Gui Ruiyan

Maurice Merleau-Ponty · 莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂
Phenomenology of Perception · 知觉现象学

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Phenomenology of Perception — Reading notes · Part II

Apple Notes

Revised 9 July 2025

In this note / 篇目

245–249

Body as the constituting subjectivity that first gives rise to syntheses of objects. Moreover, these syntheses are most often passive syntheses; these synthetic powers are faculties, to be sure, but they are also instantiations of our bodily essences. Anyways, these synthetic powers are also not posited as purely “powers”, but themselves constituting themselves and are constituted in turn by others. A whole network of affective powers, let’s say. Our modern objectivity is modeled on geometry and other mathematical objects. But these objectivities are products of our immediate perceptive syntheses. That is, before objects, there’s the world of objects. And our body is the nexus of this world opening up for us. Body is primarily not the subjective correlate to objects, as if they are posited at the two sides of a mirror, but it is an originary horizon where the perceived horizons are situated and border, the same way the body itself feels other than its head (which I primarily identify as myself).

251–261

Sensation has a few noteworthy characteristics: 1. its anonymity, 2. its incompleteness, 3. its convergence.

How do I mean all these? Sensation is always passive in our general structure of existence. It does not grant us full responsibility and is hence anonymous to us. We feel as if another senses in me and for me. When we gaze at the blue of the sky, it’s the sky that thinks and perceives through us. The perceiving subject holds the place where perceptions converge. Yes, the sky doesn’t think, if the sky is viewed merely as a scientific object; but as a perceptible, it is a horizon, a field that diastoles and systoles with a rhythm. It enraptures us as we plunge into it. It is not an indifferent quale that our consciousness later interprets: rather, we live the blue, as our body situates itself into an attitude to experience the blue in all its motor and sense significations. Before the blue is for empiricism the state of a consciousness, it is for intellectualism the consciousness of a state, but even prior to this, it is a stated consciousness, wherein consciousness puts itself into a state where it is situated by its own history.

So we can say in the case of sensing, the blue intrigues us and takes us up into an attitude, which prepares us to be calmed in blue, while red prepares us to be provoked by it. These are of course not temporally demarcated, but are horizons inter-layered, always intending more. What is sensed is never self-enclosed but always cointends, inexhaustibly, as this inexhaustibility is per se intended as well, other horizons. So we are folds of sensations when we do sense. We are enfolded into sense, which for us comprise our constitutive past: they are born in us and then they die, the same as death and birth are unknown to us yet mortality and natality are enfolded in us as our sedimented pre-personal horizons that nonetheless permeate our personal lives. The same as sleep falls to us when our body adjusts itself for sleep.

261–271

Each sense gives a field of sense. This field is immediate and originary. This means that it is not a mere reserve of sense material onto which form is to be imposed. Rather, it is already its own immediate unity of facticity and normativity. Kant separates a priori from a posteriori, but these essentially belong together, the former only an elucidated version of the latter. Given this, it would be absurd to claim that there is any form that’s without material or material without form. In our example, it’d be absurd to claim that the tactile field is aspatial. Rather the tactile field presents us only with a different structure of spatial sense that is to be geared into the general sense of space synthesized through all fields of perception. For instance, the visual field of universal coexistence is only prepared by the partial but more vital sense of tactile coexistence. Partial because it’s always point to point and of short distance, always of a grasping and stretching, but vital because it holds and maintains the object in its simultaneous clutch of hand. A recuperated blind man has to learn to trust his vision at first, for vision for him opens up a world of “surfaces” that don’t hold together without his gaze having learned how to sustain these surfaces. He uses his gaze as he uses his hand in stretching, in tending towards and caressing, weighing and making sure of the non-existent solidity of the visual object, without yet having learned to receive in his gaze these surfaces as a whole that’s been knit together prior to the reception. The visual world was for him initially a world of many whirlpools and was too flimsy to his gaze, instead of a taut and resilient texture we’ve come to receive.

271–280

What is a bodily synthesis like? Merleau-Ponty offers two examples: synesthesia and binocular vision. Different sense fields do not posit notionally some higher genus of all fields, nor does it simply synthesize already posited and stabilized worlds. Rather, all sense fields conflict with each other and merge into particular ones. They are fluids, or milieus. For synesthesia is the norm of perception: when we see glass, we feel its brittle texture, we hear it clinks and we smell glassiness. If synesthesia seems like an exception that’s because objective science has been teaching us what we ought to perceive. Yet perception is always fluid and always “merging towards one.” The perceptual field is always a one of many, instead of a one above many.

So is binocular vision. Each of our eyes sees something slightly different. Yet we do not see two images with our two eyes. Moreover, we don’t even take the data or stimuli and then mush them together into one. Rather, we perceive only one image whatsoever, which is not a mixture, but is simply singular, yet a singularity towards which the two images previously in disequilibrium converge. Why? Is it not the case that we do see the disequilibrium when we don’t focus, and when we focus they are brought together, so that we need the focusing to synthesize two distinct images? But this is to misunderstand focusing: focusing is conjured by the settling disequilibrium within the visual field itself, not a purely spontaneous act. This is evident in the case of someone long blind that suddenly recovers sight, for he could not learn to focus due to a yet unorganized visual field with too great disequilibrium. He sees only patches of fleeting colors that have not yet stabilized enough for him to rule and center by focusing. In other words, focusing is prepared for by some previous centralization and anchors the visual field into a steady background that can later emerge from anonymity and unite the two distinct images.

280–289

So what is the new paradigm of knowledge that perception prompts us to take up? And how is this paradigm self-consistent? The major opponent is not empiricism, as that is simply third-person objectivism, which is thoroughly indefensible. But it’s more tricky with intellectualism. Intellectualism believes that any knowledge has to be reflective, and an eternal and active subjectivity has to sit behind the veil of phenomena to synthesize and make sense of the multiplicity of sense data.

How is this reflective attitude generated? When one perceives, one posits that one must perceive the perceiving, and one must in turn perceive the perceiving of the perceiving, ad infinitum. So there must be the transcendental unity of apperception. But is that really the case with perception? Rather, we find that in perception, we lose ourselves to the perceived. There’s no unity of apperception fully encapsulated and delivered to itself. For then hyle would really be inexplainable. Rather, instead of a fully transparent (because truly vacant and empty) source of activity, this reflective activity is to be delivered to the unreflected core of perceived reality. This is in a way the Aristotelian tradition: perception holds in potency the many reflective activities. These reflective activities are passive syntheses sedimented in our immediate perception as the pre-history to this perception. It’s enough that critical philosophy tells us about the conditions that make experience possible, now we need a radical philosophy that could reincorporate it into the real description of the unreflected immediacy of experience.

That is to say the “eternal synthetic faculty” is itself a temporal synthesis, and not some thetic entity ready at hand. The synthesis has to synthesize itself temporally. In other words, as at the present, I immediately perceive, this consciousness flows away, and is retained in the next consciousness. Two consequences follow from this temporal characterization of synthesis: the synthetic unity itself is to be resynthesized and renewed every moment (Husserl’s absolute flow of inner-time consciousness) and this unity is forever finite and obscure. The same way Kant would propose that transcendental unity of apperception is itself a notional unity to be synthesized with experience and is always somehow absent from experience. And such is the status of perception: perception is passive because it is full of sediments. We seem to be lost in perception and perception hits us, because we merge with it, yet it resists us. It is not an eidos without residue and fully present to us. Rather, it generates an eidos, yet itself only centers around its eidos as its ideal. The perceived, when idealized, can be fully present, but the perceived itself in our perception can never be fully present.

290–303

The strange status of space and spatiality. It’s always assumed that there’s a spaced space and a spacing space, that there are objects oriented in particular ways, that “possess space,” and there is a mind that “imposes space.” But both are difficult to reckon with. First out is intellectualism, which simply assumes the Cartesian coordinate system that recognizes no true orientation, or rather, where direction has no absolute meaning and carries no import. It is rather random if one selects this or that to be the x-axis and which counts as up and which counts as down. As “up” and “down” are mere impositions by the mind, intellectualism is incapable of explaining where “up” and “down” first come about.

But so is empiricism. Empiricism presumes that head has the sensation of “up” and feet the sensation of “down,” so that when the visual spectacle is inverted, the tactile space still recognizes what is up for it as what is down for the visual, and as one grows accustomed to this inversion, he gradually recovers the association, and “up” and “down” are then redefined for the visual as the tactile realigns with the visual, as now the tactile up feels mixed with what used to be the visual down, and vice versa, so that feet and head are confused in a way.

But again this is a big problem. For there is not yet a clear and intelligible understanding of what up and down are. Is up merely a sensed feeling of the head, while down that of feet? But then why are we always striving to invert the inverted? Why do we not naturally and painlessly fall into the new orientation? This of course is a case of habit, but not in the empiricist sense of mere psychic association. Rather, the spatial level is more primordial. I do certainly acclimate to the new orientation, but with more or less difficulty, not because I am more or less psychically susceptible, but because of the practical and biological milieu my body situates me. If my visual world is inverted, and I fit into this inverted world, it is not because of associations, but because of my motor projects are realigned. But there are things that can never be realigned for me: I can never see an inverted face without feeling uncanny about it; I can never read words upside down with naturalness. This has nothing to do with habit, but has everything to do with my corporeality.

What is this primordial level of corporeal space? Eyes are at the top because eyes scour and roam the horizon, because feet are grounded to support the body. The body is situated in the field of gravity, and is pulled down by and moves against this background. The very fact that a body only with difficulty and effort (through the medium of a rational mapping and deliberate coordination between the previous and the now inverted visual field) resituates itself into the inverted field speaks of this primordial level of living space. This space is always preconstituted for me and received by me. The inverted world rubs against this prior world to finally is compromised with it. This alone is the meaning of this experiment: inversion only has meaning against that which is upright; and the two levels then reconstitute a new level; space is hence always a historical space for a historical existence.

A huge difficulty therefore needs be resolved. How is the visual field at all oriented, if it were simply an image? But this assumption is false: rather, the visual is always already saturated with the tactile, and anything that looks grave always already assumes the felt gravity. An image is never like the blank canvas, but is rather like a framed picture: it is always already oriented, and its frame is nothing besides the body. We look at the human body: it is not merely inferred that what is fatter inclines to stay at the bottom. For if that is the case, we merely need to look at the image and that’s be all. But instead, we experience that the image is already saturated with a heaviness, that it is “weighted” and pulled down by the body, like a curtain is pulled down. The whole visual horizon is not a self-enclosed image floating in the void, but more like a painting that hangs, and its up and down are not determined by what meets the eye, but what is invisible, that which subtends the eye around its corner. The visual field is prefigured in a body frame that is already oriented.

304-317

This is a great chapter. How is depth perceived? Traditionally, philosophers believe that we only perceive depth-less images, or “extensions.” Then, we impose upon these data either the associations or a “natural geometry” that in turn interpret these data as saying: if something looks smaller, it means it’s farther off; by “being farther off,” I mean if you walk to the side and look at that thing sideways, you see a breadth. That is, distance is reduced to breadth seen laterally that’s then revolved around. One sees a pole from South to North, but the same pole appears as a point from East to West. Convergence of the eyes, apparent sizes, clarity, all are different signs to help us interpret distance.

But this is wrong. One has to understand that depth is important because it implies originarily perspective. That is, the situatedness of a subject. For a subject, a thing is far or near in his own field. Depth or distance primarily is a feeling of “the hold,” or, the power of one’s gaze and body to perceive a thing. A thing is farther off if it imposes less unto my situation, if it does not immediately take hold of me, if it takes only a small portion of all of my visual field, if its sound grows faint, if it does not force my eye to converge. That means depth is not a synthesis of abstract moments already torn apart, but is an originary whole that holds together. Apparent size is not an actual size of some psychic image really extant that can be compared to our retinal images: as Husserl already remarked in The Origin of Geometry, the pre-geometrical world is a world without measure. “Bigness” doesn’t imply a measurable size, but the pre-objective perception of a pre-exact type. Our retinal images are not even determinant of how we actually perceive the size psychically, as a photo can hardly convey the largeness of the object we actually perceive.

If one is deceived of illusions of depth, that does not mean that depth is merely an interpretation of something we don’t actually see. Rather, we do see depth because we strive always to see a “thing,” and this thing looks far from us. In a painting, we see depth simply because the depth is there: the painting is less brushstrokes on paper than the depiction of a thing in space, the passerby is really nearer to me and affects me more than Icarus falling at a distance. Our perception is distorted by craftsmanship: it attempts to understand the perceived as the mathematically constituted, depth as calculated angles converging towards the vanishing point. But that is not primarily what depth is. Again, we are deceived not because of our wrong interpretation or the false hypothesis we hold, but because our faith in the thing animates it and bestows it its givenness to us. Same way we don’t interpret a person from a doll as we play, but in the situation of play, a doll simply is given to us as a person.

Anyhow, when a thing is given to us, it is not simply raw data to be interpreted. Rather, it always consists in motives to be taken up which already assume the whole field in these motives. These motives give us determinate situations that are then incorporated by us and lived by us. Apparent sizes, convergences and vagueness are given to me already in one field, and is to be taken up by me, not as disparate elements later to be organized, but as a field to motivate my journey in this field, which then reciprocally transforms the field. This is what a norm is. It is not fact given to be interpreted, but a norm is what gives a field that is taken up by me and comports to me. This is transition synthesis: what is synthesized are not immutable facts, but are overdeterminable vectors in a field. Hence all these facts such as the apparent size and convergence are only meaningful in relation to the living subject, as imbued in his lived situation with depth and distance of “the hold.” These facts point to distance, and distance animates them then into a meaningful whole.

In a word, obviously everything contributes to the perception of depth, including colors, shapes, contours, etc. What is crucial, however, is to understand what really is depth and how depth takes up all these motives or cues and saturates them and animates them as an organic whole for a living subject in a lived situation. Distance is just how much a thing is present to our hold as a project.

317–332

Another great chapter. How have psychology and objective science misconstrued movement? Objective science believes that object, the movable being, is external to its movement, that motion is nothing but a relational denomination, so that the movable can either be in motion or at rest, but really is indifferent to both. Motion merely “covers the objective positions laid along the length” and in this way it destroys movement: as the object is indifferent to either, it can be either relative to how it is seen. There is hence no “absolute motion.”

Psychology, on the other hand, does not believe in a concealed and unified object. Rather, it posits the many units of images to be unified by the psyche. Yet it nonetheless has to admit that there is motion perceived in the thing itself, and the continuity constituted by noesis has to have its noematic constitution nonetheless.

In the case of stroboscopic motion, with lights on and off, one sees a collection of discrete positions. They don’t merge into a movement. As physicist believes each snapshot is the thing taking up a position, he has to admit that millions of these put together wouldn’t give us the perceived motion. And as psychologist believes in the same kind of atomism, he also has to relent. A reverse but similar case is cinema: we do see that as the images move fast enough, it immediately turns into a continuous flow. Motion is therefore always perceived as pre-objective and moving against any measure.

But what is actually the motion as perceived? It is the escape from or approach to some anchorage, some center or hold. A thing tries to leave the milieu that held it: it trails away in the field and resists its force. Such is motion as perceived. Even there is no external and objective reference towards which the object is moving, as in the case of a turning sphere, its dynamism nonetheless is perceived, as throbbing and palpitating. How is relativity understood here? It means motion is always moving against some background, yet this background is not external to the thing, but very much geared to it: even in its escape, it tries to leave what matters to it. It transforms itself in leaving it behind.

The relativity of the thing moving against my eye is not the thing moving definitely towards the boundary of my vision: which is no objective limit whatsoever. Even when a thing is moving against a background, it’s seen how the background is blurred and surrounds the thing, as if the background is “giving space to it.” Again, even my eye is a holding force into which things are geared. When I am on the train, it is true that I can view the train as moving or the side, but when I am playing cards in my booth with others it is the outside that is perceived to be moving. Thus we understand what is relative and what is absolute about perceived motion. What is relative is that the anchorage or the center or the horizon is not fixed, but is fluid. What is absolute about motion, however, is that it is often asymmetrical: I leave home, but home does not leave me the same way I leave it, rather, home stays behind and beckons me. The prey gets away from the lion, it moves away; lion does not move away, but fails to pursue. Motion is always structured against a horizon, but that does not make it relative: it is relative insofar as motion is reciprocal in generality, but is absolute insofar as is asymmetrical in its historicity and existential situation. That is, insofar as movement is lived. One lives in the movement. Space, thus constituted in movement, is a lived space, and space as packets between temporal waves.

332–340

Prior to space being geographically and geometrically determined, it is lived. Body lives it and constitutes it and animates it. This space surrounds and permeates our perceived space, for our perceived space is but one horizon among many bordering horizons. Prior to perceiving ups and downs and highs and lows, we first understand what is high and what is low through the anchorage of our body: so no, high morale is not figurative speech, as if “high” is somehow a geometrical determination before “high” is determined in sense through our lived experience. No, we first understand what is high according to our own experience, then we extenuate this same experienced structure as we gradually proceed to perceive, nonchalantly, what is high geographically. The same way left and right are only recognized as different spaces with their differentiation in dexterity. Spatiality or space is primordially an existential structure, it is how experiences are woven together. Perceived space is rather a leveling representation of this originary space.

Some examples are already given in earlier analyses of the way perceptual categories of space can be derived from our lived experience. What is up is what lifts, what attracts and appeals to us against gravity, against the terrestrial pull, and absorbs us into a floating state, where we don’t wade on earth but play in the clouds. What is up is no different from what is uplifting. Up is what makes light. Hence high spirit is not a spatial metaphor, but the precise sense of our existential experience of height: height is what touches heavens, what uplifts us and guides us into the void of lightness. Height does not signify freedom, it is freedom. Height is therefore all of these: it is the arching of the neck, the raising of an eye, and the beckoning of the invisible at the limit of our eye.

What is far is what calls and beckons but does not seize. What is left is what always feels slightly off, slightly out of place. Only these first are of interest to our lifeworld to be thus demarcated and constituted, imbued with sexual, mythical and playful sense. Left and right are often mixed up as they are less differentiated, as can be witnessed in many simple movements, such as walking or marching. Left and right hands if crossed directly in front of us with our eyes closed, though we know the intersection is in the middle, we nonetheless feel they come from different spaces: a left-handed space that is explored differently than the right-handed space. These two spaces are the same insofar as they are almost symmetrically explored, usually one more awkwardly than the other; yet they are different insofar as each has some angle out of reach for it that can be covered by the other, this way they are complementary. How is one usually taught to tell left from right? One is taught by pinching the arm: I pinch one arm of my child and tell her the space explored by this hand is called left.

The space of left and right, a space of predominant equality and complementarity.

340–351

Our unreflected, immediate space is the unity of three spaces in one: the anthropological, the natural, and the geometrical. One has to see that the geometrical space is an idealization of the natural space which needs to be put back into the world. The natural space is a space that gleams under the lived space: nature is itself a lived nature. It supports and grounds civilization as the canvas does the paint. Space is structured with these multiple layers.

Is our focus on lived space not some kind of psychologism? But we still hold onto the noematic. Only that we say what we deal with here are not immediately, scientifically objective. Rather, we say these factical phenomena as perceived in our lifeworld are supported by objectivities as their conditions of possibility, yet these conditions are themselves results of analysis, and must be united with the unreflected core of experience. That is, objectivity as the condition of possibility is to be incorporated into the actual situation of immediacy of the perceived phenomena in the lifeworld. Geometry is also a practice. This however does not mean it is without its own rule and norm and noematic structure.

Truth and error are determined neither without a transcendent standard nor without immanent mark. If we say truth and illusion are immanent, to tell them apart, we necessarily need some marks immanent to them that differentiate them. Yet if so they will immediately posit a behind since any immanent mark that makes illusion illusion could in principle be ignored. Therefore, any immanence will necessarily implicate transcendence; if there’s transcendent truth to illusion, there’s also transcendent noumenon to truth. And vice versa, for if there is a behind to illusion and truth, truth and illusion must nonetheless embody this transcendence as they have differences immanent to them; truth must be closer to the transcendent ideal than illusion is, and both must hold the transcendent in order to measure against it. We need a more robust notion of truth and falsity. Every truth is an error, so is every error its own truth. There’s only immanent transcendence. We perceive everything, but not equally. We know ourselves, but they are always concealed from us. Between the two ends of cogito, there is worldliness.

352–358

So how do we know the size of an object? Psychologists believe that we could have a privileged size and orientation, that is, a preferred image, of an object, and that would be the determinate size and shape of an object. Every other shape and size would just be variations on this image. But this begs the question, since what is at issue here is precisely how these variations are established as variations.

Rationalists, following Kant, believe that there are laws and mathematical formulas regulating the conditions with their results: given that I see the cube from a given angle, it appears like it’s not a square; given that something is seen far off, it should appear that it looks smaller. But this intellectual synthesis is precisely what does not happen in perception. Law is established or clarified on the perceived, not the other way around. Kant knows of course that sizes and shapes must appear determinate, otherwise there wouldn’t be any experience; but he supposes that it’s our transcendental activity that determines these.

But in truth, the psychologist is asking the right question. How do we have determinate sizes and how do we come to know them as objective? It’s not an independent image, for then the unity of an object as a nexus of all these images remains inexplicable. It has to have, not a bundle structure, but a horizonal structure. That is, each image needs be broken down into a series of explorative fields and vectors. Perspectives do not attach themselves to the object, rather, they intend each other and intend the kernel uniting each other. When I see the front, I cointend the left and right. All these perspectives surge toward a norm, which is the privileged position, which is privileged only in relation to our body. Our body moves towards that norm and it’s now not an independent image, but a pole of gravity. The unity is hence clarified as the unity of a norm. If one starts out anticipating a bundle of images, one of course would have difficulty understanding this unity.

358–373

Visual and tactile space are organized as fields. Again, these spaces are not bundles of properties or quales. The visual space is not a bundle of patches of color, so is tactile space not a bundle of impressions. Rather, these are fields to be explored by the intending body, by explorative hands and eyes and other organs, knitted and woven together into one field of the body. For visual, lighting is the guide that traces out gaze and thus weaves together color with what resists color, i.e. texture, and what dominates color, i.e. the permeating medium of light that is itself “colored.” As Marx says of production as “the permeating medium that gives color to all other elements.” Color is always color of a thing, and color as such is only an idea, a norm towards which the thing surges. There is no red but only a wooly red, for instance. The color of the shine, the color of the surface, the color of light, the color of the source of light, the color of a transparent body, etc. So is weight perceived in about the same way: the body’s movement guides the perception of the weight and evaluates it through the resistance it feels against the object and the object poses against the body’s advance.

373–383

Things resist. Things are in themselves for us. They have a deep sense. But it also means that their sense is inexhaustible to us and wild and strange. A painting torn to pieces is no longer a painting, for its sense heavily relies upon imagination, which, one could say, is very superficial. Or rather self-contained: it does not go far out into its infinitely many bordering horizons and lose itself in them. But perception always loses itself in the thing and forgets about its own constitutive activity. That is to say the thing, in its originary immediacy, overtakes us. It is not enough for phenomenology to merely analyze the synthesis and constitution of a thing to account for this primordial immediacy. Rather one must realize that the contingency implicit in every perception is irreducible to the synergy of bodily functions and subjective acts, since it’s the first unity of a thing that entrains and polarizes the body. This correspondence between body and world is hence indeterminate. When I’m looking at a thing I’m not aware of seeing only a profile, but rather I see the side of the thing. This contingency and immediacy of thinghood is the perceptual maximum, i.e. the norm for perception.

In short, one can say that though there are infinitely many acts of constitution, the immediacy of perception unite all these acts in one pole of pure contingency: the Aristotelian ineffable substance of thinghood, the thisness. Things could be constituted by the synergy of body, but a body is itself open onto the world and is called by the world to be directed towards things. The bodily synthesis is not purely subjectively willed, but is overdetermined by the world it encounters. The structure is then clear: instead of us constituting things, it is the world that constitutes itself in things through our body. Nature is the ultimate and absolute subject and constitutes through us. But this is also susceptible to a reversal: as we are co-subjects to Nature, so is Nature to us. The contingency and immediacy, though undeniable, is nonetheless a constitution. What matters is then the logic of our constitution of this contingency, which is nothing but our own otherness to ourselves. That is, though this contingency of the thing is constituted through our subjectivity, it is nonetheless absolutely strange to me, and pervades my whole being; I am in the hold of the thing as another the same as I am in the hold of myself as another. I lose myself in the thing the same way I lose myself in myself: I lose some peripheral horizons sedimented in the immediate horizon. Thinghood is as much a pole as subjectivity, one focuses on one more than the other depending on the situation: one focuses on things more when one deals with theoretical knowledge of objects in their ideal and endurable articulations, and on the ideal ego more when one deals with practical.

384–391

The world is a style and a horizon. It is not an object. An object is not the perfection of presence, but precisely its impossibility, since pure presence without a situation is not a presence at all. Every presence requires some absent horizon to give place to it. The world is imbued with a temporal structure: the key insight of Being and Time.

391–402

A crucial chapter. Both empiricism and intellectualism fail to grasp the essence of hallucinations, for they presuppose objective thought. That is, they think hallucinations are objects: but then they cannot explain, why, if hallucinations are objective, patients are neither willing to let go of it if they know these objectively are false appearances, nor willing to take them as truth if they do mistake these for true appearances. How come patients cannot properly “deal with” these fantastic beings?

That’s because hallucinations are not objects. Rather, they are pre-objective affects and disintegrated debris of the body schema that haunt the peripheral horizons of the “real world.” But if so and if patients can shift gear to turn to these “peripheral worlds” and be immersed in them instead of the public, real world, that means the world, as the primordial horizon of all horizons, is much more expansive than the simply public world of light. Rather, as the originary horizon, it is capable of accommodating both the enlightened public world and the many private worlds of obscurity, without this being under a bird’s-eye-view as if the public world is the basket into which other worlds are put, but diacritically they envelop each other.

The originary horizon of the originary opinion is what grounds the horizon of the perceived world of light. One has to remember that this perceived world is not a world of perceived objects but a world of perceptive experiences. Each perception borders on the other and is to be continually corrected by others, hence it continually wanders off into those illusory private worlds. In these lacunae and fissures of the world of perception we have the supplementary world of illusions, where patients experience magic, rather than see illusory objects. This, mind, is not to say that each perception is only probable or possible, since that is not how the world is experienced. We do not think possibility or probability in our natural life. Rather, we simply are certain of our perceptions and are certain of their uncertainty as horizons. This is not the scientific world of trial and error and possibility and probability. Rather, it’s the world of naive experiences.

The structure is then clear. We have the superstructure of an objective perceptual world, wherein we perceive objects. But underlying it is a world of experiences and horizons and affects. This world has many fissures, lacunae, variations and short circuits, which usually are private worlds of less richness and verity, but which are nonetheless of primal interest to the whole intention to the patient’s body schema. These horizons merge together without however losing their distinction. This is only possible when the grounding horizon permits both truth and falsehood, and where they cohere in obscurity, where one conglomeration of appearances could be overwhelmingly more centered and enriched than the other (more “real”), notwithstanding the other being overwhelmingly more valuable to the subject. In such cases, hallucinations occur, as a conglomeration of appearances that cohere somehow in the real world and resist their being cancelled out by the outside world that is much richer and which doesn’t harmonize with it, because these “false” appearances are somehow worth preserving. The same way I don’t simply think the patient unreasonable, nor do I condescendingly “put myself in his shoes,” rather, I start off where I am, trying to understand the patient in a diacritical way, fostering a dialogue where one center is constantly being recentered by the other.

403–413

We know another person as another subject not because we first identify the other’s objective body looks similar to our own objective body and then we say, since our own objective body carries out the task assigned to it by our subjective consciousness, we posit the same consciousness behind it. This is not how things work. When I perceive another’s body, I do not reduce her into a bare object. Rather, her body is already a force vector in my field. It already immediately decenters me. Her behavior exudes something that transcends a mere phenomenal world and appears always already uncanny. This is precisely because my body is not an object, and the world I perceive is not a static scroll. Rather, they are already horizons enveloped by horizons.

414–424

Transcendental subjectivity is always intersubjectivity, generated in temporality. These are all the fundamental insights labored out by Husserl in his last manuscripts. Phenomenology’s telos is to gather all phenomena, essences, existences into the logos of the free transcendental subject. This subject is the flow between self and other. It is not God as the universal us, since this God is only present to the finite subject and as God his activity is inaccessible to us: he thinks through me but I cannot fully think his thinking. I cannot coincide with God, but God is nonetheless present somehow.