Edmund Husserl · 埃德蒙德·胡塞尔
The Crisis of European Sciences · 欧洲科学的危机
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欧洲科学的危机——散记
Reflections · Pages
在被重新激活之前,科学对象的整体性总是以内在可能性的方式而潜在的。因此胡赛尔的回溯-探问所探询的并非是一种逻辑上的先验可能性,而是实在的可能性,或者说作为动力的意义之源泉/涌出。这在任何先验哲学中都是如此,先验哲学的可能性与逻辑的可能性必须严格加以区分。
科学所遭遇的危机不是因为“远离了生活世界”,而是“生活世界”恰恰还远未开始。
克莱恩对胡赛尔的批评
胡赛尔将意向性历史的任务视为1.对伽利略对自然世界的几何化的研究和2.对前科学世界的自然根源经验的研究。对于克莱恩来说,这里缺少了至关重要的第三种类,即对数字科学与数之象征化的历史的激活。这一种类之必要性在于,如果缺少了代数经验,胡赛尔对自然世界几何化的研究将不可能完成。如果仅仅关注于自然世界的几何化,那只能局限于有限的特定经验,构造出的图形也仅仅只是对普遍几何的特殊应用;在这个意义上,自然世界仍然是特殊实例的集合,但是其本身并不是“自然地几何着”的。胡赛尔对几何学和自然世界的联结最终只能达到以下的说明:通过一种数学操作,普遍几何可以有限地被加诸自然世界上,但自然世界本身与几何世界是有距离的。而克莱恩需要说明的是更进一步的mathesis universalis,即普全数学,是如何可能的。也就是说,不仅仅是几何学能对现实世界“有用”,或是能一定程度上说明特殊的自然物是如何几何地被构成的,而是自然的全体就是几何。
这样的工作要求了以下几个步骤:1.自然世界在希腊时已经可以通过数来说明,因此需要的就是对数的几何化;2.几何的“量”因此要与“数”取得等同;3.因为由数到量是质与种的跨越,所以需要能跨越“种”的操作模式;4.这就是韦达的纯粹代数所达成的工作。韦达的纯粹代数将数转换为符号,因而获得了形式抽象化。形式抽象化后,数字就不再指涉特定数目的自然物,而与几何的量获得了统一。希腊代数仅仅对几何量进行抽象,而保留了数的特异性与不可分性,但韦达所做的就是将数字也如此转换了。
但这又勾连出新的问题:是如何的转变使得数字的抽象化得以可能呢?这就是克莱恩在「希腊代数与数学思想起源」中试图解决的问题。
相当于克莱恩认为胡叟的研究只关注了几何图形与自然物的“application and coincidence”,却忽视了物理公式构筑的物理世界本身的几何化……一个仅仅是idealization,另一个则是完全的现代科学
换句话说,胡叟所做的是“我看见面前有一块地毯,看起来像是长方形,由此我推断它作为长方形拥有长方形的一切性质”;但克莱恩认为这还不够,还要做到“我现在通过测量拥有了几个数,比如F,m,a;F,m和a并不是能被看见的图像。但被我组合成公式后,这几个数的公式要具有一切几何学上的能被看见的明证性。而这光作为数是不够的,因为几何学是量的科学。所以最后就相当于把其它量先转换为数,而数则意味着几何的量”。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
Before its reactivation, the totality of scientific objects is always latent in the mode of immanent possibility. Husserl’s retrospective questioning therefore inquires not into a logical a priori possibility, but into actual possibility: the source or welling-up of meaning as an impetus. This holds in every transcendental philosophy. Transcendental philosophy’s possibility must be strictly distinguished from logical possibility.
The crisis confronting science does not arise because it has “strayed from the lifeworld,” but because the “lifeworld” has scarcely even begun.
Klein’s Criticism of Husserl
Husserl sees the task of intentional history as 1. investigating Galileo’s geometrization of the natural world, and 2. investigating the natural, originary experience of the prescientific world. For Klein, a crucial third category is missing: reactivating the history of numerical science and the symbolization of number. This category is necessary because, without algebraic experience, Husserl’s investigation of the geometrization of the natural world cannot be completed. Attending only to geometrization confines one to finite, determinate experiences, while the figures constructed remain merely particular applications of universal geometry. In this sense, the natural world remains a collection of particular instances, rather than itself “being geometrical by nature.” Husserl’s connection of geometry with the natural world can ultimately offer only this account: through a mathematical operation, universal geometry can be imposed on the natural world to a limited extent, but the natural and geometrical worlds remain at a distance. Klein needs to explain the further possibility of mathesis universalis, universal mathematics. It is not merely that geometry can be “useful” for the actual world, or explain to some degree how particular natural things are geometrically constituted, but that nature in its entirety is geometry.
This work requires the following steps: 1. The natural world could already be explained through number in Greece, so what is needed is the geometrization of number. 2. Geometrical “magnitude” must therefore attain identity with “number.” 3. Because passing from number to magnitude crosses qualities and kinds, a mode of operation capable of crossing “kinds” is required. 4. This is what Viète’s pure algebra accomplishes. It transforms numbers into symbols and thus achieves formal abstraction. After formal abstraction, numerals no longer refer to a determinate number of natural things, but attain unity with geometrical magnitude. Greek algebra merely abstracts from geometrical magnitudes, preserving number’s particularity and indivisibility; Viète transforms numerals in this way as well.
But this brings forth a new problem: what transformation made the abstraction of numerals possible? This is the problem Klein attempts to solve in Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra.
In effect, Klein thinks Husserl’s investigation attends only to the “application and coincidence” of geometrical figures and natural things, while neglecting the geometrization of the physical world itself as constituted by physical formulas… One is merely idealization; the other is fully modern science.
In other words, what Husserl does is: “I see a carpet before me that looks rectangular; I infer that, as a rectangle, it possesses all the properties of a rectangle.” Klein thinks this is insufficient. One must also accomplish this: “Through measurement, I now have several numbers, say F, m, and a. F, m, and a are not visible images. But once I combine them into a formula, the formula involving these numbers must possess all the visible evidence of geometry. Being mere numbers is insufficient, because geometry is the science of magnitudes. Ultimately, then, other magnitudes are first converted into numbers, and the numbers signify geometrical magnitudes.”