Karl Marx · 卡尔·马克思
1844 Manuscripts · The German Ideology · Capital · 1844年经济学哲学手稿 · 德意志意识形态 · 资本论
24年马克思,一些零散笔记
Douban · Bidasari
Source revised / 来源修订: 27 June 2026
In this note / 篇目
马克思对亚当斯密的批判:
1. 斯密的问题首先是对「利润」的起源论述不清。一方面一切「价值」来源于「劳动」,另一方面商品的自然价格包含了「工资」、「地租」和「利润」,假如「工资」等价于「劳动」,那「利润」是不可能存在的,因此「利润」必须起源于劳动者的过剩劳动,但斯密在这一点上混淆不清,将「剩余价值」神秘地安放在资本的身上,仿佛是资本自己要求了利润的产生。
2. 除了对「利润」的神秘化,斯密还神秘化了「抽象劳动」。对劳动的抽象化是为了解释价值的可量化属性,而价值是为了解释商品。但在给出了劳动价值是真实价值后,他忽视了价值交换和价值生产的真正动因及其结论,转而将「市场价格」视作唯一的对「价值」的决定。然而「价格」只是对「价值」的表征,因为「价格」依赖于「商品」的交换属性,而交换属性依赖于「价值」。因此斯密局限于表征与现象,而忽视了其背后的更为“本质”的系统。
3. 最后一种神秘化是对「货币」的神秘化。斯密准确地洞察了「货币」作为「一般等价物」的功能,但他忽视了「货币」的基础并不仅仅是其自有的「价值」,而是「信用」。尽管他明确指出了国家在货币功能上发挥了作用,但他认为那只是权力对货币自有的价值的确认。因此,他没有意识到,货币的自有的价值与货币依赖于信用的价值是完全不同的。
4. 这些批评的最终落脚点是,斯密将资本主义的生产模式和分配模式视作自然的了。对「利润」的神秘化来源于对「财产所有权」的肯定,因为「利润」归属于资本,因此它必须起源于资本;对「劳动」的神秘化来源于对「市场」的肯定,因为「市场」是资本主义中的自然的现象,「劳动」是对「市场」可能性的奠基,或者其“本质”,但「劳动」是如何成为「抽象劳动」的,「价值」是怎么发生的,又要求什么样的条件才能被生产和交换,这些都被预设为“自然”的、“本质”的了,并因此仅仅作为市场的背景而存在;对「货币」的神秘化则来自于斯密认为国家政治与资本主义社会的关系类似于「创制」与「自然」的关系,仿佛国家政治仅仅“管控”着资本主义社会,而不是本身在资本主义社会的生成中扮演了至关重要的角色。
第一点修改:于第二卷斯密明确指出了剩余价值起源于劳动者的劳动,尽管他并没有对这一生产模式进行彻底的分析
马克思和恩格斯的「德意志意识形态」:
1. 科学及其诸范畴(如历史、阶级、劳动、经济第一性等)和意识形态都是历史产物,但科学的真理性来自于无产阶级革命的真理性,而无产阶级革命的真理性在其世界历史性。只有在资本主义高度发达的阶段,生产条件之全体与作为生产者的无产阶级之全体才得以被联系在共同的命运中。这一全体化具有必然性,是因为必然性正是在这一全体化中被搭建和保证的:对自然世界的座架(machination)终于让自由王国克服了机运,而使历史之必然性成为了可能;历史的必然性是被主体对自然的改造活动所构造出来的。如果说意识形态要将可变更的经验事实把握为理念本质,那么科学就需要将理念本质还原为被生产活动所中介的经验事实,也就是自由。在这里,唯物主义科学暴露出了和现象学还原方法的亲缘性,这亲缘性由Tran Duc Thao给出了详尽的分析。
2. 与黑格尔哲学的差异在于,正如黑格尔自己所说,哲学是历史终结处的回溯反思。但是此思依旧需要在历史中发生,并最终直接地介入历史。如果说对黑格尔哲学的“完成”正是需要一种对辩证法之历史介入的叙述,那么辩证唯物主义就是这一辩证法与历史关联之直接性的表达。换句话说,辩证唯物主义的关窍在于辩证法作为历史之产物是如何直接作用于现实历史并成为一种方法的。如果说哲学是对根本意义上的历史的“终结”与“自身思义”,那辩证唯物主义就是对这一历史终结之历史发生(无产阶级革命)的“开端”、“转向”或“再掷”。见阿尔都塞。
3. 在历史的最后阶段,辩证唯物主义明确了历史无非是分工史。分工是质与量上皆有的。因为分工,所以每个人有了自己所“应当拥有”的“财产”,分工与私有财产是对应的。因为分工导致生产力提升,这带来更多的需要,又导致更细化的分工。生产和分配逐渐脱离一个固定可掌控的秩序,市场和私有制就诞生了。资本主义市场是生产与消费、买与卖的割裂。资本主义生产模式是工种与工种的割裂,尤其是阶级与阶级的割裂。资本主义意识形态是体力与脑力的割裂。发达资本主义之所以会是历史克服的最后阶段,首先是因为无产阶级已经成为对劳动本身的否定,也是最根本的否定,而生产力则已经作为一个整体被联系起来,这两者是内容上的彻底;其次是因为世界历史作为普遍性已经被完全建立起来,并且因为阶级与阶级之间的矛盾,与前不同,深入了个人心灵与社会生活,因此每个个人都获得了对彻底的自由与对彻底的必然的意识,也因此任何革命都必须同时是彻底的、心灵上的重构,这两者是形式上的彻底。
简言之,正因对发达资本主义内在矛盾的演进,发展出的无产阶级就成为了净化过后的绝对否定性,或者说,历史最末者成为了开端处的最先者。这一矛盾要么停留在此处;要么设定某个“更高”的中介,但这是不可能的,因为这忽视了这一矛盾的纯粹直接性以及无产阶级作为开端的在先性,这不能完成历史的闭环(只有通过这一封闭才可以获得大全的直接性),反而只能成为一种退行。共产主义要让历史回归历史之开端,它才会成为历史中的绝对者。
对1的补充:当我说对自然机运的克服使历史必然性成为可能时,我的意思是任意社会形式都具有自我设定的倾向,并总是在此种自我设定中趋向新的形式;对自然之机运的克服使得这一种新的趋向得以获得清晰的表达,而这一表达同样是自由在必然中的显示
马克思论商品:
1. 商品的「价值形式(form of value)」指的是一个自反的结构,即商品A的「价值」需要另一个商品B以其「使用价值」作为「交换价值」的载体去激活A内在作为凝固劳动的「价值」。这一自反结构是必然要求一种不对称的,这是因为任何商品都无法脱离其社会交换活动被理解(资本论的第一章,对商品的分析,无法脱离第二章,对交换关系的分析,被理解),因此任意商品都是一个亟待出手的商品。在这个意义上,任何商品潜在积累的劳动都是需要在现实的交换关系中才能作为「价值」被激活,而任何交换活动都是充满危险的「信仰的一跃」,因此「x商品A=y商品B」才具有不对称性,即商品A需要在与商品B的可能的交换中才能展现并拥有其价值。
2. 这也就是为什么第二种价值形式「x商品A=y商品B,x商品A=z商品C,……」需要和第三种价值形式「y商品B=x商品A=z商品C」区分开来。因为第二种价值形式意味着商品A成功建立了稳定的交换网络并成为这一网络的锚点,但这并不意味着商品B可以直接地与商品C进行交换。在第二种形式中,商品A需要不断地完成交换,直至自己的使用价值完全被其作为一般等价物(货币)的功能代替,且自己的「相对价值(relative value)」可以被所有等价物表示(expressed by all equivalents)。而在第三种形式中,商品A作为货币的功能已经被默认,所有人都追逐商品A以期最终能完成有效的交换,直到商品A本身完全地被先验设定成了绝对的货币,也就是,任何新的商品都自然地与商品A获得等价关系。
3. 商品交换预设了一个商品对某人具有使用价值,可是一个商品究竟是否具有使用价值,又只有通过交换的实现才能确认。这是市场交换的根本矛盾。这也是商品拜物教的根本矛盾。因为商品拜物教意味着生产者仅仅在交换中相互接触,且这一种接触并不是通过对「社会需要(social needs)」的有效认识完成的。相反的,任何一个商品都仅仅以其价值形式而非使用价值显示自身,因此无法判断这一商品的生产能否彻底满足需要,生产与分配因此处于紧张;并且,商品之间的价值关系也不再以社会劳动之间的关系被理解,诸劳动者在商品关系里被异化。在商品堆积下,死的劳动支配着活的劳动者。
4. 「活劳动」与「死劳动」的对立就意味着,活生生的劳动时间本身无法作为一般等价物,哪怕劳动时间本身创造了一切价值,包括了货币的价值。这是因为在私有制和资本主义私有生产的模式下,各个活的劳动之间无法具体地、切近地被联系起来,而只能通过市场的抽象的中介;市场里只有被对象化了的、抽象的劳动,也就是商品与商品,可以交换。因为活劳动直接地属于生产活动,而在生产与分配对立的模式下,活劳动无法脱离生产,而只能在生产出产品之后,以产品的形式进入价值交换。但是在社会主义制度下,生产中的活劳动可以直接地介入分配,也就是多劳多得的意思。这一对价值形式的历史探究因此就是一次激活,让被视作「自然」的法则获得可能性的动态,这就是真正的「自然与必然」;当然,这种自然与必然也是人造之历史对自然之机运的压制所创制出来的。
5. 之所以劳动价值论和效用价值论是没有分别的,是因为如果使用效用作为价值,那这一商品超出自然物的效用依然是来源于劳动本身的效用的。这个意义上,无论是效用价值论还是劳动价值论都没有任何分别,真正具有意义的是“价值”本身作为一个社会现实是在稳定了的市场交换下(也就是,大规模的商品生产下)才获得客观性的;只有在劳动本身被抽象化,且商品与商品之间的交易逐渐脱离无序的定价过程而获得某种稳定的先验实存的情况下,价值才具有客观意义。
马克思论资本交换与生产:
1. C-M-C和M-C-M在形式上就隐含了一个十分重要的价值颠倒。C-M-C最终实现的是消费,是使用价值与使用价值的交换,并隐含了商品在消费中的耗尽;但M-C-M所实现的是价值的自我持存。只有在M-C-M的框架之下,出于对纯粹价值的追求,资本主义才是可能的。但是仅仅是纯粹价值是不够的,资本的自我设限是对绝对价值的实现。M-C-M必须蜕变成M-C-M'。
2. 在资本主义下,劳动力本身成为了商品,对使用价值的消费也就蜕变成了对社会劳动力的再生产。因此就有了第二个颠倒,不再是资本为人创造价值,而是人为资本创造价值。
3. 商人资本无法生产价值,而最多只能通过操作市场获得本就是被他人生产出来的价值。在「世界历史」被构造起来的当下,建立在需求和供给的变动下的市场波动所以可以被忽略,因为对一个商品的需求和供给都在这种构造中获得了稳定,因此我们可以从「实然」的市场价格抽象出一个平均价格,而这一平均价格有其「应然」的方面,也就是「价值」。「价值」意味着,在资本主义的理想状态下,我的劳动所「应当」获得的平等的(也就是社会必要的)他人的劳动。在一个商品刚刚诞生,对其生产和需要还未稳定下来的时候,供给和需求的波动异常明显,生产这一商品的总劳动也因此还没有成为社会必要的劳动,其劳动也没有相对稳定的「应当获得的价值」;无论是极度稀缺(如奢侈品)还是相反(如自然物),还是在两个极端摇摆,其都不是商品的正常样态,其价值没有一个稳定的应然。但不管怎么说,我们知道,在资本主义下,没有付出劳动或其等价物就没有所有权,物品就没有价值;且商品的价值总是期待去弥补劳动者所付出的劳动,但不能侵占他人同样的权利;这种情况下,任何市场都有从「实然价格」生成「应然价值」的倾向。更不用说「社会必要劳动」这一范畴已经涵盖了「社会需要」了。总结来说,「劳动价值」是建立在资本主义法权下的「应然」,是对资本主义市场的理想和目的因;这一「应然」相对于市场的波动更具有稳定性,因为市场的波动仅仅影响到暂时的劳动的价值(某种劳动短期被视作更有价值或相反),但是真正的社会必要劳动是已经稳定下来,并与其它劳动获得了一个相对静止的比例的了。
4. 服务业虽然并不售卖真正的外在的商品,但或许可以视作对商品化了的自我的售卖。售卖的是某一个技能与对这一技能的使用权。培育和使用这一技能需要成本,而虽然服务本身不创造外在的价值,但不能否认,劳动者可以通过劳动短时间维持或改造自身的某一个官能,而这就是所售卖的商品。如果劳动力本身就是商品,那任何技能,作为劳动力的某个官能,是商品也是很自然的事。当然,这并不是唯一可能的模型,还有比如劳动者将自己的身体视作可以收取地租的土地,等等。
5. 是否会有对某些概念过分泛化的风险?能否有意义地脱离人类中心主义谈论「剥削」,如「动物剥削」?假如对自由与生产力的理解脱离了人类,假如我们认为「自然是自由」这一论断是有意义的,那么「生产资料」和「生产者」之间的关系就是模糊的。事实上,只有在资本主义市场环境下,人与自然的关系才成为了绝对的「使用-被使用」的关系。自然的主体性不被承认,自然在资本主义世界没有「应得」或「应然」,也就不真正产生「价值」。所以「剥削」的涵义对动物和对人的意义自然也不一样。对于非人的自然,剥削仅仅具有使用价值上的意义,因为自然没有一个「应得」的要求,人也不会认为自然的创造有「价值」。「价值」在最根本的意义上是对「劳动」和「人」的支配。但自然会有自己的复仇,因为劳动将自然转化为材料,生成了诸多过剩的使用价值,但这些过剩的使用价值同样需要被部分重新投入自然的保存,但在资本主义生产模式下,这些过剩的「使用价值」,因其不具备「价值」,而被完全地忽略与浪费。在这个层面上,自然与人的综合合法地成为了克服资本主义的议题之一。
补充5.:这个某种意义上就是原始的礼物经济所描述的某个方面,也就是说,自然的造物被随意毁灭抹除,因为自然的造物不具备交换价值。
6. 所以,才会有自然与人之间的矛盾,因为人为了「价值」的积累和对人的奴役而毁坏自然的造物,并否定自然本身的主体性以及这一主体性所要求的对资本的设限;对自然的「使用价值」的剥削意味着将自然视作是被索取「使用价值」的客体,而不将同样的「使用价值」交还于自然;换句话说,只将人视作自然的使用者,那人就会颠倒成自然的工具,这就是对自然的「异化」与其报复。人与自然的和谐只有在「异化劳动」被扬弃的状态下才可以达到。「异化劳动」意味着人对自然单方面的支配造就了过剩,而过剩的产物获得了自己的主体性并对抗其造主,这意味着劳动者无法辨识自己的造物,也就无法辨识自己的创造活动,也就无法辨识自己的自然(类本质),也就无法辨识他者(活的资本家的个体,或者抽象的资本家)。产物越过剩,劳动者的可支配的世界就越受堆积挤压而显得狭小,那一个敌意主体(人造物构造出的第二个自然/社会)包围着劳动者的力量就越大,劳动者就越弱小,其官能就越衰退,其自然就越衰退,最后成为这一敌意主体的奴隶。哪怕是所有“人”最后都平等了,某种抽象的资本家位置依旧可以为这私有的、因此被异化的第二自然的形式保留下来,如托克维尔所论「多数人的暴政」,或者庸俗共产主义。另一个有价值的东西提到的是,尽管私有制推动了异化劳动,但私有制本身亦是异化劳动的产物。只有在某种劳动被视作“与人无关”“异化过了”的时候,那种劳动才能成为了“可买卖商品”,私有制才成为资本主义社会的最基底,就是说,“我虽然现在拥有这些使用价值,但这些使用价值于我是过剩的,我在为别人生产,所以我可以将其卖出;卖出后这产物就不再属于我”。“买”也一样,就是,“要生产那些过剩的使用价值,我得满足过剩的需要;而这些过剩的需要超出我的生产的能力,因此我得向他人购买”。异化劳动在最开始仅仅是为他人生产并向他人表达需要的社会化活动,但在这一过剩变得极端后,产品和需要都脱离了理性可以分析理解的范畴(“我绝大部分的生产都是为了社会;可是那具体是谁?我绝大部分的需要都得社会满足;可是具体谁来满足?”),生产者之间没有稳定系统交流沟通的私有制(作为一个稳定的、绝对的系统与制度)就诞生于这样一种不理解和不关心;但这样的不关心刚开始本是现实要求,却转而因为一些获利者的坚持成了自然原则,并同样反过来推动异化(因为稳定的私有制,所以生产者无法过问另一个潜在竞争者的生产计划或需求)。历史的自我发展。
7. 「需要(needs)」在消费和生产两个领域彼此异化。在消费领域不断刺激欲望并将欲望固化为需要,却在生产领域不断压低工资并剥离这些需要被实现的可能。因此社会愈富有,劳动者就愈贫困。并且,这些需要在消费阶层那里获得了确凿的肉身。最后,劳动者的需要不再是自我实现的需要,而转化成了自我毁灭和自我麻醉的需要。
8. 资本对土地财产的吸收经过了其对价值之源泉的重新发现和主观化。这是价值理论和经济学上的哥白尼革命。此后价值不再被绑定在自然物上,而是成为了主体的造物。对土地贵族来说,既然其实现的价值不在于劳动者的主体性,那自然就没有对劳动者进行抽象化并引入自由竞争的必要。但是资本其制造出的是一个抽象的劳动主体,而成为了丰富生命的反题。
9. 在资本主义生产模式下,社会退步,劳动者受苦;社会进步,劳动者依旧受苦,因为进入市场的劳动者将更加依赖于这一生产模式,并因此必然迎来生产过剩的危机;如果社会停滞,那依旧因其停滞受苦。如果说「兴,百姓苦;亡,百姓苦」,那只有可能是这个社会生产模式本身就导致对其大多数成员的压迫。
马克思对黑格尔哲学的批判:
1. 马克思对黑格尔的批判与谢林一脉相承,都集中在开端问题上。无论是作为「精神现象学」开端的「感性确定性」还是作为「逻辑学」开端的「存在」都是完全抽象的开端,并预设了一个已经被抽象出来的主体之思。正是因为这开端的抽象性,黑格尔将自己的辩证法描述为从抽象出发抵达具体的运动。可是,这样得到的具体无非是一个同样抽象的具体,一个保留了之前所有被扬弃部分却依旧让它们在整体中维持其未被扬弃的形式的具体。所以,在哲学中,在绝对的知识中,宗教依然还是宗教,国家还是国家,只不过它们各自都在哲学中获得了与全体决定的关系。
2. 然而,既然「思」与「在」或「主观」与「客观」都彼此扬弃了,那真正的辩证法就不应该依然局限于从抽象到具体,而应该从已经获得了自身确定性的具体到具体。如果说黑格尔的哲学是预先从现实中抽象出两个部分,再将两个部分彼此沟通为具体的话,那么马克思要求的辩证法则要拒绝这种预先的抽象,而应该「重新开始」,达成对「现实」「自然」和「历史」的重思。也就是说,要从已经开始具体地自我对象化去构造自身的主体出发,完成对具体历史的刻画描述。而在这种被表达出的「具体现实」的自我构造历史中,任何一个整体都不再能被误解成依然以同样的形式保留着那本该被扬弃的部分,因为如此被实在历史所扬弃的宗教丧失了其本质的客观性,因此至多只能算是一个社群的精神虚构、一种图腾,而不再具有在黑格尔哲学中抽象物的持存性,仿佛在历史的终结处宗教被「返还」给了历史;恰恰相反,「宗教」必须在实在的历史中获得根本的变革,直到「宗教」本身丧失一切现实性。
3. 所以,于马克思而言,黑格尔的逻辑学最后被抛向自然哲学恰恰是因黑格尔最开始的抽象带来的匮乏。「一种神秘的激情使哲学家的概念投向了自然——『无聊』,或对内容的渴望。」但概念将自身转化为自然实际上是两种抽象的沟通。这一步如果真正需要被成就,那我们还需要从具体到具体的辩证法,或者说需要一种具体的历史。并不是从抽象的精神投向自然或者反之,而是本就具有精神性的物质是如何自我决定并自我构造的。
4. 当然,我们可以质疑马克思这里不是随意给了黑格尔一个「抽象」的标签吗?马克思又该如何假定自己所说的就是「具体」的呢?或者说,又有什么思考或者什么实践不是「抽象」的?关于这些问题,可以有如下回应。首先,马克思对黑格尔哲学的「抽象」的批评主要来自他对其开端的批评,因为我们反思的开端从来不是感性确定性或者存在,反而是我们生活的世界以及我们的各种实践。然后,尽管最开始进行科学或哲学反思,抽象是必要的,但是这种抽象必须要与其它抽象领域结合并具体化,到这里马克思眼里的黑格尔都是正确的;但是这是否意味着这就是终点?事实上,在黑格尔处,我们仅仅达到了一种对「具体化进程(concretization process)」的神秘化,也就是所谓的「否定之否定」,但这一个神秘的公式无法解释一个抽象领域是如何与另一个抽象领域彼此影响彼此构成的。在黑格尔那里,「概念」与「自然」的关系表现为一种神秘的平行化和「抛置(posit)」,仿佛自然只是概念的镜子,仿佛自然中的「运动」只是「生成」这一概念的影像;但实际上,任何的自然物必然有着某种“精神性”的潜能,一种自我构建成历史的潜能。这两者并不是单调的镜像对应的关系,而是彼此间有着复杂的构成关系;不是概念A对应自然物B,而是自然物B有着自己的复杂构成结构,并以具体的方式参与了对概念A的构成,反之亦然,概念A也以自己的方式参与了对自然物B的构成,;并且这两者彼此的视域交融,甚至还隐含了其它视域的构成;而这些不同方向的构成组合成一个有机且复杂的动态整体。这是反思的镜像结构所无法涵盖的。同样的,一个实践与另一个实践之间亦有着复杂的彼此构成的关系。简言之,马克思处辩证法的关窍不应该是「抽象-具体」的上升关系,因为这一上升已然被黑格尔达成了;在这一关系已经被克服之后,新的唯物历史主义辩证法应要聚焦在「主体-客体」的构造关系。在这个意义上,早期马克思与晚期胡赛尔的亲缘性可以重新被现象学发现。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
In this note / 篇目
Marx’s Critique of Adam Smith:
1. Smith’s first problem is his unclear account of the origin of “profit.” On the one hand, all “value” comes from “labor”; on the other, a commodity’s natural price includes “wages,” “rent,” and “profit.” If “wages” are equivalent to “labor,” “profit” cannot exist. “Profit” must therefore originate in workers’ surplus labor. Yet Smith is confused on this point, mysteriously lodging “surplus value” in capital, as though capital itself demanded the production of profit.
2. Besides mystifying “profit,” Smith also mystifies “abstract labor.” Labor is abstracted to explain value’s quantifiable character, and value is introduced to explain commodities. Yet after establishing labor-value as real value, he neglects the actual driving forces of the exchange and production of value and their implications, turning instead to “market price” as the sole determination of “value.” But “price” merely represents “value,” since “price” depends on a “commodity’s” exchangeability, and exchangeability depends on “value.” Smith thus confines himself to representations and appearances, neglecting the more “essential” system behind them.
3. The final mystification concerns “money.” Smith accurately perceives money’s function as a “general equivalent,” but overlooks that money is founded not merely on its own “value,” but on “credit.” Although he explicitly points out the state’s role in the functioning of money, he considers this merely power’s confirmation of money’s own value. He therefore fails to recognize that money’s own value and the value it derives from credit are entirely different.
4. These criticisms ultimately converge on Smith’s treatment of capitalist modes of production and distribution as natural. The mystification of “profit” comes from the affirmation of “property ownership”: because “profit” belongs to capital, it must originate in capital. The mystification of “labor” comes from the affirmation of the “market”: because the “market” is a natural phenomenon within capitalism, “labor” grounds the market’s possibility, or is its “essence.” Yet how “labor” becomes “abstract labor,” how “value” arises, and what conditions its production and exchange require are all presupposed as “natural” and “essential,” and therefore exist merely as the market’s background. The mystification of “money” comes from Smith’s belief that the relation between state politics and capitalist society resembles that between “institution” and “nature,” as though state politics merely “regulates” capitalist society instead of itself playing a crucial role in capitalist society’s genesis.
Revision to point 1: In Book II, Smith explicitly states that surplus value originates in workers’ labor, although he does not thoroughly analyze this mode of production.
Marx and Engels’ The German Ideology:
1. Science and its categories—history, class, labor, the primacy of the economy, and so forth—and ideology are all historical products. But science’s truth derives from the truth of proletarian revolution, and the truth of proletarian revolution lies in its world-historical character. Only at a highly developed stage of capitalism are the totality of the conditions of production and the totality of the proletariat as producers connected in a common destiny. This totalization is necessary because necessity is precisely constructed and guaranteed within this totalization: the machination of the natural world finally enables the realm of freedom to overcome fortune, making historical necessity possible. Historical necessity is constituted by the subject’s activity of transforming nature. If ideology grasps mutable empirical facts as ideal essences, science must reduce ideal essences to empirical facts mediated by productive activity—that is, to freedom. Here materialist science reveals its kinship with the method of phenomenological reduction, a kinship thoroughly analyzed by Tran Duc Thao.
2. The difference from Hegel’s philosophy is that, as Hegel himself says, philosophy is retrospective reflection at history’s end. Yet this thought must still occur within history and ultimately intervene directly in history. If “completing” Hegel’s philosophy requires an account of dialectic’s historical intervention, dialectical materialism is the expression of the immediacy of this connection between dialectic and history. In other words, the key to dialectical materialism is how dialectic, as history’s product, acts directly upon actual history and becomes a method. If philosophy is history’s “termination” and “self-interpretation” in the fundamental sense, dialectical materialism is the “beginning,” “turn,” or “rethrow” of this end of history’s historical occurrence—proletarian revolution. See Althusser.
3. At history’s final stage, dialectical materialism makes clear that history is nothing but the history of the division of labor. The division of labor is both qualitative and quantitative. Through it, each person acquires the “property” they “ought to possess”: the division of labor and private property correspond. Because the division of labor increases productive forces, it brings more needs, which in turn lead to a finer division of labor. Production and distribution gradually depart from a fixed, manageable order, and the market and private ownership are born. The capitalist market is the separation of production from consumption, buying from selling. The capitalist mode of production separates occupation from occupation, and above all class from class. Capitalist ideology separates manual from intellectual labor. Developed capitalism is history’s final stage to be overcome, first because the proletariat has become the negation of labor itself, the most fundamental negation, while productive forces have already been connected as a whole: these two constitute thoroughness in content. Second, world history has been fully established as universality; and because contradictions between classes, unlike before, penetrate individual minds and social life, each individual acquires consciousness of thoroughgoing freedom and thoroughgoing necessity. Every revolution must therefore also be a thoroughgoing reconstruction of the mind: these two constitute thoroughness in form.
In brief, it is precisely through the development of advanced capitalism’s internal contradictions that the resulting proletariat becomes purified absolute negativity. Or: what is last in history becomes what is first at the beginning. This contradiction must either remain here or posit some “higher” mediation. Yet the latter is impossible, since it neglects the contradiction’s pure immediacy and the proletariat’s priority as beginning. It cannot close history’s circle—only through this closure can the immediacy of the all be obtained—but can only become a regression. Communism must return history to history’s beginning if it is to become the absolute within history.
Supplement to 1: When I say that overcoming nature’s fortune makes historical necessity possible, I mean that every social form tends to posit itself, and always tends toward new forms within this self-positing. Overcoming natural fortune allows this new tendency to acquire clear expression, and this expression is likewise freedom’s manifestation within necessity.
Marx on Commodities:
1. The commodity’s “form of value” refers to a reflexive structure: the “value” of commodity A requires another commodity, B, whose “use-value” serves as the vehicle of “exchange-value,” to activate the “value” immanent in A as congealed labor. This reflexive structure necessarily requires an asymmetry, because no commodity can be understood apart from its social activity of exchange: Chapter 1 of Capital, the analysis of the commodity, cannot be understood apart from Chapter 2, the analysis of exchange relations. Every commodity is therefore a commodity awaiting disposal. In this sense, any commodity’s potentially accumulated labor can be activated as “value” only within actual exchange relations. Every act of exchange is a hazardous “leap of faith.” Hence the asymmetry of “x commodity A = y commodity B”: only in a possible exchange with commodity B can commodity A exhibit and possess its value.
2. This is also why the second form of value, “x commodity A = y commodity B, x commodity A = z commodity C, …,” must be distinguished from the third, “y commodity B = x commodity A = z commodity C.” The second form means commodity A has successfully established a stable network of exchange and become its anchor, but this does not mean commodity B can be exchanged directly for commodity C. In the second form, commodity A must continually complete exchanges until its use-value is entirely replaced by its function as general equivalent—money—and its “relative value” can be “expressed by all equivalents.” In the third form, however, commodity A’s monetary function is already taken for granted: everyone pursues commodity A in the hope of eventually completing an effective exchange, until commodity A itself is wholly posited a priori as absolute money. That is, any new commodity naturally acquires a relation of equivalence with commodity A.
3. Commodity exchange presupposes that a commodity has use-value for someone, yet whether it actually has use-value can be confirmed only through the realization of exchange. This is market exchange’s fundamental contradiction. It is also commodity fetishism’s fundamental contradiction. Commodity fetishism means that producers encounter one another only in exchange, and that this encounter is not accomplished through an effective knowledge of “social needs.” On the contrary, each commodity presents itself only through its form of value, rather than its use-value. It is therefore impossible to judge whether the commodity’s production can fully satisfy needs, and production and distribution remain in tension. Moreover, value relations between commodities are no longer understood as relations between social labors: workers are alienated within commodity relations. Beneath the accumulation of commodities, dead labor rules living workers.
4. The opposition between “living labor” and “dead labor” means that living labor-time itself cannot serve as a general equivalent, even though labor-time creates all value, including the value of money. This is because, under private ownership and capitalist private production, separate instances of living labor cannot be connected concretely and immediately, but only through the market’s abstract mediation. Within the market, only objectified, abstract labor—commodity for commodity—can be exchanged. Living labor belongs directly to productive activity; under a mode in which production and distribution oppose each other, it cannot detach itself from production, but can enter value exchange only after producing a product, and in the product’s form. Under socialism, however, living labor within production can intervene directly in distribution: this is the meaning of receiving more for working more. This historical investigation of the form of value is therefore an activation, restoring the dynamic of possibility to laws regarded as “natural.” This is genuine “nature and necessity”—although, of course, this nature and necessity are themselves instituted through human-made history’s suppression of natural fortune.
5. The reason there is no difference between the labor theory of value and the utility theory of value is that, if utility is taken as value, the utility a commodity possesses beyond that of a natural object still derives from the utility of labor itself. In this sense, the utility and labor theories of value make no difference. What truly matters is that “value” itself, as a social reality, acquires objectivity only under stabilized market exchange—that is, large-scale commodity production. Value has objective meaning only when labor itself has been abstracted and exchanges between commodities gradually depart from disorderly pricing to acquire a certain stable, a priori actual existence.
Marx on Capitalist Exchange and Production:
1. C–M–C and M–C–M already imply a crucial inversion of value in their forms. C–M–C ultimately realizes consumption, the exchange of use-value for use-value, and implies the exhaustion of the commodity in consumption. M–C–M, however, realizes value’s self-preservation. Capitalism becomes possible only within the framework of M–C–M, through the pursuit of pure value. Yet pure value alone is insufficient: capital’s self-limitation is the realization of absolute value. M–C–M must transform into M–C–M'.
2. Under capitalism, labor-power itself becomes a commodity, and the consumption of use-value transforms into the reproduction of social labor-power. A second inversion thus occurs: capital no longer creates value for people; people create value for capital.
3. Merchant capital cannot produce value; at most it can obtain, through market manipulation, value already produced by others. Now that “world history” has been constituted, market fluctuations based on changes in demand and supply can be disregarded, since a commodity’s demand and supply both acquire stability within this constitution. We can therefore abstract an average price from “actual” market prices, and this average price has a dimension of what “ought to be,” namely “value.” “Value” means the equal—that is, socially necessary—labor of others that my labor “ought” to obtain under capitalism’s ideal conditions. When a commodity has just emerged, and its production and the need for it have not yet stabilized, supply and demand fluctuate particularly markedly. The total labor producing this commodity has therefore not yet become socially necessary labor, nor has it acquired a relatively stable “value it ought to receive.” Extreme scarcity, as with luxury goods, its opposite, as with natural objects, or oscillation between the two extremes: none is the commodity’s normal condition, and its value has no stable “ought.” In any case, we know that under capitalism there is no ownership without the expenditure of labor or its equivalent, and an object has no value without it. A commodity’s value always seeks to compensate the labor expended by the worker, without infringing the same right of others. Under these conditions, every market tends to generate “normative value” from “actual price.” Moreover, the category of “socially necessary labor” already encompasses “social needs.” In sum, “labor-value” is an “ought” established under capitalist right: the capitalist market’s ideal and final cause. This “ought” is more stable than market fluctuations, since those fluctuations affect only labor’s temporary value—a certain kind of labor is briefly considered more valuable, or the opposite—whereas genuine socially necessary labor has already stabilized and acquired a relatively fixed proportion to other labor.
4. Although the service sector does not sell genuinely external commodities, it might be regarded as selling the commodified self. What is sold is a particular skill and the right to use it. Developing and exercising this skill requires costs. Although the service itself creates no external value, it is undeniable that a worker can use labor to maintain or transform a particular faculty of their own for a short time, and this is the commodity sold. If labor-power itself is a commodity, it is quite natural for any skill, as a faculty of labor-power, also to be a commodity. Of course, this is not the only possible model: another would be workers treating their bodies as land on which rent can be charged, and so forth.
5. Is there a risk of overgeneralizing certain concepts? Can one meaningfully discuss “exploitation,” such as “animal exploitation,” outside anthropocentrism? If the understanding of freedom and productive forces departs from humanity, if we consider the statement “nature is freedom” meaningful, the relation between “means of production” and “producers” becomes ambiguous. In fact, only within a capitalist market does the relation between humanity and nature become an absolute relation of “using–being used.” Nature’s subjectivity is unacknowledged. Within the capitalist world, nature has no “due” or “ought,” and thus does not truly produce “value.” “Exploitation” therefore naturally means different things for animals and humans. For nonhuman nature, exploitation has meaning only in terms of use-value, since nature has no claim to what it is “due,” and people do not regard nature’s creations as having “value.” In its most fundamental sense, “value” is domination over “labor” and “humanity.” Yet nature will have its revenge. Labor transforms nature into material, generating many surplus use-values, but these surplus use-values must themselves be partially reinvested in nature’s preservation. Under the capitalist mode of production, however, these surplus “use-values,” because they lack “value,” are completely neglected and wasted. On this level, the synthesis of nature and humanity legitimately becomes one of the questions involved in overcoming capitalism.
Supplement to 5: In a sense, this is an aspect described by the primitive gift economy: nature’s creations are casually destroyed and erased because they possess no exchange-value.
6. This is why a contradiction arises between nature and humanity: for the sake of accumulating “value” and enslaving people, humanity destroys nature’s creations and denies nature’s own subjectivity, along with the limits this subjectivity demands be placed on capital. Exploiting nature’s “use-value” means regarding nature as an object from which “use-value” is extracted, without returning the same “use-value” to nature. In other words, if humanity is regarded only as nature’s user, humanity will invert into nature’s instrument: this is nature’s “alienation” and its revenge. Harmony between humanity and nature can be attained only when “alienated labor” is sublated. “Alienated labor” means that humanity’s unilateral domination of nature creates a surplus, and surplus products acquire a subjectivity of their own, opposing their creators. Workers consequently cannot recognize their own creations, and thus cannot recognize their creative activity, their own nature—species-being—or others: the living capitalist individual, or the abstract capitalist. The greater the surplus of products, the more accumulation crowds and compresses the world at workers’ disposal, making it seem smaller. The greater the power of the hostile subject surrounding workers—the second nature or society constituted by artifacts—the weaker workers become, the more their faculties and nature decline, until they finally become this hostile subject’s slaves. Even if all “people” finally become equal, an abstract capitalist position can remain reserved for the form of this private, and therefore alienated, second nature: as in Tocqueville’s “tyranny of the majority,” or vulgar communism. Another valuable point is that, although private ownership promotes alienated labor, private ownership itself is also a product of alienated labor. Only when a certain labor is regarded as “unrelated to people,” as “alienated,” can it become a “tradable commodity,” and private ownership become capitalist society’s foundation. That is: “Although I now possess these use-values, they are surplus to me; I am producing for others, so I can sell them. After sale, the product no longer belongs to me.” “Buying” works similarly: “To produce those surplus use-values, I must satisfy surplus needs; these surplus needs exceed my productive capacity, so I must buy from others.” Alienated labor initially is merely the social activity of producing for others and expressing needs to others. But when this surplus becomes extreme, products and needs alike escape rational analysis and understanding: “Most of my production is for society—but who, specifically? Most of my needs must be met by society—but by whom, specifically?” Private ownership, as a stable and absolute system and institution in which producers lack stable, systematic communication, is born of this nonunderstanding and indifference. Yet this indifference, initially a requirement of reality, turns through the insistence of certain beneficiaries into a natural principle, and likewise promotes alienation in return: stable private ownership prevents producers from inquiring into another potential competitor’s production plans or needs. History’s self-development.
7. “Needs” become mutually alienated across the two domains of consumption and production. In consumption, desires are continually stimulated and solidified into needs; in production, wages are continually depressed and the possibility of realizing those needs is stripped away. Thus, the richer society becomes, the poorer workers become. Moreover, these needs acquire a definite embodiment in the consuming class. Finally, workers’ needs cease to be needs for self-realization, becoming needs for self-destruction and self-anesthesia.
8. Capital’s absorption of landed property proceeds through its rediscovery and subjectivization of the source of value. This is the Copernican revolution in the theory of value and economics. Henceforth value is no longer bound to natural objects, but becomes the subject’s creation. For the landed aristocracy, since the value it realizes does not lie in workers’ subjectivity, there is naturally no need to abstract workers and introduce free competition. Capital, however, manufactures an abstract laboring subject and thereby becomes the antithesis of rich life.
9. Under the capitalist mode of production, workers suffer when society regresses; they still suffer when society progresses, because workers entering the market become more dependent on this mode of production and therefore inevitably encounter a crisis of overproduction. If society stagnates, they still suffer from that stagnation. If “in prosperity, the people suffer; in downfall, the people suffer,” the only possibility is that this social mode of production itself oppresses most of its members.
Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy:
1. Marx’s critique of Hegel follows Schelling’s lineage: both concentrate on the problem of the beginning. Whether “sense-certainty” at the beginning of Phenomenology of Spirit or “being” at the beginning of the Logic, the beginning is entirely abstract, presupposing a subject’s thought that has already been abstracted. It is precisely because this beginning is abstract that Hegel describes his dialectic as a movement from the abstract to the concrete. Yet the concrete obtained in this way is merely an equally abstract concrete: a concrete retaining all previously sublated parts while still preserving their unsublated forms within the whole. Thus, within philosophy, within absolute knowledge, religion remains religion and the state remains the state; each merely acquires within philosophy a determinate relation to the whole.
2. Yet since “thought” and “being,” or the “subjective” and the “objective,” have mutually sublated each other, genuine dialectic should no longer remain confined to the passage from the abstract to the concrete. It should move from the concrete, already possessing its own certainty, to the concrete. If Hegel’s philosophy first abstracts two parts from reality and then communicates them into concreteness, Marx’s required dialectic must reject this preliminary abstraction and “begin again,” accomplishing a rethinking of “reality,” “nature,” and “history.” That is, it must start from a subject already concretely objectifying itself to constitute itself, and accomplish the characterization and description of concrete history. In this expressed history of “concrete reality’s” self-constitution, no whole can any longer be misunderstood as retaining, in the same form, the parts that ought to have been sublated. Religion sublated by actual history loses its essential objectivity: at most it can count as a community’s spiritual fiction, a totem. It no longer has the persistence that abstractions have in Hegel’s philosophy, as though religion were “returned” to history at history’s end. On the contrary, “religion” must undergo a fundamental transformation within actual history, until “religion” itself loses all actuality.
3. Thus, for Marx, Hegel’s Logic is ultimately thrown toward the philosophy of nature precisely because of the lack produced by Hegel’s initial abstraction. “A mysterious passion casts the philosopher’s concepts toward nature—‘boredom,’ or the craving for content.” Yet the concept’s transformation of itself into nature is actually a communication between two abstractions. If this step is truly to be accomplished, we still require a dialectic from the concrete to the concrete, or a concrete history. The issue is not the casting of abstract spirit toward nature, or vice versa, but how matter that is already spiritual determines and constitutes itself.
4. Of course, we may ask whether Marx is merely arbitrarily labeling Hegel “abstract.” How can Marx assume that what he speaks of is “concrete”? Or what thought or practice is not “abstract”? These questions admit the following response. First, Marx’s criticism of the “abstraction” of Hegel’s philosophy primarily derives from his criticism of its beginning: our reflection never begins with sense-certainty or being, but with the world we inhabit and our various practices. Then, although abstraction is necessary at the outset of scientific or philosophical reflection, it must combine with other abstract domains and become concrete. Up to this point, Hegel is correct in Marx’s eyes. But does this mean the endpoint has been reached? In fact, in Hegel we have reached only a mystification of the “concretization process,” the so-called “negation of negation.” This mysterious formula cannot explain how one abstract domain affects and constitutes another. In Hegel, the relation between “concept” and “nature” appears as a mysterious parallelization and “positing,” as though nature were merely the concept’s mirror, as though “motion” in nature were merely the image of the concept of “becoming.” In fact, however, every natural thing necessarily has a certain “spiritual” potential, a potential to construct itself into history. The relation between the two is not a monotonous mirror correspondence but a complex relation of mutual constitution. It is not that concept A corresponds to natural thing B; rather, natural thing B has its own complex constitutive structure and participates concretely in constituting concept A. Conversely, concept A participates in its own way in constituting natural thing B. Their horizons fuse with each other, even implying the constitution of further horizons; and these constitutive movements in different directions combine into an organic, complex, dynamic whole. Reflection’s mirror structure cannot encompass this. Likewise, one practice and another stand in complex relations of mutual constitution. In brief, the key to Marx’s dialectic should not be the ascending relation of “abstract–concrete,” since Hegel has already accomplished this ascent. Once this relation has been overcome, the new materialist-historicist dialectic should concentrate on the constitutive relation of “subject–object.” In this sense, phenomenology can rediscover the kinship between early Marx and late Husserl.