Gui Ruiyan

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz · 戈特弗里德·威廉·莱布尼茨
Universal characteristic and monadology · 普全符号与单子论

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Universal Characteristic — Reading notes

Reflections · Pages

The paradox of substance being not a substance for substance can be taken as a predicate, namely substantial

Not just an analogy of colliding bodies: continuous argument: primitive forces effect changes on two bodies according to each one’s own point of view, yet their points of view also accommodate each other and correspond

Not careful enough to distinguish external things from perspectives and phenomena; what exactly correspond; representations from each substance or external things?

To make exist those whose existences allow the maximum number of possibles to exist (perhaps in time)

A rather weird formulation: more and more realities; but some parts asleep resist this multiplying reality

Though a lot of realities are there, the newly created realities are like seeds there waiting to be awakened; hence always some possibilities are there not yet realized

Particular; imprint of the universal

Action and resistance to action; expressions striving against each other; substances; otherness-possibility

Intensity is a limit of infinity; extension has no such limit since it’s a continuum

Intensity is a point of infinity

The Cartesian inertia means something totally passive; that is, nothing will ever change motion by itself, hence all must be acted upon by divine power. But the Leibnizian inertia means resistance against motion, or mass.

Reason is just the ground, it is that which supports the thing and shows the thing, but is itself not to be manifest, as a cause is. It is just the thing itself shown in its expanse. It’s a logos that shows the thing in relation to others, proportion. It is also not determinate, but that which determines.

The reason doesn’t need a self-reason; reason is without why and is the thing itself. It’s the ground that suppresses itself.

Efficient cause: otherness; final cause: selfhood

Body and soul: convergence of parallels

Identity is truth: but there’s always difference in things; how does abstraction play into this?

Communicating the ideal substances with the natural monads: most important

Bodies are organized through space-time; but are all monads organized through space-time?

Abstraction, matter, body, unity by aggregates; individual substances, ideal substances

Unfolding is an actualization starting from a presupposed existence, a growth in expression

Nor is the predicate the same as the subject unless it is considered concretely

Situational space and time

Substantial unities aren’t really parts but foundations of phenomena

The difference between real and ideal is always less than any given amount that can be specified

Passiveness, predication, abstraction, compossibility, and ideation are the same thing

auto-inclusion: prime numbers in prime numbers; reciprocal inclusion: products of prime numbers in prime numbers as parts and wholes; non-reciprocal inclusion: arbitrary series of products of prime numbers in prime numbers as fields and requisites, and prime numbers over the limiting variation of any series as a rule and principle, and here we encounter a problem of finite and relative intelligence, experiments and variation to determine differences and principles; non-localizable inclusion: infinity as the end result of an infinite series in prime numbers as world and monad’s perspective, reason of the world (infinity) as exterior to the series starting from one prime number as opposed to the other

What series are more perfect and better and are hence realized; series that do not contain inherent contradictions yet are not real; due to a principle of excellence, which is a necessity for God, but our finite intelligence cannot analyze notions of actual things back to primary truth of goodness, nor to derive from primary goodness any particular series

Book of history of world. Page number. Universal calculus

Apollo. Athene.

Infinity tolerates selections of possibilities and series — on freedom.

Being turned into predicates for a subject turns the subject (substantial form) into an infinite series of predicates, a substance; a substance is that infinite series for which a subject can be posited, matter is that abstraction of the series once a subject is thus posited, substantial form is the posited subject

abstraction, rule of phenomena, and ideality

in abstraction we follow the ideal order in which the whole is prior and more actual, but in reality we follow the real order in which the part is prior to the whole since the part is the real unity or individual substance

Infinities converge in time or space; a world to come and a world of depth

For strictly speaking motion and time never really exist since there’s no whole of parts; what is there is therefore only (qualitative?) change of a force of striving, a battle between expressions.

force is something absolutely real in substances while space time motion are beings of reason and are true or real not per se but only to the extent that they involve either the divine attributes or the force in created substances

primary matter is not an aggregate of substances, but something incomplete; only secondary matter or mass is an aggregate of substances

incomplete is the passive without the active, or the active without the passive

death is nothing but the contraction of an animal, as generation is nothing but its unfolding.

Sense, imagination, understanding; perception, common mathematics, I. Matter doesn’t carry in itself its own reason to exist.

Force is unexplainable by simple maths.

Perception is also unexplainable by material science, even maths.

Every time the circumstances taken together tip the balance of deliberation more in one side than on the other it’s certain and infallible that the former side will be chosen.

Circumstances include passions and reasons alike.

The universe has no center and its parts are always varied.

Relations of harmony are that which are capable of marking the location of incorporeal things with respect to each other; but the presence of incorporeal things is to be distinguished from such harmony.

Presence obscures the union and vice versa among material things; something analogous happens in immaterial things; yet we can account for material things and their union and relations through explicating the phenomenon, by mechanics; but we can’t do this for immaterial things for we are finite.

It’s obscure because these things are in a sense both absolute, harmony and unity, metaphysically.

Most important correspondence: letters to Des Bosses

Either body is but phenomenon, or it is a substance. If the latter, the monads happen to come together into one substance by the principle of best possible, and one monad is dominating and active, all activities make up the union, while all passivities make up the primary matter. But if such chains of composition have an end, they end up in finite abstractions and are merely phenomena. Corporeal substance is a making real of the phenomena over and above their agreement.

If such substantial chain ceases, it means there’s no infinity held in one union of the chained reality, but only separate series posited alongside each other, hence an abstraction; since monads don’t compose body, only the one real infinity, or singularity, makes a substance, this singularity is indispensable for union.

The added-on order of monads, the ultimate world monad, the relations of all monads making up the world monad. There are such things as aggregated accidents or aggregated essences, yet these aren’t substances. Substance is that of which all attributes are modifications of the substance itself. Strange. Seems not the same as other definitions.

The substantial chain is naturally not essentially a chain; it requires monads but it doesn’t involve them essentially, since it can exist without monads and monads without it.

Composite substances therefore only come into being or pass away by sense, since the unity persists.

The countable infinities: the finite number of monads essentially make up the composite, so if all parts leave the whole is destroyed, but……infinity is 0, 0 is the subject.

the echo of monads

perceived continuity; real independent continuity; the perceived continuity comes from abstraction and a unified perception, the real continuity comes from one substantial reality independent of the dominating perceiver

what’s added to monads to relate them together is not merely relation or order, since order is between two monads that are totally independent from each other, and order itself is not a substance, but is also in neither monad; there then must be one substance that orders and organizes these monads. If there’s an order between monads, it is in the mind alone; the ordering therefore comes from a unifying substance.

the unity between one unity as opposed to another unity is posited in the unity of another, the unity of an outside perceiver.

monads have to be thought in terms of perception and perceivers, though it’s more convenient if we treat them as if mathematical or metaphysical points?

the “I” is the ultimate substance that orders all other substances, even aggregates, but it orders the totality; what are aggregates are those that don’t have a singularity independent from such perceived totality of the “I”; in other words, “I” is the series that orders all series into one singular series, yet the elements in this series don’t randomly make all kinds of series, but only some of them converge into hierarchies or groups of series, with one organizing series at the top.

the substance and the composite are numerically the same because composite is substance added with other substances.

Though still there’s abstraction, since passivity and primary matter is the ground for continuity.

but since extension have to do with passivity, it is half essential, because all monads have passivity and are able to be abstracted, so extension accompanies all perception and abstraction, since it is abstraction as such, the highest and most universal level of abstraction; yet it is possible that one substance should be supernaturally singled out and thus don’t have to be abstracted, so that all its perception and accidents cease, including matter or extension itself.

if there’s no corporeal substance, the phenomena might still be the same to perception though the underlying and insensible phenomena are changed

“notwithstanding my infinitesimal calculus I don’t admit any real infinite number, even though I confess that the multitude of things surpasses any finite number, or rather any number”

Processes of convergence; ultimately distinct infinities; if infinities were actual, there would be no distinction among things whatsoever, since all would be the same number, the same infinity. Potential infinity has the possibility of finding a term that differentiates, since it proscribes a series, whereas an actual infinity a simple number.

Perfection is intelligibility and order and affirmation.

Natural theology is metaphysics, which is the art of invention in general, which we can find traces of in mathematics.

The universal characteristic should also be able to show probabilities.

Aristotle on his head: limit is only a mode, the substance is that which is limited.

Matter is repetition of passivity; derivative force is that which is actualized as actions or strivings or endeavors to action and motion; primitive force is the entelechy as such that is the origin of such action and motion; rest is always but a special case of motion.

Physics, geometry, arithmetics, dynamics, metaphysics: bodies(confused expression), shapes(repetitive expression/inflection), definite unities(inclusive expression/inclusion), substances(singular expression), God(ultimate expression).

Leibniz deviates from Spinoza, that substance is not that which is independent of everything, but that which includes everything. Since independence might come from abstraction.

Space is a diffusion of locality or situation or place, and a place is attributed to a thing as the situation it is in with respect to other things.

If body were considered merely as extension, it’s merely mass and repetition and aggregate; but if it were considered to have action and not merely passivity, it’s living and ensouled by a unity, which makes it a corporeal substance.

Leibniz therefore deviates from Descartes’ proof for mind and body duality; Descartes takes body to be only extension and mind has modifications different from modifications of extension, therefore they are distinct; yet such foundation is unstable, for this distinction might be breached by Epicureanism, which claims mind to be material. The only unbridgeable distinction for Leibniz is the passivity of matter and the action of soul, so that even if we grant Epicureanism and say that our thinking is but moving matter, such matter is still thoughtfully organized, therefore still distinct from mere matter.

The Cartesian argument that external things can be annihilated without destroying our reality when only the intelligible world is preserved posits that we can have clear and distinct ideas and perfect knowledge of essences, and start from these ideas to deduce derivative modifications; but Leibniz argues this is not the actual process of thinking. Essences cannot always be adequately perceived by human intellect: sometimes an idea entails a hidden contradiction, sometimes an idea expresses infinity that cannot be completely grasped, sometimes an idea itself is related to many other ideas that cannot be untangled. Hence for Leibniz, the idea of pure and unlimited space is not needed if only finite thoughts of space are provided, since we cannot intuit such an idea. The only idea we have of space is “that which can always be added”, not that which is unlimited, nor that which is ultimately limited; hence what we have is a regulative idea of possibility, but not an idea of active reality.

Only God can unfold such regulative idea; in the case of space, it’s not that “infinite space” incurs a contradiction, like the idea “greatest space”, but only that it’s impossible to intuit and actualize such idea with finite intelligence. We can only partake of its existence through the actuality of God, though of ourselves we are infinite monads, we are limited from the actual totality, and fail to see that essence which grounds all series. Hence there’s the infinite attribute that grounds all series (the infinite ground, the infinite reason, the infinite origin), and the infinite substance that in/concludes all series (the infinite end, the infinite convergence, the infinite singularity). The particular is infinite for its number of folds included, the universal is infinite for its power to generate; the particular is finite for it’s limited by other infinities and series, the universal is finite for simply being one attribute of infinitely many.

The universals are not like monads, i.e. infinitely singular perspectives limited by other monads, but rather infinitely intense expressions(attributes) of the one infinite intellect. Attributes and ideas like these are not numerically distinct, but belong actively to the one intellect; not until these series go on to infinity do they become numerically distinct singularities.

Singularities limit each other; but all monads are gathered into one world series; this world series delineates the one ultimate substance, which has infinite terms, that make up these infinite monads.

We think about the idea of space for instance only symbolically since our intellect is finite and we have a limited perspective of the world so that we don’t see the totality of series generated by this idea but only the possibility of this idea; that is, we don’t see this idea adequately.

Hence we can’t perceive such things as the infinite content of an abstract idea; but God can, and all ideas (once unfolded) are thereby substances for God.

Symbolic truth stems from the invariance of relationship through substitution; that though we cannot perceive the idea of space the symbol we have of this idea always operates the same way and maintains the same relation to other symbols of ideas.

“But it’s completely alien to every sort of reason that a soul should be an idea. Ideas are purely abstract things, like numbers and shapes, and cannot act. Ideas are abstract and universal: the idea of any animal is a possibility, and it is a mockery to call souls immortal because ideas are eternal, as if the soul of a globe is to be called eternal because the idea of a spherical body is eternal. The soul is not an idea, but the source of innumerable ideas. For, over and above a present idea, the soul has something active, that is, the production of new ideas.”

Leibniz against Spinoza: mind and body are not parallel attributes but rather an ordered hierarchy; moreover, substance is not that which can be conceived alone, nor is essence that without which a thing cannot be conceived, for anything can be conceived by itself but not everything includes a totality of things, and an essence is a possibility, but not an individual that is never distinctly conceived, so that the essence is not the substance itself, and a substance can be without the essence. Spinoza tries to reduce all modes and finite realities to Phantasma of the essential reality, but for Leibniz all essences are merely abstractions, and the distinct knowledge is but a symbolization. So the coincidental reality is irreducible to the ideal and intelligible progression of deduction, but there’s a pregiven infinity of substance that has a different kind of reason; instead of deductive necessity, the prevailing reason of perfection.

“We have a clear idea but not a distinct idea of substance which arises from the fact that we who are substances have an internal sensation of it in ourselves.”

Our soul is like veined marble that has innate disposition and structure.

These innate ideas are potentialities in our soul.

Though some actions always accompany these potencies, but they could be insensible.

“It can even be said that as a result of these tiny perceptions, the present is filled with the future and laden with the past, that everything conspires together.”

“But an abstraction is not an error, provided we know that what we are ignoring is really there…For the more careful we are not to neglect any consideration we can subject to rules, the more closely practice corresponds to theory. But only the supreme reason, which nothing escapes, can distinctly understand the whole infinite, all the reasons and all the consequences.”

Due to disequilibrium and differences of degrees of harmony, matter is sometimes rigid(cohesive) and sometimes fluid.

Souls must have bodies because they have to have the passivity to be changed and unfolded continuously and infinitely.

Bodies are passive powers for unities insofar as matter is always that which is not distinct and not clear and that which is therefore infinite and continuous.

Matter is the continuous infinity grasped by the indivisible unity.

Hence only where there’s matter is law of continuity preserved.

Hence matter is not merely a product of abstraction by finite intellect, but has its own ontological status even in the perspective of God.

Logical genus(finite series)/real genus(matter, infinite series); within real genus, the metaphysical and the physical, whereof one is partook by bodies, the other by shapes of one single body.

“The conception of creatures is not the measure of God’s power, but that their conceptivity or force to conceive is measure of nature’s power.”

Philosophy searches for reason and God provides natural reason for it.

Because continuity can be consequent to infinity alone.

Composite Things are reduced to simple things step by step, and one must not resort to those first things from the start.

Hence gravitation should be explained mechanically, since mechanics is intelligible.

Start from mechanics and principles of mechanics; one then proves that these principles are grounded metaphysically. One shouldn’t jump directly to metaphysical notions to explain physical realities.

The unity of monad is not a force that “organizes” other monads as if intelligently and teleologically, for that will make all other monads necessary to it and hence make itself only an aggregate of monads. Truth is, nothing is simply necessary for the monad. Monads therefore don’t attract other monads as if they need each other, nor do they intelligently design their manifestation. Rather, they are all coincidental organisms.

God is not present to things by situation but by essence.

Space, time, order are not attributes of one body, but situation emergent.

If time were a real independent thing, one would not be able to say why world should be created at this but not that time, and the world hence must be eternal, since it would be created some unassignable time ago; but since time is only the order of things, it don’t matter.

“Before” (without) creation there’s no time.

“God perceives things in himself. Space is the place of things and not the place of God’s ideas.”

Nature is thoroughly, in every part of time and space, dependent on God to be its artisan so that it is much more than an artificial machine.

“A movable finite must therefore make part of another finite, that any change may happen which can be observed.”

A possible origin of the idea of space is that of a trace or mark left by a thing.

So that one sees not a similar relation but the same relation; and such identity of relation is therefore substantiated into an ideal being, which is modeled on the trace left by one thing over another thing.

There is true motion, but not true space or time; for true motion occurs when the cause is present in the thing itself, yet the change thus caused is always relational and relative. For instance, one can say that a body is truly moving while it accelerates due to a force, yet acceleration itself is still a relatively observed phenomenon.

Order and relation have quantities, such as proportion.

Principle of sufficient reason might succeed a priori or a posteriori. So one might be able to reason how one option is better than the other. Or one might simply compare actual results and see how one is better, so one occurs more naturally and more regularly.

To deny the principle of sufficient reason leads eventually to the denial of the principle of contradiction, because one cannot explain why one option should be actualized rather than the other, so A and B can equally be present, hence there’s the potential contradiction, that A and B should equally be actualized, which will lead to a contradiction. Of course one can leave that to chance, but the contradiction is still there, that between “both should be actualized” and “only one is actualized”, for the conclusion that follows from the former is not the same as the latter. Hence we have A equal to non-A, which is absurd.

So that two conclusions follow from the same premise, hence we deduce something that contradicts the other thing deduced, hence contradicting the principle of contradiction.

Infinity is the ground for compossibility since it is a dynamic push away against an impossibility or contradiction.

Two ways to deal with contradictions: 1. two concepts are mutually exclusive, hence by holding one concept to be the principle (circle), the other is opposed and absent (square), this is the so-called impossibility, which is at the level of abstract essences; 2. two concepts are mutually exclusive, hence by having one concept to be the principle, the other is opposed and pushed far beyond into a divergence, which nevertheless pushes itself back from the original repression, divergence nothing but the minimal convergence, and convergence the minimal divergence. This minimal or maximal difference between the series is the spatial-temporal order. So a circle can be reconciled with a square by being at different places or different times.

Hence the Leibnizian Best is not the Platonic Good; the best world is best simply because it is, that it is made of infinitely many principles amid its incompossibles, and always becomes and receives its own negativity; but the Platonic Good is because it can be pre-conceived to be good or even good enough. So that the platonic cosmos is a triumph of the ideal good order over material, but the best is a retrospective explanation of material becoming.

Not the Order as something static and ideal is the best order possible; but the world as we see it has to be something best, simply because it is actual against virtual. So there is an evolution here. Plato takes ideas and impose them onto actuality vertically; Leibniz takes what is actual as opposed from, not the ideal, but the virtual, thus horizontally on a plane. Thus Leibniz starts from the actual and material, from individuals, not from ideas as the ruler of hierarchies.

It’s not true that there are many events, or many perceptions, or many motivations, as if they are all separate among themselves and divisible; rather, every event is inherent in one event and there inherently ordered by “space-time”, like every monad in every monad; hence all actions are strictly voluntary since all involve the whole determination of a soul.

And it’s not that there’s A and there’s B to choose from, but the inclination of A and B are inflectively folded into one, so that it’s A*B that determines, not merely A or B alone.

The damned are a manifestation of the negativity, or non-existence and incompossibilities, against which and toward which the world-series unfolds. It is through the elimination of the damned the world and the elect infinitely progress and improve.

Extensities, inflection; intensities, convergence of series into one series; inclusion, monad, prehension, oneness, totality in unity; ingression, of possibles and essences that are continually actualized in a monad’s world of space and time

Essences are actual as eternal objects or ideas, but have virtual products of individual substances; substances are actual in reality but have virtual folds of series of essences condensed into substances.

Necessity is only with essences and possibles, but there is always coincidence and freedom of God’s will to add some essence to the prior essences, and in such addition also the freedom to add these essences in space-time so as to evade contradiction. In adding congruent essences together, one does not add “circle” to “square”; but God does freely add other essences to the prior essence, like “big”; once added, the new thing has a different congruence, that one cannot add “small” to it; but when these determinations are stretched to infinity, within these infinite series there’s always that potential impossibility showing up, and instead of strict impossibilities, they are now incompossibilities. Namely, previously, it is impossible for a square to be a circle; but now, it is rather when a thing contains in it the notion of square, it is also always infinitely approaching the notion of the circle. And this infinite approach is manifest in the monad’s eventual “encounter” with another monad ordered by its time and space.

So spatialization and temporalization is a consequence of the Infinitization of substances and respective series.

All perceptions are abstractions. Abstractions are not wholes formed out of parts, but forms extracted from contents. They are series overriding micro-series and hence are differential relations, or a unity that relates together two vanishing quantities. Finite monads perceive abstractions, but there are always further down abstractions that confusedly rise out of the material and disturb the clear abstractions. Intelligences improve by relating abstractions together horizontally or extend abstractions downwards vertically even into the microperceptions.

Ideas are abstractions from perceptions, and are themselves perceptions with contents, only the contents are symbolized through words. Yet why indeed do we need bodies and organs?

Actualization in a soul is when confused matter is brought under the clarity of the monad and thereby unfolded; realization of possibles in matter is when a possible or finite essence is connected to the world and added to the infinite series of the world

Ontogenesis of body that belongs to “I”: where does the “ownedness” of body come from? The difference between perceptive organs and other organs, and bodies in general. Bodies in general are generated by a posited “I”, that the perceiver posits monads through mathematization of phenomena. But my perceptive organs are not posited monads, rather ascertained monads: “I” know that my “eye” perceives. The unity of apperception; in relation to other perceivers, my perceptive organs are just phenomena, but my monad nonetheless perceives not only the objectified perceiver, but also the perceptive action itself. My eye perceives my hand, but “I” perceive the hand moving and touching. What is happening here? The eye monad constitutes a visual series, this series includes some series as clear and other series obscure; the hand constitutes another series, in which another realm of clarity and obscurity is opened. Yet these series are perceived by the “I” monad, but not merely as perceptions, but in their very action and process of constitution. That is, for perceptive organs, they are perceived as objects by other series, yet for the “I” monad they are perceived as perceivers, not merely posited perceivers. “I” not only perceive a perceiving thing, I also perceive that very perceiving of the perceiver. That is, I don’t simply see a hand and posit that a hand must perceive, but I am clear on its very perception.

What is unique here? I perceive some things clearly. I see red clearly. But this is a clear abstraction from the obscure infinitesimal vibrations of light. What about this perception of a perceiving? Where comes its clarity? What about the eye that sees itself?

There is a difference between nearness and clarity, then. Perceptive organs are near to “I”, for they compose “I” and are the contents of “I”, and their own contents are relatively clear. Vegetative organs are near to me, since they compose what I am, but they are not unfolded and are obscure. And other bodies can be unfolded, but they are not near to me. The question of course is what is the standard for foldability. Can vegetative organs ever be unfolded and yet be near? It’s possible that vegetative organs can be unfolded under the eye but are not thereby near to eye, though they are near to “I”. Difference between series of inclusion and parallel series. Nearness has to do with how are series included, as requisites or events.

Some monads are so near to me that their activities are my activities; some monads are so clear that their own unfoldings of the series are included in my series as manifest illuminations.

The projection is of myself and my monad and my activity to the passive matter, so as to create organs, which are still posited by me outside me, as far from me. But clear and unfolded.

Can series be pushed away from the “I” monad? Surely things are foldable or unfoldable, but are things distanceable? It seems so, one gouges one’s eyes out in order to look at them. One make organs merely organs, passivities, to understand how bodies’ workings resemble perceptions, how mechanics work, etc.

But you can’t seem to bring something near to you and make of it a perceptive organ. Or can you?

In the interiority of monads, nothing exists separate from the monad and there is no real time or space; it is filled up by everything. It’s only when another monad is posited that there are multiple singularities and distance as such make sense. So that quantities are no longer vanishing and reduced to ethereality, but are substantiated and have their forms that stand them off from other things. They now possess thinghood, and therefore a maximum and minimum of formation.

They now possess contours.

This is because continuity implies unity, and all phenomena are organized around the single unity of “I” and must be totally continuous throughout.

A second pair of eyes are looking at the mirror while I see my two eyes; but this second pair is nothing but the two eyes themselves; they recognize in the mirror their own selves, the series that are the most constitutive requisites of my eyes.

Newton only likes forces and continuity and vanishing things; Leibniz however likes a spiritual order of infinitesimal things, so that unities and monads are always posited accordingly and mitigate the continuity by succession.

Abstraction is such positing of unities; hence perception always entails an abstraction, a positing, and mechanics; that’s why phenomena are understood through figures. But phenomena have the other aspect of being reducible, that they are to be reduced to one singular monad and lose all boundaries, and in that sense they become all fluid evanescences. Newtonian calculus deals with the latter, while Leibniz deals with the former. And Leibniz has spiritual order of perceptions and organs of matter.

In other words, the more phenomenal a thing is, the less distinct it is; the more a thing is distinct, the less it should be phantasmagoric.

Abstract unities are phenomenal, they hold things together, but are only posited unities, and are hence not unfolded and obscure; concrete unities are substances fully unfolded in their minutiae. Therefore, abstract unities are phenomenal and indistinct, but nonetheless are “unities”, though only posited. The more things lose their unities, the more abstract they become. Hence perceptions are always phenomenal, and haunted by obscurities. But when perceptions are organized into unities, they become substantiated. Unity is that which is clear and clearing. This clarity is empty and disturbed by little obscurities of subseries. But this empty clarity can be fulfilled by distinct unfoldings. This is when a perception is truly substantiated, since the unity is not simply a posited unity, but a unity that has necessary relations to other unities and fulfilled.

The emptying (kenosis) of the world: since monad of the object is only posited, this body is stripped of organs and reduced to different differential relations of matter that flow into different media. The monad of the thing is emptied. Everything else becomes simply material for that very monad, and this monad becomes merely a posited unity. But this only obscures the monad, and material is of disturbances to the clarity of the object. The subseries, being obscure, continuously strive to obscure the main series. If this eventually works, and the main series is successfully obscured, the posited unity is eliminated. At the stage of posited unities, we have abstractions and ordered phenomena, or perceptions, and hence mechanics. At the stage of eliminated unity, we have chaos and phenomena reduced to the monad simply. Hence as the monad (substantiated unity) passes to body (posited unity) to matter, things get more and more abstracted from unity, and are finally reduced to the perceiver’s monad, and are thus also passing from adequate intuitions to perceived phenomena to chaos.

Or chaos is death.

But to reduce everything to one singular monad also means to illuminate the monad in its contents. It means to fully unfold everything in the monad. It cannot be disorder simply. It should rather mean fulfillment. The contracted and condensed interiority of a monad depicts phenomena as swarming matter; but that is because the monad reaches its pure interiority through abstraction, but not effective reduction. True reduction comes from infinite linkages and passageways that fulfill the flows and undercurrents of matter, and sees the monad itself everywhere. True reduction is the reflection of the “I”. The reflexive reduction hence is different from abstraction. To enfold is exactly to unfold, and to unfold is to enfold.

That is, one way to reduce is to regard everything under the biggest abstraction: matter. Yet if that abstraction is itself canceled, that is, if the material flows and passageways are liberated and discerned, the reduction stops being an abstraction, but becomes the illumination of one monad through infinite reflection.

A possible world is infinitely clear and unfolded in God, but is not near to him and his world.

To measure far and near, you need certain clarity; to unfold or enfold, you need a given distance.

For our body is perceived and constituted by other monads under different series, but we access these other series because these series are near to us.

A unity can be dispersed by divergent immanent series but can never be wholly destroyed. It’s a matter of degrees. Even the least hooked aggregate of monads moves by instantaneous tendency, the instant itself being a tendency or order into the future.

Central monads, captured monads, escaping monads that are so loosely organized and so divergent that they make their unity easily affected, temporally by changing course of motion, spatially by changing its shape. Though it still exerts elasticity so as to stay in shape and resistance so as to stay in motion.

Derivative forces belong to the body like an abstraction belongs to the whole; body belongs to the primary force as a totality belongs to a concrete unity.

A triplet of measures: compatibility of series (if there’s contradiction and also where and when it might show up), nearness of series (how essential they are as requisites), clarity of series (how terms are unfolded).

1. Spatial temporal individuation. 2. Spatial temporal totalization. 3. Representation.

Abstractions are screens that might suddenly be broken by the infinite series included.

Actualization is for the possible essence to be unfolded in its full capacity; but realization is to again fold this essence into the network of the best possible chain and become envelopes, abstractions, and bodies.

In collision, a body tries to save its unity of movement by changing shape, but also tries to save its shape by changing movement. It is both strivings taken together that are called elasticities. And elasticity is a measure of such combined principle.

Occasionalism is God’s counterpoint (one note related to the other in a makeshift way), while preestablished harmony is God’s harmonics (the triad already put forth).

Sufficient reason is to unfold and clarify an obscurity with things clearer and nearer to us, to the monad. Experiment. The Baconian project. Or deduction. Universal characteristic.

Where for a monad there’s clarity there must also be obscurity, and there must be another monad, for there’s infinity.

Contra Spinoza, whose causality means necessity that follows; Leibniz prefers to treat of grounds, which are layers of grounds of added possibles each of which only “inclines” the addition of follow-up possibles compatible.