Immanuel Kant · 伊曼努尔·康德
Ethics and radical evil · 伦理与根本恶
Undated 未注日期
伦理与根本恶——散记
Reflections · Pages
滕老师论康德伦理
康德的radical evil主要问题在于恶的两面性:一方面恶意味着需要主体责任,一方面恶又总是超出主体行动之外(不然主体是无法认识其为恶并感到愧疚)。这被转移到了自由概念的两面性,一方面自由是超出经验与感性的“好道德”,一方面自由又仅仅指涉这个超出本身而仅仅关乎责任。这里恶的问题就展现为:如果自由就意味着服从道德律令,那“恶”是如何可能的?感性与经验不可能被识别为恶,这点纯批里已经讲得很清楚了:“感性从不犯错”。康德的解决办法是说,恶意味着感性与理性的颠倒。然而这并无法真正解决问题,因为颠倒本身并没有一定意味着“行为”。因此康德只能止步于通过理性的无时性来“假装”一切后果都肇因于理性主体的自身决断,道德的根基因此成为一种误认。
有两种可能回应。一种是谢林式的“恶矛盾论”,即,恶是始于理性自身的有限性,一种是海哥/列维纳斯式的“预先责任论”,即责任的发生要先于道德理性。第一种,理性虽然需要负道德责任,但这一责任本质上是悲剧性的。第二种,道德责任无需理性的担保,而本身已经超出了理性成为第一伦理准则,也就是类似于所谓的欲望伦理。
此外,谢林式的恶观念不能等同于苏格拉底的恶=无知,因为此处恶并非是“无意无知的情况下”达成的,而是恰恰在好与坏中进行了思考与选择才达成的。换句话说,我们不能说获得了什么选择是善的知识就一定会行善,因为理性的有限性并不等同于认识的有限性,而是有些矛盾是绝对无法消除的。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
Professor Teng on Kantian Ethics
The main problem with Kant’s radical evil lies in evil’s twofold character: on the one hand, evil requires the subject’s responsibility; on the other, evil always exceeds the subject’s action, otherwise the subject could not recognize it as evil and feel guilt. This is transferred to the twofold character of freedom. On the one hand, freedom is “good morality” beyond experience and sensibility; on the other, freedom refers merely to this exceeding itself and concerns responsibility alone. The problem of evil now appears as follows: if freedom means obeying the moral law, how is “evil” possible? Sensibility and experience cannot be identified as evil; this is already very clear in the Critique of Pure Reason: “Sensibility never errs.” Kant’s solution is to say that evil means an inversion of sensibility and reason. But this does not really solve the problem, since inversion does not itself necessarily mean an “action.” Kant can therefore go no further than to use reason’s timelessness to “pretend” that all consequences originate in the rational subject’s own decision. The foundation of morality thus becomes a misrecognition.
Two responses are possible. One is a Schellingian “contradiction theory of evil,” where evil begins in reason’s own finitude. The other is a Heideggerian or Levinasian “theory of prior responsibility,” where responsibility arises before moral reason. In the first, reason must bear moral responsibility, but this responsibility is essentially tragic. In the second, moral responsibility requires no guarantee from reason: it already exceeds reason and becomes the first ethical principle, something like what is called an ethics of desire.
Moreover, the Schellingian conception of evil cannot be equated with the Socratic equation of evil and ignorance. Here evil is not accomplished “unintentionally and unknowingly,” but precisely through deliberation and choice between good and bad. In other words, we cannot say that knowing which choice is good necessarily makes one act well. Reason’s finitude is not equivalent to the finitude of cognition: some contradictions simply cannot be eliminated.