Maurice Merleau-Ponty · 莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂
Phenomenology of Perception · 知觉现象学
Undated 未注日期
Phenomenology of Perception — Reading notes · Part III
Apple Notes
Revised 13 July 2025
427–441
Cogito is not a collection of psychical facts registered by a consciousness transparent to itself. As objects are always already only known by the subject if they are to be known at all, the Platonic theory of recollection is supposed. Yet this must be modified. Consciousness is not a source out of which knowledge is drawn; rather consciousness is ecstasy, it transcends itself.
In the case of perception, as was discussed, the Cartesian division between perception and the consciousness of perception is untenable. As perception is always already apperception, perception always implicates self-consciousness; but this apperception is also not fully present to itself, as the perceived nonetheless transcends beyond self-consciousness. Moreover, the act of perceiving depends on the actual perception: seeing is not disengaged from what is seen. Descartes mistakenly believes that “though what is seen is doubtful, seeing itself is not.” This is not how things are. Seeing itself becomes questionable when we don’t think we see the right thing. He also believes that though one might make the wrong judgement about what is seen, sensation doesn’t lie. Again, this is not how perception is structured. Sensation is not a bundle of sense data, but always consists in intentional acts.
Moreover, this holds for those more active psychological acts as well, such as love, desire, etc. One can always love falsely, not just regarding who is lovable, as one might love the wrong person or the wrong aspect of a person; but also because one does not fully understand about oneself. One can see something without knowing that he sees. Cogito is never transparent to itself: when one fully loves, one stops seeing love, as love has saturated everything and becomes everywhere and nowhere. Here one might believe one loves not, but is wrong about it. It all depends on what is the situation and horizon the said subject occupies, in relation to what other subject or what other aspect of the same subject.
An episode in my childhood might be reinterpreted in the future. But it has its own right as the past. It contends with the retrospect. The retrospect might impose its false interpretation, and thus change all life founded upon the meaning of that incident a false life. But the authentic life underneath might be recovered sometime again. Authenticity is to not play in different roles and situations half-heartedly or eclectically. It is to be finally centered and take root in one finite horizon in contention with other horizons.
441–453
Geometry is not an operation with formal essences. All the demonstrations about a triangle are not contained in its formal essence, since in the intuition of such a formal essence, one does not see the inherence of all following demonstrations, e.g. the sum of its interior angles is two right angles, but merely the foundation of a possible demonstration, whose possibility is only present in connection with all the other constellations of axioms, postulates, and other configurations of constructions that transcend its formal essence.
One might object that though one does not intuit those properties, one can certainly think it. But to think is always dependent upon intuition; thinking without intuition is nugatory. Moreover, a geometer starts formalizing only after the first intuitive leap to the demonstration. Therefore, it is indisputable that geometry is an existential practice that transcends from one configuration to another.
This way, it is no longer a mere science of the ideas. Rather, the body projects beyond the given shape to trace another constellation of possible spatial constructions and projects, preserving and transforming the original, the same way a melody line transforms the whole mood of music. This opens geometry up to the body and its self-expression. Language as the catching up between the expressive and the expressed, delivers us to the same structure of an acquisition: of taking up and appropriating a sense from the past but making it anew, in so doing transforming it into an inexhaustible source of creative projection. A quadratic equation is such a possession in culture that repeats itself again and again, acquiring ever new meanings; so is Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony. This is expression. And maths is not more real or eternal by kind than music is; though Fifth Symphony can be destroyed and forgotten, quadratic equations are also vulnerable, if less so and more prompt for being “recovered;” quadratic equations are also mutable in nature or reality, since our world is governed by norms and productive processes, not by iron-clad laws.
454–470
The interpretation of cogito. First, cogito does not hinge upon “doubting,” but a general “thinking” or “letting something appear.” That’s because doubting is still a mere mode of act, and though it is special, it is only indexing thinking as such. What doubt achieves is merely the clarification of what is implicit in every thought: the horizonal structure as such. Thus in every neutral thought there’s already that horizon of uncertainty, without needing to resort to doubt.
Then, what this opens up is the distance between the “I think” and the “I am.” What is meant is that, precisely the evidentness of “I think” opens up its ground of depth, the abyss of being. I think, but I am what I think, in the sense that my thinking is founded on the unreflected being, which is taken up by my thinking. This however is even more complicated. This corresponds to what Hegel says: each evidentness or certainty is but the reflected failure, the master signifier, so to speak. That is, all my reasons and understanding are founded upon the originary evidence, which evidence however is precisely the irrational immediacy that reflects the totality of reason in the shape of immediate madness.
This same distance is the distance between the tacit cogito and the expressed cogito, or, the enunciated and the enunciating. What’s special about consciousness is just the “apodictic evidence” of cogito, and one has to understand precisely what is this “certainty of vision that is affected but not destroyed by the uncertainty of the thing seen.” There’s always this evidence of the world and being that is taken up by consciousness, which is the originary evidence of the abyss. And this evidence is precisely that peculiar evidence of the self-knowing consciousness. It is not an evidence of a constituting subject, but the evidence of a subject’s constituting his own constitutedness. It is the evidence of being-in-the-world or being-in-a-situation. Here, we have the paradoxical identity: the subject’s self-certainty is precisely his transcendence and opaqueness (the living present always implicating itself as its past), while his opacity or thickness is again precisely what is his self-certainty (the past always implicating itself as the lived present).
471–496
Temporality as the basic structure of all horizons. Not much new is in this chapter than what is in Husserl. Past projects towards future and is pushed back by future, thus falling to the present, which again differentiates itself and becomes itself its own past. Either way, all three moments are overdeterminant and equally originary. So is subjectivity the same as temporality, which is the self-splitting of Being, and consciousness is united to being in this very abyss. Body as the in itself is the acquired past but also the inexhaustible future. Such is corporeality, temporality, subjectivity all in one.
496–512
Hegel. Conditioned freedom is freedom of a horizon situated in a horizon. The subject is fundamentally free, but is also free to encounter its own freedom as an obstacle, a horizon counteracting its own freedom. Sense and counter-sense.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
427–441
我思并不是由一个对自身透明的意识记录下来的一组心理事实。对象只要能够被认识,就总已经是被主体认识的,因此柏拉图的回忆说被预设了。但这一点必须有所修改。意识并不是知识从中流出的源头;相反,意识是绽出,是对自身的超越。
如前所述,就知觉而言,笛卡尔对知觉与知觉之意识的区分是无法成立的。知觉总已经是统觉,因此知觉总是内涵着自我意识;但这一统觉也并不完全向自身在场,因为被知觉者依然超出自我意识。此外,知觉的行动依赖于现实的知觉:看并不脱离所见。笛卡尔错误地相信,“虽然所见之物可以被怀疑,看本身却不可以。”事情并非如此。当我们不认为自己看到了正确的东西时,看本身也就成为可疑的。他还相信,虽然人可能对所见之物作出错误判断,感觉却不会说谎。但知觉的结构同样并非如此。感觉不是一束感觉材料,而总是由意向性行动构成的。
此外,这也适用于那些更为主动的心理行动,如爱、欲望等等。人总是可能错误地爱,这不仅关乎谁值得爱,比如爱错了人,或爱上了一个人的错误方面;也因为人并不完全理解自身。人可以看到某物,却不知道自己看到了。我思从不对自身透明:当人充分地爱时,他就不再看见爱,因为爱已经浸透一切,变得无处不在又无处可寻。这时,人或许相信自己并不爱,却在这一点上犯了错。一切都取决于所说的主体占据怎样的处境和视域,以及它与什么别的主体、或与同一主体的什么别的方面发生关系。
我童年的一个片段可能在未来得到重新解释。但它作为过去有着自己的正当性,与回溯相抗衡。回溯可能强加其错误诠释,从而让奠基于那一事件意义之上的整个生活变成虚假的生活。但其下本真的生活也可能在某个时候重新被找回。本真性不是三心二意地、或折衷地在不同角色与处境之间周旋,而是最终获得中心,在一个有限的视域中扎根,并与其它视域争执。
441–453
几何并不是对形式本质的操作。关于三角形的一切证明并不包含在它的形式本质中,因为在对这一形式本质的直观中,人看不到随后所有证明都内在于其中,例如其内角之和为两个直角;人看到的仅仅是一个可能证明的基础,而这一可能性只有在与所有其它公理、公设的星丛,以及超出其形式本质的其它构造配置的关联中才在场。
或许有人会反对,虽然不能直观这些性质,但当然可以思考它们。然而思考总是依赖于直观;没有直观的思考是空洞无效的。而且,几何学家只有在首次凭直观跃向证明之后,才开始进行形式化。因此,几何是一种从一个配置超越到另一个配置的生存实践,这一点无可争议。
这样,几何就不再仅仅是一门理念的科学。相反,身体超出被给予的形状进行投射,勾勒出另一组可能的空间构造与筹划的星丛,同时保存并转化原来的形状,正如一条旋律线改变整首音乐的情调。这向身体及其自我表达敞开了几何。语言作为表达者与被表达者之间的相互追赶,将我们带向同一种习得(acquisition)结构:接过并据有来自过去的意义,却又将其重新创制,并在这一过程中把它转化为创造性投射的无尽源泉。二次方程就是文化中的这样一种所有物,它一次又一次地重复自身,获得不断更新的意义;贝多芬第五交响曲也是如此。这就是表达。数学在种类上并不比音乐更实在或更永恒;虽然第五交响曲可以被毁掉、被遗忘,二次方程也同样脆弱,尽管程度较低,也更容易被“重新发现”。二次方程的本性或现实性也可以改变,因为支配我们的世界的是规范和生产过程,而非铁一般的法则。
454–470
对我思的诠释。首先,我思并不取决于“怀疑”,而是取决于一般的“思考”或“让某物显现”。这是因为怀疑仍然仅仅是一种行动样式,虽然特殊,却只是指示了思考本身。怀疑所成就的,仅仅是澄清每一次思考中都已隐含的东西:视域结构本身。因此,每一个中性的思想中都已经有着不确定性的视域,而无须诉诸怀疑。
由此开启的,是“我思”与“我在”之间的距离。其意涵是,恰恰是“我思”的明见性开启了它的深度之根基,即在的深渊。我思,但我就是我所思者,因为我的思考奠基于未经反思的在,而这在被我的思考接过。然而事情还要更复杂。这对应于黑格尔所说的:每一个明见性或确定性,都不过是被反思的失败,可以说,是主人能指。也就是说,我的一切理由与理解都奠基于原初的明见性;而这一明见性恰恰是那非理性的直接性,它以直接的疯狂之形态映照理性的总体。
这同一个距离,也是缄默的我思与被表达的我思之间的距离,或者说,所言与言说之间的距离。意识的特殊性,恰恰在于我思的“必然明见性(apodictic evidence)”;我们必须准确地理解,何为这种“受到所见之物的不确定性影响、却并不被其摧毁的视觉确定性”。总有一种世界与在的明见性被意识接过,这就是深渊的原初明见性。而这一明见性恰恰就是自知的意识所特有的明见性。它不是一个构成着的主体的明见性,而是一个主体构成自身之被构成性的明见性。它是在世存在或处境中存在的明见性。在这里,我们有了一个悖论式的同一:主体的自我确定性恰恰就是其超越性与不透明性,活的当下总是将自身内涵为自己的过去;而主体的不透明性或厚度又恰恰就是其自我确定性,过去总是将自身内涵为被生活的当下。
471–496
时间性是一切视域的基本结构。比起胡塞尔,这一章没有多少新的内容。过去向未来投射,又被未来推回,由此落入当下;而当下再次差异化自身,自己成为自己的过去。无论从哪一面看,这三个环节都是超定的,也都是同样本源的。主体性因此与时间性相同,而时间性就是在的自我分裂,意识恰恰在这一深渊中与在统一。身体作为自在,是已习得的过去,也是无尽的未来。身体性、时间性、主体性就这样合而为一。
496–512
黑格尔。受条件规定的自由,是一个处于视域中的视域的自由。主体在根本上是自由的,但也自由地将自身的自由遭遇为一个障碍,一个抵抗自身自由的视域。意义与反意义。