Gui Ruiyan

Maurice Merleau-Ponty · 莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂
Phenomenology of Perception · 知觉现象学

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Phenomenology of Perception — Reading notes · Part I

Apple Notes

Revised 19 June 2025

In this note / 篇目

7–22

Merleau-Ponty seems to go from Husserl to Heidegger, but in fact, he believes that Husserl is more Heidegger than Heidegger himself. The reason is that Husserl pushes his phenomenological transcendental idealist method to the extreme so that he, according to Merleau-Ponty, can specifically depict the original facticity that delimits phenomenology. This is reflected in Husserl 1. through his phenomenological reduction, which retroactively expresses the radically irreducible nature, that is, the phenomenological reflection on facticities in the fundamental sense is but a means to achieve a reflection on what is originarily perceived in our natural attitude, as is evident in Husserl’s reintroducing the noematic in relation to the noetic analyses, since noema as noema is precisely this irreducible factuality; 2. through eidetic reduction, which only expresses more radically the irreducible existence, that is, eidetic reduction is precisely to reflect the absolute flux of interwoven existents in relation to essences qua ideas, because the thrownness of Dasein’s being-thrown-into-world is so thorough that he even forgets this very thrownness, and only through a contemplation of these essences, can Dasein recover this thrownness, thus grasping the flux of geneses from existence to essence and back, rather than simply impose essence on existence; 3. through the dialectical relationship between the various intentionalities, so that rationality is not a pre-formed interpretation of history, but the self-interpretation of rationality is a part of historicity itself, similarly, the subject is not just the one who constitutes the other that is known by the subject, but the alterego who is known by the subject is known as knowing the subject at the same time.

Eidetic reduction transforms existences into essential structures; phenomenological reduction transforms these essential structures into norms back in relation to existential and factical experiences that generate these structures.

23–35

Here Mearleau-Ponty criticizes three different ways traditionally to define “sensing.” First, sensing as impression, second, sensing as what in consciousness corresponds to a quality, and third, sensing as reaction of a sensory organ in response to a stimulus.

First, impression is atomistic. An impression always entails some homogenous “jolt” of sensory datum. But such is not the case, as to sense is always to perceive a difference and to intend differentially. It is to look at the sensed in a milieu.

Second, quality is, different from impression, transcendent to consciousness. Yet it is nonetheless atomistic, for red is red only in a context. There is no “quality of red” other than a property of a thing given in its situation. This definition is equivalent to the first.

Third, a sensory organ is always contextualized by other organs, in the same way it is contextualized by the psychical subject. There is no point-to-point correspondence between an organ’s response and its stimulus. Rather, the stimulus is first of all a bestowed sense constituted through the activity of the organ, which is itself constituted by other activities. The eye does not see a part of the world, but rather constitutes a profile that cointends other profiles in vanishing horizons.

All these three misinterpretations stem from an objectivistic point of view, which is the view taken up by modern science, which sees more truth in the constituted things than in the constituting subjectivities. This view is the ideal of perception, not perception per se. This, however, only indicates how perception is not a mere faculty, but also a historical becoming within which the subjects constitute themselves, as adults constitute their perceptions more in accord to this ideal than children do, as modern men more than primitives. Yet, such constitution is founded on the primitive pre-objective field of perception. We have to understand this field, which accompanies our field and continually activates it, following a dialectic of perception. Rules vs Roots. Ideas vs Norms.

36–49

Again, a critique of empiricism and atomism, expressed through the opposition between “sensation” and “sense.”

Empiricism is a whole system, and is hence irrefutable. But it distorts originary phenomena. It explains away the perceived phenomenon through atoms of sensation, through associations (by similarity or by contiguity) of sensations qua strong or weak impressions, and through memory compensations.

Yet the perceived is always a perceived sense immanently intending other senses which creates a horizon that first makes such associations possible. Associations are analytical elements situated in a prefiguration of the whole. I do not see parts that join into a ship as I come closer, rather, I see a landscape strewn with parts that is gradually transformed into a ship clearly delineated against its background. The same I can only explain or even initiate my associations through my most originary perception of the thing itself that could intend specifically that association. The same I could perceive the house or the mountain without ever seeing them move as one solid whole. The same I could even perceive gaps between things as wholes if I really choose to.

Perceptions are not of assemblages of indifferent elements but of nexuses of cointending senses.

50–62

Intellectualism and empiricism are supplements to each other. This is manifest in the two intellectualistic doctrines of 1. attention and 2. judgement.

First, empiricism supposes attention to be like a flashlight shone onto things, thus illuminating transcendent objects preexisting, while intellectualism supposes attention to be, again, modeled after a flashlight, this time onto content already immanent to and contained in mind, waiting only to be unfolded. But attention should rather be a constitution and creation of a perceptual field, thus attention is nothing but intentionality. One is attentive to a thing when the thing is prefigured in a horizon that one is previously attentive to, which the secondary attention reconstructs dialectically. Such is the attention paid to a location on my own body.

Second, intellectualism presupposes empiricism by suggesting that judgement really determines perception, while sensation only provides its material. But judgement should not only extrinsically supervene over sensation, but should be intrinsically generated from sensation as well. The saying goes “judgement errs but sensation doesn’t.” This is incorrect. For judgement does not supply error to the same material sensed, rather it constitutes the error perceptually as an illusion; moreover, judgement can only err when the perception already possesses a wrong sense, that the mad man makes false judgements not because he makes false judgements, but because he really is hallucinating and perceiving differently. This denies all kinds of naïveté that presuppose a “true world” where all sensations are homogeneous and objectified; rather, the lifeworld is pre-objective and measureless, though still differentially perceivable as constituted through subjectivity.

63–70

This strain put upon intellectualism is the most evident in the case of reflective analysis. This paradigm in the thought of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Kant asserts that all perceptions are confused intellections and all intellections are decentralized and absolutely free from facticity. Even a dialectic between empiricism and intellectualism would not address the problem adequately since it starts with the two dogmas and are thereby stuck in the false opposition, which generates only false solutions.

One solution is to suggest that, dialectically, there is the constituting consciousness that absolutely constitutes itself as the constituted object. The consciousness would then be some self-objectified absolute spirit. This, however, still posits the split: such as in neo-Kantianism, the hidden subject of absolute activity and its product of passive objectivity. This solution intends to bring together two moments that start off as separate and antagonistic. But this is still not the positive solution of starting with the originary unity, in lieu of recovering traces of activity inside passivity. To think dialectically is different from to do phenomenology: the former induces us to unify opposites, while the latter induces to think already in this unity. The former yields us what is “correct,” while the latter teaches us how to produce and practice correctly. This seems to be the same critique of Hegelianism by Schelling, Marx and Kierkegaard.

So this dialectical solution is nonetheless still lacking in a truly philosophical sense. How to understand the problem? The problem is, though one is aware of the dialectical relationship between the constituting and the constituted, one nonetheless believes that the constituting is absolute and primary, that in its self-constituting it individuates, so that the body is but a product of the intellect’s self-reflection, and that evil or perception is just self-obfuscation and self-privation of the intellect, that there exists such an absolute, that there is truth and self-evidence ready to be known everywhere, that potentially everything can be clarified. Even if there must be privation, privation is itself a constitutive element to the divine architecture of Absolute Spirit: one is still striving for that absolute knowledge, that Wissenschaft.

But one should not start from the ideal of knowledge and presume that the ideal is equivalent to inner truth. Rather, facticity and the unity of a thinking body as this thinking body is what is primary. Eternity is not constituting time, but eternity is itself reconstituted through the living present in time. Knowledge is to preserve the mystery of contingency. Experience in finitude reigns supreme, for what is precisely in the middle as a unity is in the middle between God and nothingness: that is the finite. The finite and its living present are our roots. Not everything is simply knowable, but knowledge itself is constituted through intersubjectivity rooted in our finitude; not everything is simply intuitive, but intuition is itself constituted through our temporality.

71–77

A summation of all previous arguments, including a critique of Gestalt theory, which, though more attentive to the phenomena, nonetheless returns to a naively natural attitude, presupposing causes and effects.

Causes are entirely external to effects, while reasons entirely internal to the constitution of phenomena. We phenomenologists want an immanent transcendence, hence motivations. Perception is always motivated, by bodily movement and by the milieu. Distance is perceived relying on other more or less ambiently perceived surrounding things. A landscape is no longer recognizable upside down. This is not something one judges or reckons with, but something one immediately perceives.

78–91

In perception, things, the stable kernels of phenomenal unity, the “poles” that organize experiences, rivet us. This introduces us to objectivism, hence a tradition of objectified thought and hence objectivisitic science. But its opposite is complementary to it. Psychologism is but a necessary consequence of the division of the phenomenal field into the objective versus the subjective. On the one hand, there is the third-person viewpoint where everything is constituted, and the living body is reduced to a physical body. On the other hand there is the first-person viewpoint where everyone is a constituting consciousness that constitutes“mere images.” Either, in a Bergsonian way, these images are per impossible supposed to coincide with exteriority, when the subject is absolutely segregated from the external and all images are but ineffable feelings. Or, in a Kantian way, this consciousness rather provides the ideal rule as a universal and absolute consciousness. This again is ineffectual, as this again, as was critiqued in the last section, only results in a dialectical unification, but not a description of the dialectical unity itself which starts from the originary phenomena. Only from the factical origin can one fully approach, first an authentic psychology cleansed of psychologism via transforming its material of images into senses, and once thus cleansed, grows into transcendental phenomenology. An authentic transcendental philosophy is only possible through an authentic transcendental psychology, as the eidetic structure of norms is premised on the fact of this structure inherent in the originary phenomena present to consciousness. In the unity of lifeworld, ideas (philosophy) are unified with facts (psychology) into norms (phenomenology).

92–100

We say we see an object, but what does it really mean? Do we not just see an image? How is an object constituted?

The eidetic structure of vision and all perceptions for that matter is object-horizon, and qua eidetic, it is independent of any contingent organization of our physical body. An object is constituted, first, as I see a profile of it. Then, this profile intends a horizon wherein it is situated. Every other point in the horizon projects or reflects my gaze upon the object to cast it in infinitely many profiles, organized into a spatial entity through my motrically embodied sense. As an object increases in its objectivity within the focus of my gaze, all other objects lose themselves and merge with the horizon, for then they become the constituting angles, the indeterminate flux of activity, and their activities converge to the object in question. That’s to say all other surrounding objects become placeholders for the gaze directed at the table at the center of my vision, as the tile and the roof etc. all reflect my gaze and see the table for me.

But these gazes cannot be simply reduced to images when synthesized. An eye is not a camera. Before it focuses on an object, the camera shows a blurred image. But before an eye focuses, it shows a horizon wherein the object awaits to be conjured. Eyes provide profiles that constitute an object spatially. An object assumes its spatial character only when all of its “frontal views” from all sides are not smashed together but synthesized in a series of cointending and motrical sense, that when I perceive when I move to the left of my current view a view of the left side would be provided frontally. The perception of depth is necessary for the perception of a daily object.

The reflected gaze is then concentrated on the object to constitute it as a limit of infinite synthesis, an idea thereof. It affords itself as self-enclosed and self-sufficient. Horizons are suppressed by this idea. All experiences are sedimented in this kernel, and the world is reduced to a universe of these kernels. This constitutes the objective universe which our common sense inhabits. The same with time, as the present not only intends its past, but is in turn intended by the past through a reflected temporal gaze that fixes it in its place and reduces it to an objective position in a universal time. The objective world is a world in equilibrium of all these modifications and forces.

In losing ourselves, giving ourselves up to the object, we become equally given up to an absolute subjectivity. For we don’t recall constituting the objects: rather, objects are posited by us all at once in their full autonomy. Thus even in German Idealism we still have this idea of positing which is unoriginary. This was already brought up in the last section.

But why is it necessary for us to lose ourselves in the object, and universalizing the object till it congeals the whole world? For the feeling of divine power and absolute subjectivity? For the practical use of objects for life?

Also, it seems necessary to supply the counter-phenomenon of an object resisting our gaze. The stone that conceals itself in its exterior. Is it part of what constitutes the object? Perhaps “the kernel” par excellence?

101–112

The case of phantom limbs. To explain the phenomenon of phantom limbs neither a psychological nor a physiological explanation is enough. For it’s not sufficient to say the receptor still receives a stimulus, as the effect of the receptor is only actively perceived in given situations, and also the stimulus must be given a sense. But on the other hand, it’s tied to the body and the stimulus and is not purely psychological. The best framework to understand the phenomenon has to be phenomenological and existentialist. The receptor only opens towards the stimulus so as to figure a horizon. The phantom limb belongs to the habitual and general type of the body that is used to solve practical problems and that bestows a habitual sense to the surrounding objects. The body perceives those objects as manipulable, even more, manipulable in themselves. In this sense, the body, in treating the world horizon as full of objects ready-to-hand, treats itself as ready-with-a-hand. Hence stems the phantom limb. In the same sense an insect with its leg tied still has a leg, thus wouldn’t supply a new leg, but with a leg removed would instinctively substitute it with a new leg. This instinctual behavior is as fluid as concealed. It is therefore neither mechanical nor conscious, but worldly.

113–118

So what is a situation, and what is the situation of our body? Body naturally, in relation to our human world, takes up the hidden level, as the more fundamentally sedimented horizon of the organism. This is analogous to the horizon of the repressed experience. The repressed is not present in consciousness, which makes every experience operable in codetermining it with other experiences to the subject’s choice and action, and which generates the subject as an actor. The repressed experience is experience whose content is emptied out, yet leaving its essential form or structure untouched. The structure persists as the habitual attitude of existence that the subject takes up within the world, and has not outlived, like a traumatic experience not just leaves traces of its content, but also its habitual and general structure. To “remember” in psychoanalysis is only to give back the general structure its particular genetic history and thus to unify it again as an experience codeterminable with other experiences consciously. The same with our organic body. The body is a general structure determining us but is itself a generative history of the species, which we as individuals constitute. We can always reactivate our body in this sense, to give back its integral sense, and in doing so incorporate it back to our human life: to make the organism human, in the same way we make the trauma our symptom, and we make the past present. But the past, in being itself once a present, retains a force to decenter our centering. In the same way, not only do we make the organism human, the body return us to organisms. Horizons intermingle. Our bodily dimension is a historical dimension within our history, as our biological past.

Now, how does this explain the phantom limb? The phantom limb is a practical opening up permissible to the general horizon of the body. So long as the nerve circuits are not closed, the limb is there operative as a general structure without content (the actual presence of the limb), determined by that moment of trauma. Yet, as the nerve circuit is closed, the biological horizon closes: what does this mean? This means the nerve circuit fundamentally is not just a physical organ, but an opening to a horizon. This is understandable given what is said about biological facts being simultaneously genealogical norms. Humans have many reflexes, not because we are machines, but because we are organisms and we have our more primary concerns. Machines are manufactured for us to delegate menial jobs to: that is precisely what reflexes are for us, i.e. our devoted but blind servants. We are hardwired not because that’s simply what we are, but because we become hardwired so as to become human beings, whose primary needs and concerns are spiritual. We are machines, but machines are built, are constituted, and are used. That speaks to us meaningfully, as our body contains horizons recalcitrantly sedimented within our current and prominent horizons, which nonetheless remain horizons.

119–126

Body as the latent horizon for the horizon of objective knowledge and science. What is body as a horizon? The body is a strange being.

First, my body is constantly present, yet not permanent as an object; rather, the relative permanence of an object is constituted by the permanent possibility of my using my permanently available body to change perspective, and in this change to constitute the object. But this means the body is a priori: its transcendental structure permits objects to first emerge.

Second, my body constitutes a space. My body’s movement opens up first a kinesthetic space. I don’t usually calculate objectively the coordinates of the goal of my bodily movement, and I don’t first even need to determine the goal. Rather, I already sense the location my hand is moving immediately in moving my hand. In a manner of speaking, one can say my hand really touches and incorporates the empty space it is going to occupy before it is even there. This primordial voluminousity of sensing is also evident in my feeling my feet hurt: I don’t perceive my feet as the cause of my pain, but the pain immediately comes from my feet. Also, I can tell my left hand from my right simply by instinct, as they first constitute a space where left and right first become objectively determinable for me.

Third, my body is always both indeterminably active and passive. As I sense my right hand with my left, my one hand constitutes the other as object that nonetheless also explores. I sense in my right hand a shell of the explorative left hand. This again is different from objects, which is explored, but is never explorative. Though I see my eye in the mirror, the living gaze is lacking.

But given these non-mistakable characteristics of the body, how come psychologists still miss the unique status of body? They naively believe an object always corresponds to a subjective representation. They repress the body, yet its horizon nonetheless surges forth. One always lives the body, and the living dimension always is the most important to be understood. Facts have to be taken up back into norms.

127–140

The body schema is not a spatial representation of, e.g. the hand, associated with the spatial representation of the whole body. Rather, the body schema is what first of all allows these representations to be associated. The body schema is the overall experience enveloping the experience of a part, that is localized yet intimately felt. The bodily space is a situational, not a geometrical, space. If we say point-horizon is the basic structure of perception, body is the missing link that a priori determines what can be constituted as a point situated in what horizon. Body is the horizon of all perceptual horizons, and when a part of body appears, it conceals others, as the comet with its trailing tail. As was said earlier, I don’t distinguish my left hand from my right hand through representations: they simply are different through their inner tension.

Next, what about those pathological cases where the patient is no longer clear about their abstract bodily space? When they are asked to grasp a body part or to do something concrete, they can make use of their bodily space. But when they are asked to do some random movement or to localize what is abstractly present or to point at it, they can’t. That is these patients’ bodily space has lost the virtual horizon of possibilities, and instead they are steeped in the actual horizon. When they are asked to grasp the body part, that part becomes for them “graspable” and hence real. When they are commanded to imitate a scenario, they wholeheartedly immerse their body in that scenario and effect that action. When they fail to point to a thing or to localize the object on their skin, they do not live their body in a real enough situation, but they have to do some preparatory movements in order to first represent their whole body and deduce and calculate.

But on the other hand a normal subject can not only entertain his phenomenal body in a real situation, but also in any general situation. The horizon for him is always reducible to traits and general characters. He does not need to measure the space in order to indicate a possibility, but what is possible is inherently in his bodily space. His horizon is therefore open as a horizon that also accommodates what is only signified. It’s an indicative horizon, a relatively more open and less rigid one.

One also needs to understand that pathology is not mere normalcy subtracting some facility. Pathology is its own process and movement, and even the substitution strategy grows out of the pathology and its solution is hence equally pathological. So without the mediating space of possibility, how do pathological subjects arrive at the objective space? First, these subjects might not absolutely lack the virtual space, otherwise the actual horizon wouldn’t even be possible; the horizon structure is still present, only too rigid, and what is present as possibilities too obscure to be fully designated. The imposition of mathematics and geometry does not require a due order of acquisition, since pathology follows its own order. It is then the case that, the patients acquire geometry because they understand virtual space, though they never experience it as presence, but an absence, which is indifferent to the founding of geometry. In other words, as a normal person can experience their bodily space both interestedly (for action) and indifferently (for indication), a patient can only experience it interestedly, and he has to either resort to preparatory movements that transform what is only indifferent to his body into what’s of interest to it, or resort to geometrical representation, which is founded, not on the experience of what is present to the phenomenal body’s horizon, but on the overall experience of this horizon.

140–152

Again we try to understand the phenomenon present to this specific patient. Though the horizon is given to his thought and perception, we can say it is nonetheless not given to his motor space, that space where his body is oriented in a free way towards the world. The basic structure is less rigid and more projective. The world is the subject’s project, towards which he freely comports himself and his bodily movement. The rigid structure of the patient determines him to a step-by-step realization of motion, instead of a projection or a leap into the possible through signification.

Do we have to interpret this phenomenon in an existential way? Is empiricism not sufficient? Merleau-Ponty here provides two objections on this account. First, as empiricism was refuted earlier, Merleau-Ponty points out how the inductive method is not sufficient for any science which wishes to not merely establish causal links but also to have rational concepts that could really elucidate the phenomena. It’s never enough to explain things without then understanding them. This is a general criterion. The second objection is more particular to psychology, as it concerns the more concealed and enveloped phenomenon of behavior, many interpretations of the phenomenon are equally probable. If one says the patient is like this because he is deprived of visual cues, this is not observed in a lot of experiments, plus what would tactile experience in itself be, if it is sufficiently modified by the visual experience in a normal person? Moreover, in visual givens there’s already that point-horizon structure, which structure is precisely what vision supposedly first gives to the normal subject, thus we are moving in a circle. It’s wrong to suppose that vision is just visual data or hearing just auditory material: vision is more horizonal than hearing, and this is a structural trait, not a material distinction. One cannot ignore the proper visual structure that presupposes what is supposed to be afforded by vision. Again, there is no reason to assume that touch is structurally dissimilar to vision and requires a visual supplement to perform a project. One therefore has to accept that in psychology the basic unit is experience, and experience is always fundamentally singular and unique. The patient has his unique experience with the visual and tactile givens. Not only is there no determinate cause here, nor is there a cause insufficiently understood, causality itself is not proper for our understanding psychology, as causality is too founded on the notions of an objective world where objects are indifferent to each other.

152–163

One has to understand that each of the physiologist and intellectualist interpretation of the phenomenon has to be totalizing. This means that they are not mutually exclusive as in a Venn Diagram, but they are two systems that unfold two different worlds. One understands this when one asks oneself, if the phenomenon can be understood in any part and to any degree in terms of a third person process, why can it not be fully reduced to such processes? If a patient simply lacks some visual content, why can’t a normal subject simply possesses it? And if a normal subject indicates, is not the same bodily movement at work as the patient grasps? The patient hence is essentially the same as the normal person, only somewhat deprived. Contrarily, if the normal person can signify and constitute a world-horizon, is the patient not doing the same in order to be a patient and not a thing? But then the patient would again essentially have the same transcendental subjectivity that is synthesizing, only empirically restricted and conditioned in the patient. Again, one loses the phenomenon of the pathology.

Therefore one has to remember always that we are dealing here with not a mixture of two causes, but a free reason that intends two self-sufficient and parallel worlds. There is no transcendental consciousness purely for itself; its synthesis is not atemporal, but precisely the presupposed atemporality is itself constituted in time. The transcendental subject freely constitutes itself as empirical, but is not isolated from it as Spirit walks over water. The form does not subsume material, but is always already material. So conversely the third-person process is always already taken up and made into sense. Neo-Kantianism always believes that some pure consciousness hovers above beings as the core faculty of signification (“the community of sense”) as if form hovers above material. These two worlds can only be related dialectically through phenomenology which starts from the phenomenon concretely, without abstractions.

164–169

To recapitulate the phenomenon, one has to definitively say that the problem with the patient can neither be solely intellectual nor solely perceptual. Rather, intelligence is always contextualized within a perception, that form is always situated in its material. The problem with the patient is precisely the connection between his intelligence and perception is destroyed, so that he can only impose his intelligence onto the perceived material without effecting the immediate perception of form and content in their immediate unity. The intellectual form does not project its singular objectification while the perceived does not project a universal possibility. Rather, he has to first see something, then infer something out of it explicitly.

When he reads, he understands the narrative, but cannot recount the narrative creatively, as the inspiration of the moment when form and content collide is lacking for him. He can only reconstitute the sense from the content he hears, but cannot immediately perceive the sense. The same with riddles and puzzles, he can logically deduce the answer, but cannot solve the puzzle. The same with counting, though he nonetheless synthesizes different items into one enumeration, he does not count insofar as he does not keep the sediment of the past available for reactivation; as for a normal subject counting is largely a symbolic act of going through ciphers that nonetheless maintains continuously some intuitable multiplicity, for the patient counting is simply going by the rules, and he only verifies the count as he arrives at the result, but never in the process of it, thus he retains no trailing of the numerical sense in his consciousness when counting as a normal subject does. These eloquently display how much the intellectual function is already implicated in the pre-conscious perceptual function for a normal subject, and how rigid the structure that harbors these two functions really is for the patient.

170–183

Body has its intentional arc that constitutes its own world from its given past: the world it constitutes is a historical world. This makes illness qua illness possible. Pathology is always irreversible; though it can be cured and body restored to health, pathology is still preserved in the body’s “medical history.” So simple empiricism is problematic, for it believes implicitly that any pathology is external to the body, and a simple removal of the illness is equivalent to the curing of the body. But neither is synthesis some general function of understanding, for reasons already mentioned. The world adjunct to body is intuitive and immediate.

The perceived world is not an objective world. Nothing is measured in this world, but everything is a power and a burgeoning field of sense. For some patients one can say that the more fundamental structure or field is damaged, yet the superstructure persists, so that the world for him has collapsed really, yet still holds a facade. And this world belongs to the body itself, as body is the knot that ties multiple worlds together into the particular world that body immediately perceives. And our body learns a habit not through active understanding, but through its own historical acquisition: the incorporation of a subfield into the originary field of the body, e.g. the body learns to dance not through analyzing the steps, but through repeated practice of the steps, even without any active understanding.

184–190

The bodily dimension gives an originary unity, which means that it is not an assemblage or subsumption of different segments into a structure or an idea, as is the case with objects. Rather, all bodily experiences flow into each other. Body is not an objective core to which all organs or perceptions refer, but is immediately what is experienced, the same way a painting, though an object physically, is not an object as a work of art. Rather, as a work of art, it is given not as a core to which all perspectives point, but as a self-appearing world where objects are first allowed to appear. It is not an object nor an idea because as a work of art the painting has no stable center, but each particular stroke is appealing to the eye. The same way body is not an ideal transcendence, but every singular experience is itself a wavelet in the overall experience. There is thus no stable hierarchical structure, but a free play. Similarly, the body is not a law governing bodily or psychic facts, as it is not an empty formula that holds all facts indifferently: body is not a medium that regulates equals. Again, it opens up a field of free play between different unities of senses. That is the freedom of the body. Laws govern what do not organize by themselves and ideas concentrate what do organize by their own dynamism, while the body plays with the organism as the organism: so it puts itself into many nows that nonetheless envelop each other organically, so that it’s no law that deals equally with absences or presences qua instances of the law; but on the other hand, it plays with its own many organs, and decenters itself into many centers without losing itself as a totality of network, while an idealized body becomes that dynamic core eternally actualizing itself into presence that also preserves its own absences contained in this actualization of the idea.

191–198

Sexuality is first and foremost the privileged structure of desire and drives that accentuates our existential totality into a concentrated perspective, where body is perceived not primarily as an object, but a subjectivity expressive of desire and receptive of pleasure and pain. For a patient with impotence, the sexual world is depleted. The body is an affective body that also perceives other bodies not fundamentally as objects but as erotic realms to explore and receive. This is fundamentally the insight of psychoanalysis, that sexuality is a privileged tuning of existence, and its pansexualism is merely an expression of this privileged status granted to sexuality to render a totality, a sexual world. This, however, doesn’t mean that existence is fully absorbed into sexuality, but rather they are always in dialectical tension: such is the tension within psychoanalysis itself. The key here is to understand why sexuality takes up this privileged position.

198–212

Here Merleau-Ponty addresses some concerns with great analogies. First, the “unconscious” is neither a bad faith nor a pure transcendent. Rather, every repression is a structural figuration within consciousness (taking the broadest designation), and repression as enclosure precludes a horizon, the same as the loss of an arm precludes the use of an arm, the repression of a memory precludes that whole horizon of memories. Also the same as one really falls asleep when one “pretends” to take up the sleeping position, one really forgets the memory repressed, though this memory is forever inscribed in the symbolic order: as the purloined letter.

Then, body has the duplicity of anonymity and expressiveness. A person retreats inside his body, and cuts all ties from others. But the body already opens up horizons of perception that nonetheless prepares for a development of the public domain. Systole and diastole. The body could even melt before the mind does as Spring comes…

Finally, existence and sexuality and economic position all comprise an overdeterminate unity: but this is no unity of a whole of parts, but unity of the interconnected fabric of perspectived and privileged systems. So is psychoanalysis simultaneously prejudiced and holistic, for it is a free enterprise with its intrinsic movement constituting its own totality.

213–221

Yet again Merleau-Ponty pulled the same move regarding speech. Speech is at once the immediate presence of sense in the word. It is not an inert combination of words or verbal images, for this always presupposes an intentional rule of unification; but between the empirical manifold and the intellectual unity there obtains not an external relation, but a pregnant one. When I speak, I immediately sense the sense in words, words are inhabited by sense, and I follow a style of speech. Words are not coined by thoughts, but thoughts strive towards words as their completed expressions. So are mythical and “childish” thoughts concerned with language in the same way, as language is for these subjects itself full of being. Cross-reference Cassirer. But this is not because of the real existence of linguistic objects and subjects, who speak what is spoken, but rather, precisely due to this real existence of linguistic community, one understands language as a communal place for self-expression, so that language is not signs imposed onto secondary nature, but is itself externalized existence of the subject. Moreover, what is externalized is not simply “thought” as such, as if the thought is already determinate and ready-at-hand, but a free projection. The same way body projects its own space, body projects words pregnant with sense, so body projects irreal imagined presences as memories. Space, words, memories: these are never images or data; these are rather all projects, constituted in the very presence of the present marking its horizons.

222–231

Such is a very interesting position. Language is not a cloak pulled over thought, but is, one could say, the flesh of thought, the body of thought. Language completes thought in expressing it: this expression is a “making habitat for.” Just like in music we do not discard the sound of music to access the hidden layer of signification, in language we don’t discard words. Words are the precarious practice to commit oneself to linguistic being.

What about the arbitrariness of signifiers? Are words merely conventional, or are they merely natural? This is a false dichotomy. If words are merely signifiers, they are such only in principle, but in reality there’s etymology marking the history of different sense-groups, there’s grammatical structure such as inflections, etc. Clearly, then, language is not arbitrary, but spiritual. But is language then really natural? Is language an imitation of nature? No. Rather, language is always a free and precarious practice; though it attaches to emotional and expressive values, and words do express emotions, it’s dangerous to believe emotions are natural. Rather, emotions, their ways of expressing, and even their very contents can be surprisingly indeterminate. Words do not imitate nature; the word “anger” doesn’t necessarily sound angry, yet it harbors an emotive history of varying significance, the same as anger itself can take up multiple nuanced layers, including this layer of verbal communication. For instance, do we not see an expressive difference between “anger” “rage” and “ire”?

Language is therefore gesticulatory. It gestures towards the other to invite the other be present to the subject so reciprocally the subject can be present to the other. When I see someone smile, I don’t analyze her every detailed movement of the face, rather, I’m first invited to see herself, as expressed through her whole body with full presence, adjusting my evaluation and feeling according to her ambivalent mien. When she smiles, her whole world lights up in a new mood, she would speak softly, would pat me on the shoulder, and would give me agreeable response. These various other things that I expect from her smiling are neither my associated images nor rational analyses, but are pre-reflexive horizons that open up through her smile. So when she speaks of “love,” her personal world of love is opened in this word. Communication, either verbal or gestural, are all fundamentally invitations, not “reminder notes.”

If language seems somehow more transparent than music in this regard, that it really seems to express with fixed meanings, that is because it’s been so institutionalized and constituted, that poets are banished from the republic and dictionaries are conventionalized. If you pull the same trick on music, to say that a major four is always of this mood, and that motif always of that meaning, music will wither as well. Music resists this institutionalization via its more poignant emotional force and its less rigid internal structure, but also via its obscurity in articulation and its repetitive limits (a phrase is less distinct from others than a word is from others; a phrase is too often repeated to achieve emotional valence, etc.). But this is to take the effect for the cause. Truth is, music is a different vehicle of expression than language because it is set for a different goal: and its signification inhabits a different layer of human spirit. While language invites the other without intending to subjugate the other, but only means to persuade the other as an equal subject, music overwhelms and sways the listener. Over this boundary wanders the poet, who tries to sway but fails to, for it also sets the person free.

231–241

As a patient sees only a bundle of minuscule colors holding totally indeterminate relations against each other without ever obtaining one stable convergence, like how a normal person sees color, his perception is carved into vortices each of which is too small to pull in other perceptive vectors. That’s how he cannot categorize colors, for no category is for him over dominant. Rather he has to rely on formulated and pre-established associations and relations. That is analogous to how a person knows not how to swim, and has to walk the bridge.

The same way a word might have lost its living sense, for it becomes too restricted to itself and no longer reaches out to its “sense.” As it’s bound to happen if one repeats a word too many times in one run. But then the patient might nonetheless “understand” its meaning because its meaning is designated for him by convention. He’s nevertheless lost the living sense and creative production of sense of the word. The different structural layers and centers (a syntactical center; a phonetical center; etc.) are no longer unified for him, but each center restricts only to itself. That is how the patient, losing sense, retains meaning, as one retains the debris of a superstructure after earthquakes at the foundation.

What about Merleau-Ponty’s statement that language is somehow unique? That for each musician the world begins anew, that it’s inconceivable to have Music That Ends All Music? I believe this is an overstatement. I believe this, though in speech’s essence, is nonetheless due to a logocentric attitude of human subject. One much more often demands of musicians originality than a sedimented and reusable repertoire. Whereas with language except for poets people most often demand less creativity than reliability.