Gui Ruiyan

Edmund Husserl · 埃德蒙德·胡塞尔
The Crisis of European Sciences · 欧洲科学的危机

Husserl’s Monadology

Paper / 论文

Husserl and Leibniz share multiple similarities in their thinking, yet are distinguished in important ways. In this paper I will attempt to reconstruct the structure of Husserl’s transcendental (i.e. non-metaphysical) phenomenology and clarify why it is fundamentally monadological, while differentiating it from Leibniz’s metaphysical monadology.

According to Husserl, “what philosophical self-exposition in the epoché actually teaches us”1 is that “the ego—through a particular constitutive accomplishment of its own—makes itself declinable, for itself, transcendentally; that starting from itself and in itself, it constitutes transcendental intersubjectivity, to which it then adds itself as a merely privileged member, namely, as ‘I’ among the transcendental others.”2 He goes on to clarify that, “the always singular ‘I,’ in the original constituting life proceeding within it, constitutes a first sphere of objects, the ‘primordial’ sphere,”3 and it “starting from this, in a motivated fashion, performs a constituting accomplishment through which an intentional modification of itself and its primordiality achieves ontic validity under the title of ‘alien-perception,’ perception of others, of another ‘I’ who is for himself an ‘I’ as I am.”4

Since Husserl insists that any objectivity alongside its ontic validity and meaning for the subject is constituted primarily through intersubjectivity, so that intersubjectivity is an arche-objectivity or Ur-objectivity, meaning the most originary and primordial form of objectivity, the discovery that intersubjectivity in turn is constituted through and within the primal ego excavates an even deeper layer: a “singular” subjectivity is in itself an originary intersubjectivity. At the deepest layer of transcendental constitution, there is no separation between subject and object. Instead, at this layer, a transcendent “other” is but a continuous variation of the same ego immanent to the ego. Underlying the discreteness of objects standing over against the subject is an irreducible continuum that infinitesimally mediates the transcendent with the ego. This fits with Husserl’s claim that “in the elucidation of the accomplishment of the intentional syntheses, privileged status is given to the clarification of the syntheses of continuity”5 since “these serve as a ground for elucidating on a higher level the discrete syntheses.”6

A brief summary shall suffice to clarify the monadological structure of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Transcendental phenomenology revolves around at least three axes: one-many, transcendent-immanent, and discrete-continuous. The transcendental reduction should therefore be construed along these three axes. First, a single object should be reduced to a manifold of appearances unified through the singularity of the self-alienating and self-transcendent ego. Next, transcendence should be reduced to a continuous variation of the ego in its immanence. Finally, discreteness should be reduced to its primary ground of the continuum that makes the higher-level syntheses of the discrete possible in the first place. In none of these aspects of the reduction is there a denial of “many-ness,” “transcendence” or “discreteness” as such. Instead, the reduction only reveals the ground that allows these categories to even be conceivably meaningful.

If we now compare Husserl with Leibniz, their similarity is striking. First, all transcendent monads express themselves in another monad through manifold perceptions unified and organized by the “perspective” of the monad wherein other monads express themselves. Moreover, transcendence is reduced to that which is “expressed” within the monad where these expressions as content immanent to the monad concur. Lastly, according to Leibniz’s principle of continuity, all that discreteness of absolutely enclosed and enclosing monads is nonetheless grounded in the continuity of matter. Unquestionably, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology takes on a monadological character.

Yet, different from Leibniz’s metaphysical monadology, transcendental phenomenology does not propose a theory that explains the real world based on fundamental principles. Through the transcendental reduction what is yielded is not a reality more fundamental and more real, but is a layer of meaning that constitutes and grounds other layers of meaning in their possibility. In other words, monads as such do not exist, but they instead constitute their existences in an infinite network of significances and validities. This network, moreover, is not a network of necessary deductions, in whose necessity Leibniz conceives predicates in the monad to be implicated (though these predicates are not “necessary simpliciter,” they are nevertheless “necessary due to ‘the principle of fitness’ which determines the best of all possible worlds”). If for Leibniz monads are “substances” eternally in full presence regulated through necessity, Husserl reduces these substances to the originary interplay between presence and absence, thus fully explicating the significance of transcendentalism, i.e. its role as the infinite critique of an unreflective objectivism. The monads are, in this transcendentalism, centers for free and rational achieving of the motivated and self-transcendent ego.

Notes

  1. The Crisis of European Sciences, page 185

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  2. Ibid.

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  3. Ibid.

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  4. Ibid.

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  5. Ibid., page 169

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  6. Ibid.

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