Maurice Merleau-Ponty · 莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂
Phenomenology of Perception · 知觉现象学
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Phenomenology of Perception — Reading notes · Part II
Apple Notes
Revised 9 July 2025
In this note / 篇目
245–249
Body as the constituting subjectivity that first gives rise to syntheses of objects. Moreover, these syntheses are most often passive syntheses; these synthetic powers are faculties, to be sure, but they are also instantiations of our bodily essences. Anyways, these synthetic powers are also not posited as purely “powers”, but themselves constituting themselves and are constituted in turn by others. A whole network of affective powers, let’s say. Our modern objectivity is modeled on geometry and other mathematical objects. But these objectivities are products of our immediate perceptive syntheses. That is, before objects, there’s the world of objects. And our body is the nexus of this world opening up for us. Body is primarily not the subjective correlate to objects, as if they are posited at the two sides of a mirror, but it is an originary horizon where the perceived horizons are situated and border, the same way the body itself feels other than its head (which I primarily identify as myself).
251–261
Sensation has a few noteworthy characteristics: 1. its anonymity, 2. its incompleteness, 3. its convergence.
How do I mean all these? Sensation is always passive in our general structure of existence. It does not grant us full responsibility and is hence anonymous to us. We feel as if another senses in me and for me. When we gaze at the blue of the sky, it’s the sky that thinks and perceives through us. The perceiving subject holds the place where perceptions converge. Yes, the sky doesn’t think, if the sky is viewed merely as a scientific object; but as a perceptible, it is a horizon, a field that diastoles and systoles with a rhythm. It enraptures us as we plunge into it. It is not an indifferent quale that our consciousness later interprets: rather, we live the blue, as our body situates itself into an attitude to experience the blue in all its motor and sense significations. Before the blue is for empiricism the state of a consciousness, it is for intellectualism the consciousness of a state, but even prior to this, it is a stated consciousness, wherein consciousness puts itself into a state where it is situated by its own history.
So we can say in the case of sensing, the blue intrigues us and takes us up into an attitude, which prepares us to be calmed in blue, while red prepares us to be provoked by it. These are of course not temporally demarcated, but are horizons inter-layered, always intending more. What is sensed is never self-enclosed but always cointends, inexhaustibly, as this inexhaustibility is per se intended as well, other horizons. So we are folds of sensations when we do sense. We are enfolded into sense, which for us comprise our constitutive past: they are born in us and then they die, the same as death and birth are unknown to us yet mortality and natality are enfolded in us as our sedimented pre-personal horizons that nonetheless permeate our personal lives. The same as sleep falls to us when our body adjusts itself for sleep.
261–271
Each sense gives a field of sense. This field is immediate and originary. This means that it is not a mere reserve of sense material onto which form is to be imposed. Rather, it is already its own immediate unity of facticity and normativity. Kant separates a priori from a posteriori, but these essentially belong together, the former only an elucidated version of the latter. Given this, it would be absurd to claim that there is any form that’s without material or material without form. In our example, it’d be absurd to claim that the tactile field is aspatial. Rather the tactile field presents us only with a different structure of spatial sense that is to be geared into the general sense of space synthesized through all fields of perception. For instance, the visual field of universal coexistence is only prepared by the partial but more vital sense of tactile coexistence. Partial because it’s always point to point and of short distance, always of a grasping and stretching, but vital because it holds and maintains the object in its simultaneous clutch of hand. A recuperated blind man has to learn to trust his vision at first, for vision for him opens up a world of “surfaces” that don’t hold together without his gaze having learned how to sustain these surfaces. He uses his gaze as he uses his hand in stretching, in tending towards and caressing, weighing and making sure of the non-existent solidity of the visual object, without yet having learned to receive in his gaze these surfaces as a whole that’s been knit together prior to the reception. The visual world was for him initially a world of many whirlpools and was too flimsy to his gaze, instead of a taut and resilient texture we’ve come to receive.
271–280
What is a bodily synthesis like? Merleau-Ponty offers two examples: synesthesia and binocular vision. Different sense fields do not posit notionally some higher genus of all fields, nor does it simply synthesize already posited and stabilized worlds. Rather, all sense fields conflict with each other and merge into particular ones. They are fluids, or milieus. For synesthesia is the norm of perception: when we see glass, we feel its brittle texture, we hear it clinks and we smell glassiness. If synesthesia seems like an exception that’s because objective science has been teaching us what we ought to perceive. Yet perception is always fluid and always “merging towards one.” The perceptual field is always a one of many, instead of a one above many.
So is binocular vision. Each of our eyes sees something slightly different. Yet we do not see two images with our two eyes. Moreover, we don’t even take the data or stimuli and then mush them together into one. Rather, we perceive only one image whatsoever, which is not a mixture, but is simply singular, yet a singularity towards which the two images previously in disequilibrium converge. Why? Is it not the case that we do see the disequilibrium when we don’t focus, and when we focus they are brought together, so that we need the focusing to synthesize two distinct images? But this is to misunderstand focusing: focusing is conjured by the settling disequilibrium within the visual field itself, not a purely spontaneous act. This is evident in the case of someone long blind that suddenly recovers sight, for he could not learn to focus due to a yet unorganized visual field with too great disequilibrium. He sees only patches of fleeting colors that have not yet stabilized enough for him to rule and center by focusing. In other words, focusing is prepared for by some previous centralization and anchors the visual field into a steady background that can later emerge from anonymity and unite the two distinct images.
280–289
So what is the new paradigm of knowledge that perception prompts us to take up? And how is this paradigm self-consistent? The major opponent is not empiricism, as that is simply third-person objectivism, which is thoroughly indefensible. But it’s more tricky with intellectualism. Intellectualism believes that any knowledge has to be reflective, and an eternal and active subjectivity has to sit behind the veil of phenomena to synthesize and make sense of the multiplicity of sense data.
How is this reflective attitude generated? When one perceives, one posits that one must perceive the perceiving, and one must in turn perceive the perceiving of the perceiving, ad infinitum. So there must be the transcendental unity of apperception. But is that really the case with perception? Rather, we find that in perception, we lose ourselves to the perceived. There’s no unity of apperception fully encapsulated and delivered to itself. For then hyle would really be inexplainable. Rather, instead of a fully transparent (because truly vacant and empty) source of activity, this reflective activity is to be delivered to the unreflected core of perceived reality. This is in a way the Aristotelian tradition: perception holds in potency the many reflective activities. These reflective activities are passive syntheses sedimented in our immediate perception as the pre-history to this perception. It’s enough that critical philosophy tells us about the conditions that make experience possible, now we need a radical philosophy that could reincorporate it into the real description of the unreflected immediacy of experience.
That is to say the “eternal synthetic faculty” is itself a temporal synthesis, and not some thetic entity ready at hand. The synthesis has to synthesize itself temporally. In other words, as at the present, I immediately perceive, this consciousness flows away, and is retained in the next consciousness. Two consequences follow from this temporal characterization of synthesis: the synthetic unity itself is to be resynthesized and renewed every moment (Husserl’s absolute flow of inner-time consciousness) and this unity is forever finite and obscure. The same way Kant would propose that transcendental unity of apperception is itself a notional unity to be synthesized with experience and is always somehow absent from experience. And such is the status of perception: perception is passive because it is full of sediments. We seem to be lost in perception and perception hits us, because we merge with it, yet it resists us. It is not an eidos without residue and fully present to us. Rather, it generates an eidos, yet itself only centers around its eidos as its ideal. The perceived, when idealized, can be fully present, but the perceived itself in our perception can never be fully present.
290–303
The strange status of space and spatiality. It’s always assumed that there’s a spaced space and a spacing space, that there are objects oriented in particular ways, that “possess space,” and there is a mind that “imposes space.” But both are difficult to reckon with. First out is intellectualism, which simply assumes the Cartesian coordinate system that recognizes no true orientation, or rather, where direction has no absolute meaning and carries no import. It is rather random if one selects this or that to be the x-axis and which counts as up and which counts as down. As “up” and “down” are mere impositions by the mind, intellectualism is incapable of explaining where “up” and “down” first come about.
But so is empiricism. Empiricism presumes that head has the sensation of “up” and feet the sensation of “down,” so that when the visual spectacle is inverted, the tactile space still recognizes what is up for it as what is down for the visual, and as one grows accustomed to this inversion, he gradually recovers the association, and “up” and “down” are then redefined for the visual as the tactile realigns with the visual, as now the tactile up feels mixed with what used to be the visual down, and vice versa, so that feet and head are confused in a way.
But again this is a big problem. For there is not yet a clear and intelligible understanding of what up and down are. Is up merely a sensed feeling of the head, while down that of feet? But then why are we always striving to invert the inverted? Why do we not naturally and painlessly fall into the new orientation? This of course is a case of habit, but not in the empiricist sense of mere psychic association. Rather, the spatial level is more primordial. I do certainly acclimate to the new orientation, but with more or less difficulty, not because I am more or less psychically susceptible, but because of the practical and biological milieu my body situates me. If my visual world is inverted, and I fit into this inverted world, it is not because of associations, but because of my motor projects are realigned. But there are things that can never be realigned for me: I can never see an inverted face without feeling uncanny about it; I can never read words upside down with naturalness. This has nothing to do with habit, but has everything to do with my corporeality.
What is this primordial level of corporeal space? Eyes are at the top because eyes scour and roam the horizon, because feet are grounded to support the body. The body is situated in the field of gravity, and is pulled down by and moves against this background. The very fact that a body only with difficulty and effort (through the medium of a rational mapping and deliberate coordination between the previous and the now inverted visual field) resituates itself into the inverted field speaks of this primordial level of living space. This space is always preconstituted for me and received by me. The inverted world rubs against this prior world to finally is compromised with it. This alone is the meaning of this experiment: inversion only has meaning against that which is upright; and the two levels then reconstitute a new level; space is hence always a historical space for a historical existence.
A huge difficulty therefore needs be resolved. How is the visual field at all oriented, if it were simply an image? But this assumption is false: rather, the visual is always already saturated with the tactile, and anything that looks grave always already assumes the felt gravity. An image is never like the blank canvas, but is rather like a framed picture: it is always already oriented, and its frame is nothing besides the body. We look at the human body: it is not merely inferred that what is fatter inclines to stay at the bottom. For if that is the case, we merely need to look at the image and that’s be all. But instead, we experience that the image is already saturated with a heaviness, that it is “weighted” and pulled down by the body, like a curtain is pulled down. The whole visual horizon is not a self-enclosed image floating in the void, but more like a painting that hangs, and its up and down are not determined by what meets the eye, but what is invisible, that which subtends the eye around its corner. The visual field is prefigured in a body frame that is already oriented.
304-317
This is a great chapter. How is depth perceived? Traditionally, philosophers believe that we only perceive depth-less images, or “extensions.” Then, we impose upon these data either the associations or a “natural geometry” that in turn interpret these data as saying: if something looks smaller, it means it’s farther off; by “being farther off,” I mean if you walk to the side and look at that thing sideways, you see a breadth. That is, distance is reduced to breadth seen laterally that’s then revolved around. One sees a pole from South to North, but the same pole appears as a point from East to West. Convergence of the eyes, apparent sizes, clarity, all are different signs to help us interpret distance.
But this is wrong. One has to understand that depth is important because it implies originarily perspective. That is, the situatedness of a subject. For a subject, a thing is far or near in his own field. Depth or distance primarily is a feeling of “the hold,” or, the power of one’s gaze and body to perceive a thing. A thing is farther off if it imposes less unto my situation, if it does not immediately take hold of me, if it takes only a small portion of all of my visual field, if its sound grows faint, if it does not force my eye to converge. That means depth is not a synthesis of abstract moments already torn apart, but is an originary whole that holds together. Apparent size is not an actual size of some psychic image really extant that can be compared to our retinal images: as Husserl already remarked in The Origin of Geometry, the pre-geometrical world is a world without measure. “Bigness” doesn’t imply a measurable size, but the pre-objective perception of a pre-exact type. Our retinal images are not even determinant of how we actually perceive the size psychically, as a photo can hardly convey the largeness of the object we actually perceive.
If one is deceived of illusions of depth, that does not mean that depth is merely an interpretation of something we don’t actually see. Rather, we do see depth because we strive always to see a “thing,” and this thing looks far from us. In a painting, we see depth simply because the depth is there: the painting is less brushstrokes on paper than the depiction of a thing in space, the passerby is really nearer to me and affects me more than Icarus falling at a distance. Our perception is distorted by craftsmanship: it attempts to understand the perceived as the mathematically constituted, depth as calculated angles converging towards the vanishing point. But that is not primarily what depth is. Again, we are deceived not because of our wrong interpretation or the false hypothesis we hold, but because our faith in the thing animates it and bestows it its givenness to us. Same way we don’t interpret a person from a doll as we play, but in the situation of play, a doll simply is given to us as a person.
Anyhow, when a thing is given to us, it is not simply raw data to be interpreted. Rather, it always consists in motives to be taken up which already assume the whole field in these motives. These motives give us determinate situations that are then incorporated by us and lived by us. Apparent sizes, convergences and vagueness are given to me already in one field, and is to be taken up by me, not as disparate elements later to be organized, but as a field to motivate my journey in this field, which then reciprocally transforms the field. This is what a norm is. It is not fact given to be interpreted, but a norm is what gives a field that is taken up by me and comports to me. This is transition synthesis: what is synthesized are not immutable facts, but are overdeterminable vectors in a field. Hence all these facts such as the apparent size and convergence are only meaningful in relation to the living subject, as imbued in his lived situation with depth and distance of “the hold.” These facts point to distance, and distance animates them then into a meaningful whole.
In a word, obviously everything contributes to the perception of depth, including colors, shapes, contours, etc. What is crucial, however, is to understand what really is depth and how depth takes up all these motives or cues and saturates them and animates them as an organic whole for a living subject in a lived situation. Distance is just how much a thing is present to our hold as a project.
317–332
Another great chapter. How have psychology and objective science misconstrued movement? Objective science believes that object, the movable being, is external to its movement, that motion is nothing but a relational denomination, so that the movable can either be in motion or at rest, but really is indifferent to both. Motion merely “covers the objective positions laid along the length” and in this way it destroys movement: as the object is indifferent to either, it can be either relative to how it is seen. There is hence no “absolute motion.”
Psychology, on the other hand, does not believe in a concealed and unified object. Rather, it posits the many units of images to be unified by the psyche. Yet it nonetheless has to admit that there is motion perceived in the thing itself, and the continuity constituted by noesis has to have its noematic constitution nonetheless.
In the case of stroboscopic motion, with lights on and off, one sees a collection of discrete positions. They don’t merge into a movement. As physicist believes each snapshot is the thing taking up a position, he has to admit that millions of these put together wouldn’t give us the perceived motion. And as psychologist believes in the same kind of atomism, he also has to relent. A reverse but similar case is cinema: we do see that as the images move fast enough, it immediately turns into a continuous flow. Motion is therefore always perceived as pre-objective and moving against any measure.
But what is actually the motion as perceived? It is the escape from or approach to some anchorage, some center or hold. A thing tries to leave the milieu that held it: it trails away in the field and resists its force. Such is motion as perceived. Even there is no external and objective reference towards which the object is moving, as in the case of a turning sphere, its dynamism nonetheless is perceived, as throbbing and palpitating. How is relativity understood here? It means motion is always moving against some background, yet this background is not external to the thing, but very much geared to it: even in its escape, it tries to leave what matters to it. It transforms itself in leaving it behind.
The relativity of the thing moving against my eye is not the thing moving definitely towards the boundary of my vision: which is no objective limit whatsoever. Even when a thing is moving against a background, it’s seen how the background is blurred and surrounds the thing, as if the background is “giving space to it.” Again, even my eye is a holding force into which things are geared. When I am on the train, it is true that I can view the train as moving or the side, but when I am playing cards in my booth with others it is the outside that is perceived to be moving. Thus we understand what is relative and what is absolute about perceived motion. What is relative is that the anchorage or the center or the horizon is not fixed, but is fluid. What is absolute about motion, however, is that it is often asymmetrical: I leave home, but home does not leave me the same way I leave it, rather, home stays behind and beckons me. The prey gets away from the lion, it moves away; lion does not move away, but fails to pursue. Motion is always structured against a horizon, but that does not make it relative: it is relative insofar as motion is reciprocal in generality, but is absolute insofar as is asymmetrical in its historicity and existential situation. That is, insofar as movement is lived. One lives in the movement. Space, thus constituted in movement, is a lived space, and space as packets between temporal waves.
332–340
Prior to space being geographically and geometrically determined, it is lived. Body lives it and constitutes it and animates it. This space surrounds and permeates our perceived space, for our perceived space is but one horizon among many bordering horizons. Prior to perceiving ups and downs and highs and lows, we first understand what is high and what is low through the anchorage of our body: so no, high morale is not figurative speech, as if “high” is somehow a geometrical determination before “high” is determined in sense through our lived experience. No, we first understand what is high according to our own experience, then we extenuate this same experienced structure as we gradually proceed to perceive, nonchalantly, what is high geographically. The same way left and right are only recognized as different spaces with their differentiation in dexterity. Spatiality or space is primordially an existential structure, it is how experiences are woven together. Perceived space is rather a leveling representation of this originary space.
Some examples are already given in earlier analyses of the way perceptual categories of space can be derived from our lived experience. What is up is what lifts, what attracts and appeals to us against gravity, against the terrestrial pull, and absorbs us into a floating state, where we don’t wade on earth but play in the clouds. What is up is no different from what is uplifting. Up is what makes light. Hence high spirit is not a spatial metaphor, but the precise sense of our existential experience of height: height is what touches heavens, what uplifts us and guides us into the void of lightness. Height does not signify freedom, it is freedom. Height is therefore all of these: it is the arching of the neck, the raising of an eye, and the beckoning of the invisible at the limit of our eye.
What is far is what calls and beckons but does not seize. What is left is what always feels slightly off, slightly out of place. Only these first are of interest to our lifeworld to be thus demarcated and constituted, imbued with sexual, mythical and playful sense. Left and right are often mixed up as they are less differentiated, as can be witnessed in many simple movements, such as walking or marching. Left and right hands if crossed directly in front of us with our eyes closed, though we know the intersection is in the middle, we nonetheless feel they come from different spaces: a left-handed space that is explored differently than the right-handed space. These two spaces are the same insofar as they are almost symmetrically explored, usually one more awkwardly than the other; yet they are different insofar as each has some angle out of reach for it that can be covered by the other, this way they are complementary. How is one usually taught to tell left from right? One is taught by pinching the arm: I pinch one arm of my child and tell her the space explored by this hand is called left.
The space of left and right, a space of predominant equality and complementarity.
340–351
Our unreflected, immediate space is the unity of three spaces in one: the anthropological, the natural, and the geometrical. One has to see that the geometrical space is an idealization of the natural space which needs to be put back into the world. The natural space is a space that gleams under the lived space: nature is itself a lived nature. It supports and grounds civilization as the canvas does the paint. Space is structured with these multiple layers.
Is our focus on lived space not some kind of psychologism? But we still hold onto the noematic. Only that we say what we deal with here are not immediately, scientifically objective. Rather, we say these factical phenomena as perceived in our lifeworld are supported by objectivities as their conditions of possibility, yet these conditions are themselves results of analysis, and must be united with the unreflected core of experience. That is, objectivity as the condition of possibility is to be incorporated into the actual situation of immediacy of the perceived phenomena in the lifeworld. Geometry is also a practice. This however does not mean it is without its own rule and norm and noematic structure.
Truth and error are determined neither without a transcendent standard nor without immanent mark. If we say truth and illusion are immanent, to tell them apart, we necessarily need some marks immanent to them that differentiate them. Yet if so they will immediately posit a behind since any immanent mark that makes illusion illusion could in principle be ignored. Therefore, any immanence will necessarily implicate transcendence; if there’s transcendent truth to illusion, there’s also transcendent noumenon to truth. And vice versa, for if there is a behind to illusion and truth, truth and illusion must nonetheless embody this transcendence as they have differences immanent to them; truth must be closer to the transcendent ideal than illusion is, and both must hold the transcendent in order to measure against it. We need a more robust notion of truth and falsity. Every truth is an error, so is every error its own truth. There’s only immanent transcendence. We perceive everything, but not equally. We know ourselves, but they are always concealed from us. Between the two ends of cogito, there is worldliness.
352–358
So how do we know the size of an object? Psychologists believe that we could have a privileged size and orientation, that is, a preferred image, of an object, and that would be the determinate size and shape of an object. Every other shape and size would just be variations on this image. But this begs the question, since what is at issue here is precisely how these variations are established as variations.
Rationalists, following Kant, believe that there are laws and mathematical formulas regulating the conditions with their results: given that I see the cube from a given angle, it appears like it’s not a square; given that something is seen far off, it should appear that it looks smaller. But this intellectual synthesis is precisely what does not happen in perception. Law is established or clarified on the perceived, not the other way around. Kant knows of course that sizes and shapes must appear determinate, otherwise there wouldn’t be any experience; but he supposes that it’s our transcendental activity that determines these.
But in truth, the psychologist is asking the right question. How do we have determinate sizes and how do we come to know them as objective? It’s not an independent image, for then the unity of an object as a nexus of all these images remains inexplicable. It has to have, not a bundle structure, but a horizonal structure. That is, each image needs be broken down into a series of explorative fields and vectors. Perspectives do not attach themselves to the object, rather, they intend each other and intend the kernel uniting each other. When I see the front, I cointend the left and right. All these perspectives surge toward a norm, which is the privileged position, which is privileged only in relation to our body. Our body moves towards that norm and it’s now not an independent image, but a pole of gravity. The unity is hence clarified as the unity of a norm. If one starts out anticipating a bundle of images, one of course would have difficulty understanding this unity.
358–373
Visual and tactile space are organized as fields. Again, these spaces are not bundles of properties or quales. The visual space is not a bundle of patches of color, so is tactile space not a bundle of impressions. Rather, these are fields to be explored by the intending body, by explorative hands and eyes and other organs, knitted and woven together into one field of the body. For visual, lighting is the guide that traces out gaze and thus weaves together color with what resists color, i.e. texture, and what dominates color, i.e. the permeating medium of light that is itself “colored.” As Marx says of production as “the permeating medium that gives color to all other elements.” Color is always color of a thing, and color as such is only an idea, a norm towards which the thing surges. There is no red but only a wooly red, for instance. The color of the shine, the color of the surface, the color of light, the color of the source of light, the color of a transparent body, etc. So is weight perceived in about the same way: the body’s movement guides the perception of the weight and evaluates it through the resistance it feels against the object and the object poses against the body’s advance.
373–383
Things resist. Things are in themselves for us. They have a deep sense. But it also means that their sense is inexhaustible to us and wild and strange. A painting torn to pieces is no longer a painting, for its sense heavily relies upon imagination, which, one could say, is very superficial. Or rather self-contained: it does not go far out into its infinitely many bordering horizons and lose itself in them. But perception always loses itself in the thing and forgets about its own constitutive activity. That is to say the thing, in its originary immediacy, overtakes us. It is not enough for phenomenology to merely analyze the synthesis and constitution of a thing to account for this primordial immediacy. Rather one must realize that the contingency implicit in every perception is irreducible to the synergy of bodily functions and subjective acts, since it’s the first unity of a thing that entrains and polarizes the body. This correspondence between body and world is hence indeterminate. When I’m looking at a thing I’m not aware of seeing only a profile, but rather I see the side of the thing. This contingency and immediacy of thinghood is the perceptual maximum, i.e. the norm for perception.
In short, one can say that though there are infinitely many acts of constitution, the immediacy of perception unite all these acts in one pole of pure contingency: the Aristotelian ineffable substance of thinghood, the thisness. Things could be constituted by the synergy of body, but a body is itself open onto the world and is called by the world to be directed towards things. The bodily synthesis is not purely subjectively willed, but is overdetermined by the world it encounters. The structure is then clear: instead of us constituting things, it is the world that constitutes itself in things through our body. Nature is the ultimate and absolute subject and constitutes through us. But this is also susceptible to a reversal: as we are co-subjects to Nature, so is Nature to us. The contingency and immediacy, though undeniable, is nonetheless a constitution. What matters is then the logic of our constitution of this contingency, which is nothing but our own otherness to ourselves. That is, though this contingency of the thing is constituted through our subjectivity, it is nonetheless absolutely strange to me, and pervades my whole being; I am in the hold of the thing as another the same as I am in the hold of myself as another. I lose myself in the thing the same way I lose myself in myself: I lose some peripheral horizons sedimented in the immediate horizon. Thinghood is as much a pole as subjectivity, one focuses on one more than the other depending on the situation: one focuses on things more when one deals with theoretical knowledge of objects in their ideal and endurable articulations, and on the ideal ego more when one deals with practical.
384–391
The world is a style and a horizon. It is not an object. An object is not the perfection of presence, but precisely its impossibility, since pure presence without a situation is not a presence at all. Every presence requires some absent horizon to give place to it. The world is imbued with a temporal structure: the key insight of Being and Time.
391–402
A crucial chapter. Both empiricism and intellectualism fail to grasp the essence of hallucinations, for they presuppose objective thought. That is, they think hallucinations are objects: but then they cannot explain, why, if hallucinations are objective, patients are neither willing to let go of it if they know these objectively are false appearances, nor willing to take them as truth if they do mistake these for true appearances. How come patients cannot properly “deal with” these fantastic beings?
That’s because hallucinations are not objects. Rather, they are pre-objective affects and disintegrated debris of the body schema that haunt the peripheral horizons of the “real world.” But if so and if patients can shift gear to turn to these “peripheral worlds” and be immersed in them instead of the public, real world, that means the world, as the primordial horizon of all horizons, is much more expansive than the simply public world of light. Rather, as the originary horizon, it is capable of accommodating both the enlightened public world and the many private worlds of obscurity, without this being under a bird’s-eye-view as if the public world is the basket into which other worlds are put, but diacritically they envelop each other.
The originary horizon of the originary opinion is what grounds the horizon of the perceived world of light. One has to remember that this perceived world is not a world of perceived objects but a world of perceptive experiences. Each perception borders on the other and is to be continually corrected by others, hence it continually wanders off into those illusory private worlds. In these lacunae and fissures of the world of perception we have the supplementary world of illusions, where patients experience magic, rather than see illusory objects. This, mind, is not to say that each perception is only probable or possible, since that is not how the world is experienced. We do not think possibility or probability in our natural life. Rather, we simply are certain of our perceptions and are certain of their uncertainty as horizons. This is not the scientific world of trial and error and possibility and probability. Rather, it’s the world of naive experiences.
The structure is then clear. We have the superstructure of an objective perceptual world, wherein we perceive objects. But underlying it is a world of experiences and horizons and affects. This world has many fissures, lacunae, variations and short circuits, which usually are private worlds of less richness and verity, but which are nonetheless of primal interest to the whole intention to the patient’s body schema. These horizons merge together without however losing their distinction. This is only possible when the grounding horizon permits both truth and falsehood, and where they cohere in obscurity, where one conglomeration of appearances could be overwhelmingly more centered and enriched than the other (more “real”), notwithstanding the other being overwhelmingly more valuable to the subject. In such cases, hallucinations occur, as a conglomeration of appearances that cohere somehow in the real world and resist their being cancelled out by the outside world that is much richer and which doesn’t harmonize with it, because these “false” appearances are somehow worth preserving. The same way I don’t simply think the patient unreasonable, nor do I condescendingly “put myself in his shoes,” rather, I start off where I am, trying to understand the patient in a diacritical way, fostering a dialogue where one center is constantly being recentered by the other.
403–413
We know another person as another subject not because we first identify the other’s objective body looks similar to our own objective body and then we say, since our own objective body carries out the task assigned to it by our subjective consciousness, we posit the same consciousness behind it. This is not how things work. When I perceive another’s body, I do not reduce her into a bare object. Rather, her body is already a force vector in my field. It already immediately decenters me. Her behavior exudes something that transcends a mere phenomenal world and appears always already uncanny. This is precisely because my body is not an object, and the world I perceive is not a static scroll. Rather, they are already horizons enveloped by horizons.
414–424
Transcendental subjectivity is always intersubjectivity, generated in temporality. These are all the fundamental insights labored out by Husserl in his last manuscripts. Phenomenology’s telos is to gather all phenomena, essences, existences into the logos of the free transcendental subject. This subject is the flow between self and other. It is not God as the universal us, since this God is only present to the finite subject and as God his activity is inaccessible to us: he thinks through me but I cannot fully think his thinking. I cannot coincide with God, but God is nonetheless present somehow.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
In this note / 篇目
245–249
身体是构成着的主体性,对象的综合首先由此产生。而且,这些综合大多是被动综合;这些综合力量固然是官能,却也是我们身体本质的实例。无论如何,这些综合力量也并非被设定为纯粹的“力量”,而是自己构成着自己,同时又反过来被其他力量构成。可以说,这是一整个情动力量的网络。我们的现代客观性以几何学及其他数学对象为模型。但这些客观性是我们直接知觉综合的产物。也就是说,在对象之前,先有对象的世界。而我们的身体就是这个向我们展开的世界的联结点。身体首先并不是对象的主观相关项,仿佛二者被置于镜子的两边;它是一个原初视域,被知觉的诸视域位于其中,并与之接壤,就像身体自身所感到的自己不同于头部,而我主要把头部认同为自己一样。
251–261
感觉有几个值得注意的特征:1.匿名性,2.不完整性,3.汇聚性。
这些都是什么意思?在我们一般的生存结构中,感觉始终是被动的。它不赋予我们完全的责任,因此对我们而言是匿名的。我们仿佛觉得是另一个人在我之中、为我而感觉。当我们凝视天空的蓝,是天空通过我们思想和知觉。知觉主体占据诸知觉汇聚的位置。是的,如果只把天空看作科学对象,天空不思想;但作为可知觉者,它是一个视域,一个依韵律舒张收缩的场。当我们投入其中,它让我们出神。它不是意识后来才加以解释的无差别感觉质(quale);相反,我们生活着这蓝,身体把自身安置于某种姿态,以经验蓝的一切运动与感觉意义。在蓝对经验主义成为意识的一种状态之前,它对理智主义是对一种状态的意识;但更先于此,它是处于状态中的意识(stated consciousness),意识把自己置入某个状态,而它自身的历史将它安置于此。
所以,在感觉的情况下,蓝吸引我们,把我们带入一种姿态,使我们准备好在蓝中平静,而红使我们准备好被它激发。当然,这些并非在时间上被划界,而是层层交叠的视域,总意向着更多。被感觉者从不自我封闭,而总是无穷尽地共同意向其他视域,因为这种无穷尽性本身也被意向。因此,当我们感觉时,我们就是感觉的褶子。我们被折入感觉,而感觉对我们构成了我们那构成性的过去:它们在我们之中出生,然后死去;就像死亡与出生为我们所不知,死亡性与出生性却作为沉淀的前个人视域被折入我们,仍渗透个人生活。也像身体调整自身准备入睡时,睡眠便降临我们。
261–271
每种感觉给出一个感觉场。这个场是直接而原初的。这意味着,它不是等待形式施加其上的感觉材料储备;相反,它已经是事实性与规范性自身的直接统一。康德把先天与后天分离,但二者本质上属于一起,前者只是后者得到澄清的版本。既然如此,声称存在任何无材料的形式或无形式的材料,都会荒谬。在我们的例子里,说触觉场没有空间性就是荒谬的。相反,触觉场只呈现另一种空间感觉结构,它将被接合进通过全部知觉场综合的一般空间感。比如,普遍共存的视觉场,是由部分的、却更具活力的触觉共存感准备的。说它部分,是因为它总是点对点、短距离,总是抓取与伸展;说它有活力,是因为它在手的同时抓握中持有并维持对象。复明的盲人起初必须学会信任视觉,因为视觉为他打开“表面”的世界,在目光尚未学会支撑这些表面之前,它们无法保持在一起。他使用目光就像伸手一样,朝向、抚触、掂量并确认视觉对象那并不存在的坚实,却尚未学会在凝视中把这些表面接受为一个在接受之前已经编织起来的整体。视觉世界最初对他是许多漩涡的世界,对他的凝视过于脆弱,还不是我们已经能够接受的紧绷而有韧性的肌理。
271–280
身体综合是什么样的?梅洛-庞蒂给出两个例子:联觉与双眼视觉。不同感觉场并不在概念上设定一个囊括所有场的更高的属,也不只是综合已经设定且稳定的世界。相反,所有感觉场相互冲突,汇入特定的场。它们是流体,或环境。因为联觉才是知觉的常态:看到玻璃时,我们感到它脆的质地,听到它叮当作响,闻到玻璃的气息。联觉之所以看似例外,是因为客观科学一直教导我们应该知觉什么。但知觉始终流动,始终“朝向一而汇合”。知觉场始终是多中之一,而非多上之一。
双眼视觉也是如此。两只眼睛看到的东西略有不同,但我们并不用双眼看到两幅图像。而且,我们甚至不是先取得数据或刺激,再把它们糅合为一。相反,我们从始至终只知觉一幅图像,它不是混合物,而只是单一的;但这单一性又是先前失衡的两幅图像所汇聚的方向。为什么?难道不是不聚焦时看见失衡,聚焦时二者才合在一起,所以需要聚焦来综合两幅不同图像吗?这误解了聚焦:聚焦由视觉场自身逐渐安定的失衡所唤起,不是纯粹自发的行动。长期失明者突然复明的情况说明了这一点:视觉场尚未组织,失衡太大,他就学不会聚焦。他只看到一片片转瞬即逝的颜色,尚未稳定到足以让他通过聚焦来统辖并使其围绕中心组织。换句话说,聚焦由某种先前的中心化准备,把视觉场锚定于稳定背景;这个背景后来才能从匿名状态中显现,把两幅不同图像统一。
280–289
那么,知觉促使我们采取什么新的知识范式?这个范式如何自洽?主要对手不是经验主义,因为经验主义只是第三人称的客观主义,完全站不住脚。理智主义则更棘手。理智主义相信,任何知识都必须是反思性的,一个永恒而主动的主体性必须坐在现象帷幕后面,综合感觉材料的杂多,使之具有意义。
这种反思态度怎样产生?当一个人知觉时,他设定自己必须知觉这知觉,又必须知觉对知觉的知觉,如此以至无穷。所以必须有统觉的先验统一。但知觉真是这样吗?我们反而发现,在知觉中,我们将自身失落于被知觉者。没有一个完全包裹好、交付给自身的统觉统一,否则质料(hyle)才真的无法解释。相反,这反思活动不是一个完全透明(因为真正空洞无物)的活动源头,而要被交还给被知觉现实中未经反思的核心。这在某种意义上是亚里士多德传统:知觉潜在地持有许多反思活动。这些反思活动是被动综合,作为当前知觉的前史沉淀于我们的直接知觉。批判哲学告诉我们使经验成为可能的条件,已经足够;现在需要一种根本哲学,把它重新纳入对经验未经反思的直接性的真实描述。
也就是说,“永恒综合官能”自身就是时间综合,不是现成可用的某个设定实体。综合必须在时间上综合自身。换句话说,在当下我直接知觉时,这个意识流去,并滞留在下一个意识中。对综合的这种时间刻画带来两个后果:综合统一自身必须每一刻重新被综合、被更新(胡塞尔内时间意识的绝对流),而且这个统一永远有限、晦暗。就像康德会提出,统觉的先验统一自身是有待与经验综合的概念统一,总以某种方式不在经验之中。知觉的地位也如此:知觉被动,因为它充满沉淀。我们仿佛迷失在知觉里,知觉袭来,因为我们与之融合,它却抵抗我们。它不是毫无剩余、完全呈现给我们的理念(eidos);相反,它生成一个理念,自身却只是围绕作为其理想的理念组织。被知觉者被理念化时可以完全在场,但我们知觉中的被知觉者自身永远不能完全在场。
290–303
空间与空间性的奇特地位。人们总是假定,存在一个已被空间化的空间与一个进行空间化的空间,存在以特定方式定向、因而“拥有空间”的对象,以及一个“施加空间”的心灵。但两者都难以说清。首先排除理智主义:它径直假定笛卡尔坐标系,其中没有真正的定向;或者说,方向没有绝对意义,也不承载重要性。选择这条或那条作x轴,哪边算上、哪边算下,都是任意的。“上”“下”既然只是心灵施加的,理智主义就无法解释“上”“下”最初从何而来。
经验主义也一样。经验主义预设头部有“上”的感觉,脚有“下”的感觉,所以当视觉景象颠倒时,触觉空间仍把对它为上的东西辨认为视觉中的下;随着人习惯颠倒,他逐渐恢复关联,触觉与视觉重新对齐,“上”“下”便在视觉中重新定义。此时触觉的上与原先视觉的下混在一起,反之亦然,于是脚与头在某种意义上混淆。
但这又是大问题,因为我们仍未清楚理解上与下。上只是头部被感到的感觉,下只是脚的感觉吗?那么为什么我们总努力把倒过来的再倒回去?为什么不自然、无痛苦地进入新的定向?这当然关乎习惯,但不是经验主义所谓单纯的心理联想。相反,空间层次更原初。我确实会适应新定向,却有或多或少的困难,不是因为心理易感性多或少,而是因为身体将我置身的实践与生物环境。若视觉世界颠倒,而我适应了这个颠倒世界,那不是由于联想,而是由于运动筹划重新对齐。但有些东西对我永远不能重新对齐:我永远无法看一张倒置的脸而不感到诡异,永远无法自然地读倒过来的文字。这与习惯无关,却完全关乎我的身体性。
这个身体空间的原初层次是什么?眼睛在上,因为眼睛搜寻、漫游视域;脚则扎根地面,支持身体。身体置于重力场中,被它向下牵引,并以它为背景运动。身体只能艰难费力地把自己重新安置于颠倒场域中,须借助理性的映射与先前视觉场和当前颠倒视觉场之间的有意协调;这一事实本身就表明生活空间的原初层次。这个空间总是已为我构成,并被我接受。颠倒世界与这个先行世界摩擦,最后与之妥协。这才是实验的意义:颠倒只有相对正立者才有意义,然后两个层次重新构成一个新层次;空间因此始终是历史性存在的历史性空间。
由此有一个巨大困难需要解决:如果视觉场只是图像,它究竟如何有定向?但这个假定是错的。相反,视觉总已经充满触觉,任何看起来沉重的东西都已经预设被感到的重力。图像从不像空白画布,而更像装框的画:它总已经有定向,其框架无非身体。看人体时,我们不是单纯推断比较肥厚的部分倾向于留在底部;如果如此,只看图像就够了。但实际上,我们经验到图像已经浸满重量,它被身体“加重”、向下拉,就像帘幕被垂下。整个视觉视域不是漂浮虚空的自闭图像,更像悬挂着的一幅画;它的上下不是由映入眼中的东西决定,而是由不可见者、在眼角周围支撑眼睛的东西决定。视觉场在一个已经定向的身体框架中被预先构形。
304-317
非常精彩的一章。深度如何被知觉?传统哲学家相信,我们只知觉无深度的图像,或“广延”。然后给这些材料施加联想或“自然几何”,再把材料解释为:东西看着更小,就意味着更远;“更远”指的是,如果走到旁边侧看那个东西,就看到宽度。也就是说,距离被还原为侧面所见、随后再被旋转的宽度。从南向北看一根杆,同一根杆从东向西看却成为一点。双眼会聚、表观大小、清晰度,都是帮助我们解释距离的不同符号。
但这错了。必须理解,深度重要,是因为它原初地包含视角,即主体的处境性。对主体,一个物在自己的场域中或远或近。深度或距离首先是“把握”的感受,即目光与身体知觉一个物的力量。一个物更远,是因为它较少强加于我的处境,不直接抓住我,只占视觉场较小部分,声音渐弱,不迫使眼睛会聚。这意味着深度不是把已经拆散的抽象环节重新综合,而是原初保持在一起的整体。表观大小不是某个实际存在、可与视网膜图像比较的心理图像的实际尺寸:正如胡塞尔在《几何学的起源》中指出,前几何世界是没有度量的世界。“大”不含可测量尺寸,而是对前精确类型的前客观知觉。视网膜图像甚至不能决定我们在心理上实际如何知觉大小,因为照片很难传达我们实际知觉的对象之大。
若被深度错觉欺骗,并不意味着深度只是对我们实际上看不到的东西的解释。相反,我们确实看到深度,因为总努力看见一个“物”,而这个物看起来离我们远。画中看见深度,只是因为深度就在那里:画与其说是纸上笔触,不如说是空间中某个物的描绘;路人真的比远处坠落的伊卡洛斯更接近我,也更影响我。我们的知觉被制作技艺扭曲:它试图把被知觉者理解为数学构成者,把深度理解为朝灭点会聚的计算角度。但深度首先不是这个。再次说,我们受骗不是因错误解释或错误假设,而是因为对物的信让物活起来,赋予它向我们的被给予性。正如玩耍时,我们不是把玩偶解释成人;在游戏情境中,玩偶直接作为人给予我们。
无论如何,一个物给予我们时,并不是等待解释的原始数据。相反,它总包含有待承接的动机,这些动机已经预设整个场域。动机给我们确定的情境,然后被我们纳入、被我们生活。表观大小、双眼会聚与模糊性,已经在同一个场中给予我,有待我承接;它们不是以后才组织的分散元素,而是一个场,推动我在其中的行程,行程又反过来变更这个场。这就是常模。常模不是给来解释的事实,而是给出一个被我承接、与我相适应的场。这是过渡综合:被综合的不是不变事实,而是场中可被超定的向量。因此,表观大小、会聚之类的事实,只有相对于生活着的主体才有意义,它们在主体的生活情境中浸透了“把握”的深度与距离。这些事实指向距离,距离再使它们活起来,成为有意义的整体。
总之,显然一切都参与深度知觉,包括颜色、形状、轮廓等等。但关键是理解深度究竟是什么,以及它如何承接所有这些动机或线索,浸透它们、赋活它们,使之对处于生活情境中的活主体成为有机整体。距离就是作为一项筹划的物,向我们的把握呈现多少。
317–332
又是精彩的一章。心理学与客观科学怎样误解运动?客观科学相信,对象即可动存在者外在于自身运动,运动只是关系性命名,因此可动者可运动也可静止,实际上却对两者无差别。运动只是“覆盖沿长度排列的客观位置”,以此毁掉运动:对象既然对两者无差别,便可依被观看的方式而相对地运动或静止。因此没有“绝对运动”。
心理学则不相信隐藏而统一的对象,而设定许多图像单位由心理统一。但它仍必须承认,物自身中有被知觉的运动,意向活动(noesis)构成的连续性仍必须有其意向相关项层面的构成。
在频闪运动中,灯光明灭,人看到离散位置的集合,它们并不融成运动。物理学家既然相信每个快照是物占据一个位置,就必须承认,数百万张快照合在一起也不能给出被知觉的运动。心理学家既相信同样的原子主义,也得让步。反过来却类似的例子是电影:我们确实看到,图像运动得足够快时,就立即成为连续流。因此,运动总作为前客观者被知觉,抵抗任何度量地运动。
但被知觉的运动究竟是什么?它是逃离或接近某个锚定处、中心或把握。物试图离开原来持有它的环境,在场中渐远,并抵抗这个场的力量。这就是被知觉的运动。即使没有对象正朝向的外在客观参照,如转动球体,其动力仍作为搏动、跳动被知觉。这里怎样理解相对性?它意味着运动总以某个背景为背景,但背景并非外在于物,而是与物紧密接合;即使逃离,物也在试图离开对它重要的东西。在把它留在身后时,物改变自身。
物相对我的眼睛运动,并不是物确定地朝视野边界移动,因为视野边界根本不是客观界限。即使物以某个背景为背景运动,我们也看到背景模糊并包围物,仿佛在“为它让出空间”。同样,我的眼睛也是持有的力量,物与之接合。坐火车时,确实可把火车看成运动,也可把旁边看成运动;但在车厢里与人打牌时,被知觉为运动的是外部。由此理解被知觉运动的相对与绝对。相对的是锚定处、中心、视域不固定,而是流动的;运动的绝对性在于,它往往不对称:我离家,但家不会以我离开它的同一方式离开我,它留在后面召唤我。猎物逃离狮子,它离去了;狮子不是离去,而是追赶失败。运动始终以一个视域为背景组织,但这不使它仅仅相对:就运动一般地相互关联而言,它相对;就其历史性与生存情境中的不对称而言,它绝对。也就是说,就运动被生活而言。人生活在运动中。由运动如此构成的空间是生活空间,是时间波浪之间的一束束空间。
332–340
空间在被地理学与几何学规定之前,先被生活。身体生活它、构成它、赋活它。这空间包围并渗透被知觉空间,因为被知觉空间只是许多相邻视域中的一个。在知觉上下高低之前,我们先通过身体的锚定理解高与低。所以,士气“高”不是比喻,仿佛“高”在通过生活经验获得意义规定之前,先就是几何规定。不,我们先依自身经验理解高,然后在逐渐、不经意地知觉地理之高时,把同一经验结构稀释。同样,左右只有在灵巧程度分化时,才被辨认为不同空间。空间性或空间原初地是生存结构,是诸经验编织在一起的方式。被知觉空间更像是对这一原初空间的平面化表征。
此前关于空间知觉范畴如何来自生活经验的分析,已经给出一些例子。上是提升者,是逆着重力、逆着地面的牵引吸引召唤我们的东西,把我们吸入漂浮状态,使我们不在地面跋涉,而在云中嬉游。上与振奋人心者没有区别。上使人轻盈。因此,精神高昂不是空间比喻,而是我们对高度的生存经验的精确意义:高度触及天空,提升我们,引导我们进入轻盈的虚空。高度不象征自由,它就是自由。因此,高度就是这一切:颈部的弓起、目光的抬升,以及眼睛界限处不可见者的召唤。
远是呼唤、招手却不攫取。左是总感觉略微偏离、略微不在位置上的东西。只有这些首先对生活世界有意义,才会如此被划定构成,并浸透性的、神话的、游戏的意义。左右常被混淆,因为分化较小,许多简单运动,如行走、行军,都能见证。若闭眼把左右手直接交叉在面前,虽知道交点在中间,仍感到它们来自不同空间:左手空间的探索方式不同于右手空间。两个空间相同,因为它们被近乎对称地探索,只是通常一侧较笨拙;它们又不同,因为各自有到不了、却由另一侧覆盖的角度,于是互补。通常如何教人区分左右?通过捏手臂:我捏孩子的一条手臂,告诉她,这只手探索的空间叫左。
左右的空间,一个以平等与互补为主的空间。
340–351
我们未经反思的直接空间,是三种空间合而为一:人类学的、自然的、几何的。必须看到,几何空间是自然空间的理念化,需要重新放回世界。自然空间是在生活空间下闪烁的空间:自然自身是被生活的自然。它支持并奠基文明,如画布支持颜料。空间以这些多重层次构成结构。
关注生活空间,难道不是某种心理主义?但我们仍坚持意向相关项。只是说,这里处理的东西并非直接就是科学上客观的。相反,我们说,生活世界中知觉到的这些事实性现象,以客观性为其可能性条件而得到支持,但这些条件自身是分析结果,必须与经验未经反思的核心统一。即作为可能性条件的客观性,须被纳入生活世界中被知觉现象的直接性的实际情境。几何学也是实践。但这不意味着它没有自身规则、常模与意向相关项结构。
真与误的确定,既不能没有超越标准,也不能没有内在标记。如果说真与幻觉都是内在的,要区分它们,就必须有内在于它们的区别标记。但如此一来,它们就会立即设定一个背后,因为使幻觉成为幻觉的任何内在标记,原则上都可能被忽略。因此,任何内在性必然包含超越性;如果有超越幻觉的真,也就有超越真的本体。反之亦然:若幻觉与真背后有东西,真与幻觉仍必须体现这一超越性,因为二者有内在差异;真必须比幻觉更接近超越的理想,而二者都必须持有超越者,才能与之衡量。我们需要更强的真假概念。每个真都是一个误,每个误也都是自己的真。只有内在的超越性。我们知觉一切,却不平等地知觉。我们认识自身,但自身总对我们遮蔽。在我思的两端之间,有世界性。
352–358
那么,我们如何知道一个对象的大小?心理学家相信,对象可以有一个特权大小与定向,即一幅优先图像,那就是对象确定的大小与形状。其他一切形状大小只是这幅图像的变式。但这预设了待说明之事,因为问题恰好在于,这些变式如何被建立为变式。
追随康德的理性主义者相信,有法则与数学公式规整条件及其结果:如果从某个角度看立方体,它就显得不是方形;如果远看某物,它就应显得较小。但这种理智综合恰好不发生在知觉中。法则在被知觉者之上建立或澄清,而非相反。康德当然知道,大小形状必须确定地显现,否则就不会有经验;但他假定是我们的先验活动规定它们。
其实,心理学家问对了问题。我们如何拥有确定大小,又如何知道它们是客观的?答案不是一幅独立图像,否则对象作为这些图像联结点的统一仍无法解释。它必须具有视域结构,而不是束状结构。即每幅图像都须被分解为一系列探索场与向量。视角不是附着在对象上,而是相互意向,意向着统一彼此的核心。看到正面时,我共同意向左右。所有视角涌向一个常模,即特权位置,而其特权只相对于身体成立。身体朝这个常模运动,它就不再是独立图像,而是重力极点。统一由此被澄清为常模的统一。如果一开始预期的就是一束图像,当然很难理解这一统一。
358–373
视觉与触觉空间作为场来组织。再次说,这些空间不是性质或感觉质的束。视觉空间不是色块的束,触觉空间也不是印象的束。它们是有待意向着的身体、探索着的手眼与其他器官探寻的场,被编结成身体的一个场。对视觉,照明引导并勾勒凝视,把颜色与抵抗颜色者,即质地,以及支配颜色者,即本身也“有色”的、渗透一切的光之媒介编在一起。正如马克思说生产是“给其他一切要素染色的渗透性媒介”。颜色总是某物的颜色,颜色本身只是理念,是物涌向的常模。譬如,没有红,只有毛绒绒的红。光泽的颜色、表面的颜色、光的颜色、光源的颜色、透明体的颜色,等等。重量也差不多如此被知觉:身体运动引导重量知觉,通过身体面对对象所感到的阻力,以及对象对身体前进的抵抗,来评估重量。
373–383
物抵抗。物对我们是自在的。它们有深的意义。但这也意味着,对我们其意义无穷尽、野生而陌生。画被撕碎就不再是画,因为画的意义极度依赖想象,而想象可以说很表浅。或者更准确地说,自我封闭:它不深入无穷多个相邻视域,并迷失其中。但知觉总迷失于物,忘记自身的构成活动。即物以其原初直接性压过我们。现象学仅分析物的综合与构成,不足以说明这种原初直接性。必须认识到,每次知觉隐含的偶然性都不可还原为身体机能与主体活动的协同,因为首先是物的统一牵引身体、使其极化。因此,身体与世界的对应不确定。看物时,我并不意识到只看到一个侧显,而是看到物的一面。物性这种偶然性与直接性,就是知觉的最大值,即知觉的常模。
简言之,虽然有无穷多构成活动,知觉的直接性把它们全统一在纯粹偶然性的一个极点中,即亚里士多德那不可言说的物性本体、此性。物可以由身体协同构成,但身体自身向世界开放,被世界呼唤着朝向物。身体综合不是纯由主体意愿,而被遭遇的世界超定。结构于是清晰:不是我们构成物,而是世界通过身体在物中构成自身。自然是最终且绝对的主体,通过我们构成。但这也可以反转:正如我们是自然的共同主体,自然也是我们的共同主体。偶然性与直接性虽不可否认,却仍是一种构成。因此,重要的是我们构成这一偶然性的逻辑,而它无非是我们对自身的他异性。即虽然物的偶然性通过主体性构成,它对我仍绝对陌生,渗透整个存在;我被作为他者的物把握,正如被作为他者的自己把握。我迷失于物,如同迷失于自己:我失落了一些沉淀在直接视域中的边缘视域。物性与主体性同样是极点,视情境而对一方比另一方更聚焦:处理对象在其理念的、持存的联结中的理论知识时,更聚焦物;处理实践问题时,更聚焦理念自我。
384–391
世界是一种风格、一个视域,不是对象。对象不是在场的完善,恰恰是在场的不可能,因为没有情境的纯在场根本不在场。每个在场都要求某个缺席视域为之让出位置。世界浸透时间结构,这是《存在与时间》的关键洞见。
391–402
关键的一章。经验主义与理智主义都无法把握幻觉的本质,因为它们预设客观思想。即它们认为幻觉是对象,但于是无法解释:如果幻觉客观,患者既然知道它们客观上是虚假显象,为何不愿放下?若把它们错认成真实显象,为何又不愿把它们当真?患者为什么无法妥善“处理”这些奇异存在者?
因为幻觉不是对象,而是前客观的情动与身体图式解体的残片,萦绕于“真实世界”的边缘视域。但若如此,若患者能换挡转向这些“边缘世界”,沉浸其中而不是公共真实世界,就意味着,世界作为一切视域的原初视域,远比单纯光明的公共世界宽广。作为原初视域,它能容纳照亮的公共世界与许多晦暗的私人世界;这不是俯瞰图,仿佛公共世界是装入其他世界的篮子,而是它们以差异辨别的方式(diacritically)相互包裹。
原初意见的原初视域,奠基了被知觉的光明世界的视域。必须记住,这个被知觉世界不是被知觉对象的世界,而是知觉经验的世界。每个知觉与其他知觉接壤,不断有待其他知觉修正,因此不断偏入那些幻象的私人世界。在知觉世界的空隙裂缝中,有幻象的补充世界;患者在那里经验魔法,而不是看到虚假的对象。注意,这不是说每次知觉都只具有概率或可能性,因为世界并非如此被经验。在自然生活中,我们不思考可能或概率,而只是确信知觉,并确信它们作为视域的不确定性。这不是试错、可能性与概率的科学世界,而是天真经验的世界。
结构于是清晰。我们有客观知觉世界的上层结构,在其中知觉对象;其下却是经验、视域、情动的世界。这个世界有许多裂缝、空隙、变式与短路,通常是丰富性与真实性较低的私人世界,却对患者身体图式的整体意向有首要意义。这些视域彼此融合,却不丧失区分。只有当奠基视域同时允许真与假,使它们在晦暗中相容时,这才可能:一组显象可以比另一组更有中心、更丰富得多(更“真实”),即便另一组对主体有压倒性的重要价值。在这种情况下,幻觉出现:一组显象以某种方式在真实世界中保持一致,抵抗被外部世界取消;外部世界虽丰富得多、与它不和谐,这些“虚假”显象却以某种方式值得保存。同样,我既不直接认定患者不讲理,也不居高临下地“设身处地”;我从自身所在出发,尝试以差异辨别的方式理解患者,展开对话,使一个中心不断被另一个重新定中心。
403–413
我们把另一个人认作另一个主体,并不是先辨认对方的客观身体看起来与自身客观身体相似,再说,既然自己的客观身体执行主观意识交付的任务,就在对方身体背后设定相同意识。事情不是这样运作的。知觉他人身体时,我不把她还原为赤裸对象;相反,她的身体已经是我场中的力量向量,已经立即使我去中心。她的行为流露出超越单纯现象世界的东西,总已经显得奇异。恰恰因为我的身体不是对象,我知觉的世界也不是静止画卷;它们已经是被视域包裹的视域。
414–424
先验主体性始终是在时间性中生成的主体间性。这些都是胡塞尔晚期手稿艰苦开拓出的根本洞见。现象学的目的,是把一切现象、本质、存在聚集进自由先验主体的逻各斯。这一主体是自我与他者之间的流。它不是作为普遍的“我们”的神,因为这位神只向有限主体在场,而作为神,其活动为我们所不可及:祂通过我思想,我却不能完全思想祂的思想。我不能与神重合,但神仍以某种方式在场。