Niccolò Machiavelli · 尼科洛·马基雅维利
The Prince · Discourses on Livy · 君主论 · 论李维
Notes on Machiavelli and Us, 2024
Douban · Bidasari
Source revised / 来源修订: 30 June 2026
Reading / 研读:Louis Althusser · Machiavelli and Us 马基雅维利与我们
In this note / 篇目
Althusser on Machiavelli, I:
1. [The Prince] is a gripping and elusive book. The essential question is to grasp exactly the origin of this quality. This can only be done by examining the structure and inner purpose of this work. First, this work is organized around a purpose, namely, the making of a modern (national) state. This speaks of a particular conjuncture of history and also a problem of political practice. The practical “problem” that reveals the break or “disconjuncture” in history opens up a place for the political subject, and this place where subjectivity resides grips.
2. This, however, is in rough strokes only. A more detailed study has to delineate carefully the three spaces this work occupies. First, as a theoretical work, it has a particular theoretical position. It is not a general study of forms of governments. Rather, all its contents are organized around one central political problem, which is again not a problem to fit in a general theory, but a political problem that is monopolized by a political practice, namely, the making of a state. That is, this book is not a book of forms, but a book of forces. This Althusser calls Machiavelli’s theoretical “dispositive”. This is what Gramsci calls “revolutionary” about [The Prince].
3. The second space it occupies is its material space. As a work addressed particularly to the problem, it has to be able to contribute to the solution of this problem by itself as a text. This solution asks for a subject, “the new prince”, hence the work itself must be able to call forth this subject to occupy the position. That is, it must rally itself as one of the forces. It itself is a political act. This is why Gramsci calls it a “manifesto”.
4. But here a new space is opened up. For the subject called forth is “the new prince”, yet the viewpoint Machiavelli has is that of the people. This is the ideological space of the text. Unlike [The Communist Manifesto], whose political subject called upon is the same as the viewpoint taken, [The Prince] has constructed a theoretical space that is organized around a political problem that yet calls for a subject essentially different from those whom this problem strictly concerns. “The people” want a modern state, but only “the prince” can bring it to fulfillment. This is why, to sum up, [The Prince] is for Gramsci “a revolutionary utopian manifesto”.
5. The main force [The Prince] has as it speaks to Hegel, Marx (though they both fit Machiavelli into their historical consciousness as a particular moment of development, yet they also recognize the particularity of the event that Machiavelli himself represents) and Gramsci is that it deals with a “conjuncture”, a historical moment and a particular political problem. It speaks of a problem that demands a solution. And is hence gripping. A system is never gripping, but only captures. Problems alone grip. Yet this work is elusive, for it posits a distance between the political subject spoken of and the speaking subject, and relies on chance possibilities. This is why “virtù” evades all kinds of definitions.
Althusser on Machiavelli, II:
1. To see how Machiavelli patches together different theories to address one particular political practical problem, we have to trace the development of his theses. Althusser gives three examples. The first example is with the problem of state in history, the second with virtù, the third with the status of antiquity.
2. With the problem of state in history, there are four theses. First, things never change. Second, all things always change. This is a blatant contradiction. Machiavelli cannot give up on either, since he needs the first to make modern men comparable to ancient men, and from comparisons draw lessons, and revive what is witnessed in Ancient Rome; he needs the second so that he can explain why it occurs that it seems so difficult for that revival to actually happen, that something must have changed that covered up antiquity, and he also needs the second to confirm the possibility for a revolution. So he reconciles both theses with a third thesis: things change in an eternal cycle. “Governments” pass away in their differing forms, but there are invariant laws that can make “states” enduring. His third thesis is thereby turned into a fourth one: forms of governments succeed each other, but a state that combines these forms in good proportions endure. One needs to be mindful here that he is talking about mixture of forms differently from Aristotle: for Aristotle, the mixture is to achieve “political good”, whose manifestation is duration, and each of the good forms in itself is good. But for Machiavelli, “the good forms” are only transient, and only mixture brings stability; the good forms themselves do not endure. This group is organized essentially around the question of “state” and the practice of “state making”.
3. This initial group of theses is then developed into the next group on virtù. The third thesis: governments pass away, states endure. But states also pass away, most of the times with their governments, even when these forms are well-mixed. Then what is really passing away? And what really endures? It is the virtue to make and maintain a state that passes away in one place, but endures in the whole by moving to another place. New states crop up while old states perish. This then starts a new series of theses on the question of virtù. This group, as before, is organized around “state making”.
4. The third group of theses have to do with the notion of antiquity. First thesis: all people admire antiquity. Second thesis: nobody imitates antiquity for its politics. This is not an inconsistency: we are corrupted and softened, so we only moralize and appreciate antiquity, but do not dare to practice virtù. This move in his argument would remain obscure if we don’t notice Machiavelli’s stance against all kinds of ideology. Ideology and moralization is the utopian sentiment that stirs up a revolution that is yet restricted in its content. This is what Marx says in [18th Brumaire], that bourgeoisie conjures up Rome to clothe its own timidness and shallowness. The same way moderns clothe themselves in antiquity, for they practice shallow politics. To spurn all that ideology, Machiavelli dares to touch upon the “real politics” from antiquity that deals with the same problem he faces in his own reality; he compares past and present “scientifically”, not because he is doing any kind of positivistic science, but because he sees a real practical problem he has resolved to provide a solution for, because he does not lie to himself, that he is willing to penetrate and address what no one dares or wants to touch upon: namely, how to make a state. In this sense, we must remind ourselves, Machiavelli is a utopian thinker, not because he moralizes or borrows from the phantom of the past, but because of the distance between his people and his prince, different subjects for the same problem. He does not write for prince or people alone. His theory must be for both.
Continuation on 4.: In a word, we admire antiquity because we want to borrow from antiquity its grandeur, because our own politics are measly, because we lack virtù; Machiavelli studies antiquity because he wants to solve a problem and needs someone who has virtù to accomplish a task, so he teaches virtù and actually wants people to imitate antiquity.
P.S. 阿尔都塞和施的解读很多时候是完全相反的:对施来说,马基雅维利是纯粹的政治哲人,其它一切“实践”相关很可能都是给其颠覆性的哲思做粉饰的幌子,而施之所以这么关注这一面,就是为了去思考现代性起源这一问题;对阿尔都塞来说,如果只是因为要了解马基雅维利带来的思想革命才去读他,那说明马基雅维利其实已经失去了其政治功用了,他的政治关切也丧失了,马基雅维利作为政治哲人其最直接的价值就被取消了,因此事实上需要注意的是马基雅维利的政治关切本身,是为了解决什么政治问题,而不是他的政治“思想”带来了什么样的革命。
也就是说,施那里的马基雅维利是思考“政治作为整体”的哲人,其根本问题是“政治是什么”,因此关涉于现代性起源;但阿尔都塞对其可能的批评是,马基雅维利不只是哲人,更是政治哲人,而任何政治哲人对政治的思考都无法脱离于一个具体的政治语境和政治问题,否则他就是无政治关切的“客观”的“科学家”,而这是不可能适用于马基雅维利的。因此马基雅维利不是对“政治”思考,而是对具体的“政治问题”进行思考,这一问题就是现代国家的建立。
Althusser on Machiavelli, III:
1. Machiavelli’s political problem is the foundation of an enduring nation state. This is his political objective. [The Prince] talks about the foundation, while [Discourses] the duration.
2. [Discourses] lays out the true content of a nation state. It cannot be a tyranny, for a tyrannical state is at first unstable, for people constantly revolt, and once stabilized would be necessarily weak, for slaves must be kept weak. It cannot be simply a republic, for a pure republic (without kingly roles, like dictators or consuls) is necessarily weak and meek. It cannot be an ecclesiastical state, for that is not a political entity and takes itself to be outside history. The only option is an empire, like the Roman Republic. It must expand and be universal, and in order to do so it must have strength; that is, its people must be free, and the prince rules on the side of people. So Machiavelli is not a republican, for he doesn’t advocate for freedom as such, but only for the freedom of and within an empire.
3. The beginning of a nation state requires a foundation whence laws of freedom can take root in the people. Yet this foundation can only be provided by one individual. The orderer of a new state must be alone. But why must the prince be new? That is because a subjected people can only recover their freedom by great difficulty, so that everything needs to be swept away and established anew. And in order for Italy to become a nation state, there must be a transcendent conjuncture conducive to the beginning: the correspondence between Fortuna and Virtù. Such possibility is left open and abstract not because Machiavelli is merely a political theorist thinking in abstract terms, but because this anonymity of the New Prince is practically necessary for him to start everything anew. Cesare Borgias substantiated that possibility for Machiavelli.
Althusser on Machiavelli, IV:
1. Machiavelli’s New Prince has all his political practice directed toward the objective of the establishment of the nation state. As the prince of the nation state, he has to be in charge of the state apparatus, i.e. the apparatus of force, the apparatus of ideology, and the apparatus of class struggle.
2. With the apparatus of force, viz. the military, Machiavelli has two theses. First, military is the precondition and the true foundation of a nation state. Second, the military is not brute force, but is precisely the fundamental base where nationalization needs to occur. It is through the making of a national army that the nation itself can be born. Hence the army has to be constituted in specific ways. First, the army has to heavily involve the forces of peasants, so as to complete the nationalization of all social relations and destroy feudalism. In a similar vein, infantry has to be prioritized over cavalry. Hence the political always comes before everything. Though military precedes ideology and law absolutely, military has to be directed toward both latter as its end goal and has to contain in itself that end, so that the end is both immanent to the means and sometimes a relative means to the means, for good soldiers cannot be without good orders and good religion. This also explains why Machiavelli excludes other sorts of force but commends only a national army.
3. Regarding ideology, the prince has to be able to use religion, for religion is the bedrock for custom and fear. To use religion, however, means that the prince has to be capable of dissembling. The prince needs a moral façade but should nonetheless exercise political virtù. That is to say, the prince has to be a man and a beast, so as to be capable of moral virtues and also political virtù. The beast is composed of a lion and a fox. Lion is force. But the prince has to conceal his violence and crime, so he has to be guileful.
4. That is, a prince has to always side with the people. He is the prince of a popular state. He must not incur hatred, but also not love, since love is unstable and uncontrolled by the prince (people choose if to love the prince, but the prince chooses if they should fear him). The only right course therefore is fear. To make people fear without hatred is to make people respect his force, but never to hurt people directly, rather side with the people and attack the nobles. This is of one and the same principle as before, that is the nation state is a popular state and the prince must always be alone, but popular. Therefore he must conceal himself and learn to fraud.
非中文段落由 AI 翻译,中文原文保持不变。中英混合原稿可通过“原文”按钮查看。
In this note / 篇目
阿尔都塞论马基雅维利,I:
1. 《君主论》是一部扣人心弦而又难以把握的书。根本问题在于准确把握这一特质的起源,而这只有通过考察作品的结构与内在目的才能做到。首先,这部作品围绕一个目的组织起来,即现代(民族)国家的建立。这指向一个特殊的历史形势,也指向一个政治实践问题。实践的“问题”揭示历史中的断裂或“脱节”,为政治主体打开一个位置,而主体性所在的这个位置扣人心弦。
2. 但这只是粗略的轮廓。更详细的研究必须仔细刻画这部作品占据的三个空间。首先,作为理论著作,它有一个特定的理论立场。它并非对政府形式的一般研究;相反,它的全部内容都围绕一个核心政治问题来组织,而这又不是一个被纳入一般理论的问题,而是被某种政治实践独占的政治问题,即国家的建立。也就是说,这不是一部关于形式的书,而是一部关于力量的书。阿尔都塞将其称为马基雅维利的理论“配置(dispositive)”。这就是葛兰西所谓《君主论》的“革命性”。
3. 它占据的第二个空间是其物质空间。作为一部专门针对这一问题的作品,它必须能够作为文本本身为问题的解决作出贡献。这一解决要求一个主体,即“新君主”,因此作品自身必须能够召唤这一主体来占据这个位置。也就是说,它必须把自己集结为诸力量之一。它本身就是一个政治行动。这就是葛兰西称它为“宣言”的原因。
4. 但这里又开启了一个新的空间。被召唤的主体是“新君主”,而马基雅维利采取的视角却属于民众。这是文本的意识形态空间。《共产党宣言》所召唤的政治主体与它采取的视角相同;与之不同,《君主论》构造出一个围绕政治问题组织的理论空间,却召唤了一个在本质上不同于这一问题严格所关涉者的主体。“民众”想要现代国家,但只有“君主”才能将其实现。总而言之,这就是为什么《君主论》对葛兰西来说是“一篇革命的乌托邦宣言”。
5. 《君主论》向黑格尔、马克思与葛兰西言说时,其主要力量在于它处理一个“形势”,一个历史时刻与一个特殊政治问题。虽然黑格尔与马克思都把马基雅维利纳入自己的历史意识,作为发展的一个特殊环节,但他们也承认马基雅维利本人所代表的事件之特殊性。这部作品谈论一个要求解决的问题,因此扣人心弦。体系从不扣人心弦,而只是捕获;只有问题才扣人心弦。但这部作品又难以把握,因为它在被谈论的政治主体与进行言说的主体之间设立距离,并依赖偶然的可能性。这就是“德性(virtù)”逃避一切定义的原因。
阿尔都塞论马基雅维利,II:
1. 为了看清马基雅维利如何把不同理论拼接起来,以回应一个特定的政治实践问题,我们必须追踪其论题的发展。阿尔都塞给了三个例子:第一个是历史中的国家问题,第二个是德性,第三个是古典的地位。
2. 关于历史中的国家问题,有四个论题。第一,事物从不改变。第二,一切事物总在改变。这是一个明显的矛盾。马基雅维利不能放弃其中任何一个,因为他需要第一个来使现代人与古人可以比较,从比较中吸取教训,并复兴古罗马所见之事;他需要第二个来解释为什么这样的复兴看起来如此难以真正发生,即一定有什么发生了改变,遮蔽了古典;他也需要第二个来确认革命的可能性。于是他以第三个论题调和前两者:事物在永恒循环中改变。“政府”以其不同形式消逝,但存在不变的法则,可以让“国家”持久。由此,第三个论题转化为第四个:政府形式彼此接替,而以良好比例结合这些形式的国家可以持久。这里需要注意,他谈论形式混合的方式不同于亚里士多德:对亚里士多德来说,混合是为了达成“政治善”,其表现是持久,而每一种好的形式本身就是好的。但对马基雅维利来说,“好的形式”只是暂时的,只有混合带来稳定;好的形式本身并不持久。这组论题在根本上围绕“国家”问题与“国家建立”的实践而组织。
3. 这最初的一组论题继而发展为下一组关于德性的论题。第三个论题说:政府消逝,国家持久。但国家同样消逝,往往与其政府一起,即便这些形式已充分混合。那么真正消逝的是什么?真正持久的又是什么?是在一处消逝、却通过转移到另一处而在整体中持久的、建立与维持国家的德性。新国家兴起,旧国家灭亡。这便开启了关于德性问题的新一系列论题。与之前一样,这组论题围绕“国家建立”来组织。
4. 第三组论题与古典这一概念有关。第一个论题:所有人都钦慕古典。第二个论题:没有人在政治上模仿古典。这并不矛盾:我们腐化而软弱,所以只把古典道德化、欣赏古典,却不敢实践德性。如果不注意马基雅维利对一切意识形态的反对,这一步论证就会晦暗不明。意识形态与道德化是激起革命的乌托邦情感,但这革命的内容仍受限制。这正是马克思在《雾月十八日》中所说的:资产阶级召唤罗马,为自身的怯懦与浅薄披上外衣。现代人也以同样方式用古典装扮自己,因为他们实践的是浅薄的政治。为了摒弃这一切意识形态,马基雅维利敢于触碰古典的“真实政治”,它处理的是与他在自身现实中面对的相同问题。他“科学地”比较古今,并不是因为他在从事某种实证主义科学,而是因为他看到了一个真实的实践问题,并决心提供解决办法;因为他不欺骗自己,愿意深入并处理别人不敢或不愿触碰的东西:如何建立国家。在这个意义上,我们必须提醒自己,马基雅维利是乌托邦思想家,并不是因为他道德化或借用过去的幽灵,而是因为其民众与君主之间的距离,同一个问题的不同主体。他并不只为君主或只为民众写作;他的理论必须同时面向两者。
续4:一句话,我们钦慕古典,是因为想借用古典的宏伟,因为我们自己的政治卑微,因为我们缺乏德性;马基雅维利研究古典,是因为他想解决一个问题,需要有德性的人来完成一项任务,所以他教导德性,并真正想让人模仿古典。
P.S. 阿尔都塞和施的解读很多时候是完全相反的:对施来说,马基雅维利是纯粹的政治哲人,其它一切“实践”相关很可能都是给其颠覆性的哲思做粉饰的幌子,而施之所以这么关注这一面,就是为了去思考现代性起源这一问题;对阿尔都塞来说,如果只是因为要了解马基雅维利带来的思想革命才去读他,那说明马基雅维利其实已经失去了其政治功用了,他的政治关切也丧失了,马基雅维利作为政治哲人其最直接的价值就被取消了,因此事实上需要注意的是马基雅维利的政治关切本身,是为了解决什么政治问题,而不是他的政治“思想”带来了什么样的革命。
也就是说,施那里的马基雅维利是思考“政治作为整体”的哲人,其根本问题是“政治是什么”,因此关涉于现代性起源;但阿尔都塞对其可能的批评是,马基雅维利不只是哲人,更是政治哲人,而任何政治哲人对政治的思考都无法脱离于一个具体的政治语境和政治问题,否则他就是无政治关切的“客观”的“科学家”,而这是不可能适用于马基雅维利的。因此马基雅维利不是对“政治”思考,而是对具体的“政治问题”进行思考,这一问题就是现代国家的建立。
阿尔都塞论马基雅维利,III:
1. 马基雅维利的政治问题是建立一个持久的民族国家。这是他的政治目标。《君主论》谈奠基,《论李维》谈持久。
2. 《论李维》阐明民族国家的真正内容。它不能是僭政,因为僭政国家起初不稳定,民众不断反叛;一旦稳定下来,它又必然虚弱,因为奴隶必须被保持为弱者。它不能仅仅是共和国,因为纯粹的共和国——没有独裁官或执政官等王者角色——必然软弱而温顺。它不能是教会国家,因为后者不是政治实体,并自认为处于历史之外。唯一选择是帝国,如罗马共和国。它必须扩张,必须普遍;为此,它必须有力量,也就是说,它的民众必须自由,而君主站在民众一边统治。因此马基雅维利不是共和主义者,因为他并不提倡自由本身,而只提倡帝国的自由及帝国内部的自由。
3. 民族国家的开端要求一种奠基,自由的法律才能由此在民众中扎根。但这一基础只能由一个个体提供。新国家的创制者必须独自行动。但君主为什么必须是新的?因为受奴役的民众只有通过巨大的困难才能恢复自由,所以一切都需要被扫除并重新建立。为了让意大利成为民族国家,必须有一个有利于开端的超越性形势:机运(Fortuna)与德性(Virtù)的对应。这种可能性被保持为开放而抽象,并不是因为马基雅维利只是一个以抽象方式思考的政治理论家,而是因为新君主的这一匿名性在实践上是他使一切重新开始的必要条件。切萨雷·博尔贾为马基雅维利具体证实了这一可能性。
阿尔都塞论马基雅维利,IV:
1. 马基雅维利的新君主把所有政治实践都导向民族国家的建立这一目标。作为民族国家的君主,他必须掌握国家装置,即武力装置、意识形态装置与阶级斗争装置。
2. 关于武力装置,也就是军队,马基雅维利有两个论题。第一,军队是民族国家的前提与真正基础。第二,军队并不是赤裸的武力,而恰恰是民族化必须发生的根本基地。只有通过建立民族军队,民族本身才得以诞生。因此,军队必须以特定方式构成。首先,军队必须大量纳入农民的力量,以完成一切社会关系的民族化并摧毁封建制。同样,步兵必须优先于骑兵。因此,政治总是先于一切。尽管军队绝对先于意识形态与法律,但军队必须把后两者作为最终目的,并把这一目的包含在自身之中;目的既内在于手段,有时又成为相对于手段的手段,因为好士兵不能没有好秩序和好宗教。这也解释了为什么马基雅维利排除其它武力形式,而只推崇民族军队。
3. 关于意识形态,君主必须能够运用宗教,因为宗教是习俗与恐惧的基石。但运用宗教意味着君主必须善于伪装。君主需要道德的外表,却仍必须践行政治德性。也就是说,君主必须既是人又是兽,才能同时具有道德美德与政治德性。兽由狮子和狐狸构成。狮子是武力;但君主必须隐藏自己的暴力与罪行,因此必须狡诈。
4. 也就是说,君主必须始终站在民众一边。他是民众国家的君主。他不能招致仇恨,但也不能招致爱,因为爱不稳定,而且不受君主控制:民众选择是否爱君主,君主却可以选择是否让他们恐惧自己。因此唯一正确的道路是恐惧。让民众恐惧却不仇恨,就是让他们尊敬他的力量,却从不直接伤害他们,而是站在民众一边攻击贵族。这与之前是同一个原则:民族国家是民众的国家,而君主必须始终独自行动,却又属于民众。因此他必须隐藏自己,学会欺诈。
AI translated the non-English passages; original English passages are preserved. The mixed-language original is available under Original.
In this note / 篇目
Althusser on Machiavelli, I:
1. [The Prince] is a gripping and elusive book. The essential question is to grasp exactly the origin of this quality. This can only be done by examining the structure and inner purpose of this work. First, this work is organized around a purpose, namely, the making of a modern (national) state. This speaks of a particular conjuncture of history and also a problem of political practice. The practical “problem” that reveals the break or “disconjuncture” in history opens up a place for the political subject, and this place where subjectivity resides grips.
2. This, however, is in rough strokes only. A more detailed study has to delineate carefully the three spaces this work occupies. First, as a theoretical work, it has a particular theoretical position. It is not a general study of forms of governments. Rather, all its contents are organized around one central political problem, which is again not a problem to fit in a general theory, but a political problem that is monopolized by a political practice, namely, the making of a state. That is, this book is not a book of forms, but a book of forces. This Althusser calls Machiavelli’s theoretical “dispositive”. This is what Gramsci calls “revolutionary” about [The Prince].
3. The second space it occupies is its material space. As a work addressed particularly to the problem, it has to be able to contribute to the solution of this problem by itself as a text. This solution asks for a subject, “the new prince”, hence the work itself must be able to call forth this subject to occupy the position. That is, it must rally itself as one of the forces. It itself is a political act. This is why Gramsci calls it a “manifesto”.
4. But here a new space is opened up. For the subject called forth is “the new prince”, yet the viewpoint Machiavelli has is that of the people. This is the ideological space of the text. Unlike [The Communist Manifesto], whose political subject called upon is the same as the viewpoint taken, [The Prince] has constructed a theoretical space that is organized around a political problem that yet calls for a subject essentially different from those whom this problem strictly concerns. “The people” want a modern state, but only “the prince” can bring it to fulfillment. This is why, to sum up, [The Prince] is for Gramsci “a revolutionary utopian manifesto”.
5. The main force [The Prince] has as it speaks to Hegel, Marx (though they both fit Machiavelli into their historical consciousness as a particular moment of development, yet they also recognize the particularity of the event that Machiavelli himself represents) and Gramsci is that it deals with a “conjuncture”, a historical moment and a particular political problem. It speaks of a problem that demands a solution. And is hence gripping. A system is never gripping, but only captures. Problems alone grip. Yet this work is elusive, for it posits a distance between the political subject spoken of and the speaking subject, and relies on chance possibilities. This is why “virtù” evades all kinds of definitions.
Althusser on Machiavelli, II:
1. To see how Machiavelli patches together different theories to address one particular political practical problem, we have to trace the development of his theses. Althusser gives three examples. The first example is with the problem of state in history, the second with virtù, the third with the status of antiquity.
2. With the problem of state in history, there are four theses. First, things never change. Second, all things always change. This is a blatant contradiction. Machiavelli cannot give up on either, since he needs the first to make modern men comparable to ancient men, and from comparisons draw lessons, and revive what is witnessed in Ancient Rome; he needs the second so that he can explain why it occurs that it seems so difficult for that revival to actually happen, that something must have changed that covered up antiquity, and he also needs the second to confirm the possibility for a revolution. So he reconciles both theses with a third thesis: things change in an eternal cycle. “Governments” pass away in their differing forms, but there are invariant laws that can make “states” enduring. His third thesis is thereby turned into a fourth one: forms of governments succeed each other, but a state that combines these forms in good proportions endure. One needs to be mindful here that he is talking about mixture of forms differently from Aristotle: for Aristotle, the mixture is to achieve “political good”, whose manifestation is duration, and each of the good forms in itself is good. But for Machiavelli, “the good forms” are only transient, and only mixture brings stability; the good forms themselves do not endure. This group is organized essentially around the question of “state” and the practice of “state making”.
3. This initial group of theses is then developed into the next group on virtù. The third thesis: governments pass away, states endure. But states also pass away, most of the times with their governments, even when these forms are well-mixed. Then what is really passing away? And what really endures? It is the virtue to make and maintain a state that passes away in one place, but endures in the whole by moving to another place. New states crop up while old states perish. This then starts a new series of theses on the question of virtù. This group, as before, is organized around “state making”.
4. The third group of theses have to do with the notion of antiquity. First thesis: all people admire antiquity. Second thesis: nobody imitates antiquity for its politics. This is not an inconsistency: we are corrupted and softened, so we only moralize and appreciate antiquity, but do not dare to practice virtù. This move in his argument would remain obscure if we don’t notice Machiavelli’s stance against all kinds of ideology. Ideology and moralization is the utopian sentiment that stirs up a revolution that is yet restricted in its content. This is what Marx says in [18th Brumaire], that bourgeoisie conjures up Rome to clothe its own timidness and shallowness. The same way moderns clothe themselves in antiquity, for they practice shallow politics. To spurn all that ideology, Machiavelli dares to touch upon the “real politics” from antiquity that deals with the same problem he faces in his own reality; he compares past and present “scientifically”, not because he is doing any kind of positivistic science, but because he sees a real practical problem he has resolved to provide a solution for, because he does not lie to himself, that he is willing to penetrate and address what no one dares or wants to touch upon: namely, how to make a state. In this sense, we must remind ourselves, Machiavelli is a utopian thinker, not because he moralizes or borrows from the phantom of the past, but because of the distance between his people and his prince, different subjects for the same problem. He does not write for prince or people alone. His theory must be for both.
Continuation on 4.: In a word, we admire antiquity because we want to borrow from antiquity its grandeur, because our own politics are measly, because we lack virtù; Machiavelli studies antiquity because he wants to solve a problem and needs someone who has virtù to accomplish a task, so he teaches virtù and actually wants people to imitate antiquity.
P.S. Althusser’s and Strauss’s readings are often diametrically opposed. For Strauss, Machiavelli is a pure political philosopher; everything concerned with ‘practice’ may well be a pretext that dresses up his subversive philosophical thought. Strauss pays such close attention to this aspect precisely in order to think through the origins of modernity. For Althusser, if we read Machiavelli merely to understand the intellectual revolution he brought about, then Machiavelli has already lost his political function and concerns, and his most immediate value as a political philosopher has been canceled. What actually demands attention, therefore, is Machiavelli’s political concern itself: what political problem he sought to solve, rather than what revolution his political ‘thought’ brought about.
In other words, Strauss’s Machiavelli is a philosopher who thinks ‘politics as a whole’; his fundamental question is ‘What is politics?’, and thus concerns the origins of modernity. Althusser’s possible criticism, however, is that Machiavelli is not merely a philosopher but a political philosopher, and no political philosopher’s thinking about politics can be detached from a concrete political context and problem. Otherwise, he would be an ‘objective’ ‘scientist’ without political concerns, which cannot possibly apply to Machiavelli. Machiavelli therefore thinks not about ‘politics’ but about a concrete ‘political problem’: the establishment of the modern state.
Althusser on Machiavelli, III:
1. Machiavelli’s political problem is the foundation of an enduring nation state. This is his political objective. [The Prince] talks about the foundation, while [Discourses] the duration.
2. [Discourses] lays out the true content of a nation state. It cannot be a tyranny, for a tyrannical state is at first unstable, for people constantly revolt, and once stabilized would be necessarily weak, for slaves must be kept weak. It cannot be simply a republic, for a pure republic (without kingly roles, like dictators or consuls) is necessarily weak and meek. It cannot be an ecclesiastical state, for that is not a political entity and takes itself to be outside history. The only option is an empire, like the Roman Republic. It must expand and be universal, and in order to do so it must have strength; that is, its people must be free, and the prince rules on the side of people. So Machiavelli is not a republican, for he doesn’t advocate for freedom as such, but only for the freedom of and within an empire.
3. The beginning of a nation state requires a foundation whence laws of freedom can take root in the people. Yet this foundation can only be provided by one individual. The orderer of a new state must be alone. But why must the prince be new? That is because a subjected people can only recover their freedom by great difficulty, so that everything needs to be swept away and established anew. And in order for Italy to become a nation state, there must be a transcendent conjuncture conducive to the beginning: the correspondence between Fortuna and Virtù. Such possibility is left open and abstract not because Machiavelli is merely a political theorist thinking in abstract terms, but because this anonymity of the New Prince is practically necessary for him to start everything anew. Cesare Borgias substantiated that possibility for Machiavelli.
Althusser on Machiavelli, IV:
1. Machiavelli’s New Prince has all his political practice directed toward the objective of the establishment of the nation state. As the prince of the nation state, he has to be in charge of the state apparatus, i.e. the apparatus of force, the apparatus of ideology, and the apparatus of class struggle.
2. With the apparatus of force, viz. the military, Machiavelli has two theses. First, military is the precondition and the true foundation of a nation state. Second, the military is not brute force, but is precisely the fundamental base where nationalization needs to occur. It is through the making of a national army that the nation itself can be born. Hence the army has to be constituted in specific ways. First, the army has to heavily involve the forces of peasants, so as to complete the nationalization of all social relations and destroy feudalism. In a similar vein, infantry has to be prioritized over cavalry. Hence the political always comes before everything. Though military precedes ideology and law absolutely, military has to be directed toward both latter as its end goal and has to contain in itself that end, so that the end is both immanent to the means and sometimes a relative means to the means, for good soldiers cannot be without good orders and good religion. This also explains why Machiavelli excludes other sorts of force but commends only a national army.
3. Regarding ideology, the prince has to be able to use religion, for religion is the bedrock for custom and fear. To use religion, however, means that the prince has to be capable of dissembling. The prince needs a moral façade but should nonetheless exercise political virtù. That is to say, the prince has to be a man and a beast, so as to be capable of moral virtues and also political virtù. The beast is composed of a lion and a fox. Lion is force. But the prince has to conceal his violence and crime, so he has to be guileful.
4. That is, a prince has to always side with the people. He is the prince of a popular state. He must not incur hatred, but also not love, since love is unstable and uncontrolled by the prince (people choose if to love the prince, but the prince chooses if they should fear him). The only right course therefore is fear. To make people fear without hatred is to make people respect his force, but never to hurt people directly, rather side with the people and attack the nobles. This is of one and the same principle as before, that is the nation state is a popular state and the prince must always be alone, but popular. Therefore he must conceal himself and learn to fraud.