Søren Kierkegaard · 索伦·祁克果
Philosophical Fragments · Johannes Climacus · 哲学片段 · 约翰内斯·克利马库斯
2024年笔记
Douban · Bidasari
Source revised / 来源修订: 30 June 2026
In this note / 篇目
祁克果与哲学片段:
苏格拉底对永恒的追求并非基督徒对那神圣一瞬的渴求,也就是那让自己无法忘却、他者暴露在爱中的时刻。但这是否遗忘了「美诺」中苏格拉底与神圣的关系,又或者是苏格拉底之哲学活动是在神圣差遣下的事实?
神爱世人,爱他们作为人的有限性,并对他们最本质的面目(有限但无罪)爱着,因此并不完全抬升他们,而是自行降落让自己成为最末者——但这种也完全可以解读成虚伪冒犯,一方面这降落对神并不真切,一方面那爱也不是无条件的甚至对罪的爱。或者从一开始就不用追求平等,爱本就不是平等的。
如果要坚持瞬间,那就得坚持悖论和存在相对于思的在先性。也要坚持原罪,因为未知之物作为绝对差异是在思之边缘的,任何模糊化都是思本身的内容。
如果要坚持瞬间,就得坚持「教-学」的不平等,但这就引入了爱之平等与爱者之不平等的矛盾:因为不平等,所以他者才变得重要,所以才爱;可是爱本身又要抹平差异,就使得爱坍塌回自爱。
祁克果与对历史体系的批评:
1. 必然性是本质作为本质的不可改变。改变则是本质从不存在进入存在,从潜在进入实在。这一实现就是自由。自然没有历史,因为它不“实现”自由,没有那一个把可能性实现为更高可能性的运动进程(潜能阶次?)。但正因为历史是自由的,是对可能性的实现,它是没有任何体系意义上的必然性的,因为任何历史的系统都预设了自由为其构成性外部。
2. 过去是可变的、不确定的,因为每一个过去的实在都内涵了其潜在,而这一潜在时刻否定着这一实在的必然性。体系对必然性的回溯构建是没有意义的,因为它只意味着对已经达成了的实在其本质的理解,而没有看到这一可能性之实现的自由。一个体系当中,每一个阶段都是一个停顿,而这一停顿就是与悖论的直面,这一与悖论的直面哪怕是在未来回望也注定是不可理解的。在体系的停顿中,无论是停顿的这一阶段所设定的目的还是体系的演进本身作为内在目的都被悬置了。哪怕过去的事实性无法质疑,这一事实性本身的意义、这一「事实(the actual thus so and so)」是「如何(the possible how)」被现实化的却是不可知的。
3. 回忆是必然预设了「原初时刻」的,正如思是必然预设了那一「不可预思之在」的。但是对时刻的预设就意味着时刻永恒地在回忆中绽出着。任何回忆事实上都是对那一时刻的重复,并且这一重复并非是对「同一者」的重复,而是对「绝对差异」的重复。或者说,被回忆的并非是某个固定的图像(祁克果所言的第一种历史式的直接意识),也并不是通过图像所唤起的永恒被把握为同一者的自我(第二种苏格拉底式的回忆),而是那绝对的悖论与差异,那永恒的他者(第三种基督教式的信仰)。
4. 现代的体系怀疑论者没有意识到古代怀疑论是对意志、激情与心性的锻炼,反而不是要通过有计划的筛选和发展去达到最后的绝对知识。古代怀疑论是直接的,而与之相呼应的信也是直接的。这一直接性并非是知觉意义上的直接性,而是说,信是对绝对中介的直接明见。对绝对中介的直接明见并不是体系结尾才能完成的,反而恰恰是在体系的缝隙里、在体系的外部才开显出来。绝对中介之绝对并不是在经过思的提纯后才得以被直观的,因为要运起这思,这本身就已经预设了对绝对中介的直观与激情了。
5. 历史之信有两种,一种是对事实之信,一种是对悖论之信。任何历史事实都预设了其潜在转化为实在的偶然性,或其意义的不确定性,以至于其事实性本身都在动摇。而神之成人不仅带有历史本身的不确定,还带有永恒化为一瞬、必然化为偶然的悖论。因此,一般来说,信仅仅指对事实的信。但是基督徒的信超出了对事实的信,甚至还有对「不可能之事实」的信。
祁克果论怀疑(skepsis):
1. 怀疑与哲学的关系有三种可能,其一为「怀疑是现代哲学的开端」,其二为「怀疑是哲学的开端」,其三为「怀疑是哲学的预备」。
2. 如果说「怀疑是现代哲学的开端」具有深刻的意义的话,那它必然指的是哲学的本质在现代获得了澄清或改变。但这必然意味着过去的哲学并非真正的哲学,且往后的哲学的本质也被不可逆地决定了。这是怎么可能的?永恒本质是怎么在历史中决定?
3. 同样,如果说「怀疑是哲学的开端」,那我们必须要问是什么被怀疑了。怀疑不是某种肯定性的活动,而是对某物的否定,可这一否定必然预设了历史。那么,这个论断的意义与上一个论断是相同的:哲学的本质要在历史中决定。一个人如果要接受这个论断,他必须在全体的知识中保持个体性,要让个体的经验在已经固化的系统中依旧保持开放性。而且,一个人如果要接受这个论断,为了保持这一真正的开放性,他同时还得怀疑这个论断本身。
4. 因此,更直观的似乎是「怀疑是哲学的预备」。也就是说,我们并不能保证在怀疑中获得哲学的知识,而只能说保持怀疑,并「期望」能因此获得智慧。这意味着要在怀疑中生活,这也是古代怀疑论者的态度。怀疑是一种生活实践。那么,怀疑的先验可能性是什么?在于对两个直接性的中介。这意味着将矛盾把握为矛盾。任何体系试图抹去矛盾而获得真理的直接性,但怀疑恰恰是将两个真理并置于意识中的实践,并且扎根于这一个体的意识。怀疑不是客观的,而是完全主观的,它将直接给予的客观事实并置一起,并获得实践的解读自由。本真的绝望就是真正去生活在怀疑与对直接性的绝对中介中。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
In this note / 篇目
Kierkegaard and Philosophical Fragments:
Socrates’ pursuit of eternity is not the Christian’s longing for that divine instant: the unforgettable moment when the other is exposed in love. But does this forget Socrates’ relation to the divine in the Meno, or the fact that his philosophical activity is undertaken on a divine commission?
God loves human beings, loves their human finitude and their most essential aspect, finite yet sinless. He therefore does not raise them up completely, but descends himself to become the lowliest. Yet this can also be interpreted as hypocritical offense: on the one hand, this descent is not real for God; on the other, this love is not unconditional, not a love even of sin. Or perhaps equality need never be pursued in the first place: love is not equal to begin with.
To insist on the instant, one must insist on paradox and the priority of existence over thought. One must also insist on original sin, because the unknown as absolute difference lies at thought’s edge. Any blurring is itself a content of thought.
To insist on the instant, one must insist on the inequality of “teaching–learning.” But this introduces a contradiction between love’s equality and the lovers’ inequality. Because they are unequal, the other matters, and therefore there is love; yet love itself seeks to efface difference, collapsing love back into self-love.
Kierkegaard’s Criticism of the Historical System:
1. Necessity is essence’s immutability as essence. Change is essence’s passage from nonexistence into existence, from potentiality into actuality. This actualization is freedom. Nature has no history because it does not “actualize” freedom, lacking the movement that actualizes possibility into higher possibility—a hierarchy of potentialities? Yet precisely because history is free, an actualization of possibility, it possesses no necessity in the sense of a system, because every historical system presupposes freedom as its constitutive outside.
2. The past is mutable and uncertain, because every past actuality contains its potentiality, which constantly negates that actuality’s necessity. The system’s retrospective construction of necessity is meaningless: it means only understanding the essence of an already achieved actuality, without seeing the freedom involved in actualizing this possibility. Within a system, every stage is a pause, and this pause is a direct confrontation with paradox, destined to remain incomprehensible even when viewed retrospectively from the future. In the system’s pause, both the end posited by the paused stage and the system’s development itself as an immanent end are suspended. Even if the past’s factuality cannot be questioned, the meaning of this factuality itself, “how” this “fact”—the actual thus so and so—was actualized, the possible how, is unknowable.
3. Recollection necessarily presupposes an “originary moment,” just as thought necessarily presupposes that “being which cannot be thought in advance.” Yet presupposing the moment means that the moment eternally bursts forth within recollection. Every recollection is actually a repetition of that moment, and this is not a repetition of “the same,” but of “absolute difference.” In other words, what is recollected is neither a fixed image, Kierkegaard’s first kind of historical immediate consciousness, nor the self eternally grasped as identical and evoked through the image, the second, Socratic kind of recollection. It is absolute paradox and difference, the eternal other: the third, Christian kind of faith.
4. Modern systematic skeptics do not realize that ancient skepticism trains will, passion, and disposition, rather than seeking final absolute knowledge through planned selection and development. Ancient skepticism is immediate, and the faith corresponding to it is also immediate. This is not perceptual immediacy. Rather, faith is immediate evidence of absolute mediation. Such evidence is not attained only at the system’s conclusion; it opens precisely in the system’s gaps and outside it. The absoluteness of absolute mediation does not become intuitable only after purification through thought, because setting this thought in motion already presupposes intuition of and passion for absolute mediation.
5. Historical belief has two kinds: belief in facts and belief in paradox. Every historical fact presupposes the contingency of its potentiality’s becoming actuality, or the uncertainty of its meaning, to the point of unsettling its factuality itself. God’s becoming human carries not only history’s own uncertainty, but also the paradox of eternity becoming an instant and necessity becoming contingency. Generally, then, belief means merely belief in facts. Christian faith, however, exceeds belief in facts and even includes faith in the “impossible fact.”
Kierkegaard on Skepsis:
1. There are three possible relations between doubt and philosophy: “Doubt is the beginning of modern philosophy”; “Doubt is the beginning of philosophy”; and “Doubt is a preparation for philosophy.”
2. If “Doubt is the beginning of modern philosophy” has a profound meaning, it must mean that philosophy’s essence is clarified or changed in modernity. But this necessarily means that past philosophy was not genuine philosophy, and that the essence of future philosophy has also been irreversibly determined. How is this possible? How can an eternal essence be determined in history?
3. Likewise, if “Doubt is the beginning of philosophy,” we must ask what is doubted. Doubt is not an affirmative activity, but the negation of something; this negation necessarily presupposes history. This claim therefore means the same as the previous one: philosophy’s essence is to be determined in history. Anyone accepting this claim must preserve individuality within the totality of knowledge, keeping individual experience open within an already solidified system. Moreover, to preserve this genuine openness, anyone accepting the claim must simultaneously doubt the claim itself.
4. “Doubt is a preparation for philosophy” therefore seems more intuitive. We cannot guarantee that doubt yields philosophical knowledge; we can only continue doubting and “hope” thereby to attain wisdom. This means living in doubt, the attitude of ancient skeptics. Doubt is a practice of life. What, then, is doubt’s transcendental possibility? It lies in mediating two immediacies. This means grasping contradiction as contradiction. Every system tries to efface contradiction and attain truth’s immediacy. Doubt, however, is precisely the practice of juxtaposing two truths within consciousness, rooted in this individual consciousness. Doubt is not objective, but wholly subjective. It juxtaposes directly given objective facts and gains a practical freedom of interpretation. Authentic despair is genuinely living in doubt and in the absolute mediation of immediacy.