontology, or to death without history and genesis of facts, or to subjectivism without natural sciences. So he starts in this section with instituting the eidetic region of subjectivity, then will move on to a transcendental overcoming of the merely eidetic, to the properly phenomenological: through the instituting of an ontology of the lifeworld (metaphysics) between formal and material ontologies, a universal transcendental history between facts and ideas, and a constitutive phenomenology between nature and spirit.
34.—38.
The essential structure of consciousness is it is always consciousness of something. There is always transcendence of the thing and immanence of the content of consciousness qua experience. Moreover, there is always a center of focus and a horizon gradually out of focus. This must have something to do with transcendence and immanence.
39.—41.
A thing is most primarily transcendent not as a scientific object but as a perceived thing. As such it stands opposite to experience. An easy way to grasp the essential difference between an experience and a thing is that an experience, though always another experience “transcends” it, its transcendence is not construed in a way that necessitates a harmonizing function. Experiences are always harmonized in an absolute flow: that is, it is immaterial if experiences might contradict each other. A thing is a pre-unified center of harmony or coherence, and it has a rigid form. Experiences are fluid and have no form: their reality depends only on the amount of content. See my Leibniz paper, the discussion on substance vs form.
42.—46.
All the consequences follow from this essential difference: the manifold of experiences is therefore absolutely certain and indubitable, as it is always there, whereas thinghood qua the center of organized experiences might not be there all the time, hence is dubitable. But what is even more important is that thinghood here is entirely emergent as an effect of experiences, i.e. how much a manifold of experiences harmonize. This way, one can say that the independent region of experiences is finally instituted as it now incorporates its own “opposite” under its perspective, that transcendence is now its accessory. Things are still essentially different from experiences, which, for instance, are not spatially extended. Thus the transcendence of things is irreducible to what is immanent, yet they are irreducible merely as effects are irreducible to causes, so that they are still dependent on experiences. Fundamentally, things are transcendent only due to what is immanent, i.e. experiences. That is why in 43. Husserl criticizes the “thing in itself” or the “symbolic view of thinghood,” as if a thing is merely something “out there” that has not shown up as itself in its appearances. That might very well be a reasonable theory, but not how the sense of thinghood is understood properly. In other words, even God cannot intuit a thing not as a thing (e.g. as experiences), but He only intuits a thing infinitely. Our finitude has nothing to do with the essential structure of a thing, and in this matter Heidegger is gravely mistaken. Husserl has here accomplished what he sets out to do, namely, to attain an independent region for subjectivity.
One must also realize that the region of natural bodies also is independent and essentially indubitable in its own perspective, as a thing is there construed as the ultimate objectivity guaranteed eidetically through mathematics, hence absolutely certain. What Husserl has achieved here is therefore an initial counterpoint to the rationalistic perspective, which would eventually be expanded to incorporate all regions and their mutual geneses.
47~62
47.
All “things” through the phenomenological reduction are reduced to unities of sense, or simply manifolds of experiences. Some manifolds don’t need to constitute coherent “things.” These manifolds of experiences are unified through motivations, which are all teleological actions, and they are not causal since they are not unified as transcendent things are unified through their mutual eidetic necessities (horizontally between two distinct units) but are unified as immanent experiences are through the absolute ego into a more intensive experience.
48.
Something can be logically possible without making sense materially, namely, in relation to all the “facts” and their material essences. The imperceptible world is one such example, as it cannot make sense materially and does not harmonize with other experiences.
49.—50.
Destruction of the world that retains the region of absolute consciousness. See Majolino.
51.
If transcendental reduction starts out as an abstraction, it has now retained the fully concrete substance of an independent perspective, hence an ontological region. Yet in order to become the absolute region, though no region should by necessity refers to it, it must by necessity incorporates all regions, i.e. nature and spirit, formal and material ontologies, essences and facts, in itself. The self-overcoming of phenomenology starts here with the Remark, with the positing of an immanent teleological and theological principle: the absolute ordering is different from the ordering that gives rise to a “thing.”
52.
The mistake of naive realism is twofold. First it mistakes experiences with “appearances,” thus calling appearances merely subjective, without noticing how appearances such as colors are altogether transcendent. Then it mistakes appearances with physical things, so as to believe there are some “things in themselves” not completely perceived hidden inside appearances, without realizing that these so-called “things in themselves” are nothing but rational kernels of laws and rules regulating experiences of “appearances.” In other words, physical things are but higher unities of experience founded on lower unities.
53.—54.
Another overcoming comes in here with the incorporation of the physicalistic and naturalistic attitude inside the phenomenological one: the physical-psychological perspective is nothing other than an apperceptive unity of experiences of bodies founded on the absolute flow of experiences.
55.
Phenomenology affords a different stipulation of “reality.”
56.—62.
Here we are to fully comprehend the metamorphosis of phenomenology. All “suspensions” here are not to be understood as negations but as reductions, i.e. as constituted through the absolute consciousness. These reductions are of the independent regions: nature vs spirit, facts vs essences, and formal vs material ontologies.
With nature and spirit it is obvious. Nature and the naturalistic attitude are still legitimate in themselves, as they have their own eidetic region and perspective. But it is also overcome as it is incorporated in the absolute genesis of absolute consciousness. Moreover, this region of absolute consciousness is not simply the region of psychology or spirit, as it transcends all spiritual unities as such. Rather, qua transcendental subjectivity, it also points to a transcendental nature.
It then overcomes the gulf between facts and essences. This is achieved in three ways. First, as each fact is a unity of sense, it is no longer a given fact but a fact constituted through a horizon of possibility, i.e. a fact construed eidetically. A phenomenology of facts means nothing other than an eidetic phenomenology of facts, reducing these facts to their material essences, qua immanent essences of experiences that constitute a certain experienced objectivity. Therefore, there is no purely factual experience, but every experience is essentially both: phenomenology is always material in its practice. Second, it also becomes clear that phenomenology, as a science, cannot dispense with essences, and though it is not inconceivable for a pure consciousness to be purely factual, that is, purely concerned with actuality and overlooking the essential motivational possibility behind this “fact,” it would not be a scientific consciousness. Phenomenology therefore has to stay with essences, if only with immanent essences such as “the experience A is not possible without…” Finally, phenomenology has to take its bearing with facts too, for it must posit a teleology that leads from possibility to fact (for otherwise no fact is fundamentally “possible,” in the sense of lacking a sufficient reason), and also its own immanent essences (including the ontological essence of a general consciousness) are themselves objectivities constituted through the flux of absolute consciousness, the absolute consciousness therefore must be a teleological self-explication of its own essence as a material fact to itself: the self-constituting constitution.
The last transformation is already underway, for though a formal ontology is absolutely empty and hence “applicable” also to pure consciousness, and phenomenology must use formal logic, it explicates itself through its achievement of the region of formal logic: formal logic is an independent region, yet phenomenology must exceed formal logic and its emptiness. For phenomenology is ultimately material and is nothing other than a universal genesis of everything, including formal logic as the self-explication of this very universality. Hence, transcendental logic is the fulfilling of a genuine material ontology: metaphysics.
Therefore, we witness the multiple cloaks phenomenology wears. As pure psychology, it is at the same time a transcendental naturalism; as an eidetics, it is at the same time a rational theology; as a transcendental logic, it is at the same time the genuine universal metaphysics.
63~79
63.—65.
Phenomenology has to be the first philosophy. As first philosophy that is forever self-critical, hence self-generative, it is by necessity self-referential. Self-reference is only a problem when all things derived utterly depend on the first principle and hence have no self-validity. That is, in the way all logical arguments are thoroughly dependent on the premises, the premises cannot be proved through these derivative arguments, yet can be enriched or further differentiated through them.
66.
The ideal for phenomenology as a science is therefore this self-fulfilling of sense through self-determined intuitions and self-appropriated methods.
67.
This is very important. The three different designations for givenness. First, givenness or givenness of self, in the sense of a manifold giving itself as it is in its essential and normative structure of clarity and obscurity, presence and absence; e.g. a thing giving itself in its manifold of profiles. Second, originary givenness as the source of maximal and absolute (apodeictic) intuition or vivacity; e.g. original impression. Third, givenness as a readiness for affording intuition; e.g. the potency of a horizon.
68.
Another important distinction. Givenness can be intensive or extensive. Either an intuition is clear as a unity, or it is clear as a manifold; and clarification can proceed inside the unified intuition or from it to other intuitions. All these manifolds have essential restrictions or limits on their structure of givenness.
69.—70.
Perception and free phantasy are both privileged ways of gaining intuitions. But essentially what is required is to maximize the intensity and scope of one’s mental gaze to determine the essence of the experience; if such an essence is only “limited” it is nonetheless an essence.
71.—75.
Phenomenology is itself a self-contained region of study. The question now is if it is like mathematics. It is obviously material and concrete. But its domain is not definitively of an exhaustive and definite manifold. That is, a phenomenologist does not start with a limited set of axiomatic experiences to deduce every possible experience (though it is not yet proved in principle impossible) in the domain but only describes morphological essences as they are. Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem has no effect on this matter since the impossibility to prove the self-consistency of a system through this system alone does not negate the motivation that institutes the system in the first place. That is, though an axiomatic system depends on other related systems, its axiomacity is not denied, nor its basic structure of founding derivatives on primitive axioms. Moreover, precisely because phenomenology is indifferent to deductions, though it always has to employ logic, it obeys intuition primarily, so that it does not have to follow one step from the other in some fixed order, but is generally free in its motivations and its descriptiveness, which freedom is prescribed by intuition.
76.
The clearest statement of what was established earlier about the scope of phenomenology as a first philosophy: it is the root region of every region and every discipline, i.e. it is the pre-established harmony of all monads.
77.—79.
Reflections are key to phenomenology for phenomenology is first of all an eidetic science, and all essences are about possibilities, hence always reflective. Reflection is here the synthesis of self-alienation and is structural: originary givenness is always a structurally modified moment within the harmony of the givenness of itself. In this sense, though retention is less originary than impression, it is equally essential to constituting impression. The same way imagination, though (in its essence) less originary than perception, must (also in its essence) presuppose perception. What has absolute legitimacy is what is essential to the most originary, including retention, protention and impression. What has relative legitimacy is what is inessential to the most originary, such as recollection and perception might play against each other, though perception, since it is more originary, weighs more than recollection.
Reflection always retains the act in relation to its correlate, thus modifying it. But is reflection then always missing the “actual thing” through modifying it? No, for several reasons. First, Husserl uses the term “modification” for a reason, as “modification” does not suggest a total transformation, but rather it (in a Spinozist way) always expresses the original and as such is a structural moment that can immediately comprehend the original through this structure. Its “ideation” or “making essence” is not itself outside the prescription of the givenness. Second, to say we always miss the original is only a verbal game, for such is not afforded in intuition, and nothing would make sense, including this statement, “we always miss the original,” itself. Finally, to be thus skeptical is making a false assumption, namely, the thing is an “intrinsically perceivable reality” that is not yet perceived, that is, the thing is fully transcendent beyond what is “subjectively immanent,” but this is the same mistake as before. For we suppose “a past time” is like a real thing we can access, only that we are trapped in our “present time;” yet intuition affords us a different insight, that “a past time” is an immanently constituted transcendence that gives itself in the living present. Such is the essence of time, and psychology has to follow phenomenology’s determination of essence instead of wallowing in its own naturalistic prejudices.
80~96
80.—83.
Inner-time consciousness is the absolute foundation for consciousness. Through its three dimensions intentionality gathers its essential threefold structure: depth, expanse, and altitude. So is an impression at once a noesis—that is, the activity of synthesizing what is other and obscure from what is clearly intuited, or an activity in depth, a noema—that is, the achievement of an expanding structure of the unified manifold of sense, a noesis-noema compound, and an absolute ideal—that is, the highest limit of originary intuition. Noesis and noema can be glossed in a different way, as noesis is the unity of what becomes clear, noema is the unity of what stays obscure and recalcitrant; and these are proximate to the former sense, as “activity” is precisely what is most proximate to the unity of clarity or illumination. But either way, it cannot be denied that there is an ideal limit of the absolute unity of consciousness.
84.—86.
Hyletic phenomenology is concerned with what is purely or abstractly immanent to consciousness as material for intentional functions to objectify. These are “sensory” data not in the sense of secondary qualities but as drives and inner feelings. These are then implemented in intentional acts, clear or unclear, as material for objectivities. The phenomenology concerned with the noetic aspect, or what is beyond the hyletic, is properly called transcendental phenomenology.
87.—91.
Noema is what transcends the really obtaining noetic function as its intended sense. The noetic function reaches out over itself into another noesis and only in such overreaching synthesizes this other potential noesis into a noematic unity. The noematic unity stresses the intended or unfulfilled kernel about which the sense is organized, while the noetic unity stresses the intending or the fulfillment about which the sense is construed. In this relation, noetic unity is more vital and proximate, while the noematic less so.
92.—96.
But the noematic and the noetic are also one unity with different focal points. The structure of a horizon or “attention” is absolutely crucial to this unity, as is witnessed through the syntheses of multiple horizons of attention affording sense. Logical judgement is always twofold as the noematic, the “judged as such,” and as the noetic, the “general judging.” One cannot be without the other without thereby being an abstraction. Logicians are right insofar as they emphasize the objectivity of judgements, but they omit the equally “objective” (essential and universal) noetic unity of a general judgement. So is axiology or ethics concerned with noetic essences of valuation as much as with the noematic essences of what is valuable. These different essences are founded on each other or correlated to each other, vertically as valuation is on perception, horizontally as valuation is to what is valuable.
97~117
97.—101.
The hyletic and noetic aspects are really obtaining, while the noematic are constituted as transcendent. But it also seems that noema is constituted as a unity, while noeses are always the constituting manifold. We must therefore be careful about our analyses. First, we cannot ignore that a noema is in turn a unity of manifold noemata, while noeses themselves are organized by a dominating noesis. The distinction between noema and noesis does not reside in that simply of one and many. Rather, it is clear that noema is the structure where a manifold of immanences and transcendences of noeses are constituted into an “overly transcendent” unity, which in turn is composed of other such noemata, mediated through these noeses. Noesis is immanent mediation. Any phenomenological explication therefore must follow a zigzag pattern: noesis-noema-noesis-noema… Noeses and noemata reflect into each other.
102.—108.
All acts in the natural attitude are thetic. That is, they, either actually or potentially (meaning actual to the attention focus of consciousness or only latent for it), all posit being. This is not only meant in a foundational sense, that all doxic modifications of being rely on some primary being, which does constitute part of the problematic; but also that all modifications in themselves can potentially be construed as thetic. For instance, it is true that in order to doubt something, you need something posited so that you can doubt it; but even when you doubt it, it is now a “dubious being.” These modifications, because of this thetic nature, are themselves modifiable ad infinitum. That is, one can doubt a doubt, can confirm a doubt, can reject a doubt, etc.
One has to be clear, however, that the noema corresponding to a noesis is immediate. That is, it is not because I unite the doubting I reflect upon with the thing I doubt that I see the thing as doubtful; but I first immediately see the thing as doubtful so that on later reflection I can analyze my doubt. One must not substitute an experience reflected upon with an immediate experience, for in that immediate experience no such analysis is carried out, and if it is carried out it would not be the same experience. One might be tempted to ask again how is phenomenological analysis capable of explicating the experience if the immediate experience is not identical to the reflected experience. It is to be understood that they are not identical, but equivalent: through reflections and analyses, one clarifies what was not clear, including how it was not clear, thus preserving the experience with its corresponding unclarity and immediacy within the content of its reflection; but in the immediacy of experience it cannot comprehend its own reflection, for that contradicts the very definition of immediacy.
109.—117.
Phenomenological reflection, however, is a very unique kind of reflection. It is non-positional, hence is a neutral modification. Unlike doxic modifications that all depend on what is thetic, each expounding only on the theses through reason (even dialectic proceeds in this manner: perhaps not beyond it until the final moment of comprehending the totality in its immediacy), this neutral modification only posit things as if they are: neither ascertained nor negated. They are only expressions of the expressed, not the generated out of an origin. That is, neutrality is a symbolic attribute, as through symbols a totality of actualities and potentialities are posited indifferently. This neutrality expresses a different kind of potency than a potency that is related to actuality and in urge to become actualized: it is the potency to leave this network altogether, it is the potential surface of universality.
But a non-absolute surface can always become stratified. That is, some phantasy, though neutral in itself, for instance, can always be tapped back to reality as its foundation. Normal acts of reflections all have this characteristic, that they can always be iterated, for they always point to their originals to be further reflected upon. A phantasy can contain a further phantasy, etc. To achieve the phenomenological reduction, however, the act has to be absolute to “produce” a universal surface of reflection. The world must be “destroyed” in this process. That is, since all reflections bracket some theses, what is needed is therefore a universalization of these reflections that destroy the original once and for all. For instance, my memory points to another memory points to another memory, and each memory is itself taken as immediately remembered, so memories all indicate some original presentation, and each memory is itself such a presentation “as a memory.” But since the ideal possibility is always essentially there that something originally remembered is itself but a remembrance of something else, ad infinitum, and each remembrance, as an original being, is but itself something remembered, that ultimately everything is but a memory deprived of any actual being. This is the significance of Plato’s doctrine of recollection. The thing recollected is itself a recollection, and recollection itself is nothing but the recollected of another recollection. Every original being is therefore dissolved into the immanent surface of universal recollection: each recollection is equally original and equally a derivative image, equally an as if. Everything therefore consists in these equally expressive “mere appearances.” The univocity of being. All things are in the totality of expressions, equally as expressions, and qua expressions are ordered into different manifolds, each manifold with its own respective center of unity, hence “origin” or “originary givenness.” But no such originary givenness marks an absolute genesis, only a normative structure of expression. Just as we need to explain why there are simulations of origins if all are equally expressions.
This does not merely apply to the world of being, but also the world of values and the world of practices. As acts can be founded on other acts, they can even be founded on such neutral acts: the valorization of a phantasy, or the life as a phenomenologist. But the phenomenologist’s attitude does not allow for iterated acts: it has to be once and for all, though phenomenological attitude itself can become thetic in reflection, it is a self-instantiation, not an iteration. A phenomenology of phenomenology is an Absolute Science differentiating itself into different levels, not a bundle of fundamentally different phenomenologies.
Finally, as everything can be turned into the thetic, the thetic attitude is also essentially universal. Since anything axiological or practical is founded on the thetic, and can itself be turned into the thetic, a formal axiology and a formal theory of praxis both depend on a formal logic. Moreover, as formal logic is essentially universal, it correlates to the universal material ontology: metaphysics, the ontology of the lifeworld. But that in turn depends on phenomenology as the universal science. Why? Because formal logic is in principle neutral. It presupposes the neutrality of a phenomenologist so as to become truly universal as a thetic science. Otherwise it would be entangled in the practice of specific logical practices in determining what is thetic and what is not without attaining the universal view of all that is thetic, the universal surface of being, so to speak.
118~135
118.—123.
Each thetic can be related syntactically to other thetics to be synthesized. This synthetic, however, can be also transformed in consciousness into a simple thetic.
124.—127.
The problem of meaning and expression is related to the problem of sense. While sense is not necessarily linguistic, hence universal, meaning and expression are linguistic categories. The difficulty is how language mirrors sense unities and its basic motivations. More importantly, one might be tempted to ask if the mirroring of language is not an archaic preparation of phenomenological attitude: through language, each sense is represented and captured. Perhaps the difference is that language, though potentially universal, never incorporates this universality as a positive aim, like phenomenology does. That is, it mostly only expresses confusedly, unreflectively, and incompletely, while also taking itself again as some entity. Phenomenological attitude, however, is a conscious universalization that aims to fully explicate every meaning and its expressed sense. Moreover, as language is not always doxic, it sometimes is rather a speech act, which requires again a bracketing.
128.—135.
Not only is there a noetic intending to sense, there is also a noematic sense. An object itself intends another object as its constituting horizon. Moreover, all objects contain in themselves the bearers of sense, the transcendental Xs, around which senses are centered in fleshing out the fullness of these noematic cores. Phenomenology provides the access to a theoretical comprehensive study of all the systems of these cores and their coinciding identities as a genuine metaphysics of general and concrete objectivity, in relation to the universal psychology of general and concrete noetic subjectivity. Such is the universal science that unites formal logic with material sciences (including objective formal and material ethics) and an equally universal psychology. But with all these systematic interconnections, another crucial aspect is yet lacking, that is the problem of facticity or actuality. In what ways are these essences prescribing horizons of possibility considered actualized? In what ways do essences pass into facts? What is the essence of a fact? These questions concern phenomenology in a new way: a phenomenology qua rational theology and teleology is thereby outlined. Not the essence of a “this,” which is merely the singular, in relation to the universal; but the essence of “this as a fact,” which might even include essences, for essences could themselves be simply reduced to the factual existences in natural attitude. That is, phenomenology also needs to account for the essence of a thesis and the natural attitude in its relation to the transcendental attitude together with the constitution of a this in order to fully explicate the factical.
136~153
136.—153.
So, what is facticity? Before we even proceed to consider this, we need to understand what is actuality. Actuality’s first component is vivacity in the Humean sense, or the Cartesian natural light. This, one can say, amounts to evidence in general, and in the particular realm of judgment or logic, insight. But it is crucial to note that this natural light would simply be mysterious without its second component, rationality. Rationality is the co-articulation of all evidences into a reciprocally corroborating network of illumination.
We need to understand more carefully how evidences present themselves in different regions. First, all essences qua essences give adequate, apodeictic, immanent insights. They give themselves perfectly and fully in intuition as essences. They are purely the horizons of all immediate possibilities as such. In the same sense “1+1=2” is certain, so is “a centaur is a horse-man combination,” or “a material thing is essentially inadequately given in perception.” They completely give forth their constitution content as essence.
Does this mean, however, that essences are purely self-sufficient? In a way, yes; for all essences are independent insofar as they are completed and totalizing horizons. Yet, they also, not by essential necessity, but by transcendental necessity (i.e. freedom), intend factual instantiations. Are essences essentially essences of facts? Not necessarily, for we can imagine a world where all are essences, where no fact obtains, which indeed is the region of constitutive phenomenology with its comprehended individual senses; nor is a world only of facts incomprehensible, as a world in our empirical and natural attitude. Essences and facts are rather related through, not the essence of essences, but the essence of transcendental consciousness. For transcendental consciousness precisely is the self-transcending absolute flux of consciousness that, though an essence in it completely retains its veracity as itself, nonetheless freely expounds the sense of this essence through the sense of another essence, and intends with one independent region another region. Why? Because though the region is self-enclosed and does not intend “itself” in another, consciousness nonetheless intends itself as the Absolute Totality through it, enriching itself in this intending. In other words, though a mathematical axiom is self-evident, it nonetheless “intends” its derived propositions, not because it is incomplete without those propositions, but because it makes consciousness unfree without the totality of its posits.
Therefore, all essences are to be understood, not as mysterious posits, but also norms regulating facts, which are nonetheless intended through the self-differentiating act of absolute consciousness. Essences intend facts, not essentially, but transcendentally.
Yet we still have not clarified the sense of “facticity.” It is now evident, however, that though it is necessarily an actuality, i.e. evidence, coarticulated and verified by other evidences in harmony inherent to absolute consciousness, it lacks a third component to set it apart from essence. An essence also is actual and co-intends other evidences. What kind of evidence do facts possess?
Not particularity, for “this horse” is also an essence. Rather, the distinguishing mark is inadequacy. That is, though the essence of a thing entails “inadequacy,” yet this is nonetheless adequately comprehended as a universal horizon, a norm. “Inadequacy” is contained in the essence merely as an adequate essence itself. However, if an essence dictates inadequacy as a norm, the essence has to transcend itself and become incarnate in a fact. A fact is therefore understood as an “evidence essentially inadequately given, i.e. necessitated by the very essence itself, to intend other actualities, including other essences.” That is, a fact is the necessary supplement to an essence that dictates its own inadequacy to be fully given as itself, while itself can only be given as an idea. Every essence, therefore, is constituted as a fact, through the essence of transcendental consciousness. For the essence of consciousness is “that which intends absolutely but always inadequately,” and through its own essence, though its essence is adequately given as an essence, this adequacy itself entails the (infinite) inadequacy inherent to its very content, thus overcoming its own essence, it intends other evidences as facts. Simply put, a fact belongs to an essence that negates its own adequacy, such that it adds in its essential content the operation sign: “…but I, the essence, am not it.” A factual essence is, unlike essences that cointend only transcendentally, what cointends infinitely by essential necessity. An essence that prescribes only a limited amount of essences in making it up is a pure essence; its contrary is the essence of a fact. And facticity, therefore, is just this effect of condensed or confused totality intended by an essence: the infinite transcendence of a concrete noema.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
1~17
1.
知识从经验开始。经验朝向世界。原初直观。
2.
被经验的是事实。所有事实都含本质核心,其本质总可理念化为理念(eidos)。事实及自然法则等事实规律处理存在者,本质处理可能存在者。因此,本质被直接设定,并非生成。在此意义上,所有本质都普遍,因为它们表达可能性的总体。
3.
理念化把事实变成本质。但依对它的知识,本质被直观得清晰、分明,甚至恰切。某些本质必然不完整、不恰切,因而必然指涉其他本质来完成其形式。这种不恰切性之后会被视为抽象性。对普遍本质本身的直观与对其事实范例的直观须区分。
4.
通过幻想,人可自由辨明本质本身,而不设定任何事实存在。设定本质不同于设定存在。现象学态度恰是悬置任何存在设定的态度。
5.
普遍本质本身不同于该本质为其可能实例创造的一般视域。可以对象化本质本身,也可不这样做,让它保持为事实实例出现的视域。
6.
理念的判断活动与判断对应于理念上所意指者,因此只是对象性。判断的理念真理对应于作为确定对象而在理念上成立者。
理念的必然性作为特殊化、实例化的后果,跟随判断的理念普遍性。事实总是本质的实例,因此总也是某种理念必然性。理念科学感兴趣的恰是这种先天本质必然性。
7.
事实科学与本质科学彼此平行。
8.
理念科学由其本质独立于事实科学,因为作为理念科学,它们不需要指涉经验事实;事实科学却须依赖理念科学,因为科学须指涉全部可能性的普遍知识,所以首先,所有事实科学须服从形式逻辑,也须符合研究对象的质料本质。15~17的伏笔已在此运作。
9.
现在从考察事实与本质关系转为只考察本质。所有区域都由某个作为组织中心的质料本质定义。
10.
须澄清几个概念:对象、范畴、区域。对象有多种意义,原初范型是物自身。从形式本体论开始,以更好理解这些概念。区域是通过范畴规制、组织的单位集合,各自设定公理。只须理解单位是什么(对象)、经什么集合(范畴)、形成什么(区域)。
意义与对象平行,别忘了意义只是未充实、未验证的对象性;不关心意义是否真的充实时,就研究意义。
11.
句法范畴是单位间的关系,把它们统一为杂多,却不淹没于无差别同质性。若这些杂多又被视为进一步的单位,这些单位或基底就是句法对象。终极基底是剥离任何有意义句法配置的单位(在给定区域限度内?:终极的“这个东西”,如“这个红”“这个颜色”,甚至“这个本质”)。
12.
所有本质形成属与种。这是纵向结构。属种通过“整体与部分”的部分整体论范畴统一。整体与部分彼此依赖,之后会看到,因此自身不能具体,只有全部属及其下属种的完整纵向序列,才是“具体者(concretum)”的候选。
13.
一般化从种升向属,种通过属中的规定相应被规定。简言之,这是纵向运动。它不同于依赖符号的普遍化或形式化。形式化不是上升到更高属,甚至不是升到存在之属,因为它像对无差别的“无论什么”一样平等关切万物,因此没有纵向运动;最高属对它只是另一个对象,要与其诸种作句法关联。更重要的是,普遍对象不能是最高属,因为那样它就不“空”,而是质料本质,通过无限抽象关联事实性;但最高属自身首先只有通过根本克服抽象法的普遍化才可能。
更好的阐述见我的莱布尼茨论文。
14.
所论的最低种本身仍可特殊化为“这一个”。“这一个”不是事实存在!只是可能存在。准确说,这个可能存在。所以“这一个”也是本质!
15.—17.
“这一个”尚非个体。个体是其本质不必然指涉其他本质的“这一个”。由此定义可见,属种必不具体,因为所有属都必然指涉其种。所以所有属作为属都是抽象的,只有完整纵向序列才可能成为具体者。但某些纵向序列,如从“这个红”到“颜色”到更高者,其个别“这个红”内在蕴涵某个“这个形状”,因此在横向不完整。只有个体在其本质中如此完整的序列,才可恰当称为区域。区域因此总是纵向与非纵向相互印证的意义序列的复合体。虽然每个区域都研究完整个体,因而每个区域都涉及其他所有区域,原则上被包含、排除的本质间没有清晰边界(因为每个区域本体论都是把本体作为无限单子来研究),但这不意味着它不通过某个特定本质复合体,在视角上被特定框定。区域本体论因此总差异性地“加权”为生物主义、心理主义、人类学主义、物理主义等。要把它们统一为一门普遍科学,首先须通过不受任何质料本质加权、连存在本身也不加权的形式本体论(“超出”诸区域的区域);但还须一门科学,即现象学,把形式本体论与质料本体论统一为真正形而上学。
对此参见我此前论胡塞尔《危机》的论文。
18~32
18.
理念学不是继承传统偏见的产物,恰是回到“事物本身”的后果。
19.
经验主义者的出发点是摧毁阻碍思的所有偶像。但它把经验等同于对自然、现实事物的经验,自己便成了偏见偶像。它须用理念学证成自己的论题,因而自我挫败。直观比单纯知觉宽广。对事物本身的直观是原初证成者,因为它甚至首先确立如何正当地证成的方式。
20.
现象学是实证主义,在于它把真理交托给在直观中肯定地给予自身者。
21.
观念论有退化成心理主义的危险,因为它不在事物本身及其为自身意义的直观充实提供的结构中寻找“自然之光”,而在“情感感受”中寻找;后者只能是特定区域中特殊的明见来源。
22.
本质虽“客观”,却不“现实”。
23.
理念化相较知觉是自发的。如知觉,它的意义可相对充实或空洞。想象同样如此,但想象是依赖知觉原初给予的区域,因此自身抽象。所以本质不是被想象意义上的虚构,而像知觉一样虚构:即它们是现象的。
24.
一切原则的原则是:凡在直观中给予者,都须在它为自身设定的限度内,按其给予自身为何物来接受。这个原则不也自指吗?但至少它通过直观闭合,因此不自相矛盾,因为原则本身就是直观的。尽管形式循环,它首先“一致”,此外“直观”。但经验主义认为一切真理都只是特殊、通过习俗的论题,与自身不一致:要么预设与自身主张矛盾的普遍真理,要么声明自己也仅特殊,挫败自身真理,于是退化成无意义或空陈述。
同样,自然科学家对事实做实验,因为自然科学本质如此规定。
25.
科学家的双重意识:在教条实践中毫无顾虑地使用数学等理念学,在哲学实践中却成了怀疑论者。本能与历史无意识决不可能生成科学这样精确的东西。因此经验主义科学立场绝无正当性。
26.
两支怀疑论:对外部世界,对理念学。科学家依直观或明见的第一原则前进时,两者都不必困扰他们。但这种知识批判在应用于一般科学前,应先通过哲学内在的反思完成。
27.—30.
这里从否定转向现象学的肯定建立。从自然态度及其周遭世界,走向与之协调的其他态度。还须清楚:现象学恰是建立精神的理念科学,如数学是自然的理念科学;此外它须先验,才能不局限于精神区域,而在一个普遍生成中沟通所有区域。
我在论文说过:现象学是生活世界的本体论,通过科学实践的本体论完成形式与质料本体论的统一;同时是心理学的理念科学,但不仅是诸区域或视角之一,而以本质必然性走向对每个意向相关项区域的先验阐明,说明它如何向先验主体给予自身;先验主体作为绝对主体,须在每个理念者与其事实者之间见证,甚至包括心理学自身,在理念主体与经验主体之间。
31.—32.
现象学悬置不是怀疑,也不是尝试怀疑;只是怀疑或尝试怀疑的一个构成要素。它虽否定性,却不否定世界,也不质疑世界。反而仍确信世界,同时把确信本身看作态度。故称“加括号”。这是最本真的自由形式,因为不采取任何立场,也不试图转变任何东西,因而不与任何东西建立客观关系。它“使之无用”,因而从世界自由出来。
33~46
33.
这里的筹划不只是获得自然理念学或本体论的区域,数学科学已建立它,而是获得新区域,即纯粹体验区域。我先初步说明必要性。如前已明,区域是基于一个视角的理念系统,该视角着眼于一个在本质上不必然指涉另一个视角的总体。换言之,区域是独立、自足的单子。可找到平行、互补却不必然互相指涉的区域对,最突出的是:形式本体论与质料本体论、事实与理念、自然与精神。这些区域共同构成所有区域的总体,却本质上不需要彼此。它们只向一(pros hen)。人可以彻底精神、质料或事实……所以它们只通过自由类比地统一。
自由是主体的自由。这主体作为终极统一须统一所有视角。表面说,它须从每个区域的他者生成该区域。例如,须伦理地通过理念构成事实,历史地通过事实构成理念;须直观地通过质料构成形式,普遍地通过形式构成质料;最后,须通过自然构成精神,反之亦然。但首要是胡塞尔须把精神建立为一个区域。心理学须独立。本节筹划是显示精神独立于自然。
只有这些区域全建立,胡塞尔才能最终引入先验现象学,在构成中涉及所有这些区域;虽必然从精神开始,因为精神如将显示,是不可怀疑的原初区域。但也将看清,精神自身封闭的理念区域,若不通过与形式本体论沟通而普遍化方法,就会降为单纯质料心理学;没有历史与事实生成就走向死亡;没有自然科学就走向主观主义。所以本节从建立主体性的理念区域出发,随后先验地克服单纯理念者,走向恰当的现象学:通过在形式与质料本体论之间建立生活世界本体论(形而上学),在事实与理念之间建立普遍先验历史,在自然与精神之间建立构成现象学。
34.—38.
意识本质结构是总为关于某物的意识。总有事物的超越性,与意识内容作为体验的内在性。此外,总有焦点中心,以及逐渐失焦的视域。这必与超越、内在有关。
39.—41.
事物最首要不是作为科学对象超越,而是作为所知觉之物超越。如此它与体验相对。把握体验与物的本质差异,有个简单方式:虽总有另一体验“超越”此体验,其超越性却不是以必需某种协调功能的方式构想。体验总在绝对流中协调:即体验可能彼此矛盾,这无关紧要。物是预先统一的和谐或融贯中心,有刚性形式。体验流动、无形式:其实在性仅依内容数量。参见我的莱布尼茨论文,本体与形式的讨论。
42.—46.
所有后果都从本质差异而来:体验杂多绝对确定、不可怀疑,因为总在那里;物性作为组织了的体验中心,却未必一直在那里,因而可怀疑。更重要的是,物性完全作为体验的效果涌现,即体验杂多协调到什么程度。于是可说,独立的体验区域终于建立,因为它现在在其视角下纳入自身“对立面”,超越性成为附属。物仍在本质上不同于体验,例如体验没有空间广延。所以物的超越性不可还原为内在者,但只是如效果不可还原为原因那样不可还原,仍依赖体验。根本上,物只因内在者,即体验,才超越。所以43中胡塞尔批评“物自身”或“物性的象征观点”,仿佛物只是某种“外面”的东西,没有在显现中作为自身出现。那可能是合理理论,却不是恰当理解物性意义的方式。换言之,连神也不能不作为物而直观物(例如把它直观为体验),祂只是无限地直观物。有限性与物的本质结构无关,海德格尔在此严重错了。胡塞尔已完成所定目标,即获得独立的主体性区域。
也必须意识到,自然物体区域在自身视角中同样独立、本质上不可怀疑,因为物在那里被构想为经数学在理念上保证的终极对象性,因而绝对确定。所以胡塞尔在此取得的是对理性主义视角的初步对应声部,最终将扩展为纳入一切区域及其相互生成。
47~62
47.
所有“物”通过现象学还原被还原为意义统一体,或仅为体验杂多。有些杂多无须构成融贯的“物”。这些体验杂多通过动机统一,动机全是目的论行动,而非因果:它们不像超越事物经彼此理念必然性统一(两个不同单位间的横向统一),而像内在体验,通过绝对自我统一为更高强度的体验。
48.
某物可以逻辑上可能,质料上却无意义,即相对于所有“事实”及其质料本质无意义。不可知觉世界就是例子:它质料上无法有意义,不与其他体验协调。
49.—50.
世界的毁灭,保留了绝对意识的区域。参见马约利诺。
51.
如果先验还原起初是一种抽象,它现在便保留了一个独立视角充分具体的本体,因而是一个本体论区域。然而,为了成为绝对的区域,虽然没有哪个区域必然指向它,它却必须必然在自身中包含所有区域,即自然与精神、形式与质料本体论、本质与事实。现象学的自我克服从这里的附注开始,从设定一个内在的目的论与神学原则开始:绝对的秩序化不同于产生一个“物”的秩序化。
52.
朴素实在论的错误有两重。首先,它把体验误作“显象”,从而称显象为纯粹主观的,却没有注意到颜色等显象是完全超越的。其次,它把显象误作物理事物,以为有某些未被完全知觉的“物自身”藏在显象之中,却没有意识到这些所谓的“物自身”,无非是调节“显象”体验的法则与规则的理性核心。换言之,物理事物不过是奠基于较低体验统一体之上的更高统一体。
53.—54.
另一重克服在此出现:把物理主义和自然主义态度纳入现象学态度。物理—心理的视角无非是身体体验的统觉统一体,奠基于体验的绝对流之上。
55.
现象学为“实在”提供了一种不同的规定。
56.—62.
我们在这里要充分理解现象学的蜕变。这里所有的“悬置”都不应理解为否定,而应理解为还原,即理解为通过绝对意识而构成。这些还原涉及独立的区域:自然与精神、事实与本质、形式与质料本体论。
自然与精神的情况很明显。自然及自然主义态度在自身中仍然正当,因为它们有自己的理念区域与视角。但这一态度又通过被纳入绝对意识的绝对发生而被克服。此外,这一绝对意识区域并不只是心理学或精神的区域,因为它超越了一切精神统一体本身。相反,作为先验主体性,它也指向一种先验自然。
接着,它克服事实与本质之间的鸿沟。这通过三种方式实现。首先,每个事实既然都是意义统一体,它就不再是一个被给予的事实,而是通过可能性视域构成的事实,即在理念上被理解的事实。事实的现象学无非是事实的理念现象学,把这些事实还原为其质料本质,作为那些构成了某种被体验的对象性的体验之内在本质。因此,没有纯粹事实性的体验,每种体验在本质上都兼有两者:现象学在其实践中总是质料的。其次,这也表明现象学作为科学不能舍弃本质;虽不能说纯粹意识不可能是纯粹事实性的,即只关心现实性而忽视这一“事实”背后的本质动机可能性,但那样的意识不会是科学意识。所以现象学必须坚持本质,哪怕只是“体验A若没有……便不可能”这类内在本质。最后,现象学也必须以事实为依归,因为它必须设定一种从可能性通往事实的目的论(否则,没有任何事实在根本上是“可能的”,也就是说,它将缺乏充足理由);而且,它自身的内在本质(包括一般意识的本体论本质)也都是通过绝对意识之流构成的对象性。因此,绝对意识必须是一种目的论的自我阐明,把自身的本质作为一个质料事实向自身阐明:自我构成的构成。
最后一种转变已经在进行:尽管形式本体论绝对空洞,因而也“适用于”纯粹意识,现象学也必须使用形式逻辑,但现象学通过它对形式逻辑区域的成就来阐明自身。形式逻辑是一个独立区域,然而现象学必须超出形式逻辑及其空洞性。因为现象学归根到底是质料的,无非是一切事物的普遍发生,其中包括作为这一普遍性之自我阐明的形式逻辑。因此,先验逻辑就是对真正的质料本体论——形而上学——的充实。
于是,我们看到现象学披着多重外衣。作为纯粹心理学,它同时是先验自然主义;作为理念学,它同时是理性神学;作为先验逻辑,它同时是真正的普遍形而上学。
63~79
63.—65.
现象学必须是第一哲学。作为永远自我批评、因而自我生成的第一哲学,它必然是自指的。只有当一切被推导之物完全依赖第一原则,因而没有自身有效性时,自指才成为问题。也就是说,如同所有逻辑论证都彻底依赖前提,这些前提不能通过那些派生论证得到证明,却可以通过它们得到丰富或进一步差异化。
66.
所以,现象学作为科学的理想,就是通过自我规定的直观与自行取得的方法,完成意义的自我充实。
67.
这一点很重要。给予性有三种不同的意指。首先,给予性或自身给予性,意指一个杂多按照其清晰与晦暗、在场与缺席的本质及常模结构,如其所是地给予自身;例如,一个物在其侧显杂多中给予自身。其次,原初给予性,作为最大且绝对(无可置疑)的直观或生动性的来源;例如,原初印象。第三,给予性作为提供直观的准备状态;例如,视域的潜能。
68.
另一个重要区分。给予性可以是强度的,也可以是广度的。一个直观或者作为统一体而清晰,或者作为杂多而清晰;澄清可以在统一的直观内部进行,也可以从它出发走向其他直观。这些杂多的给予性结构都有本质性的约束或界限。
69.—70.
知觉与自由想象都是获得直观的优先方式。但本质上所要求的是,把精神凝视的强度与范围尽可能扩大,以规定体验的本质;即使这一本质只是“有限的”,它也仍然是本质。
71.—75.
现象学自身是一个自足的研究区域。现在的问题是,它是否像数学。它显然是质料而具体的。但其领域并不明确地属于一个可穷尽且确定的杂多。也就是说,现象学家并不从一组有限的公理性体验出发,推导领域内每种可能体验(虽然这还未被证明在原则上不可能),而只是如其所是地描述形态本质。哥德尔不完备定理对此没有影响,因为无法只通过一个系统证明其自身一致性,并不否定最初建立这个系统的动机。也就是说,虽然公理系统依赖其他相关系统,但其公理性并未被否定,其把派生物奠基于原初公理之上的基本结构也未被否定。此外,正因为现象学虽总要使用逻辑,却对推演持中立态度,它首先服从直观,因而不必按照某种固定次序一步接着一步地进行,而在动机和描述性方面一般而言是自由的,这种自由由直观来规定。
76.
这里最清楚地陈述了先前关于现象学作为第一哲学之范围的结论:它是每个区域、每门学科的根本区域,即所有单子的前定和谐。
77.—79.
反思是现象学的关键,因为现象学首先是理念科学,而一切本质都关乎可能性,因而总是反思性的。反思在这里是自我异化的综合,并且是结构性的:原初给予性总是自身给予性之和谐中一个被结构性变样了的环节。在这个意义上,虽然滞留不如印象原初,但它对于构成印象同样是本质的。同样,想象虽(在其本质上)不如知觉原初,却也必须(在其本质上)预设知觉。具有绝对正当性的是对于最原初者本质必需的东西,包括滞留、前摄与印象。具有相对正当性的是对于最原初者非本质的东西,例如回忆与知觉可能相互抵牾,虽然知觉因更为原初而比回忆更有分量。
反思总是在行为与其相关项的关系中保留该行为,从而使它变样。但反思是否因此总在变样中错失“实际事物”?并不是,理由有几条。首先,胡塞尔使用“变样”一词有其理由,因为“变样”并不表示彻底转化,相反,它(以一种斯宾诺莎式的方式)总是表达原本,并因而是一个能够通过其结构直接把握原本的结构性环节。它的“理念化”或“成为本质”本身并不处在给予性的规定之外。其次,说我们总是错失原本,只是文字游戏,因为直观并未提供这种说法;若果真如此,一切都将失去意义,连“我们总是错失原本”这个说法本身也不例外。最后,如此怀疑是在作出一个错误假定,即事物是一个尚未被知觉的“内在可知觉的实在”,也就是说,事物完全超越“主观内在者”;但这还是先前那个错误。因为我们假定“过去的时间”就像一个可以进入的真实事物,只是我们被困在“现在的时间”中;然而,直观给我们另一种洞见:“过去的时间”是一种被内在地构成、在活的当下中给予自身的超越性。这就是时间的本质,而心理学必须遵循现象学对本质的规定,不能沉溺于自身自然主义的偏见。
80~96
80.—83.
内时间意识是意识的绝对基础。意向性通过它的三个维度汇集起本质的三重结构:深度、广度与高度。所以,一个印象同时是意向活动(noesis),即从被清晰直观者出发综合他者与晦暗者的活动,或一种纵深活动;是意向相关项(noema),即统一的意义杂多所扩展的结构之成就;是一个意向活动—意向相关项复合体;也是一个绝对的理念,即原初直观的最高界限。意向活动与意向相关项还可以换一种方式解释:意向活动是变得清晰者的统一,意向相关项则是仍然晦暗、抗拒者的统一;这与前一个意义相近,因为“活动”恰恰最贴近清晰或照明的统一体。但无论如何,不可否认意识的绝对统一有一个理念界限。
84.—86.
质料现象学关心的是纯粹或抽象地内在于意识、作为意向功能之对象化材料的东西。这些是“感觉”材料,意指驱力与内在感受,而非第二性质。这些材料随即在清晰或不清晰的意向行为中被运用,成为对象性的材料。关心意向活动方面,即超出质料方面的现象学,才恰当地称为先验现象学。
87.—91.
意向相关项是作为被意指的意义而超越实项存在的意向活动功能者。意向活动功能越出自身,进入另一意向活动,并只有在这种越出中才把另一个潜在的意向活动综合为意向相关项的统一体。意向相关项的统一体强调意义所围绕着组织起来的被意指或未被充实的核心,而意向活动的统一体则强调意义所围绕着构造起来的意指或充实。在这种关系中,意向活动的统一体更有活力、更为贴近,意向相关项的统一体则相对较少如此。
92.—96.
但意向相关项与意向活动也是同一个统一体的不同焦点。视域或“注意”的结构对于这一统一绝对关键,这可通过赋予意义的多个注意视域的综合看出。逻辑判断总是双重的:作为意向相关项,它是“被判断者本身”;作为意向活动,它是“一般的判断活动”。任何一者离开另一者都将成为抽象。逻辑学家强调判断的对象性,在这一点上是对的,却遗漏了一般判断同样“客观”(本质且普遍)的意向活动统一体。所以价值论或伦理学既关心有价值者的意向相关项本质,也关心评价活动的意向活动本质。这些不同本质相互奠基或关联:纵向地,如评价奠基于知觉;横向地,如评价关联于有价值者。
97~117
97.—101.
质料与意向活动方面是实项存在的,而意向相关项方面被构成为超越的。但似乎意向相关项被构成为统一体,而意向活动总是进行构成的杂多。因此,分析时必须谨慎。首先,不能忽略一个意向相关项又是多个意向相关项的统一,而意向活动本身也由一个占统治地位的意向活动组织起来。意向相关项与意向活动的区分并不只是“一”与“多”的区分。相反,显然意向相关项是这样一个结构:意向活动之内在性与超越性的杂多在其中被构成为一个“更为超越的”统一体,而这统一体又由其他此类意向相关项组成,并通过那些意向活动得到中介。意向活动是内在中介。因此,任何现象学阐明都必须遵循之字形的样式:意向活动—意向相关项—意向活动—意向相关项……意向活动与意向相关项相互反映入对方。
102.—108.
自然态度中的一切行为都是设定性的(thetic)。也就是说,它们无论现实地还是潜在地(即对意识的注意焦点而言是现实的,还是仅仅潜伏着),都设定存在。这不仅具有奠基意义,即所有存在的信念变样(doxic modifications)都依赖某个原初存在——这确实构成问题的一部分;而且也意味着,一切变样本身都可能被理解为设定性的。例如,要怀疑某物,确实需要先设定某物才能怀疑;但即使在怀疑它时,它现在也仍是一个“可疑的存在”。这些变样因其设定性质,自身也可以无穷地再变样。也就是说,人可以怀疑一个怀疑、确认一个怀疑、拒绝一个怀疑,等等。
然而,必须明确:与意向活动相应的意向相关项是直接的。也就是说,并不是因为我把反思到的怀疑活动与所怀疑的事物统一起来,才把事物看成可疑;而是我先直接把事物看成可疑,然后才能在后来的反思中分析自己的怀疑。不能用被反思的体验替换直接体验,因为在直接体验中并没有进行这种分析;如果进行了,它便不再是同一个体验。人或许又想问:如果直接体验不同一于被反思的体验,现象学分析怎么能够阐明体验?必须理解,它们并非同一,却是等价的:通过反思与分析,人澄清先前不清晰者,包括它如何不清晰,从而把体验及其相应的不清晰与直接性保留在反思的内容之中;但体验在直接性中无法把握自身的反思,因为这与直接性的定义相矛盾。
109.—117.
然而,现象学反思是一种极独特的反思。它是非立场性的,因而是一种中性变样。信念变样都依赖设定者,每一种都只通过理性阐述设定(甚至辩证法也这样进行:或许直到最终在直接性中把握总体的时刻才超出这一点);而这种中性变样只是仿佛事物存在那样设定它们,既不确认,也不否定。它们只是被表达者的表达,而非从起源生成者。也就是说,中性是一种象征属性,因为通过象征,现实性与潜能的总体被无差别地设定。这种中性表达的潜能,不同于与现实性相关、迫切要求现实化的潜能:它是彻底离开这一网络的潜能,是潜在的普遍性表面。
但一个非绝对的表面总会重新分层。比如,某种想象虽在自身中是中性的,却总可以重新接到作为其基础的现实上。普通反思行为都有这一特征:它们总可以迭代,因为它们总指向自己的原本,以供进一步反思。一个想象可以包含更进一步的想象,等等。然而,要达成现象学还原,行为必须是绝对的,才能“产生”反思的普遍表面。世界必须在这一过程中被“毁灭”。也就是说,所有反思既然都会给某些设定加括号,我们所需要的就是把这些反思普遍化,从而一劳永逸地毁灭原本。例如,我的记忆指向另一个记忆,再指向另一个记忆,而每个记忆自身都被当作直接被记起者,所以记忆都指示某种原初呈现,每个记忆“作为记忆”本身也是这样一种呈现。但理念上的可能性在本质上总是在那里:最初记起的东西本身不过是对别的东西的记忆,如此无穷进行;而每次记忆作为一个原初存在,自身也不过是被记起的某物,所以归根到底,一切都只是被剥除了任何实际存在的记忆。这就是柏拉图回忆学说的意义。被回忆者本身是回忆,而回忆自身无非是另一回忆的被回忆者。因此,每个原初存在都消融于普遍回忆的内在表面:每次回忆都同样原初,也同样是派生图像,同样是一个仿佛。所以,一切都在于这些同样富于表达性的“纯粹显象”。存在的单义性。所有事物都在表达的总体之中,同样作为表达;并且作为表达被组织成不同杂多,每个杂多都有其自身的统一中心,因而有其“起源”或“原初给予性”。但这样的原初给予性都不标志着绝对发生,而只标志表达的常模结构。正如:如果一切同样都是表达,我们就需要解释,为何还会出现起源的模拟。
这不仅适用于存在世界,也适用于价值世界与实践世界。行为既然可以奠基于其他行为,便甚至可以奠基于这类中性行为:对想象的价值化,或作为现象学家的生活。但现象学家的态度不容许迭代行为:它必须一次而永远地完成;虽然现象学态度本身在反思中也可以变为设定性的,这却是自我实例化,而非迭代。现象学的现象学是一门把自身差异化为不同层次的绝对科学,而非一束根本不同的现象学。
最后,一切既然都可以转化为设定者,设定态度在本质上也是普遍的。任何价值论或实践之物都奠基于设定者,而且自身也可以转化为设定者,所以形式价值论和形式实践理论都依赖形式逻辑。此外,形式逻辑既然本质上是普遍的,便与普遍的质料本体论相关联:即形而上学,生活世界的本体论。但这又依赖作为普遍科学的现象学。为什么?因为形式逻辑在原则上是中性的。它预设现象学家的中性,才能作为设定科学达到真正的普遍性。否则,它会纠缠在判定什么是设定性的、什么不是的具体逻辑实践中,而无法达到一切设定者的普遍视野,可以说,无法达到存在的普遍表面。
118~135
118.—123.
每个设定者都可以在句法上与其他设定者相联系,从而被综合。但这种综合者也可以在意识中转化为简单的设定者。
124.—127.
含义与表达的问题关联于意义的问题。意义不一定是语言性的,因而是普遍的,而含义与表达则是语言范畴。困难在于,语言如何映照意义统一体及其基本动机。更重要的是,人也许想问,语言的映照是否是现象学态度的一种古老准备:通过语言,每种意义都得到再现与捕捉。也许差异在于,语言虽潜在地普遍,却从不如现象学那样把这种普遍性纳入一个肯定的目标。也就是说,它大多只是混乱地、不反思地、不完整地表达,同时又把自己当作某种实体。但现象学态度是一种自觉的普遍化,旨在充分阐明每一含义及其所表达的意义。此外,语言并不总是信念性的,有时它反而是一种言语行为,这又要求加括号。
128.—135.
不仅有朝向意义的意向活动之意指,也有意向相关项的意义。对象自身把另一个对象意指为其构成视域。此外,所有对象都在自身中包含意义的承担者,即先验的X;意义围绕它们形成中心,充实这些意向相关项核心的丰盈。现象学为全面地理论研究这些核心的一切系统及其重合的同一性提供了入口,成为关于一般而具体的对象性的真正形而上学,并关联于关于一般而具体的意向活动主体性的普遍心理学。这就是把形式逻辑、质料科学(包括客观的形式与质料伦理学)及同样普遍的心理学统一起来的普遍科学。但尽管已有这一切系统的相互联系,仍缺少另一个关键方面,即事实性或现实性的问题。这些规定可能性视域的本质,以什么方式被认为已经现实化?本质以什么方式过渡为事实?事实的本质是什么?这些问题以一种新方式关乎现象学:一种作为理性神学与目的论的现象学由此初具轮廓。这里关心的并非与普遍者相关的、仅仅作为单称者的“这个”的本质,而是“这个作为事实”的本质;其中甚至可能包括本质,因为本质本身在自然态度下也可能被简单地还原为事实存在。也就是说,现象学还需要说明设定与自然态度在其与先验态度之关系中的本质,以及一个这个的构成,才能充分阐明事实性的东西。
136~153
136.—153.
那么,什么是事实性?在着手考虑这一点之前,先要理解什么是现实性。现实性的第一个成分是休谟意义上的生动性,或笛卡尔的自然之光。可以说,这相当于一般意义上的明见性,以及在判断或逻辑这一特殊区域中的洞见。但必须注意,没有第二个成分——理性——自然之光就只会是神秘的。理性就是所有明见性的共同联结,使其形成一个相互确证的照明网络。
我们需要更仔细地理解,明见性在不同区域中如何呈现自身。首先,一切本质作为本质都给出恰切的、无可置疑的、内在的洞见。它们作为本质,在直观中完满而充分地给予自身。它们纯粹是一切直接可能性本身的视域。在“1+1=2”确定无疑的同一意义上,“半人马是马与人的结合”或“物质事物在本质上在知觉中被不恰切地给予”也同样确定。它们完整地给出自身作为本质的构成内容。
然而,这是否意味着本质纯粹是自足的?在某种意义上,是的;一切本质就其为已完成且总体化的视域而言,都是独立的。但它们也意指事实性的实例,这不是出于本质必然性,而是出于先验必然性(即自由)。本质在本质上是事实的本质吗?未必,因为我们可以想象一个一切都是本质、没有事实成立的世界,这确实就是构成现象学及其所把握的个别意义的区域;而只有事实的世界也并非不可理解,例如我们在经验与自然态度中的世界。本质与事实的联系并不通过本质的本质,而是通过先验意识的本质。因为先验意识恰恰是自我超越的绝对意识之流:其中的本质虽然完全保留自身作为自身的真实性,意识却仍自由地通过另一本质的意义来展开这一本质的意义,并以一个独立区域意指另一个区域。为什么?因为虽然区域自我封闭,并不在另一者中意指“自身”,意识却仍通过它把自身意指为绝对总体,并在这种意指中充实自身。换言之,虽然数学公理是自明的,它仍“意指”由它导出的命题;这不是因为没有那些命题它就不完整,而是因为,没有其设定的总体,它就使意识处于不自由之中。
因此,一切本质都不应理解为神秘的设定,也应理解为调节事实的常模;而这些事实仍是通过绝对意识自我差异化的行为被意指的。本质意指事实,不是本质地,而是先验地。
然而,我们仍未澄清“事实性”的意义。但现在显然的是:虽然它必然是现实性,即在绝对意识内在的和谐中,被其他明见性共同联结并验证的明见性,却还缺少第三个成分,才能与本质区分。本质同样是现实的,也共同意指其他明见性。那么,事实具有什么样的明见性?
不是特殊性,因为“这匹马”也是一个本质。相反,区别性标志是不恰切性。也就是说,虽然物的本质包含“不恰切性”,这一点却仍被作为普遍视域、作为常模而恰切地把握。“不恰切性”被包含在本质中时,本身只是一个恰切的本质。然而,如果一个本质把不恰切性规定为常模,这一本质就必须超越自身,化身为事实。因此,事实被理解为“在本质上被不恰切地给予的明见性,即由其本质自身所要求、去意指其他现实性(包括其他本质)的明见性”。也就是说,一个本质若规定了自身无法作为自身被充分给予,而其自身又只能作为理念被给予,那么事实就是这一内在不恰切性的必要补充。因此,每个本质都通过先验意识的本质被构成为事实。因为意识的本质是“绝对地、却总是不恰切地意指者”;通过这一自身本质,虽然其本质作为本质被恰切地给予,这种恰切性本身却包含其内容所固有的(无限)不恰切性,因而克服自身的本质,把其他明见性意指为事实。简单地说,事实属于一个否定自身恰切性的本质,仿佛它在自己的本质内容中加入了一个运算符号:“……但我,这个本质,不是它。”事实性本质不同于仅仅先验地共同意指的本质,而是依本质必然性无限地共同意指者。一个本质若只规定有限数量的本质来构成自身,它便是纯粹本质;它的反面则是事实的本质。因此,事实性不过是本质所意指的凝聚或混淆的总体之效果:一个具体意向相关项的无限超越性。