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Edmund Husserl · 埃德蒙德·胡塞尔
The Origin of Geometry · 几何学的起源

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The Origin of Geometry — Reading notes

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Revised 30 September 2024

Reading / 研读:Jacques Derrida · Introduction to Husserl’s Origin of Geometry 胡塞尔《几何学的起源》导论

In this note / 篇目

1

Derrida sees the fundamental problem that concerns late Husserl is the problem of history and its status inside phenomenology. This consists in three aspects: 1. why history needs phenomenology to elucidate itself and its eidetic presuppositions; 2. how history, after being elucidated by phenomenology, can become a genuine science, given that it seems to be concerned only with events “very particular”; 3. how phenomenology is intrinsically “historical.”

What is even more troubling here is that in all Husserl’s earlier works, historicity is never essential to phenomenology or any genuine science elucidated through phenomenology. Earlier, science is to be grounded through the egological, and inside the egological through the grounding of logic, or formal ontology. That is to say, logic and experience alone seem to give us a sufficient genesis for a genuine science.

Yet, through examining a particular science such as geometry, a new horizon of historicity is discovered, which remains concealed in the earlier method but is nonetheless essential for any genuine science. In what sense, then, are we to understand the relation between history and science? Why is historicity concealed in the genesis of logic or formal ontology yet unconcealed by an examination of material ontologies? Is there some inversion of priority occurring in Husserl’s thought?

2

The key issue is, what is a phenomenological reduction in terms of historicity? What is a return inquiry that reduces historically and phenomenologically at the same time?

First, we see that the inquiry is not concerned with parts of or facts about geometry, but rather the whole essence of geometry. Second, we see that it is not concerned with the conception or psychology of the first “geometer”, nor the axioms and the science as a whole, nor all the historical facts relevant to geometry, since all these would presuppose a ready-made factual existence of geometry. Rather, what the return inquiry is up to is exactly to determine the original sense of the instituting of geometry as an essential horizon of possibility.

It is obvious that a return inquiry is to reactivate the origin and remove forgetfulness. Forgetfulness is shown as a matter-of-factness, that is to say, everything geometrical is handed down to us as simple facts, and we do not take full responsibility for clarifying them and do not see the intrinsic (not extrinsic) connection between our work and tradition, but simply build on those stacked up facts.

The problem is, through static phenomenological analyses, we already recover, if only partially, our freedom. Through eidetic reduction, we reduce what was indistinguishably presented as a fact to be really a norm, and through phenomenological reduction, even what is already shown to be a norm has its factuality or givenness further reduced to a norm of our own constitution. What then is the status of a historical analysis?

Kant has to situate concepts in the realm of transcendental idealism, so as to reject any ready-at-handness of either historicist empiricism or unwarranted metaphysics. But in doing this, he forgets that concepts themselves, though “irreal”, might still appear to be ready-made within us. To fully reduce the factuality, therefore, Husserl has to push reduction to the limit, and an account of the constitution of transcendental concepts is necessary, therefore, of the complete phenomenological reduction.

Yet still, a genetic account might very well be necessary, but why history in particular? Is history not the factuality par excellence? But this is because we are here dealing with a material ontology, so the factuality is always already here. That is, we are always already acquainted with a factual science handed down to us, and we are trying to determine the sense of what is handed down to us. This has to be historical, for we can very well comprehend how we now get to understand geometry via a genetic account, yet it is impossible to disregard the already determined sense of geometry imposed onto us. The account therefore has to be more than genetic.

The return inquiry is not dealing with factuality as such, but a factuality already reduced eidetically into an essence. The historical fact is an essential fact, a fact that is invariable both because it is a “possible fact” that can be varied in its realm of essentiality (eidetic reduction), but also because it can be reactivated by later acts and therefore is an irreproducible anchor for all later references (return inquiry). In its own way, therefore, the historical horizon of phenomenology as an account of sciences is both dependent and secondary and independent and primary: it is dependent on formal ontology to give a radical eidetic sense to the totality of its “facts” (that history also applies to any object whatsoever, that factuality itself has to be accounted for in transcendental logic), but is independent insofar as formal ontology itself has to originate in history.

3

The origin in question limits the science as a whole. This origin is, however, not the regulative ideal which posits a pure deductivity or axiomatics, but rather has a more originary sense of truth that determines projectively the scope of what is decidable and what is not decidable for a particular science. Any axiomatic system has to confront the incompleteness theorem, yet exactly what relation the particular kind of undecidability has to what is decidable is predetermined by the originary sense of the science.

This primordial ground, therefore, is a horizon of free activities and projects. This means that activity and passivity have to be intertwined, since passivity is intrinsic to activity as its immanent transcendence: science is historically constituted. It is a tradition handed down like any tradition, but in its sedimentation it is always capable of reactivation of its originary sense. This is what historicity means. It cannot be an ideal object being fulfilled in subsequent additions, for in such cases, the ideal object is closed off and muted and without its content impossible as its genesis implies an active reduction from experience, whilst the empirical additions are discontinuous among themselves. Reactivation is never a logical explication.

4

Husserl, in his study of the origin of geometry, is not greatly concerned with the origin of the geometrical sense, but the “sense of sense”, or more simply, the genesis of the ideal objectivity of the geometrical sense, which is to say, the genesis of sense in general, as sense is equated to the primordial evidence of objectivity.

As Dilthey is concerned with the subjective reception of tradition, Husserl is concerned with the subjective creation of a tradition. How does Subject constitute the Objective Spirit in the first place? This has turned the study from the concrete historical a priori to the a priori historical, or, from the particular fact that institutes the whole transcendental horizon to the general conditions for historicity. In this sense, what is characterized as genesis here is rather the “static structure of genesis.” It is fictive in the sense that no geometrical sense ever “precedes” its “objectivation in history”, though this difference can be laid out structurally. This is not contradicting Husserl’s own projection of genesis and development, however, since no such eidetic structure of historicity is possible without a primary concrete history.

5

The question of the transcendental possibility of geometry or that of science as such is then also a question of the transcendental possibility of a “pure language.”

It is to be noted that such a transcendentally pure language is neither the “eidetic language” nor the “transcendental discourse.” This language is the constituting language which makes any constituted, empirically real language possible. This is the language that first allows an object to be constituted in thought through a “voice”, and then be translated to other subjects in a community of intersubjectivity.

Eidetic language on the other hand is the objectivated language with its pure a priori structure. As an objective eidos, it is not yet phenomenologically reduced to the transcendental subjectivity. Though a transcendentally pure language is necessarily eidetic, since it is beyond any constituted product, yet how such a language constitutes its own eidetic structure without presupposing such a structure remains problematic, as is shown in Chapter 6.

But at least the initial step of reduction is obvious. The degrees of ideality of language are laid out as follows: 1. the ideality of a word as always recognized as that one word, which grounds the workings internal to a language; 2. the ideality of a content (essence as Wesen) as always referring to that empirical content bounded in space and time, which grounds the translatability of any language; 3. the ideality of an eidos as unbounded and isolated, which grounds the possibility of science as such. To say that the ultimate ideality of an eidos is linguistic therefore does not mean that it is relative to any factual language, but that it is ultra-translatable, that it is constituted through a pure and transcendental linguistic intersubjectivity.

The other thing is that this “pure and transcendental language” is nonetheless not a “phenomenological description,” or a transcendental discourse, since it is neither “concrete” nor “reflective.” The transcendental discourse aims to reactivate the transcendental language internal to the factical language, so as to also reactivate itself. But this is immensely difficult, since such an endeavor necessarily needs to go into a circle, as it presupposes that this discourse is itself not merely factical but concretely carried out through the transcendental subject, yet its very concreteness relies upon the employment of a factical, hence natural and naive, language, for instance, German. It therefore has to be infinitely self-critical, hence Heidegger’s argument for a transcendental hermeneutics, which moves within the givenness of the language.

Husserl, however, suspects the facticity of language. Rather, he clings to the possibility of a pure transcendental language, in which all facticity as such can be removed, and sees it as evident that it is fundamentally possible to invent a discourse for phenomenology. In other words, equally as Heidegger suspects the primacy of the ideality of language which has to be phenomenologically clarified in its relation to the subject’s historicity, which clarification (as phenomenological discourse) itself relies upon a presupposition of this ideality, Husserl is not convinced that the linguistic historicity is so fundamentally factical that even phenomenology itself becomes limited in a certain naturalness. Any measure of phenomenology’s success, then, has to be the evidence in its own carrying out the task.

6

Derrida criticizes, or rather clarifies, Husserl’s approach to language on three grounds. First, Husserl privileges “normal adults” to be the exemplary of transcendental subjectivity. This is nonetheless consistent, for transcendental subjectivity, as transcendentally reduced, does not necessarily entail an eidetic “abstraction,” not even a reduction to a fixed “essence.” Just as the eidetically reduced language is still but an objectivated language, not the speech of the speaking subject as such. Rather, the transcendental reduction is to reduce a “fact” to a “norm”, an “eidos” to a “telos.” So just as the eidetic speech is not yet spiritual, so the eidetic subject is not yet concrete.

This expresses Derrida’s second point. Though Husserl is quite clearly only interested in the linguistic constitution of ideal objects such as mathematical ones, of the poles of identity or centers of reference, he is not unaware that at the borders of such objective language, an elusive subjective language related to poetic objects is nonetheless at work. Language as a horizon has to allow for a general division between immanence and transcendence, no matter to what degree accordingly. This is why even when an eidetically fixed language as such is possible, there might still be anomalous discourses as produced teleogically in reference to the linguistic “norm.”

Derrida’s third point is that, since language is primarily the horizon of intersubjectivity, it necessarily involves an inquiry of the “ground” of such linguistic communities. This “ground” is the “Earth” on which we live, which we constantly speak of and point to. To inquire into geometry is to inquire into the possibility of language, but also to inquire into the “earth”, the primal ground for all objects as such. Here the originary sense of geometry is implicitly reactivated: geometry is a living science in relation to the earth and the space we live in, thus is reimplicated in the life-world.

7

The problem of origin and its reactivation is marked by the fundamental tension between eidos and telos. Though an origin is always experienced as a fact, it is nonetheless not an empirical fact, but a fact as such. In other words, an origin can only be infinitely reactivated, thus constituting a pure history as such, only through the fundamental act of infinitization, or idealization. An eidos is reached and then chained to writing, which as a pure writing is ideal and transcendental. Such a writing is a pure act and has nothing to do with any factual preservation of writing, but is merely the “literality” of ideas. However, this literality of eidos is nonetheless immanent to it, since any eidos is not only a given Absolute, but also a corporal and spiritual “signitivity.” In such sense, the true sense, though immortalized, has to express itself through its multiplicity, and is in this sense only a telos, that is, eidos as constituted.

The process of reactivation, therefore, as the reduction of historical passivity to recover the originary activity, is the intensified comprehension of an essence as historically constituted. This is to say, it is not merely an inquiry as to the essence of an object, but building off that, an inquiry as to how that essence is to be factically produced, though such facticity is itself an ideal one.

In the case of geometry, therefore, it is first the recovery of the ideal and true sense of geometry from the half-comprehending symbols. Such a reduction has to go two ways, firstly, it reduces the factical contingency to recover an eidos, what geometry itself is given to be in its clear evidence, and secondly, it in doing so has to also reduce the factical necessity to recover a telos, where its evidence is not only true, but also adequate to the absolute transcendental subject. Though in the second reduction, it seems as if a return to other contingent facts is inevitable, it is really not so if one supposes even the factical grounds a transcendental subject makes use of is in themselves pure and transcendental.

In this sense, one can say that Husserl is James Joyce inverted. Joyce is trying to practice equivocation as much as possible to reach that infinite telos as implicating an eidos, Husserl is trying to reduce equivocation as much as possible to have an eidos as attracting a teleology.

8

Again to inquire into any particular origin is to inquire into a particular historicity that is a reduced factuality. In this sense any external empiricism is invalid, unless it is grounded by a prior understanding of phenomenological reduction and an a priori structure of pure historicity.

But even if we do grant pure historicity it is not necessary to admit historicism. For historicism is predicated under a unity of “historicity”, and historicity is a relativism only under the unification of one historical task.

Therefore we can say there is an order of cultures based on three levels. First level is the general historicity immanent to any culture. Second level is the European culture that exemplifies the idea of pure historicity. Third level is the ultimate clarification of pure historicity not as an idea only exemplified or possessed by Europe, but as constituted by Europe as a telos.

9

Any inquiry to a particular origin presupposes the inquiry to pure originality as such. But more than the inquiry of a pure historicity that constructs the objectivity of geometry, this investigation of the origin of geometry has to at the same time account for the constitution of ideality intrasubjectively.

Yet such a particular constitution cannot be without historically determined factualities providing a basis of material for it, that is, providing norms for it. That means, these materials cannot be simply facts, but have to be grounds of possibilities of a science. They have to be eidetic structural stratums that are both concrete and scientific. A different science is required for this task, i.e. phenomenology. Any objectivism (positivism) or subjectivism (Heidegeerianism) is thereby illegitimate.

But since Husserl also uncovers the layer of subjectivity, how then is the pre-predicative stratum of experience related to the historicity? Is pure historicity that constitutes any science itself constituted more profoundly by a transcendental subjectivity? Yet if any ego is fundamentally saturated by historicity, how is such a historicity again constituted by an ego? Self-constituting constitution that first converts all ideal facts back to norms, then discovers how norms interrelate. That is, first, to reduce all factual histories (including the factuality of the European eidos of pure historicity) to potential historicities, the eidos of pure historicity is therefore itself constituted historically, but still constituted transcendentally. Next, to uncover the structure of all these interrelated norms, namely, these potential historicities, including the pure historicity, itself dependent on other transcendental norms, which norms are dependent on historicity as well. Hence self-constituting constitution.

10

There is a disruption or a turning away from between what is geographical and what is geometrical. The “roundness” and the “straightness”, for example, are geographical essences that are morphological types still inherent in sensible shapes, they are anexact but not inexact. That is to say they are vague yet nonetheless essences subject to a “more or less” of eidetic variations.

The first infinitization of geometry is to institute this ideality beyond sensible shapes. This gives us the “ideality of objects.” Derrida is perceptive of the fact that the second infinitization ushered in by modernity is an ideality of “systems as such”, or systemicity, which however is nonetheless founded upon the first institution of a closed system.

For Husserl, any reactivation is necessarily an infinitization, for a reactivation of sense is nothing other than the reactivation of a transcendental intersubjectivity’s constituting acts. It therefore necessarily implies the ideation of a pure historicity and the idealizing transformation of the object under such a pure historicity (or objectivity theoretically, freedom ethically).

This idealization presupposes the practical and theoretical aspect of philosophy. These two aspects, unlike for Kant if taken at face value in his earlier writings, for Husserl are essentially united. To think is to be free. This attitude is nothing but the pure historicity of a transcendental intersubjectivity. This historicity is not itself again constituted by history, but is only constituted by itself throughout history as the teleology of self-constituting Reason. That is why between morphological types and pure ideas there is always a leap, for types are always only hints or indications to infinity, but infinity itself has to be instituted only by infinity itself. Only in this leap is history possible: otherwise facts are only externally chained together, without immanent and intrinsic relation of infinity saturating the finite.

Husserl and Heidegger are different in that Husserl presses for the de jure primordiality of phenomenology (or possibility) while early Heidegger presses for the de facto primordiality of ontology (or factuality).

In this sense the limit of phenomenology is the phenomenalization of the transcendental subjectivity, or the factical analysis of this subjectivity. It is a certainty of form but not the infinite knowledge of content. Intentionality is the horizon-certainty. This is guaranteed through the essential twofoldness of the reduction: a phenomenological reduction might posit a fundamental constituting ego, making pure activity a fact, while the eidetic reduction can reduce this activity to a constituted possibility; while as the essence the subject can be a pure constituted fact, it again can be reduced to a product involving the act of constitution.

11

The Idea in history is the self-manifestation of the telos of Reason. The problem of ahistoricity, historicity and history all united: the atemporality of Idea is omnitemporality of transcendental historicity, and is the pure happening of a factual history. The instituting of a pure historicity through phenomenology (Husserlian) only emphasizes or purifies the ontological problem of Being and History (Heideggerian), or the factical event of Being. The problem of sense purifies the factuality of all its materiality and presents the problem of a pure fact. Phenomenology is a critical discourse that always reflects upon the primordial Fact and is always delayed in expanding and being situated in the horizon: in its delay (différance) phenomenology is primordial in its teleological unity with ontology, it “hears” the primordial Being and understands Being can only be purified into its primordial “show” when phenomenology institutes itself as pure difference in pure difference. Phenomenology is the horizonal critique (that is, the unfolding of a differentiation) of the ontological question of unprethinkable Being. Ontology can only pose the question of this Being qua the primordial Fact, it cannot answer it, since it does not relate it to anything else; only phenomenology has the right to develop it, since it is late to the fact and is this belatedness. This is why Husserl says that phenomenology legislates to philosophy as such. The transcendental and the eidetic have to coincide at the ultimate level. Reduction is a fruitful method that gives birth to Being as such and grounds ontology, whereas ontology clarifies the fundamental question and limit for phenomenology. Heidegger is the other side to Husserl.