Miscellaneous · 杂记
Measurement · 测量
Is There a Measure on Earth?
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When Hölderlin asks in one of his poems “is there a measure on earth?” he formulates, with his peculiar clairvoyance and insight, one of the most difficult questions of all times; however, his definitive answer to that question, namely a diametrical “there is none”, is hardly satisfying. But in order to see the full scope of this question, we have to understand what lies behind this poetical formulation. In a way, Hölderlin is opposing the earthly realm with the heavenly divine, so that for him, it becomes a problem how the murkiness and darkness of earth can give birth to a measure. This conception, of course, is already founded upon a consequential presupposition: that a measure has to bring clarity to the things measured, thus making them more intelligible than they were.
Is this belief really justified? Is there any alternative understanding of measure other than a form of clarification? Does measurement necessarily clear things up for us? To examine these questions, it is inevitable that we look into our experience, and try to measure up our notion of measure against the rule of the world.
Let’s take the measuring of length as an example. When a length is measured, there are always two things involved: the measuring and the measured. A length does not measure itself, thus it always requires an other to put it into a comparison. By this very fact, are we tempted to agree with Socrates’ Protagoras, that everything is for an other? Not yet; since measuring does not stop at the putting together of two things, but rather they have to reach a certain agreement. When we measure a certain length, we do not merely put the length beside the ruler. We count up the units that would match the cutting edge of that length, where the length abruptly stops, and we announce that number of units to be of “the same” of that length measured. By this token, the two parties will ultimately be unified into one same thing. It would be very ridiculous if we say, in the end, that “one meter” and a “one-meter-long length” to be of different lengths. Nevertheless, it results in great confusion when the doubling of things suddenly dissolves into a unification. This confusion is most poignant when we think how the unity is itself different from any of those two things being compared. Take the internationally approved “meter” as an example, which is really just a stick in Paris. If we think about that meter stick being shortened over time, we are still capable of judging it to fall short of the true “meter” that unifies those different sticks. Then, is what we call meter that stick, or that ghostly figure of the “one true meter” we somehow have a sense of?
It seems like a specter is conjured up every time a measure is taken. Separate things suddenly seem to be conjoined in a definite relationship. Two questions then ensue. First, how do we characterize that relationship? Second, how do we understand this “conjuring up”?
The first characterization we offer of this relationship is that of a unity. This relationship has to express a sameness, that one thing is as another. But that is not the whole story. As the two things are measured against each other, they cannot become one, otherwise it will be a self-measure, which is no measure at all. Thus, a unification in this sense always incorporates its counter-moment, that of dispersion, though a rather limited dispersion that is restricted by the whole. The word that is commonly assigned to such a relationship is “harmony”.
Dispersion happens when things come to be different, and unification the reverse; but this is already assuming that the two moments are two counter-movements. When things separate, they become different, whereas when things gather, they become the same. The question, nevertheless, becomes pressing: when we measure things up, do we really see a double movement? This is also related to the other question we put forth a while ago: what is the nature of the “conjuring up”? is this a mere result of that double movement?
But there is not always movement; in fact, in most of the cases where a measurement is taken, things are quite at rest. I do need to multiply the ruler for many times if I need to measure a very long line, and multiplying certainly involves motion on my part. But in the end, things are quite at peace lying alongside each other; we do not necessarily observe a movement of being dispersed and being gathered at the same time, or even at different times, during the course of measurement. It is not the case that the ruler and the body measured suddenly take flight and suddenly join together like a pair of magnets.
Even if we take a case in which movement seems to be importantly involved, like the measuring of time, the process of measuring might take place in a gradual unfolding of one movement matching up with another, but the match itself, the fact that one slice of time measures another slice does not require the two slices themselves to be in movements. Not only does it not require, it actively rejects the idea of movement. Let us assume that an object in constant movement is measured, then the very instant after that measure is taken the object will be moving out of that measure, if it is moving with respect to what is measured. In that sense, it is impossible for a moving thing to be measured; any measure taken is between two things at rest, or two things transformed into a state of rest. Like when I measure the distance over which the moving ball traverses, I have to wait till it is at rest to take that measure successfully.
But is not the “conjuring up” a legitimate sense expressed by the measuring in our common experience? Do we not always share the feeling, that something new pops up when two things are put together, that they suddenly seem to say something as one, and become a new expression?
So, what is this monstrosity, this mixture of movements at rest? If the two things in the course of being measured are at total rest, how do they “bring about” a measure? But perhaps this is not too unfamiliar. When we have a force and a counter-force being applied to a body, ofttimes we find the body at rest; when that tendency to change is countered by another tendency, inactivity is the result. Then, are we tempted to say, that when two things are measured, they are always in some kind of equilibrium? This seems plausible, if we totally disregard the difference between movement and force. What happens in measurement is not merely that the bodies have a tendency to disperse or unify; no, the dispersion and unification are carried out and effectively actualized. The two parties in being measured have to persistently be separate and joined, as we have seen above, and this is not the same as to hold in reserve a potency that only waits to be actualized in future. The stasis is the confluence of movements.
Shall we say, then, the two movements in opposing merely “cancel each other out”? The problem, however, remains. How is it possible to cancel something that is required to happen, is always happening, and always has happened? It should be noted, that, it is prior to the actual measurement taking place that the two things should be posited against each other in a harmony; this harmony lays the very foundation of making any measurement possible in the first place. Without the two things being different, a measurement has no reason to exist; yet without their being the same, a measurement cannot be conclusive. Then, in what way can the two movements cancel each other out, yet preserve that double effect?
Let us think of a different example. The sun traverses; she follows a certain route, and if she ever oversteps too much, disasters like famine will ensue. But she does constantly overstep, which gives forth the seasons. Yet, there is always that limit which she holds dear. She gives light and warmth, which brings forth life, harvest, and joy. In this sense, she brings forth all that which has value to us. But she sometimes goes out of bounds; that is what we call night. The division of day and night gives us the most natural and original unit of time. Being and non-being reflect each other as they shine and darken, this primary experience constitutes all of that what time means. Time, originally, is given by the sun; time, thus, is given by a giving-forth. And the sun rules, perhaps in her own time, everything on earth, according to her own measure of traversing, thus giving measure to all things, as she also gives time.
Let us think back to what happens in a measurement. The things measuring and being measured overflow into its other, but does not overstep the limit. A measure is given in that very instant of putting things together; something new is thereby conjured up. But it is conjured up outside of time; by this original measuring, a time is given. The things spill and disperse, as if were about to be lost and destroyed in that darkest of nights; but are rescued at the limit, as if by an un-thinged receptacle. They move, but not really; this is the power of time. It is only in time, that you can have the same thing enduring, aging, and dying, but holding onto itself and striving. The fact that we do not seem to notice any change or movement when two things are lying alongside each other perhaps has to do with our habitual exclusion of time or taking account of perceiving in time in science; in its most radical sense, taking rest also happens in a time. Thus, when bodies are at rest when being measured, they are still moving in time; and this temporal movement is the double bind described above. Time is the rhythm via which things show themselves; in that sense, time is measure.
But, does it not mean that, if measure and time were the same, measurement is necessarily temporal? In a sense, yes; but that giving of measure itself originates outside time, like the sun gives time forth to earth. Measuring is thus a breed of both the earthly and the divine; it seems, ultimately, that Protagoras is right in calling man as the measure of all things, since what is man except that strange breed of the earthly and the divine?
Hölderlin is absolutely right in asking that question “is there a measure on earth?”, but his answer ignores the fact that it is only on earth that a measure can be established, whereas with the divine there is no need of a measure at all. And, finally, if we interpret the intelligible as something so elevated as to not connect to earth, which only seems to those to taint their godlike all-seeing view, then we could say that measurement is not intended for that kind of clarification, hence is not intelligible. But, if we stick to the more undercurrent meaning of intelligible as that of the “idea(seen)”, as that which receives sunlight on earth and reflects it in an articulation with all other beings together, then it is most intelligible. Or, to put it even more radically, it is the intelligible itself. Science, if it does not view itself as a radical poetical practice, will lose eventually its supreme power of clarification, through ossifying its own perspective and making every object it touches, like the Midas touch, into a static, not-giving-forth fossil. When nature stands as an ungenerous corpse and stops giving herself forth, what more could a natural science do? Will it, perhaps, assert itself as that new voracious tyrant, to impose measures of his own and claim those to be the general principles of nature......?
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
荷尔德林在一首诗中问“大地上是否有尺度?”时,以他独特的先见与洞察,提出了有史以来最为艰难的问题之一;然而,他对此给出的断然回答,即完全否定的“并没有”,却很难令人满意。但为了看到这一问题的全部范围,我们必须理解这诗性表达背后蕴含着什么。在某种意义上,荷尔德林把大地的领域与天上的神圣对立起来,因此,对他来说,大地的混浊与黑暗如何能孕育出尺度,就成了一个问题。当然,这一观念已经建立在一个后果深远的预设之上:尺度必须使被测量的事物变得清晰,从而比原来更加可理解。
这一信念真的有根据吗?除了把尺度理解为一种澄清的形式之外,是否还有别的理解?测量必然会为我们澄清事物吗?要考察这些问题,我们不可避免地要回到经验之中,并试着以世界的准则来衡量我们关于尺度的观念。
让我们以长度的测量为例。测量一个长度时,总涉及两个东西:测量者与被测量者。一个长度并不测量自身,因此,它总需要一个他者来使之进入比较。仅仅凭借这一事实,我们是否就会倾向于赞同苏格拉底笔下的普罗泰戈拉,认为万物都是为一个他者而存在的?还不能;因为测量并不止于把两个东西放在一起,它们还必须达成某种一致。测量一个长度时,我们并不只是把这段长度放在尺子旁边。我们会数出多少个单位能与这段长度戛然而止的边缘相合,并宣告这些单位的数目与被测量的长度“相同”。这样一来,双方最终就被统一为同一个东西。如果最后我们说“一米”和“一段一米长的长度”具有不同的长度,那就十分可笑了。然而,事物的加倍突然消融为统一,又会引起极大的困惑。当我们想到,这一统一体本身又不同于相互比较的那两个东西中的任何一个时,这种困惑就最为尖锐。以国际认可的“米”为例,它其实不过是巴黎的一根棒。如果我们设想那根米尺随着时间变短,我们仍然能够判断,它比那个统一着诸多不同尺棒的真正的“米”短了。那么,我们称之为米的,究竟是那根棒,还是那个我们不知如何有所感知的、“唯一真正的米”的幽灵形象?
仿佛每进行一次测量,就会召唤出一个幽灵。彼此分离的事物,突然仿佛在一种确定的关系中联结起来。随之而来的是两个问题。第一,我们如何刻画这种关系?第二,我们如何理解这一“召唤”?
我们对这种关系给出的第一个刻画,是统一。这一关系必须表达一种相同性,即一个东西如同另一个东西。但事情并不止于此。两个东西相互测量时,不能成为一个东西,否则这就成了自我测量,而自我测量根本不算测量。因此,这种意义上的统一,总包含着与之相反的环节,即离散,尽管这种离散颇为有限,受着整体的约束。通常用来指称这种关系的词是“和谐”。
事物变得不同,离散就发生了;统一则恰恰相反。但这已经预设了,这两个环节是两种相反的运动。事物分开,就变得不同;事物聚集,就变得相同。然而,一个问题变得迫切起来:测量事物时,我们真的看到了双重运动吗?这也关涉我们方才提出的另一个问题:“召唤”的本性是什么?它仅仅是那双重运动的结果吗?
可是,运动并不总是存在;事实上,大多数测量发生时,事物都相当静止。如果要测量一条很长的线,我确实必须把尺子重复放置许多次,而这种重复当然涉及我的运动。但最终,事物还是安静地并排躺在那里;在测量过程中,我们并不一定同时,甚至不一定在不同时间,观察到离散与聚集的运动。尺子和被测物体并不会突然飞起,又突然像一对磁铁那样合在一起。
即使我们取一个似乎必然涉及运动的重要例子,例如时间的测量,测量的过程或许表现为一个运动与另一个运动逐渐展开的匹配,但这种匹配本身,即一段时间测量另一段时间这一事实,并不要求这两段时间本身处于运动之中。它不仅不要求,反而主动排斥运动的观念。让我们假设,一个不断运动的对象受到了测量;那么,测量一经完成,下一瞬间,只要这一对象在被测量的方面有所运动,它就会移出那个尺度。在这个意义上,运动着的东西不可能被测量;任何一次测量都发生在两个静止的东西之间,或发生在两个被转化为静止状态的东西之间。就像我测量一个运动的小球所经过的距离时,必须等它停下来,才能成功完成测量。
但是,“召唤”难道不是测量在我们的日常经验中所表达的一种正当意义吗?我们难道不总会有这样的感觉:两个东西被放到一起时,某种新的东西就涌现出来,它们突然仿佛作为一体说出了什么,成为了一种新的表达?
那么,这种怪物,这种静止中的运动混合物,究竟是什么?如果测量过程中的两个东西全然静止,它们又如何“产生”一个尺度?但这也许并不那么陌生。一个力及其反作用力施加在一个物体上时,我们常常发现这个物体静止不动;一种改变的倾向被另一种倾向抵消时,结果便是不动。那么,我们是否就会倾向于说,两个东西受到测量时,它们总处于某种平衡状态?如果完全忽略运动与力的区别,这似乎很有道理。但测量中发生的,并不仅仅是物体具有离散或统一的倾向;不,离散与统一已经被施行,并得到切实的实现。如上所见,测量中的双方必须持续地既分离又联结,而这与把一种潜能保留起来、仅仅等待它在未来实现,并不是一回事。静止是诸运动的汇流。
那么,我们是否应该说,这两种对抗的运动仅仅“相互抵消”了?可是问题依然存在。一件必然要发生、始终在发生而且总已发生的事情,怎么可能被抵消?应当注意,在实际的测量发生之前,这两个东西就应当在一种和谐中彼此相对而立;正是这一和谐,为任何测量之所以可能奠定了基础。没有两者的差异,测量就没有存在的理由;但没有两者的相同,测量又不能得出结论。那么,这两种运动究竟以什么方式既相互抵消,又保留了那双重效果?
让我们想一个不同的例子。太阳在运行;她循着一定的路线,倘若越界过远,饥荒之类的灾难就会随之而来。但她又不断越界,由此带来了四季。然而,她总珍视着那个界限。她给予光与热,由此带来生命、收获与快乐。在这个意义上,她带来了对我们有价值的一切。但有时,她会走到界外;这就是我们所说的夜晚。昼与夜的划分,给予我们最自然、最原初的时间单位。有与无在明暗交替中彼此映照,这一原初经验构成了时间意义的全部。时间原初地由太阳给予;时间,因此由一种生发给予。太阳也许就在她自己的时间中,依照她自身运行的尺度统治大地上的一切;她在给予时间的同时,也给予万物以尺度。
让我们回想测量中究竟发生了什么。测量者与被测量者向其各自的他者溢出,却又不越过界限。尺度就在事物被放在一起的那一瞬间被给予;某种新的东西由此被召唤出来。但它是在时间之外被召唤的;通过这一原初的测量,一个时间被给予了。事物漫溢、离散,仿佛将要在那最黑暗的夜晚中失落、毁灭;却又在界限处被拯救,仿佛被一个尚未物化的容器接住。它们在运动,却又并不真的运动;这就是时间的力量。只有在时间中,同一事物才能绵延、衰老、死亡,同时又坚持着自身、奋力挣扎。两个东西并排躺着时,我们似乎没有注意到任何变化或运动,这也许与科学中一种习惯有关:我们惯于排除时间,或不把在时间中的知觉纳入考虑;从最根本的意义上说,静止也发生在某个时间中。因此,物体在测量中即使静止,也仍然在时间中运动;而这种时间性的运动,正是上文所描述的双重束缚。时间是事物借以显现自身的韵律;在这个意义上,时间就是尺度。
但是,如果尺度与时间相同,这难道不意味着测量必然是时间性的吗?在某种意义上,是的;然而,那尺度的给予本身却发源于时间之外,就像太阳向大地给予时间。因此,测量是大地与神圣的混种;归根结底,普罗泰戈拉称人为万物的尺度,似乎是正确的,因为人除了是大地与神圣的那种奇异混种,还能是什么呢?
荷尔德林问“大地上是否有尺度?”时完全正确,但他的回答忽略了这样一个事实:尺度只有在大地上才能建立,而在神圣那里,根本不需要尺度。最后,如果我们把可理解者解释为如此高高在上、以至于不与大地发生联系的东西,而在那些人看来,大地似乎只会玷污他们神一般无所不见的视野,那么,我们可以说,测量并不是为了那种澄清,因而不是可理解的。但如果我们坚持“可理解”一词更为潜在的含义,把它理解为“理念(所见者)”,理解为那在大地上接受阳光,并在与一切其他存在者共同的联结中反射阳光的东西,那么,测量就是最可理解的。或者,更激进地说,它就是可理解者本身。科学若不把自己视作一种根本的诗性实践,就会通过僵化自身视角,像点石成金的弥达斯那样,把自己触及的每一个对象都变成静止的、不再生发的化石,并最终丧失其最高的澄清力量。当自然作为一具吝于施予的尸体站立,不再把自身给予出来时,自然科学还能做些什么?它是否也许会把自己确立为那个新的、贪得无厌的暴君,强加它自己的尺度,并把这些尺度宣称为自然的普遍原则……?