Edmund Husserl · 埃德蒙德·胡塞尔
The Crisis of European Sciences · 欧洲科学的危机
Husserl’s Monadology
Paper / 论文
Husserl and Leibniz share multiple similarities in their thinking, yet are distinguished in important ways. In this paper I will attempt to reconstruct the structure of Husserl’s transcendental (i.e. non-metaphysical) phenomenology and clarify why it is fundamentally monadological, while differentiating it from Leibniz’s metaphysical monadology.
According to Husserl, “what philosophical self-exposition in the epoché actually teaches us”1 is that “the ego—through a particular constitutive accomplishment of its own—makes itself declinable, for itself, transcendentally; that starting from itself and in itself, it constitutes transcendental intersubjectivity, to which it then adds itself as a merely privileged member, namely, as ‘I’ among the transcendental others.”2 He goes on to clarify that, “the always singular ‘I,’ in the original constituting life proceeding within it, constitutes a first sphere of objects, the ‘primordial’ sphere,”3 and it “starting from this, in a motivated fashion, performs a constituting accomplishment through which an intentional modification of itself and its primordiality achieves ontic validity under the title of ‘alien-perception,’ perception of others, of another ‘I’ who is for himself an ‘I’ as I am.”4
Since Husserl insists that any objectivity alongside its ontic validity and meaning for the subject is constituted primarily through intersubjectivity, so that intersubjectivity is an arche-objectivity or Ur-objectivity, meaning the most originary and primordial form of objectivity, the discovery that intersubjectivity in turn is constituted through and within the primal ego excavates an even deeper layer: a “singular” subjectivity is in itself an originary intersubjectivity. At the deepest layer of transcendental constitution, there is no separation between subject and object. Instead, at this layer, a transcendent “other” is but a continuous variation of the same ego immanent to the ego. Underlying the discreteness of objects standing over against the subject is an irreducible continuum that infinitesimally mediates the transcendent with the ego. This fits with Husserl’s claim that “in the elucidation of the accomplishment of the intentional syntheses, privileged status is given to the clarification of the syntheses of continuity”5 since “these serve as a ground for elucidating on a higher level the discrete syntheses.”6
A brief summary shall suffice to clarify the monadological structure of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Transcendental phenomenology revolves around at least three axes: one-many, transcendent-immanent, and discrete-continuous. The transcendental reduction should therefore be construed along these three axes. First, a single object should be reduced to a manifold of appearances unified through the singularity of the self-alienating and self-transcendent ego. Next, transcendence should be reduced to a continuous variation of the ego in its immanence. Finally, discreteness should be reduced to its primary ground of the continuum that makes the higher-level syntheses of the discrete possible in the first place. In none of these aspects of the reduction is there a denial of “many-ness,” “transcendence” or “discreteness” as such. Instead, the reduction only reveals the ground that allows these categories to even be conceivably meaningful.
If we now compare Husserl with Leibniz, their similarity is striking. First, all transcendent monads express themselves in another monad through manifold perceptions unified and organized by the “perspective” of the monad wherein other monads express themselves. Moreover, transcendence is reduced to that which is “expressed” within the monad where these expressions as content immanent to the monad concur. Lastly, according to Leibniz’s principle of continuity, all that discreteness of absolutely enclosed and enclosing monads is nonetheless grounded in the continuity of matter. Unquestionably, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology takes on a monadological character.
Yet, different from Leibniz’s metaphysical monadology, transcendental phenomenology does not propose a theory that explains the real world based on fundamental principles. Through the transcendental reduction what is yielded is not a reality more fundamental and more real, but is a layer of meaning that constitutes and grounds other layers of meaning in their possibility. In other words, monads as such do not exist, but they instead constitute their existences in an infinite network of significances and validities. This network, moreover, is not a network of necessary deductions, in whose necessity Leibniz conceives predicates in the monad to be implicated (though these predicates are not “necessary simpliciter,” they are nevertheless “necessary due to ‘the principle of fitness’ which determines the best of all possible worlds”). If for Leibniz monads are “substances” eternally in full presence regulated through necessity, Husserl reduces these substances to the originary interplay between presence and absence, thus fully explicating the significance of transcendentalism, i.e. its role as the infinite critique of an unreflective objectivism. The monads are, in this transcendentalism, centers for free and rational achieving of the motivated and self-transcendent ego.
Notes
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
胡塞尔与莱布尼茨的思想有多重相似之处,却又在重要方面彼此区别。本文将试图重构胡塞尔的先验现象学,也就是非形而上学的现象学的结构,并澄清它为何在根本上是单子论的,同时把它与莱布尼茨的形而上学单子论区分开来。
按照胡塞尔的说法,“悬搁中的哲学自我阐释实际上教给我们的”1,是“自我通过自身的一项特殊构造成就,在先验上使自身对于自身成为可变格的;它从自身出发,并在自身之中,构造先验主体间性,然后把自身作为一个仅仅具有优先地位的成员加入其中,也就是作为先验的他者们之中的‘我’。”2他接着澄清:“始终独异的‘我’,在于其内部进行的原初构造生活中,构造出第一个对象领域,也就是‘本原的’领域”;3并且,“以此为出发点,以一种受动机引导的方式,进行一项构造成就,通过这一成就,自身及其本原性的一种意向变样,以‘异己知觉’之名,也就是对他者的知觉、对另一个‘我’的知觉,获得存在上的有效性;这另一个‘我’,对于他自身而言,也像我一样是一个‘我’。”4
胡塞尔坚持,任何客观性,连同它对主体的存在有效性与意义,首先都通过主体间性构造起来;因此,主体间性是一个arche-客观性,或者Ur-客观性,也就是客观性最本源、最本原的形式。而主体间性反过来又通过原初自我、并在原初自我内部被构造,这一发现发掘出了更深的一层:“独异的”主体性,在自身中就是本源的主体间性。在先验构造最深的层次上,主体与客体之间没有分离。相反,在这一层次上,一个超越的“他者”,无非是内在于自我的同一自我的连续变样。在与主体相对而立的对象的离散性之下,存在着一个不可化约的连续统,它以无穷小的方式,使超越者与自我得到中介。这符合胡塞尔的主张:“在阐明意向综合的成就时,连续性综合的澄清被赋予了优先地位”,5因为“这些综合为在更高层次上阐明离散的综合提供了基础”。6
一番简要总结,便足以澄清胡塞尔先验现象学的单子论结构。先验现象学至少围绕三条轴线展开:一与多、超越与内在、离散与连续。因此,先验还原应当沿着这三条轴线来理解。首先,一个单一对象,应当被还原为显现的杂多,这些显现通过自我异化、自我超越的自我的独异性而得到统一。其次,超越性应当被还原为自我在其内在性中的连续变样。最后,离散性应当被还原为它的首要基础,即那个使更高层次的离散综合首先成为可能的连续统。还原的任何一个方面,都不否定“多性”“超越性”或“离散性”本身。相反,还原只是揭示使这些范畴得以成为可理解、有意义之物的基础。
如果现在把胡塞尔与莱布尼茨作比较,二者的相似性便十分显著。首先,一切超越的单子,都通过多样的知觉,在另一个单子中表达自身;这些知觉由容纳其它单子表达的那个单子的“视角”来统一和组织。其次,超越性被还原为在单子内部被“表达”的东西;而这些表达作为内在于单子的内容,在其中汇聚。最后,根据莱布尼茨的连续性原则,绝对封闭、又封闭着其它单子的那些单子,其全部离散性仍然奠基于物质的连续性。毫无疑问,胡塞尔的先验现象学具有单子论的特征。
然而,与莱布尼茨的形而上学单子论不同,先验现象学并不提出一种以根本原则为基础来解释真实世界的理论。通过先验还原所得到的,并不是一个更加根本、更加实在的实在性,而是一个意义层次,它在其它意义层次的可能性上,构造它们并为之奠基。换句话说,单子本身并不存在;相反,它们在一个由意指与有效性构成的无限网络中,构造出各自的存在。而且,这个网络并不是必然推演的网络;莱布尼茨则认为,单子中的谓词正包含于这样的必然性之中。尽管这些谓词并非“无条件地必然”,它们却仍然“由于决定一切可能世界中最佳者的‘适宜原则’而必然”。如果对于莱布尼茨而言,单子是在必然性调节下,永恒地充分在场的“本体”,那么胡塞尔便把这些本体还原为在场与缺席之间的本源交互,从而充分阐明了先验论的意义,也就是它作为对不反思的客观主义之无限批判的角色。在这一先验论中,单子是受动机引导、自我超越的自我进行自由而理性成就的中心。