Gui Ruiyan

Lucretius · 卢克莱修
On the Nature of Things · 物性论

Undated 未注日期

On the Nature of Things — Reading notes

Reflections · Apple Notes

Revised 30 September 2022

In this note / 篇目

1: Book on Atoms

1 starts with ode and prayer to Venus; 60 “defies” religion.

40 is very interesting: gods are not touched by anger or turbulence, war seems to be only an expression by Mars that can be easily assuaged by Venus; also, the political and the philosophical.

70 peace is called for; but philosophy is viewed as another war.

95 what is the standard for being pious?

150 is very ambiguous, it seems to mean 1.there’s nothing that comes nothing and 2.it’s not what divine power does, and it leaves open the question whether there is divine power, for the object is limited by the search, and “the source each thing can be created” does not exclude the possibility of things created by gods.

220 is the weaker argument, for it establishes how without external forces there’s intrinsic eternity, and 225 establishes how even with external forces there’s still perdurance of things. 240 argues on the basis of 220, that because things have to be broken up by specific forces, they withstand each other, hence enjoy a certain stability.

300 touch is the primal sense, yet there’s this opposition between vision and other senses.

330 establishes basic evidence till 370. 370 addresses the possibility of everything moving together simultaneously (as one thing must first yield to give the initiative), 385 the possibility of compression and extension. But he doesn’t address possible counter arguments, like how things will hold up as he admits if things can yield.

405 the harmony of content and form: just as things yield to each other, so do things yield their secrets to intellect: matters obstruct, and there must be void for intellect to penetrate. Things have to be porous not only materially, but also intellectually.

420 interesting word choice: faith firmly founded. Bodies are established in senses and they offer the standard to reason about hidden things, again this commonality between void and reason.

445 a third kind is denied, only the third kind here seems to be “eidos”, though I guess it depends on definition of what a thing is: sensible or reasonable.

450 important definitions on properties and accidents; but what about essences as given right below?

460 times does not exist by itself but is from things themselves.

465 deeds are all but accidents in some sense, and facticity is nothing independent.

480 does he not notice the absurdity of this position? Voids as nothing “exists”, then how does this “nothing” come about? Shall we construe this in a different way, that “nothing” only comes from “nothing”, in the sense that void comes from void? Or simply that matters and voids are ungenerated things?

555 “heat death”.

560 this is not too convincing for if the speed of dissolution is faster than reconstruction having a limit on dissolution wouldn’t help the renewal of things. But I guess what he means is that, as things can be dissolved faster than constructed, after a certain passage of time, the things will be splintered to such a degree as to be totally irremediable. Things can be constructed without being broken up because being broken up is a contingent possibility but not a universal necessity, though on the grand scale things do dissolve faster, some independent things do not dissolve before they are constructed, for they don’t yet encounter an outside force. But if there’s no limit on dissolution, over a great passage of time most things will be so broken up and not renewed, and things that still stand will be by fluke so few and rare. And even if things do get renewed, their time will not be fixed.

605 a weird description: atoms are not the points without parts, but are wholes cohered from smallest parts close packed together. What’s the necessity of this qualification?

615 he seems to believe his atom harbors finite parts instead of infinite ones.

630 this, in relation to 645, has to be construed in this way: the smallest parts are all homogenous to one another, yet we do see variety of things; then it’s only possible that their compositions as wholes have to differ to contribute to that variety, so that “parts differ from wholes”. But these varieties have to be stable and indivisible, for things have their determinate origins. So this conception is to reconcile the two requirements: variety and indivisibility. The reasoning proceeds like this: 1.the smallest parts have to be without parts, otherwise they cannot be the smallest; 2.being without parts make these parts impossible to be of different natures for they are contentless; 3.in order to have differences, compositions or atoms are necessitated; 4.these atoms have to be fixed too, and its parts being indivisible is necessary though insufficient for this indivisibility.

660 the whole composed of atoms is again a different level for it allows for void.

670 transgression of certain fixed limits would mean death of the thing, yet this is not possible, for things do not return to nothing. “Nothing” then means “every random thing”.

680 fire is only a manifestation of the order of atoms which can make bodies other than fire.

690 “he uses senses to fight against senses”, so perceptions should be harmonized instead of conflicting one another; it’s wrong to let one perception rule over other perceptions, for all perceptions are equally valid, and it’s only by virtue of other perceptions is the perception of fire established. By this position there are no “false perceptions”. This echoes 130 when he says he should explain about hallucinations and dreams. But then what about “senses being the most certain at distinguishing false from true”? Is it saying that what can be perceived is certainly true?

760 the elements, if we accept those ancient doctrines, will be hostile to each other and perish at each other’s hands.

765 two very forceful arguments: 1.just as elements can change into things, so can things change into elements, if things do change their natures; 2.but if things don’t change their natures, then we shall see no mixture of elements, which is not the case.

775 primal atoms seems to be each of its own nature (composition).

895 things are not mixed and hidden like how small bodies simply exist side by side, but rather in a very different way, so that the parts are very strictly different from the wholes, as wholes are ordered parts, and each ordered whole is of a different nature from other wholes with different orderings. Otherwise, as one thing comes from other things, these things again come from more things, everything will come from everything, which is previously refuted.

945 the purpose of poetizing philosophy expounded; yet can this mixture facilitate, or do they still hold enmity?

960 the infinity of universe.

990 this argument seems to say that sky and bodies in the sky are constantly falling, but since the space in between is infinite, they still do not fall onto earth, and things on earth can move freely under space.

1010 given the infinity of space, matter again needs to be infinite, or else space will be without limit and matter will be thoroughly dispersed.

1025 an order tried and true from aeons of disorder; a partial and relative finitude or order.

1035 here he seems to defeat his own purpose; if matter is infinite, what point is there to argue for its eternity? Unless he presupposes a relative finitude.

1045 responds to the questions above; the world is relatively stable in its structure, but as time goes by its material will gradually wear away and has to be replenished from outside the world.

1080 the middle is denied, but weight is not, for weight seems to merely be forces or movements of bodies, and voids give way to bodies, but do not obstruct. So there is no point in space where bodies will stop moving. And nothing could rest on itself but has to rest on something else that is moving in the other direction. Yet how is the tendency to fall as expounded in 990 possible if this is the case? Why will matter eventually unify?

Regarding 990, it seems possible to say that the boundaries above will continue to press down, while the boundaries below will remain. So at length everything will pile on one another. But this happens not, for everything is falling in an infinite space, so the distance between heaven with heavenly bodies and earth can be maintained.

2: Book on Motions

5 what a great and powerful soul!

25 body can be taken care of without riches.

50 reason is the only saving light.

65 motions that beget, forces that drive these motions, and voids that make room for motions.

100 “Brownian motion”, the steady thing is when atoms are entangled by their complex shapes.

120 “a footprint of a concept”.

140 this paradigm is for both the greatest scale and the smallest.

180 still ambivalent on gods, “for men’s sake” and “for us” seem to be important qualifications.

210 I’m again bewildered. What does he think weight is? What is downward tendency in an infinite universe? It seems to suggest that things are constantly falling and by free swerves impact one another.

235 without resistance all things move equally fast, though of unequal weights. So various impacts have to be caused by slight sideway movements.

255 free will as grounded by free motion of atoms, and free actions by free will.

285 the natural analogy between mind and body.

360 yet the steadfastness of kinds seems compromised.

440 whence would sensibility come forth?

495 shapes have to be finite in number for to infinitely change the shape and ordering of parts one requires infinite number of parts. For with two parts only one ordering is possible, with three some more, with four even more, yet still finite. To increase the number of shapes to infinity means to add infinitely many parts. Then there will have to be an infinitely large atom.

515 the question, however, seems to me to be not so much if the path to change is finite, but if it’s continuous.

545 as atoms are infinitely many, no kind of atoms has a finite number. For what’s rare here is many there, and even if the thing created by those atoms is unique, the atoms still should be infinitely many in order to encounter one another in the disorder of matter and to replenish one another.

700 this is crucial, for this manages to ground structures and forms as intrinsic possibilities of the atoms themselves.

730 colors are visible of things, but touch can still feel invisible atoms; so atoms are colorless as they are invisible.

750 and atoms cannot change color, for if particles change they have to be able to transform from one ordering of parts to another, but this will make everything come from everything.

860 atoms themselves are without attributes, for attributes are all perishable.

870 atoms are insentient.

905 what’s sentient is also changeable, hence perishable.

925 if living things only come from living things, the origin of life itself becomes inexplicable; this will result in vitalism. Yet vitalism cannot be, for if we say even earth is sentient, every living thing will be a swarm of living things, each with its own sensation. Then how are they unified into a whole?

1120 here it seems a fundamental challenge is exposed: how, by random atomic motion, can things naturally reach their peak and start to pass away? Why is there a fixed point over which the outpouring of particles exceeds the import? This seems only explainable by the fact of directionality, by the downward tendency. This polarity would make things unequal in their receptiveness and steadiness. Like a jar with opening at the top is more receptive of nutrition, but once its bottom is also shattered open, outpour would exceed import. In other words, since parts are all unequal, there will be some parts much more difficult to repair but much more important in gaining nutrition, so that once impaired, death would quickly result.

1145 “world age”.

3: Book on Death

86 an apparently similar task as in Phaedo.

55 truth about a man needs to be revealed by adversity.

80 by fear of death people plan out their own deaths. This seems to be arguing somehow counter to Aristotle: is yearning for eternity synonymous with fear of death?

105 intelligence is not the whole of body, but is like an independent part (of man).

125 spirit is the source of things that which most support our life.

140 this seems ironic: the “head” of body is the understanding placed at the middle of the chest.

155 it seems that mind is its own source, whereas spirit mediates for mind and body.

165 mind, even if independent from body, is still bodily.

190 water is rounder than honey, yet honey is more sweet?

215 “weight or rather weightlessness of soul”. Soul to body is like fragrance to wine.

240 the multiplicity of spirit and the ineffable part most essential.

250 do flesh feel pleasure or do spirit feel them? And motions still do not seem to exhaust what feelings are.

295 how do each category relate to appearances: the intensity of motion and the quantity of atoms?

320 some vices are in nature and “beyond the power of reason to expel”, though their manifestations are still negligible in actual life.

335 sensation is joint effort of mind and body.

375 there’s a ratio between mind and body, that more body particles shall be moved in order to move a mind particle.

420 here the true face of the task is revealed: to overcome fear of death is not to deny mortality, as in Phaedo.

435 in some sense body is a vessel for spirit, and death is when spirit dissolves into air outside body.

520 do fixed boundaries mean boundaries impassable or boundaries once passed death would result?

525 interestingly, in Phaedo the same evidence supports the opposite argument: because soul can withstand evil (its disease) and not die, it is immortal.

530 since spirit is divisible, it’s able to be dissolved and thus die.

545 the definition of death is when senses leave a man.

570 so it seems spirit is more the ordered thing than its atoms.

600 what about sleep?

670 “recollection”.

675 he thinks the loss of all past memories is not too different from death.

720 a funny argument: the number of whole spirits that are let live do not match the number that perish, where a thousand grow only one has died. So spirit has to be divisible.

735 if spirits want to be in bodies, they have to grow together; once a body is complete, it shields off and cannot be entered. Even if spirit does get in, it cannot form all the close links it shares with body.

785 one has to be very careful in saying that in Lucretius the universe is random: no, the universe is order coming from disorder, and it’s like natural selection (if you transgress, death will follow), the ordering persists through motion and change.

840 echoes Phaedo, if after death there’s nothing, then we don’t feel and shouldn’t fear; but if there is something, it is no longer what it was and lost all memories (since no one remembers his past lives) and is like already dead.

865 “when death the immortal has taken his mortal life”.

900 what if I desire desire itself?

920 sleep is an instantiation of death-like nothingness.

925 “less than nothing”.

930 nature finding her voice.

945 everything will be the same.

965 yet there’s always the new thrusting out the old.

970 the past is a mirror to see death in our future.

980 people do not fear death itself, but what chance in this life might bring to them. Then why is death substituting for their other cravings? Is that because death is the nihilating force general enough so as to conceal the real content of desire?

1020 also people fear after death there’s things worse to come.

1045 you waste your time fearing death; but what will be the consequence of fully accepting death? What will be the benefit of “waking up”? Isn’t it paradoxical that he wants people to “wake up” and yet lie down in life?

1070 now yet again he reveals his true color: a yearning for eternity.

4: Book on Senses

5 “of things so dark in verse so clear I write”; is clarity innate to poetry?

51 “images” are sent out from the things’ surfaces.

115 I guess then the question to this theory will be: how is depth and objectivity possible?

160 the images are constantly thrown off so as to appear instantaneous before the mirror.

220 will the speed of traveling images be dependent on the things? Then will there not be things unseeable? It seems strange that everything needs to flow in order to be known.

245 he recognizes the problem of depth and determines that depth can be produced by measuring the air particles pushed through our pupils.

260 addresses the other question I have, that’s how important are images and visibility to things. Clearly there are cases where the images either are simply not there or are invisible to human eye, yet one can still differentiate the thing itself from the rest.

270 now he’s more deeply invested in this question of depth and tries to deal with mirrored depths. His answer to this is that two streams of air are involved instead of one, for there’s reflection.

340 here it seems darkness is also made of particles and likely an image of something. And darkness is no mere deprivation of light or anything near nothingness. I wonder how will he explain the example Aristotle always uses, as to why the eye cannot see things too near to itself.

370 yet here shades are deprivations of light. I wonder what is the nature of light, is it just the image particles of sun? Why does it not, by immersing everything, destroy other images? And how to account for the fact that visibility is deeply involved with illumination? And he himself clearly stresses the role light plays repeatedly, as he wants to shatter the darkness of religion. It seems that darkness is something that blocks other images, whilst light is that which enhances.

380 here yet light and dark are described as two fundamental categories of vision. Is light the driving force making images move fast?

390 again echoes Phaedo, how perceptions create paradoxes. Somehow we need to save the appearances and make them each retain their authority and yet be in harmony.

470 “I will spare to argue a case”.

480 if people do know, it’s only possible by having a standard judging truth and falsehood. Senses are this standard. It’s not possible to judge senses by reason, for reason itself is derived from senses, and if senses are false, reason is only false.

500 it’s better to give false explanations on perceptions than to discredit perceptions.

505 ambivalent statement: what if life collapses? Would that not be death?

590 funny.

605 a strange picture indeed: voice begetting voices.

695 smells are buried deep inside things.

745 imagination then seems to be reception of mixed images instead of production.

765 in dream all other senses and memory are put to sleep. It seems that senses need to corroborate each other. But I guess this again throws this theory into question: how are eyes able to differentiate different images and keep them apart, whilst mind cannot? Also, what is memory?

780 this tries to address the question of spontaneous production of images.

805 our mind only sees what it strains to see and lets countless other images perish, for these images are infinite and too thin. This probably explains also why eyes can see and differentiate, for those images are still relatively resilient. This makes the continuity of imaginations and dream images the result of an effort on mind’s part. One question would be, however, why are the images not all destroyed and blurred, but seem to hold onto their clarity (though still impossible and non-actual) and integrity?

835 telos is utterly denounced.

845 purposiveness is with men, but nature is random.

880 this sounds paradoxical in a way: the mind must foresee what it wills to do; yet it’s still not clear which holds priority, the image or the will? By nearer context it seems to suggest that images strike mind and make mind will; yet according to previous passages, mind is also selective on its imagination.

905 there’s some kind of leverage between mind and body.

925 sleep is induced by the spirit taking apart.

945 again it’s not by telos that sleep comes upon man but by necessity of being taken apart by constant blows.

960 the explanation on why we wake up is lacking; also is lacking the observation on our circadian rhythm.

965 funny. But this seems to have to do with memory and our past. I guess past can leave their traces?

1035 funny.

1070 Venus is praised, yet love is to be avoided. The advice seems to say, don’t chase after images but just satisfy what can be satisfied, that is the sexual impulse, and let that thing which desires love die away and wither.

1085 Venus seems in opposition to nature.

1090 “this is the only thing for which the more we have the more the heart burns with fell desire for it”.

1125 are these verses not trying to feed heart with thin images?

1155 funny.

1200 only out of natural desire do females submit to males.

1265 so funny that I can’t believe it’s not irony.

1280 love by accommodation.

5: Book on Desire

10 he seems to think himself divine or following the divine.

50 the dynamism between words, images and voices.

90 everything has finite power and deep boundary stones.

100 things true but “insensible”.

105 reason rather than the event declares end of the world.

120 “stain immortal things with mortal speech”.

155 gods are of nature thin and untouched.

175 no one “wants” to be born.

180 this is one of the crucial questions in Timaeus, that where do the paradigms god looks at come from?

225 funny.

525 beautiful: “fiery bodies grazing the starry pastures of the sky”.

545 to grow together means to be unified into a stable state.

555 air is rooted into earth.

570 these are actually very reasonable arguments: since everyone on earth feels the same heat and sees the same size, there is no reason to assume the sun will change its size or temperature significantly when we get closer. Also, the moon has no blurry outlines, which suggests it’s really not that far from us.

665 arguments which Ptolemy has refuted.

825 earth is worthy to be called mother.

840 certain things nowadays considered monstrosities were allowed in certain past ages.

850 “natural selection”.

880 but even if monstrosities can occur, certain things as combinations of already extant things, like centaurs, still cannot be, for they are products of imagination and do not conform to reason. Everything, even if monstrous, should naturally grow out of its own singular nature, but not out of a violent superimposition.

925 a theory, or a myth?

990 beautiful: “living flesh buried in a living tomb”.

1005 “the wicked art of seamanship”. Now it seems like social critique.

1045 language also naturally comes into being through social interactions.

1125 envy.

1130 people tend to desire what others desire for in that way they can be secured among others.

1170 here he reveals himself: gods are images, that’s why they are thin and ethereal. For as long as there are bodies, there are images, that’s how gods become eternal; also men cannot touch gods because they are so thin and removed from actual life interacting with bodies.

1200 true piety is for a man to have the power to contemplate the world with quiet mind.

1345 so funny.

1355 misogyny detected.

1415 no more pleasure is gained from newer and better things, for what we have we have already accustomed ourselves to them. And to have newer and better things always mars the prior taste and pleasure. What once was pleasure now becomes pain; and pleasure itself is not added any bit more.

1430 people are vain for they see no boundaries of their aspirations.

1445 before writing was invented only traces for things of old remain that reason can explore.

6: Book on Spectacles

15 the vessel itself produced the flaws. The body was the vessel, but now so is the mind.

30 who is this person? Epicurus? And if all evil is natural , how could understanding nature again disperse it? By understanding its inevitability and learning to accept it?

205 he seems not to think the clouds are painted by sun, but rather the clouds absorb seeds from the sun.

390 the assumption that gods are just.

610 a translational error: to render “globe” into this phrase is much too careless.

800 again, what seemingly brings pleasure and satisfaction also at the same time is abrasive to man.

920 what kind?

1005 magnetism is a difficult notion for there is force without apparent contact.

1015 this is dubious for magnets have polarity.

1050 repulsion is discussed but I’m not convinced. It seems to say, attraction happens where a void is created within the iron and between it and the stone by the stream coming from the stone. Repulsion happens when the passageway is blocked and the stream from the stone, instead of creating a void, pushes the iron away.

1080 most perfect union when one’s hollow meets another’s projection; sometimes “hooks and rings” also can bind things together, being not as stable.

1140 this book starts with the glory of Athens, ends with pestilence.