Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz · 戈特弗里德·威廉·莱布尼茨
Universal characteristic and monadology · 普全符号与单子论
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Universal Characteristic — Reading notes
Reflections · Pages
The paradox of substance being not a substance for substance can be taken as a predicate, namely substantial
Not just an analogy of colliding bodies: continuous argument: primitive forces effect changes on two bodies according to each one’s own point of view, yet their points of view also accommodate each other and correspond
Not careful enough to distinguish external things from perspectives and phenomena; what exactly correspond; representations from each substance or external things?
To make exist those whose existences allow the maximum number of possibles to exist (perhaps in time)
A rather weird formulation: more and more realities; but some parts asleep resist this multiplying reality
Though a lot of realities are there, the newly created realities are like seeds there waiting to be awakened; hence always some possibilities are there not yet realized
Particular; imprint of the universal
Action and resistance to action; expressions striving against each other; substances; otherness-possibility
Intensity is a limit of infinity; extension has no such limit since it’s a continuum
Intensity is a point of infinity
The Cartesian inertia means something totally passive; that is, nothing will ever change motion by itself, hence all must be acted upon by divine power. But the Leibnizian inertia means resistance against motion, or mass.
Reason is just the ground, it is that which supports the thing and shows the thing, but is itself not to be manifest, as a cause is. It is just the thing itself shown in its expanse. It’s a logos that shows the thing in relation to others, proportion. It is also not determinate, but that which determines.
The reason doesn’t need a self-reason; reason is without why and is the thing itself. It’s the ground that suppresses itself.
Efficient cause: otherness; final cause: selfhood
Body and soul: convergence of parallels
Identity is truth: but there’s always difference in things; how does abstraction play into this?
Communicating the ideal substances with the natural monads: most important
Bodies are organized through space-time; but are all monads organized through space-time?
Abstraction, matter, body, unity by aggregates; individual substances, ideal substances
Unfolding is an actualization starting from a presupposed existence, a growth in expression
Nor is the predicate the same as the subject unless it is considered concretely
Situational space and time
Substantial unities aren’t really parts but foundations of phenomena
The difference between real and ideal is always less than any given amount that can be specified
Passiveness, predication, abstraction, compossibility, and ideation are the same thing
auto-inclusion: prime numbers in prime numbers; reciprocal inclusion: products of prime numbers in prime numbers as parts and wholes; non-reciprocal inclusion: arbitrary series of products of prime numbers in prime numbers as fields and requisites, and prime numbers over the limiting variation of any series as a rule and principle, and here we encounter a problem of finite and relative intelligence, experiments and variation to determine differences and principles; non-localizable inclusion: infinity as the end result of an infinite series in prime numbers as world and monad’s perspective, reason of the world (infinity) as exterior to the series starting from one prime number as opposed to the other
What series are more perfect and better and are hence realized; series that do not contain inherent contradictions yet are not real; due to a principle of excellence, which is a necessity for God, but our finite intelligence cannot analyze notions of actual things back to primary truth of goodness, nor to derive from primary goodness any particular series
Book of history of world. Page number. Universal calculus
Apollo. Athene.
Infinity tolerates selections of possibilities and series — on freedom.
Being turned into predicates for a subject turns the subject (substantial form) into an infinite series of predicates, a substance; a substance is that infinite series for which a subject can be posited, matter is that abstraction of the series once a subject is thus posited, substantial form is the posited subject
abstraction, rule of phenomena, and ideality
in abstraction we follow the ideal order in which the whole is prior and more actual, but in reality we follow the real order in which the part is prior to the whole since the part is the real unity or individual substance
Infinities converge in time or space; a world to come and a world of depth
For strictly speaking motion and time never really exist since there’s no whole of parts; what is there is therefore only (qualitative?) change of a force of striving, a battle between expressions.
force is something absolutely real in substances while space time motion are beings of reason and are true or real not per se but only to the extent that they involve either the divine attributes or the force in created substances
primary matter is not an aggregate of substances, but something incomplete; only secondary matter or mass is an aggregate of substances
incomplete is the passive without the active, or the active without the passive
death is nothing but the contraction of an animal, as generation is nothing but its unfolding.
Sense, imagination, understanding; perception, common mathematics, I. Matter doesn’t carry in itself its own reason to exist.
Force is unexplainable by simple maths.
Perception is also unexplainable by material science, even maths.
Every time the circumstances taken together tip the balance of deliberation more in one side than on the other it’s certain and infallible that the former side will be chosen.
Circumstances include passions and reasons alike.
The universe has no center and its parts are always varied.
Relations of harmony are that which are capable of marking the location of incorporeal things with respect to each other; but the presence of incorporeal things is to be distinguished from such harmony.
Presence obscures the union and vice versa among material things; something analogous happens in immaterial things; yet we can account for material things and their union and relations through explicating the phenomenon, by mechanics; but we can’t do this for immaterial things for we are finite.
It’s obscure because these things are in a sense both absolute, harmony and unity, metaphysically.
Most important correspondence: letters to Des Bosses
Either body is but phenomenon, or it is a substance. If the latter, the monads happen to come together into one substance by the principle of best possible, and one monad is dominating and active, all activities make up the union, while all passivities make up the primary matter. But if such chains of composition have an end, they end up in finite abstractions and are merely phenomena. Corporeal substance is a making real of the phenomena over and above their agreement.
If such substantial chain ceases, it means there’s no infinity held in one union of the chained reality, but only separate series posited alongside each other, hence an abstraction; since monads don’t compose body, only the one real infinity, or singularity, makes a substance, this singularity is indispensable for union.
The added-on order of monads, the ultimate world monad, the relations of all monads making up the world monad. There are such things as aggregated accidents or aggregated essences, yet these aren’t substances. Substance is that of which all attributes are modifications of the substance itself. Strange. Seems not the same as other definitions.
The substantial chain is naturally not essentially a chain; it requires monads but it doesn’t involve them essentially, since it can exist without monads and monads without it.
Composite substances therefore only come into being or pass away by sense, since the unity persists.
The countable infinities: the finite number of monads essentially make up the composite, so if all parts leave the whole is destroyed, but……infinity is 0, 0 is the subject.
the echo of monads
perceived continuity; real independent continuity; the perceived continuity comes from abstraction and a unified perception, the real continuity comes from one substantial reality independent of the dominating perceiver
what’s added to monads to relate them together is not merely relation or order, since order is between two monads that are totally independent from each other, and order itself is not a substance, but is also in neither monad; there then must be one substance that orders and organizes these monads. If there’s an order between monads, it is in the mind alone; the ordering therefore comes from a unifying substance.
the unity between one unity as opposed to another unity is posited in the unity of another, the unity of an outside perceiver.
monads have to be thought in terms of perception and perceivers, though it’s more convenient if we treat them as if mathematical or metaphysical points?
the “I” is the ultimate substance that orders all other substances, even aggregates, but it orders the totality; what are aggregates are those that don’t have a singularity independent from such perceived totality of the “I”; in other words, “I” is the series that orders all series into one singular series, yet the elements in this series don’t randomly make all kinds of series, but only some of them converge into hierarchies or groups of series, with one organizing series at the top.
the substance and the composite are numerically the same because composite is substance added with other substances.
Though still there’s abstraction, since passivity and primary matter is the ground for continuity.
but since extension have to do with passivity, it is half essential, because all monads have passivity and are able to be abstracted, so extension accompanies all perception and abstraction, since it is abstraction as such, the highest and most universal level of abstraction; yet it is possible that one substance should be supernaturally singled out and thus don’t have to be abstracted, so that all its perception and accidents cease, including matter or extension itself.
if there’s no corporeal substance, the phenomena might still be the same to perception though the underlying and insensible phenomena are changed
“notwithstanding my infinitesimal calculus I don’t admit any real infinite number, even though I confess that the multitude of things surpasses any finite number, or rather any number”
Processes of convergence; ultimately distinct infinities; if infinities were actual, there would be no distinction among things whatsoever, since all would be the same number, the same infinity. Potential infinity has the possibility of finding a term that differentiates, since it proscribes a series, whereas an actual infinity a simple number.
Perfection is intelligibility and order and affirmation.
Natural theology is metaphysics, which is the art of invention in general, which we can find traces of in mathematics.
The universal characteristic should also be able to show probabilities.
Aristotle on his head: limit is only a mode, the substance is that which is limited.
Matter is repetition of passivity; derivative force is that which is actualized as actions or strivings or endeavors to action and motion; primitive force is the entelechy as such that is the origin of such action and motion; rest is always but a special case of motion.
Physics, geometry, arithmetics, dynamics, metaphysics: bodies(confused expression), shapes(repetitive expression/inflection), definite unities(inclusive expression/inclusion), substances(singular expression), God(ultimate expression).
Leibniz deviates from Spinoza, that substance is not that which is independent of everything, but that which includes everything. Since independence might come from abstraction.
Space is a diffusion of locality or situation or place, and a place is attributed to a thing as the situation it is in with respect to other things.
If body were considered merely as extension, it’s merely mass and repetition and aggregate; but if it were considered to have action and not merely passivity, it’s living and ensouled by a unity, which makes it a corporeal substance.
Leibniz therefore deviates from Descartes’ proof for mind and body duality; Descartes takes body to be only extension and mind has modifications different from modifications of extension, therefore they are distinct; yet such foundation is unstable, for this distinction might be breached by Epicureanism, which claims mind to be material. The only unbridgeable distinction for Leibniz is the passivity of matter and the action of soul, so that even if we grant Epicureanism and say that our thinking is but moving matter, such matter is still thoughtfully organized, therefore still distinct from mere matter.
The Cartesian argument that external things can be annihilated without destroying our reality when only the intelligible world is preserved posits that we can have clear and distinct ideas and perfect knowledge of essences, and start from these ideas to deduce derivative modifications; but Leibniz argues this is not the actual process of thinking. Essences cannot always be adequately perceived by human intellect: sometimes an idea entails a hidden contradiction, sometimes an idea expresses infinity that cannot be completely grasped, sometimes an idea itself is related to many other ideas that cannot be untangled. Hence for Leibniz, the idea of pure and unlimited space is not needed if only finite thoughts of space are provided, since we cannot intuit such an idea. The only idea we have of space is “that which can always be added”, not that which is unlimited, nor that which is ultimately limited; hence what we have is a regulative idea of possibility, but not an idea of active reality.
Only God can unfold such regulative idea; in the case of space, it’s not that “infinite space” incurs a contradiction, like the idea “greatest space”, but only that it’s impossible to intuit and actualize such idea with finite intelligence. We can only partake of its existence through the actuality of God, though of ourselves we are infinite monads, we are limited from the actual totality, and fail to see that essence which grounds all series. Hence there’s the infinite attribute that grounds all series (the infinite ground, the infinite reason, the infinite origin), and the infinite substance that in/concludes all series (the infinite end, the infinite convergence, the infinite singularity). The particular is infinite for its number of folds included, the universal is infinite for its power to generate; the particular is finite for it’s limited by other infinities and series, the universal is finite for simply being one attribute of infinitely many.
The universals are not like monads, i.e. infinitely singular perspectives limited by other monads, but rather infinitely intense expressions(attributes) of the one infinite intellect. Attributes and ideas like these are not numerically distinct, but belong actively to the one intellect; not until these series go on to infinity do they become numerically distinct singularities.
Singularities limit each other; but all monads are gathered into one world series; this world series delineates the one ultimate substance, which has infinite terms, that make up these infinite monads.
We think about the idea of space for instance only symbolically since our intellect is finite and we have a limited perspective of the world so that we don’t see the totality of series generated by this idea but only the possibility of this idea; that is, we don’t see this idea adequately.
Hence we can’t perceive such things as the infinite content of an abstract idea; but God can, and all ideas (once unfolded) are thereby substances for God.
Symbolic truth stems from the invariance of relationship through substitution; that though we cannot perceive the idea of space the symbol we have of this idea always operates the same way and maintains the same relation to other symbols of ideas.
“But it’s completely alien to every sort of reason that a soul should be an idea. Ideas are purely abstract things, like numbers and shapes, and cannot act. Ideas are abstract and universal: the idea of any animal is a possibility, and it is a mockery to call souls immortal because ideas are eternal, as if the soul of a globe is to be called eternal because the idea of a spherical body is eternal. The soul is not an idea, but the source of innumerable ideas. For, over and above a present idea, the soul has something active, that is, the production of new ideas.”
Leibniz against Spinoza: mind and body are not parallel attributes but rather an ordered hierarchy; moreover, substance is not that which can be conceived alone, nor is essence that without which a thing cannot be conceived, for anything can be conceived by itself but not everything includes a totality of things, and an essence is a possibility, but not an individual that is never distinctly conceived, so that the essence is not the substance itself, and a substance can be without the essence. Spinoza tries to reduce all modes and finite realities to Phantasma of the essential reality, but for Leibniz all essences are merely abstractions, and the distinct knowledge is but a symbolization. So the coincidental reality is irreducible to the ideal and intelligible progression of deduction, but there’s a pregiven infinity of substance that has a different kind of reason; instead of deductive necessity, the prevailing reason of perfection.
“We have a clear idea but not a distinct idea of substance which arises from the fact that we who are substances have an internal sensation of it in ourselves.”
Our soul is like veined marble that has innate disposition and structure.
These innate ideas are potentialities in our soul.
Though some actions always accompany these potencies, but they could be insensible.
“It can even be said that as a result of these tiny perceptions, the present is filled with the future and laden with the past, that everything conspires together.”
“But an abstraction is not an error, provided we know that what we are ignoring is really there…For the more careful we are not to neglect any consideration we can subject to rules, the more closely practice corresponds to theory. But only the supreme reason, which nothing escapes, can distinctly understand the whole infinite, all the reasons and all the consequences.”
Due to disequilibrium and differences of degrees of harmony, matter is sometimes rigid(cohesive) and sometimes fluid.
Souls must have bodies because they have to have the passivity to be changed and unfolded continuously and infinitely.
Bodies are passive powers for unities insofar as matter is always that which is not distinct and not clear and that which is therefore infinite and continuous.
Matter is the continuous infinity grasped by the indivisible unity.
Hence only where there’s matter is law of continuity preserved.
Hence matter is not merely a product of abstraction by finite intellect, but has its own ontological status even in the perspective of God.
Logical genus(finite series)/real genus(matter, infinite series); within real genus, the metaphysical and the physical, whereof one is partook by bodies, the other by shapes of one single body.
“The conception of creatures is not the measure of God’s power, but that their conceptivity or force to conceive is measure of nature’s power.”
Philosophy searches for reason and God provides natural reason for it.
Because continuity can be consequent to infinity alone.
Composite Things are reduced to simple things step by step, and one must not resort to those first things from the start.
Hence gravitation should be explained mechanically, since mechanics is intelligible.
Start from mechanics and principles of mechanics; one then proves that these principles are grounded metaphysically. One shouldn’t jump directly to metaphysical notions to explain physical realities.
The unity of monad is not a force that “organizes” other monads as if intelligently and teleologically, for that will make all other monads necessary to it and hence make itself only an aggregate of monads. Truth is, nothing is simply necessary for the monad. Monads therefore don’t attract other monads as if they need each other, nor do they intelligently design their manifestation. Rather, they are all coincidental organisms.
God is not present to things by situation but by essence.
Space, time, order are not attributes of one body, but situation emergent.
If time were a real independent thing, one would not be able to say why world should be created at this but not that time, and the world hence must be eternal, since it would be created some unassignable time ago; but since time is only the order of things, it don’t matter.
“Before” (without) creation there’s no time.
“God perceives things in himself. Space is the place of things and not the place of God’s ideas.”
Nature is thoroughly, in every part of time and space, dependent on God to be its artisan so that it is much more than an artificial machine.
“A movable finite must therefore make part of another finite, that any change may happen which can be observed.”
A possible origin of the idea of space is that of a trace or mark left by a thing.
So that one sees not a similar relation but the same relation; and such identity of relation is therefore substantiated into an ideal being, which is modeled on the trace left by one thing over another thing.
There is true motion, but not true space or time; for true motion occurs when the cause is present in the thing itself, yet the change thus caused is always relational and relative. For instance, one can say that a body is truly moving while it accelerates due to a force, yet acceleration itself is still a relatively observed phenomenon.
Order and relation have quantities, such as proportion.
Principle of sufficient reason might succeed a priori or a posteriori. So one might be able to reason how one option is better than the other. Or one might simply compare actual results and see how one is better, so one occurs more naturally and more regularly.
To deny the principle of sufficient reason leads eventually to the denial of the principle of contradiction, because one cannot explain why one option should be actualized rather than the other, so A and B can equally be present, hence there’s the potential contradiction, that A and B should equally be actualized, which will lead to a contradiction. Of course one can leave that to chance, but the contradiction is still there, that between “both should be actualized” and “only one is actualized”, for the conclusion that follows from the former is not the same as the latter. Hence we have A equal to non-A, which is absurd.
So that two conclusions follow from the same premise, hence we deduce something that contradicts the other thing deduced, hence contradicting the principle of contradiction.
Infinity is the ground for compossibility since it is a dynamic push away against an impossibility or contradiction.
Two ways to deal with contradictions: 1. two concepts are mutually exclusive, hence by holding one concept to be the principle (circle), the other is opposed and absent (square), this is the so-called impossibility, which is at the level of abstract essences; 2. two concepts are mutually exclusive, hence by having one concept to be the principle, the other is opposed and pushed far beyond into a divergence, which nevertheless pushes itself back from the original repression, divergence nothing but the minimal convergence, and convergence the minimal divergence. This minimal or maximal difference between the series is the spatial-temporal order. So a circle can be reconciled with a square by being at different places or different times.
Hence the Leibnizian Best is not the Platonic Good; the best world is best simply because it is, that it is made of infinitely many principles amid its incompossibles, and always becomes and receives its own negativity; but the Platonic Good is because it can be pre-conceived to be good or even good enough. So that the platonic cosmos is a triumph of the ideal good order over material, but the best is a retrospective explanation of material becoming.
Not the Order as something static and ideal is the best order possible; but the world as we see it has to be something best, simply because it is actual against virtual. So there is an evolution here. Plato takes ideas and impose them onto actuality vertically; Leibniz takes what is actual as opposed from, not the ideal, but the virtual, thus horizontally on a plane. Thus Leibniz starts from the actual and material, from individuals, not from ideas as the ruler of hierarchies.
It’s not true that there are many events, or many perceptions, or many motivations, as if they are all separate among themselves and divisible; rather, every event is inherent in one event and there inherently ordered by “space-time”, like every monad in every monad; hence all actions are strictly voluntary since all involve the whole determination of a soul.
And it’s not that there’s A and there’s B to choose from, but the inclination of A and B are inflectively folded into one, so that it’s A*B that determines, not merely A or B alone.
The damned are a manifestation of the negativity, or non-existence and incompossibilities, against which and toward which the world-series unfolds. It is through the elimination of the damned the world and the elect infinitely progress and improve.
Extensities, inflection; intensities, convergence of series into one series; inclusion, monad, prehension, oneness, totality in unity; ingression, of possibles and essences that are continually actualized in a monad’s world of space and time
Essences are actual as eternal objects or ideas, but have virtual products of individual substances; substances are actual in reality but have virtual folds of series of essences condensed into substances.
Necessity is only with essences and possibles, but there is always coincidence and freedom of God’s will to add some essence to the prior essences, and in such addition also the freedom to add these essences in space-time so as to evade contradiction. In adding congruent essences together, one does not add “circle” to “square”; but God does freely add other essences to the prior essence, like “big”; once added, the new thing has a different congruence, that one cannot add “small” to it; but when these determinations are stretched to infinity, within these infinite series there’s always that potential impossibility showing up, and instead of strict impossibilities, they are now incompossibilities. Namely, previously, it is impossible for a square to be a circle; but now, it is rather when a thing contains in it the notion of square, it is also always infinitely approaching the notion of the circle. And this infinite approach is manifest in the monad’s eventual “encounter” with another monad ordered by its time and space.
So spatialization and temporalization is a consequence of the Infinitization of substances and respective series.
All perceptions are abstractions. Abstractions are not wholes formed out of parts, but forms extracted from contents. They are series overriding micro-series and hence are differential relations, or a unity that relates together two vanishing quantities. Finite monads perceive abstractions, but there are always further down abstractions that confusedly rise out of the material and disturb the clear abstractions. Intelligences improve by relating abstractions together horizontally or extend abstractions downwards vertically even into the microperceptions.
Ideas are abstractions from perceptions, and are themselves perceptions with contents, only the contents are symbolized through words. Yet why indeed do we need bodies and organs?
Actualization in a soul is when confused matter is brought under the clarity of the monad and thereby unfolded; realization of possibles in matter is when a possible or finite essence is connected to the world and added to the infinite series of the world
Ontogenesis of body that belongs to “I”: where does the “ownedness” of body come from? The difference between perceptive organs and other organs, and bodies in general. Bodies in general are generated by a posited “I”, that the perceiver posits monads through mathematization of phenomena. But my perceptive organs are not posited monads, rather ascertained monads: “I” know that my “eye” perceives. The unity of apperception; in relation to other perceivers, my perceptive organs are just phenomena, but my monad nonetheless perceives not only the objectified perceiver, but also the perceptive action itself. My eye perceives my hand, but “I” perceive the hand moving and touching. What is happening here? The eye monad constitutes a visual series, this series includes some series as clear and other series obscure; the hand constitutes another series, in which another realm of clarity and obscurity is opened. Yet these series are perceived by the “I” monad, but not merely as perceptions, but in their very action and process of constitution. That is, for perceptive organs, they are perceived as objects by other series, yet for the “I” monad they are perceived as perceivers, not merely posited perceivers. “I” not only perceive a perceiving thing, I also perceive that very perceiving of the perceiver. That is, I don’t simply see a hand and posit that a hand must perceive, but I am clear on its very perception.
What is unique here? I perceive some things clearly. I see red clearly. But this is a clear abstraction from the obscure infinitesimal vibrations of light. What about this perception of a perceiving? Where comes its clarity? What about the eye that sees itself?
There is a difference between nearness and clarity, then. Perceptive organs are near to “I”, for they compose “I” and are the contents of “I”, and their own contents are relatively clear. Vegetative organs are near to me, since they compose what I am, but they are not unfolded and are obscure. And other bodies can be unfolded, but they are not near to me. The question of course is what is the standard for foldability. Can vegetative organs ever be unfolded and yet be near? It’s possible that vegetative organs can be unfolded under the eye but are not thereby near to eye, though they are near to “I”. Difference between series of inclusion and parallel series. Nearness has to do with how are series included, as requisites or events.
Some monads are so near to me that their activities are my activities; some monads are so clear that their own unfoldings of the series are included in my series as manifest illuminations.
The projection is of myself and my monad and my activity to the passive matter, so as to create organs, which are still posited by me outside me, as far from me. But clear and unfolded.
Can series be pushed away from the “I” monad? Surely things are foldable or unfoldable, but are things distanceable? It seems so, one gouges one’s eyes out in order to look at them. One make organs merely organs, passivities, to understand how bodies’ workings resemble perceptions, how mechanics work, etc.
But you can’t seem to bring something near to you and make of it a perceptive organ. Or can you?
In the interiority of monads, nothing exists separate from the monad and there is no real time or space; it is filled up by everything. It’s only when another monad is posited that there are multiple singularities and distance as such make sense. So that quantities are no longer vanishing and reduced to ethereality, but are substantiated and have their forms that stand them off from other things. They now possess thinghood, and therefore a maximum and minimum of formation.
They now possess contours.
This is because continuity implies unity, and all phenomena are organized around the single unity of “I” and must be totally continuous throughout.
A second pair of eyes are looking at the mirror while I see my two eyes; but this second pair is nothing but the two eyes themselves; they recognize in the mirror their own selves, the series that are the most constitutive requisites of my eyes.
Newton only likes forces and continuity and vanishing things; Leibniz however likes a spiritual order of infinitesimal things, so that unities and monads are always posited accordingly and mitigate the continuity by succession.
Abstraction is such positing of unities; hence perception always entails an abstraction, a positing, and mechanics; that’s why phenomena are understood through figures. But phenomena have the other aspect of being reducible, that they are to be reduced to one singular monad and lose all boundaries, and in that sense they become all fluid evanescences. Newtonian calculus deals with the latter, while Leibniz deals with the former. And Leibniz has spiritual order of perceptions and organs of matter.
In other words, the more phenomenal a thing is, the less distinct it is; the more a thing is distinct, the less it should be phantasmagoric.
Abstract unities are phenomenal, they hold things together, but are only posited unities, and are hence not unfolded and obscure; concrete unities are substances fully unfolded in their minutiae. Therefore, abstract unities are phenomenal and indistinct, but nonetheless are “unities”, though only posited. The more things lose their unities, the more abstract they become. Hence perceptions are always phenomenal, and haunted by obscurities. But when perceptions are organized into unities, they become substantiated. Unity is that which is clear and clearing. This clarity is empty and disturbed by little obscurities of subseries. But this empty clarity can be fulfilled by distinct unfoldings. This is when a perception is truly substantiated, since the unity is not simply a posited unity, but a unity that has necessary relations to other unities and fulfilled.
The emptying (kenosis) of the world: since monad of the object is only posited, this body is stripped of organs and reduced to different differential relations of matter that flow into different media. The monad of the thing is emptied. Everything else becomes simply material for that very monad, and this monad becomes merely a posited unity. But this only obscures the monad, and material is of disturbances to the clarity of the object. The subseries, being obscure, continuously strive to obscure the main series. If this eventually works, and the main series is successfully obscured, the posited unity is eliminated. At the stage of posited unities, we have abstractions and ordered phenomena, or perceptions, and hence mechanics. At the stage of eliminated unity, we have chaos and phenomena reduced to the monad simply. Hence as the monad (substantiated unity) passes to body (posited unity) to matter, things get more and more abstracted from unity, and are finally reduced to the perceiver’s monad, and are thus also passing from adequate intuitions to perceived phenomena to chaos.
Or chaos is death.
But to reduce everything to one singular monad also means to illuminate the monad in its contents. It means to fully unfold everything in the monad. It cannot be disorder simply. It should rather mean fulfillment. The contracted and condensed interiority of a monad depicts phenomena as swarming matter; but that is because the monad reaches its pure interiority through abstraction, but not effective reduction. True reduction comes from infinite linkages and passageways that fulfill the flows and undercurrents of matter, and sees the monad itself everywhere. True reduction is the reflection of the “I”. The reflexive reduction hence is different from abstraction. To enfold is exactly to unfold, and to unfold is to enfold.
That is, one way to reduce is to regard everything under the biggest abstraction: matter. Yet if that abstraction is itself canceled, that is, if the material flows and passageways are liberated and discerned, the reduction stops being an abstraction, but becomes the illumination of one monad through infinite reflection.
A possible world is infinitely clear and unfolded in God, but is not near to him and his world.
To measure far and near, you need certain clarity; to unfold or enfold, you need a given distance.
For our body is perceived and constituted by other monads under different series, but we access these other series because these series are near to us.
A unity can be dispersed by divergent immanent series but can never be wholly destroyed. It’s a matter of degrees. Even the least hooked aggregate of monads moves by instantaneous tendency, the instant itself being a tendency or order into the future.
Central monads, captured monads, escaping monads that are so loosely organized and so divergent that they make their unity easily affected, temporally by changing course of motion, spatially by changing its shape. Though it still exerts elasticity so as to stay in shape and resistance so as to stay in motion.
Derivative forces belong to the body like an abstraction belongs to the whole; body belongs to the primary force as a totality belongs to a concrete unity.
A triplet of measures: compatibility of series (if there’s contradiction and also where and when it might show up), nearness of series (how essential they are as requisites), clarity of series (how terms are unfolded).
1. Spatial temporal individuation. 2. Spatial temporal totalization. 3. Representation.
Abstractions are screens that might suddenly be broken by the infinite series included.
Actualization is for the possible essence to be unfolded in its full capacity; but realization is to again fold this essence into the network of the best possible chain and become envelopes, abstractions, and bodies.
In collision, a body tries to save its unity of movement by changing shape, but also tries to save its shape by changing movement. It is both strivings taken together that are called elasticities. And elasticity is a measure of such combined principle.
Occasionalism is God’s counterpoint (one note related to the other in a makeshift way), while preestablished harmony is God’s harmonics (the triad already put forth).
Sufficient reason is to unfold and clarify an obscurity with things clearer and nearer to us, to the monad. Experiment. The Baconian project. Or deduction. Universal characteristic.
Where for a monad there’s clarity there must also be obscurity, and there must be another monad, for there’s infinity.
Contra Spinoza, whose causality means necessity that follows; Leibniz prefers to treat of grounds, which are layers of grounds of added possibles each of which only “inclines” the addition of follow-up possibles compatible.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
本体不是本体的悖论,因为本体可以被当作谓词,即“本体性的”。
不只是碰撞物体的类比,而是连续的论证:原始力依照每个物体自己的视点,使两个物体发生变化,但它们的视点也相互适应、彼此对应。
没有足够仔细地区分外物与视角、现象;究竟什么相互对应,是每个本体的表征,还是外物?
使那些其存在能允许最多可能者存在的东西存在,也许是在时间中。
相当奇怪的表述:越来越多的现实性;但某些沉睡的部分抵抗着现实性的增殖。
虽然已有许多现实性,新创造的现实性却像种子,等在那里有待唤醒;所以总有尚未实现的可能性。
特殊者,普遍者的印记。
行动与对行动的抵抗;彼此争斗的表达;本体;他异性—可能性。
强度是无限的界限;广延没有这种界限,因为它是连续统。
强度是无限之点。
笛卡尔的惯性意指完全被动的东西,即没有什么会自行改变运动,因此一切都必须由神力作用。但莱布尼茨的惯性意指对运动的抵抗,即质量。
理由就是根据,它支撑物、展示物,但自身不像原因那样要显现。它就是物自身在其展开中的展示。它是把物展示于与他物关系中的逻各斯,是比例。它也不是被规定者,而是规定者。
理由不需要自身的理由;理由没有为什么,就是物自身。它是压下自身的根据。
动力因:他异性;目的因:自身性。
身体与灵魂:平行者的汇聚。
同一性就是真;但物中总有差异,抽象如何参与其中?
沟通理念本体与自然单子,最重要。
物体通过时空组织;但所有单子都通过时空组织吗?
抽象、质料、身体、聚集形成的统一;个体本体、理念本体。
展开是从预设存在出发的现实化,是表达的增长。
除非具体地考察,谓词也不与主词相同。
情境性的空间与时间。
本体统一体不真正是部分,而是现象的基础。
实在与理念之间的差异,总小于任何可以指定的给定量。
被动性、谓述、抽象、共可能性与理念化,是同一回事。
自我包含:素数中的素数;相互包含:作为部分与整体、在素数中的素数乘积;非相互包含:作为场域与必要条件、在素数中的任意素数乘积序列,以及作为规则与原则、居于任意序列的极限变分之上的素数,这里遇到有限相对理智、通过实验与变分确定差异和原则的问题;不可定位的包含:无限作为无穷序列在素数中的最终结果,作为世界与单子的视角,世界的理由(无限)外在于从某个素数而非另一个素数出发的序列。
哪些序列更完满、更好,因而被实现;有些序列不含内在矛盾,却并不实在;这是由于卓越原则,它对神是必然性,但我们的有限理智既不能把现实事物的概念分析回善的原初真理,也不能从原初善推导任何特定序列。
世界历史之书。页码。普全演算。
阿波罗。雅典娜。
无限容许对可能性与序列的拣选,论自由。
成为某个主词的谓词,使主词(本体形式)变成谓词的无穷序列,即本体;本体就是可以为之设定主词的无穷序列,质料是主词被如此设定后对序列所作的抽象,本体形式则是被设定的主词。
抽象、现象的规则与理念性。
抽象中,我们遵循理念秩序,整体在先而且更现实;现实中,我们遵循实在秩序,部分先于整体,因为部分才是真实的统一体或个体本体。
诸无限在时间或空间中汇聚;将来之世界与深度之世界。
严格说,运动与时间从不真正存在,因为没有部分的整体;所以存在的只是努力之力的变化(质的?),表达之间的争斗。
力在本体中是绝对实在的东西,空间、时间、运动则是理性存在者,本身不真也不实在,只在包含神的属性或被造本体的力的程度上才真或实在。
第一质料不是本体的聚集,而是不完整的东西;只有第二质料或物质团块才是本体的聚集。
不完整,就是没有主动者的被动者,或没有被动者的主动者。
死亡无非是动物的收缩,生成无非是它的展开。
感觉、想象、知性;知觉、共同数学、我。质料不在自身中携带其存在理由。
力无法由简单数学解释。
知觉也无法由物质科学、甚至数学解释。
每当诸情境合起来使思虑的天平更偏向一侧而非另一侧,前一侧被选择就是确定而不会落空的。
情境同样包括激情与理由。
宇宙没有中心,其部分总是各不相同。
和谐关系能够标定无形体之物彼此之间的位置;但无形体之物的在场应与这种和谐区分。
在物质事物间,在场遮蔽结合,反之亦然;非物质事物中也发生类似情况。但我们能通过力学、通过阐明现象来说明物质事物及其结合与关系;对非物质事物却做不到,因为我们有限。
晦暗是因为这些东西——和谐与统一——在某种意义上、在形而上学上都绝对。
最重要的通信:致德博斯的书信。
身体要么只是现象,要么是本体。如果是后者,单子依据最佳可能原则偶合为一个本体,一个单子居于支配地位而主动;全部活动构成结合,全部被动性构成第一质料。但若这种复合链条有终点,就止于有限抽象,只是现象。有形本体是在现象的一致之外,使现象成为实在。
若这种本体链条停止,就意味着,被串联的实在没有在一个统一中持有无限,只有分离的序列被并列设定,因此只是抽象;因为单子不组成身体,只有一个真实的无限,即孤异性,才构成本体,所以这种孤异性对结合不可或缺。
加在单子之上的秩序,最终的世界单子,构成世界单子的所有单子关系。确有聚集的偶性或聚集的本质,但它们不是本体。本体是这样一种东西,其所有属性都是本体自身的变状。奇怪,似乎与其他定义不同。
本体链条自然并非本质上就是链条;它需要单子,却不在本质上包含单子,因为它可以没有单子而存在,单子也可以没有它而存在。
复合本体因此只在感觉中生灭,因为统一持续存在。
可数无限:有限数目的单子在本质上组成复合体,所以全部部分离开,整体就毁灭,但……无限是0,0是主体。
单子的回声。
被知觉的连续性;真实独立的连续性。被知觉的连续性来自抽象与统一的知觉,真实连续性来自一个独立于主导知觉者的本体实在。
附加于单子、使它们相联系的东西,不只是关系或秩序,因为秩序在两个完全彼此独立的单子之间,秩序自身不是本体,也不在任一单子中;因此必须有一个本体给这些单子排序、组织它们。如果单子间有秩序,它只在心灵中;排序因此来自统一的本体。
一个统一体与另一个相对的统一体之间的统一,被设定于另一个的统一中,即外部知觉者的统一中。
必须用知觉与知觉者来思考单子,虽然把它们当作数学点或形而上学点更方便?
“我”是为其他所有本体、甚至聚集体排序的最终本体,但它排序的是总体;聚集体是没有独立于“我”所知觉总体的孤异性的东西。换句话说,“我”是把全部序列排序成一个孤异序列的序列,但其中元素并不任意组成各式序列,只有某些会汇聚为层级或序列群,顶端有一个组织性的序列。
本体与复合体在数目上相同,因为复合体就是本体加上其他本体。
但仍有抽象,因为被动性与第一质料是连续性的根据。
广延既与被动性有关,就是半本质的,因为所有单子都有被动性,都可被抽象;因此广延伴随一切知觉与抽象,因为它就是抽象本身,是最高、最普遍层次的抽象。但也可能某个本体以超自然方式被单独取出,不再需要被抽象,于是其全部知觉与偶性停止,包括质料或广延本身。
若没有有形本体,即使底层不可感的现象改变,对知觉而言现象仍可能相同。
“尽管有我的无穷小演算,我并不承认任何真实的无限数,虽然我承认事物的众多超出任何有限数,或者更准确地说,超出任何数。”
汇聚的进程,最终相异的诸无限;如果无限是现实的,事物之间就没有任何区别,因为一切都是同一个数、同一个无限。潜无限有找到区分项的可能,因为它规定一个序列,而实无限则是单纯的数。
完满是可理解性、秩序与肯定。
自然神学是形而上学,即一般的发现技艺,我们可以在数学中找到其踪迹。
普全符号也应能展示概率。
倒过来的亚里士多德:界限只是样态,本体则是被限定者。
质料是被动性的重复;派生力是在行动、努力或朝向行动运动的奋力中现实化者;原始力是隐德莱希本身,是这种行动运动的起源;静止始终只是运动的特例。
物理学、几何学、算术、动力学、形而上学:物体(混杂表达)、形状(重复表达/屈折)、确定统一体(包含性表达/包含)、本体(孤异表达)、神(最终表达)。
莱布尼茨偏离斯宾诺莎:本体不是独立于一切者,而是包含一切者。因为独立性可能来自抽象。
空间是地点、处境或位置的扩散;位置被归于一个物,作为它相对于他物所处的情境。
若身体只被看作广延,它只是物质团块、重复与聚集;但若身体被看作有行动而不只被动,它就是活的,被一个统一体赋魂,使其成为有形本体。
因此莱布尼茨偏离笛卡尔对身心二元的证明。笛卡尔把身体只看作广延,心灵的变状不同于广延的变状,所以二者相异;但基础不稳,因为伊壁鸠鲁主义声称心灵是物质的,可能攻破这一区分。对莱布尼茨,唯一不可跨越的区分是质料的被动性与灵魂的行动。所以即便接受伊壁鸠鲁主义,说思想只是运动的质料,这种质料仍被有思想地组织,因而仍区别于单纯质料。
笛卡尔论证,若只保留可理解世界,外物可被消灭而不毁掉我们的实在性;这设定我们能有清晰分明的观念与对本质的完美知识,并从这些观念出发推导派生变状。但莱布尼茨认为,这不是思想的实际过程。人的知性并不总能恰切地知觉本质:有时观念蕴涵隐藏矛盾,有时表达无法完全把握的无限,有时观念自身与许多其他观念相连而无法解开。因此对莱布尼茨,只要提供了有限的空间思想,就不需要纯粹无限空间的观念,因为我们不能直观这种观念。我们唯一拥有的空间观念是“总可以再加的东西”,不是无限制者,也不是最终有限制者;因此我们拥有的是可能性的调节性理念,不是主动实在的观念。
只有神能展开这种调节性理念。以空间为例,并不是“无限空间”像“最大空间”观念那样导致矛盾,只是有限理智不可能直观并现实化这种观念。我们只能通过神的现实性分有它的存在;虽然自身也是无限单子,却被限制而无法通达现实总体,看不到奠基全部序列的那个本质。因此,有奠基所有序列的无限属性(无限根据、无限理由、无限起源),也有包含并收束所有序列的无限本体(无限终点、无限汇聚、无限孤异性)。特殊者因包含的褶子数目而无限,普遍者因其生成力而无限;特殊者因被其他无限与序列限定而有限,普遍者则因只是无穷多属性中的一个而有限。
普遍者不像单子,即被其他单子限定的无限孤异视角,而是一个无限理智的无限强度的表达(属性)。这样的属性与观念不在数目上相异,而主动属于同一个理智;只有这些序列延续至无限时,它们才成为数目相异的孤异性。
孤异性相互限定,但所有单子聚集为一个世界序列。世界序列勾勒一个最终本体,有无限项,构成这些无限单子。
例如,我们只象征性地思考空间观念,因为理智有限,对世界的视角有限,看不到这个观念生成的序列总体,只看到观念的可能性;即我们没有恰切地看到它。
因此,我们不能知觉抽象观念的无限内容之类的东西;但神可以,所以一切观念一旦展开,对神而言都是本体。
象征真理来自代入中关系的不变:虽然无法知觉空间观念,我们关于该观念的符号总以相同方式运作,与其他观念符号保持同一关系。
“但灵魂竟会是一个观念,这完全有悖于任何理性。观念像数与形状一样,是纯粹抽象之物,不能行动。观念抽象而普遍,任何动物的观念都是可能性;因为观念永恒就称灵魂不朽,是荒唐的,仿佛因为球体的观念永恒,就要称球体的灵魂永恒。灵魂不是观念,而是无数观念的源泉。因为在当前观念之外,灵魂还有主动的东西,即新观念的生产。”
莱布尼茨反对斯宾诺莎:心灵与身体不是平行属性,而是有序层级;而且,本体不是可以单独被构想者,本质也不是缺少它就无法构想某物者,因为任何东西都可单独被构想,但并非一切都包含事物总体;本质是可能性,不是永远无法被分明构想的个体,因此本质不是本体自身,本体可以没有本质。斯宾诺莎试图把所有样态与有限实在还原为本质实在的幻象,但对莱布尼茨,一切本质只是抽象,分明知识只是符号化。因此,偶然实在不可还原为理念的、可理解的演绎进程;本体有一个预先给予的无限,具有另一种理由,不是演绎必然性,而是完满性的占优势理由。
“我们对本体有清晰而非分明的观念,这来自如下事实:我们自身就是本体,在自己之中有对它的内部感觉。”
灵魂像有纹理的大理石,带有天生倾向与结构。
这些天赋观念是灵魂中的潜能。
虽然某些活动总伴随这些潜能,却可能不可感觉。
“甚至可以说,由于这些微知觉,当下充满未来,负载过去,一切共同协作。”
“但只要知道我们忽略的东西真实存在,抽象就不是错误……我们越谨慎,不忽略任何可纳入规则的考虑,实践就越紧密地对应理论。但只有无所遗漏的最高理性,才能分明地理解整个无限、所有理由与所有后果。”
由于失衡及和谐程度的差异,质料有时坚硬(凝聚),有时流动。
灵魂必须有身体,因为它们必须有被动性,才能连续而无限地被改变、被展开。
身体是统一体的被动力量,因为质料总是不分明、不清晰者,因此是无限而连续者。
质料是被不可分的统一体把握的连续无限。
因此,只有有质料之处,连续律才被保留。
因此,质料不只是有限理智抽象的产物,即使在神的视角中,也有自身的本体论地位。
逻辑的属(有限序列)/实在的属(质料,无限序列);实在的属内部,有形而上学的与物理的,前者由物体分有,后者由单一物体的形状分有。
“被造物的构想不是神力的尺度,但其构想能力,即构想的力量,是自然力量的尺度。”
哲学寻找理由,神为它提供自然理由。
因为连续性只能由无限推出。
复合之物逐步还原为简单之物,不能一开始就诉诸那些最初的东西。
因此,重力应以力学解释,因为力学可理解。
从力学与力学原则出发,再证明这些原则在形而上学上得到奠基。不应直接跳到形而上学概念来解释物理实在。
单子的统一不是一股仿佛理智地、目的论地“组织”其他单子的力,因为那会使其他一切单子都成为它的必要条件,从而使它自己只是单子的聚集体。事实上,没有什么对单子是单纯必需的。因此,单子不仿佛彼此需要那样吸引他者,也不理智地设计自身显现;它们全是偶合的有机体。
神不依位置向物在场,而依本质。
空间、时间、秩序不是一个物体的属性,而是涌现的情境。
若时间是真实独立的东西,就无法说出为什么世界应在此时而非彼时被创造;世界因此必须永恒,因为它会是在某个无法指定的过去时刻被创造。但时间既只是事物的秩序,就无所谓。
创造“之前”(没有创造),没有时间。
“神在自身之中知觉事物。空间是事物的位置,不是神的观念的位置。”
自然彻底地、在时空每一部分中,都依赖神作其工匠,因此远超过人造机器。
“一个可动的有限者因此必须是另一个有限者的部分,才会发生任何可被观察的变化。”
空间观念的一个可能起源,是物留下的踪迹或印记。
于是,人看到的不是相似关系,而是同一关系;这种关系同一性便被本体化为理念存在者,以一个物在另一个物上留下的踪迹为模型。
有真正运动,却没有真正空间或时间;因为当原因在物自身中在场时,真正运动发生,但由此导致的变化始终关系性而相对。比如,可以说物体因受力而加速时确实在运动,但加速本身仍是相对观察到的现象。
秩序与关系有量,例如比例。
充足理由原则可以先天或后天地奏效。人可能推论出一个选项为何优于另一个,也可能只是比较实际结果,看到一个更好,所以它更自然、更有规则地发生。
否定充足理由原则,最终导致否定矛盾原则,因为无法解释为什么一个选项而非另一个应被现实化,于是A与B可以同样在场,便有潜在矛盾:A与B都应现实化,这将导致矛盾。当然可以交给偶然,但矛盾仍在,即“两者都应现实化”与“只有一个现实化”之间的矛盾,因为从前者推出的结论不同于后者。因此得到A等于非A,荒谬。
于是同一前提推出两个结论,所推导之物与另一个推导之物矛盾,因而违背矛盾原则。
无限是共可能性的根据,因为它是对不可能或矛盾的动态推离。
处理矛盾有两种方式:1.两个概念互斥,因此以一个概念为原则(圆),另一个被对立并缺席(方),这就是所谓不可能性,处于抽象本质层次;2.两个概念互斥,因此以一个为原则,另一个被对立并推至遥远的发散中,但它仍从最初的压抑中反推回来;发散无非最小的收敛,收敛无非最小的发散。序列之间这种最小或最大的差异,就是时空秩序。所以圆与方可以通过处于不同时地而调和。
因此,莱布尼茨的最佳不是柏拉图的善。最佳世界之所以最佳,只因为它存在,因为它在诸不共可能者之中由无限原则构成,总在生成并接受自身的否定性;柏拉图的善则因为它可以被预先构想为善,甚至足够善。所以,柏拉图的宇宙是理念的善秩序对质料的胜利,最佳则是对质料生成的回溯解释。
不是作为静态理念之物的秩序,是最佳可能秩序;而是我们所见的世界必须最佳,只因为它是与潜在(virtual)相对的现实。所以这里有一种演化。柏拉图取理念,垂直施加于现实;莱布尼茨取现实,使之与潜在而非理念相对,因而水平地在平面上展开。所以莱布尼茨从现实与质料、从个体出发,不从作为层级统治者的理念出发。
并不是有许多事件、许多知觉或许多动机,仿佛它们彼此分离且可分;相反,每个事件内在于一个事件,并在其中由“时空”内在排序,就像每个单子在每个单子中。因此,所有行动严格说都是自愿的,因为都包含一个灵魂的全部规定。
而且并不是有A和B供选择,而是A与B的倾向屈折地折成一个,所以起决定作用的是A*B,不只是A或B。
被诅咒者是否定性、非存在与不共可能性的显现,世界序列抵抗它、朝向它而展开。通过消除被诅咒者,世界与被选者无限进步、改善。
广延量,屈折;强度,诸序列汇聚成一个序列;包含,单子,预相,一性,统一中的总体;进入(ingression),诸可能者与本质不断在单子的时空世界中现实化。
本质作为永物或理念是现实的,却有个体本体的潜在产物;本体在实在中现实,却有凝聚其中的本质序列的潜在褶子。
必然性只关乎本质与可能者,但神意总有偶然与自由,给先前诸本质增添某个本质;这种增添也有在时空中添加这些本质以回避矛盾的自由。把相合本质加在一起时,不把“圆”加到“方”上;但神确实自由地为先前本质添加其他本质,如“大”。一旦加入,新物具有不同的相合性,不能再添“小”;但这些规定延伸至无限时,无穷序列中总有潜在不可能性出现,它们现在不再是严格的不可能性,而是不共可能性。即先前方不可能为圆;现在则是,某物只要包含方的概念,也总无限接近圆的概念。这无限接近显现于该单子最终“遭遇”另一个由其时空排序的单子。
所以空间化与时间化,是本体及其各自序列无限化的后果。
一切知觉都是抽象。抽象不是由部分形成的整体,而是从内容中提取的形式。它们是凌驾于微序列的序列,因此是微分关系,即把两个消失量联系起来的统一体。有限单子知觉抽象,但总有更下层的抽象,混杂地从质料升起,扰动清晰抽象。理智通过水平地联系抽象,或垂直向下把抽象扩展到微知觉中而改善。
观念是从知觉中抽取的抽象,自身也是有内容的知觉,只是内容通过词语符号化。但我们究竟为什么需要身体与器官?
灵魂中的现实化(actualization),是混杂质料被纳入单子的清晰性并由此展开;可能者在质料中的实在化(realization),则是一个可能者或有限本质被连接到世界,加入世界的无穷序列。
属于“我”的身体的个体发生:身体的“属己性”从哪里来?知觉器官、其他器官与一般身体之间的区别。一般身体由被设定的“我”生成,知觉者通过现象的数学化来设定单子。但我的知觉器官不是被设定的单子,而是被确证的单子:“我”知道“眼睛”知觉。统觉的统一;相对于其他知觉者,我的知觉器官只是现象,但我的单子不仅知觉被对象化的知觉者,也知觉知觉行动本身。眼睛知觉手,但“我”知觉手在运动、触摸。这里发生什么?眼单子构成视觉序列,某些序列在其中清晰,其他晦暗;手构成另一序列,其中打开另一个清晰与晦暗的领域。但“我”单子知觉这些序列,不仅把它们作为知觉,也在它们构成的行动与过程自身中知觉它们。即知觉器官被其他序列作为对象知觉,但对“我”单子,它们作为知觉者被知觉,不只是被设定的知觉者。“我”不仅知觉一个知觉着的物,也知觉这知觉者的知觉本身。即我不只是看到一只手,再设定手必然知觉,而是对它的知觉本身清楚明了。
这里有什么独特之处?我清晰地知觉某些东西,清晰地看到红。但这是从光的晦暗无穷小振动中得到的清晰抽象。那么,对知觉的这个知觉呢?其清晰性从何而来?看见自己的眼睛又如何?
因此,亲近与清晰有区别。知觉器官靠近“我”,因为它们构成“我”,是“我”的内容,其自身内容也相对清晰。营养器官靠近我,因为它们构成我的所是,但未展开,晦暗。其他身体可以展开,却不靠近我。当然,问题是可折叠性的标准是什么。营养器官能否展开而仍亲近?可能营养器官在眼睛下展开,却不因此靠近眼睛,虽然靠近“我”。包含序列与平行序列的区别。亲近性关乎序列如何作为必要条件或事件被包含。
有些单子如此亲近,其活动就是我的活动;有些单子如此清晰,其自身对序列的展开作为明示的照亮被包含于我的序列。
投射是把我自身、我的单子、我的活动投向被动质料,以创造器官;这些器官仍由我设定在我之外,远离我,但清晰且展开。
序列能否被从“我”单子推远?当然,物可以折叠或展开,但物能否被拉开距离?似乎可以:人挖出眼睛以便看它们,把器官变成仅仅是器官、被动性,以理解身体运作如何类似知觉、力学如何运作,等等。
但似乎不能把某物拉近,变成知觉器官。或者可以?
在单子内部,没有东西与单子分离而存在,没有真实时空,它被一切填满。只有另一个单子被设定时,才有多个孤异性,距离本身才有意义。于是量不再消失、不再还原为虚渺,而被本体化,具有使自身与他物分立的形式。它们现在拥有物性,因此有成形的最大与最小值。
它们现在有轮廓。
因为连续性意味着统一,一切现象围绕“我”的单一统一体组织,必须全程完全连续。
当我看自己的双眼时,有第二双眼睛在看镜子;但第二双无非就是这双眼睛自身,它们在镜中认出自己,认出那些作为眼睛最具构成性的必要条件的序列。
牛顿只喜欢力、连续性与消失之物;莱布尼茨却喜欢无穷小事物的精神秩序,因此统一体与单子总被相应设定,并以相继缓和连续性。
抽象就是这种统一体的设定;因此知觉总蕴涵抽象、设定与力学,所以通过图形理解现象。但现象还有可还原的另一面:它们要被还原到一个孤异单子,失去全部边界,在此意义上成为流动的消逝。牛顿演算处理后者,莱布尼茨处理前者。而莱布尼茨有知觉与质料器官的精神秩序。
换句话说,一个物越现象化,就越不分明;越分明,就越不应是幻景般的。
抽象统一体是现象性的,把物保持在一起,但只是被设定的统一体,因而未展开、晦暗;具体统一体是在细微处完全展开的本体。因此,抽象统一体现象性而不分明,却仍是“统一体”,哪怕只是设定的。物越丧失统一,就越抽象。因此,知觉总是现象性的,被晦暗萦绕。但知觉被组织成统一体时,就被本体化。统一体是清晰且澄清者。这种清晰性空洞,被子序列的微小晦暗扰动;但空洞清晰性可以由分明展开充实。这时知觉才真正本体化,因为统一体不再只是被设定的统一,而是与其他统一体有必然关系、得到充实的统一体。
世界的虚己(kenosis):对象单子只是被设定的,所以这个身体被剥去器官,还原为质料的不同微分关系,流入不同媒介。物的单子被倒空。其他一切只成为该单子的材料,这个单子成为仅仅被设定的统一体。但这只使单子晦暗,材料扰动对象的清晰性。子序列晦暗,因而不断努力使主序列晦暗。若最终奏效,主序列成功被遮蔽,被设定的统一体就被消除。在被设定统一体的阶段,有抽象与有序现象,即知觉,因而有力学;在统一体被消除的阶段,有混沌与单纯还原到单子的现象。因此,从单子(本体化统一体)过渡到身体(被设定统一体),再到质料,物越来越脱离统一而被抽象,最终还原到知觉者的单子,也就从恰切直观过渡到被知觉现象,再到混沌。
或者,混沌就是死亡。
但把一切还原到一个孤异单子,也意味着在内容中照亮单子,意味着完全展开单子中的一切。这不可能只是无序,更应意味着充实。单子收缩凝聚的内在性把现象描绘成蜂拥的质料,但这是因为单子通过抽象而非有效还原抵达纯内在性。真正还原来自无限连接与通道,充实质料的流与潜流,处处看见单子自身。真正还原是“我”的反思。所以,反思还原不同于抽象。折入恰好就是展开,展开就是折入。
即一种还原方式是以最大抽象——质料——看待一切。但如果这个抽象自身被取消,即质料的流与通道得到解放、辨明,还原就不再是抽象,而成为通过无限反思对一个单子的照亮。
可能世界在神中无限清晰、充分展开,却不亲近祂及祂的世界。
衡量远近,需要一定清晰性;展开或折入,需要给定距离。
因为身体被其他单子在不同序列下知觉构成,但我们能够通达这些其他序列,是因为它们亲近我们。
统一体可被发散的内在序列驱散,却永不能完全毁灭。这是程度问题。即使联系最松的单子聚集体,也凭瞬间倾向运动,而瞬间自身就是通向未来的倾向或秩序。
中心单子、被捕获的单子、逃逸的单子,组织如此松散、如此发散,使统一体容易受影响:时间上改变运动路径,空间上改变形状。但仍施展弹性以保持形状,施展抵抗以保持运动。
派生力属于身体,如抽象属于整体;身体属于原始力,如总体属于具体统一体。
三项尺度:序列的相容性(是否矛盾,以及矛盾可能何时何地出现)、序列的亲近性(作为必要条件有多本质)、序列的清晰性(各项如何展开)。
1.时空个体化。2.时空总体化。3.表征。
抽象是可能突然被其包含的无穷序列冲破的屏幕。
现实化是可能本质以全部能力展开;实在化则是把这个本质重新折入最佳可能链条的网络,成为包裹、抽象与身体。
碰撞中,身体试图通过变形保存运动统一,也试图通过改变运动保存形状。两种努力合起来称为弹性,弹性是这种结合原则的尺度。
偶因论是神的对位(一个音符临时地与另一个关联),前定和谐是神的和声(三和弦已然给出)。
充足理由,是用对我们、对单子而言更清晰、更亲近的东西,展开澄清某个晦暗者。实验,培根计划;或演绎,普全符号。
对一个单子,只要有清晰,就必有晦暗,也必有另一个单子,因为有无限。
与斯宾诺莎相反,斯宾诺莎的因果性意指随之而来的必然性;莱布尼茨更愿意谈根据,即层层添加的可能者的根据,每个都只使后续相容可能者的增添“趋向”发生。