Gui Ruiyan

Niccolò Machiavelli · 尼科洛·马基雅维利
The Prince · Discourses on Livy · 君主论 · 论李维

Notes on Machiavelli and Us, 2024

Douban · Bidasari

Source revised / 来源修订: 30 June 2026

Reading / 研读:Louis Althusser · Machiavelli and Us 马基雅维利与我们

AI translated the non-English passages; original English passages are preserved. The mixed-language original is available under Original.

In this note / 篇目

Althusser on Machiavelli, I:

1. [The Prince] is a gripping and elusive book. The essential question is to grasp exactly the origin of this quality. This can only be done by examining the structure and inner purpose of this work. First, this work is organized around a purpose, namely, the making of a modern (national) state. This speaks of a particular conjuncture of history and also a problem of political practice. The practical “problem” that reveals the break or “disconjuncture” in history opens up a place for the political subject, and this place where subjectivity resides grips.

2. This, however, is in rough strokes only. A more detailed study has to delineate carefully the three spaces this work occupies. First, as a theoretical work, it has a particular theoretical position. It is not a general study of forms of governments. Rather, all its contents are organized around one central political problem, which is again not a problem to fit in a general theory, but a political problem that is monopolized by a political practice, namely, the making of a state. That is, this book is not a book of forms, but a book of forces. This Althusser calls Machiavelli’s theoretical “dispositive”. This is what Gramsci calls “revolutionary” about [The Prince].

3. The second space it occupies is its material space. As a work addressed particularly to the problem, it has to be able to contribute to the solution of this problem by itself as a text. This solution asks for a subject, “the new prince”, hence the work itself must be able to call forth this subject to occupy the position. That is, it must rally itself as one of the forces. It itself is a political act. This is why Gramsci calls it a “manifesto”.

4. But here a new space is opened up. For the subject called forth is “the new prince”, yet the viewpoint Machiavelli has is that of the people. This is the ideological space of the text. Unlike [The Communist Manifesto], whose political subject called upon is the same as the viewpoint taken, [The Prince] has constructed a theoretical space that is organized around a political problem that yet calls for a subject essentially different from those whom this problem strictly concerns. “The people” want a modern state, but only “the prince” can bring it to fulfillment. This is why, to sum up, [The Prince] is for Gramsci “a revolutionary utopian manifesto”.

5. The main force [The Prince] has as it speaks to Hegel, Marx (though they both fit Machiavelli into their historical consciousness as a particular moment of development, yet they also recognize the particularity of the event that Machiavelli himself represents) and Gramsci is that it deals with a “conjuncture”, a historical moment and a particular political problem. It speaks of a problem that demands a solution. And is hence gripping. A system is never gripping, but only captures. Problems alone grip. Yet this work is elusive, for it posits a distance between the political subject spoken of and the speaking subject, and relies on chance possibilities. This is why “virtù” evades all kinds of definitions.

Althusser on Machiavelli, II:

1. To see how Machiavelli patches together different theories to address one particular political practical problem, we have to trace the development of his theses. Althusser gives three examples. The first example is with the problem of state in history, the second with virtù, the third with the status of antiquity.

2. With the problem of state in history, there are four theses. First, things never change. Second, all things always change. This is a blatant contradiction. Machiavelli cannot give up on either, since he needs the first to make modern men comparable to ancient men, and from comparisons draw lessons, and revive what is witnessed in Ancient Rome; he needs the second so that he can explain why it occurs that it seems so difficult for that revival to actually happen, that something must have changed that covered up antiquity, and he also needs the second to confirm the possibility for a revolution. So he reconciles both theses with a third thesis: things change in an eternal cycle. “Governments” pass away in their differing forms, but there are invariant laws that can make “states” enduring. His third thesis is thereby turned into a fourth one: forms of governments succeed each other, but a state that combines these forms in good proportions endure. One needs to be mindful here that he is talking about mixture of forms differently from Aristotle: for Aristotle, the mixture is to achieve “political good”, whose manifestation is duration, and each of the good forms in itself is good. But for Machiavelli, “the good forms” are only transient, and only mixture brings stability; the good forms themselves do not endure. This group is organized essentially around the question of “state” and the practice of “state making”.

3. This initial group of theses is then developed into the next group on virtù. The third thesis: governments pass away, states endure. But states also pass away, most of the times with their governments, even when these forms are well-mixed. Then what is really passing away? And what really endures? It is the virtue to make and maintain a state that passes away in one place, but endures in the whole by moving to another place. New states crop up while old states perish. This then starts a new series of theses on the question of virtù. This group, as before, is organized around “state making”.

4. The third group of theses have to do with the notion of antiquity. First thesis: all people admire antiquity. Second thesis: nobody imitates antiquity for its politics. This is not an inconsistency: we are corrupted and softened, so we only moralize and appreciate antiquity, but do not dare to practice virtù. This move in his argument would remain obscure if we don’t notice Machiavelli’s stance against all kinds of ideology. Ideology and moralization is the utopian sentiment that stirs up a revolution that is yet restricted in its content. This is what Marx says in [18th Brumaire], that bourgeoisie conjures up Rome to clothe its own timidness and shallowness. The same way moderns clothe themselves in antiquity, for they practice shallow politics. To spurn all that ideology, Machiavelli dares to touch upon the “real politics” from antiquity that deals with the same problem he faces in his own reality; he compares past and present “scientifically”, not because he is doing any kind of positivistic science, but because he sees a real practical problem he has resolved to provide a solution for, because he does not lie to himself, that he is willing to penetrate and address what no one dares or wants to touch upon: namely, how to make a state. In this sense, we must remind ourselves, Machiavelli is a utopian thinker, not because he moralizes or borrows from the phantom of the past, but because of the distance between his people and his prince, different subjects for the same problem. He does not write for prince or people alone. His theory must be for both.

Continuation on 4.: In a word, we admire antiquity because we want to borrow from antiquity its grandeur, because our own politics are measly, because we lack virtù; Machiavelli studies antiquity because he wants to solve a problem and needs someone who has virtù to accomplish a task, so he teaches virtù and actually wants people to imitate antiquity.

P.S. Althusser’s and Strauss’s readings are often diametrically opposed. For Strauss, Machiavelli is a pure political philosopher; everything concerned with ‘practice’ may well be a pretext that dresses up his subversive philosophical thought. Strauss pays such close attention to this aspect precisely in order to think through the origins of modernity. For Althusser, if we read Machiavelli merely to understand the intellectual revolution he brought about, then Machiavelli has already lost his political function and concerns, and his most immediate value as a political philosopher has been canceled. What actually demands attention, therefore, is Machiavelli’s political concern itself: what political problem he sought to solve, rather than what revolution his political ‘thought’ brought about.

In other words, Strauss’s Machiavelli is a philosopher who thinks ‘politics as a whole’; his fundamental question is ‘What is politics?’, and thus concerns the origins of modernity. Althusser’s possible criticism, however, is that Machiavelli is not merely a philosopher but a political philosopher, and no political philosopher’s thinking about politics can be detached from a concrete political context and problem. Otherwise, he would be an ‘objective’ ‘scientist’ without political concerns, which cannot possibly apply to Machiavelli. Machiavelli therefore thinks not about ‘politics’ but about a concrete ‘political problem’: the establishment of the modern state.

Althusser on Machiavelli, III:

1. Machiavelli’s political problem is the foundation of an enduring nation state. This is his political objective. [The Prince] talks about the foundation, while [Discourses] the duration.

2. [Discourses] lays out the true content of a nation state. It cannot be a tyranny, for a tyrannical state is at first unstable, for people constantly revolt, and once stabilized would be necessarily weak, for slaves must be kept weak. It cannot be simply a republic, for a pure republic (without kingly roles, like dictators or consuls) is necessarily weak and meek. It cannot be an ecclesiastical state, for that is not a political entity and takes itself to be outside history. The only option is an empire, like the Roman Republic. It must expand and be universal, and in order to do so it must have strength; that is, its people must be free, and the prince rules on the side of people. So Machiavelli is not a republican, for he doesn’t advocate for freedom as such, but only for the freedom of and within an empire.

3. The beginning of a nation state requires a foundation whence laws of freedom can take root in the people. Yet this foundation can only be provided by one individual. The orderer of a new state must be alone. But why must the prince be new? That is because a subjected people can only recover their freedom by great difficulty, so that everything needs to be swept away and established anew. And in order for Italy to become a nation state, there must be a transcendent conjuncture conducive to the beginning: the correspondence between Fortuna and Virtù. Such possibility is left open and abstract not because Machiavelli is merely a political theorist thinking in abstract terms, but because this anonymity of the New Prince is practically necessary for him to start everything anew. Cesare Borgias substantiated that possibility for Machiavelli.

Althusser on Machiavelli, IV:

1. Machiavelli’s New Prince has all his political practice directed toward the objective of the establishment of the nation state. As the prince of the nation state, he has to be in charge of the state apparatus, i.e. the apparatus of force, the apparatus of ideology, and the apparatus of class struggle.

2. With the apparatus of force, viz. the military, Machiavelli has two theses. First, military is the precondition and the true foundation of a nation state. Second, the military is not brute force, but is precisely the fundamental base where nationalization needs to occur. It is through the making of a national army that the nation itself can be born. Hence the army has to be constituted in specific ways. First, the army has to heavily involve the forces of peasants, so as to complete the nationalization of all social relations and destroy feudalism. In a similar vein, infantry has to be prioritized over cavalry. Hence the political always comes before everything. Though military precedes ideology and law absolutely, military has to be directed toward both latter as its end goal and has to contain in itself that end, so that the end is both immanent to the means and sometimes a relative means to the means, for good soldiers cannot be without good orders and good religion. This also explains why Machiavelli excludes other sorts of force but commends only a national army.

3. Regarding ideology, the prince has to be able to use religion, for religion is the bedrock for custom and fear. To use religion, however, means that the prince has to be capable of dissembling. The prince needs a moral façade but should nonetheless exercise political virtù. That is to say, the prince has to be a man and a beast, so as to be capable of moral virtues and also political virtù. The beast is composed of a lion and a fox. Lion is force. But the prince has to conceal his violence and crime, so he has to be guileful.

4. That is, a prince has to always side with the people. He is the prince of a popular state. He must not incur hatred, but also not love, since love is unstable and uncontrolled by the prince (people choose if to love the prince, but the prince chooses if they should fear him). The only right course therefore is fear. To make people fear without hatred is to make people respect his force, but never to hurt people directly, rather side with the people and attack the nobles. This is of one and the same principle as before, that is the nation state is a popular state and the prince must always be alone, but popular. Therefore he must conceal himself and learn to fraud.