Lucretius · 卢克莱修
On the Nature of Things · 物性论
Undated 未注日期
On the Nature of Things — Reading notes
Reflections · Apple Notes
Revised 30 September 2022
In this note / 篇目
1: Book on Atoms
1 starts with ode and prayer to Venus; 60 “defies” religion.
40 is very interesting: gods are not touched by anger or turbulence, war seems to be only an expression by Mars that can be easily assuaged by Venus; also, the political and the philosophical.
70 peace is called for; but philosophy is viewed as another war.
95 what is the standard for being pious?
150 is very ambiguous, it seems to mean 1.there’s nothing that comes nothing and 2.it’s not what divine power does, and it leaves open the question whether there is divine power, for the object is limited by the search, and “the source each thing can be created” does not exclude the possibility of things created by gods.
220 is the weaker argument, for it establishes how without external forces there’s intrinsic eternity, and 225 establishes how even with external forces there’s still perdurance of things. 240 argues on the basis of 220, that because things have to be broken up by specific forces, they withstand each other, hence enjoy a certain stability.
300 touch is the primal sense, yet there’s this opposition between vision and other senses.
330 establishes basic evidence till 370. 370 addresses the possibility of everything moving together simultaneously (as one thing must first yield to give the initiative), 385 the possibility of compression and extension. But he doesn’t address possible counter arguments, like how things will hold up as he admits if things can yield.
405 the harmony of content and form: just as things yield to each other, so do things yield their secrets to intellect: matters obstruct, and there must be void for intellect to penetrate. Things have to be porous not only materially, but also intellectually.
420 interesting word choice: faith firmly founded. Bodies are established in senses and they offer the standard to reason about hidden things, again this commonality between void and reason.
445 a third kind is denied, only the third kind here seems to be “eidos”, though I guess it depends on definition of what a thing is: sensible or reasonable.
450 important definitions on properties and accidents; but what about essences as given right below?
460 times does not exist by itself but is from things themselves.
465 deeds are all but accidents in some sense, and facticity is nothing independent.
480 does he not notice the absurdity of this position? Voids as nothing “exists”, then how does this “nothing” come about? Shall we construe this in a different way, that “nothing” only comes from “nothing”, in the sense that void comes from void? Or simply that matters and voids are ungenerated things?
555 “heat death”.
560 this is not too convincing for if the speed of dissolution is faster than reconstruction having a limit on dissolution wouldn’t help the renewal of things. But I guess what he means is that, as things can be dissolved faster than constructed, after a certain passage of time, the things will be splintered to such a degree as to be totally irremediable. Things can be constructed without being broken up because being broken up is a contingent possibility but not a universal necessity, though on the grand scale things do dissolve faster, some independent things do not dissolve before they are constructed, for they don’t yet encounter an outside force. But if there’s no limit on dissolution, over a great passage of time most things will be so broken up and not renewed, and things that still stand will be by fluke so few and rare. And even if things do get renewed, their time will not be fixed.
605 a weird description: atoms are not the points without parts, but are wholes cohered from smallest parts close packed together. What’s the necessity of this qualification?
615 he seems to believe his atom harbors finite parts instead of infinite ones.
630 this, in relation to 645, has to be construed in this way: the smallest parts are all homogenous to one another, yet we do see variety of things; then it’s only possible that their compositions as wholes have to differ to contribute to that variety, so that “parts differ from wholes”. But these varieties have to be stable and indivisible, for things have their determinate origins. So this conception is to reconcile the two requirements: variety and indivisibility. The reasoning proceeds like this: 1.the smallest parts have to be without parts, otherwise they cannot be the smallest; 2.being without parts make these parts impossible to be of different natures for they are contentless; 3.in order to have differences, compositions or atoms are necessitated; 4.these atoms have to be fixed too, and its parts being indivisible is necessary though insufficient for this indivisibility.
660 the whole composed of atoms is again a different level for it allows for void.
670 transgression of certain fixed limits would mean death of the thing, yet this is not possible, for things do not return to nothing. “Nothing” then means “every random thing”.
680 fire is only a manifestation of the order of atoms which can make bodies other than fire.
690 “he uses senses to fight against senses”, so perceptions should be harmonized instead of conflicting one another; it’s wrong to let one perception rule over other perceptions, for all perceptions are equally valid, and it’s only by virtue of other perceptions is the perception of fire established. By this position there are no “false perceptions”. This echoes 130 when he says he should explain about hallucinations and dreams. But then what about “senses being the most certain at distinguishing false from true”? Is it saying that what can be perceived is certainly true?
760 the elements, if we accept those ancient doctrines, will be hostile to each other and perish at each other’s hands.
765 two very forceful arguments: 1.just as elements can change into things, so can things change into elements, if things do change their natures; 2.but if things don’t change their natures, then we shall see no mixture of elements, which is not the case.
775 primal atoms seems to be each of its own nature (composition).
895 things are not mixed and hidden like how small bodies simply exist side by side, but rather in a very different way, so that the parts are very strictly different from the wholes, as wholes are ordered parts, and each ordered whole is of a different nature from other wholes with different orderings. Otherwise, as one thing comes from other things, these things again come from more things, everything will come from everything, which is previously refuted.
945 the purpose of poetizing philosophy expounded; yet can this mixture facilitate, or do they still hold enmity?
960 the infinity of universe.
990 this argument seems to say that sky and bodies in the sky are constantly falling, but since the space in between is infinite, they still do not fall onto earth, and things on earth can move freely under space.
1010 given the infinity of space, matter again needs to be infinite, or else space will be without limit and matter will be thoroughly dispersed.
1025 an order tried and true from aeons of disorder; a partial and relative finitude or order.
1035 here he seems to defeat his own purpose; if matter is infinite, what point is there to argue for its eternity? Unless he presupposes a relative finitude.
1045 responds to the questions above; the world is relatively stable in its structure, but as time goes by its material will gradually wear away and has to be replenished from outside the world.
1080 the middle is denied, but weight is not, for weight seems to merely be forces or movements of bodies, and voids give way to bodies, but do not obstruct. So there is no point in space where bodies will stop moving. And nothing could rest on itself but has to rest on something else that is moving in the other direction. Yet how is the tendency to fall as expounded in 990 possible if this is the case? Why will matter eventually unify?
Regarding 990, it seems possible to say that the boundaries above will continue to press down, while the boundaries below will remain. So at length everything will pile on one another. But this happens not, for everything is falling in an infinite space, so the distance between heaven with heavenly bodies and earth can be maintained.
2: Book on Motions
5 what a great and powerful soul!
25 body can be taken care of without riches.
50 reason is the only saving light.
65 motions that beget, forces that drive these motions, and voids that make room for motions.
100 “Brownian motion”, the steady thing is when atoms are entangled by their complex shapes.
120 “a footprint of a concept”.
140 this paradigm is for both the greatest scale and the smallest.
180 still ambivalent on gods, “for men’s sake” and “for us” seem to be important qualifications.
210 I’m again bewildered. What does he think weight is? What is downward tendency in an infinite universe? It seems to suggest that things are constantly falling and by free swerves impact one another.
235 without resistance all things move equally fast, though of unequal weights. So various impacts have to be caused by slight sideway movements.
255 free will as grounded by free motion of atoms, and free actions by free will.
285 the natural analogy between mind and body.
360 yet the steadfastness of kinds seems compromised.
440 whence would sensibility come forth?
495 shapes have to be finite in number for to infinitely change the shape and ordering of parts one requires infinite number of parts. For with two parts only one ordering is possible, with three some more, with four even more, yet still finite. To increase the number of shapes to infinity means to add infinitely many parts. Then there will have to be an infinitely large atom.
515 the question, however, seems to me to be not so much if the path to change is finite, but if it’s continuous.
545 as atoms are infinitely many, no kind of atoms has a finite number. For what’s rare here is many there, and even if the thing created by those atoms is unique, the atoms still should be infinitely many in order to encounter one another in the disorder of matter and to replenish one another.
700 this is crucial, for this manages to ground structures and forms as intrinsic possibilities of the atoms themselves.
730 colors are visible of things, but touch can still feel invisible atoms; so atoms are colorless as they are invisible.
750 and atoms cannot change color, for if particles change they have to be able to transform from one ordering of parts to another, but this will make everything come from everything.
860 atoms themselves are without attributes, for attributes are all perishable.
870 atoms are insentient.
905 what’s sentient is also changeable, hence perishable.
925 if living things only come from living things, the origin of life itself becomes inexplicable; this will result in vitalism. Yet vitalism cannot be, for if we say even earth is sentient, every living thing will be a swarm of living things, each with its own sensation. Then how are they unified into a whole?
1120 here it seems a fundamental challenge is exposed: how, by random atomic motion, can things naturally reach their peak and start to pass away? Why is there a fixed point over which the outpouring of particles exceeds the import? This seems only explainable by the fact of directionality, by the downward tendency. This polarity would make things unequal in their receptiveness and steadiness. Like a jar with opening at the top is more receptive of nutrition, but once its bottom is also shattered open, outpour would exceed import. In other words, since parts are all unequal, there will be some parts much more difficult to repair but much more important in gaining nutrition, so that once impaired, death would quickly result.
1145 “world age”.
3: Book on Death
86 an apparently similar task as in Phaedo.
55 truth about a man needs to be revealed by adversity.
80 by fear of death people plan out their own deaths. This seems to be arguing somehow counter to Aristotle: is yearning for eternity synonymous with fear of death?
105 intelligence is not the whole of body, but is like an independent part (of man).
125 spirit is the source of things that which most support our life.
140 this seems ironic: the “head” of body is the understanding placed at the middle of the chest.
155 it seems that mind is its own source, whereas spirit mediates for mind and body.
165 mind, even if independent from body, is still bodily.
190 water is rounder than honey, yet honey is more sweet?
215 “weight or rather weightlessness of soul”. Soul to body is like fragrance to wine.
240 the multiplicity of spirit and the ineffable part most essential.
250 do flesh feel pleasure or do spirit feel them? And motions still do not seem to exhaust what feelings are.
295 how do each category relate to appearances: the intensity of motion and the quantity of atoms?
320 some vices are in nature and “beyond the power of reason to expel”, though their manifestations are still negligible in actual life.
335 sensation is joint effort of mind and body.
375 there’s a ratio between mind and body, that more body particles shall be moved in order to move a mind particle.
420 here the true face of the task is revealed: to overcome fear of death is not to deny mortality, as in Phaedo.
435 in some sense body is a vessel for spirit, and death is when spirit dissolves into air outside body.
520 do fixed boundaries mean boundaries impassable or boundaries once passed death would result?
525 interestingly, in Phaedo the same evidence supports the opposite argument: because soul can withstand evil (its disease) and not die, it is immortal.
530 since spirit is divisible, it’s able to be dissolved and thus die.
545 the definition of death is when senses leave a man.
570 so it seems spirit is more the ordered thing than its atoms.
600 what about sleep?
670 “recollection”.
675 he thinks the loss of all past memories is not too different from death.
720 a funny argument: the number of whole spirits that are let live do not match the number that perish, where a thousand grow only one has died. So spirit has to be divisible.
735 if spirits want to be in bodies, they have to grow together; once a body is complete, it shields off and cannot be entered. Even if spirit does get in, it cannot form all the close links it shares with body.
785 one has to be very careful in saying that in Lucretius the universe is random: no, the universe is order coming from disorder, and it’s like natural selection (if you transgress, death will follow), the ordering persists through motion and change.
840 echoes Phaedo, if after death there’s nothing, then we don’t feel and shouldn’t fear; but if there is something, it is no longer what it was and lost all memories (since no one remembers his past lives) and is like already dead.
865 “when death the immortal has taken his mortal life”.
900 what if I desire desire itself?
920 sleep is an instantiation of death-like nothingness.
925 “less than nothing”.
930 nature finding her voice.
945 everything will be the same.
965 yet there’s always the new thrusting out the old.
970 the past is a mirror to see death in our future.
980 people do not fear death itself, but what chance in this life might bring to them. Then why is death substituting for their other cravings? Is that because death is the nihilating force general enough so as to conceal the real content of desire?
1020 also people fear after death there’s things worse to come.
1045 you waste your time fearing death; but what will be the consequence of fully accepting death? What will be the benefit of “waking up”? Isn’t it paradoxical that he wants people to “wake up” and yet lie down in life?
1070 now yet again he reveals his true color: a yearning for eternity.
4: Book on Senses
5 “of things so dark in verse so clear I write”; is clarity innate to poetry?
51 “images” are sent out from the things’ surfaces.
115 I guess then the question to this theory will be: how is depth and objectivity possible?
160 the images are constantly thrown off so as to appear instantaneous before the mirror.
220 will the speed of traveling images be dependent on the things? Then will there not be things unseeable? It seems strange that everything needs to flow in order to be known.
245 he recognizes the problem of depth and determines that depth can be produced by measuring the air particles pushed through our pupils.
260 addresses the other question I have, that’s how important are images and visibility to things. Clearly there are cases where the images either are simply not there or are invisible to human eye, yet one can still differentiate the thing itself from the rest.
270 now he’s more deeply invested in this question of depth and tries to deal with mirrored depths. His answer to this is that two streams of air are involved instead of one, for there’s reflection.
340 here it seems darkness is also made of particles and likely an image of something. And darkness is no mere deprivation of light or anything near nothingness. I wonder how will he explain the example Aristotle always uses, as to why the eye cannot see things too near to itself.
370 yet here shades are deprivations of light. I wonder what is the nature of light, is it just the image particles of sun? Why does it not, by immersing everything, destroy other images? And how to account for the fact that visibility is deeply involved with illumination? And he himself clearly stresses the role light plays repeatedly, as he wants to shatter the darkness of religion. It seems that darkness is something that blocks other images, whilst light is that which enhances.
380 here yet light and dark are described as two fundamental categories of vision. Is light the driving force making images move fast?
390 again echoes Phaedo, how perceptions create paradoxes. Somehow we need to save the appearances and make them each retain their authority and yet be in harmony.
470 “I will spare to argue a case”.
480 if people do know, it’s only possible by having a standard judging truth and falsehood. Senses are this standard. It’s not possible to judge senses by reason, for reason itself is derived from senses, and if senses are false, reason is only false.
500 it’s better to give false explanations on perceptions than to discredit perceptions.
505 ambivalent statement: what if life collapses? Would that not be death?
590 funny.
605 a strange picture indeed: voice begetting voices.
695 smells are buried deep inside things.
745 imagination then seems to be reception of mixed images instead of production.
765 in dream all other senses and memory are put to sleep. It seems that senses need to corroborate each other. But I guess this again throws this theory into question: how are eyes able to differentiate different images and keep them apart, whilst mind cannot? Also, what is memory?
780 this tries to address the question of spontaneous production of images.
805 our mind only sees what it strains to see and lets countless other images perish, for these images are infinite and too thin. This probably explains also why eyes can see and differentiate, for those images are still relatively resilient. This makes the continuity of imaginations and dream images the result of an effort on mind’s part. One question would be, however, why are the images not all destroyed and blurred, but seem to hold onto their clarity (though still impossible and non-actual) and integrity?
835 telos is utterly denounced.
845 purposiveness is with men, but nature is random.
880 this sounds paradoxical in a way: the mind must foresee what it wills to do; yet it’s still not clear which holds priority, the image or the will? By nearer context it seems to suggest that images strike mind and make mind will; yet according to previous passages, mind is also selective on its imagination.
905 there’s some kind of leverage between mind and body.
925 sleep is induced by the spirit taking apart.
945 again it’s not by telos that sleep comes upon man but by necessity of being taken apart by constant blows.
960 the explanation on why we wake up is lacking; also is lacking the observation on our circadian rhythm.
965 funny. But this seems to have to do with memory and our past. I guess past can leave their traces?
1035 funny.
1070 Venus is praised, yet love is to be avoided. The advice seems to say, don’t chase after images but just satisfy what can be satisfied, that is the sexual impulse, and let that thing which desires love die away and wither.
1085 Venus seems in opposition to nature.
1090 “this is the only thing for which the more we have the more the heart burns with fell desire for it”.
1125 are these verses not trying to feed heart with thin images?
1155 funny.
1200 only out of natural desire do females submit to males.
1265 so funny that I can’t believe it’s not irony.
1280 love by accommodation.
5: Book on Desire
10 he seems to think himself divine or following the divine.
50 the dynamism between words, images and voices.
90 everything has finite power and deep boundary stones.
100 things true but “insensible”.
105 reason rather than the event declares end of the world.
120 “stain immortal things with mortal speech”.
155 gods are of nature thin and untouched.
175 no one “wants” to be born.
180 this is one of the crucial questions in Timaeus, that where do the paradigms god looks at come from?
225 funny.
525 beautiful: “fiery bodies grazing the starry pastures of the sky”.
545 to grow together means to be unified into a stable state.
555 air is rooted into earth.
570 these are actually very reasonable arguments: since everyone on earth feels the same heat and sees the same size, there is no reason to assume the sun will change its size or temperature significantly when we get closer. Also, the moon has no blurry outlines, which suggests it’s really not that far from us.
665 arguments which Ptolemy has refuted.
825 earth is worthy to be called mother.
840 certain things nowadays considered monstrosities were allowed in certain past ages.
850 “natural selection”.
880 but even if monstrosities can occur, certain things as combinations of already extant things, like centaurs, still cannot be, for they are products of imagination and do not conform to reason. Everything, even if monstrous, should naturally grow out of its own singular nature, but not out of a violent superimposition.
925 a theory, or a myth?
990 beautiful: “living flesh buried in a living tomb”.
1005 “the wicked art of seamanship”. Now it seems like social critique.
1045 language also naturally comes into being through social interactions.
1125 envy.
1130 people tend to desire what others desire for in that way they can be secured among others.
1170 here he reveals himself: gods are images, that’s why they are thin and ethereal. For as long as there are bodies, there are images, that’s how gods become eternal; also men cannot touch gods because they are so thin and removed from actual life interacting with bodies.
1200 true piety is for a man to have the power to contemplate the world with quiet mind.
1345 so funny.
1355 misogyny detected.
1415 no more pleasure is gained from newer and better things, for what we have we have already accustomed ourselves to them. And to have newer and better things always mars the prior taste and pleasure. What once was pleasure now becomes pain; and pleasure itself is not added any bit more.
1430 people are vain for they see no boundaries of their aspirations.
1445 before writing was invented only traces for things of old remain that reason can explore.
6: Book on Spectacles
15 the vessel itself produced the flaws. The body was the vessel, but now so is the mind.
30 who is this person? Epicurus? And if all evil is natural , how could understanding nature again disperse it? By understanding its inevitability and learning to accept it?
205 he seems not to think the clouds are painted by sun, but rather the clouds absorb seeds from the sun.
390 the assumption that gods are just.
610 a translational error: to render “globe” into this phrase is much too careless.
800 again, what seemingly brings pleasure and satisfaction also at the same time is abrasive to man.
920 what kind?
1005 magnetism is a difficult notion for there is force without apparent contact.
1015 this is dubious for magnets have polarity.
1050 repulsion is discussed but I’m not convinced. It seems to say, attraction happens where a void is created within the iron and between it and the stone by the stream coming from the stone. Repulsion happens when the passageway is blocked and the stream from the stone, instead of creating a void, pushes the iron away.
1080 most perfect union when one’s hollow meets another’s projection; sometimes “hooks and rings” also can bind things together, being not as stable.
1140 this book starts with the glory of Athens, ends with pestilence.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
1:原子之书
1 以对维纳斯的颂歌与祈祷开篇;60处则“蔑视”宗教。
40 很有意思:诸神不受愤怒或动荡触及,战争似乎只是玛尔斯的一种表达,维纳斯可以轻易平息它;此外,还有政治与哲学。
70 呼唤和平,但哲学又被视为另一场战争。
95 虔敬的标准是什么?
150 很含糊,似乎意味着:1. 没有什么从无中产生;2. 神力也不这样做。它仍未封闭神力是否存在的问题,因为对象受探寻所限制,而“每物可以被创造的源头”并不排除事物由神创造的可能。
220是较弱的论证,因为它确立了没有外力时的内在永恒;225则确立了即便有外力,事物仍有持存。240在220的基础上论证:因为事物必须被特定力量拆解,它们会彼此抵抗,因此享有一定稳定性。
300 触觉是原初感觉,但这里又有视觉与其它感觉之间的对立。
330至370确立基本的明见性。370讨论一切同时运动的可能,因为必须先有某物让位,才会有开端;385讨论压缩与延展的可能。但他没有回应可能的反驳:比如,如果事物可以让位,它们又如何像他承认的那样支撑起来?
405 内容与形式的和谐:正如事物彼此让位,事物也向理智让出其秘密。质料阻碍,必须有虚空,理智才能穿透。事物必须是多孔的,不只在质料上,也在理智上。
420 用词有趣:“牢固奠基的信”。身体在感觉中被确立,并为推理隐蔽事物提供标准;虚空与理性之间再次出现这种共同性。
445 第三种被否定,但这里的第三种似乎是“eidos”;不过,我猜这取决于如何定义事物:是可感的,还是可理知的。
450 对属性与偶性的几个重要定义;但紧接着提出的本质又如何?
460 时间不独立存在,而来自事物本身。
465 行为在某种意义上都只是偶性,事实性并不独立。
480 他没有注意到这一立场的荒谬吗?作为无的虚空“存在”,那么这个“无”从何而来?是否应换一种方式理解:“无”只从“无”而来,即虚空来自虚空?或者,只是说质料与虚空是不生的?
555 “热寂”。
560 这不太令人信服,因为如果分解比重构更快,给分解设定限度也无助于事物的更新。但我猜他的意思是:既然事物的分解可以比构造更快,经过一定时间,事物就会碎裂到完全无法修复。事物可以被构造而不被拆散,因为被拆散是偶然的可能,而非普遍必然。虽然在宏观尺度上事物确实分解得更快,某些独立事物却不会在被构造之前就分解,因为它们尚未遇到外力。但如果分解没有限度,经过漫长时间,大部分事物都会被拆散而无法更新,仍然存续者就只会是极少而罕见的侥幸。即使事物确实更新,其时间也不会固定。
605 奇怪的描述:原子不是没有部分的点,而是最小部分紧密排列、凝聚而成的整体。为什么需要这个限定?
615 他似乎相信原子包含有限的部分,而非无限的部分。
630 联系645,必须这样理解:最小部分彼此全都同质,但我们确实看到事物的多样性;因此,只有它们作为整体的组合各不相同,才能造成这种多样性,所以“部分不同于整体”。但这些多样者必须稳定且不可分,因为事物有确定的起源。因此,这一构想要调和两种要求:多样性与不可分性。推理如下:1. 最小部分必须没有部分,否则就不是最小;2. 没有部分,使这些部分不可能具有不同自然,因为它们没有内容;3. 为了有差异,就必须有组合或原子;4. 这些原子也必须固定,而其部分不可分,是原子不可分的必要条件,却不是充分条件。
660 由原子构成的整体又是另一个层次,因为它允许虚空。
670 逾越某些固定限度就意味着事物死亡;然而,这不可能,因为事物不会回归虚无。如此,“无”意味着“任何随机事物”。
680 火只是原子秩序的一种表现,而这种秩序也可以造成火以外的身体。
690 “他用感觉对抗感觉”:诸知觉应当和谐,而不是彼此冲突。让一种知觉支配其它知觉是错误的,因为所有知觉同样有效,而且对火的知觉,也只有凭借其它知觉才能确立。按此立场,没有“虚假知觉”。这呼应130处所说,要解释幻觉与梦。但“感觉最能确定地区分真假”又是什么意思?是在说,凡可被感知者就必定为真吗?
760 如果接受那些古老学说,元素就会彼此敌对,毁于彼此之手。
765 两个很有力的论证:1. 如果事物确实改变其自然,那么正如元素可以变成事物,事物也可以变成元素;2. 但如果事物不改变自然,我们就不应看到元素的混合,而事实并非如此。
775 原初的原子似乎各有其自身自然,即组合。
895 事物的混合与隐藏,并不像小身体简单并列存在,而是以完全不同的方式发生,因此部分与整体严格不同:整体是有秩序的部分,每个有序整体的自然,都不同于排序不同的其它整体。否则,一物来自其它事物,这些事物又来自更多事物,一切就会来自一切,而这已在此前被反驳。
945 阐明了将哲学诗化的目的;但这种混合能有所助益,还是它们仍相互敌视?
960 宇宙的无限性。
990 这个论证似乎是说,天空与天体不断下落,但由于其间空间无限,它们仍不会落到大地上,而地上事物可以在空间之下自由运动。
1010 既然空间无限,质料也必须无限,否则空间无边,而质料就会彻底散尽。
1025 一种经过亿万年无序检验的可靠秩序:部分而相对的有限性或秩序。
1035 这里似乎违背了他自己的目的:如果质料无限,还有什么必要论证其永恒?除非他预设一种相对有限性。
1045 回应上述问题:世界的结构相对稳定,但随着时间流逝,其质料会逐渐耗损,必须从世界之外补充。
1080 中心被否定,但重量没有,因为重量似乎只是身体的力或运动,而虚空让位于身体,却不阻碍它们。因此,空间中没有任何一点会让身体停止运动。也没有什么能靠自身静止,而必须靠向相反方向运动的别物。但如果如此,990处阐述的下落倾向如何可能?质料为什么最终会聚合?
关于990,似乎可以说,上方的边界不断压下,而下方的边界保持不动。这样,最终一切都会堆叠起来。但这没有发生,因为一切都在无限空间中下落,因此天空及天体与大地之间的距离可以保持。
2:运动之书
5 多么伟大而有力的灵魂!
25 无须财富,也能照料身体。
50 理性是唯一救济的光。
65 生育的运动、推动这些运动的力,以及为运动让出空间的虚空。
100 “布朗运动”:稳定的事物,是原子因其复杂形状而相互纠缠时的情形。
120 “概念的足迹”。
140 这一范式同时适用于最大与最小尺度。
180 对诸神仍含糊不定;“为了人类”和“为了我们”似乎是重要限定。
210 我又困惑了。他认为什么是重量?无限宇宙中的向下倾向是什么?似乎是说,事物不断下落,并通过自由偏斜彼此撞击。
235 没有阻力时,万物运动一样快,虽然重量不同。因此,各种撞击必须由轻微的侧向运动造成。
255 自由意志奠基于原子的自由运动,自由行动奠基于自由意志。
285 心灵与身体之间的自然类比。
360 然而,种类的恒定性似乎受到损害。
440 感受性从何而来?
495 形状的数量必须有限,因为要无限改变部分的形状与排序,就需要无限数量的部分。两个部分只有一种排序,三个多一些,四个更多,但仍有限。把形状数量增加至无限,就意味着加入无限多的部分。那就必然会有一个无限大的原子。
515 但在我看来,问题与其说是变化的路径是否有限,不如说是它是否连续。
545 既然原子无限多,就没有哪类原子的数量有限。因为这里稀少的,在别处就很多;即使那些原子所创造的事物独一无二,原子仍应无限多,才能在质料的无序中相遇,并彼此补充。
700 这至关重要,因为它成功地将结构与形式奠基为原子自身的内在可能性。
730 颜色是事物的可见者,但触觉仍能感到不可见的原子;因此,原子因其不可见而无色。
750 原子也不能改变颜色,因为粒子如果改变,就必须能够从部分的一种排序转化为另一种,但这会让一切来自一切。
860 原子自身没有属性,因为属性全都会消亡。
870 原子没有感觉。
905 有感觉者也是可变的,因此会消亡。
925 如果生命只能来自生命,生命本身的起源就无法解释,这将导致活力论。但活力论不可能成立,因为若说连大地也有感觉,每个生命就会是一群生命,各有自己的感觉。那么,它们如何统一为整体?
1120 这里似乎暴露了一个根本挑战:凭借随机的原子运动,事物如何自然达到顶点,并开始消逝?为什么有一个固定点,越过后粒子流出就超过流入?这似乎只能由方向性、向下倾向这一事实来解释。这种极性会使事物在接受性与稳定性上不平等。比如,开口在上的罐子更能接受营养,但一旦底部也碎裂敞开,流出就会超过流入。换句话说,既然各部分并不平等,就会有某些部分更难修复,却对获取营养更重要,因此一旦损坏,就很快死亡。
1145 “世界纪元”。
3:死亡之书
86 表面上与《斐多篇》相似的任务。
55 一个人的真相,需要由逆境揭示。
80 人们因为害怕死亡,规划自己的死亡。这似乎在某种程度上反对亚里士多德:渴求永恒,等同于恐惧死亡吗?
105 理智不是身体整体,而像是人的一个独立部分。
125 精神(spirit)是那些最能支持我们生命之物的源头。
140 这似乎很讽刺:身体的“头”是位于胸膛中央的理解力。
155 心灵似乎是自身的源头,而精神中介心灵与身体。
165 心灵即使独立于身体,仍是身体性的。
190 水比蜂蜜更圆,但蜂蜜更甜?
215 “灵魂的重量,或者更确切地说,无重量”。灵魂之于身体,如香味之于酒。
240 精神的多样性,以及最本质的不可言说部分。
250 是肉体感到快乐,还是精神感到快乐?而且,运动似乎仍未穷尽感受之所是。
295 每种范畴如何关联显象:运动的强度与原子的数量?
320 某些恶德在自然中,“超出理性所能驱除的范围”,尽管它们在实际生活中的表现仍微不足道。
335 感觉是心灵与身体的共同努力。
375 心灵与身体之间有一个比例:必须推动更多身体粒子,才能推动一个心灵粒子。
420 任务的真面目在此揭示:克服死亡恐惧,不是像《斐多篇》那样否认必死性。
435 身体在某种意义上是精神的容器,死亡就是精神散入身体外的空气。
520 固定边界是指不可跨越的边界,还是一旦跨越就会死亡的边界?
525 有趣的是,在《斐多篇》中,同样的证据支持相反论证:因为灵魂能够承受恶,即其疾病,而不死,所以它不朽。
530 既然精神可分,它就可以被分解,从而死亡。
545 死亡的定义,是感觉离开一个人。
570 因此,精神似乎更是有序之物,而非其原子。
600 睡眠呢?
670 “回忆”。
675 他认为,失去所有过去的记忆,与死亡没有太大区别。
720 一个好笑的论证:获准生活的完整精神的数目,与消亡者的数目不匹配;长出一千个,却只死了一个。所以精神必须可分。
735 如果精神想在身体中,就必须与身体一同生长;身体一旦完成,就会封闭自身,无法再进入。即使精神确实进去了,也无法形成它与身体共有的全部紧密联系。
785 说卢克莱修的宇宙是随机的,必须非常小心:不是,宇宙是从无序中产生的秩序,类似自然选择;一旦逾越,死亡随之而来。排序通过运动与变化而持存。
840 呼应《斐多篇》:如果死后什么都没有,我们就没有感受,也不应害怕;但如果还有某物,它就已不再是原来的东西,并且失去全部记忆,因为没有人记得前世,所以等于已经死了。
865 “当不朽的死夺去了他必死的生命”。
900 如果我欲望欲望本身呢?
920 睡眠是如死一般的虚无的一个实例。
925 “比无还少”。
930 自然找到自己的声音。
945 一切都会相同。
965 但新的总在挤走旧的。
970 过去是一面镜子,让我们看到未来的死亡。
980 人们害怕的不是死亡本身,而是今生的机运可能带来什么。那么,为什么死亡替代了其它渴望?是因为死亡是一种足够普遍的虚无化力量,足以遮蔽欲望的真实内容吗?
1020 人们也害怕死后还有更糟的东西。
1045 你把时间浪费在害怕死亡上;但完全接受死亡会带来什么后果?“醒来”有什么好处?他希望人“醒来”,却又在生活中躺下,这难道不矛盾吗?
1070 现在他又一次露出真面目:对永恒的渴望。
4:感觉之书
5 “如此幽暗的事物,我以如此清晰的诗句书写”;清晰性是诗歌内在的吗?
51 “图像”从事物表面发出。
115 那么,我猜对这一理论的问题是:深度与客观性如何可能?
160 图像不断被抛出,从而在镜前显得是瞬时的。
220 传播中的图像,其速度会取决于事物吗?那不就会有无法看见的事物?一切都必须流动,才能被认识,这似乎很奇怪。
245 他认识到深度问题,并判定深度可以通过衡量推过瞳孔的空气粒子而产生。
260 回应了我的另一个问题:图像与可见性对事物究竟多重要。显然,有些情况下图像根本不存在,或人眼不可见,但仍能将事物本身与其余事物区分开。
270 现在他更深入这一深度问题,并尝试处理镜中的深度。他的答案是:因为有反射,涉及的不是一股气流,而是两股。
340 这里,黑暗似乎也由粒子构成,很可能是某物的图像。黑暗并不只是光的缺失,也不是接近虚无的东西。我想知道,他会如何解释亚里士多德总举的例子:眼睛为什么看不见离自身太近的事物?
370 但这里,阴影又是光的缺失。我想知道光的自然是什么:只是太阳的图像粒子吗?为什么光浸没一切,却不毁掉其它图像?又如何解释,可见性与照明深刻相关这一事实?他自己显然也反复强调光的作用,因为他想打碎宗教的黑暗。黑暗似乎是阻挡其它图像者,而光则是增强图像者。
380 但这里,光与暗又被描述为视觉的两个根本范畴。光是使图像快速运动的驱动力吗?
390 再次呼应《斐多篇》:知觉如何造成悖论。我们必须以某种方式拯救显象,让它们各自保有权威,却又和谐共处。
470 “我便省去对这一问题的争论”。
480 如果人们确实知道,那就只能是因为有判断真假的标准。感觉就是这一标准。不可能以理性判断感觉,因为理性自身来自感觉;如果感觉虚假,理性也只能虚假。
500 对知觉给出虚假解释,也比否定知觉的可信性更好。
505 含糊的陈述:如果生命坍塌呢?那不就是死亡吗?
590 好笑。
605 确实是奇怪的图景:声音生育声音。
695 气味深埋在事物内部。
745 那么,想象似乎是对混合图像的接受,而非生产。
765 梦中,其它一切感觉与记忆都被置于睡眠。感觉似乎需要相互印证。但我猜这又使理论受到质疑:眼睛如何能够区分不同图像,使其分开,而心灵却不能?此外,什么是记忆?
780 这试图回应图像自发产生的问题。
805 心灵只看到它努力去看的东西,让无数其它图像消亡,因为这些图像无限而过于稀薄。这也许也解释了眼睛为何能够看见并区分,因为那些图像还相对坚韧。如此,想象与梦中图像的连续性,就成为心灵努力的结果。但一个问题是:为什么图像没有全被毁坏、模糊,而似乎仍保持清晰与完整,尽管依旧不可能且非现实?
835 目的(telos)被彻底谴责。
845 合目的性在人那里,但自然是随机的。
880 这在某种意义上听来矛盾:心灵必须预见自己意愿做的事;但仍不清楚何者优先,图像还是意志?就邻近语境而言,似乎是说图像撞击心灵,使心灵意愿;但据此前段落,心灵对其想象也有所选择。
905 心灵与身体之间有某种杠杆关系。
925 睡眠由精神的分散引起。
945 再次,睡眠降临于人,并非出于目的,而是不断撞击所造成的拆散之必然。
960 缺少对为什么会醒来的解释,也缺少对昼夜节律的观察。
965 好笑。但这似乎与记忆和过去有关。我猜过去可以留下踪迹?
1035 好笑。
1070 维纳斯受到赞颂,爱情却应被回避。建议似乎是:不要追逐图像,只满足能够被满足的东西,即性冲动;让那个欲求爱情的东西死去、枯萎。
1085 维纳斯似乎与自然对立。
1090 “只有这一件事,我们拥有得越多,心就越因对它的凶猛欲望而燃烧”。
1125 这些诗句难道不正试图用稀薄图像喂养心灵?
1155 好笑。
1200 雌性只因自然欲望而顺从雄性。
1265 太好笑了,我无法相信这不是反讽。
1280 因相互适应而生的爱。
5:欲望之书
10 他似乎认为自己是神圣的,或追随神圣者。
50 语词、图像与声音之间的动力关系。
90 万物都有有限的力量,以及深埋的界石。
100 真实却“不可感”的事物。
105 宣告世界终结的是理性,而非事件。
120 “以必死者的言语玷污不朽之物”。
155 诸神的自然是稀薄而不可触及的。
175 没有人“想要”出生。
180 这是《蒂迈欧篇》的关键问题之一:神所观看的范型从何而来?
225 好笑。
525 很美:“火焰的身体在天空繁星的牧场上吃草”。
545 一同生长,意味着被统一到一种稳定状态。
555 空气扎根于大地。
570 这些其实是很合理的论证:既然地上每个人感到相同热量、看见相同大小,就没有理由假定接近太阳时,其大小或温度会显著改变。而且,月亮没有模糊的轮廓,说明它确实离我们不远。
665 托勒密已经反驳过的论证。
825 大地配得上母亲之名。
840 如今被视为怪异的某些事物,在某些过去时代曾被允许。
850 “自然选择”。
880 但即使怪物可能出现,某些由已有事物组合而成的东西,比如半人马,仍不可能,因为它们是想象的产物,不符合理性。万物即使怪异,也应自然地从自身独异的自然中长出,而非出自暴力叠加。
925 理论,还是神话?
990 很美:“活的肉埋在活的坟墓里”。
1005 “邪恶的航海技艺”。现在似乎成了社会批评。
1045 语言也通过社会互动自然生成。
1125 嫉妒。
1130 人们倾向于欲求别人所欲求者,因为如此就能在他人中获得安全。
1170 这里他显露自身:诸神是图像,所以稀薄而缥缈。只要有身体,就有图像,诸神由此永恒;人也无法触及诸神,因为它们如此稀薄,远离与身体交互的现实生活。
1200 真正的虔敬,是人有能力以安静的心灵沉思世界。
1345 太好笑。
1355 发现厌女。
1415 更新、更好的东西并不带来更多快乐,因为我们已经习惯所拥有的东西。而拥有更新、更好的东西,总会损害先前的品味与快乐。曾经的快乐现在变成痛苦,快乐本身却一丝也没有增加。
1430 人们虚妄,因为看不到自己渴望的边界。
1445 在书写被发明之前,旧事只留下踪迹,供理性探究。
6:奇观之书
15 容器本身制造了缺陷。身体曾是容器,现在心灵也是。
30 这个人是谁?伊壁鸠鲁?如果一切恶都是自然的,理解自然又如何能驱散恶?通过理解其不可避免,并学习接受它吗?
205 他似乎不认为云被太阳染色,而是认为云吸收了太阳的种子。
390 假定诸神是正义的。
610 一个翻译错误:把“globe”译成这个短语,太不谨慎。
800 再次,那些似乎带来快乐与满足的东西,同时也在磨损人。
920 哪一种?
1005 磁性是个困难的概念,因为有力,却没有明显接触。
1015 这值得怀疑,因为磁石有极性。
1050 讨论了排斥,但我不信服。似乎是说,石头发出的流在铁内部,以及铁与石头之间造成虚空时,就发生吸引;当通路被阻断,石头发出的流不再制造虚空,而是将铁推开时,就发生排斥。
1080 一者的凹处遇到另一者的凸处时,便形成最完美的结合;有时“钩与环”也能把事物连在一起,但没有那么稳定。
1140 本书以雅典的荣耀开始,以瘟疫结束。