Maurice Merleau-Ponty · 莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂
Phenomenology of Perception · 知觉现象学
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Phenomenology of Perception — Reading notes · Part I
Apple Notes
Revised 19 June 2025
In this note / 篇目
7–22
Merleau-Ponty seems to go from Husserl to Heidegger, but in fact, he believes that Husserl is more Heidegger than Heidegger himself. The reason is that Husserl pushes his phenomenological transcendental idealist method to the extreme so that he, according to Merleau-Ponty, can specifically depict the original facticity that delimits phenomenology. This is reflected in Husserl 1. through his phenomenological reduction, which retroactively expresses the radically irreducible nature, that is, the phenomenological reflection on facticities in the fundamental sense is but a means to achieve a reflection on what is originarily perceived in our natural attitude, as is evident in Husserl’s reintroducing the noematic in relation to the noetic analyses, since noema as noema is precisely this irreducible factuality; 2. through eidetic reduction, which only expresses more radically the irreducible existence, that is, eidetic reduction is precisely to reflect the absolute flux of interwoven existents in relation to essences qua ideas, because the thrownness of Dasein’s being-thrown-into-world is so thorough that he even forgets this very thrownness, and only through a contemplation of these essences, can Dasein recover this thrownness, thus grasping the flux of geneses from existence to essence and back, rather than simply impose essence on existence; 3. through the dialectical relationship between the various intentionalities, so that rationality is not a pre-formed interpretation of history, but the self-interpretation of rationality is a part of historicity itself, similarly, the subject is not just the one who constitutes the other that is known by the subject, but the alterego who is known by the subject is known as knowing the subject at the same time.
Eidetic reduction transforms existences into essential structures; phenomenological reduction transforms these essential structures into norms back in relation to existential and factical experiences that generate these structures.
23–35
Here Mearleau-Ponty criticizes three different ways traditionally to define “sensing.” First, sensing as impression, second, sensing as what in consciousness corresponds to a quality, and third, sensing as reaction of a sensory organ in response to a stimulus.
First, impression is atomistic. An impression always entails some homogenous “jolt” of sensory datum. But such is not the case, as to sense is always to perceive a difference and to intend differentially. It is to look at the sensed in a milieu.
Second, quality is, different from impression, transcendent to consciousness. Yet it is nonetheless atomistic, for red is red only in a context. There is no “quality of red” other than a property of a thing given in its situation. This definition is equivalent to the first.
Third, a sensory organ is always contextualized by other organs, in the same way it is contextualized by the psychical subject. There is no point-to-point correspondence between an organ’s response and its stimulus. Rather, the stimulus is first of all a bestowed sense constituted through the activity of the organ, which is itself constituted by other activities. The eye does not see a part of the world, but rather constitutes a profile that cointends other profiles in vanishing horizons.
All these three misinterpretations stem from an objectivistic point of view, which is the view taken up by modern science, which sees more truth in the constituted things than in the constituting subjectivities. This view is the ideal of perception, not perception per se. This, however, only indicates how perception is not a mere faculty, but also a historical becoming within which the subjects constitute themselves, as adults constitute their perceptions more in accord to this ideal than children do, as modern men more than primitives. Yet, such constitution is founded on the primitive pre-objective field of perception. We have to understand this field, which accompanies our field and continually activates it, following a dialectic of perception. Rules vs Roots. Ideas vs Norms.
36–49
Again, a critique of empiricism and atomism, expressed through the opposition between “sensation” and “sense.”
Empiricism is a whole system, and is hence irrefutable. But it distorts originary phenomena. It explains away the perceived phenomenon through atoms of sensation, through associations (by similarity or by contiguity) of sensations qua strong or weak impressions, and through memory compensations.
Yet the perceived is always a perceived sense immanently intending other senses which creates a horizon that first makes such associations possible. Associations are analytical elements situated in a prefiguration of the whole. I do not see parts that join into a ship as I come closer, rather, I see a landscape strewn with parts that is gradually transformed into a ship clearly delineated against its background. The same I can only explain or even initiate my associations through my most originary perception of the thing itself that could intend specifically that association. The same I could perceive the house or the mountain without ever seeing them move as one solid whole. The same I could even perceive gaps between things as wholes if I really choose to.
Perceptions are not of assemblages of indifferent elements but of nexuses of cointending senses.
50–62
Intellectualism and empiricism are supplements to each other. This is manifest in the two intellectualistic doctrines of 1. attention and 2. judgement.
First, empiricism supposes attention to be like a flashlight shone onto things, thus illuminating transcendent objects preexisting, while intellectualism supposes attention to be, again, modeled after a flashlight, this time onto content already immanent to and contained in mind, waiting only to be unfolded. But attention should rather be a constitution and creation of a perceptual field, thus attention is nothing but intentionality. One is attentive to a thing when the thing is prefigured in a horizon that one is previously attentive to, which the secondary attention reconstructs dialectically. Such is the attention paid to a location on my own body.
Second, intellectualism presupposes empiricism by suggesting that judgement really determines perception, while sensation only provides its material. But judgement should not only extrinsically supervene over sensation, but should be intrinsically generated from sensation as well. The saying goes “judgement errs but sensation doesn’t.” This is incorrect. For judgement does not supply error to the same material sensed, rather it constitutes the error perceptually as an illusion; moreover, judgement can only err when the perception already possesses a wrong sense, that the mad man makes false judgements not because he makes false judgements, but because he really is hallucinating and perceiving differently. This denies all kinds of naïveté that presuppose a “true world” where all sensations are homogeneous and objectified; rather, the lifeworld is pre-objective and measureless, though still differentially perceivable as constituted through subjectivity.
63–70
This strain put upon intellectualism is the most evident in the case of reflective analysis. This paradigm in the thought of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Kant asserts that all perceptions are confused intellections and all intellections are decentralized and absolutely free from facticity. Even a dialectic between empiricism and intellectualism would not address the problem adequately since it starts with the two dogmas and are thereby stuck in the false opposition, which generates only false solutions.
One solution is to suggest that, dialectically, there is the constituting consciousness that absolutely constitutes itself as the constituted object. The consciousness would then be some self-objectified absolute spirit. This, however, still posits the split: such as in neo-Kantianism, the hidden subject of absolute activity and its product of passive objectivity. This solution intends to bring together two moments that start off as separate and antagonistic. But this is still not the positive solution of starting with the originary unity, in lieu of recovering traces of activity inside passivity. To think dialectically is different from to do phenomenology: the former induces us to unify opposites, while the latter induces to think already in this unity. The former yields us what is “correct,” while the latter teaches us how to produce and practice correctly. This seems to be the same critique of Hegelianism by Schelling, Marx and Kierkegaard.
So this dialectical solution is nonetheless still lacking in a truly philosophical sense. How to understand the problem? The problem is, though one is aware of the dialectical relationship between the constituting and the constituted, one nonetheless believes that the constituting is absolute and primary, that in its self-constituting it individuates, so that the body is but a product of the intellect’s self-reflection, and that evil or perception is just self-obfuscation and self-privation of the intellect, that there exists such an absolute, that there is truth and self-evidence ready to be known everywhere, that potentially everything can be clarified. Even if there must be privation, privation is itself a constitutive element to the divine architecture of Absolute Spirit: one is still striving for that absolute knowledge, that Wissenschaft.
But one should not start from the ideal of knowledge and presume that the ideal is equivalent to inner truth. Rather, facticity and the unity of a thinking body as this thinking body is what is primary. Eternity is not constituting time, but eternity is itself reconstituted through the living present in time. Knowledge is to preserve the mystery of contingency. Experience in finitude reigns supreme, for what is precisely in the middle as a unity is in the middle between God and nothingness: that is the finite. The finite and its living present are our roots. Not everything is simply knowable, but knowledge itself is constituted through intersubjectivity rooted in our finitude; not everything is simply intuitive, but intuition is itself constituted through our temporality.
71–77
A summation of all previous arguments, including a critique of Gestalt theory, which, though more attentive to the phenomena, nonetheless returns to a naively natural attitude, presupposing causes and effects.
Causes are entirely external to effects, while reasons entirely internal to the constitution of phenomena. We phenomenologists want an immanent transcendence, hence motivations. Perception is always motivated, by bodily movement and by the milieu. Distance is perceived relying on other more or less ambiently perceived surrounding things. A landscape is no longer recognizable upside down. This is not something one judges or reckons with, but something one immediately perceives.
78–91
In perception, things, the stable kernels of phenomenal unity, the “poles” that organize experiences, rivet us. This introduces us to objectivism, hence a tradition of objectified thought and hence objectivisitic science. But its opposite is complementary to it. Psychologism is but a necessary consequence of the division of the phenomenal field into the objective versus the subjective. On the one hand, there is the third-person viewpoint where everything is constituted, and the living body is reduced to a physical body. On the other hand there is the first-person viewpoint where everyone is a constituting consciousness that constitutes“mere images.” Either, in a Bergsonian way, these images are per impossible supposed to coincide with exteriority, when the subject is absolutely segregated from the external and all images are but ineffable feelings. Or, in a Kantian way, this consciousness rather provides the ideal rule as a universal and absolute consciousness. This again is ineffectual, as this again, as was critiqued in the last section, only results in a dialectical unification, but not a description of the dialectical unity itself which starts from the originary phenomena. Only from the factical origin can one fully approach, first an authentic psychology cleansed of psychologism via transforming its material of images into senses, and once thus cleansed, grows into transcendental phenomenology. An authentic transcendental philosophy is only possible through an authentic transcendental psychology, as the eidetic structure of norms is premised on the fact of this structure inherent in the originary phenomena present to consciousness. In the unity of lifeworld, ideas (philosophy) are unified with facts (psychology) into norms (phenomenology).
92–100
We say we see an object, but what does it really mean? Do we not just see an image? How is an object constituted?
The eidetic structure of vision and all perceptions for that matter is object-horizon, and qua eidetic, it is independent of any contingent organization of our physical body. An object is constituted, first, as I see a profile of it. Then, this profile intends a horizon wherein it is situated. Every other point in the horizon projects or reflects my gaze upon the object to cast it in infinitely many profiles, organized into a spatial entity through my motrically embodied sense. As an object increases in its objectivity within the focus of my gaze, all other objects lose themselves and merge with the horizon, for then they become the constituting angles, the indeterminate flux of activity, and their activities converge to the object in question. That’s to say all other surrounding objects become placeholders for the gaze directed at the table at the center of my vision, as the tile and the roof etc. all reflect my gaze and see the table for me.
But these gazes cannot be simply reduced to images when synthesized. An eye is not a camera. Before it focuses on an object, the camera shows a blurred image. But before an eye focuses, it shows a horizon wherein the object awaits to be conjured. Eyes provide profiles that constitute an object spatially. An object assumes its spatial character only when all of its “frontal views” from all sides are not smashed together but synthesized in a series of cointending and motrical sense, that when I perceive when I move to the left of my current view a view of the left side would be provided frontally. The perception of depth is necessary for the perception of a daily object.
The reflected gaze is then concentrated on the object to constitute it as a limit of infinite synthesis, an idea thereof. It affords itself as self-enclosed and self-sufficient. Horizons are suppressed by this idea. All experiences are sedimented in this kernel, and the world is reduced to a universe of these kernels. This constitutes the objective universe which our common sense inhabits. The same with time, as the present not only intends its past, but is in turn intended by the past through a reflected temporal gaze that fixes it in its place and reduces it to an objective position in a universal time. The objective world is a world in equilibrium of all these modifications and forces.
In losing ourselves, giving ourselves up to the object, we become equally given up to an absolute subjectivity. For we don’t recall constituting the objects: rather, objects are posited by us all at once in their full autonomy. Thus even in German Idealism we still have this idea of positing which is unoriginary. This was already brought up in the last section.
But why is it necessary for us to lose ourselves in the object, and universalizing the object till it congeals the whole world? For the feeling of divine power and absolute subjectivity? For the practical use of objects for life?
Also, it seems necessary to supply the counter-phenomenon of an object resisting our gaze. The stone that conceals itself in its exterior. Is it part of what constitutes the object? Perhaps “the kernel” par excellence?
101–112
The case of phantom limbs. To explain the phenomenon of phantom limbs neither a psychological nor a physiological explanation is enough. For it’s not sufficient to say the receptor still receives a stimulus, as the effect of the receptor is only actively perceived in given situations, and also the stimulus must be given a sense. But on the other hand, it’s tied to the body and the stimulus and is not purely psychological. The best framework to understand the phenomenon has to be phenomenological and existentialist. The receptor only opens towards the stimulus so as to figure a horizon. The phantom limb belongs to the habitual and general type of the body that is used to solve practical problems and that bestows a habitual sense to the surrounding objects. The body perceives those objects as manipulable, even more, manipulable in themselves. In this sense, the body, in treating the world horizon as full of objects ready-to-hand, treats itself as ready-with-a-hand. Hence stems the phantom limb. In the same sense an insect with its leg tied still has a leg, thus wouldn’t supply a new leg, but with a leg removed would instinctively substitute it with a new leg. This instinctual behavior is as fluid as concealed. It is therefore neither mechanical nor conscious, but worldly.
113–118
So what is a situation, and what is the situation of our body? Body naturally, in relation to our human world, takes up the hidden level, as the more fundamentally sedimented horizon of the organism. This is analogous to the horizon of the repressed experience. The repressed is not present in consciousness, which makes every experience operable in codetermining it with other experiences to the subject’s choice and action, and which generates the subject as an actor. The repressed experience is experience whose content is emptied out, yet leaving its essential form or structure untouched. The structure persists as the habitual attitude of existence that the subject takes up within the world, and has not outlived, like a traumatic experience not just leaves traces of its content, but also its habitual and general structure. To “remember” in psychoanalysis is only to give back the general structure its particular genetic history and thus to unify it again as an experience codeterminable with other experiences consciously. The same with our organic body. The body is a general structure determining us but is itself a generative history of the species, which we as individuals constitute. We can always reactivate our body in this sense, to give back its integral sense, and in doing so incorporate it back to our human life: to make the organism human, in the same way we make the trauma our symptom, and we make the past present. But the past, in being itself once a present, retains a force to decenter our centering. In the same way, not only do we make the organism human, the body return us to organisms. Horizons intermingle. Our bodily dimension is a historical dimension within our history, as our biological past.
Now, how does this explain the phantom limb? The phantom limb is a practical opening up permissible to the general horizon of the body. So long as the nerve circuits are not closed, the limb is there operative as a general structure without content (the actual presence of the limb), determined by that moment of trauma. Yet, as the nerve circuit is closed, the biological horizon closes: what does this mean? This means the nerve circuit fundamentally is not just a physical organ, but an opening to a horizon. This is understandable given what is said about biological facts being simultaneously genealogical norms. Humans have many reflexes, not because we are machines, but because we are organisms and we have our more primary concerns. Machines are manufactured for us to delegate menial jobs to: that is precisely what reflexes are for us, i.e. our devoted but blind servants. We are hardwired not because that’s simply what we are, but because we become hardwired so as to become human beings, whose primary needs and concerns are spiritual. We are machines, but machines are built, are constituted, and are used. That speaks to us meaningfully, as our body contains horizons recalcitrantly sedimented within our current and prominent horizons, which nonetheless remain horizons.
119–126
Body as the latent horizon for the horizon of objective knowledge and science. What is body as a horizon? The body is a strange being.
First, my body is constantly present, yet not permanent as an object; rather, the relative permanence of an object is constituted by the permanent possibility of my using my permanently available body to change perspective, and in this change to constitute the object. But this means the body is a priori: its transcendental structure permits objects to first emerge.
Second, my body constitutes a space. My body’s movement opens up first a kinesthetic space. I don’t usually calculate objectively the coordinates of the goal of my bodily movement, and I don’t first even need to determine the goal. Rather, I already sense the location my hand is moving immediately in moving my hand. In a manner of speaking, one can say my hand really touches and incorporates the empty space it is going to occupy before it is even there. This primordial voluminousity of sensing is also evident in my feeling my feet hurt: I don’t perceive my feet as the cause of my pain, but the pain immediately comes from my feet. Also, I can tell my left hand from my right simply by instinct, as they first constitute a space where left and right first become objectively determinable for me.
Third, my body is always both indeterminably active and passive. As I sense my right hand with my left, my one hand constitutes the other as object that nonetheless also explores. I sense in my right hand a shell of the explorative left hand. This again is different from objects, which is explored, but is never explorative. Though I see my eye in the mirror, the living gaze is lacking.
But given these non-mistakable characteristics of the body, how come psychologists still miss the unique status of body? They naively believe an object always corresponds to a subjective representation. They repress the body, yet its horizon nonetheless surges forth. One always lives the body, and the living dimension always is the most important to be understood. Facts have to be taken up back into norms.
127–140
The body schema is not a spatial representation of, e.g. the hand, associated with the spatial representation of the whole body. Rather, the body schema is what first of all allows these representations to be associated. The body schema is the overall experience enveloping the experience of a part, that is localized yet intimately felt. The bodily space is a situational, not a geometrical, space. If we say point-horizon is the basic structure of perception, body is the missing link that a priori determines what can be constituted as a point situated in what horizon. Body is the horizon of all perceptual horizons, and when a part of body appears, it conceals others, as the comet with its trailing tail. As was said earlier, I don’t distinguish my left hand from my right hand through representations: they simply are different through their inner tension.
Next, what about those pathological cases where the patient is no longer clear about their abstract bodily space? When they are asked to grasp a body part or to do something concrete, they can make use of their bodily space. But when they are asked to do some random movement or to localize what is abstractly present or to point at it, they can’t. That is these patients’ bodily space has lost the virtual horizon of possibilities, and instead they are steeped in the actual horizon. When they are asked to grasp the body part, that part becomes for them “graspable” and hence real. When they are commanded to imitate a scenario, they wholeheartedly immerse their body in that scenario and effect that action. When they fail to point to a thing or to localize the object on their skin, they do not live their body in a real enough situation, but they have to do some preparatory movements in order to first represent their whole body and deduce and calculate.
But on the other hand a normal subject can not only entertain his phenomenal body in a real situation, but also in any general situation. The horizon for him is always reducible to traits and general characters. He does not need to measure the space in order to indicate a possibility, but what is possible is inherently in his bodily space. His horizon is therefore open as a horizon that also accommodates what is only signified. It’s an indicative horizon, a relatively more open and less rigid one.
One also needs to understand that pathology is not mere normalcy subtracting some facility. Pathology is its own process and movement, and even the substitution strategy grows out of the pathology and its solution is hence equally pathological. So without the mediating space of possibility, how do pathological subjects arrive at the objective space? First, these subjects might not absolutely lack the virtual space, otherwise the actual horizon wouldn’t even be possible; the horizon structure is still present, only too rigid, and what is present as possibilities too obscure to be fully designated. The imposition of mathematics and geometry does not require a due order of acquisition, since pathology follows its own order. It is then the case that, the patients acquire geometry because they understand virtual space, though they never experience it as presence, but an absence, which is indifferent to the founding of geometry. In other words, as a normal person can experience their bodily space both interestedly (for action) and indifferently (for indication), a patient can only experience it interestedly, and he has to either resort to preparatory movements that transform what is only indifferent to his body into what’s of interest to it, or resort to geometrical representation, which is founded, not on the experience of what is present to the phenomenal body’s horizon, but on the overall experience of this horizon.
140–152
Again we try to understand the phenomenon present to this specific patient. Though the horizon is given to his thought and perception, we can say it is nonetheless not given to his motor space, that space where his body is oriented in a free way towards the world. The basic structure is less rigid and more projective. The world is the subject’s project, towards which he freely comports himself and his bodily movement. The rigid structure of the patient determines him to a step-by-step realization of motion, instead of a projection or a leap into the possible through signification.
Do we have to interpret this phenomenon in an existential way? Is empiricism not sufficient? Merleau-Ponty here provides two objections on this account. First, as empiricism was refuted earlier, Merleau-Ponty points out how the inductive method is not sufficient for any science which wishes to not merely establish causal links but also to have rational concepts that could really elucidate the phenomena. It’s never enough to explain things without then understanding them. This is a general criterion. The second objection is more particular to psychology, as it concerns the more concealed and enveloped phenomenon of behavior, many interpretations of the phenomenon are equally probable. If one says the patient is like this because he is deprived of visual cues, this is not observed in a lot of experiments, plus what would tactile experience in itself be, if it is sufficiently modified by the visual experience in a normal person? Moreover, in visual givens there’s already that point-horizon structure, which structure is precisely what vision supposedly first gives to the normal subject, thus we are moving in a circle. It’s wrong to suppose that vision is just visual data or hearing just auditory material: vision is more horizonal than hearing, and this is a structural trait, not a material distinction. One cannot ignore the proper visual structure that presupposes what is supposed to be afforded by vision. Again, there is no reason to assume that touch is structurally dissimilar to vision and requires a visual supplement to perform a project. One therefore has to accept that in psychology the basic unit is experience, and experience is always fundamentally singular and unique. The patient has his unique experience with the visual and tactile givens. Not only is there no determinate cause here, nor is there a cause insufficiently understood, causality itself is not proper for our understanding psychology, as causality is too founded on the notions of an objective world where objects are indifferent to each other.
152–163
One has to understand that each of the physiologist and intellectualist interpretation of the phenomenon has to be totalizing. This means that they are not mutually exclusive as in a Venn Diagram, but they are two systems that unfold two different worlds. One understands this when one asks oneself, if the phenomenon can be understood in any part and to any degree in terms of a third person process, why can it not be fully reduced to such processes? If a patient simply lacks some visual content, why can’t a normal subject simply possesses it? And if a normal subject indicates, is not the same bodily movement at work as the patient grasps? The patient hence is essentially the same as the normal person, only somewhat deprived. Contrarily, if the normal person can signify and constitute a world-horizon, is the patient not doing the same in order to be a patient and not a thing? But then the patient would again essentially have the same transcendental subjectivity that is synthesizing, only empirically restricted and conditioned in the patient. Again, one loses the phenomenon of the pathology.
Therefore one has to remember always that we are dealing here with not a mixture of two causes, but a free reason that intends two self-sufficient and parallel worlds. There is no transcendental consciousness purely for itself; its synthesis is not atemporal, but precisely the presupposed atemporality is itself constituted in time. The transcendental subject freely constitutes itself as empirical, but is not isolated from it as Spirit walks over water. The form does not subsume material, but is always already material. So conversely the third-person process is always already taken up and made into sense. Neo-Kantianism always believes that some pure consciousness hovers above beings as the core faculty of signification (“the community of sense”) as if form hovers above material. These two worlds can only be related dialectically through phenomenology which starts from the phenomenon concretely, without abstractions.
164–169
To recapitulate the phenomenon, one has to definitively say that the problem with the patient can neither be solely intellectual nor solely perceptual. Rather, intelligence is always contextualized within a perception, that form is always situated in its material. The problem with the patient is precisely the connection between his intelligence and perception is destroyed, so that he can only impose his intelligence onto the perceived material without effecting the immediate perception of form and content in their immediate unity. The intellectual form does not project its singular objectification while the perceived does not project a universal possibility. Rather, he has to first see something, then infer something out of it explicitly.
When he reads, he understands the narrative, but cannot recount the narrative creatively, as the inspiration of the moment when form and content collide is lacking for him. He can only reconstitute the sense from the content he hears, but cannot immediately perceive the sense. The same with riddles and puzzles, he can logically deduce the answer, but cannot solve the puzzle. The same with counting, though he nonetheless synthesizes different items into one enumeration, he does not count insofar as he does not keep the sediment of the past available for reactivation; as for a normal subject counting is largely a symbolic act of going through ciphers that nonetheless maintains continuously some intuitable multiplicity, for the patient counting is simply going by the rules, and he only verifies the count as he arrives at the result, but never in the process of it, thus he retains no trailing of the numerical sense in his consciousness when counting as a normal subject does. These eloquently display how much the intellectual function is already implicated in the pre-conscious perceptual function for a normal subject, and how rigid the structure that harbors these two functions really is for the patient.
170–183
Body has its intentional arc that constitutes its own world from its given past: the world it constitutes is a historical world. This makes illness qua illness possible. Pathology is always irreversible; though it can be cured and body restored to health, pathology is still preserved in the body’s “medical history.” So simple empiricism is problematic, for it believes implicitly that any pathology is external to the body, and a simple removal of the illness is equivalent to the curing of the body. But neither is synthesis some general function of understanding, for reasons already mentioned. The world adjunct to body is intuitive and immediate.
The perceived world is not an objective world. Nothing is measured in this world, but everything is a power and a burgeoning field of sense. For some patients one can say that the more fundamental structure or field is damaged, yet the superstructure persists, so that the world for him has collapsed really, yet still holds a facade. And this world belongs to the body itself, as body is the knot that ties multiple worlds together into the particular world that body immediately perceives. And our body learns a habit not through active understanding, but through its own historical acquisition: the incorporation of a subfield into the originary field of the body, e.g. the body learns to dance not through analyzing the steps, but through repeated practice of the steps, even without any active understanding.
184–190
The bodily dimension gives an originary unity, which means that it is not an assemblage or subsumption of different segments into a structure or an idea, as is the case with objects. Rather, all bodily experiences flow into each other. Body is not an objective core to which all organs or perceptions refer, but is immediately what is experienced, the same way a painting, though an object physically, is not an object as a work of art. Rather, as a work of art, it is given not as a core to which all perspectives point, but as a self-appearing world where objects are first allowed to appear. It is not an object nor an idea because as a work of art the painting has no stable center, but each particular stroke is appealing to the eye. The same way body is not an ideal transcendence, but every singular experience is itself a wavelet in the overall experience. There is thus no stable hierarchical structure, but a free play. Similarly, the body is not a law governing bodily or psychic facts, as it is not an empty formula that holds all facts indifferently: body is not a medium that regulates equals. Again, it opens up a field of free play between different unities of senses. That is the freedom of the body. Laws govern what do not organize by themselves and ideas concentrate what do organize by their own dynamism, while the body plays with the organism as the organism: so it puts itself into many nows that nonetheless envelop each other organically, so that it’s no law that deals equally with absences or presences qua instances of the law; but on the other hand, it plays with its own many organs, and decenters itself into many centers without losing itself as a totality of network, while an idealized body becomes that dynamic core eternally actualizing itself into presence that also preserves its own absences contained in this actualization of the idea.
191–198
Sexuality is first and foremost the privileged structure of desire and drives that accentuates our existential totality into a concentrated perspective, where body is perceived not primarily as an object, but a subjectivity expressive of desire and receptive of pleasure and pain. For a patient with impotence, the sexual world is depleted. The body is an affective body that also perceives other bodies not fundamentally as objects but as erotic realms to explore and receive. This is fundamentally the insight of psychoanalysis, that sexuality is a privileged tuning of existence, and its pansexualism is merely an expression of this privileged status granted to sexuality to render a totality, a sexual world. This, however, doesn’t mean that existence is fully absorbed into sexuality, but rather they are always in dialectical tension: such is the tension within psychoanalysis itself. The key here is to understand why sexuality takes up this privileged position.
198–212
Here Merleau-Ponty addresses some concerns with great analogies. First, the “unconscious” is neither a bad faith nor a pure transcendent. Rather, every repression is a structural figuration within consciousness (taking the broadest designation), and repression as enclosure precludes a horizon, the same as the loss of an arm precludes the use of an arm, the repression of a memory precludes that whole horizon of memories. Also the same as one really falls asleep when one “pretends” to take up the sleeping position, one really forgets the memory repressed, though this memory is forever inscribed in the symbolic order: as the purloined letter.
Then, body has the duplicity of anonymity and expressiveness. A person retreats inside his body, and cuts all ties from others. But the body already opens up horizons of perception that nonetheless prepares for a development of the public domain. Systole and diastole. The body could even melt before the mind does as Spring comes…
Finally, existence and sexuality and economic position all comprise an overdeterminate unity: but this is no unity of a whole of parts, but unity of the interconnected fabric of perspectived and privileged systems. So is psychoanalysis simultaneously prejudiced and holistic, for it is a free enterprise with its intrinsic movement constituting its own totality.
213–221
Yet again Merleau-Ponty pulled the same move regarding speech. Speech is at once the immediate presence of sense in the word. It is not an inert combination of words or verbal images, for this always presupposes an intentional rule of unification; but between the empirical manifold and the intellectual unity there obtains not an external relation, but a pregnant one. When I speak, I immediately sense the sense in words, words are inhabited by sense, and I follow a style of speech. Words are not coined by thoughts, but thoughts strive towards words as their completed expressions. So are mythical and “childish” thoughts concerned with language in the same way, as language is for these subjects itself full of being. Cross-reference Cassirer. But this is not because of the real existence of linguistic objects and subjects, who speak what is spoken, but rather, precisely due to this real existence of linguistic community, one understands language as a communal place for self-expression, so that language is not signs imposed onto secondary nature, but is itself externalized existence of the subject. Moreover, what is externalized is not simply “thought” as such, as if the thought is already determinate and ready-at-hand, but a free projection. The same way body projects its own space, body projects words pregnant with sense, so body projects irreal imagined presences as memories. Space, words, memories: these are never images or data; these are rather all projects, constituted in the very presence of the present marking its horizons.
222–231
Such is a very interesting position. Language is not a cloak pulled over thought, but is, one could say, the flesh of thought, the body of thought. Language completes thought in expressing it: this expression is a “making habitat for.” Just like in music we do not discard the sound of music to access the hidden layer of signification, in language we don’t discard words. Words are the precarious practice to commit oneself to linguistic being.
What about the arbitrariness of signifiers? Are words merely conventional, or are they merely natural? This is a false dichotomy. If words are merely signifiers, they are such only in principle, but in reality there’s etymology marking the history of different sense-groups, there’s grammatical structure such as inflections, etc. Clearly, then, language is not arbitrary, but spiritual. But is language then really natural? Is language an imitation of nature? No. Rather, language is always a free and precarious practice; though it attaches to emotional and expressive values, and words do express emotions, it’s dangerous to believe emotions are natural. Rather, emotions, their ways of expressing, and even their very contents can be surprisingly indeterminate. Words do not imitate nature; the word “anger” doesn’t necessarily sound angry, yet it harbors an emotive history of varying significance, the same as anger itself can take up multiple nuanced layers, including this layer of verbal communication. For instance, do we not see an expressive difference between “anger” “rage” and “ire”?
Language is therefore gesticulatory. It gestures towards the other to invite the other be present to the subject so reciprocally the subject can be present to the other. When I see someone smile, I don’t analyze her every detailed movement of the face, rather, I’m first invited to see herself, as expressed through her whole body with full presence, adjusting my evaluation and feeling according to her ambivalent mien. When she smiles, her whole world lights up in a new mood, she would speak softly, would pat me on the shoulder, and would give me agreeable response. These various other things that I expect from her smiling are neither my associated images nor rational analyses, but are pre-reflexive horizons that open up through her smile. So when she speaks of “love,” her personal world of love is opened in this word. Communication, either verbal or gestural, are all fundamentally invitations, not “reminder notes.”
If language seems somehow more transparent than music in this regard, that it really seems to express with fixed meanings, that is because it’s been so institutionalized and constituted, that poets are banished from the republic and dictionaries are conventionalized. If you pull the same trick on music, to say that a major four is always of this mood, and that motif always of that meaning, music will wither as well. Music resists this institutionalization via its more poignant emotional force and its less rigid internal structure, but also via its obscurity in articulation and its repetitive limits (a phrase is less distinct from others than a word is from others; a phrase is too often repeated to achieve emotional valence, etc.). But this is to take the effect for the cause. Truth is, music is a different vehicle of expression than language because it is set for a different goal: and its signification inhabits a different layer of human spirit. While language invites the other without intending to subjugate the other, but only means to persuade the other as an equal subject, music overwhelms and sways the listener. Over this boundary wanders the poet, who tries to sway but fails to, for it also sets the person free.
231–241
As a patient sees only a bundle of minuscule colors holding totally indeterminate relations against each other without ever obtaining one stable convergence, like how a normal person sees color, his perception is carved into vortices each of which is too small to pull in other perceptive vectors. That’s how he cannot categorize colors, for no category is for him over dominant. Rather he has to rely on formulated and pre-established associations and relations. That is analogous to how a person knows not how to swim, and has to walk the bridge.
The same way a word might have lost its living sense, for it becomes too restricted to itself and no longer reaches out to its “sense.” As it’s bound to happen if one repeats a word too many times in one run. But then the patient might nonetheless “understand” its meaning because its meaning is designated for him by convention. He’s nevertheless lost the living sense and creative production of sense of the word. The different structural layers and centers (a syntactical center; a phonetical center; etc.) are no longer unified for him, but each center restricts only to itself. That is how the patient, losing sense, retains meaning, as one retains the debris of a superstructure after earthquakes at the foundation.
What about Merleau-Ponty’s statement that language is somehow unique? That for each musician the world begins anew, that it’s inconceivable to have Music That Ends All Music? I believe this is an overstatement. I believe this, though in speech’s essence, is nonetheless due to a logocentric attitude of human subject. One much more often demands of musicians originality than a sedimented and reusable repertoire. Whereas with language except for poets people most often demand less creativity than reliability.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
In this note / 篇目
7–22
梅洛-庞蒂似乎从胡塞尔走向海德格尔,但事实上,他认为胡塞尔比海德格尔本人更海德格尔。原因在于,依梅洛-庞蒂,胡塞尔把其现象学的先验观念论方法推到极端,从而能够具体描绘限定现象学的原初事实性。这在胡塞尔那里体现在:1. 通过现象学还原,回溯性地表达根本不可还原的自然,即根本意义上对事实性的现象学反思,只是达到对我们自然态度中原初所知觉者的反思的手段;胡塞尔相对于意向活动分析重新引入意向相关项分析,就显明了这一点,因为意向相关项之为意向相关项,恰是这种不可还原的事实性;2. 通过理念还原,更激进地表达不可还原的实存,即理念还原恰是相对于本质作为理念,反思相互交织的实存者的绝对流动,因为此在被抛入世界的被抛性如此彻底,以至他甚至遗忘了这一被抛性本身,只有通过观照这些本质,此在才能重新获得被抛性,从而把握从实存到本质、再返回的生成流动,而非简单把本质强加于实存;3. 通过各种意向性之间的辩证关系,使理性不成为对历史预先成形的解释,而理性的自我解释是历史性本身的一部分;同样,主体不只是构成自己所知他者的那个人,主体所知的另一个自我,同时被认识为认识着主体。
理念还原把实存转化为本质结构;现象学还原则把这些本质结构转化为常模,重新关联于生成这些结构的实存与事实性经验。
23–35
这里梅洛-庞蒂批评传统上定义“感觉”的三种方式。第一,感觉作为印象;第二,感觉作为意识中对应于某性质的东西;第三,感觉作为感觉器官对刺激的反应。
首先,印象是原子论的。印象总意味着感性材料某种同质的“震动”。事实却非如此,因为感觉总是知觉一个差异,并差异性地意向。它是在一个环境中看所感觉者。
其次,与印象不同,性质超越于意识。但它仍是原子论的,因为红只有在一个情境中才是红。除了在其处境中给予的事物属性,没有什么“红的性质”。这个定义与第一个等价。
第三,感觉器官总处在其他器官的情境中,正如处在心理主体的情境中。器官反应与刺激之间没有逐点对应。相反,刺激首先是通过器官活动构成的被赋予的意义,而器官自身又由其他活动构成。眼睛并不看世界的一部分,而是构成一个侧显,它在消隐的视域中共同意向其他侧显。
这三种误解都源于客观主义视角,即现代科学采取的视角,它在被构成的事物中看见的真理,比在构成着的主体性中更多。这种视角是知觉的理想,而非知觉本身。但这仅表明,知觉不是单纯能力,还是主体在其中构成自身的历史生成:成年人比儿童更依照这一理想构成知觉,现代人比原始人更如此。然而这种构成奠基于原始、前客观的知觉场。我们必须依循知觉的辩证法,理解这个伴随我们的场、不断激活它的场。规则与根源。理念与常模。
36–49
再次批评经验主义与原子论,通过“感觉”与“意义”的对立表达。
经验主义是完整体系,因此无法反驳。但它扭曲原初现象。它用感觉原子、感觉作为强弱印象的联想(依相似或邻近)、记忆补偿,消解所知觉现象。
但所知觉者总是所知觉的意义,内在地意向其他意义,创造一个首先使这些联想成为可能的视域。联想是置于全体预构中的分析性元素。我走近时,并非看见各部分合成一条船,而是看见散布各部分的景观逐渐变成一条在背景前清晰划出的船。同样,我只能通过对事物本身最原初的知觉,解释甚至发动联想;那知觉能够具体意向该联想。同样,我无需曾见房子或山作为坚实整体移动,就能知觉它们。同样,若真愿意,我甚至可把事物间的空隙知觉为整体。
知觉的不是无差别元素的集合,而是共同意向的意义之契机。
50–62
理智主义与经验主义互为补充。这表现在理智主义关于1.注意、2.判断的两种学说中。
首先,经验主义把注意设想为照向事物的手电筒,照亮预先存在的超越对象;理智主义也以手电筒为模型设想注意,不过这次照向已经内在于心灵、被心灵包含、只等展开的内容。但注意更应是知觉场的构成与创造,因此注意无非是意向性。当事物被预构于人此前注意的视域中,人就注意它;第二次注意又辩证地重构这一视域。对自己身体某个位置的注意正如此。
其次,理智主义预设经验主义,认为判断真正决定知觉,感觉仅提供材料。但判断不应只从外部凌驾感觉,还应从感觉内部生成。俗语说“判断会错,感觉不会”。这不正确。判断不是给同一感觉材料添上错误,而是在知觉上把错误构成为幻象;而且只有知觉已具有错误意义,判断才会错,疯子作错误判断,不是因为他作错误判断,而是因为他真的在幻觉中,知觉得不同。这否定了一切预设“真实世界”的天真,在那个世界中所有感觉都同质且对象化;生活世界反而是前客观、不可量度的,却仍可作为通过主体性构成的世界而被差异性地知觉。
63–70
理智主义承受的这种压力在反思分析中最明显。笛卡尔、斯宾诺莎、莱布尼茨、康德思想中的这一范式断言,所有知觉都是混乱的理智活动,所有理智活动都去中心化,绝对不受事实性束缚。即使经验主义与理智主义之间的辩证法,也不能恰切处理问题,因为它从两个教条出发,因而陷在错误对立中,只生成错误解答。
一种解答是说,辩证地存在一个构成意识,它绝对地把自己构成为被构成的对象。意识于是成为某种自我对象化的绝对精神。但这仍设定分裂:例如新康德主义中,绝对活性的隐藏主体及其被动客观性产物。此解答意图把起初分离、敌对的两个环节结合。但这仍非从原初统一出发的肯定解答,而只是在被动中找回活性的痕迹。辩证地思与做现象学不同:前者引导我们统一对立,后者引导我们已在这一统一中思考。前者给出“正确”者,后者教我们如何正确生产与实践。这似乎与谢林、马克思、祁克果对黑格尔主义的批评相同。
所以这种辩证解答在真正哲学意义上仍有欠缺。如何理解问题?问题是:虽然意识到构成者与被构成者之间的辩证关系,却仍相信构成者绝对而首要,在自我构成中个体化,因而身体只是理智自我反思的产物,恶或知觉只是理智的自我遮蔽与自我匮乏,相信存在这样的绝对者,处处都有等待被知的真理与明见性,潜在地一切都能澄清。即使必须有匮乏,匮乏自身也成了绝对精神神圣架构的构成要素:人仍在追求那个绝对知识、那个Wissenschaft。
但不应从知识理想出发,并预设理想等于内在真理。首要的反而是事实性,以及思维身体作为这个思维身体的统一。不是永恒构成时间,而是永恒自身通过时间中的活当下重新构成。知识是保存偶然性的神秘。有限中的经验居最高地位,因为作为统一恰处中间者,是处在神与虚无之间:即有限者。有限者及其活当下是我们的根。不是一切都简单可知,而是知识本身通过扎根于有限性的主体间性构成;不是一切都简单可直观,而是直观本身通过时间性构成。
71–77
对此前所有论证的总结,包括对格式塔理论的批评:它虽更注意现象,却仍回到天真的自然态度,预设因与果。
原因完全外在于结果,理由却完全内在于现象构成。我们现象学家想要内在的超越,因此要动机。知觉总由身体运动与环境动机化。距离依赖其他多少在周围被感知的事物而被知觉。景观倒过来便不再可辨认。这不是判断或盘算的东西,而是直接知觉的东西。
78–91
在知觉中,事物——现象统一的稳定核心、组织经验的“极”——把我们钉住。这引我们进入客观主义,因而进入对象化思维传统,再进入客观主义科学。但它的反面与它互补。心理主义不过是把现象场分成客观与主观的必然后果。一边是第三人称视角,一切都已被构成,活身体还原为物理身体;另一边是第一人称视角,每个人都是构成“单纯图像”的构成意识。要么依柏格森方式,在主体与外部绝对隔绝、一切图像只是不可言说感受时,却不可能地假设这些图像与外部重合。要么依康德方式,这意识作为普遍绝对意识提供理想规则。这也无效,因为如上一节批评,它只造成辩证统一化,而非从原初现象出发,描述辩证统一本身。只有从事实性起源出发,才能充分接近真正的心理学:先把其图像材料转化为意义,清除心理主义,然后成长为先验现象学。真正的先验哲学只有通过真正的先验心理学才可能,因为常模的理念结构以这个结构内在于呈现给意识的原初现象这一事实为前提。在生活世界的统一中,理念(哲学)与事实(心理学)统一成常模(现象学)。
92–100
我们说看见一个对象,究竟意味着什么?不只是看见一个图像吗?对象如何构成?
视觉,以及一切知觉的理念结构,是对象—视域,作为理念结构,它独立于物理身体的任何偶然组织。对象的构成首先是我看见它一个侧显。然后这个侧显意向它所在的视域。视域中的每个其他点都把我的目光投射或反射到对象上,赋予它无限多个侧显,通过我的运动性具身意义组织成空间实体。当对象在目光焦点中增加其客观性,所有其他对象都失去自身、融入视域,因为这时它们成为构成着的角度、不确定的活动流,活动汇聚到所论对象上。即所有周围对象都成了指向我视野中央桌子的目光的占位符,瓦片、屋顶等等都反射我的目光,替我看桌子。
但这些目光综合时不能简单还原为图像。眼睛不是相机。聚焦对象前,相机显示模糊图像;但眼睛聚焦前,呈现的是视域,对象在其中等待被召出。眼睛提供空间上构成对象的侧显。只有来自四面的所有“正面视图”不是挤成一团,而是在一系列共同意向、运动性的意义中综合,对象才取得空间性质:我知觉到,移往当前视角左侧时,左侧视图将正面呈现。深度知觉是日常对象知觉的必要条件。
反射的目光随后集中到对象上,将它构成为无限综合的极限、其理念。它把自己给出为自我封闭、自足的。视域被这一理念压抑。所有经验沉积在这个核心中,世界还原为这些核心的宇宙。这构成常识栖居的客观宇宙。时间同理:当下不仅意向其过去,反过来也被过去通过反射的时间目光意向,把当下固定在其位置,还原为普遍时间中的客观位置。客观世界是这些变更与力量处于平衡的世界。
失去自身、把自己交给对象时,我们同样交给了绝对主体性。因为我们不记得构成过对象:对象反而被我们一次性在其完全自主性中设定。所以即便德国观念论仍有这个非原初的设定观念。上一节已经提过。
但为什么我们必须在对象中失去自身,并把对象普遍化,直到它凝固整个世界?为了神圣力量与绝对主体性的感受?为了对象对生命的实际用处?
而且似乎必须补充对象抵抗我们目光的反现象。在其外表中隐藏自身的石头。这是构成对象的一部分吗?也许正是卓越意义的“核心”?
101–112
幻肢的例子。心理学解释与生理学解释都不足以说明幻肢现象。只说感受器仍接收刺激不够,因为感受器的效应仅在给定处境中被积极知觉,刺激也必须获得意义。但另一方面,它又系于身体与刺激,并非纯粹心理的。理解这一现象的最佳框架必须是现象学与实存论的。感受器只是向刺激敞开,以形成视域。幻肢属于身体习惯性、一般性的类型,它用于解决实际问题,并给周围对象赋予习惯意义。身体把那些对象知觉为可操作的,甚至自身就可操作的。在此意义上,身体把世界视域当作充满上手对象时,也把自身当作准备好有手可用。幻肢由此产生。同样,昆虫腿被绑住时仍有腿,所以不提供新腿;腿被切除后却本能地以新腿替代。这种本能行为既流动又隐蔽。因此它既非机械也非意识的,而是属世的。
113–118
那么什么是处境,我们身体的处境又是什么?相对于人的世界,身体自然占据隐藏层次,作为机体更根本沉积的视域。它类似被压抑经验的视域。被压抑者不在意识中呈现;意识通过让经验与其他经验共同规定,使每个经验可服务于主体选择与行动,并生成作为行动者的主体。被压抑经验的内容被掏空,本质形式或结构却原封未动。结构作为主体在世界中采取、尚未超越的习惯性实存态度持续,就像创伤经验不仅留下内容痕迹,还留下习惯性的一般结构。精神分析中的“记起”,只是把一般结构特定的生成历史还给它,从而重新把它统一为可有意识地与其他经验共同规定的经验。有机身体同样如此。身体是规定我们的一般结构,本身却是我们作为个体所构成的物种生成史。在此意义上总能重新激活身体,还给它完整意义,并由此把它重新纳入人的生活:使机体成为人的,正如把创伤变成症状,把过去变为当下。但过去曾经也是当下,因而保留使我们的中心化去中心的力量。同样,不只是我们使机体成为人的,身体也把我们送回机体。视域互相交混。身体维度是我们历史内部的历史维度,作为生物学的过去。
这如何解释幻肢?幻肢是身体一般视域允许的一种实践敞开。只要神经回路未关闭,肢体就在场,作为无内容(肢体实际在场)的一般结构起作用,由创伤时刻规定。然而神经回路关闭,生物视域就关闭:这意味着什么?意味着神经回路根本不只是物理器官,而是向视域的开放。考虑到生物事实同时是谱系常模的说法,这可以理解。人有许多反射,不是因为我们是机器,而是因为我们是机体,有更首要的关切。机器被制造出来,让我们把琐碎工作交出去:反射对我们恰是如此,即忠诚却盲目的仆人。我们被硬接线,不是因为我们本来就是如此,而是因为我们变得硬接线,以便成为人,其首要需求与关切是精神的。我们是机器,但机器被建造、被构成、被使用。这有意义地向我们说话,因为身体包含顽固沉积在当前突出视域内部的视域,它们却依然是视域。
119–126
身体作为客观知识与科学视域的潜在视域。作为视域的身体是什么?身体是奇异的存在。
第一,我的身体不断在场,却不像对象那样恒久;相反,对象的相对恒久由一种恒久可能性构成:我使用始终可用的身体改变视角,并在改变中构成对象。但这意味着身体是先天的:其先验结构首先允许对象出现。
第二,我的身体构成空间。身体运动首先打开动觉空间。我通常不客观计算身体运动目标的坐标,甚至不必先确定目标;在移动手时,就已经直接感觉手正移向的位置。某种意义上可以说,手甚至还没到那里,就真的触摸并纳入了它将占据的空空间。感觉这种原初的体积性,也显明于我感到脚痛:我不把脚知觉为痛的原因,痛直接来自脚。同样,只凭本能就能区分左右手,因为它们首先构成空间,左右才首次在其中对我变得客观可规定。
第三,我的身体始终既主动又被动,无法确定。当左手感觉右手,一只手把另一只构成为对象,但那只手也在探索。我在右手中感觉到探索着的左手的外壳。这再次不同于对象:对象被探索,却从不探索。虽在镜中看见眼睛,活的目光却缺席。
既然身体有这些不可误认的特征,心理学家为何仍错过身体独特地位?他们天真相信对象总对应主观表征。他们压抑身体,它的视域却仍涌出。人总生活着身体,生活维度总是最应理解的。事实必须重新纳入常模。
127–140
身体图式不是例如手的空间表征与全身空间表征的联想。身体图式反而首先允许这些表征联结。它是包裹部分经验的总体经验;部分经验虽局部,却被亲密感受。身体空间是处境的,非几何的空间。若说点—视域是知觉基本结构,身体就是缺失的环节,先天地规定什么能构成为位于什么视域的点。身体是一切知觉视域的视域,身体一部分出现就遮蔽其他部分,如彗星拖着尾巴。如前所说,我不经表征区分左右手:它们直接通过内在张力而不同。
那些病理病例又如何,患者不再清楚抽象身体空间?要求抓住身体部分或做具体事情时,他们能运用身体空间;要求做随机运动、定位抽象呈现者或指向它时,却不能。即这些患者的身体空间失去可能性的潜在视域,沉浸在现实视域中。要求抓身体部分时,那部分对他们变得“可抓”,因而真实。命令模仿场景时,他们全身心把身体浸入场景,完成动作。不能指物或定位皮肤上的对象时,是没有在足够真实的处境中生活身体;他们必须做准备动作,先表征全身,再推导计算。
另一方面,正常主体不仅在真实处境中,也在任意一般处境中把握现象身体。视域对他总可还原为特征和一般性状。指示可能性无须测量空间,可能者内在于身体空间。所以其视域敞开,也容纳仅被指意者。它是指示性视域,相对更开放、不那么僵硬。
还须理解,病理不是正常状态减去某种机能。病理有自己的过程与运动,甚至替代策略也从病理长出,解决方式因而同样病理。没有可能性的中介空间,病理主体如何到达客观空间?首先,他们未必绝对缺乏潜在空间,否则现实视域也不可能;视域结构仍在,只是太僵硬,作为可能性呈现者太模糊,无法充分指明。施加数学与几何不要求依正常获得次序,因为病理循自身次序。于是患者获得几何,是因为理解潜在空间,尽管从不经验它为在场,而只经验为缺席,这对几何奠基无关紧要。换言之,正常人能有兴趣(为行动)或无兴趣(为指示)地经验身体空间;患者只能有兴趣地经验,要么诉诸准备动作,把对身体无关紧要者转成有关者,要么诉诸几何表征,其奠基不在于经验现象身体视域中在场者,而在于对该视域的总体经验。
140–152
再次尝试理解呈现给这个特定患者的现象。视域虽给予他的思与知觉,却可说未给予其运动空间,即身体自由朝向世界的空间。基本结构较少僵硬、更具筹划性。世界是主体的筹划,主体与身体运动自由地对之采取态度。患者僵硬结构决定他逐步实现运动,而非通过指意进行投射或跃入可能。
必须以实存方式解释现象吗?经验主义不够吗?梅洛-庞蒂在此给出两项反对。第一,正如此前反驳经验主义,他指出归纳法对任何不只想建立因果联系、还想拥有真正阐明现象的理性概念的科学都不够。解释事物却不继而理解它们,永远不够。这是一般标准。第二更特别针对心理学:它涉及更隐蔽、更被包裹的行为现象,多种解释同样可能。若说患者如此是因缺乏视觉线索,许多实验未观察到;而且若正常人的触觉经验已被视觉经验充分改变,那触觉经验本身是什么?此外,视觉给予中已存在点—视域结构,而这恰是据说视觉首先给正常主体的结构,所以我们绕了圈。假设视觉只是视觉材料、听觉只是听觉材料,是错的:视觉比听觉更具视域性,这是结构特征,非材料区别。不能忽略视觉固有结构,它预设了据说由视觉提供的东西。也无理由假设触觉在结构上不同于视觉,需要视觉补充才能实施筹划。因此必须接受,心理学基本单位是经验,经验根本上总是孤异、独特的。患者对视觉与触觉给予有其独特经验。这里不仅没有确定原因,也不是什么理解不充分的原因;因果性本身就不适于理解心理学,因为它过于奠基于对象彼此无差别的客观世界观念。
152–163
必须理解,生理学家与理智主义者对现象的解释各自都须总体化。即它们不像维恩图中那样彼此排斥,而是展开两个不同世界的两个系统。问自己就能理解:若现象任何部分、任何程度可按第三人称过程理解,为什么不能完全还原为这种过程?若患者只是缺少某些视觉内容,为什么正常主体不能只是拥有它?正常主体指示时,不也是患者抓取时的同一身体运动在工作?患者于是本质上与正常人相同,只是有所缺失。反过来,若正常人能指意并构成世界视域,患者为了是患者而非物,不也在做同样事情?但这样患者又会本质上具有同样综合着的先验主体性,只是在他那里受经验限制和制约。病理现象再次丢失。
所以必须始终记得,这里处理的不是两种原因的混合,而是意向两个自足平行世界的自由理由。没有纯然自为的先验意识;其综合非无时间的,恰是预设的无时间性自身在时间中构成。先验主体自由地把自身构成为经验的,却不与经验隔绝,如精神行走水上。形式不统摄材料,而总已是材料;反过来,第三人称过程也总已被纳入、成为意义。新康德主义总相信某种纯意识悬浮在存在者之上,作为指意的核心能力(“意义共同体”),如形式悬浮在材料之上。这两个世界只能通过从具体现象出发、不作抽象的现象学,辩证地关联。
164–169
总结现象,必须明确说患者问题不能仅属理智或仅属知觉。理智总置于知觉情境,形式总处其材料。患者问题恰是理智与知觉的联系被破坏,只能把理智强加于知觉材料,却不能让形式与内容在直接统一中被直接知觉。理智形式不投射其孤异对象化,所知觉者也不投射普遍可能。他反而须先看见某物,再从中显式推论。
阅读时,他理解叙事,却不能创造性复述,因为缺少形式与内容碰撞那一刻的灵感。他只能从听到的内容重新构成意义,不能直接知觉意义。谜语、谜题同理,能逻辑推出答案,却不能解谜。计数也同理:虽仍把不同项目综合为一次枚举,却在未保持过去沉积可供重新激活的意义上不计数;正常主体计数很大程度是逐个经过符号的象征活动,却持续维持某种可直观杂多;患者计数只是照规则行进,仅在到达结果时核验,从不在过程中核验,所以不像正常主体,计数时意识里没有数字意义的拖尾。这些雄辩显示,正常主体的理智功能已多深地卷入前意识知觉功能,而容纳两功能的结构对患者又多僵硬。
170–183
身体有其意向弧,从被给予的过去构成自己的世界:所构成的是历史世界。这使疾病之为疾病成为可能。病理总不可逆;虽可治愈、身体可恢复健康,病理仍保存在身体“病史”中。所以简单经验主义有问题,因为它暗中相信任何病理都外在于身体,单纯去掉疾病就等于治好身体。但出于已说过的理由,综合也不是知性某种一般功能。附属于身体的世界是直观、直接的。
所知觉世界不是客观世界。这个世界中没有东西被测量,一切都是力量和萌生的意义场。对某些患者,可以说更根本结构或场损坏,上层结构却持续,所以世界对他实已坍塌,仍留门面。这个世界属于身体本身,身体是把多个世界系成自己直接知觉的特定世界的结。身体学习习惯不是通过主动理解,而是通过自己的历史获得:把子场纳入身体原初场。例如身体学跳舞,不是分析步法,而是反复练习,甚至没有主动理解。
184–190
身体维度给出原初统一,即它不是像对象那样把不同片段组装或统摄进一个结构、理念。所有身体经验反而流入彼此。身体不是所有器官或知觉指涉的客观核心,而直接就是被经验者;同样,一幅画虽在物理上是对象,作为艺术品却不是对象。作为艺术品,它不是作为所有视角指向的核心给予,而是作为自我显现的世界给予,对象才首次在其中被允许出现。它既非对象也非理念,因为作为艺术品的画没有稳定中心,每一特定笔触都吸引目光。同样,身体不是理念性超越,每个孤异经验本身都是总体经验中的小波。因此没有稳定等级结构,而是自由游戏。同样,身体不是支配身体或心理事实的法则,不是无差别地容纳一切事实的空公式:身体不是规制相等者的媒介。它再次开启不同意义统一体之间自由游戏的场。这是身体自由。法则支配不自我组织者,理念集中凭自身动力组织者,身体则作为机体与机体游戏:把自身放入许多仍有机地互相包裹的现在,因此它不是把缺席、在场都作为法则实例而平等处理的法则;另一方面,它与自己的诸器官游戏,把自身去中心成许多中心,却不失去作为网络总体的自身,而理念化身体则变成永恒把自身现实化为在场的动态核心,也保存包含在这一理念现实化中的自身缺席。
191–198
性首先是欲望与驱力的特权结构,把实存总体突出为集中的视角;身体在这里主要不被知觉为对象,而被知觉为表达欲望、接受快乐与痛苦的主体性。阳痿患者的性世界枯竭。身体是情动身体,也根本上不把其他身体知觉为对象,而是可探索、接受的爱欲领域。这根本上就是精神分析的洞见:性是实存的一种特权调谐,泛性论只是表达赋予性的特权地位,使其呈现总体、一个性世界。但这不意味着实存完全被性吸收,两者始终在辩证张力中:精神分析自身内部也有这种张力。关键是理解性为何占此特权位置。
198–212
这里梅洛-庞蒂用很好的类比回应一些关切。首先,“无意识”既非自欺,也非纯粹超越者。每次压抑反而是意识(最宽泛意义)内部的结构成形,压抑作为封闭排除一个视域,如失去手臂排除手臂的使用,压抑记忆排除整个记忆视域。同样,如人“假装”采取睡姿时会真的睡着,人也真的遗忘被压抑记忆,尽管该记忆永远铭写于象征秩序:如被窃的信。
然后,身体有匿名性与表达性的双重性。人退进身体内部,切断与他人的一切联系。但身体已经打开知觉视域,仍为公共领域的发展作准备。收缩与舒张。春天来时,身体甚至可能先于心灵融化……
最后,实存、性、经济地位共同构成超定的统一:却不是诸部分全体的统一,而是具有视角、占据特权的系统相互联系织物的统一。精神分析也因而同时有偏见又整体化,因为它是一项自由事业,以内在运动构成自己的总体。
213–221
梅洛-庞蒂对言说再次使出同一步。言说当即就是意义在词中的直接在场。它不是词或言语图像的惰性组合,因为这总预设意向性的统一规则;经验杂多与理智统一之间的关系却非外在,而是孕育性的。我说话时,直接感觉词中的意义,意义栖居词中,我依循言说风格。词不是思想铸造的,思想反而趋向词,作为完成的表达。神话与“儿童式”思想也以同样方式关切语言,因为语言对这些主体自身就充满存在。参见卡西尔。但这不是因为语言对象与说出所说之物的语言主体的真实存在;反而恰因语言共同体的真实存在,人把语言理解为共同自我表达的场所,使语言不是强加于第二自然的符号,而自身就是主体外化的实存。此外,外化的不是仿佛已经确定、准备上手的“思想”本身,而是自由投射。身体投射自己空间,同样投射孕育意义的词,也同样把非实在的想象在场投射为记忆。空间、词、记忆:从不是图像或材料;都是筹划,在当下标记其视域的在场本身中构成。
222–231
这是很有趣的立场。语言不是披在思想上的外衣,可以说是思想的肉、思想的身体。语言在表达中完成思想:这种表达是“为之营造栖居地”。如音乐中不丢弃声音去接近隐藏的指意层,在语言中也不丢弃词。词是把自己交付给语言存在的危险实践。
能指任意性又如何?词只是约定的,还是只是自然的?这是错误二分。若词仅是能指,也仅在原则上如此;现实中有词源标记不同意义群的历史,有屈折等语法结构,等等。所以语言显然不任意,而是精神的。那语言真的自然吗?模仿自然吗?不。语言总是自由而危险的实践;虽附于情感和表达价值,词确表达情绪,相信情绪自然却危险。情绪、表达方式甚至内容本身都可能惊人地不确定。词不模仿自然;“anger(愤怒)”未必听起来愤怒,却容纳意义各异的情感史,如愤怒本身可有多个细腻层次,包括言语交流这一层。例如,“anger”“rage”“ire”三词不有表达上的差异吗?
所以语言是姿态性的。它向他者作姿态,邀请他者对主体在场,主体也由此相互地对他者在场。看见一个人微笑,我不分析她面部每个细微运动,而首先被邀请看她自身,通过整个身体在完全在场中表达,依其含混神情调整判断与感受。她微笑时,整个世界在新心境中亮起,她会轻声说话,拍拍我肩,给我友善回应。我从她微笑中期待的这些其他事物,既非联想图像,也非理性分析,而是通过微笑打开的前反思视域。所以她说“爱”时,她个人的爱之世界在词中敞开。交流,无论言语还是姿态,根本上都是邀请,非“提醒便条”。
若语言在此似乎比音乐更透明,真的像以固定含义表达,是因为它被如此制度化、构成,诗人被逐出共和国,词典成为约定。若对音乐用同一招,说大四度永远属此心境,那个动机永远属彼含义,音乐也会枯萎。音乐通过更尖锐的情感力量、更不僵硬的内部结构抵抗制度化,也通过其表达上的模糊与重复限制抵抗(乐句之间的区分不如词之间鲜明;乐句为达到情感效价而重复太多,等等)。但这是倒果为因。事实上,音乐是不同于语言的表达载体,因为它被设定为不同目标,其指意栖居人类精神的另一层。语言邀请他者,并不意图使之屈服,只想把他者作为平等主体说服;音乐却压倒、摆布听者。诗人在边界上游荡,试图摆布却失败,因为它也让人自由。
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患者只看见一束微小颜色,彼此关系完全不定,永远不能像正常人看颜色那样得到稳定汇聚,于是其知觉被切成漩涡,每个都太小,拉不进其他知觉向量。因此他不能给颜色分类,没有范畴对他占统治地位。他须依赖公式化、预先建立的联想与关系。如一个人不会游泳,只能走桥。
同样,一个词可能失去活的意义,因为它太局限于自身,不再伸向“意义”。如一口气重复词太多次,就必然发生。但患者仍可能“理解”其含义,因为约定为他指定含义。他却失去词活的意义与意义的创造生产。不同结构层次与中心(句法中心、语音中心等等)对他不再统一,每个中心只限自身。患者如此失去意义,却保留含义,如地基地震后保留上层建筑残骸。
梅洛-庞蒂说语言某种程度独特,又如何?对每个音乐家,世界重新开始,不可能有终结一切音乐的音乐?我认为夸大了。我认为这虽在言说本质中,却仍缘于人类主体的逻各斯中心态度。人更常要求音乐家原创,而非沉积、可复用的曲目;对语言,除诗人外,人通常更要求可靠而非创造性。