Gui Ruiyan

Maurice Merleau-Ponty · 莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂
Phenomenology of Perception · 知觉现象学

Undated 未注日期

Phenomenology of Perception — Reading notes · Part III

Apple Notes

Revised 13 July 2025

In this note / 篇目

427–441

Cogito is not a collection of psychical facts registered by a consciousness transparent to itself. As objects are always already only known by the subject if they are to be known at all, the Platonic theory of recollection is supposed. Yet this must be modified. Consciousness is not a source out of which knowledge is drawn; rather consciousness is ecstasy, it transcends itself.

In the case of perception, as was discussed, the Cartesian division between perception and the consciousness of perception is untenable. As perception is always already apperception, perception always implicates self-consciousness; but this apperception is also not fully present to itself, as the perceived nonetheless transcends beyond self-consciousness. Moreover, the act of perceiving depends on the actual perception: seeing is not disengaged from what is seen. Descartes mistakenly believes that “though what is seen is doubtful, seeing itself is not.” This is not how things are. Seeing itself becomes questionable when we don’t think we see the right thing. He also believes that though one might make the wrong judgement about what is seen, sensation doesn’t lie. Again, this is not how perception is structured. Sensation is not a bundle of sense data, but always consists in intentional acts.

Moreover, this holds for those more active psychological acts as well, such as love, desire, etc. One can always love falsely, not just regarding who is lovable, as one might love the wrong person or the wrong aspect of a person; but also because one does not fully understand about oneself. One can see something without knowing that he sees. Cogito is never transparent to itself: when one fully loves, one stops seeing love, as love has saturated everything and becomes everywhere and nowhere. Here one might believe one loves not, but is wrong about it. It all depends on what is the situation and horizon the said subject occupies, in relation to what other subject or what other aspect of the same subject.

An episode in my childhood might be reinterpreted in the future. But it has its own right as the past. It contends with the retrospect. The retrospect might impose its false interpretation, and thus change all life founded upon the meaning of that incident a false life. But the authentic life underneath might be recovered sometime again. Authenticity is to not play in different roles and situations half-heartedly or eclectically. It is to be finally centered and take root in one finite horizon in contention with other horizons.

441–453

Geometry is not an operation with formal essences. All the demonstrations about a triangle are not contained in its formal essence, since in the intuition of such a formal essence, one does not see the inherence of all following demonstrations, e.g. the sum of its interior angles is two right angles, but merely the foundation of a possible demonstration, whose possibility is only present in connection with all the other constellations of axioms, postulates, and other configurations of constructions that transcend its formal essence.

One might object that though one does not intuit those properties, one can certainly think it. But to think is always dependent upon intuition; thinking without intuition is nugatory. Moreover, a geometer starts formalizing only after the first intuitive leap to the demonstration. Therefore, it is indisputable that geometry is an existential practice that transcends from one configuration to another.

This way, it is no longer a mere science of the ideas. Rather, the body projects beyond the given shape to trace another constellation of possible spatial constructions and projects, preserving and transforming the original, the same way a melody line transforms the whole mood of music. This opens geometry up to the body and its self-expression. Language as the catching up between the expressive and the expressed, delivers us to the same structure of an acquisition: of taking up and appropriating a sense from the past but making it anew, in so doing transforming it into an inexhaustible source of creative projection. A quadratic equation is such a possession in culture that repeats itself again and again, acquiring ever new meanings; so is Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony. This is expression. And maths is not more real or eternal by kind than music is; though Fifth Symphony can be destroyed and forgotten, quadratic equations are also vulnerable, if less so and more prompt for being “recovered;” quadratic equations are also mutable in nature or reality, since our world is governed by norms and productive processes, not by iron-clad laws.

454–470

The interpretation of cogito. First, cogito does not hinge upon “doubting,” but a general “thinking” or “letting something appear.” That’s because doubting is still a mere mode of act, and though it is special, it is only indexing thinking as such. What doubt achieves is merely the clarification of what is implicit in every thought: the horizonal structure as such. Thus in every neutral thought there’s already that horizon of uncertainty, without needing to resort to doubt.

Then, what this opens up is the distance between the “I think” and the “I am.” What is meant is that, precisely the evidentness of “I think” opens up its ground of depth, the abyss of being. I think, but I am what I think, in the sense that my thinking is founded on the unreflected being, which is taken up by my thinking. This however is even more complicated. This corresponds to what Hegel says: each evidentness or certainty is but the reflected failure, the master signifier, so to speak. That is, all my reasons and understanding are founded upon the originary evidence, which evidence however is precisely the irrational immediacy that reflects the totality of reason in the shape of immediate madness.

This same distance is the distance between the tacit cogito and the expressed cogito, or, the enunciated and the enunciating. What’s special about consciousness is just the “apodictic evidence” of cogito, and one has to understand precisely what is this “certainty of vision that is affected but not destroyed by the uncertainty of the thing seen.” There’s always this evidence of the world and being that is taken up by consciousness, which is the originary evidence of the abyss. And this evidence is precisely that peculiar evidence of the self-knowing consciousness. It is not an evidence of a constituting subject, but the evidence of a subject’s constituting his own constitutedness. It is the evidence of being-in-the-world or being-in-a-situation. Here, we have the paradoxical identity: the subject’s self-certainty is precisely his transcendence and opaqueness (the living present always implicating itself as its past), while his opacity or thickness is again precisely what is his self-certainty (the past always implicating itself as the lived present).

471–496

Temporality as the basic structure of all horizons. Not much new is in this chapter than what is in Husserl. Past projects towards future and is pushed back by future, thus falling to the present, which again differentiates itself and becomes itself its own past. Either way, all three moments are overdeterminant and equally originary. So is subjectivity the same as temporality, which is the self-splitting of Being, and consciousness is united to being in this very abyss. Body as the in itself is the acquired past but also the inexhaustible future. Such is corporeality, temporality, subjectivity all in one.

496–512

Hegel. Conditioned freedom is freedom of a horizon situated in a horizon. The subject is fundamentally free, but is also free to encounter its own freedom as an obstacle, a horizon counteracting its own freedom. Sense and counter-sense.