John Locke · 约翰·洛克
Natural law · 自然法
Undated 未注日期
自然法——散记
Reflections · Pages
其实洛克和霍布斯最大的区别就是洛克那里的主权者不仅仅只是一个单纯的peace maker,而是真正意义上的自然法的判官。任何基本的人的组织都对保卫自然法有着兴趣,也因此确实会去惩戒那些破坏自然法的人。这是建立在自然法本身已经有效力,而不只是摆设的情况下了;只有自然法有效力,才会被人当一回事儿,但同样只有被人当一回事儿,自然法才会获得其效力。这是洛克的逻辑闭环,和霍布斯那里的相反的逻辑闭环相映成趣:只有利维坦有效力,利维坦才被承认;只有利维坦被承认,利维坦才有效力。
写了一白板的demonstration来考察洛克对传统自然法的批判……读的时候就一直奇怪为什么要把上帝的智性和目的分开来说,最后发现可怕的地方在这里:“有一种可能的情况,我们知道上帝的目的,但我们不知道上帝是否是理性的”;这就是克苏鲁了……所以洛克最后的疑问就是:“上帝真的对人类是抱有善意的吗?”并且意识到了答案,所以拒斥了这一整个传统自然法的论证过程……
其实反过来也是一样,“上帝有理性,上帝是全能的,因此我们不知道其目的并因此违反自然法受惩戒也在祂的计划中”,那我们也得疑问上帝是不是真的对人类是善意的
所以洛克这里,讨论了两种情况,没有讨论一种情况(无论是不是故意的);第一种,我们只知道上帝有智性,而不知道祂的具体目的,那任何行为都已经被智性的上帝计划好了向祂秘密的目的进发,并且我们对祂具体目的的无知也在祂的计划中,那如果这种情况下还存在自然法,那上帝就是想让一批人下地狱,这自然法就不会是正义的
第二种,我们知道上帝有智性,也知道祂的具体目的,自然法传统上认为这个最可能的目的是“运用理性赞美上帝”;但我们经验当中却会遇到不遵从祂的具体目的的人;因为上帝有智性,所以我们仍然得假设那一批没有履行祂具体目的人是被设计成无法完成的;那上帝就还是想让那一批人下地狱而已,那自然法就不会是正义的
最后一种没有讨论的,就是我们知道上帝的具体目的,却不知道祂有没有智性;那我们就只知道自然法的内容,却不知道这个内容到底是正义的还是邪恶的,是好的还是坏的,是对的还是错的;那自然法就可能是不正义的,只是一个机械,违反了就受惩罚,但却并不是道德的;另外,如果我们不知道上帝有没有智性,那我们就不知道自然法的内容是不是要赞颂上帝,那自然法的内容就从上帝转换为了自然:所以洛克最后讨论并反驳了霍布斯式的自然法起源,一个没有真正道德内容的、纯粹历史性发生的、必然却不正义(有目的却不正义)的自然法理论
所以其实这最后还是一个一多互摄的问题,是一个知识本身如何可能的问题……传统的自然法理论没有办法解释从一(全知全能完全理性绝对可理解的上帝)到多(祂意图的多样可能性)的过渡,先限定了一个本该是无限的绝对者(限定一个一切都可以包容的绝对者使祂表达某个确定的目的),然后发现这个绝对者意志的多与祂存在的一的矛盾,而事实上当绝对者具有意志的时候就已经不再是一了,当祂说出“我意愿……”的时候祂就已经匮乏了;而霍布斯式的自然法理论则无法从多(各经验物体的作用)过渡到一(自然法的奠基),否认了上帝存在就没有办法确定哪个时刻是自然状态(我认为与卢梭不同,霍布斯确实认为自然状态是现实存在的),自然状态如何过渡到公民社会,公民社会为什么不会重新堕落回自然状态,如果不接受自然状态的自我保存目的论(eg自杀)怎么办这些问题都无法被解决,因为他拒绝了绝对者而试图在历史的多中选一个有限的境遇认作无限的一。而智性和其目的的割裂其实就是一和作为其表达的多的割裂……
施论洛克自然法(其实我没看太懂)
洛克对传统的自然法抱有疑虑,因为他认为传统的对自然法的知识是由三个前提奠基的:1.对造物者存在的知识;2.对造物者意图的知识;3.对灵魂不朽的知识。因为造物者存在,所以被造物都是根据一定的法则行动的,包括人类;法则的具体内容可以通过对造物者意图的知识而确定,通过对自然的审视可得一切事物都有其存在目的,因此造物者是有意图的,人类被赠予了理性,因此造物者的意图就是让人类用理性去思考并赞颂造物者自己;然而并不是所有人都可以妥善运用自己的理性,也就是有人可以违越自然法,自然法并不是必然被遵守的,那就必然有对违越的惩罚;这样的惩罚在世间并不一定能被执行,比如无神论国家也可以很强盛;因此惩罚一定会在超世间被执行,也就是灵魂不朽,天堂和地狱的存在。
洛克的疑虑在于,假如自然法不是必然的,甚至不是自明的、所有人都可以对其获得知识的(比如无神论者,多神论者,甚至只是普通的太忙或者太穷困而无法学习自然法,或者天生缺乏理性能力的),那ta们对自然法的违越似乎就是不知者无罪;可却仍然得因其后果而接受惩罚;并且,这个惩罚不是世间的、因此可以被知晓的,比如你杀人了被判重刑那我们都确切地知道不能杀人,但你违反了自然法被惩罚下地狱我们却没有办法确切地知道,甚至你违反了自然法在世间还活得更好了,这就显得很没有道理,类似于钓鱼执法了。因此传统的自然法解释显得非常申必,它可以被违越,违越了要被惩罚;但你不知道它到底有没有惩罚,你只能相信它会惩罚;没有对惩罚的确切知识,也就没有作为前提的对灵魂不朽的确切知识;因为可以被违越,所以不是所有人都被赠予理性的能力,所以我们不能确切知道造物者的意图是不是要按传统自然法理论要求的那样去运用理性;而因为我们不清楚造物者的意图,我们无法确定一切事物的目的,它们的存在轨迹也就不受规定而不确定了,造物者的存在本身也就不确定了。
因为造物者祂必须是有智慧的;如果是无智慧的祂就无法自行创造或设计;就不会有法律;自然法就不会存在;同时祂不仅要有智慧,祂还需要有意图,否则祂就是随意制造的世界,那自然法就不会作为法律被强制执行,自然法同样不会存在。这些都是自然法的前提,但没有一个是可以在经验或者在世间被证明的;所以传统自然法的知识不能得到辩护。
而另一种可能的自然法理论是霍布斯式的:自然状态下所有人对所有人战争,但是发现不能只为了当下利益否则会皆输,所以进入了和平的契约状态,就是自然法。洛克反驳这种论点,因为假如社会契约是建立在个人利益上的,那哪怕是为了长远的利益,当那一刻来临时还是会有所有人对所有人的战争;是不可能有持久的和平的,那就不可能有对持久和平的要求,那就不可能有自然法了;所以自然法必须建立在共同的利益之上。另外,假如自然法的奠基是自我保存的冲动,那自杀作为对其前提的反驳,就不可能是不道德的或是违背自然法的;因为自然法被自我保存奠基,所以自我保存不是被自然法规定的义务,而是可以被舍弃的权利;那自杀就不违反自然法强制的义务,也就不违反自然法本身。
神制造这个世界如果没有一个特定的目的,那祂可以也可以不这样制造世界,那就没有一个确定的应然;如果祂有一个特定的目的,但祂不是最高智性的,那祂也可以换种方式制造世界以符合祂的目的,那同样不会有一个确定的应然。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
In fact, the greatest difference between Locke and Hobbes is that Locke’s sovereign is not merely a peacemaker but a judge of natural law in the true sense. Any basic human organization has an interest in defending natural law and will therefore indeed punish those who violate it. This presupposes that natural law already has efficacy and is not merely ornamental. Only if natural law has efficacy will people take it seriously; yet only if people take it seriously will it acquire efficacy. This is Locke’s logical circle, an intriguing counterpart to Hobbes’ opposite circle: only if Leviathan has efficacy is Leviathan recognized; only if Leviathan is recognized does Leviathan have efficacy.
I filled a whiteboard with a demonstration examining Locke’s critique of traditional natural law… While reading, I kept wondering why God’s intelligence and purpose had to be discussed separately. Finally, I found the frightening point: ‘It is possible that we know God’s purpose but do not know whether God is rational.’ This is Cthulhu… So Locke’s final question is: ‘Does God really bear humanity goodwill?’ And, having realized the answer, he rejects this entire traditional argument for natural law…
Actually, the reverse is the same: ‘God is rational and omnipotent, so our ignorance of his purpose, and our consequent punishment for violating natural law, are also part of his plan.’ We must then still ask whether God is really benevolent toward humanity.
So Locke discusses two situations here and leaves one undiscussed, deliberately or otherwise. In the first, we know only that God has intelligence, not his specific purpose. Every action has then already been planned by an intelligent God to advance toward his secret purpose, and our ignorance of that specific purpose is itself part of his plan. If natural law still exists under these conditions, God wants some people to go to hell, and this natural law cannot be just.
In the second, we know that God has intelligence and also know his specific purpose. The natural-law tradition considers the likeliest purpose to be ‘using reason to praise God.’ Yet in experience we encounter people who do not comply with his specific purpose. Because God has intelligence, we must still suppose that those who fail to fulfill his specific purpose were designed to be unable to fulfill it. God therefore still simply wants those people to go to hell, and natural law cannot be just.
The last, undiscussed situation is that we know God’s specific purpose but do not know whether he has intelligence. We then know only the content of natural law, without knowing whether that content is just or wicked, good or bad, right or wrong. Natural law might therefore be unjust, merely a mechanism that punishes violations without being moral. Furthermore, if we do not know whether God has intelligence, we do not know whether the content of natural law is to praise God. The content of natural law then shifts from God to nature. Thus Locke finally discusses and refutes a Hobbesian origin of natural law: a theory of natural law without genuine moral content, arising purely historically, necessary but unjust—purposive but unjust.
So in the end this is still a problem of the mutual inclusion of one and many, a problem of how knowledge itself is possible… Traditional natural-law theory cannot explain the passage from one—the omniscient, omnipotent, completely rational, absolutely intelligible God—to many—the multiple possibilities of his intentions. It first limits an absolute that ought to be infinite, limiting an all-embracing absolute so that he expresses one determinate purpose, and then discovers the contradiction between the multiplicity of this absolute’s will and the oneness of his existence. In fact, once the absolute possesses a will, he is no longer one. When he says ‘I will…,’ he already lacks. Hobbesian natural-law theory, conversely, cannot pass from many—the interactions of empirical bodies—to one—the grounding of natural law. Denying God’s existence makes it impossible to determine which moment is the state of nature (unlike Rousseau, I think Hobbes really does regard the state of nature as actually existent), how the state of nature passes into civil society, why civil society does not degenerate back into the state of nature, or what happens if one does not accept the state of nature’s teleology of self-preservation—for example, in suicide. None of these questions can be resolved, because he rejects the absolute and attempts to select a finite situation from historical multiplicity and recognize it as the infinite one. The separation of intelligence from its purpose is really the separation of the one from the many as its expression…
Strauss on Locke’s natural law (I did not really understand it very well)
Locke has doubts about traditional natural law because he holds that traditional knowledge of natural law rests on three premises: 1. knowledge of the Creator’s existence; 2. knowledge of the Creator’s intentions; 3. knowledge of the soul’s immortality. Because the Creator exists, created things act according to certain laws, including human beings. The specific content of these laws can be established through knowledge of the Creator’s intentions. An examination of nature shows that everything has a purpose for its existence, so the Creator has intentions. Humanity has been endowed with reason, so the Creator’s intention is for human beings to use reason to think about and praise the Creator himself. Yet not everyone can use reason properly: some can transgress natural law. Natural law is not necessarily obeyed, so transgression must be punished. Such punishment is not necessarily carried out in this world—for example, atheist states can also be powerful. Punishment must therefore be carried out beyond this world, which means the immortality of the soul and the existence of heaven and hell.
Locke’s doubt is this: if natural law is not necessary, not even self-evident or knowable by everyone—for example, atheists, polytheists, or simply ordinary people too busy or poor to study natural law, or those born without the capacity for reason—then their transgressions would seem to fall under ‘ignorance excuses.’ Yet they must still be punished for the consequences. Moreover, this punishment is not worldly and therefore knowable. If you commit murder and receive a heavy sentence, we know with certainty that we must not murder. But if you violate natural law and are punished by being sent to hell, we have no way of knowing this with certainty. You might even live better in this world after violating natural law. This seems quite unreasonable, something like entrapment. The traditional explanation of natural law thus seems very fishy: it can be transgressed, and transgression must be punished, but you do not know whether it actually punishes; you can only believe that it will. Without certain knowledge of punishment, there is no certain knowledge of the immortality of the soul that serves as a premise. Because natural law can be transgressed, not everyone has been endowed with the capacity for reason, so we cannot know with certainty whether the Creator intends reason to be used as traditional natural-law theory demands. And because we are unclear about the Creator’s intentions, we cannot establish the purposes of all things. The courses of their existence become undetermined and uncertain, and the Creator’s own existence becomes uncertain as well.
For the Creator must have wisdom. Without wisdom, he could not create or design on his own; there would be no law, and natural law would not exist. At the same time, he needs not only wisdom but also intention. Otherwise he would have made the world arbitrarily, and natural law would not be enforced as law; again, natural law would not exist. These are all premises of natural law, yet none can be proved in experience or in this world. Traditional knowledge of natural law therefore cannot be justified.
Another possible theory of natural law is Hobbesian: in the state of nature, everyone wages war against everyone, but people discover that attending only to present interests leads everyone to lose. They therefore enter a peaceful contractual condition, which is natural law. Locke refutes this argument because if the social contract rests on individual interests, then even if these are long-term interests, when the relevant moment arrives there will still be a war of all against all. Lasting peace is impossible; there can therefore be no demand for lasting peace, and thus no natural law. Natural law must therefore rest on common interests. Furthermore, if natural law is grounded in the impulse of self-preservation, suicide, as a refutation of its premise, cannot be immoral or contrary to natural law. Because natural law is grounded in self-preservation, self-preservation is not an obligation prescribed by natural law but a right that can be relinquished. Suicide therefore violates neither an obligation enforced by natural law nor natural law itself.
If God makes this world without a specific purpose, he could either make it this way or not, and there would be no determinate ought. If he has a specific purpose but is not supremely intelligent, he could also make the world differently to suit that purpose, and again there would be no determinate ought.