Niccolò Machiavelli · 尼科洛·马基雅维利
The Prince · Discourses on Livy · Florentine Histories · 君主论 · 论李维 · 佛罗伦萨史
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Mansfield的马基雅维利
Douban · Bidasari
Source revised / 来源修订: 26 June 2026
Reading / 研读:Harvey Mansfield · Machiavelli’s Virtue 马基雅维利的德性
In this note / 篇目
Mansfield论马基雅维利的德性:
1. 「德性(virtù)」是在面对机运时为其做好准备的属己的操作特质。因为机运是根本上不可预测的,德性也是根本上不可锚定的;恰恰相反,德性不是任何一种固定自然的特质,而是一种根本上对转变和变更持开放态度的操作能力。这种开放最根本的态势就是人为了预备机运的到来而对自然、他人和自己无限度的掠夺和攫取。因此对德性最恰切的概括,在我们这个时代,其实就是“现代性”。
2. 但是现代人并不一定具有德性,这是因为德性除了是一种操作态度以外,也是一种强度和力量。马基雅维利将人分成两种:弱者,即民众,和强者,即君主。弱者没有血气,也没有力量去直面机运。这并不代表他们不一样怀有攫取的意愿,只是他们的攫取是虚弱的,必须通过君主的中介才得以存续。所以马基雅维利说,“君主欲望压迫,而民众欲望不被压迫。”这并不是因为民众真的不欲望压迫,而是因为他们没有直面压迫与攫取之必然性的胆气,而仅仅满足于一种浮于表面的、羸弱的、多数人对少数人的“压迫”,即民众对君主们的遏制。反之,君主直面机运,并通过攫取别的攫取者直接地与机运作战,因此他必须压榨、剥削并迫害民众,像使用工具一样使用民众。所以,君主遏制机运,民众遏制君主。马基雅维利因此是某种对科耶夫式主奴辩证法解读的“颠倒”,或者更恰切地说,是某种转写,他更改了主奴辩证法演进的某种次序:民众只是供君主攫取的材料,而不是供他享受的材料,奴隶因此并非是主人与自然之间的中介,相反,直面自然之机运的永远是君主,奴隶是他的武器,不是他的衣食父母;类似的,奴隶的确能从君主那里感受到死的恐怖,这让他们联合起来,以诡诈和建制束缚君主,但根本上,无论君主是服从还是以死的恐怖摇撼建制,君主始终是比民众更诡诈的“那一个(uno solo)”,所以君主并不是主奴辩证法里因享乐而消磨掉的主人,而是强力的攫取者,也是比民众们更诡诈的创制者。民众因此依赖于君主去中介自然,君主却并不同样地依赖民众:因为攫取是面对机运的必然,所有软弱者都永远需要一个替他们去攫取的头领,而这个头领的诡诈又意味着他总是可以蒙骗软弱者,而使自己的阴谋得逞;阴谋就是君主独立于民众的证明,证明民众只是他使用的工具和武器,而非相反。民众没有阴谋,只有隐私;所以民众不创造,不蒙骗,也不直面攫取之必然性,而君主直面这一必然性。那些会被民众“蒙骗”,不酝酿阴谋,不施行创制,反而在享乐中消磨时间的所谓“君主”,“永远不是主人,而只是高等奴隶。”这里面也包括了那些“明君”,也就是在这一辩证阶段的末尾,意识到物质享乐的虚无,而转而投入到对民众的改造、关心,因此成为了人民公仆的“君主”,这依旧只是一种奴隶式的享乐和对必然性的逃避。君主永远必须是阴谋家,必须永远坚持最根本的与机运之间的直接关系。他必须是“孤异(singular)”的。
3. 马基雅维利反对以亚里士多德为代表的古典德性。马基雅维利推崇的孤异性并非亚里士多德式美德的自足。因为这种自足永远不会彻底向机运开放,亚里士多德因此无法坦率地承认美德和幸福依赖于机运和自然。亚里士多德认为人要“活得好,而非只是活着,”可马基雅维利强调,生存是人的根本境遇和条件。人永远不是一蹴而就脱离了动物性的活着之后,就可以转头只追求活得幸福了。相反,恰恰在城邦中,因为人人都追求幸福,攫取之必然性才更加恶劣;人一刻也脱离不了生存这一根本处境。任何美德因此必须要包括使美德得以存续的条件,而这一条件总是包含着必然性。亚里士多德的美德是两种恶习之间的中道,因此是不包含这些恶习的美德上的极道;但马基雅维利则认为,美德要能成立,必须包含使它成立的条件,也就是恶德。并不仅是偶尔这些恶德,比如残忍、狡诈、言而无信,会帮助我们活下去,更是因为这种恶德会动摇美德,让美德具有活性;同时,它又反衬我们的美德。通过残忍酷烈,一个君主可以让民众恐惧,从而不把君主平日里的沉静视作理所应当。这反而让民众懂得感恩君主的美德。恐惧是爱的条件。
4. 马基雅维利同时反对基督教德性,因为基督教德性的“善良”并非是德性,而只是弱者出于软弱的一种操作。善良的人将必然性交给愿意介入政治的君主中介,并满足于仅仅遏制君主。遏制的方式有两种,一种是神化和美化,让成长中的君主为了借助他们的力量必须学会伪装;一种是妖魔化,将逾矩的君主视为邪恶铲除。但哪怕他们掩耳盗铃,却根本上依然处在生存的根本处境中;只不过他们把与必然性的对抗拖延、推迟,交给君主去面对。这个君主,如果向着他们,就是敢于替他们直面一切的神明,如果反对他们,就是没有理由就想摧毁一切的恶魔。所以,基督徒反而是一群最彻头彻尾的“马基雅维利主义者”,就是说,神救济他们,为了这个目的甚至可以牺牲一切,包括神自己;反之,任何人,只要反对他们这个“宗派(sect)”,有任何义举也得下地狱。他们把这个结果推给神,一个无所不能、绝不犯错的君主,通过想象让所有软弱以及借软弱之名行压迫之实的虚伪都被原谅。不仅如此,基督徒甚至接受神对他们自己施加痛苦,也接受这一必然性,因为他们相信这些痛苦“在根本上是为了一个善好的目的”。他们接受神是一个马基雅维利主义的君主,但不接受属人的君主效仿(当然我们知道基督教内部对君权神授的理解有多大分歧和争议,但马基雅维利的主要敌人是罗马教廷,尽管他同样有理由相信新教的宗教改革会在政治意义上失败),更不接受马基雅维利将他们一直以来其实都已经相信了的教条普遍化。因为马基雅维利拒绝神这个虚构。他推崇人的君主,因为这些君主可以犯错,也可以是真正邪恶的,他们并不因其邪恶而不具有德性,而其德性也并不禁止对他们的批判。所以,“为达目的,不择手段(the end justifies the means)”实际上反过来也可以说“未达目的,不择批判(the failure justifies the critique)”。因为任何属人的君主都可能犯错,他们都必须直面时运,必须向生存这一根本境遇开放。因此,他们必须具有无限变化,必须承认政治现实,这是他们的德性。他们必须成为阴谋家。
5. 古典德性两次在意大利复苏,一次是西塞罗在罗马对哲学的复苏,一次是人文主义者们在佛罗伦萨对西塞罗的复苏。西塞罗为复苏哲学,强调哲学的“气概(fortitude)”而非“爱欲(eros)”。哲学对西塞罗来说最重要的定义是“医治死亡之药”而不是“智慧之爱”。他认为,哲学带来“美德(virtus)”,让人成为“男人(vir)”。他对气概的强调为群众捏造了一个英雄王的形象,仿佛最具有男子气概的人就自然是最有智慧、最正当的君主(尽管通过普鲁塔克,我们知道凯撒事实上有其阴柔的一面,但民众恰恰因为这个捏造,选择视凯撒为“男人”)。这一捏造惠及凯撒和屋大维,最终反噬了西塞罗本人。而马基雅维利认为同时期的人文主义者们同样在捏造一个和平王,即耶稣基督,的神圣形象。这只会让某些别有用心的阴谋家篡位,最终必定会反噬意大利的人文主义者集团。他指的是罗马教廷。马基雅维利并不心存幻想,与其捏造一个君主,他宁愿揭露君主的本质;这并不是因为他想向民众揭露统治者的黑暗和邪恶,像卢梭以为的那样;反而,他只是认为这些想象中的捏造只利于某种君主凌驾于其他所有君主,却不利于一整个互相攻伐的阴谋家君主集团的诞生。而缺少这一具有内在张力的阴谋家集团,马基雅维利自己想通过他们做哲人王的阴谋也就无法实现。马基雅维利想要建立自己的“宗派”。他以自己所能所想,意欲直面他最大的敌人,也是他的时代最强大的宗派——基督教。
6. 马基雅维利对德性的根本刻画因此是,美德必须要恶德衬托,反之亦然。德性根本是在美德和恶德之间转换的韵律。君主向群众表现出美德,私底下却以恶德施阴谋。他的德性是完全政治化的,是向生存这一根本境遇开放的政治表演以及背后的阴谋,而不是自足闲适的完满。衡量德性的唯一标准是其强度,强度就是血气(animo),而不是超脱的精神(spirito)。人是理性的动物,这不代表人比动物高等,而代表人是一种普遍的、可以去模仿与捏造其它所有动物的动物。这就是索福克勒斯讲的,“禽兽之变诈远不如人之变诈。”人可以模仿狮子,也可以模仿狐狸。人是“男人”,也是“女人”。根本上,德性是身体为了自我保存而变形的运动。德性因此必须是表演性质的,而每场表演都有其背后的阴谋。阴谋不是隐私,阴谋是新秩序对旧秩序酝酿的颠覆。德性是阴谋的强度;这也是衡量马基雅维利自己的德性的标准。他并不是一个政治科学家,但确实第一个将人“还原(reduce)”回其政治动物本质的哲人,并由此统治着其后所有的政治家。所以马基雅维利那里最重要的政治区分并非是共和国和君主国的区分,而是君主和民众的区分。马基雅维利的阴谋与德性就是建立起君主们,这一阴谋家的集团。而作为第一个真正的阴谋家,所有阴谋家背后的阴谋家,他因此通过他的书写,通过逼迫所有君主直面政治与攫取的必然性,成为了所有君主的君主,与民众这一道德家集团的君主,一切道德家的道德家,基督教的神相对立。
Mansfield论马基雅维利的开端:
1. 马基雅维利是一个有修辞学素养和意识的思想家,这点毋庸置疑。其在思考罗马之开端的同时,也在思考自己在基督教世界里的开端。任何新君主,他说,必须要学会欺瞒。因此,他通过教导新君主们去欺瞒旧君主,同时自己也在欺瞒这些新君主。他对开端的论述因此必然也是充满了欺瞒的:而修辞学就是语言的欺瞒。所以,他在「论李维」的开端章节自然不可能全盘托出,而是像他在之后说的一样,任何开端都必须是重复的;任何政制到最后都必须回到它的开端,重新开始。他文本中持续出现的矛盾因此不用以思想转变来解释,而可以以修辞来解释。但是在这里,如果马基雅维利真的希望成为君主中的君主,他难道不可能切实地去“转变思想”吗?这难道不正是对君主们的要求吗?将这些仅仅还原为修辞,而预设马基雅维利有一个统一的思想和阴谋,这也是施派解释无法自圆其说而让我怀疑的地方。
2. 在「论李维」的开端,马基雅维利有几个修辞上的“选择”。首先,即便所有的政制在建立时,都会依赖宗教或者神迹,他却在开端完全没有提到宗教。然后,他提到建制者,以完全古典政治哲学的口吻,而非他为人所知的政治现实主义,让建制的开端显得仿佛是建制者的一个有意识的“选择”,仿佛一个政制是完全可以被计划的:要去什么地方,要修什么法律。此外,他一方面对政制本身以及其根据地做出划分,一方面又强调政制完全依赖于根据地。接着,他做出了对“自内(native)”和“自外(foreign)”的划分,但又抹除这一差异,因为不论是本地人还是外地人,建立的政制都可以成为自由的,也都同样可以被奴役。最后,他完全没有在开端提及他那里最重要的划分,即君主和民众之间的划分,而是在之后才重新回到开端,详细阐述这一划分。
3. 但马基雅维利的修辞并非“选择”,而是出于必然的欺瞒。首先,为了躲避可能的迫害,他将自己“新君主”的身份隐藏在李维,也就是共和国罗马或帝国罗马,这一旧君主的面具底下,让旧罗马反对新罗马,即罗马教廷,的正统性;所以,他用古典政治哲学以及无宗派(即多宗派或普遍宗派,锚点为“人的自然”而非“神启”)的态度去反对罗马教廷的一神教神权政治,而不是以自己的新政治去直接反对罗马教廷。这一古典政治哲学的框架看似和亚里士多德类似,甚至同样包含了两组古典哲学中的标志性对子,即“根据地-法律”对应“机运-善好”,“自外-自内”对应“强迫-自然”,但实际上,马基雅维利的实际内容完全取消了这两组对立。人选择根据地从来不是因为他们土生土长在某地。从来没有所谓的“本地人”,因为本地人一开始总是外地人。无论是自然灾害,还是敌人侵扰,人总是在不断地向更富庶的区域迁徙和运动,因此总是不断在占据敌人的土地,或者是去抢先占据敌人未来也会去争抢的潜在生存空间。只要形成城邦或者政制,那就一定会有迁徙,无论是从乡村迁徙到城市,还是从一个国度迁徙到另一个国度;而有迁徙就一定会有新与旧之间的争夺。这种争夺必然带来永恒的不安和变动。因此,法律才会被制订;法律是用来回应变动和争夺的必然性,甚至是用来推动这一必然性的。人追求富庶的土地,并非是为了古典意义上的闲适,也不是负有原罪的堕落者为了追求基督教意义上的伊甸,而只是人出于必然性的攫取;而为了攫取制订的法律也不会是对人的完善,不会是对善好和美德的追求;这种“法律(law)”是纯粹在推动这种新旧的流变中同时保障安全的一种操作。“习俗(custom)”也是与之关联的一种操作:如果说法律规定并整合了新旧之间总体交互的态势的话,那习俗则更多是完成了新旧之间的区分。无论是法律还是习俗都可以是旧君主用来压制新君主的武器,也可以是新君主用来欺瞒旧君主的面具;所以,新君主在尚未变强之前,是被奴役的,是“外地人”,但他们也可以成为“本地人”。“自内”和“自外”从字面上肤浅理解才有的差异,即地理意义上“本地人”和“外地人”的差异,因此被“自由”和“奴役”完全取代。所以,马基雅维利是借了古典哲学的壳去反对基督教,但同时又在这个壳内用自己的新政治去反对亚里士多德的古典政治。通过这个壳,他敦促新君主(文艺复兴时期对古典传统的模仿者)去欺瞒旧君主(罗马教廷),但同时他自己又欺瞒这些新君主。直到之后,他才逐步向更贴近于他思想本质的那些潜在的、真正的君主们揭露他的“阴谋”:真正重要的对立并不是古典美德与基督教美德的对立,而是他的新德性与旧德性的对立,也就是君主与民众的对立。他一开始不提及这一对立,因为他要用“人的自然”反对“神启”,因此着重于统一的人,而非人之间的差异。最后,这些真正的君主们要欺瞒的不仅仅是旧君主,还有那些旧君主麾下的“大多数”;与基督教这一宗派对抗,这些真正的君主们需要一个自己的宗派,也因此在「论李维」从接近末尾处开始,马基雅维利花费了大量篇幅论述宗教用来欺瞒的手段、迷信对欺瞒的必要性以及「论李维」众多主题中的重中之重,阴谋。
Mansfield论马基雅维利和党派政治:
1. 马基雅维利是最早为党派政治辩护的政治思想家。在「论李维」中,他最开始以亚里士多德的修辞提出了这样一个问题:一个政制是由贵族统治,还是由民众统治,才更容易保障自由?他随后说,贵族们富于野心,意图压迫,民众们则安于现状,意图不被压迫,由此,民众统治似乎要比贵族统治更容易保障自由。但事情肯定不是这么简单,因为,首先,民众虽然安于现状,但这不代表潜藏在民众之间、尚未夺权的新君主们同样安于现状;其次,由民众统治,贵族们自然会不满,而这些不满的贵族一旦试图煽动并颠覆政制,自由就随时可能失去,甚至似乎不如由这些贵族一开始就处在高位并作为民众的保护者取得荣耀来得划算。
2. 所以,马基雅维利真正去问的问题并不是亚里士多德所问的“谁来统治?”他一开始提出斯巴达与罗马的对立也并不是认定斯巴达就是贵族政制而罗马就是民众政制。一方面,所有长久的政治都必须是不同政体的混合,必须既有贵族也有民众的成分(王和贵族的区分在这一范式内被模糊化了,一并被视为君主)。另一方面,由谁去统治取决于要去用谁;如果是像斯巴达那样坚持自主隔绝的孤岛政策,那一开始就预设了君主们缺乏扩张的野心,因此,他们本就不会过度压迫民众,这也能从斯巴达激进的经济敉平政策看出,这种情况下,为了保持安定,自然是始终让同一个阶级维持稳定的统治更有利于斯巴达政制的标准,民众追求安定愿意接受,贵族不必割让荣誉也愿意被满足;但如果是像罗马那样坚持帝国主义扩张政策,那对民众的赋权是必然的,因为帝国要扩张,新的君主们必须为了利益和野心源源不断地对扩张做贡献,因此民众作为提供这些新君主的池子,必须要给予足够的地位,但这也预设了这些君主野心的庞大,也就让民众的权利地位更加岌岌可危,而君主们如果不去让渡自己的一部分利益和权力给民众,就会面临无休止的内乱。最后,马基雅维利进一步指出,实际上,斯巴达所坚持的政策只是一种幻想,因为永远会出现极富野心的君主们,而这些君主如果不能对外扩张,就会对内压迫,就像斯巴达实质上也是一个帝国主义霸权,无论是对希洛人、伯罗奔尼撒半岛上的其它城邦还是整个希腊来说,只是它的意识形态和法律反对着自己实际上的操作;同时,对外政策总是决定了对内政策,一个国家如果不走帝国主义道路,就必然被其它帝国主义霸权吞并或奴役,除非它与其它国家联盟,但这种联盟脆弱而不稳定,必须由贵族通过高压政策强迫那些因循守旧坚持习俗和惯性的民众与其它国家同样因循守旧的民众联合。简而言之,压迫是不可避免的,无非是对外还是对内罢了。但注意,马基雅维利主义并非是某种“黑暗森林法则”,实际上,所谓的“黑暗森林法则”是建立在两个预设上的,第一,是对方不可沟通不可交流,而必须只能视作绝对敌人,第二,是假设了己方必须永远自信拥有足以对对方造成毁灭性打击的手段。如果这两个预设成立,那就根本就不会有政治了,更遑论什么政治思想。
3. 这种情况下,党派政治便不可避免,因为民众和君主间的必须被纳入考虑。但这不是亚里士多德那里的党派政治;根本上,马基雅维利的共和国是无党派的,因为民众是因循守旧、信仰虔诚而“善良”的。党派冲突出现在作为既得利益者的旧君主和因为变化而必然出现的新君主之间,他们各自去吸引民众的支持。这样的竞争有利于政制的生存,因为这些君主出于利益、野心和荣誉会极尽手段增强他麾下的民众们的力量,也就增强了政制本身的力量。善良的民众们无法实现共同善,只有邪恶的君主们可以。但同时,虽然民众根本上是中立无「党派(party)」的,但却是可以被「宗派(sect)」腐化的。这些腐化的因素有比如基督教这种宣称自己超脱政治的宗教,有巨大持续的贫富差距和阶级分化,等等。为了维系一个政制的长久,因此必须维持民众作为材料根本的中立性,所以旧君主们必须给予新君主们实现抱负的可能,同时必须坚持政治的第一性。
4. 像伯克就会认为旧君主和新君主之间的权力交接可以通过审慎而逐渐达成。伯克相信那些旧君主,比如他的辉格党资助人们,因其继承来的财富可以拥有某种超脱于攫取的「纯真(innocence)」,这种纯真让他们具有足够的常识和审慎去洞察时代的变化,并愿意逐步让渡权力给新人。他的这种调和主义强调君主们不必为了荣誉而掀起激进的、全体的革命,而相反,君主们,尤其是旧君主们,因其纯真可以仅仅在已有的建制上进行合法的改革和修补。而「天意(The Providence)」也并非不可预测,而在绝大多数情况下都是稳定的、有先例的。对他来说,党派政治是一个政制的自我发展和自我丰富,因为一方面政制不再有古典政治哲学的对至善的追求,所以一些偏离至善的自我发展是被允许的,另一方面,既然天意并非不可预测,君主们也并非不可绥靖,政制就不是单纯对安全的追求,乃至于像霍布斯那里的“和平恐怖主义”一样对安全的追求可以取消一切其它元素,所以,建立在安全基础之上的发展也是可能的。只是伯克始终需要面对一个无可辩驳的矛盾,那就是,虽然旧君主当中可能会有这种纯真之人,也就是所谓的「绅士(gentlemen)」,但我们可以说,绝大多数新君主都必须是马基雅维利主义者;而这些绅士应该如何对抗新君主呢?一方面,我们可以说,既然天意是可预测的,而传统又有其价值,那旧君主的“纯真”和“道德”都是有其奖赏才能被保存下来,这些并不只是基督教带来的偏见,所以道德的旧君主们面对不道德的新君主们也有着比如民意上的优势;另一方面,假如旧君主们真的不够狡诈,那至少他们有足够审慎和果断的支持者,比如伯克本人,去抢先替他们发言和行动。但这似乎就重复了马基雅维利后果的不可避免,为了阻止马基雅维利主义者们,道德家必须自己成为马基雅维利主义者。
Mansfield论马基雅维利与进步史观:
1. 马基雅维利是第一个现代思想家,也因此是进步史观的奠基人。他使用进步史观的动机是为了强调攫取的无限性与诸政制之间激烈斗争的不可调和,就是说,并没有什么政制的衰落不是伴随着另一些政制的兴起,这并不是来自政制自身自然形式的限制,仿佛政制有其气数,如人有其寿命;相反,这一限制是普遍政治和这一普遍政制的参与者们加诸自身的。他奠基进步史观的策略是让两种相敌对的史观左右互搏,即古典循环史观和基督教救赎史观。一方面,他用基督教救赎史观打破了历史没有开端的古典哲学窠臼,另一方面,他用古典循环史观消除了弥赛亚到来的必然性。其完整史观因此是,事物自然的循环让人不断地回到开端,但这一开端是普遍的,而那独异的新君主就像诺亚或基督一样,洞悉过去和将来,总是在循环的末尾带来普遍的震撼和恐怖,并建立起普遍的秩序,而这一普遍秩序因其普遍性必须保有其过去历史的踪迹,也必须为未来的变数做保障;而这一秩序的德性直接面对机运的必然性,并在这一直面中通过比较被激活。这就是某种进步意义上的永久革命论的原型。但是,马基雅维利的这种进步史观依然强调德性带来的恐怖对秩序的激活,也因此和我们所熟悉的线性进步史观大相径庭。
2. 马基雅维利那里的历史也因此不是我们所一直理解的历史,他的「佛罗伦萨史」毋宁说是取了ἱστορία“探究”的本义。历史对马基雅维利来说尚未成为可以被探究的对象,他的历史只是对非历史对象的历史性探究罢了。在他那里还没有历史事实,因为事实并没有直接地积累在历史之线中;相反,历史和进步对他来说尚不是线性的,更遑论说成为现在流行的平面史观或是星丛史观了。他的历史总是有一个所有事实最终都要回归的、非历史的中心,也就是德性与机运的普遍斗争。这两个元素之间的对抗和异质性拒绝了任何将事实同质化成历史事实的可能性,而这种根本上的同质性,或者说单义性,是无论平面史观还是星丛史观都必须坚持的。所以对于马基雅维利来说,历史并不是一个对象,而是对超历史现实的政治解读;那超历史现实的部分他称之为机运,而政治解读的部分他称之为德性。前者在科学革命取得成功之后被纳入了历史,而后者则成为了普遍历史的一个部分而非历史整体,所以我们才有了现在更为复杂的、把历史可以视作一个统一对象的历史学科,其包括了政治史、思想史、军事史、经济史、科学史,等等。马基雅维利为现代性所做的准备是通过利用基督教史观和古典史观的对立让现代进步史观成为了可能,并同时让对现实的政治解读而非脱离德性范畴的“天意”“自然”“机运”“必然性”“真实”“现实”等超政治实体去左右历史书写,这成功让历史书写成为了人对自我意识的书写,而非对无意识的书写;但另一方面,马基雅维利并不否认无意识,也不认为无意识可以被意识完全捕捉,他甚至认为意识必须直面无意识才能取得自我的真理,这点与孱弱的现代理性人认为一切事实都可以被意识理性分析的态度背道而驰。
Mansfield论马基雅维利和宗派政治:
1. 马基雅维利的「佛罗伦萨史」同样提出了古典与当代的对立,但他尤其关注这样一个问题,即,明明同样是“党同伐异”,为什么古典罗马的党派政治远不如当代意大利,比如佛罗伦萨,政治内斗来得血腥而酷烈呢?为什么古罗马时期,人们虽然彼此攻讦(accuse)却从未有像当代意大利这样彼此诽谤(calumniate)?是什么变数导致了当代意大利的虚弱和政治的退化?马基雅维利指出,最大的变数便是基督教带来的宗派政治。
2. 佛罗伦萨从未有过自己的开端,而总是作为殖民地隶属于宗主国,无论是古典时期属于罗马共和国或罗马帝国,还是在当代属于罗马教廷。佛罗伦萨因此从未有过自己的“党派(parties)”而只有属于皇帝抑或是属于教皇的“宗派(sects)”。基督教带来了这样一种后果,也就是教皇必须不能拥有世俗权力,但又因此作为神之牧首具有超越一切世俗君主的权力。也就是说,教皇不能拥有属于自己的武装,但却可以调用除自己所有属地(即罗马)之外的所有其它武装;距离产生恐怖,所以教皇经常使唤不动罗马,却可以使唤或雇佣别的君主来镇压罗马本地的教皇反对势力。
3. 基督教宗派政治因此有几个特征。首先,基督教贬低世俗的荣誉而夸大彼岸的报偿,因此使人质疑自己的德性,让人犹疑不定,却又无法使人完全放弃世俗的欲望,最后只能落得一个“既不知道如何行善,也不知道如何作恶”的下场。然后,基督教虽然贬低世俗的荣誉,但也同样煽动了人的复仇心;因为人的复仇心是自然的,基督教政制却没有给出一个公共层面处理纠纷和复仇的完整机制,而是试图用教条取消人的复仇心;但这只会让人将教条曲解,将自己的复仇视作神罚本身,而将复仇对象视作本就背负原罪之人,而让复仇成为了无限度的私人行为。这一点与第一点类似,因为取消了公共层面上可以满足新君主们天生野心和德性的世俗荣誉的价值,基督教政制里充斥着横征暴敛的个人和家庭,却没有一个真正的君主。根因因此在于基督教取消了公共政治这个维度,这是由于罗马教廷作为一个超政治的神圣政制既无法成为君主,也无法不对抗其他君主,因此在任何城邦中,我们都有了君主和教皇的对立。与霍布斯的分析类似,君主无法信任他自己的臣民,因为他们同时也在名义上效忠于教皇,所以他的臣民对他来说有一部分是居住在他权力腹地的“境外势力”。宗派政治让意大利的内战格外残酷,因为首先,各个党派都将对方视作恰好住在同一个城邦的“外敌”,而非同一共同体底下的不同利益组织,然后,各个党派都对敌人充满了没有限度的复仇心,最后,城邦内没有一个足以被称作君主的人物可以掌握大局,而只有那些孱弱的、只有私心而无野心的工会领袖去占据被清洗掉的贵族留下的权力真空。所以仇恨和清洗永不止歇,而被放逐者也不会犹豫带雇佣兵或者境外势力回城邦来反攻倒算。如果说雇佣兵是当代政治和军事孱弱的症候,那罗马教廷,作为神在地上的雇佣兵,就是症结。
4. 在罗马帝国或是共和国,首先,野心勃勃的新君主们从民众之中涌现,在受过考验之后,比如作为护民官,可以被纳入君主们的阶级,而不用像神官那样需要和政治保持距离,所以君主就直接是属于政制的统治者,而不是政制的外来者,也不需要依赖雇佣兵;其主要敌人在外部,而不在内部。其次,这些君主被允许攫取世俗荣誉,这让他们的个人野心得以与政制整体的共同善重合,他们不单纯以压迫民众为目的,而以扩张领土压迫外族为目的,让政制得以利用他们攫取的天性。最后,他们使用民众,而民众依赖于他们,所以不会有无限的复仇或者诽谤,而只会有审慎的攻讦和抵抗。
5. 马基雅维利的「佛罗伦萨史」是伪装的对基督教的攻击。比如说,他对萨弗纳罗拉的忽略,他对几次关键节点教皇是如何恶化了意大利的政治情势的描述,这些都足以我们重构对马基雅维利含义的隐微解读。一直以来对“隐微解读”的批评中有一点是说马基雅维利本来就已经说了这么多大胆的话,乃至于招来了这么多恶名,何至于还需要隐微呢?但如果我们仔细去读的话,我们可以看到,首先,马基雅维利给几乎每个大胆的论断都加了退路,其次,根本上我们也可以说马基雅维利伪装成了政治科学家、爱国者或者幕僚。表面上,马基雅维利在教育君主,更深一层,可以读出来马基雅维利在反对基督教,可是实际上马基雅维利还有埋藏最深的阴谋:就是成为反对基督教的所有新君主的君主。我们如果说马基雅维利直白而大胆,那是在第一层或是第二层,但是马基雅维利实际上是一座迷宫,他某些层面上的直白只是诱饵,用来吸引君主注意而让他们忽略他最深的阴谋;直到我们意识到,他对君主们也只是巧言令色,实际上他也在欺诈他的君主们,让他们为他一个人的精神战争服务。
Mansfield论马基雅维利的君主:
1. 马基雅维利对「执政者(executive)」的教诲分为三层,第一层的对象是人文主义或爱国主义执政者,第二层的对象是潜在的君主,第三层的对象则是真正的君主。第一层给了对象可以直接使用的修辞,第二层则教给了对象“兵法”或者说“战争的技艺”,第三层则试图给出“德性”或者说“审慎”。
2. 兵法仿佛是一种可以学习的技艺,而马基雅维利仿佛是教导这个技艺的老师。对古典哲学来说,兵法作为一种技艺,必须处理的一个问题是其与美德的关系;因为技艺可以被习得,但美德可以被习得吗?到底是战争制造有美德的人,还是战争需要有美德的人?在古典哲学里,战争因此被善好和美德限制,这也是文艺复兴时期「公民共和主义(civic republicanism)」所窥见的限制。共和主义们试图利用基督教,将基督教的无私美德转化成爱国情怀。这些尝试都把战争放到了美德和善好之下,或者说把战争放到了意识形态之下,无论是哲学还是宗教。但是对马基雅维利来说,战争就是政治,而所谓「兵法(the art of war)」,其实质是面对战场上的机运行欺骗因势行事的能力,而战争制造和训练这种能力。职业军人或者雇佣兵的堕落不在于他们缺乏美德,为了自己的利益甚至会特意在国家间挑起争端;他们的堕落在于他们仅仅满足于被雇佣,而不意图建立自己的政制。作为一个研习兵法的潜在君主,这门技艺会敦促对象对历史上真正的君主们进行模仿和想象,在这个意义上,战争亦是一种模仿的技艺,正如狩猎是对战争的模仿。可是对君主的模仿要臻至完美,必须同样模仿君主的破而后立的精神。这就要求这些潜在的君主去“背叛”旧君主:也就是阴谋与审慎,或者说德性。
3. 通过“教导”兵法,马基雅维利成为了古典与现代之间的第一个也是唯一一个背叛者,因为“德性”“背叛”和“阴谋”的主体只能出现一次,那个允许了所有人去背叛所有人的人只能有一个。马基雅维利因此超越了犹大,迫使所有的新君主此后无论多么想要超越他,其超越性或者“背叛”也只不过是对他独异性,也就是他带来的第一次“背叛”的模仿。所以马基雅维利不会像霍布斯一样给出一门科学,因为他想要人去模仿他;他想借此成为君主,而不只是一个科学家或者教导技艺的老师。他由此建立了一个新君主们林立,各自拥有着在此世因机运而变得独异的血性(animo)而非在彼岸因救赎而变得普遍的灵魂(anima)的宗派。君主们的独异性并不是灵魂的单一性,因为他们没有一个是因科学的普遍实在才得以超越特殊、从而能够自足独立运动的灵魂单子;相反,每个君主都是只有直面时运的变化并随之变化才可以与偶然事件交互,并在这种交互中将其普遍的潜能实现为一次“事件”的。君主的独异性是身体和血性的独异性。
4. 这样的一个君主永远是一次事件,一个例外。他实质上不能允许他人的干扰,因为他必须把决断权拿在自己手里,这样功劳和风险都会是他一人的。决断永远好于不决断,行为总是比犹豫有力,并且行为,哪怕是罪行,也永远可以被话语粉饰。但君主为了自己的安全同时必须伪装自己的独异性:他必须把自己伪装成民众的一部分,或者是民众的代言。更准确的说法是,他要通过独异性让民众重温必然性的恐惧,但并不是作为一个神,某个超越的外部;相反,他要让民众意识到政治“本身”,法律“本身”,以及民众这个集团“本身”就是一个必须时不时面对必然性的例外。新君主是一个询唤者。所以,马基雅维利说,任何新君主的例外决断都必须将其伪装成民众自己的决断,这样新君主才可以在制造恐惧和依赖的同时不让自己的阴谋暴露。这是一个阴谋论中的影子政府,这与亚里士多德的直接政府不一样,甚至与混合政府也不一样。马基雅维利的政府不由统治阶级直接给出政体的特质,而是同时欺骗民众和君主,一方面通过在旧君主中抓出替罪羊并进行破格的惩戒去转移民众的注意力并对民众施以震撼,一方面又通过从民众中推举出“代言民意”的新君主去对抗旧君主以使得不断的惩戒成为可能。
5. 攻讦就是这一模式的范例;政治必须要包括惩戒,正如法律必须要包含破格的恐惧,政制必须包括例外状态才能够维持法律的活性和对秩序的依赖。君主的正义或者爱只会让被君主给予的对象自以为是,而要重新获得他们的感怀和尊敬,君主必须时不时引入阴谋和恐惧才行。在这样的政府里,具体的政府职能甚至都不重要,重要的是这些职能之间各有权柄也各有对方的把柄,可以互相制衡;但这一制衡不仅仅是我们所熟悉用来巩固某个个人的统治的帝王御下之术,因为君主本人也只是棋盘上的一个棋子;真正的操盘手是这个政制本身,总是从民众中推举能够询唤民众的新君主去惩罚某些旧君主,以此激活政治,控制君主们的野心,并安抚民众们的情绪。这一个政制并不是我们熟悉的现代国家,尚不是所谓的“国家机器”,因为这个“国家”依然是被不同的君主们攫取的;它因此并没有一个独立自主的中立实存,像我们的现代国家有其独立无党派的公务员系统。但它却确实和古典政制不同,因为其政制并不是一蹴而就,被统治阶级牢牢把持,并因此获得其属性;相反,这个政制主动地去激发君主和君主、君主和民众之间的斗争,主动去攫取并改变自身,从而被动地凸显出来其中立性。这种中立性区别于亚里士多德那里政制的中立性的原因就在于亚里士多德的政制被动接受统治阶级的属性,却不会主动去激发别的阶级对统治阶级发起的变革斗争。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
In this note / 篇目
Mansfield on Machiavelli’s Virtù:
1. “Virtù” is one’s own operative quality of preparing for fortune when facing it. Because fortune is fundamentally unpredictable, virtù is fundamentally unanchorable. It is not any fixed natural quality, but an operative capacity fundamentally open to change and transformation. This openness’s most basic stance is humanity’s unlimited plundering and acquisition of nature, others, and itself in preparation for fortune’s arrival. In our age, therefore, the most apt summary of virtù is actually “modernity.”
2. Yet modern people do not necessarily possess virtù, because besides an operative attitude, virtù is an intensity and power. Machiavelli divides people into two kinds: the weak, the people, and the strong, princes. The weak lack the spiritedness and power to confront fortune. This does not mean they do not likewise wish to acquire; their acquisition is merely weak and can persist only through a prince’s mediation. Hence Machiavelli says, “The prince desires to oppress, while the people desire not to be oppressed.” This is not because the people truly do not desire oppression, but because they lack the courage to confront the necessity of oppression and acquisition. They are satisfied instead with a superficial, feeble “oppression” of the few by the many: the people’s restraint of princes. The prince, conversely, confronts fortune, fighting it directly by acquiring from other acquisitors. He must therefore squeeze, exploit, and persecute the people, using them as tools. Thus the prince restrains fortune, and the people restrain the prince. Machiavelli is consequently a kind of “inversion” of Kojève’s interpretation of the master–slave dialectic—or, more precisely, a rewriting, altering the order of its development. The people are merely material for the prince to acquire, not material for his enjoyment. The slave is therefore not the intermediary between master and nature. On the contrary, it is always the prince who confronts natural fortune; slaves are his weapons, not his providers. Likewise, slaves do indeed feel the terror of death from the prince, which unites them to bind him with cunning and institutions. Fundamentally, however, whether the prince submits or shakes the institutions with death’s terror, he remains “the one alone”—uno solo—more cunning than the people. He is therefore not the master worn down by enjoyment in the master–slave dialectic, but a powerful acquisitor and an institutor more cunning than the people. The people thus depend on the prince to mediate nature, while he does not depend on them in the same way: because acquisition is necessary in facing fortune, all weak people always need a leader to acquire for them. That leader’s cunning means he can always deceive the weak and make his conspiracy succeed. Conspiracy proves the prince’s independence from the people, proving they are his tools and weapons, not the reverse. The people have no conspiracies, only private affairs. They therefore neither create nor deceive nor confront acquisition’s necessity; the prince confronts it. Those so-called “princes” who can be “deceived” by the people, who devise no conspiracies and institute nothing, instead wasting time in enjoyment, “are never masters, but only superior slaves.” This also includes the “enlightened rulers” who, at the end of this dialectical stage, recognize material enjoyment’s emptiness, turn toward reforming and caring for the people, and become their public servants. This remains merely slavish enjoyment and evasion of necessity. The prince must always be a conspirator, always maintain the most fundamental direct relation with fortune. He must be “singular.”
3. Machiavelli opposes classical virtue as represented by Aristotle. The singularity he esteems is not the self-sufficiency of Aristotelian virtue. Because this self-sufficiency never opens completely to fortune, Aristotle cannot frankly acknowledge that virtue and happiness depend on fortune and nature. Aristotle holds that people must “live well, not merely live,” but Machiavelli emphasizes survival as humanity’s fundamental situation and condition. People never simply leave animal living behind in one stroke and then turn exclusively toward living happily. On the contrary, precisely within the city, because everyone pursues happiness, the necessity of acquisition becomes harsher. People cannot escape survival’s fundamental situation for a moment. Every virtue must therefore include the conditions allowing its persistence, and these always contain necessity. Aristotle’s virtue is the mean between two vices, and thus an extreme in excellence excluding those vices. Machiavelli, however, holds that virtue, to stand, must contain its own enabling conditions: vice. This is not merely because vices such as cruelty, cunning, and faithlessness occasionally help us survive, but because vice unsettles virtue and makes it active. Simultaneously, it throws our virtue into relief. Through savage cruelty, a prince can make the people afraid, preventing them from taking his customary calm for granted. This instead teaches them gratitude for his virtue. Fear is the condition of love.
4. Machiavelli also opposes Christian virtue, because its “goodness” is not virtù but merely the weak’s maneuver born of weakness. Good people leave necessity to be mediated by princes willing to enter politics, contenting themselves with restraining those princes. Restraint takes two forms: deification and idealization, forcing developing princes to learn disguise if they wish to draw on the people’s power; and demonization, eliminating transgressive princes as evil. Yet even in self-deception, they remain fundamentally within survival’s basic situation. They merely delay and defer the confrontation with necessity, leaving it to the prince. If he sides with them, this prince is a god daring to confront everything on their behalf; if he opposes them, he is a demon wanting to destroy everything without reason. Christians are therefore the most thoroughgoing “Machiavellians”: God saves them, and everything may be sacrificed to that end, even God himself. Conversely, anyone opposing their “sect” must go to hell, whatever righteous deeds they perform. They attribute this outcome to God, an omnipotent, infallible prince, imaginatively excusing every weakness and every hypocrisy that oppresses in weakness’s name. Moreover, Christians even accept the suffering God inflicts on them and accept its necessity, believing such suffering “fundamentally serves a good end.” They accept God as a Machiavellian prince but refuse to let human princes imitate him. Of course, we know how deeply Christianity disputes and divides over divine right, but Machiavelli’s principal enemy is the Roman Church, although he also has reason to believe the Protestant Reformation will fail politically. Still less do Christians accept Machiavelli’s universalization of doctrines they have actually always believed. For Machiavelli rejects the fiction of God. He esteems human princes because they can err and be genuinely evil: their evil does not deprive them of virtù, nor does their virtù prohibit criticism. “The end justifies the means” can therefore also be reversed into “the failure justifies the critique.” Because every human prince can err, each must confront fortune and remain open to survival’s fundamental situation. They must consequently possess infinite variability and acknowledge political reality: this is their virtù. They must become conspirators.
5. Classical virtue revives twice in Italy: Cicero revives philosophy in Rome, and the humanists revive Cicero in Florence. To revive philosophy, Cicero emphasizes its “fortitude” rather than its “eros.” For him, philosophy’s most important definition is “medicine against death,” not “love of wisdom.” He thinks philosophy brings “virtus,” making people “vir,” men. His emphasis on fortitude fabricates for the masses the image of a heroic king, as though the most manly person were naturally the wisest and most legitimate ruler. Although Plutarch tells us Caesar also had a feminine side, this fabrication precisely leads the people to choose to see Caesar as a “man.” The fabrication benefits Caesar and Octavian and finally turns against Cicero himself. Machiavelli thinks contemporary humanists are likewise fabricating the sacred image of a prince of peace, Jesus Christ. This can only allow conspirators with ulterior motives to usurp power, ultimately turning against Italy’s humanists. He means the Roman Church. Machiavelli entertains no illusions: rather than fabricate a prince, he would expose the prince’s essence. This is not because, as Rousseau thinks, he wants to expose rulers’ darkness and evil to the people. Rather, he simply thinks these imaginative fabrications benefit one kind of prince’s supremacy over all others, but not the birth of an entire group of mutually contending conspiratorial princes. Without this group of conspirators and its internal tension, Machiavelli’s own conspiracy to become philosopher-king through them cannot succeed. Machiavelli wants to establish his own “sect.” With all he can do and conceive, he seeks to confront his greatest enemy and his age’s most powerful sect: Christianity.
6. Machiavelli’s fundamental characterization of virtù is therefore that virtue needs vice to set it off, and vice versa. Virtù is fundamentally the rhythm of transition between virtue and vice. The prince displays virtue to the masses while privately conspiring through vice. His virtù is wholly political: political performance and its underlying conspiracy, open to survival’s fundamental situation, rather than self-sufficient, leisurely perfection. Virtù’s sole measure is intensity, and intensity is spiritedness—animo—not detached spirit, spirito. That humanity is a rational animal does not mean it is higher than animals; it means humanity is a universal animal capable of imitating and fabricating every other animal. This is Sophocles’ point: “The mutability and deceit of beasts fall far short of humanity’s.” Humans can imitate the lion and the fox. Humanity is “man” and “woman.” Fundamentally, virtù is the body’s movement of transformation for self-preservation. It must therefore be performative, and every performance has its underlying conspiracy. Conspiracy is not privacy; it is the new order’s brewing subversion of the old. Virtù is conspiracy’s intensity, also the standard by which Machiavelli’s own virtù is measured. He is not a political scientist, but he is the first philosopher to “reduce” humanity to its essence as a political animal, thereby ruling all subsequent politicians. Machiavelli’s most important political distinction is therefore not republic versus principality, but princes versus people. His conspiracy and virtù consist in establishing princes as a group of conspirators. As the first genuine conspirator, the conspirator behind all conspirators, he thus becomes the prince of all princes through his writing, forcing every prince to confront the necessity of politics and acquisition. He thereby opposes the prince of the people as a group of moralists, the moralist of all moralists: the Christian God.
Mansfield on Machiavelli’s Beginning:
1. Machiavelli is unquestionably a thinker with rhetorical training and awareness. While thinking about Rome’s beginning, he also thinks about his own beginning within the Christian world. Every new prince, he says, must learn deception. Thus, while teaching new princes to deceive old princes, he himself deceives the new ones. His account of beginnings must therefore also be full of deception: rhetoric is linguistic deception. Naturally, he cannot reveal everything in the opening chapters of the Discourses on Livy. Rather, as he says later, every beginning must be repeated; every regime must finally return to its beginning and begin again. The recurring contradictions in his text can therefore be explained rhetorically, without appealing to changes in thought. Yet if Machiavelli truly hopes to become the prince of princes, could he not actually “change his mind”? Is this not precisely what he demands of princes? Reducing these changes merely to rhetoric, presupposing a unified thought and conspiracy in Machiavelli, is also where Straussian interpretation fails to convince me and arouses my suspicion.
2. At the beginning of the Discourses, Machiavelli makes several rhetorical “choices.” First, although every regime depends on religion or miracles at its founding, he says nothing about religion at the outset. Then he mentions founders in the idiom of classical political philosophy, rather than his celebrated political realism, making institutional beginnings appear to be founders’ conscious “choices,” as though a regime could be completely planned: where to go, what laws to establish. He also distinguishes regimes themselves from their sites, while emphasizing regimes’ complete dependence on those sites. Next, he distinguishes the “native” from the “foreign,” only to erase this difference, since regimes founded by natives and foreigners alike can become free or enslaved. Finally, he entirely omits at the outset his most important distinction, that between princes and people, returning to the beginning only later to elaborate it.
3. Machiavelli’s rhetoric, however, is not a “choice,” but necessary deception. First, to avoid possible persecution, he hides his identity as a “new prince” beneath the mask of the old prince Livy—republican or imperial Rome—letting old Rome oppose the legitimacy of new Rome, the Roman Church. He therefore opposes the Church’s monotheistic theocracy through classical political philosophy and a nonsectarian stance: multisectarian or universally sectarian, anchored in “human nature” rather than “revelation.” He does not oppose the Church directly with his new politics. This classical framework appears similar to Aristotle’s, even including two characteristic classical pairs: “site–laws,” corresponding to “fortune–goodness,” and “foreign–native,” corresponding to “compulsion–nature.” Yet Machiavelli’s actual content completely cancels both oppositions. People never choose a site because they were born and raised there. There are never really “natives,” because natives are initially always foreigners. Whether because of natural disaster or enemy invasion, people continually migrate and move toward richer regions, occupying enemies’ lands or preemptively occupying potential living space enemies will later contest. Wherever a city or regime forms, migration necessarily occurs, whether from countryside to city or from one country to another. Wherever there is migration, there is struggle between new and old. Such struggle necessarily brings perpetual unrest and change. Laws are therefore instituted to answer, and even promote, this necessity of change and contest. People pursue fertile land neither for classical leisure nor, as fallen bearers of original sin, for a Christian Eden, but merely through acquisition born of necessity. Laws established for acquisition therefore do not perfect humanity or pursue goodness and virtue. Such “law” is purely an operation safeguarding security while advancing this flux between new and old. “Custom” is a related operation: if law determines and integrates the overall interaction of new and old, custom more often accomplishes their distinction. Both law and custom can be old princes’ weapons against new princes, or new princes’ masks for deceiving old ones. Before becoming strong, new princes are thus enslaved “foreigners,” but they can become “natives.” The superficial, literal geographical difference between “native” and “foreign” is therefore wholly replaced by “freedom” and “enslavement.” Machiavelli borrows classical philosophy’s shell to oppose Christianity while using his new politics inside that shell to oppose Aristotle’s classical politics. Through this shell, he urges new princes—Renaissance imitators of classical tradition—to deceive old princes—the Roman Church—while himself deceiving these new princes. Only later does he gradually reveal his “conspiracy” to potential, genuine princes closer to the essence of his thought: the truly important opposition is not classical versus Christian virtue, but his new virtù versus old virtue, princes versus people. He initially omits this opposition because he wants to oppose “revelation” with “human nature,” emphasizing unified humanity rather than differences between people. Finally, these genuine princes must deceive not only old princes but also the “majority” beneath them. To confront the Christian sect, they need their own sect. Accordingly, near the end of the Discourses, Machiavelli begins devoting extensive discussion to religion’s means of deception, superstition’s necessity for deception, and the most important of the work’s many themes: conspiracy.
Mansfield on Machiavelli and Party Politics:
1. Machiavelli is among the first political thinkers to defend party politics. At the beginning of the Discourses, he poses a question in Aristotelian rhetoric: is freedom more easily secured when a regime is ruled by nobles or by the people? He then says nobles are ambitious and seek to oppress, while the people are content with the status quo and seek not to be oppressed. Popular rule thus seems more capable of securing freedom than aristocratic rule. But matters surely cannot be so simple. First, although the people are content, this does not mean the new princes hidden among them, not yet in power, are likewise content. Second, under popular rule the nobles will naturally be dissatisfied, and once they seek to agitate and overthrow the regime, freedom may be lost at any moment. It might even seem preferable to place these nobles in high office from the outset, allowing them glory as the people’s protectors.
2. Machiavelli’s genuine question is therefore not Aristotle’s “Who should rule?” His initial opposition between Sparta and Rome does not identify Sparta simply as aristocratic and Rome as popular. On the one hand, every lasting political order must mix different forms of government, containing both aristocratic and popular elements. In this paradigm, the distinction between kings and nobles is blurred: both count as princes. On the other hand, who rules depends on whom one intends to use. Pursuing Sparta’s insular policy of autonomy and isolation presupposes from the outset that princes lack expansionist ambition and therefore will not excessively oppress the people, as Sparta’s radical policies of economic leveling also show. Under these conditions, keeping the same class stably in power best serves the Spartan regime’s standard of stability. The people accept it in pursuit of security; nobles are content without surrendering honor. But pursuing Rome’s policy of imperial expansion makes empowering the people necessary. Expansion requires a continuous supply of new princes contributing through interest and ambition, so the people, as the pool supplying these princes, must receive sufficient standing. Yet this also presupposes the scale of princely ambition, making the people’s rights and position more precarious. Unless princes surrender some interests and power to the people, endless civil disorder follows. Machiavelli further points out that Sparta’s policy is actually a fantasy: immensely ambitious princes will always arise, and if unable to expand externally, they will oppress internally. Sparta itself is effectively an imperial hegemony, whether toward the helots, the other Peloponnesian cities, or Greece as a whole; its ideology and laws merely oppose its actual operations. Moreover, foreign policy always determines domestic policy. Unless a state follows an imperial course, other imperial powers will annex or enslave it, unless it allies with other states. Such alliances are fragile and unstable, however, requiring nobles to use coercive policies to force conservative people attached to custom and inertia into association with equally conservative people elsewhere. In brief, oppression is unavoidable; the only question is whether it is directed outward or inward. But Machiavellianism is not a “dark forest law.” That so-called law rests on two presuppositions: first, the other side is incapable of communication and can only be regarded as an absolute enemy; second, one must always be confident of possessing the means to strike the other side destructively. If these presuppositions hold, there would be no politics at all, let alone political thought.
3. Under these conditions, party politics becomes unavoidable, since the relation between people and princes must be considered. But this is not Aristotle’s party politics. Fundamentally, Machiavelli’s republic is nonpartisan, because the people are conservative, pious, and “good.” Partisan conflict arises between old princes as established beneficiaries and new princes necessarily emerging through change, each attracting popular support. Such competition benefits the regime’s survival, since these princes, through interest, ambition, and honor, use every means to strengthen the people beneath them, thereby strengthening the regime itself. Good people cannot realize the common good; only evil princes can. Yet although the people are fundamentally neutral and without “party,” they can be corrupted by “sects.” Such corrupting factors include religions like Christianity claiming to transcend politics, immense and persistent disparities of wealth, class divisions, and so forth. Preserving a regime’s duration therefore requires preserving the people’s fundamental neutrality as material. Old princes must allow new ones possibilities for fulfilling their ambitions, while maintaining politics’ primacy.
4. Burke, for example, thinks power can pass gradually from old princes to new through prudence. He believes old princes, such as his Whig patrons, can possess through inherited wealth a certain “innocence” beyond acquisition. This gives them sufficient common sense and prudence to recognize changing times and willingly surrender power gradually to newcomers. His accommodationism emphasizes that princes need not initiate radical, total revolutions for honor. Rather, princes, especially old ones, can through their innocence merely undertake lawful reforms and repairs within existing institutions. Nor is “Providence” unpredictable: in most cases it is stable and precedented. For him, party politics is a regime’s self-development and self-enrichment. On the one hand, regimes no longer pursue classical political philosophy’s highest good, so some self-development departing from that good is permitted. On the other, since Providence is not unpredictable and princes are not unappeasable, regimes do not merely pursue security to the point where, as in Hobbes’ “terrorism of peace,” that pursuit cancels every other element. Development founded on security is therefore possible. Yet Burke must always confront an irrefutable contradiction: although old princes may include such innocent people, the so-called “gentlemen,” most new princes must, we can say, be Machiavellians. How should these gentlemen oppose them? On the one hand, since Providence is predictable and tradition valuable, old princes’ “innocence” and “morality” must have rewards allowing their preservation; these are not merely Christian prejudices. Moral old princes therefore have advantages, such as public opinion, over immoral new ones. On the other hand, if old princes truly lack cunning, they at least possess sufficiently prudent and decisive supporters, such as Burke himself, to speak and act preemptively for them. Yet this seems to repeat the inevitability of Machiavelli’s consequences: to stop Machiavellians, moralists must themselves become Machiavellians.
Mansfield on Machiavelli and the Progressive View of History:
1. Machiavelli is the first modern thinker and therefore the founder of the progressive view of history. His motive for employing it is to emphasize acquisition’s infinity and the irreconcilability of fierce struggles between regimes. No regime declines without others rising alongside it. This does not arise from the limits of a regime’s own natural form, as though regimes had allotted spans like human lifespans. Rather, universal politics and the participants in this universal regime impose these limits upon themselves. His strategy for founding progressive history is to set two opposed historical views against each other: classical cyclical history and Christian salvation history. On the one hand, he uses Christian salvation history to break classical philosophy’s assumption that history has no beginning; on the other, he uses classical cyclical history to cancel the necessity of the Messiah’s arrival. His complete view is therefore this: things’ natural cycles continually return people to the beginning, but this beginning is universal. The singular new prince, like Noah or Christ, understands past and future, always bringing universal shock and terror at a cycle’s end and establishing a universal order. Through its universality, this order must preserve traces of its past history and provide against future contingencies. Its virtù directly faces fortune’s necessity and is activated through comparison within this confrontation. This is a prototype of permanent revolution in a progressive sense. Yet Machiavelli’s progressive history still emphasizes the activation of order through the terror brought by virtù, and thus differs greatly from the linear progressive history familiar to us.
2. History in Machiavelli is consequently not history as we have always understood it. His Florentine Histories rather adopts the original meaning of ἱστορία, “inquiry.” History has not yet become an object of inquiry for him; his history is merely historical inquiry into nonhistorical objects. There are not yet historical facts, because facts do not accumulate directly along history’s line. History and progress are not yet linear for him, still less the planar or constellational histories fashionable today. His history always has a nonhistorical center to which every fact ultimately returns: the universal struggle of virtù and fortune. These two elements’ opposition and heterogeneity prohibit any homogenization of facts into historical facts. Yet this fundamental homogeneity, or univocity, is what both planar and constellational histories must maintain. For Machiavelli, therefore, history is not an object but a political interpretation of suprahistorical reality. He calls the suprahistorical reality “fortune” and the political interpretation “virtù.” The former is incorporated into history after the Scientific Revolution’s success; the latter becomes one part of universal history rather than history as a whole. Hence our more complex historical discipline, capable of treating history as a unified object and including political, intellectual, military, economic, scientific history, and so on. Machiavelli prepares modernity by using the opposition between Christian and classical histories to make modern progressive history possible. At the same time, he makes political interpretation of reality govern historical writing, instead of suprapolitical entities detached from virtù, such as “Providence,” “nature,” “fortune,” “necessity,” “truth,” or “reality.” This successfully makes historical writing humanity’s writing of self-consciousness rather than of the unconscious. Yet Machiavelli does not deny the unconscious or think consciousness can capture it completely. He even thinks consciousness must confront the unconscious to obtain its own truth, directly opposing the feeble modern rational person’s attitude that conscious reason can analyze every fact.
Mansfield on Machiavelli and Sectarian Politics:
1. Machiavelli’s Florentine Histories likewise sets antiquity against the present, but especially concerns itself with this question: if both involve “siding with allies and attacking opponents,” why is ancient Roman party politics so much less bloody and savage than contemporary Italian infighting, in Florence for instance? Why did ancient Romans accuse one another without calumniating one another as contemporary Italians do? What variable brought contemporary Italy’s weakness and political degeneration? Machiavelli identifies the greatest variable as the sectarian politics introduced by Christianity.
2. Florence has never had its own beginning, but has always been a colony subordinate to a ruling power: the Roman Republic or Empire in antiquity, the Roman Church in the present. Florence has therefore never had its own “parties,” only “sects” belonging to emperor or pope. Christianity produces this consequence: the pope must not possess temporal power, yet precisely thereby, as God’s patriarch, possesses power transcending every secular prince. That is, the pope cannot possess his own armed force, but can call upon all armed forces beyond his own territories, Rome. Distance creates terror: the pope often cannot command Rome, yet can command or hire other princes to suppress local Roman opposition to the papacy.
3. Christian sectarian politics thus has several features. First, Christianity depreciates worldly honor and exaggerates otherworldly rewards, making people doubt their virtù and hesitate, without making them abandon worldly desires completely. They finally end up “knowing neither how to do good nor how to do evil.” Second, although Christianity depreciates worldly honor, it also incites vengeance. The desire for revenge is natural, but Christian regimes provide no complete public mechanism for resolving disputes and vengeance, instead trying to cancel revenge through doctrine. This only leads people to distort doctrine, regard their vengeance as divine punishment itself, and its targets as already bearing original sin, making revenge an unlimited private act. This resembles the first point: by canceling the value of worldly honor capable of publicly satisfying new princes’ natural ambition and virtù, Christian regimes fill with predatory individuals and families, but contain no genuine prince. The root cause is therefore Christianity’s cancellation of the dimension of public politics. As a suprapolitical sacred regime, the Roman Church can neither become a prince nor cease opposing other princes. Every city thus contains an opposition between prince and pope. As in Hobbes’ analysis, the prince cannot trust his own subjects, since they also nominally owe allegiance to the pope. Some are thus “foreign forces” living within his power’s heartland. Sectarian politics makes Italian civil wars especially cruel: first, each party regards the other as a “foreign enemy” merely happening to inhabit the same city, rather than as a different interest group within one community; second, each is filled with limitless vengeance toward its enemies; finally, the city contains no figure deserving the name of prince capable of commanding the whole situation, only weak guild leaders with private interests but no ambition, occupying the power vacuum left by purged nobles. Hatred and purges therefore never cease, and exiles do not hesitate to return with mercenaries or foreign forces for retaliation. If mercenaries are the symptom of contemporary political and military weakness, the Roman Church, as God’s earthly mercenary, is its cause.
4. In the Roman Empire or Republic, first, ambitious new princes emerge from the people and, after being tested—for instance as tribunes—can enter the class of princes. Unlike priests, they need not distance themselves from politics. Princes are therefore directly rulers belonging to the regime, not outsiders to it, and need not rely on mercenaries. Their chief enemy is external, not internal. Second, they are permitted to acquire worldly honor, allowing personal ambition to coincide with the regime’s common good. Rather than merely seeking to oppress the people, they seek territorial expansion and the oppression of foreign peoples, enabling the regime to use their acquisitive nature. Finally, they use the people, and the people depend upon them, so there is no unlimited vengeance or calumny, only prudent accusation and resistance.
5. Machiavelli’s Florentine Histories is a disguised attack on Christianity. His neglect of Savonarola, for example, and his descriptions of how popes worsened Italy’s political situation at several crucial moments suffice to reconstruct an esoteric reading of his meaning. One longstanding criticism of “esoteric interpretation” asks why Machiavelli, having already said so many bold things and attracted such infamy, would still need concealment. Yet close reading shows, first, that he gives almost every bold claim a retreat; second, we can fundamentally say he disguises himself as a political scientist, patriot, or adviser. On the surface, he educates princes. At a deeper level, we can read his opposition to Christianity. But his most deeply buried conspiracy is to become prince of every new prince opposing Christianity. Calling Machiavelli frank and bold applies to the first or second level. He is actually a labyrinth: his frankness at certain levels is bait, attracting princes’ attention so they overlook his deepest conspiracy—until we realize that he also merely flatters and deceives his princes, making them serve his own solitary spiritual war.
Mansfield on Machiavelli’s Prince:
1. Machiavelli’s teaching for the “executive” has three levels. The first addresses humanist or patriotic executives; the second potential princes; the third genuine princes. The first gives its audience immediately usable rhetoric; the second teaches “military art,” or “the art of war”; the third seeks to give “virtù,” or “prudence.”
2. Military art appears to be a learnable skill, and Machiavelli its teacher. For classical philosophy, military art must address its relation to virtue: a skill can be learned, but can virtue? Does war produce virtuous people, or require them? Classical philosophy therefore constrains war through goodness and virtue, a constraint also perceived by Renaissance “civic republicanism.” Republicans try to use Christianity, transforming its selfless virtue into patriotism. These attempts all subordinate war to virtue and goodness, or to ideology, whether philosophical or religious. For Machiavelli, however, war is politics. The essence of the “art of war” is the capacity to deceive and act according to circumstances when facing fortune on the battlefield, and war produces and trains this capacity. The corruption of professional soldiers or mercenaries does not lie in their lack of virtue, even when they deliberately provoke conflict between states for their own interests. It lies in their satisfaction with being hired, without intending to establish regimes of their own. For a potential prince studying military art, this skill urges imitation and imagination of history’s genuine princes. In this sense, war is also an imitative art, just as hunting imitates war. Yet perfect imitation of princes requires imitating their spirit of destruction and new foundation. This demands that potential princes “betray” old princes: conspiracy and prudence, or virtù.
3. By “teaching” military art, Machiavelli becomes the first and only betrayer between antiquity and modernity. The subject of “virtù,” “betrayal,” and “conspiracy” can appear only once: there can be only one person who permits everyone to betray everyone. Machiavelli thereby surpasses Judas, forcing every subsequent new prince, however much he wishes to surpass Machiavelli, to make his transcendence or “betrayal” merely an imitation of Machiavelli’s singularity—the first “betrayal” he introduced. Machiavelli therefore does not provide a science like Hobbes, because he wants people to imitate him. He wants thereby to become a prince, not merely a scientist or teacher of an art. He thus establishes a sect populated by new princes, each possessing a spiritedness—animo—made singular by fortune in this world, rather than a soul—anima—made universal by salvation in the next. Princes’ singularity is not souls’ unity: none is a soul-monad able to transcend the particular through science’s universal reality and thereby move independently and self-sufficiently. Rather, each prince can interact with contingent events only by confronting fortune’s changes and changing with them, realizing his universal potential as an “event” through this interaction. The prince’s singularity is the singularity of body and spiritedness.
4. Such a prince is always an event, an exception. Fundamentally, he cannot permit others’ interference, since he must retain the power of decision so that credit and risk are his alone. Decision is always better than indecision, action stronger than hesitation; action, even crime, can always be embellished by words. Yet for his own safety, the prince must also disguise his singularity: he must appear as part of the people or as their spokesman. More precisely, through singularity he must make the people relive the fear of necessity, but not as a god or transcendent outside. Rather, he must make them realize that politics “itself,” law “itself,” and the people as a group “itself” are exceptions that must occasionally confront necessity. The new prince is an interpellator. Thus, Machiavelli says every exceptional decision by a new prince must be disguised as the people’s own decision, allowing him to produce fear and dependence without exposing his conspiracy. This is the shadow government of conspiracy theory, different from Aristotle’s direct government and even from mixed government. Machiavelli’s government does not receive its political character directly from the ruling class; it deceives people and princes simultaneously. On the one hand, it seizes scapegoats among old princes and punishes them exceptionally, diverting and shocking the people. On the other, it promotes new princes from among the people as “spokesmen for popular opinion” to oppose old princes, making continued punishment possible.
5. Accusation exemplifies this pattern. Politics must include punishment, just as law must include exceptional terror and regimes must include the state of exception to sustain law’s vitality and dependence on order. The prince’s justice or love merely makes its recipients self-satisfied. To regain their gratitude and respect, he must occasionally introduce conspiracy and fear. In such a government, particular governmental functions are not even important. What matters is that each function possesses authority and compromising knowledge of the others, enabling mutual checks. Yet these checks are not merely the familiar imperial art of managing subordinates to consolidate one individual’s rule, since the prince himself is merely a piece on the board. The true player is the regime itself, continually elevating new princes capable of interpellating the people to punish certain old princes, thereby activating politics, controlling princely ambition, and soothing popular emotions. This regime is not our familiar modern state, not yet the so-called “state machine,” since this “state” is still acquired by different princes. It therefore has no autonomous, neutral actual existence like our modern state’s independent, nonpartisan civil service. Yet it truly differs from classical regimes: it is not established in one stroke, firmly controlled by a ruling class, and thereby given its attributes. Instead, it actively provokes struggles between princes, and between princes and people, actively acquiring and changing itself, thereby passively bringing its neutrality into relief. This neutrality differs from Aristotle’s because the Aristotelian regime passively receives the ruling class’s attributes without actively provoking other classes’ transformative struggles against that class.